• Global
    The World Next Week: April 21, 2016
    Podcast
    Presidential candidates in the Philippines hold a final debate, the thirtieth anniversary of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster is observed, and Ireland marks the centennial of the Easter Rising.
  • Digital Policy
    Do Local Laws Belong In a Global Cloud? Q&A with Brad Smith of Microsoft (Part Two)
    This is the second part of my Q&A with Microsoft Executive Vice President and General Counsel Brad Smith over the company’s legal battle with the U.S. Department of Justice over e-mails stored in Ireland. The case raises important questions with respect to the privacy of digital communications and the future of cloud computing. For those who missed it, part one can be found here. Question: According to the U.S. government in its filings, Microsoft has not objected to handing over data stored on foreign servers to federal investigators serving warrants pursuant to the Stored Communications Act (SCA) and Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) in the past. What makes this case different? Answer: What led to this case is a rise in the storage of content around the world. A few years ago, we started building data centers in many countries because keeping people’s content close to them helps ensure they can access it quickly and smoothly. So it’s fairly recent that the concept of a U.S. warrant for content in a datacenter abroad—like the one in this case—was even conceivable. Looking beyond the technological change, we think it’s important that we be transparent about government requests we receive and how we respond to them. We produce a global report here and, through a separate lawsuit we filed against the U.S. government, we’re now able to report specifically on U.S. national security orders and publish those here. Q: Microsoft has argued that it cannot turn over user e-mails to the government because the user owns those e-mails. Yet a long series of court precedents going back more than forty years say that even custodians of a third party’s records-both physical and electronic-must hand those records over to federal investigators serving a valid warrant. Why isn’t this true here? A: This is a critical question and hits at the heart of the legal case. The warrant in our case isn’t for business records such as a record of banking transactions, a hotel bill, or a list of phone numbers that were called. Rather it’s for the content of personal communications, in this case e-mails. The courts have long recognized the distinction between business records and the content of personal communications. And not surprisingly, they have held that the contents of personal communications are entitled to a higher level of legal protection. In our case the U.S. government is arguing that a customer’s e-mail becomes a cloud operator’s business records and hence the government can obtain it more easily. This is fundamentally at odds with traditional respect for privacy and limitations on government powers. For over two centuries the courts have held that the contents of a letter don’t become a business record of the U.S. Postal Service when they’re sent through the mail. They remain personal communications that are entitled to a higher level of legal protection. If our longstanding privacy rights are going to remain intact in the 21st century, we need this legal approach to make the transition effectively from traditional mail to modern e-mail. Q: According to the U.S. government’s brief, Microsoft has not produced any evidence that Microsoft would violate Irish or EU law by complying with the U.S. warrant in this case. Further, the U.S. government argues that Irish law contains similar powers for the Irish government to compel the production of records located outside Ireland by a company subject to Irish jurisdiction. How does Microsoft answer these arguments? A: In fact, multiple EU officials have raised the prospect that compliance with the warrant would violate EU law. They haven’t yet announced a final position, and we think it’s worth hearing them out. And it’s also important to acknowledge the point made in a declaration from the former Attorney General of Ireland who was involved in negotiating the MLAT with the United States. His declaration says this type of situation is exactly why they negotiated the MLAT. Ultimately, however, the question here is not about Irish or European law but about U.S. law. This is a law enacted by Congress. There is no reason to believe that Congress intended it to apply outside the United States. If law enforcement wants authority to apply search warrants outside of our own borders, it should go to Congress to seek that approval. We in fact have proposed to Congress what we believe would be a sensible approach that would give law enforcement this unilateral authority when e-mails belong to an American citizen or resident. But it would require the use and strengthening of international legal processes when e-mails belong to someone else. This is the type of approach that we believe American citizens could accept when the shoe is on the other foot, so to speak. It would strike the right balance between privacy and public safety. No doubt there are opportunities to make improvements to the legislation that is being considered.  But that will happen only if everyone starts to work on a legislative approach. And after almost two years of litigation, I think it’s fair to say that everyone will come to the table only if we win this case.
  • Digital Policy
    Do Local Laws Belong In a Global Cloud? Q&A with Brad Smith of Microsoft (Part One)
    In December 2013, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) served Microsoft with a warrant requiring the company to hand over the e-mails of a Microsoft customer suspected of drug trafficking. Microsoft refused to turn over the e-mails on the basis that they are stored in servers at a data center in Ireland and that the warrant did not apply to overseas data. Instead, Microsoft argued the DOJ should work with Irish authorities to obtain access to the data. In July 2014, a U.S. district court ordered Microsoft to turn over the e-mails, but Microsoft appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, which will hear arguments on September 9. In light of the significance of this case for U.S. consumers and businesses, and the impact that its outcome could have on the privacy of digital communications, Brad Smith, executive vice president and general counsel for Microsoft, took the time to answer some questions regarding the case and what its outcome might mean. We’ve split our interview with Brad into two posts, with today’s post looking at the policy side of things. Legal issues related to the case will be featured in a post tomorrow. Question: It’s obvious why foreign citizens have a stake in the outcome of this case: the privacy of their data is in question. Why should a U.S. citizen, whose data is stored only on servers located in the United States, care? Answer: At the broadest level, this issue is about the future of technology. We need to ensure that people can trust the technology on their desks and in their pockets. And this trust will only come if the laws are clear. There are other immediate reasons too, and perhaps the most powerful is public safety and national security. If the U.S. government is permitted to serve warrants on tech companies in the United States and obtain people’s e-mails in any country, it will open the floodgate for other countries to serve warrants on tech companies for the private communications of American citizens that are stored in the United States in a data center owned by a foreign company. Imagine the immediate implications for journalists, advocacy organizations, or government officials here. Q: If you win this litigation, it could be argued that the United States will have less authority than other states to pursue national security and law enforcement investigations across borders. Does greater privacy protection necessarily equal fewer powers for national security investigations?  A: We need to balance both privacy and national security, and we believe that can be achieved. In the first instance, we believe that the U.S. government should use effectively the international legal tools that exist today. When the French government confronted the horrendous attack on Charlie Hebdo, it routed a request through the U.S. government, and Microsoft provided the e-mail content within forty-five minutes—legally. There exists a good treaty between the U.S and Irish governments that could be used to access the e-mail that is located in Ireland and is the subject of this case. All of the testimony in the lawsuit in fact indicates that this provides an effective mechanism for law enforcement purposes. But there are additional alternatives as well. For example, if law enforcement needs more tools than Congress has provided, then we should all turn to Congress to change the law. That in fact is what Microsoft has done by advocating for the LEADS Act in Congress. This would give U.S. law enforcement the ability to obtain e-mail content located outside the United States unilaterally when the content belongs to a U.S. citizen or resident. But it would require the U.S. government to go through international mechanisms when the e-mail belongs to a foreigner who is outside the United States. We think that’s a sensible way to draw a line that will assist law enforcement and also respect international borders. Finally, there’s a clear need and opportunity to create new international legal rules and processes.  We’ve been making concrete suggestions in this area, too. Ultimately there are clear areas for improvement, but they will come only if everyone focuses on advancing them. And that starts with winning our case and putting all of us on a path that will focus on the changes that are needed. Q:What if you lose the litigation? What are the technological and legal consequences for Microsoft and others? A: As we’ve made clear since we filed this case, we’ll certainly do our best to take it all the way to the Supreme Court if that’s what is needed. The case raises important questions about the future of the Internet, privacy, respect for borders, and public safety. When we took on this case, we did so not only with an eye on our own needs, but a much broader set of interests. That is reflected in what I think is an extraordinary set of amicus briefs filed in support of our position, coming from twenty-eight technology and media companies, twenty-three trade associations and advocacy groups, thirty-five leading computer scientists, and the Government of Ireland itself. That captures a bit of what is at stake here. Q: When the laws governing access to electronic communications were passed in 1986, it was inconceivable that an individual might want to (or even have the capacity to) store large amounts of data on a remote server. Do you think Congress should modernize the law to avoid disputes such as these in the future? A: In the first instance, we think Congress’ intent was clear and this warrant was meant to be domestic like other warrants. There’s simply no indication that Congress intended to give the Executive Branch the legal authority to reach unilaterally into other countries. This scenario wasn’t even discussed. But looking beyond that, you’re absolutely right, there’s no way Congress could have known about cloud computing in 1986. The LEADS Act is one example of legislation that would carry Congress’ original intent into the Internet age by updating the law. Q: What about other governments?  Are you seeing EU or other sovereign governments putting forward solutions that could resolve these types of conflicts between sovereign nations? A: It’s already public that the United States and EU are discussing these issues, and there’s a foundation in place for the two to forge new trans-Atlantic legal rules that will better enable law enforcement, with appropriate safeguards, to obtain information needed for lawful investigations across borders. I also think there’s work many governments can do to modernize Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties, or MLATs, including by standardizing the terms and moving to electronic systems to process them.
  • Europe and Eurasia
    Greece Fallout: Italy and Spain Have Funded a Massive Backdoor Bailout of French Banks
    In March 2010, two months before the announcement of the first Greek bailout, European banks had €134 billion worth of claims on Greece.  French banks, as shown in the right-hand figure above, had by far the largest exposure: €52 billion – this was 1.6 times that of Germany, eleven times that of Italy, and sixty-two times that of Spain. The €110 billion of loans provided to Greece by the IMF and Eurozone in May 2010 enabled Greece to avoid default on its obligations to these banks.  In the absence of such loans, France would have been forced into a massive bailout of its banking system.  Instead, French banks were able virtually to eliminate their exposure to Greece by selling bonds, allowing bonds to mature, and taking partial write-offs in 2012.  The bailout effectively mutualized much of their exposure within the Eurozone. The impact of this backdoor bailout of French banks is being felt now, with Greece on the precipice of an historic default.  Whereas in March 2010 about 40% of total European lending to Greece was via French banks, today only 0.6% is.  Governments have filled the breach, but not in proportion to their banks’ exposure in 2010.  Rather, it is in proportion to their paid-up capital at the ECB – which in France’s case is only 20%. In consequence, France has actually managed to reduce its total Greek exposure – sovereign and bank – by €8 billion, as seen in the main figure above.  In contrast, Italy, which had virtually no exposure to Greece in 2010 now has a massive one: €39 billion.  Total German exposure is up by a similar amount – €35 billion.  Spain has also seen its exposure rocket from nearly nothing in 2009 to €25 billion today. In short, France has managed to use the Greek bailout to offload €8 billion in junk debt onto its neighbors and burden them with tens of billions more in debt they could have avoided had Greece simply been allowed to default in 2010.  The upshot is that Italy and Spain are much closer to financial crisis today than they should be.   Follow Benn on Twitter: @BennSteil Follow Geo-Graphics on Twitter: @CFR_GeoGraphics Read about Benn’s latest award-winning book, The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a New World Order, which the Financial Times has called “a triumph of economic and diplomatic history.”
  • Europe and Eurasia
    A Full Greek IMF-Debt Default Would Be Four Times All Previous Defaults Combined
    Since the IMF’s launch in 1946, 27 countries have had overdue financial obligations of 6 months or more.*  But the amounts involved have always been small, never exceeding SDR 1bn ($1.4bn). This could all change dramatically with Greece, which will default on the SDR 1.2bn ($1.7bn) it owes the Fund next week unless its troika creditors agree to extend further financial assistance before then.  Greece owes the IMF SDR 4.4bn ($6.2bn) through the end of this year and SDR 18.5bn ($26bn) over the coming ten years.  As shown in the graphic above, this is nearly four times the cumulative total of overdue funds in the IMF’s history. Although Greek prime minister Alexis Tsipras has blasted the Fund for “pillaging” Greece, the conditions it has imposed on the country have been mild by historical standards – particularly considering the size of the loans involved.  Non-payment by a European state will surely undermine the IMF’s credibility in the eyes of developing countries, and likely accelerate efforts to build alternative institutions. Next up: Ukraine . . . * “Defaults” in the post title are defined as financial obligations overdue by six months of more, or what the IMF refers to as “protracted arrears.”   Follow Benn on Twitter: @BennSteil Follow Geo-Graphics on Twitter: @CFR_GeoGraphics Read about Benn’s latest award-winning book, The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a New World Order, which the Financial Times has called “a triumph of economic and diplomatic history.”
  • Europe and Eurasia
    Greece-Troika Gap Over Primary Surpluses Has Shrunk Dramatically
    Greece has announced that it will not pay the IMF the €300 million due to the Fund on June 5.  Instead, it will “bundle” the payments due to the Fund over the course of June into one payment of about €1.7 billion that it will make at the end of the month.  This contradicts earlier pledges that it would not resort to bundling.  The only country ever to have done so is Zambia, three decades ago. While the dramatic move suggests that Athens is seriously contemplating outright default, we think such a move, at this point, borders on insanity.  This is because the gap between the parties over the main issue between them, the size of the primary budget surplus (the excess of revenues over expenditures, excluding interest payments) Greece will have to achieve in the coming years is now very small relative to what it was a year ago - as shown in the figure above.  In contrast, the cost of a Greek default is likely to be a complete cut-off in ECB liquidity support that will crush the Greek banking system and, also likely, force the country out of the Eurozone. Then again, Greece has always had an affinity for tragedies.   Follow Benn on Twitter: @BennSteil Follow Geo-Graphics on Twitter: @CFR_GeoGraphics Read about Benn’s latest award-winning book, The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a New World Order, which the Financial Times has called “a triumph of economic and diplomatic history.”
  • Global
    The World Next Week: May 21, 2015
    Podcast
    The UN Security Council discusses sanctions against North Korea, Ireland holds a referendum on same-sex marriages and a reporter detained in Iran goes on trial.
  • Global
    The World Next Week: May 14, 2015
    Podcast
    The UN World Health Assembly meets in Geneva; the UN Security Council debates Yemen; and Prince Charles visits Ireland.
  • Europe and Eurasia
    The ECB Fails to Stress Banks Over the One Critical Variable It Controls: Inflation
    Relentlessly falling inflation is bad news for Eurozone banks.  It increases the real (inflation-adjusted) value of borrower debt and the real cost of servicing that debt.  It causes loan defaults, and therefore bank loan losses, to rise. So with Eurozone inflation, currently at a near-record low of 0.4%, clearly at risk of heading into deflationary territory, what did the ECB say was the “adverse scenario” for this year?  Inflation of 1% – more than twice its current level.  This is indefensible; the ECB’s dire scenario for this year is actually much cheerier than the IMF’s baseline forecast, which pegs inflation at 0.5%.  The country-by-country comparison is shown in the graphic above. Disturbingly, at no point through the end of 2016 is the ECB even willing to contemplate the possibility of inflation being less than it already was in September: 0.3%.  This is a serious failure on the part of the central bank, which this month assumes supervisory responsibility for Eurozone banks.  It suggests that the ECB is more concerned with the reputational costs of acknowledging the possibility of deflation than with testing accurately the ability of banks to withstand it.  As the private sector is not privy to the proprietary bank data that would allow such a proper test, the ECB’s failure to address deflation risks raises the critical unanswerable question of how many of the seven banks that barely passed should actually have failed. Buiter: Four Rescue Measures for Stagnant Eurozone Evans-Pritchard: ECB Stress Tests Vastly Understate Risk of Deflation and Leverage Legrain: Yet Another Eurozone Bank Whitewash Financial Times: Bank Stress Tests Fail to Tackle Deflation Spectre Steil and Walker: Restoring Financial Stability in the Eurozone   Follow Benn on Twitter: @BennSteil Follow Geo-Graphics on Twitter: @CFR_GeoGraphics Read about Benn’s latest award-winning book, The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a New World Order, which the Financial Times has called “a triumph of economic and diplomatic history.”
  • Europe and Eurasia
    Mr. Draghi, Tear Down These Rates!
    ECB President Mario Draghi was able to stabilize Eurozone nominal lending rates, which had been climbing dangerously in the periphery countries, with his famous do “whatever it takes” speech in July 2012.  Real (inflation-adjusted) lending rates for nonfinancial businesses, however, have risen steadily since then; in Spain, they are back up to their 2009 euro-era peak, as the right-hand figure in today’s Geo-Graphic shows. Draghi recently characterized deflation, or rather “internal devaluation,” in the crisis-hit periphery countries as “crucial adjustments vis-à-vis other euro area countries” – adjustments which “have to take place irrespective of changes in the external value of the euro,” which have been substantial (upward) over the past two years.  In the same speech he said that low private lending levels in such countries were unsurprising because of “weak credit demand,” which “in the early stages of an economic recovery is not unusual.” He acknowledged, however, that “targeted measures” could be necessary “to help alleviate credit constraints” if such constraints “impair the effects of our intended monetary stance.” We would suggest that he’s got things backwards.  With inflation having fallen to 0.5% in May, it is the monetary stance itself that is constraining credit demand by pushing down inflation expectations and pushing up the real cost of credit. Draghi should forget about “targeted measures,” and instead take broad, bold action to boost inflation expectations and tear down the wall of credit costs holding back the recovery. Wall Street Journal: Eurozone Inflation Slows, Jobless Rate Falls Financial Times: Eurozone Inflation Falls to 0.5% Economist: Draghi Spells It Out Bloomberg: Euro Inflation Slowing More Than Forecast Pressures ECB   Follow Benn on Twitter: @BennSteil Follow Geo-Graphics on Twitter: @CFR_GeoGraphics Read about Benn’s latest award-winning book, The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a New World Order, which the Financial Times has called “a triumph of economic and diplomatic history.”
  • Europe and Eurasia
    Should the ECB Go on a Bund Buying Spree?
    Should the European Central Bank finally join the Fed, the Bank of England, and the Bank of Japan and deliver a good, stiff dose of Quantitative Easing? Maybe, came the surprise response from the hawkish Bundesbank president on March 25.  But “any private or public assets that we might buy,” Jens Weidmann warned, “would have to meet certain quality standards.” That’s a big but, as the quality of Eurozone assets has deteriorated markedly since 2009.  In fact, as today’s Geo-Graphic shows, if the ECB were to limit its asset purchases to the universe of AAA-rated Eurozone sovereign debt and securitized assets a whopping 80% of the total available would be German Bunds. But would a Eurozone QE program focused on gobbling up Bunds be such a bad idea?  We don’t think so. First, it might actually play a useful role in helping to eliminate structural imbalances within the Eurozone by pushing up German prices and wages disproportionately.  “While buying Greek or Portuguese paper could help tame deflation there,” an unnamed Eurosystem official recently told Reuters, “the falling consumer prices in these countries were part of a natural adjustment of their economies to become more competitive, and were actually welcome.” Second, through the so-called portfolio-balance effect the prices of other Eurozone assets will also be pushed up (and their yields down) as Eurozone banks replace the Bunds they sell to the ECB with other securities.  The Fed’s purchases of Treasurys and MBS most surely boosted asset prices across the spectrum in the United States (and abroad – just ask the ever-voluble Brazilian finance minister); the effect should be similarly broad in Europe. Finally, if a AAA focus for Eurozone QE were the price of getting Germany on board politically, it would be a small price to pay. Mario Draghi’s 2012 pledge to do “whatever it takes” remains in the background should he ultimately feel the need to operationalize OMT (Outright Monetary Transactions) and push down sovereign yields in Spain, Portugal, Italy, or elsewhere. Financial Times: ECB Policymakers Plot QE Road Map Bernanke: Monetary Policy Since the Onset of the Crisis The Economist: Turning Over a New Leaf? Bloomberg: Weidmann, Citing QE Legitimacy, Paves Way for ECB Consensus   Follow Benn on Twitter: @BennSteil Follow Geo-Graphics on Twitter: @CFR_GeoGraphics Read about Benn’s latest award-winning book, The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a New World Order, which the Financial Times has called “a triumph of economic and diplomatic history.”
  • Global
    The World Next Week: March 13, 2014
    Podcast
    Crimea faces a vote over secession from Ukraine; Iran marks its New Year and resumes nuclear talks; and Irish prime minister Enda Kenny visits Washington, DC.
  • Ireland
    The Northern Ireland Peace Process Today
    In his testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs' Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations and Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats, Richard N. Haass discusses his role as the chair of the Panel of parties in the Northern Ireland Executive and the remit of forging consensus on the use of flags and emblems; the regulation of parades, commemorations, and attendant protests; and contending with the past.
  • Europe and Eurasia
    ECB Rate Cut a No-Brainer; Also, for Many, a No-Gainer
    Back in April, we showed that the eurozone countries most in need of lower corporate borrowing rates benefited only marginally from ECB rate cuts. Today’s Geo-Graphic shows that little has changed in this regard; the financial crisis has clearly done serious and lasting damage to the monetary transmission mechanism in Europe – particularly as it affects Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Italy. In April we also showed that the GDP-weighted inflation rate of the countries where the monetary transmission mechanism was working normally – Austria, Finland, France, Germany, and the Netherlands – was 1.8%, right near the ECB’s target of just-below 2%. Thus, the countries that most needed lower borrowing rates needed much more than an ECB rate cut to boost business lending, whereas those where business lending was responsive to ECB rate cuts were not clearly in need of one – at least according to the ECB’s inflation criterion. Inflation in the strong countries, however, has declined significantly since then – it now stands at a GDP-weighted 1.5%. This means that a rate cut at the ECB’s November 7 governing council meeting should be a no-brainer. Sadly, our Geo-Graphic suggests it will also be a no-gainer; the ECB will have to take far more aggressive action to prod business lending in the worst-hit crisis states. Financial Times: ECB Weighs Up Options Amid Concerns Over Falling Prices Bloomberg News: Draghi Weighs Whether Rate Cuts Too Valuable as ECB Meets Wall Street Journal: A Call to Arms for the ECB The Economist: Waiting for the Cut   Follow Benn on Twitter: @BennSteil Follow Geo-Graphics on Twitter: @CFR_GeoGraphics Read about Benn’s latest award-winning book, The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a New World Order, which the Financial Times has called “a triumph of economic and diplomatic history.”
  • Europe and Eurasia
    Will Portugal Bring Down the Spanish Banking Sector?
    In its recent evaluation of the Greek bailout program, the IMF revealed that the euro area leadership sought to delay a Greek sovereign debt restructuring back in 2010 because of contagion fears; that is, Greece’s creditors might get sucked into the bailout vortex. Among eurozone national banking systems, France had the largest exposure. At its peak in the second quarter of 2008, France’s exposure to Greece totaled $86 billion. That exposure has since plummeted, partly because French banks took advantage of the ECB’s Securities Market Programme (SMP) during 2010-11 to fob off Greek bonds, effectively forcing a eurozone mutualization of the debt. SMP was terminated in September 2012. What is much less widely known is that Spanish bank exposure to Portugal today, as shown in our Geo-Graphic, is higher than French bank exposure to Greece in early 2010, despite the fact that the Spanish banking sector is only 40% the size of the French. Spanish bank stress tests in 2012 suggested that the capital hole was more manageable than widely feared, but those tests looked only at the domestic lending books; foreign assets were excluded. A restructuring of Portuguese sovereign debt similar to the one completed by Greece, which involved haircuts of over 50%, could wreak havoc on Spain’s banking system. Yet delaying restructuring, as Greece is showing, may simply drag down Portugal—whose debt-to-GDP ratio is expected to approach 125% next year—faster and further, worsening creditor losses. Without an SMP to mutualize Spanish bank exposure to Portugal, the way it mutualized French bank exposure to Greece, delaying a Portuguese restructuring will also do nothing to help Spain weather the shock. The euro area has already lent Spain €41.3 billion to recapitalize its banks, but finding a politically palatable way to convert that debt into mutualized eurozone equity may be a necessary cost of sustaining the European single currency. Oliver Wyman: Spain Stress Test Financial Times: Portugal’s Political Turmoil Risks Debt Restructure IMF: Ex Post Evaluation of Exceptional Access Under the 2010 Stand-By Arrangement on Greece Ecofin: Financial Stability Support Package for Spain   Follow Benn on Twitter: @BennSteil Follow Geo-Graphics on Twitter: @CFR_GeoGraphics