Energy and Environment

Climate Change

  • Climate Change
    Solar Reflection and Reducing Climate Risk
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    Stewart M. Patrick, the James H. Binger senior fellow in global governance and director of the International Institutions and Global Governance Program at CFR, explains climate intervention techniques including sunlight reflection and discusses the potential risks and benefits of their use in mitigating global temperature rise. Carla Anne Robbins, CFR adjunct senior fellow and former New York Times deputy editorial page editor, will hosts the webinar and helps frame stories about climate change and adaptation for local audiences. TRANSCRIPT FASKIANOS: Welcome to the Council on Foreign Relations Local Journalists Webinar Series. I’m Irina Faskianos, vice president for the National Program and Outreach here at CFR. CFR is an independent and nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, publisher, and educational research institution focusing on U.S. foreign policy. CFR is also the publisher of Foreign Affairs magazine. As always, CFR takes no institutional positions of matters of policy. This webinar is part of CFR’s Local Journalists Initiative, created to help you draw connections between the local issues you cover and national and international dynamics. We are putting you in touch with CFR resources and expertise on international issues and providing a forum for sharing best practices. So with that, thank you all for joining us. The webinar is on the record. We will post a video and transcript after the fact. So today we will discuss a new Council special report entitled Reflecting Sunlight to Reduce Climate Risk with the author and our speaker Stewart Patrick and host Carla Anne Robbins. We shared the report with you, so you have that all in your hands. Let me just read a few highlights of our distinguished speakers’ bios. Stewart Patrick is the James H. Binger Senior Fellow in Global Governance and director of the International Institutions and Global Governance Program at CFR. He previously served on former Secretary of State Colin Powell’s policy planning staff for a range of global and transitional issues including refugees and migration, international law enforcement, and global health affairs. He’s the author, co-author or editor of five books, including The Sovereignty Wars: Reconciling America with the World, and Weak Links: Fragile States, Global Threats, and International Security. And he also writes a CFR blog, The Internationalist. Carla Anne Robbins is an adjunct senior fellow at CFR. She is faculty director of the Master of International Affairs Program and clinical professor of national security studies at Baruch College’s Marxe School of Public and International Affairs. And previously she was deputy editorial page editor at the New York Times, and chief diplomatic correspondent at the Wall Street Journal. So thank you, Stewart and Carla, for being with us today. We’re going to turn it over to Carla to have a conversation with you. And then we’re going to open it up to all of you on the call for your questions and comments—either by raising your hand or by writing in the Q&A box. So, Carla, over to you. ROBBINS: Thanks so much, Irina. And thanks so much, Stewart. It’s so great to see you. I was saying before that the last time I saw Stewart was actually in person at an event. We were in Paris. Although, it was incredibly hot. And we were reminded—because I think it was in June—we were reminded, climate change even then was just unbearably hot. (Laughs.) But at least it’s a cool day today. So maybe Donald Trump was right. It gets cool in the end of May, maybe there’s no climate change. OK, that’s all the climate denial we’re going to get for today. So I’m not a science reporter, but I am an editor, at least in my last iteration, of business. So at least part of the conversation today I hope will focus on how we can shape these—this incredibly important topic into accessible stories for our readers. Many of you are regulars. You know, the drill. We’re going to chat here. And we hope that you guys are going to have really great questions and comments about this because, you know, I am a science fiction reader, and there’s a lot of science fiction at work here, OK? (Laughs.) So let’s start. Martin Amis said that the Cold War arms race was a race between nuclear weapons and ourselves. And climate change feels much the same, and definitely that we are losing at this point. So can you start for us, you know, with a very quick summary of this idea on solar reflection? It sounds pretty science fiction-y to me. You’re muted. PATRICK: There we go. Sorry. Yeah. I have to say that when I first—when this idea first came up, I thought it sounded a little crazy. It sounds sort of dystopian as well because it seems, you know, messing with—interfering with the Earth system, right? Sort of your hand on the thermostat that basically determines, you know, what the nature of nature is and how—you know, what the global environment is like. But I guess the more I started looking into it, the more I was interested in the fact that some of what’s being proposed has natural analogs, and also that it’s not as if we live in the best of all possible worlds right now. We are, in fact, already running perhaps unintentionally or unwittingly quite a massive experiment, certainly the largest that humanity has ever run, by continuing to pump greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. So we need to compare what we’re going to be talking about, not against some perfect world but against this very, very fraught world and dangerous world that we’re entering. Basically, the idea of sunlight reflection has been around since about the 1960s or so. The idea is that if you could—at a very, very modest scale—increase the reflectivity of the Earth to incoming sunlight, you could actually then reduce its heating impact on accumulated greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. We all know that since this started, the industrial revolution, average global temperatures, surface temperatures, have increased about 1.1 degrees Celsius. And they’re on their way to get much, much hotter. In Paris in 2015, U.N. member states agreed that they would try to hold temperatures to well below 2 degrees Celsius increase from pre-industrial age, and ideally no higher than 1.5 degrees Celsius. But right now we’re on track basically to blow by that, probably towards 3 degrees Celsius at least during the course of this century. And these are sort of massive—that would be a massive impact. The idea of sunlight reflection, there are a number of different ways you could do it, in principle. But in putting—even putting space mirrors up, as Elon Musk and others have suggested, to try to reflect sunlight back into space from orbit. But the two most promising strategies—and both of them mimic natural processes—one of them is called stratospheric aerosol injection, which, again, sounds kind of creepy. But it’s basically the idea of dispersing from balloons or aircraft sulfates, or calcites, or some other material into the stratosphere. So both where planes fly—would normally fly. And it basically would do something like what volcanic eruptions do. Some of—some of the journalists may be old enough to remember Mount Pinatubo. And when it exploded in the Philippines in 1991 it sent huge quantities of ash, including sulfates, into the atmosphere. And in addition to creating spectacular sunsets over the next year, it actually—over the next year or fifteen months—it actually reduced global temperatures a half a degree Celsius, or 1.1 degrees Fahrenheit. Which is quite remarkable. And then those eventually fell out of the sky and you sort of returned to the sort of normal pace of things. The other way of accomplishing this is called marine cloud brightening. And that would involve creating sort of specialized nozzles and putting them on boats or ocean platforms and spraying—basically, just lofting sea salt particles, just sea salt, several hundred feet into the lower atmosphere, the troposphere. And then something called boundary layer convection would have that go up into the clouds, and it actually brightens marine clouds. And you would have to have certainly several hundred of these vessels or platforms around the world doing this. And there are some—there are some calculations that suggest this could be done remarkably cheaply. That you could, for between $10 and perhaps $10 billion a year, which is pretty cheap for somebody even like Elon Musk, you could basically just for that expense, with planes continuously flying for stratospheric aerosol injection, you could actually stabilize or even begin to reduce global temperatures, even as greenhouse gases continues to build up. And so it could be hugely high leverage, relatively low cost, and rather effective. Now, again, this is not—by no means is this a cure for climate change. The logic behind it is that we currently have three—basically three tools that we use for managing global climate risk. The first one is emissions reductions, right? We’re trying to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. And we’re supposed to halve them, cut them in half, by 2030. But in fact, we’re on pace to go up by 16.3 percent by 2030. The second thing is carbon removal, right? We want to suck that carbon out of the atmosphere. And you can do that through nature-based solutions—you know, growing a bunch of seaweed or planting trees. But you can also do it by creating negative emissions technologies—carbon capture and storage. And there’s—it’s really promising, but it’s going to take decades for either of those things to go to scale. And then the third tools we have to deal with climate change is adaptation, right? We build resilience. We build seawalls. We try to reduce the heat effect of cities. We try to do drought-resistant agriculture. All those things are enormously important, but they’re basically about trying to make things a little bit less awful. What his technique would do, at least in theory, is to shave the peak, as they call it, of global warming, so you don’t get this catastrophic heating that you got, for instance, in India recently. You basically could limit heating. It does nothing about greenhouse gas concentrations. It does nothing about ocean acidification. But at least it could be some way of trying to, again, buy time during this timing crunch that we have as we try to go towards decarbonization. ROBBINS: Oh, OK. So, you know, it’s interesting, you were talking about people who are—who are old enough on this to remember something from 1991—(inaudible)—showing. But, you know, I show my students this wonderful video that Vox did just six or seven years ago that tracks sort of the change in political attitudes in the United States towards climate change, and how actually there was a time when Republicans embraced climate change, including Newt Gingrich. But one of the things that’s so interesting to remember is how reasonably recent, you know, the statements, you know, that 95 percent of scientists, you know, in the IPCC accepted the notion that climate change was manmade and that it was pretty damn serious. And that’s not a very long time ago, about fifteen years or so. So something like this, which sounds, as I said, so fantastic—and I don’t mean positively fantastic, but as in fantasy—you know, is this a sort of an outlier thing? Or are there really serious scientists who are saying we have to take a really hard look at it? And if there are really serious scientists, you know, are they a small percentage of them? Or is it moving more toward the mainstream? And has the IPCC talked about it? You know, the big, main epicenter community? I mean, where is this? Where is this? Are you an outlier? PATRICK: Yeah, no, I mean, I think—I mean, it’s interesting. It’s both still an outlier topic, and yet there are many, many scientists, climate scientists, increasingly who embrace it. It remains highly controversial. The notion of sunlight reflection—and I should say, that is, in a sense—some people say, well, you’re just using a euphemism. I find it more accurate. And the National Academy of Science, they have a big report on this advocating for more research on it too, and better governance, last year. They also called it sunlight reflection and reflecting sunlight. It’s also known as solar geoengineering, solar climate intervention, solar radiation modification. There’s a bunch of different terms. And it is highly controversial because there are a number of potential unintended consequences that could result, that we can talk about. There are also in particular— ROBBINS: Like blotting out the sun? PATRICK: Say it again? ROBBINS: You mean, like blotting—like blotting out the sun? PATRICK: Right, blotting out the sun, right. (Laughs.) Exactly. Well, it’s—yeah. I mean, basically, you know, it’s—as I said, it would be a very, very small percentage of sunlight that would be in the sense of the sun being dimmed. It would probably not in most cases be really appreciable. It would probably be 1 percent of incoming solar radiation. But there are questions about what will—what will this do to the ozone layer? What might this do to—would it have any health impacts? The amount of material being contemplated, being used, is highly modest. So even if you use sulfates, which contribute to, say, acid rain, for instance, it’s quite modest compared to the existing pollutants that are already there. In fact, every year humans put up 250 million metric tons of pollutants—atmospheric pollutants into the atmosphere. So that stuff is there. And this, in a sense, would be, like, a healthier version of that. And I should mention also, those pollutants in the atmosphere right now reduce—keep global temperatures 1.1 degrees Celsius cooler now than the Earth would be in their absence. So as much—so we’ve gone up 1.1 degrees Celsius, but pollutants are keeping us from going up to 1.1 degrees Celsius more. (Laughs.) So I just want to, again, reiterate that this—that in some sense there are analogs, either natural in the case of volcanoes or not natural. It is—it has been the third rail of climate policy. And the reason—one of the big reasons that it’s the third rail of climate policy is that people fear what economists call a moral hazard, right? That if you actually did this, that it would provide a get-out-of-jail free card for governments, corporations, and consumers to continue their polluting ways, right? They’d say, hey, that’s—and especially fossil fuel companies, right? They might say, wow, this is terrific. We get to keep on doing this, and we’ve got this—we’ve got this sort of escape hatch, which is called—we’ll just—we’ll just, you know, keep doing the sunlight reflection. There’s actually a lot of polling data and research that suggests that is not the case, that actually even the prospect of doing this makes people actually take climate change more seriously because if they think, oh my God, if we’re doing this sort of Dr. Strangelove stuff to the planet, then we must really be in dire straits. And they would be correct in assuming that. (Laughs.) But there are many scientists around the country and around the world who are quite interested in this. And interestingly, it’s not just in the United States. In the developing world, many poor countries are going to be hit hugely hard, much harder than the United States will be, because of climate change. And there are a number of scientists around the world who are increasingly voicing at least some approval for doing this as a stopgap measure for the world to get—while the world gets its act together on greenhouse gas emissions. There are—there’s a big solar geoengineering project at Harvard University. There’s a very big marine cloud brightening project—or, a marine cloud brightening project at the University of Washington. People are beginning to think about getting out of the labs and testing these things in smaller scales. And so it’s taken quite seriously. On the negative side, there was in January a group of prominent academics—mostly academics—got together and had an open letter calling for an international nonuse agreement for solar geoengineering. And what they said was: We don’t believe that there should even be any publicly funded research in this, because we don’t want to normalize this topic, because we feel like it could have dire effects of a number of different sorts. And there are other potential effects that need to be—need to be analyzed. My own opinion is that more research is good. I am not in favor of deploying sunlight reflection if we find out that it is bad, any more than I am in favor of, you know, the Food and Drug Administration legalizing or giving its approval to medications that turned out to cause birth defects. I think that there are ways to conduct science with appropriate governance and oversight in an international way as well so that you find out whether or not this could be useful or not. Are the negative consequences and risks not worth it, or are they worth it? And I think that that’s where we are right now. ROBBINS: So if I were to do a story on this, I mean, and you mentioned the Harvard research group on this and the University of Washington research group. Who are the big names on both sides who are, you know, really respected scientists, whose work I should be looking up? PATRICK: Yeah. The—I mean, I think David Keith, who is at the Harvard Solar Geoengineering Project, he helps run it, he is—and he has other colleagues there. Gernot Wagner is another one of them there, Josh Horton. There are folks at Cornell University as well. Doug MacMartin at Cornell University. There is a very active advocacy entity called SilverLining, run by a woman named Kelly Wanser, who is very, very active in this space. There’s a certain amount of technology sort of philanthropic money that’s going into this field. The name of the person who authored the—it’s escaping me—but the name of the person who authored—or, at least, who coordinated the global nonuse agreement is escaping me right now. But it, again, has sixty-three prominent academics. And if you look at the Solar Geoengineering Nonuse Agreement, then you—if you Google that, you’ll find their affiliations. And so there are a large number of people who are also opposed to this. Other people in the field, who are—have—are sort of cautiously interested in it would include Alan Robock, who’s at Rutgers University, and a number of other places. I should note that at a—at the federal level within the United States, the United States is already investing modestly in some of the related science. My report calls for more funding to go to the Department of Energy to look at climate aerosol interactions. They would deal with the stuff in the troposphere, the lower atmosphere. NOAA, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, they obviously—they are quite involved in this. They have a program called Earths Radiation Budget, which does atmospheric science. The National Science Foundation funds lots of work in this field. The Department of Defense even has some activity in this field. That has to be handled very delicately though, because there’s—there are potential suspicions of the U.S. actually militarizing this sort of technology, or that others might, quote/unquote, “militarize” it. And one of the important things is keeping all countries on board because the barriers to entry are not very high in this field. And there are major problems for a potential geopolitical confrontation or miscalculation if countries start to treat this as a wild west scenario where there are competing geoengineering programs. And this sort of thing could be coming down the pike unless there are multilateral rules of the road. So that’s the second piece of my report. It calls for money for research grounded in international cooperation, you know, an ambitious U.S. research program to see whether or not this makes sense. And then the other is U.S. diplomacy to try to make sure that all countries say on board and are—and agree to certain rules of road, including any decisions about any significant deployment of these untried techniques. ROBBINS: So are—I mean, the need for norms, the need for treaties, the need for some sort of agreement certainly makes sense to me. Are there other countries that are more seriously investing in this, or more seriously—or, closer to actually trying to do something? PATRICK: There are—the Chinese had—interestingly—had a program—a modest but serious research program from about 2015 to 2019. And they appear to have discontinued it. But I’m sure that the United States was watching that program. I would not be surprised if the Indian government started getting more interested in it too. There are questions as to whether or not, depending on the nature of the intervention, what it would do the monsoon pattern, or what it could do to the monsoon pattern in the Indian Ocean if there were a global program. So that’s a wrinkle that, again, would need to be found out by research. Which I should mention that the National Intelligence Council—which, you know, does the national intelligence estimates on the part of the intelligence community for the federal government—it actually came out with its first national intelligence estimate on climate change, ever, last October/November. And there was a really interesting wrinkle in that. It was basically talking about, well, what does the geopolitics of climate change look like? And it does not look pretty. That is the current geopolitics. But what it suggested is that as climate change and its impacts worsen around the world, there is a significant possibility that countries will engage in unilateral geoengineering schemes. And the United States needs to be careful about that. And so my understanding is that there have been some efforts to have scenarios and play out some of those sort of gaming exercises within the U.S. government to see, OK, what would happen here if a country went and started doing this? The other question is, would we know about it? And that is one of the findings—at least according to the folks who advised me on this report, and there are quite a bunch of advisors—that we don’t have the really good monitoring capabilities and attribution capabilities. So if suddenly—we could probably detect changes in the atmosphere. Whether or not we could detect who had actually been responsible for it is another question. So again, it creates this major problem—cooperation problem internationally. ROBBINS: So if, you know, we worry about other people messing around with it, wouldn’t that be sort of an argument for creating a norm to not do it in the first place? Other people may not be as careful as one might want? (Laughs.) PATRICK: Yeah. I think that—yeah, yeah. I mean, I think that—you know, my report calls for a temporary moratorium on any sunlight reflection activities that could cause appreciable changes to Earth’s climate. So it does not call, however, which some people have called for, which is a ban—a treaty banning or regulating research on this at this particular moment. I guess the way I look at it is that we are in a very, very dire situation with respect to the climate. So we need to at least explore all potential alternatives, even if they are at least initially unsettling or unorthodox, because the future—well, the present that we have already entered into is highly unsettling and dangerous. And you’re all aware of some of the most recent, you know, findings of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, which just finished its sixth cycle of assessments. And they are very, very dire in terms of the state. The state of climate science showing, you know, where the world is headed, showing how adaptation is lagging, the missions are lagging. And I think in addition to a lot of what we see is sort of a steady state that things are getting worse, worse, worse. The more concerning thing is that the Earth may be actually courting tipping points in certain components of its natural systems. So these include a rapid collapse, potentially, of Antarctic ice sheets, a rapid dieback of the Amazon rainforest, which by some calculations has already become a net emitter of carbon as opposed to a carbon sink. The rapid melting or Arctic permafrost which, again, is going to be catastrophic if that occurs. And then even a shutdown of the Atlantic conveyor belt that helps keep—you know, associated with the Gulf Stream. But that keeps basically Europe temperate. And so there are a major, major changes afoot, you know, and coming waves of climate refugees and all kinds of sort of political and social dislocation and economic dislocation in a lot of parts of the world. So again, that’s where I think this needs to be—at least be looked at and investigated, to see what its potential consequences could be. Because right now policymakers are, in a sense, flying blind because they don’t have the necessary knowledge base to be able to make informed decisions. And what I worry about is—right, it’s 2022 now. What if 2030 rolls around, there have been, you know, heat waves in India that have killed millions of people, right? And that’s actually how one of these science fiction books that you sort of mentioned—or, I mentioned before we got on, The Ministry for the Future. And actually, from what I understand—I haven’t read it yet—but it begins with a—you know, twenty million people, I believe, sort of dying in India. That’s kind of the way it opens, because of the combination of high heat and high humidity. So if you sort of—you know, the level of desperation that some countries may feel—you can even imagine Bangladesh, right? Forty percent of my country’s going to be underwater. What would be to stop the Bangladesh government from sending some millions of dollars to, you know, retrofit planes to do this on its own? So you can sort of imagine a very dystopian scenario the way we’re going, I guess is what I would say. ROBBINS: Thanks. That leads into—and we’re going to want recommendations on dystopian reading at the end. (Laughs.) As if life were not dystopian enough for these days. So our friend, Robert Chaney from the Missoulian, his mic’s not working so I’m going to read his question. What sort of international forum—you’re going to love this. This is one of these international institutions/global governance questions. What sort of international forum is available to oversee this concept? Could the U.N., for example, stand up a forum that could have enforcement judgement authority before someone like Elon Musk decides to act independently? Or, as you were saying, the Bangladeshis or the Indians. Does a lack of global oversight argue for restraint—I asked that question—in further research? So is the U.N. looking at this? Would it be the right place to have a conversation like this? And or if you were to bring it to a place like that, would the inevitable reaction be, well, let’s just shut the whole thing down before anything happens? PATRICK: Yeah. I think there is just certainly a chance of that occurring. The U.N., my report would argue, it is one of the places which needs to look into this. Very briefly, right now under international law, including U.N. treaties, countries have almost entirely—entire freedom of action. I mean, there are certain customary international law things, that you shouldn’t do things on your own territory that have spillover effects that are negative to others, right, OK? So there are some broad principles. The paper, the report goes through sort of twelve different international conventions that at least speak somewhat to it. The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, even outer space treaty. You know, a number of different conventions. The endangered species act—or, excuse me—U.N. Conventional on Biological Diversity. But by and large, they have carte blanche. There has been very little discussion about this at the multilateral level because it has been the third rail at the multilateral level too. So the IPCC report for the first time mentioned—or, not the first time—but a little more extensive than they had in the past. But, again, you know, a couple of paragraphs here or there. There’s been almost no willingness to engage within the IPCC. There was an effort by the Swiss to bring up a resolution in 2019 at the United Nations Environment Assembly, which meets in Nairobi periodically. And it was shot down. And a lot of folks just really don’t want to talk about it. With respect to—and I’ll just touch on the Elon Musk thing, which is very interesting. Is, you know, another novel, which has been by the bestselling author Neal Stephenson, called Termination Shock, begins—it has its scenario, without giving anything away, is a big wealthy Texas billionaire who tries to take matters into his own hands, because he wants to do something about climate change—to combat climate change. And David Gordon—not David Gordon—David Victor of University of California, San Diego has called this theory, or this approach, the “Greenfinger” scenario, right? It’s not Goldfinger, right, but it’s Greenfinger. You would get some wealthy individual. That is a little bit far-fetched, I think. And he believes that too, as well. But what’s to stop other countries from doing it? I would say the U.N. is an important venue. I could imagine as a start that U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres could appoint a high-level commission on—you know, on this, as a response to climate overshoot. It could lay the groundwork for some sort of eventual U.N. instrument or certainly deliberations within the U.N. General Assembly on this. You know, the difficulty always within the U.N. General Assembly is that it’s so encrusted by these different regional and ideological blocs. And so you have to think that you would want to break those up somehow or at least have a little bit more fluidity. I think the good news in this particular scenario is that there are—there’s some alignment in views on the part of a number of developing countries that are really, really hurting with climate change, and developed countries. I also think that this could make interesting sort of strange-bedfellows possibilities within more selective groups. So I don’t just talk about the United Nations as the U.N. General Assembly. I talk about the U.N. Security Council. The difficulty there, I think, probably is going to be Russia more than China. China is highly, highly concerned about climate change, and is not least water—in terms of waters scarcity—is highly vulnerable to climate change. So you could actually imagine a useful dialogue between the United States and China in the U.N. Security Council and other venues. I talk about the Major Economies Forum, which is the group of major emitters, as another venue. The G-20 as another venue. The Russians are tricky because, I think, from—the Russians have been much more—notwithstanding the melting permafrost—they have been much more optimistic about climate change, I think, because they see the wheat belt extending quite a bit north into Siberia. So they may not think that this is necessarily a bad thing for them. And then finally, I do talk about the importance of trying to build some common perspective within the club of Western countries as well, the G-7 NATO countries, et cetera, U.S.-EU. So there are a lot of different potential venues for it, where you could begin to forge some agreement. ROBBINS: So, please, Robert started us off with a good question. Please raise your hand. And if you can—if your mic’s working, we’d love to have you ask the question rather than having me do it. So while I wait for you guys to jump in—I will also call on you. I do that. Now that I’ve turned into an academic, I call on people. So we have—oh, no, not a question yet. That was an urging of questions. So there was going to be a test, I gather, in Sweden, and it was cancelled because of local complaints? Can you talk about that, and who sort of organized the local complaints, and what they were like? And is the test going to be rescheduled? I mean, this is an interesting sort of—was it a town and gown problem, or what? PATRICK: Yeah, no, and it actually has relevance, certainly for folks in, you know, local and regional journalists, I think. Because these tests have to be launched from somewhere, right? Although they could be launched off the coast, even in international waters, for instance. But, yeah, what was going to happen was—it was called SCoPEx, which was Stratospheric Controlled Perturbation Experiment, SCoPEx. And with all due respect to David Keith and his colleagues at Harvard Solar Geoengineering, I think sometimes—(laughs)—sometimes the language that one uses, again, can seem a little bit sort of, you know, technical— ROBBINS: Perturbing? PATRICK: Yeah, perturbing, exactly. (Laughter.) Sort of technical fix language. I think, you know, I could imagine that some folks sometimes need a little bit of a branding and marketing. We got a little bit of grief for calling it sunlight reflection but, you know, it has the benefit of explaining what it is, and it also sounds slightly more benign than, you know, stratospheric aerosol injection. But so the idea here was that there was going to be—it actually wasn’t even testing the sulfates or other material that was going to be put in the atmosphere. It was sort of testing a spray—I mean, I believe it’s sort of testing a nozzle or a delivery device from a balloon. And it was going to take place in Lapland in northern Sweden. And it relatively quickly got emmeshed in—it became a lightning rod for environmental critics—environmentalist critics. And there are many environmental critics who I would describe as somewhat absolutist who, you know, would love to throw the stand in the gears of any of this stuff. And you know, endless, you know, tying things into red tape and endless processes of public consultation, notwithstanding whether or not there’s even sort of elected representatives doing this. But in this case, it also got involved in the politics of the Sami people, who have been—even by our, you know, lovely Nordic friends—have occasionally gotten the short end of the stick in terms of Scandinavian politics. And so it’s an indigenous community. You know, there was a question of, well, could—you know, did they get—did they give permission? Was this going to have any health impacts in Sweden? Which obviously is a highly environmentally minded country, et cetera. So even though the risk would have been infinitesimal, perhaps not even measurable, that experiment got cancelled. And there are no current plans, I believe right now, for this to occur in the future. I think one of the lessons of that is not simply that—it’s not necessarily that, wow, what a terrible idea that was. Because I think these things—these apparatus’ need to be tested. But I think a lot of it probably—there are undoubtably lessons to be taken for the importance of real consultation and sort of laying the groundwork and communicating—you know, sort of risk communication. Like, what’s a real risk versus what is, in a sense, an imagined risk. And, you know, reaching out and cultivating different constituencies, because I think otherwise then it risks, like many things that involve technology, being sort of somebody else’s techno quick fix. ROBBINS: So, Mike Allen, would you like to ask your question? Q: First I had to figure out how to unmute. Can you hear me OK? ROBBINS: Absolutely. PATRICK: Sure can. Q: OK. So what I just typed was: For journalists that cover governments on a local or state level, and I addressed this both to Stewart and to Carla, do you see a way to frame these ideas within those lenses? Is there any way, for example, that a city or county government could have some stake in exploring these ideas? PATRICK: Yeah, I think so. I think on probably a couple levels. One of them is just the growing, you know, threats posed by climate change. And heat in particular, and its ramifications. You know, there are, you know, undoubtably ways that communities all around the world are trying to build resilience. I spent a lot of time because of a grandparent’s house in—vacation house at Lake Tahoe. And go up there and see the folks, you know, in Nevada county or in Placer County trying to deal with the extraordinary ramifications of wildfire, and what that has done, and how devastating it is to the local economy. Not just tourism, but obviously the local economy in general. And so part of it could be, well, in addition to building resilience and adapting to this situation, you know, are there things that can be done that might—even if they’re done at, in a sense, a global level—could have, obviously, local ramifications? But the other would be, I think that, let’s say journalists who might be where the—you know, might be where some of these experiments would be taking place. So, you know, does there require a town council or a—or the county executive and the county council to actually sign off and weigh in on whether or not an experiment could—should take place. Let’s say the marine cloud brightening project was going to be taking place off the coast of Washington. And there are plans for the University of Washington to test out some of this stuff off the coast. That is both a curiosity, but also could—you know, so kind of an interesting public interest or community story. But it also could be a question of, well, what the heck are these guys doing? Is this safe at all? Is there a way—and it could be both sort of demystifying stuff, but it also could be a little bit investigative. Did they actually talk to anybody? Did they run this by, or are they just going with the feds in terms of their sort of regulatory approval that they need? Should there be some sort of level of local authorization that needs to happen? So I would see those are—those would be two obvious ones. Another would be—would be what would be the impact on, you know, potato farming in Idaho if—you know, or precipitation patterns in, you know, the Pacific Northwest, or something along those lines? If this were to—if this were to happen, what do we actually think? There are these global things, but they’re going to have local effects. Do we know about these local effects before we start going down this road? So it might be kind of a way, interestingly, of tying, you know, what people say—they talk about the “glocal,” right, tying the global and the local together and showing how they interact with one another. Just a couple of thoughts. I haven’t—I should have thought about that question more. It’s a great one. ROBBINS: So, thanks. So Joe Zlomek from the Posts asks—I’m skipped over him because he asked a question that I’m going to turn back on him. He said—so I’m going to read your question. I’m going to ask you to work with Stewart on the answer. Stewart, thanks for introducing the topic. Your paper may address this, but I’ll ask it anyway. Why trust—and then he has in caps—ANY government with enabling this kind of technology? Even if they agree to what you describe as a hope for, quote, “multilateral rules”? History has too many examples of governments ignoring such agreements. And certainly, you know, you were talking about the Sami. Certainly, our treatment of indigenous people, certainly the—you know, anything from nuclear waste to all the terrible ways that the environment has been treated. You know, just trust me, I’m the government, is not a particularly good one. So, Joe, implicit in your question is that you don’t trust the government. If—or maybe—you know, maybe the academics either. If, you know, you’re covering something and you’re in northwest Washington, what sort of questions would you be asking of the government, of academics, that—as the surrogate for citizens that you would—you know, and could you trust any answer coming out of local officials or out of scientists? And that’s a question to Joe from me. You are unmuted, so. PATRICK: Yeah. OK. Yeah, and, Joe, I think I see you as still muted, if you wanted to jump in. Q: Thank you very much. And I apologize for the delay. As our previous questioner asked, we too are looking to localize these kinds of stories. As, Stewart, as you were talking, I was immediately thinking of the resources that our papers might depend on. State College, Penn State, comes to mind immediately, and their weather program. I was curious about the county aspect of it. And I don’t know that that would apply here, but the questions that I would ask of government, Carla Anne, to respond to you, is where’s the proof in all of this? Where can we find some demonstrable exceptions or documents that says you’ve actually stuck to your word on something before? Because we could probably all raise incidents when they hadn’t. And now what’s the—what’s the tangible proof that you’re going to stick to your word this time? I guess that’s where I’m coming from, in best answer to your question, Carla Anne. PATRICK: Yeah. I guess what—and that’s—and, again, I understand, you know, given the history of, you know, lack of regulation for, let’s just say, you know—(inaudible)—mining technologies. Or, you know, people have complaints over major fracking, and it might have been approved, and maybe it has contaminated groundwater, et cetera. I guess I would say that—and the report goes into it in significant detail—or, at least it goes into it quite explicitly—is that, first of all, the onus should be on transparency entirely, right? So there needs to be sort of a public registry of any experiments that are planned and undertaken. And that there should be a tiered system for approval. So that those that are extraordinarily modest outdoor experiments, would probably just need to have an environmental impact statement and approval from the agency that is responsible. There are existing statutes, the Endangered Species Act, the Clean Air Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, the Weather Modification Act. There are a number of different existing statutes, and then also responsible agencies for those. And so I would say that they would have to, you know, follow through on the types of reviews that have occurred. I guess I would think of, in terms of analogies, you know, sort of the authorization for, you know, new agricultural chemicals or pesticides, right? Or approval of vaccines and medical devices. Now, of course, we know that particularly in this day in age it can get quite political when you’re talking about approval of new vaccines and medical devices. Or, but, you know, standard-setting for vehicle emissions as well. So I definitely am in favor of significant or robust environmental impact assessments and review. I do not know how many different levels of review you need to go through in terms of—I’d have to think about, you know, the degree to which you need sort of municipal review of those things, as opposed to state or federal review. But I would want to see enough review to build up some level of confidence locally without, as I said, having it be so onerous that there’s no opportunity to actually engage in research, particularly research that would not rise to the level of having any major climate perturbations. ROBBINS: I mean, I think—and we talked about this all the time—I mean, who does anyone trust these days, particularly in the polarized environment? And because we don’t even have a common language on science, and polling, and who won an election. When you want to do something this big, you know, who does one trust? You know, are people more likely to trust something from the federal government than they are from their local government or from their state government? And at the same time, while the federal government may have more resources. Say something like the National Academy of Science rules on this, are people in, you know, X state or X community going to know what the National Academy of Science is? Are they going to know what the IPCC is? To the point of, you know, how much is our responsibility as reporters to educate people on, you know, who these people are and why perhaps you should take their word on it? PATRICK: Yeah, I think that that— ROBBINS: Because I can’t—you’re not going to take my word, as a reporter. All I can do is do my research and tell you whether or not these people have a track record for credibility. PATRICK: Yeah, no, and I think that’s really important. And I think that, you know, journalists, I think, can play a huge role in both holding public officials’ feet to the fire and asking difficult questions—well, how do you know that this is going to be of limited impact, et cetera? But then they can also arguably hold, in a sense, critics’ feet to the fire too as well, to, you know, really scrutinize some claims that might not withstand that scrutiny. And I think—I think that’s really important. I do think that journalists also have to—would want to pay attention to the dangers or risks of regulatory arbitrage too, so that anybody who is trying to conduct these experiments or—would perhaps go to a place where anything goes, even if it weren’t—even if there were risks that were created. So, yeah, I understand the skepticism. And I think the press needs to give voice to that and, you know, let the chips fall where they may during their reporting. But I think that it could actually create a very interesting bridging function between a skeptical public and a government that conceivably thought that this was a good idea. ROBBINS: Cedar Attanasio, do you want to voice your question? And we usually call on the AP first, but you got your question in late. (Laughter.) And she—she or he may have had to jump off because there’s breaking news somewhere. So I’m going to ask the question, which is: What are the environmental justice concerns of proposed approaches to this? PATRICK: Very interesting question. I think that obviously if—I mean, they go both ways, I guess I would say. Just in terms of any sort of tests and much less deployment. You would want to make sure that you are not repeating injustices in the past where toxic waste facilities, or dangerous chemical plants, for instance, would be placed near—disproportionately near lower-income and disenfranchised populations in the United States or abroad. I think you can actually make an argument that the social justice implications of this could be quite positive if it proved to work, because—well, again, there would have to be a lot of research using supercomputers on the distributional—the distribution of gains and losses globally. Because this does not return the climate to the previous climate. It returns the temperature to the previous temperature. But greenhouse gas distribution would be different, and there could be other ecological perturbations, or disturbances, or at least things being different from the way that they were before. But by and large, there’s no question in my mind that a return—or, first of all, a prevention of increased temperatures, a real spiking of temperatures that will otherwise occur if global warming proceeds apace, will be a huge boon—or, at least a huge relief physically and otherwise to hundreds of millions and probably billions of people in the developing world. Some of the most eloquent voices calling for global action on climate change, of course, are from some of the world’s poorest countries. Not just those countries that are disappearing beneath the waves, as in small island—many small island developing countries, particularly in the Pacific. But there are many places in the developing world where, you know, any progress on economic equity, livelihoods, hunger—and we saw tremendous gains since—unevenly, sure—to be sure—but tremendous gains since the year 2000 in many parts of the world, meeting what are called the Sustainable Development Goals, basically the global goals on alleviating poverty and improving health and education, things like that. But what we’ve seen in the wake of COVID, and we’re seeing even more with respect to climate change, is we’re seeing just devastating impacts. I mean, there will be parts of the world that will be rendered too arid for agriculture. It may be rendered too hot for human habitation because the idea of simply, you know, creating huge megacities that are now slums with air conditioning is just not going to be on the cards. So for many places around the world, this will be—this could be a real boon to help allow people to survive a transition to a post-carbon world, which is obviously going to be long and protracted. And so it could, you know, help, you know, minimize sea level rise and sea level intrusion, wildfires, you know, punishing droughts, et cetera. But it does have some significant unintended—or, excuse me—potential for unintended consequences. And we just don’t know that. And, you know, the frustrating thing is for some of these things we will not know for sure until you actually do it. I think, you know, it’s all—everything that I have said I think kind of makes sense up until, you know, even though mid-level experiments. The difficulty ultimately is going to be that line between research—and we’re not there. We’re not even close to being there. But the line between research on the one hand and deployment on the other is going to get fuzzy at some point. And we only have one world, in a sense, to experiment with. We are experimenting with it in a way we know is negative right now. (Laughs.) The question is, is the experiment we might be doing here going to make that worse or better? And, again, I’m not in favor of deployment right now. We need to investigate this. But we also can’t afford to ignore it. The other thing is that—and just to respond to a pervious thing is how can we trust the government, et cetera. I think that’s fair. The one thing I would say is that this is coming. It may not be coming from us, but I’m almost positive that this is coming down the pike, just given the level of desperation that the world’s going to find with respect to climate change. ROBBINS: So we only have three minutes left. I’m going to ask some short news Final Jeopardy questions unless someone jumps in, although I’m going to—Robert Chaney asks, have you seen any highly localized, save the—fill in the projects of—you know, geoengineering? You know, someone protecting a failing ice sheet in Antarctica, or saving the glaciers in Glacier National Park? Or is this a whole— PATRICK: There are—there’s been an effort to try to do some of that, but probably the only one that I’ve really seen along these lines is a marine cloud brightening project over the part of the Great Barrier Reef, to try to save it from coral bleaching. That’s been done. ROBBINS: And has that had any impact? PATRICK: There was some promising results from it, from what I gather, yeah. ROBBINS: Interesting. And then we wanted—you know, the news business is news. So things that are upcoming that we should be paying attention to. You said that there’s going to be some sort of test attempted of something by the University of Washington? Are there particular events, reports, you know, knock-down, drag-out fights between the two sides that we should be paying attention to in the next few months? PATRICK: Yeah. I mean, again, these are mostly international events. But there certainly are—you know, there’s the fiftieth anniversary of a famous Stockholm conference on the environment and development happening in June. There is—at the U.N. General Assembly there will be, as usual, a lot on climate change. And then, of course, there’s the next meeting of the Conference of Parties—twenty-seventh conference of parties for U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt. But I can’t right now think necessarily of anything that isn’t on the calendar. No doubt this summer will provide some, whether it’s the form of heat domes or the latest conflagration out west, enough climate-related topics, or the latest sort of extraordinarily violent hurricane, where one could maybe think about, hey, do we have a plan B here? ROBBINS: Well, thank you. This has been—I can’t say it’s been happy, but it has really been interesting. We will share links to reports, including the National Academy of Science reports and Stewarts recommended dystopian reading list. And I turn it back to Irina. FASKIANOS: Thank you, Carla. And thank you, Stewart. And to all of you for joining us. We will be sending out the link. And I encourage you to follow our speakers on Twitter. Stewart is at @stewartpatrick. And Carla at @robbinscarla. And of course, as always, go to CFR.org, ForeignAffairs.com, and Think Global Health for the latest developments and analysis on international trends and how they are affecting the United States. Again, the link to the report is in your confirm email, and we will circulate that again as well. Please share your suggestions for future webinars by emailing us at [email protected]. So thank you all again and thank you Stewart and Carla. PATRICK: Thanks, Carla. ROBBINS: Stay well, everybody. Have a good day. Bye. (END)  
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  • Climate Change
    Cooling the Planet Through Solar Reflection
    Play
    Stewart M. Patrick, the James H. Binger senior fellow in global governance and director of the International Institutions and Global Governance Program at CFR, and Robert J. Lempert, principal researcher and director of the Frederick S. Pardee Center for Longer Range Global Policy and the Future Human Condition at the RAND Corporation, discuss climate intervention techniques including solar geoengineering and considerations for policymakers in exploring new and uncertain climate change mitigation strategies Transcript FASKIANOS: Thank you. Welcome to the Council on Foreign Relations State and Local Officials Webinar. I’m Irina Faskianos, vice president for the National Program and Outreach at CFR. We are delighted to have participants from forty U.S. states and territories with us today. Today’s discussion is on the record. CFR is an independent and nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, publisher, and educational institution focusing on U.S. foreign policy. CFR is also the publisher of Foreign Affairs magazine. And CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy. Through our State and Officials Initiative, CFR serves as a resource on international issues affecting the priorities and agendas of state and local governments by providing analysis on a wide range of topics. We are pleased to have Stewart Patrick and Robert Lempert with us today. We have shared their bios, so I’ll just give you a few highlights. Stewart Patrick is the James Binger Senior Fellow in Global Governance and director of the International Institutions and Global Governance Program at CFR. Dr. Stewart previously served on the former Secretary of State Colin Powell’s policy planning staff for a range of global and transnational issues, including refugees and migration, international law enforcement, and global health affairs. He is the author, co-author, or editor of five books, including The Sovereignty Wars: Reconciling America with the World, and Weak Links: Fragile States, Global Threats, and International Security. And he also writes the CFR blog The Internationalist. Robert Lempert is principal researcher at the RAND Corporation and director of the Frederick Pardee Center for Longer Range Global Policy and the Future Human Condition at RAND Corporation. Dr. Lempert is also a professor of policy analysis at the Pardee RAND Graduate School and author of the book Shaping the Next One Hundred Years: New Methods for Quantitative, Longer-Term Policy Analysis. He is also a member of California’s Climate-Safe Infrastructure Working Group, and has been a member of numerous study panels for the U.S. National Academies, including America’s Climate Choices and Informing Decisions in a Changing Climate. So thank you both for being with us. Stewart, I thought we would begin with you. You just put forth a Council special report on reducing climate risk through sunlight reflection. We sent out that report in advance of this discussion, but if you could just give us an overview of the arguments you put forward and some of the policy recommendations. PATRICK: Thanks so much, Irina, and I’m delighted to be with you all here and to share the virtual floor, as it were, with Rob Lempert, who’s done so much work on local approaches to climate mitigation and resilience. I want to pay special tribute to Irina, who is by far the hardest-working employee at the Council on Foreign Relations with a massive portfolio and an evident need for a lot less sleep than the rest of us need to have. This is my first time speaking to CFR’s State and Local program, and I look forward to your questions and comments about how you see this issue, where the rubber meets the road, which is of course in our communities. I’ll get my thesis out front. You know, from the suffocating heat we’re seeing in India to these rampaging wildfires in New Mexico and other parts of the Southwest, the planet is sending us a pretty clear message, and that is the long-dreaded climate emergency is now. And so, faced with this clear and present danger, my report argues that the United States and other nations can’t afford to ignore the possibility of expanding their current strategies for managing climate risk to include sunlight reflection. This is also known as solar climate intervention or, perhaps more popularly, solar geoengineering. It’s been the subject of a lot of interesting science fiction, including Termination Shock and The Ministry for the Future just to name a couple that have come out. It basically would entail reflecting a tiny percentage of incoming sunlight back into space to limit the heating effect of solar radiation on our greenhouse gases while humanity goes about tackling these massive and protracted challenges of decarbonization. Sunlight reflection, as you may know, has long been the third rail of U.S. climate politics, but that’s starting to change as the gravity of global warming becomes increasingly obvious. A year ago, the prestigious National Academies of Science advocated its enhanced study. And my report kind of takes things a little bit further, looking at the logic and feasibility of such intervention and what it would require for its effective international governance. That we’re even having this conversation really is a testament to the dire straits we’re in. You know, at the big Paris Conference in 2015, as you recall, the U.S. and other governments unanimously said, hey, we’re going to keep the rise in average global temperatures well below 2 degrees Celsius and ideally no more than 1.5 degrees Celsius from pre-industrial times, and we’re poised to blow way past those targets. And the consequences, or at least potentially, could be quite devastating. Yesterday, the World Meteorological Organization predicted that we actually have a 50/50 chance of hitting the 1.5-degree line within the next five years, which is decades ahead of what many had predicted just a few years ago. And this comes on the heels of a scary sixth round of assessments from the Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change. So even if we—even if we hit the pledges that were made in Glasgow, the world is on track for warming of between 2.7 to 3 degrees Celsius this century, and that is—if you put it in Fahrenheit, it starts to seem like a lot. That is 4.9 degrees to 5.4 degrees Fahrenheit. So the ramifications for human safety and well-being are going to be particularly dire, including in communities like yours and mine. We’re going to have more frequent, intense, and prolonged heat waves, droughts, wildfires, storms, flooding, and other calamities, and it’s already happening. The U.N. a couple weeks ago said that the frequency of what we misleadingly still call natural disasters has quadrupled since just the year 2000. And, as always, the poor will suffer the most. Even more alarming is this growing risk that the world is going to—that warming’s going to trigger abrupt tipping points in important parts of the Earth’s system, and that can include the rapid die-back of the Amazon rainforest or a shutdown of the Atlantic Ocean conveyor belt that keeps Europe temperate. So it’s easy to be scared about this future of global warming, but my report says, you know, fortunately, there may be a lifeline, albeit in an unorthodox and imperfect way. And it would involve slightly increasing a reflection of sunlight from clouds and particles in the atmosphere to reduce climate warming. Society, I argue, needs to explore this option because climate change poses a major threat now. Now, the world currently has three main strategies to manage climate risk, and I know that Rob will speak to at least a couple of them. One of them is emissions reduction, another is carbon removal, and a third is adaptation. Unfortunately, climate change is now outpacing all of these efforts. Emissions are supposed to decline by 50 percent over the next eight years to meet the 1.5 degrees target, but they’re on pace to rise by 16 percent. Direct-air capture of atmospheric carbon, whether by negative-emissions technologies or nature-based solutions like planting trees, is critical, but it could take decades for these innovations or land-use changes to go to scale. And then, finally, efforts to build resilience against warming and its impact, which no doubt you are all involved in, are essential but they’re also expensive, underfunded, and inherently limited because a lot of them will simply be overwhelmed by the interconnected climate system. In short, I argue the world confronts a high-stakes timing predicament. We know we have to do more, we know what we have to do, but we’re not doing it fast enough to prevent soaring temperatures. How much worse things get depend on how hot it gets. Given this dilemma, I argue the world can’t afford to ignore a potentially rapid climate response that could, as they say, shave the peak of global warming, keeping people safe and natural systems stable while we make the long transition to net zero. Increasing sunlight reflection to cool the climate could be accomplished in various ways. The two most promising options are based on things that already occur. One approach would be to involve dispersing aerosols in the upper atmosphere or stratosphere, likely from aircraft, and this would be a safer version of the cooling effect of particles emitted by volcanic eruptions. You may recall Mount Pinatubo, which erupted in 1991. It reduced global temperatures by some estimates by half a degree to 1.1 degree Celsius over the ensuing fifteen months. Another approach would involve spraying sea salt mist from ships or ocean platforms to brighten low-lying marine clouds in what’s called the troposphere, and this would be a cleaner version of the global cooling effect that we now see from atmospheric pollution. In fact, the pollution that we have already put into the atmosphere is estimated to keep temperatures about half a degree to 1.2 degrees Celsius than they would be otherwise, and so that’s going on right now. And models suggest that this could be remarkably cost-effective. It might be done for as little as $10 billion a year, which is a tiny fraction of the estimated 275 trillion (dollars) it’s going to cost to decarbonize the global economy by 2050. So I’ll just finish up with a few remarks here. Despite its promise and precedence, the idea of sunlight reflection has been controversial, though that’s starting to change as the risks of warming intensify. There’s a lot of queasiness about playing with Earth’s thermostat. There’s worry that there are uncertain risks, and it’s true there could be unintended consequences which we need to take seriously. There’s also fear of what economists call a moral hazard; that is, that the mere prospect of this will give governments, corporations, and citizens a perceived hall pass to continue their polluting ways. I argue that these concerns really do deserve careful consideration and scrutiny. This is an untried enterprise with a risk of unintended consequences and human error. But these risks need to be assessed not alone as if we inhabited some sort of a perfect world, but alongside the known dangers, tensions, and inequities of an ongoing if unwitting experiment we’re already performing by pumping greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. The key question to ask is: Can increasing the reflection of sunlight in the atmosphere reduce the dangers posed by global warming? Unfortunately, we don’t know because we don’t have the scientific certainty about the potential efficacy and repercussions of this, and we don’t have any monitoring systems or multilateral rules of the road to govern such intentional manipulation of Earth’s climate system. And I argue that this dual vacuum is untenable because it leaves policymakers flying blind, unsure of the feasibility of this option, and unable to make informed, responsible choices. It also increases the danger—the lack of international rules in particular—of something that the National Intelligence Council has warned about, the danger that a single power could someday take matters into its own hands, launching freelance interventions with destabilizing geopolitical and economic impacts. So I basically say we have to close two gaps. To close the first knowledge gap, I recommend that the Biden administration and Congress collaborate to launch an ambitious, well-funded, transparent, and accountable research program on sunlight reflection science grounded in international cooperation. And it would build on the recommendations that were made by the National Academies, but with a lot more money. To close the second gap, I call on the United States—that’s the governance gap—I call on the U.S. and other governments to begin negotiations on a multilateral framework needed to jointly assess the feasibility, consequences, and wisdom of actually doing this, because we could decide this is a terrible idea. And also, though, importantly, to take collective decisions about any future deployment. And I argue that although, obviously, we live in a pretty complicated negotiating landscape right now, I believe that the mutual vulnerability to climate change could create some opportunities for strange bedfellows, including between the United States and China and between the United States and developing ones. As the report repeatedly emphasizes, sunlight reflection’s not a solution to climate change since it doesn’t effect emissions or eliminate atmospheric carbons. It’s more like methadone for a world weaning itself off of fossil-fuel addiction. But it’s something that we can’t afford to at least explore. You know, we have to consider all of our options, and I think it would be irresponsible not to evaluate its viability and possible consequences and at least give it—give it the science and consideration that it’s due before we dismiss it out of hand. So those are my opening remarks. Thanks. FASKIANOS: Great. Thank you, Stewart. Let’s go to you, Rob, to talk about the policy implications for these kinds of climate interventions and what you think officials in states and cities should be thinking about in terms of mitigating the consequences of climate change. LEMPERT: Great. Thank you, Irina. Thanks for the introductions, and thanks for setting this up, and, as Stewart said, all that you do to—(laughs)—make these programs run. And welcome, everybody. Yeah, so this is actually a fascinating topic to engage with state and local officials on. I mean, no one is suggesting that you put sunlight reflection into your climate action plans. But there are a number of places where I think this is an important topic that does connect with what’s going on at state and local levels. I mean, so the first is that this whole consideration of sunlight reflection is really a reason to accelerate your efforts at mitigation, reducing greenhouse gases, and adaptation, you know, achieving resilience to extreme weather and climate events. You know, the only reason, as Stewart so eloquently laid out, that this is on the agenda at all is because of the challenges we face are so imminent and significant. And sunlight reflection is, at best—I mean, it can’t be a permanent solution. At best, it’s a way to shave the peak, to keep temperatures low while we make a transition to a low-carbon emitting economy. And it might also be something that we would need to turn to in some sort of emergency if one of these feedbacks—low probability, but high consequence—feedbacks actually manifests itself. You know, climate is very much a risk management challenge. And, you know, one fundamental risk management strategy or principle of risk management is to have a diverse portfolio. And so essentially, you know, what we’re doing with sunlight reflection is making our portfolio more diverse. And so we shouldn’t make it less diverse as we consider this option. A second point is that while sunlight reflection—deployment of any sunlight reflection system is definitely in the future, there are other types of climate modification which are, you know, currently on the table and currently happening. In particular, this idea of carbon dioxide removal, extracting carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. Which can create opportunities and risks at the local level, which might be something that you all might want to consider. So Stewart mentioned nature-based solutions—reforestation, managing agricultural and other natural lands in ways so that they store more carbon. And there’s a whole issue of biofuels, and the issue of direct air capture, machines that actually suck carbon out of the air. And there are examples of—and firms and technology demonstrations, market demonstrations of all of these going on around the country and around the world. And so you may, in your community—they all pose opportunities and risks. You know, for instance, direct air capture are machines which suck carbon out of the air, or biofuels. You can, in California, where I live, take dead trees and build little mini refineries and turn those into fuels, and create then carbon that you can sequester underground. And all of those create economic opportunities, but they also create various sorts of risks—risks to ecosystems, risks from storing carbon underground, which you may want to engage with how should you exploit those opportunities, manage those risks? And then the place where you may engage directly with the sunlight reflection is that—well, is the—is the notion—or, the potential for outdoor experimentation with this technology. And to date, for sunlight reflection, particularly the stratospheric—putting particles in the stratosphere to help increase the reflectivity of the Earth to reflect sunlight—has all been in effort. In laboratories and computer modeling the science may be getting to the stage where outdoor experiments may be appropriate. By and large, at this stage they’re all going to involved negligible environmental consequences. You’re releasing, you know, only a few pounds of material into the atmosphere, which will really have no environmental—noticeable environmental impact. And so it’s straightforward for these experiments to satisfy existing environmental impact laws. But many in your community, many worldwide may see such experiments as symbolically important. So there—some communities may face the question about, you know, is it appropriate to have such experiments in their locale or not? And so my own view tends to be to see this as an opportunity for public engagement, and public engagement and participation is important. You know, first experimenters may face backlash if essentially they don’t want to ask permission to conduct an experiment in people’s backyards. Backlash would be entirely avoidable. And second, and sort of the large point, is that across the board, to address the climate change, we’re going to need to build massive amounts of new infrastructure—from solar and wind machines, to power lines, to renovated buildings and so forth, different sorts of streets. Actually, there’s a question about reflecting roofs. And in order to manage climate risk, we’re going to need to build fast and build fair in equitable ways. And I think public participation is going to be an important part of that, and we need to do that better than we’ve been doing that in many places. And sunlight reflection experiments I think provide us with an interesting and unique opportunity to advance methods for getting the public engaged in these significant, serious, but really important risk management questions. FASKIANOS: Great. Thank you so much. So we’re going to go to questions. There are already several typed up in the chat. So if you would like to ask a question you can either write it out or you can also click on the raise hand icon and we will call upon you. You can accept the unmute prompt and state your name and affiliation and your state, just to give us context. And, again, this is a great forum to share with us what you’re doing in your community. So we encourage you to do all of that. So I’m going to take the first just—there are several in the chat—from Liz Ellis, who’s a city councilperson in Aberdeen, Washington. I think you touched on this, Rob. Should the national building code require all roofs to be painted/made with reflective material? LEMPERT: Do you want me to jump in, or? FASKIANOS: Yeah. I think that one should go to you, mmm hmm. LEMPERT: Yeah. Yeah. I catch a little bit on the word “all.” So I’m not sure whether all roofs need to be, but I think the basic point you’re asking is an emphatic “yes.” We need to revise our building codes to take into account changing climate. There’s been some fascinating studies which look forward and look at how many places in the country building codes are based on climate data from the 1960s and ’70s. You know, support from decades ago. And the climate today is already significantly different than the climate those building codes envision and is changing fast. So the basic point is, yeah, we need to revise our building codes to be forward-looking, and so that we’re building for the climate that’s coming and not the one that we’ve had, or the one even that we’re living through today. And that will include, in many places, reflecting roofs and reflecting streets, you know, particularly in the southwest U.S., where I live. That sort of thing is going to definitely be important. FASKIANOS: Great. Thank you. So we have a written question from Jeffrey Sayegh, who is an aid for New York Assemblyman Thomas Abinanti. This is directed to you, Stewart. You mentioned using airplanes and ships to disperse cooling agents. You stated it could cost 10 billion (dollars) a year. Can you elaborate on this price and how this price tag came about, this number? As far as I’m concerned, we are the ones setting the price. For all we know the cost could be a lot lower if it benefits everybody. PATRICK: Yeah. That’s a great question. Yes, I mean, conceivably. I mean, that’s the price tag for—I mean, the estimated price tag by Alan Robock and a number of other climate scientists who basically suggest that for under $10 billion it would be the cost for flying several dozen planes relatively continuously in the stratosphere over the course of about a year or so. And that would also include the materials that would be used to be dispersed. It could be sulfates. It could be calcites. There are a number of different materials that people have talked about. But certainly, that expenditure could be shared in a multilateral framework, which is something that I would definitely endorse. And the report goes into some detail about the importance of making this a multilateral partnership, rather than simply a sort of a unilateral U.S. effort. Partly to, you know, put the emphasis on international cooperation as opposed to something that, in a sense, is being unilaterally placed on—or, imposed on other countries. That’s why it makes—the report makes a major emphasis on the importance of reaching out, particularly to developing countries, to avoid some sort of neocolonial notion. This is if you were to do this after all the science is done, as you don’t have any neocolonial and sort of imperialist lens on this. What you want to do is basically talk to—understand the needs of developing countries which, frankly speaking, are the ones that are taking climate change hardest on the chin. FASKIANOS: Great. So just as a point of clarification from Erica Norton, who’s a city council member in Federal Way, Washington, just can you go through the tradeoffs? Reflect and stop the sunlight, but at the same time changing our energy source to solar. So how do you sequence those two things and bring them into—you know, so they’re not seemingly at odds? PATRICK: You’re saying we need to reflect at the same time—yeah. I mean, I—OK, right, yeah. No, there is a question—no I understand that. There—I mean, one of the objections to sunlight reflection is that wouldn’t it hurt, in a sense, solar power, of all the renewables, the most? There are a number of scientists that have looked at this and studied and suggested, you know, there would be a slight—there could be a slight reduction in the amount of solar power that you generated, but the overwhelming impact would be to reduce average global temperatures. And that it wouldn’t be a huge hit on solar power. So the tradeoff, as far as the scientists who have looked at it suggest, is that it would definitely be worth it. And that it wouldn’t put solar power out of business, because we’re only talking really about reflecting perhaps 1 percent of incoming solar radiation. It’s hard to imagine that that would make solar power—change the economics of solar power. FASKIANOS: Rob, do you want to comment on that as well? LEMPERT: Yeah, nothing on that. FASKIANOS: OK. So we’ll take the next question—and people should raise their hands too, because I don’t love reading all the questions. We want to hear from you. But I will. Jackson Kaspari, who is a resiliency coordinator in Dover, New Hampshire, about where I was born. (Laughs.) The largest uncertainty for impacts on global radiative forcing come from aerosol and the aerosol interactions with clouds. With incredibly complex atmospheric chemistry at play and the potential for long-range transborder regional implications, how could this be employed in a controlled fashion? He did not tackle it in his Ph.D. seminar because of the controversy. So could you see remote sensing and drones playing a large role for monitoring atmospheric— PATRICK: Again, this is—yeah, I mean, this is precisely—I mean, you know, Jackson makes a fantastic point. I mean, this is precisely—it is unbelievably complex. And, you know, DOE has some of the most powerful supercomputer capability in the world. And yet, you know, DOE does not have the mandate or resources to do sort of direct monitoring of cloud-aerosol interactions in the troposphere, the lower part of the atmosphere. And so, you know, that’s one of the reasons why this calls for a significant budget. Now, it’s still peanuts compared to something like the defense budget, but it does envision a research program starting at $300 million a year and going up to about half a billion dollars a year by year five. But it also calls for increased investments in NASA satellite capabilities. It calls for increased investments in what’s called the Earth’s Radiation Budget Program at NOAA, which in particular is looking at sunlight and its interaction with particles in the stratosphere. And so this would have an entire suite of Earth observation systems ultimately attached to it so that we could get to some of the granularity, as they say in the military—(laughs)—of—and the details of, you know, what the dynamics would be. Because Jackson’s absolutely right. These are enormously complex systems. We are also discovering how much we are disrupting those complex systems with our current greenhouse gas policies. FASKIANOS: Rob, do you want to also add to that? LEMPERT: Yeah. Why don’t I do that, and then I can link it to the question about the small experiment that was proposed for Sweden. Yeah. As Stewart suggests—I mean, and the question suggests, I mean, the chemistry and the dynamics of the stratosphere that layer the atmosphere above the one we live in, where these particles would go, is tremendously complicated. And at some point to understand the potential and whether this technology would work or not, and how best to do it—you know, whether we would need drones to track things, et cetera—suggests we need to start—would need to start doing outdoor experiments. And the small experiment that David Keith proposed for Sweden would send a balloon up, release about two or three pounds of material—calcium carbonate—into the stratosphere. And then have little propellers and fly the balloon back through the plume to measure what was going on, and essentially see if the models that the atmospheric chemists have for predicting where that plume would go and what its properties would be, would be, in fact, what we would observe. It’s a tiny, small step towards answering the sort of question that was asked. And that experiment did not take place. And—at least my interpretation, since I had some involvement in that process—was that the experiment, the location of it—the north of Sweden has a spaceport up in the northern part of the country—that it was chosen and announced that the experiment was intended to be there on—entirely on scientific grounds, without any consideration of the people who live there, or even any discussions with the people who live there. So I think the main takeaway from that for me is that any experimental location needs to get on the list with both scientific and—considerations, and considerations of who lives there. And that no experiment ought to be, you know, announced or planned before people in potential launch sites are engaged on what they think about it, and have a chance to weigh in. PATRICK: Yeah, I agree that laying the groundwork with the communities is essential. In this case it was particularly perhaps sensitive because it was in the location of the inhabitants where all the Sami people who have often been marginalized, even in as otherwise nice Swedish political system. So I think that that, plus some environmental concerns—often exaggerated, I think, environmental and health concerns, given that, as Rob said, this small quantity that was going to be there. But I think it had some symbolic importance. And I think that that is a lesson that was learned from that experience. FASKIANOS: Great. Just I will answer one of the questions. We will be sending out after this event a link to the video and transcript so that you can obviously have a copy and share it, as well as a link to Stewart’s report. So we’re going to take the next question from Amy Cruver, who is council member from Tacoma, Washington. Actually, Pierce County Council. How much carbon dioxide is required for healthy plant production? And is the goal now to remove epigenic greenhouse gases as well as naturally occurring ones? I don’t know who wants to take that. PATRICK: Yeah, an interesting question. Yeah, I am not a—you know, I am not a botanist, or I’m not sure that I have—or a forester. So I’m not sure that I know, you know, the precise level that would be healthy. Undoubtably different species would respond differently. But the idea here is—you know, there’s no—in the global sense there’s no distinction between sort of what’s naturally occurring carbon dioxide once it gets into the atmosphere and ones that are sort of anthropogenic in nature. The idea here would not be to try to—I mean, at most it would be trying to offset the level of carbon dioxide that has been put in the atmosphere over the last two hundred years or so, since the start of the industrial revolution. And that is quite a herculean task. Actually, just removing it—just thinking of carbon dioxide removal—if you were going to try to remove—there’s one calculation we had, a report from actually a scientist who works at the University of Washington, speaking of Tacoma, your neighbors. They calculated that the amount of carbon that you’d have to remove from the atmosphere to get down to sort of preindustrial times, if it were—if it were transformed into solid black carbon, it would be the volume of Mount Rainier, basically thirty cubic miles of solid black carbon. So this is a huge enterprise that we are involved in. So that is the kind of carbon that this would have to offset. Again, decisionmakers—political decisionmakers, leaders, could decide whether or not they just want to stop the heat at 1.5 degrees Celsius. But in principle, you could reduce that heat back to preindustrial levels. But again, you have to keep on doing this until you decarbonize the global economy and reduce emissions already there, because there is—that’s why the book that I mentioned, called Termination Shock, if you were suddenly to stop doing this, you run into problems because the—suddenly you have without—if you haven’t reduced the quantity of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. Because if you suddenly stop doing this intervention, then you risk having a very strong spike in temperature. And you have that spike happen much less gradually that it would have occurred otherwise. So it is something you need to keep doing. That’s why this can only be a supplementary intervention, alongside carbon dioxide removal and emissions reduction. FASKIANOS: Rob, do you know the exact figures? Yeah. LEMPERT: Yeah. Yeah, well, let me weigh in on two points here. One is, you know, what is the perfect level of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere? And, I mean, that’s a hard question to answer. Some plants are going to do better with higher. Some are going to do better with lower. Generally, all these targets and goals are based around the idea of trying to stay close or return to something at the level of what we had before we began the industrial revolution and, in particular, the huge and very beneficial explosion of economic growth after the Second World War. There was a question I think earlier on about, well, carbon dioxide has changed levels, and temperature levels have changed, you know, over the Earth’s history. Why is it such a big deal? I mean, the—and this goes to the plant question issue—if you look back at all those wonderful, you know, pictures of dinosaurs that, you know, you and your kids have looked at, I mean, there are plants but they’re very different from the ones we had now. So the Earth has existed in different states than the one we have now, but the transition between them have often been pretty abrupt. We’ve had several mass extinctions in the history of the Earth, many of them associated with big temperature changes and big changes in carbon dioxide. And those things actually happened at a much slower pace than we’re currently changing the landmass—or, the atmosphere. And, you know, had significant disruptions. Things we would not want to live through. So basically, you know, trying to keep the atmosphere roughly the composition it was before we started these large-scale changes to it are—is the goal. On this, you know, scale of Mount Rainer point, I mean, that’s one way to look at it, which suggests how big it is. But another way to look at it is to make a significant dent in the current CO2 levels and bring them back down towards what they were before the industrial revolution, it also would take roughly the same amount of carbon removal technology and sucking through air at roughly the same magnitude of all the car radiators of all the cars we’ve put on Earth. So it’s a massive endeavor, but not different than the massive endeavor that we’re already engaged in to change the Earth’s atmosphere for beneficial purposes. So humankind is already changing the atmosphere at a massive scale. And what we’re talking about here is trying to engineer that intervention to be less disruptive to the climate. PATRICK: Yeah. Can I also just say, there was a question in the comment box which was basically saying, look, during the last, you know, ten thousand years there’s been a lot of—there’s been some significant swings in temperature. You know, if you look, though, at the period of the Holocene, which is the current geologic era we’re in, although some people say we’re now in the Anthropocene. But over the last twelve thousand years, you really don’t see a prolonged variation over basically 1 degree Celsius or 1 degree—minus-1 degree Celsius from where we have been. And then you start to see this tremendous spike over the last—the last two hundred years, particularly over the last fifty years or so. And the other thing is that the buildup of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is quite remarkable. I mean, excuse me, but not just in the atmosphere, but also in the oceans. The oceans are now 30 percent more acidic than they were two hundred years ago. And that is having a devasting impact on aquatic life and marine food chains. Now, obviously, sunlight reflection doesn’t do anything about that, which is another reason why it can only be a complementary strategy, because it doesn’t solve that problem. FASKIANOS: Suds Jain had written a question, which was answered, but he also indicates that he works with the University of Washington on the MSB (sic; MCB) project. So I’m just—is that the same project that you’re referencing, Stewart? PATRICK: Yeah, MCB, marine cloud brightening. Yeah, it’s a really—I am familiar. I know there’s a number of people who work there. But I’m familiar with Sarah Doherty, who was on our advisory board. We had a tremendous advisory committee. But she and her colleagues are investigating this question of marine cloud brightening and actually experimenting with—you know, even developing prototypes of nozzles that you would use to sort of loft sea salt particles, just sort of benign sea salt particles, into the troposphere, but only even a few hundred feet. And then, you know, boundary layer convection will take the up and into the clouds. And they’re—I believe they’re planning—or, the idea is that sometime in either late this year or in 2023 there would be some at least trials over the ocean. There have already been some trials, I believe, off the Great Barrier Reef to try to use—to try to create local cooling. Because, of course, as you know, coral bleaching is a huge problem on the GBR. FASKIANOS: Great. So, Suds, if you want to raise your hand to elaborate on your project, that would be fine. I also want to just point out, from Jeffery Sayegh in New York state, we give tax rebates to homes to implement solar energy. The problem with these rebates is that they do not cover the cost of a battery, so when there’s a blackout solar’s not any use if you don’t have a battery. There’s currently zero federal assistance towards battery powered solar homes. The average family cannot afford this, and most refuse to switch over from natural gas to solar power. So that’s just a comment there. I want to go next to Brian Beck, council member in Denton, Texas. Just stating that the atmospheric reflectivity are global community efforts. What is the role of municipalities in this sort of response? So connecting it to what people should be thinking about in their communities. Rob, I’m going to throw that one to you. LEMPERT: Yeah. Yeah. So I think, you know, proceeding with your climate action plans, that include adaptation and mitigation, you might consider including some type of carbon removal. You know, in particular based on nature-based solutions, but perhaps becoming engaged with some of the demonstration projects with carbon capture and storage, particularly if you have geological formations where carbon storage might be—might be an option. And the—and then the connection with the sunlight reflection is a little bit less—you know, less direct. But you may want to consider, you know, your state’s view on what—on experimentation. If there are—if there were interest in open-air experiments in your state or city, what would be the conditions under which that would take place? What sort of public participation, what sort of other conditions would you like to see for that to take place? FASKIANOS: Mmm hmm. OK. I’m going to go next to George Tyler, trustee in Essex Town, Vermont. Do the proposed sunlight reduction strategies reduce all wavelengths and frequencies of incurring—I’m sorry—of incoming UV radiation across the board? Or are certain wavelengths and frequencies affected more than others? Stewart, is that a question for you? I think—is Stewart frozen? I think Stewart’s frozen. He’s frozen! (Laughs.) OK. So, Rob— PATRICK: Can you hear me? FASKIANOS: Yes, Stewart. Go ahead. No, I think you’re going to have to take it. PATRICK: How about this? LEMPERT: OK. FASKIANOS: Wow, you cloned yourself. We have the fixed Stewart and the—on a different device Stewart. (Laughs.) PATRICK: What’s the question? FASKIANOS: So the question was—let me just pull it back up because I marked it as—oh. Do the proposed sunlight reduction strategies reduce all wavelengths and frequencies of incoming UV radiation across the board? Or are certain wavelengths and frequencies affected more than others? PATRICK: I believe that they’re reduced across the board, but I would need to check on that. Do you— FASKIANOS: Rob? LEMPERT: Yeah. My answer is the same, yeah. I mean, I—most particles, you know, have absorption spectrums and, you know, work differentially across different frequencies. But I don’t—I actually don’t know how flat or how—you know, I don’t know the answer to that question. It’s actually pretty googleable. Let me try to check while we’re talking. FASKIANOS: OK. Erica Norton from Federal Way, Washington has a couple of questions about—and I know you addressed her—the first question, Stewart. But we are at a solar minimum and in the coolest recorded warm period in 10,000 years. What effect will reducing the sunlight have on farming and food production? And the corollary to that, since trees and foliage derive their sustenance from carbon and sunlight, what will happen to the trees and foliage if they do not have carbon and sunlight with which to feed? PATRICK: Yeah. Again, a number of climate scientists have looked at both of those questions. And there just—in terms of food production, that does not seem to be a—does not seem to have a huge impact. The impact—the potential impact there, and this is the caveat, is that there could be regional differences in precipitation patterns. This sunlight itself—the reduction in sunlight itself could, at the very margin, have some—you know, some impact—(audio break)—productivity. But it’s more the question of—because if you do this, you’re not returning the climate to its preindustrial situation. You’re basically reducing the heat in the atmosphere, but what are the ramifications of that for precipitation in different areas? And so it’s possible—and this is what we have to find out with more science. It’s possible that there will be winners and losers in this, at least—at least modest winners and losers. And there are a few more worrisome potentialities, although it’s controversial. One of them is that sunlight reflection could have perturbations on the Indian Ocean monsoons. And if that were the case, there could be rather dramatic consequences for Indian agriculture. It’s been something that Indian scientists have talked about and have suggested we need more research for it. But I don’t—at least what I’ve seen does not—it is not huge ramifications for agricultural productivity. LEMPERT: As a simple rule of thumb, climate change is about water. Because water carries most of the energy in the atmosphere. And so a small change in carbon dioxide, its biggest effects on agriculture, as Stewart was saying, is where the water goes. So, you know, whether you’re going to have more or less precipitation, what season it comes in, whether you have floods, whether you have drought, and the effects of—the effects of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, the effects of change in the reflectivity of the Earth, the big effects on agriculture are, by and large, going to be where the water goes. And that’s the thing that we don’t understand very well. FASKIANOS: Great. Going to Tony Rogers, who’s an attorney in La Paz County, Arizona. Are the so-called chemtrails that we’ve been seeing in the sky over the past several years really solar reflection experiments already underway? LEMPERT: Yeah, I can answer that. No. There is a lot of—there have been a lot of very sort of rich—there’s a rich tradition of looking at chemtrails as some sort of experiment either being undertaken by the government or by some malevolent actors or, conceivably, even, you know, by some international authority like the United Nations. The chemtrails—at least the so-called chemtrails, as I understand them, are basically, you know, similarly vapor trails that are left behind by aircraft. There may be other sort of naturally occurring phenomenon, like cirrus clouds, et cetera, that make something look like it’s been a trail left behind. But the question does raise an interesting point, which is how do we know if somebody’s actually started doing this? And from what I understand, the—particularly in the wake of the National Intelligence Council’s report last fall that some countries could start to do this—there’s been a certain amount of increased attention, shall we say, at different parts of the U.S. government about how one could actually monitor whether or not this was going on, and could we actually tell if there was a clandestine program, say, I don’t know, not to pick on United Arab Emirates or India or China or some other country. But how would we know whether or not they’d actually launched something? And there’s—I think the answers are mixed as to whether or not we could, through our current observational apparatus—be able to ascertain that question. And you could imagine that this sort of issue and the controversy surrounding it could really disrupt international politics. You could even imagine some countries threatening to do this as a form of blackmail, either to get other countries to give them aid or to, you know, enhance their own emissions efforts—emissions reductions efforts. FASKIANOS: There’s one more question before we wrap up, if anybody wants to raise their hand or write in another question. But how can we go about and start implementing this technology and installing them on ships, cruise ships, airplanes, et cetera? PATRICK: That’s really interesting. I mean, there are—there are proposals right now to put—it’s less to spread—(audio break)—or other material in the stratosphere, but more to sort of put monitoring equipment and analysis equipment on some airliners, or freight airlines, that you could actually—while the plane was up there, they could actually be measuring the state of the stratosphere, which would seem to kind of make sense, right, with the atmosphere. With respect to, you know, the—I think that any—at least the planes for deployment of this sort of thing, if you didn’t do it by balloons, which is one possibility. Another way you could even use sort of the equivalent of artillery shells, in a sense, to sort of place some of this material up in the—up in the atmosphere. But the planes would be sort of specially modified, relatively higher altitude airplanes, to go about this. Yeah. And it’s—you know, the same—the same thing has been suggested for cruise ships and other sort of oceangoing vessels, which presumably could serve also as platforms for actually deploying some of this. Already, as I mentioned, you know, pollution creates a certain amount of brightness in clouds. And that includes low-lying marine clouds. We’ve talked about chemtrails before, but—which, you know, the vapor trails basically from airlines. You get a similar thing if you look at, from down at the ocean front, satellites. You can see so-called ship tracks. And that’s basically ship pollution that has gone up into the air. And it actually brightens marine clouds. And so those things are already going on. But you could imagine trying to piggyback on some of the existing sort of merchant fleets that we have around the world, to try to do this. I haven’t seen much written about that, but they have talked about platforms and ships as being a place that—a way that you could actually do this. FASKIANOS: Great. So I’m going to take the final question from Renee Suwaneski, who’s from Bartlett Village, Illinois. And if you could, you know, react to her question and also any parting thoughts, because we are coming to the end of our time. So we’ll first go to you Stewart, and then to Rob. So, Stewart, you mentioned winners and losers when answering the question of food shortages. How would those winners and losers be determined? And, you know, if you could tack onto that any closing thoughts you would like to leave us with. PATRICK: Yeah. No, I mean, it’s a huge issue because, you know, one could imagine losers—and this would be quite politically—geopolitically sensitive. You can imagine losers being Russia, right? It’s been interesting, we tend to think of the geopolitical rivalry between the United States and its Western partners on the one hand and increasing and maybe even a Cold War against the sort of two big authoritarian players. But what’s interesting with respect to climate change is that, you know, the Chinese are very worried about water security. And so they would conceivably be winners if they had a little bit less heat to worry about. Whereas, in Russia there’s been much less—they’re kind of much more easy come easy go when it comes to climate change because, you know, their wheat belt is moving north in Siberia at quite a clip. And so they may see this—and, you know, obviously the northern sea route between Europe and Asia. So they may see this as a way to be winners. You know, determining all of these things is really going to have to depend on an incredible, much more detailed, sort of map of vulnerabilities and benefits. And that probably would have—there would have to be some international regime eventually to have some level of compensation. The last point I’ll just make with respect to just a general point, which is that I do want to reiterate that this is not a solution to climate change. I also want to reiterate that I’m not advocating for its deployment, just its—at this stage—just its study. Whatever happens, it’s very important that we think about how these different—these four arrows in our so-called quiver of managing climate risk, actually relate to one another and actually complement and reinforce one another, rather than having one being seen as the silver bullet. Because, as Rob mentioned, one of the priorities with respect to managing your portfolio, stock or otherwise, is to diversify. FASKIANOS: Rob, over to you. LEMPERT: Yeah. No, very interesting question. And I think you have to separate into can we—how well can we predict who the winners and losers might be, and then how, well, if we ever did this sunlight reflection and it, in fact, created winners and losers, could we tell? And so on that second question, the science of what’s called attribution, being able to attribute particular storms, droughts, or heat waves to the effects of climate change has gotten much, much better in the last couple of years, which I think will have a lot of implications across the board. But in this particular one, we probably would be able to tell—you know, have a pretty good ability to tell if there was a major climate intervention and there was, say, a big drought or a lack of monsoon in a particular place. We’d probably be able to do a pretty good job of attributing it to an action that some country or, you know, entity had taken. And then, as Stewart said, that that would work a lot better if there were ways to think about compensation beforehand, as opposed to after the fact. Predicting what the effects of a climate intervention might be is—you know, we’re a long, long way from that. And part of the research agenda that, you know, Stewart’s outlined would be to improve our ability to do that. And, yeah, as parting thoughts, just to thank everybody for their interest and just to, again, reiterate that, you know, addressing climate change, there is no silver bullet and it’s really something where we need to work across the board on a diverse portfolio of solutions, and ones that are, you know, customized for each particular location and state and locality. And, yeah. Thanks, all. FASKIANOS: So I’m going—I’m going to ask one last question from Amy Cruver, because I think it is important. What effect does the war in Ukraine—is it having on our efforts to go carbon neutral or net zero? Like, in terms of how much is this going to set us back, the war and what’s happening there? Not fair to end on this, but I just thought if you could give a quick prediction. PATRICK: Yeah, I just—I think it’s set it back quite significantly, at least in the medium-term—short and medium-term, because it’s put an emphasis on, you know, energy security. And I think that there’s a long-term way of thinking about energy security, which is going really more towards the renewables. But I think that at least in the short term it’s definitely put the emphasis on, you know, fossil fuel extraction. And even removal of things like gas taxes and things like that at the pump. But Rob may have other views. LEMPERT: Yeah, no, no, I agree with that. I mean, it also has highlighted the—some of the dangers of dependence on fossil fuels. And so I would just offer that, you know, as sort of a general guideline, perhaps the best way to respond to this crisis is trying to, you know, enhance use and production of current fossil fuel assets, but direct investments—any new investments towards other types of energy might, in the long term, be a productive way to respond to the crisis. FASKIANOS: There’s a theme here. Diversity. (Laughs.) Diversify and try to put—use as many tools as possible at our disposal to come into play. Well, thank you both. This was really, really great. We really appreciate your being with us, to you, Stewart, for authoring this report. Again, you all should, if you haven’t already, take a look at it. We will send out a link to the recording and transcript. You can follow Stewart Patrick on Twitter at @stewartpatrick and Rob Lempert at @robertlempert. So go there. You can also sign up for Stewart’s blog on CFR.org, The Internationalist. So I encourage you to do that. And as always, visit CFR.org, ForeignAffairs.com, and ThinkGlobalHealth.org for more expertise and analysis on these issues, and more. And do email us, [email protected], to let us know how we can support the work that you are doing in your communities. We appreciate all your efforts. Hope you all stay safe and well. And we look forward to having you join us for the next webinar. So take care. LEMPERT: Thanks, all. PATRICK: Thanks. (END)
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    Jody Freeman, the Archibald Cox professor of law and director of the Environmental and Energy Law Program at Harvard University, leads the conversation on global climate policy. FASKIANOS: Welcome to today’s session of the Winter/Spring 2022 CFR Academic Webinar Series. I’m Irina Faskianos, vice president of the National Program and Outreach here at CFR. Today’s discussion is on the record, and the video and transcript will be available on our website, CFR.org/academic. As always, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy. We’re delighted to have Jody Freeman with us to talk about global climate policy. Professor Freeman is the Archibald Cox professor of law, founding director of the Environmental and Energy Law Program, and a leading scholar of administrative and environmental law at Harvard University. From 2009 to 2010, Professor Freeman served as counselor for energy and climate change in the Obama administration. She is a fellow of the American College of Environmental Lawyers, a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, as well as a member of CFR. She also serves as an independent director on the board of ConocoPhillips, which is an oil and gas producer. Professor Freeman has been recognized as the second most-cited scholar in public law in the nation and has written extensively on climate change, environmental regulation, and executive power. So, Professor Freeman, thanks very much for being with us today. We just saw the release of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the IPCC, Sixth Assessment Report, that was quite pessimistic about the outlook on the future. Can you talk a little bit about that report and connect it to what we are going to see the effects on climate policy and what we need to be doing to really remediate what’s happening in the world? FREEMAN: Well, thank you very much for having me. It couldn’t be a more important or interesting moment to be having this conversation, and mostly I look forward to you, students, posing some questions and us having some back and forth. So, Irina, I will be as brief as I can in trying to really encapsulate what’s going on now to set the stage for the discussion that I hope we will have. First, as you noted, the IPCC, which of course is the UN-established organization that since 1988 has put out periodic assessments of the science of climate change and their consensus-based assessments written by about six—about two hundred scientists from about sixty countries, so to give you a sense of the authority of the documents they’ve put out. This assessment was quite bleak, and really—I can read a couple of the top line conclusions to you, but the essential message is that climate change is accelerating. It has already been wreaking havoc and doing significant damage to human health, environment, and ecosystems. It is already causing and will cause increasingly devastating wildfires, historic droughts, landslides, floods, and more intense hurricanes. The long list of things that you all are witnessing around the world—think of the Australian fires, the California fires, the historic flooding we’ve seen here in the United States. The report basically says this will get worse if we continue without significant reductions in greenhouse gas emissions soon, beginning immediately, and cutting them quite drastically. There are many conclusions here about the need to accelerate the pace of our efforts, the need for the governments of the world to do more than they have pledged to do under the Paris Agreement, which we can talk about, which is the international climate agreement that the overwhelming majority of the world’s countries have pledged, have made commitments to. And the U.S. has renewed its commitment to the Paris Agreement under the Biden administration saying that it will achieve 50 to 52 percent of emissions reductions here in the United States below 2005-levels by 2030. So a very significant upping of the U.S. commitment recently at the Conference of the Parties last year in Glasgow, Scotland. That agreement is the prevailing international agreement, but this report says it’s not enough. Even if the countries of the world were to meet their pledges—and that’s an open question—what the report essentially says is we need to do more, and so there’s a consensus on the science. I don’t think there can be reasonable disagreement about the science of climate change at this point. There is significant evidence that it is already happening, already changing the world’s—the patterns that we have seen in, again, weather patterns, storms, floods, droughts, heat waves, and it is already threatening communities. The question now is, how do we close this gap between what the report—what the IPCC report is telling us is happening, the risks that the report is warning us about—how do we close the gap between that and what the governments of the world have agreed to do under the Paris Agreement? And I want to note just two other contextual developments here that make this problem even more challenging. One is what I think you’re all very conscious of now, as we all think about daily, the war in Ukraine, and the fact that that is scrambling in the geopolitics of energy. Russia, as one of the world’s top three suppliers of oil and gas, produces about 40 percent of Europe’s natural gas, and now there are sanctions that the U.S. has imposed, and that other countries have announced they will gradually phase in, against Russian oil and gas supplies. The price of gas, as you may all have noticed the United States, is sky high. That’s not just because of the war in Ukraine, but it hasn’t helped. And attention has moved to what this war means not just for the devastating human consequences, but also what is it doing to the—how to encapsulate this—to the power relationships among the world’s nations that are anchored in oil and gas, and how is it shifting the relative power of the oil-producing countries vis-à-vis each other. That conversation about how we’re going to produce enough oil and gas to meet Europe’s needs in the absence of or in the presence of sanctions against Russia, where are we going to get the extra supply from? In some sense, that conversation about the short-term need for what is admittedly fossil energy has edged out, has moved out of the main frame of the climate policy discussion temporarily. And the concern among communities, institutions, organizations, people who care deeply about climate change at the moment is, that edging to the side of the climate discussion is the wrong direction to go, is an unhelpful event. And especially in the United States where we now are looking at the dynamics in Congress to see if major climate investments will be part of a legislative package that the Biden administration has been advancing— the Build Back Better package—as the discussion is focused on Ukraine, the short-term need for oil and gas, who will produce and meet the extra demand, that conversation, the worry is it’s not helping climate policy move forward in the United States. And as you all know, the Build Back Better bill has essentially been shelved, and there are ongoing discussions about which pieces of it might move forward. As time passes and we get to the United States’ midterm elections, which are upon us very soon in the fall, the question is, will anything significant in terms of additional climate investments and climate policy come from the United States Congress? Or are they essentially done with the pieces they put into the big infrastructure bill that, as you know, was passed this past fall? The bipartisan infrastructure bill contained significant investments in things like electric vehicle infrastructure, grid investments, and other things that are beneficial for our climate policy. But as you all know, this is not nearly enough, and nothing regulatory went into the Infrastructure Act, and just to be clear about that, there was nothing in the bill that passed Congress in November that operated—that went through a process called budget reconciliation. This really was passed as a budgeting mechanism. Nothing in there regulates industry greenhouse gas emissions, and that’s because regulation can’t go in a budget bill. And what this means is, in the United States we are challenged now to put in place the policies necessary for us to meet our commitment to Paris, and the main vehicle left right now, if Congress remains fairly inactive, is using existing law like the Clean Air Act by which the Obama—listen to me, the Obama administration. I’m remembering my time in the Obama—the Biden administration can use existing law to regulate sector by sector by sector the greenhouse gas emissions that come from the power sector, that come from the transportation sector, that come from the oil and gas sector. That’s what the Biden administration is right now doing. They’re issuing regulations through agencies like the EPA to try to reduce greenhouse gas emissions across the economy on a sectoral and piecemeal basis. And what this all means is that a war is raging in the Ukraine that is refocusing attention on the need for short-term fossil fuels, while a longer-term discussion is happening about how to wean the world off fossil energy, and this dynamic is a very challenging, complicated dynamic in which to have both of those conversations simultaneously. The only thing I’d mention, before now turning to your questions, in addition, is that there is no small irony in the fact that this report that Irina cited, the new installment of the IPCC scientific assessment was issued essentially the day before the Supreme Court of the United States heard argument in a really important climate case in which what’s at stake is the EPA—the Environmental Protection Agency’s authority to set far-reaching standards to reduce our emissions from the power sector. And by all indications, the Supreme Court is poised to restrict the EPA’s ability to set standards that would really force quite forward-leaning change, quite aggressive, ambitious change—speedier, deeper reductions from the electric power sector. It looks like the Court may well constrain the agency, and I can talk more about that for those who are legal eagles and want to know more. But the fact that that argument was heard the day after this report as sort of the juxtaposition of those two things was quite striking. So let me leave it there with these sort of broad observations about what’s happening and turn to you all and see if we can dive deeper into some of these dynamics. FASKIANOS: Thanks a lot for that overview. You can all either raise your hand to ask your question, or you can write it in the Q&A box. So I'm going to first go to Babak Salimitari. Q: I had a question regarding the Paris climate accord. This is a non-binding agreement in which it seems like the United States is the only country going above and beyond to limit emissions and pollution and whatnot, but we’re also the ones suffering the most. You have, like Germany building coal plants. China and India are extremely dirty, filthy countries, to put it bluntly. They admit they destroy environmental places, not just in their own country, but all over the world. But we’re the one paying six bucks for gas. Oil is like a hundred dollars a barrel. FREEMAN: Yeah. Q: Things are getting very expensive and very annoying. So what’s the point of this agreement if we’re not reaping any benefits from it? FREEMAN: Yeah, I hear the question and—but let me add some perspective here. First of all, the ones suffering the most, it’s not us. There are really serious consequences from warming temperatures for countries around the world that are already being inundated because their low-lying coastal populations are at risk. And they’re much more vulnerable because we can afford adaptation measures, we can afford to respond to disasters, and we can afford to invest in resilience or adaptation, whereas many parts of the developing world cannot. They will be swamped. There will be massive migrations. There will be flooding, heat wave and tremendous suffering, and there already are some of these effects around the world. So I just add that perspective because I’m not sure it’s quite right that we’re the only ones or the ones who are suffering the most currently or that we will be in the future. We’re actually, in the United States, fairly well-positioned, even if some of the worst risks we anticipate befall us. We’re just a rich country compared to the rest of the world. I also would just comment that prices for gasoline are sky high here, and I understand that this is, as you say, annoying and quite difficult for folks who, you know, must purchase gas to get to work or must purchase gas in order to move around, they don’t have an option. But I will say that in many parts of the world gas prices are much higher, and they’re much higher in places like Europe and Canada and elsewhere because the governments have chosen to reflect in the price of gasoline more of the harms caused by burning fuel. In other words, they’re internalizing the cost that otherwise people have to bear in terms of health consequences from burning gas, climate consequences, et cetera. So this is all me just saying gas may seem really high and I understand it, but actually many countries choose to impose high gas prices really as a signal to populations about the cost of being dependent on these fuels. But the point of your question, I think, is what’s the value of the Paris Agreement? It’s not binding, and why are we bothering to commit to do so much? And I will say we’re not the only country to make a significant commitment. The EU countries have made significant commitments, even China. To put it in perspective, China’s commitment to level off emissions by a deadline is important. There are very significant pledges that have gone toward this agreement, and the fact that they’re nonbinding, I just want to shed a little light on that. You can say, well, it doesn’t matter because nobody can force these countries to deliver on their pledges, and there is some truth to that. There’s no grand international body presiding over this that comes knocking on the door of the world governments to say, you know, you said you’d pledge to reduce your emissions by X and you’re not even close, so we’re going to penalize you. There’s no such international enforcement system. But it turns out that the format of the Paris Agreement—which is to make a pledge and then to periodically every five years have to do what’s called a “stock take,” where the world countries come together and take stock of where they are in the progress—there are mechanisms to hold each other to account, that’s the theory of the agreement; and that there are regular meetings of the parties called Conferences of the Parties that are meant to be the vehicle for forcing a kind of truing-up and disclosure of how far countries have come. Now that’s an imperfect system, I will concede to you, but it is a big improvement over prior international climate regimes, which purported to be binding. But, for example, the Kyoto Protocol, the prior agreement to the Paris Agreement, only bound the world’s developed nations, meaning the rich countries of the world, and the developing world, which was fast overtaking the developed world in the amount of emissions being produced—so think of China, think of India, Brazil, et cetera—they weren’t part of the agreement. They had no obligation. So, while Kyoto was binding, it was binding on not the entire world, and it’s not the even—who were soon to be the largest emitters, including China. So Paris is an inclusive agreement. China’s in it. India’s in it. Brazil’s in it. Every country that’s a significant share of the world’s emissions is committed, so the inclusiveness of it is thought to be an important advance. Your question is still important. The proof is in the pudding. Are these countries going to come anywhere close to delivering on their pledges? But I guess what I would suggest is, we need an international vehicle in order to continue to press forward. And if the U.S. is in a leadership position in that international agreement, that’s better for our chances than if the U.S. is not. The strongest position to be in is the U.S. and China together. When the Paris Agreement was signed, Obama and Xi combined forces and both supported it. China has now backed off. President Xi did not show up in Glasgow for the meeting personally, whereas the Biden—President Biden did. So now we’re seeing a bit of a different approach. It’s a very long answer, but that’s because how these agreements work—their value, why they’re an improvement or not over the prior—is actually quite complicated. FASKIANOS: Now the war in Ukraine and how China’s going to align with Putin. FREEMAN: Yeah, I mean, this is really interesting—and I don’t know if any of the students have a question about that—but everything is speculative right now. For example—I mean, in terms of how this will come out for China and China’s relationship with the other powers of the world. China’s in a very delicate position, and it may turn out that its alliance with Russia, depending on how that plays out, will leave it in a position of trying to look for opportunities build back relationships with the rest of the world, and it might turn out that climate policy is an opportunity to re-establish itself. And so we can’t see how this will evolve, but a situation that looks at the moment like China’s aligned with the bad actor—Russia in this case—may actually open up opportunities in the future for it to readjust its behavior, and climate may be one of those opportunities. Historically, the United States and China, even when tense relationships existed over trade policy and other things, cooperated on climate. It became an opportunity, especially in the Obama years when I was in the White House. We had a lot of good agreements with China around climate policy, both bilaterally and multilaterally. It was sort of an area—it was a bright spot of relations. That may turn back around and come back following this conflict. FASKIANOS: A written question from, let’s see, Jackie Vazquez, who’s in undergraduate school at Lewis University in Illinois, asking: Is there any possibility for all countries to come together to make a global movement to combat climate change? Would that even make a difference? FREEMAN: I think that the Paris Agreement is meant to be at least an instrument of a global movement to address climate change. But I think if you’re talking about a political movement, that is people, not negotiators, representing governments, but populations and communities—I think we’re seeing some of that. I mean, I think this generation, your generation, has really given voice to a real need for climate action faster. And I give a lot of credit to young people. I say this—it makes me feel 150 years old when I say this—but I think this generation, at least in the United States, it’s taken the form of something called the Sunrise Movement and other youth movements. Of course, Greta Thunberg is the most famous young person putting a face on climate change, insisting that the older generations have let you all down, and I think there’s something to that. I can understand your frustration, and I would feel the same way if I were younger that the people with the power have not taken the steps necessary when they should have taken the steps to mitigate a global problem. And I think that we’re seeing movements all around the world; youth action all around the world. The problem comes in translating that political enthusiasm and political energy into policy, into laws and rules and requirements and incentives and subsidies and investments and inducements to change the trajectory to require over time—and quicker than—than many in industry want—require reductions faster, to translate it into investments from the private sector, because we need trillions of dollars of investments in low carbon technologies, in innovation. Translating that energy into real political action is the challenge. And I guess the one thing I’d say to you all is you have to vote. You have to put into power the people who support these policies, and you know, the youth vote is tremendously and increasingly important. So, in addition to activism, which is—which is critical, you want to vote in state, local, national elections at every opportunity. FASKIANOS: Earlier on, you talked about how the Supreme Court case is going to restrict the EPA trying to regulate. So there’s a question from Nathaniel Lowell, who’s at Skidmore College: Could you talk a little bit more about that Supreme Court decision, what that means for the Biden administration efforts to push forward within an act of Congress? You know, and what can be done? Because that’s pretty significant, and certainly just putting in executive orders, the next administration could just roll back on those—roll those executive orders back. FREEMAN: Yeah. So here’s what I’d say. First of all, I’m speculating a bit when I say the Court seems poised to restrict EPA’s authority. I think most observers think that’s what we got from oral argument. You know, we watched the oral argument, which is when the counsel for both sides—in this case, it was the government represented by the Solicitor General of the United States—that’s how the government is represented in the Supreme Court—and the challengers from the state of West Virginia and about seventeen other states, Republican-led states, along with the coal and mining industry on the other side, arguing this case to the justices. And you know, you can listen to these arguments, by the way. You can go to SupremeCourt.gov and click on the audio portion of these oral arguments. It’s fascinating. So I highly recommend and you can read the transcripts. And what we heard from the argument were the questions of the justices, the back and forth as the advocates were stating their positions, and basically, the petitioners in this case—that is, the mining industry, coal industry and the Republican-led states, including West Virginia—are basically saying the Environmental Protection Agency is overreaching. It’s stretching its authority under the Clean Air Act too far, and the courts should read the language of the Clean Air Act narrowly and limit what they can do. And the government, the Biden administration, and the power sector petitioners—sorry, the power sector respondents—these are legal terms of art, but this describes who’s on what side in the case—the power sector itself, this is the industry being regulated by these standards; this is the coal and natural gas plants across the country. The owners of the utilities that own these plants, they’re the ones who are going to be regulated and required to cut their carbon pollution, and yet they are on the side of the Biden administration because they want to preserve EPA’s power to set standards. They don’t want this to be a free for all in which they get sued in a bunch of different lawsuits. They want a coherent, consistent, implementable, realistic, cost-effective set of standards, and they’re prepared to make reductions. They want this done in an orderly fashion, and they don’t want the Supreme Court making a mess of things by, for example, restricting the EPA so much that the agency won’t take into account the reality of the power sector and how it works and allow them to average emissions—cut average emissions across their fleets; trade where it makes economic sense to trade emissions allowances. The industry wants all these flexibilities, and they’re worried that the Court will be on too much of a mission to cut the agency’s power, which will make the rules less economically sensible for the industry. So I hope that was an understandable explanation of what’s at stake and how unusual it is that the industry being regulated is on the side of the government in this case, supporting the idea that the EPA has the authority to do this, and the consequences of the case here are quite significant. Because if the Court limits EPA, the bottom line is the standards to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from coal and natural gas plants won’t be as stringent as they could have been. They won’t move as quickly as they could have moved, and the cuts won’t be as deep as they could have been. And that’s a loss—that’s a loss of a tool we would have in our toolbox to cut emissions from the sector in our economy that is the second largest sector in terms of its emissions. So we want a robust program to control those, and Congress didn’t pass one. And Congress doesn’t look like it’s passing one, so this is our second-best strategy. And if the Court crimps EPA so much that it limits the stringency, it’s like losing some ability that you thought you had to constrain your domestic emissions, which means it’s harder to fulfill our Paris pledge. That’s the bottom line. The last thing I’ll say—again, kind of a nerdy point, but for those of you who think about law and are interested in law—the Court should never have taken this case. You know, when—when people are unhappy with the decision in a lower court they can appeal to the Supreme Court. They ask the Court to grant review. Our Constitution requires that the Court only take cases where there is demonstrable harm or injury. You can’t go to the Supreme Court and say, you know, I’m not injured, but I really care about this, can you—can you help me out? You have to be injured. In this case there is, actually, currently no rule regulating anybody in the power sector, no federal rule, because the prior administration’s rule way back in the Obama days never went into effect. It was caught in litigation, and it was challenged in court. It never went into effect. And the Trump administration came in and repealed that and put out its own rule, which was a very minimal rule that did almost nothing to reduce emissions, and that got challenged and struck down by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. So, as a result, the bottom line people, there is no current federal rule regulating the power sector. Why would the Supreme Court take a case from West Virginia and other states and the coal industry complaining about something when nobody is being asked to do anything? There’s no harm. So it’s very unusual that the Court granted review in a case like that, and that is why many of us think they’re eager to do something that will constrain the EPA’s authority. I hope that made sense to folks. FASKIANOS: That was really helpful to clarify and give context to what’s going on. Thank you for that. So Terron Adlam has written a question, but also has a hand up. So just ask it yourself and give us your university. FREEMAN: You know, I see my former chancellor, Chancellor Carnesale from UCLA where I started my career. I'm just thrilled to see his name there. That’s great. Q: Hi there. FREEMAN: Hi. Q: Hi. So my question is, do you see any possibility of change of behavior of humans, especially during the global warfare/pandemic? I mean, ice caps are melting. Greenhouse gases are rising so much that—can we go past the differences, you think? FREEMAN: Yeah, I mean it’s very interesting you say that Terron. I do think we talk an awful lot about how we need to require industry to do things and that’s, of course, terribly important—you know, the auto makers and the oil and gas companies and the power plants and steel companies and how we do agriculture around the world. But in the end, there’s demand for energy and we are the demand. I’m sitting here on Zoom consuming a bunch of electricity. I got professional lights that you can’t see that are consuming a bunch of electricity. My phone is charging next to me consuming a bunch of electricity. And you know, I'm probably going to—well, I drive a Tesla—I’m lucky enough to have a Tesla, so I won’t be consuming gas later. But my point is just we all pull on energy, and you know, no one of us can transform the situation. We can’t accomplish the energy transition all by ourselves. But we can start thinking about the decisions we make, and we can start thinking about those implications and consequences. Your generation—I mean, I have a niece and nephew in their twenties, and I hear a lot about how nobody really wants a car anymore, apparently. I’m shocked at this, but there are generational shifts in how people think about consumption. Do you need your own vehicle or can you do ridesharing? Are we going to see ourselves in a world in the next fifteen, twenty years with autonomous vehicles that are electric vehicles, that we essentially share, at least in concentrated urban settings? These kinds of transformations, I think, are in part being driven by the demand from your generation. Likewise, I think as you build wealth—you guys will build wealth over time, right? You’re getting an education, right, and that education is directly connected to your earning power. You will build wealth over time as a result of becoming educated, and when you build wealth, you’ll have a decision about where to invest that wealth. And we see increasingly, social action investors, social commitments being made through people’s investment decisions, and they say we want to put our wealth into these kinds of stocks, these kinds of companies, these kinds of enterprises and not over here in these other ones. And I think that is another kind of behavior—where you put your capital is going to be another kind of decision that can help spark change. So, from the lowest level, most local decision about what you consume and how you consume it to bigger decisions later in life about where you put your money, I think there’s a lot of opportunity for you to make really consequential decisions. But I’m not somebody who believes that all of this will be fine if people just stop consuming energy because we all depend on energy, and we can’t stop consuming energy. For some of us, we can make decisions about where we want to get it from. Some of us live in jurisdictions where we can choose, quote/unquote, “to pay a little more” to be assured of getting more renewable energy as the provider. Not all of us can do that, and so, really, you need your governments to act. This is the kind of problem at the kind of scale where all of our individual activity can’t possibly be enough. I would say we have to do all of it. FASKIANOS: Well, I am going to go to Al Carnesale, your— FREEMAN: Oh! FASKIANOS: —your former chancellor. FREEMAN: My former chancellor! FASKIANOS: Your former chancellor and a CFR member. So, Al, over to you. Q: So we—since we traded places, I left Harvard to come to UCLA, you left UCLA to come to Harvard. FREEMAN: Yes! Q: Congratulations. So here’s my question is about nuclear power. For a number of years environmental groups have been opposed to nuclear power largely because of the waste problem. And then they—in light of climate change, they sort of changed their view and became reluctant supporters. And then came Fukushima and they again opposed nuclear power. Now, as we look ahead with the additional problems you’ve been talking about that may stymie some of our plans to deal with climate change, where do you think we might be headed on the nuclear problem? FREEMAN: You know, it’s interesting—well thank you and it’s just delightful to hear from you and see your—see you again. Here’s what I’d say. There’s a domestic conversation about nuclear and there’s a global conversation about nuclear. And of course, as you know, many countries in the world have made a big bet on nuclear. France has always been dependent on nuclear power, for example. China is investing heavily in nuclear power along with every other kind of energy because of their tremendous need as the population grows, and as they, you know, grow into the middle class. So there’s a lot of opportunity for nuclear to be built, especially updated sort of smaller more modular reactors, the next generation of reactors all around the world, and I think we’re going to see a lot of nuclear deployment. I don’t expect to see it in the United States, and the reason I don’t think we’re going to see it is the legacy you’ve cited, which is this historical discomfort with nuclear, and the ambivalence that is felt in this country about nuclear and the sort of unwillingness to tolerate the risks that are perceived from nuclear. We haven’t solved our long range—our long-term radioactive waste problem. You know, we never decided on Yucca Mountain or anywhere else to put the radioactive waste, so it’s being stored on site for—in large measure. And I think there’s still kind of a very local NIMBYism, a bad reaction to the idea of nuclear power. The challenge for us in the U.S. is right now nuclear provides about 20 percent of our electricity, and as these facilities are retired, where are we going to get that share of our electricity from? Will it be more renewable energy supported by natural gas for baseload? These are the questions if we lose even this relatively small share of nuclear that we have. The only other comment I’d make—and you may well know far more about this than me—but from my understanding of the cost comparison now, nuclear power, at least in the United States, is just far too expensive to build and not cost-competitive with the alternatives. Natural gas has been cheap because of hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling. There’s sort of abundant natural gas reserves released from shale. It outcompetes coal, and renewables have dropped so much in cost that they are extremely cost-competitive, so I don’t think nuclear competes in the American market, at least, this is what the experts have said to me. FASKIANOS: Al, given your expertise in this field, do you want to add anything? Q: It’s not to add anything, it’s to agree, largely. I think the catch is, how caught up are you in climate change? Because natural gas may be better than coal, but it’s not better than nuclear. But it would have to be government-subsidized, which basically in France it’s a national security consideration. So it would have to be subsidized as we subsidize many other things. FREEMAN: Right. Q: But I don’t see it happening. I think—I was actually on the President’s blue-ribbon commission, who tried to come up with a strategy for what to do about the waste. FREEMAN: Yeah. Q: And the strategy said it had to go someplace where the people agreed to take it. FREEMAN: Yeah. Q: And that’s not—that’s not happening. So I think your conclusion is right, but it is a tension for those of us who are concerned about climate change. FREEMAN: Yeah, it is a tension. And I think you rightly point out the evolution in thinking in the environmental community about this that initially opposed then, sort of, wait a minute, this is a zero-carbon source of energy and we should be for it. And you know, I—this is—for the students, you know, I always say to my students you can’t be against everything. You have to be for something. You can’t say, well, fossil energy, a disaster; nuclear energy, we’re not interested in that, that’s too risky et cetera, and all we want is wind and sun, when, at least currently without storage capacity, wind and sun alone without some support—this is in the electricity sector—wind and sun alone without some baseload support to regularly supply the energy when the wind isn’t blowing and the sun isn’t shining, you need something else. And that’s what Chancellor Carnesale and I are talking about. What is that baseload? Is it going to be natural gas? Is going to be nuclear, et cetera? So you have to be for something, people, is the upshot of this exchange. FASKIANOS: Thank you. So I’m going to go next—there are two written questions from Kai Corpuz and Natalie Simonian, and they’re both undergrads at Lewis University. I think they must either—must be focused at Lewis University or both taking the same course. Really talking about wealthy nations helping developing countries. Developing countries are not equipped with the funds to push for a green future. How are they supposed to participate in this? And you know, what is—what are the wealthy nations’ obligation to help assist developing economies in dealing with climate change? FREEMAN: Yes, I mean it’s a really good question. And of course, the developed world has an obligation to assist the developing world through technology transfer, with financial support. If the developed world wants other countries that have not had a chance to get as far in developing their economies yet, if they want their cooperation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, they’re going to have to make a contribution to support these countries in all these ways—financing, tech transfer, help with adaptation and resilience. And that commitment is part of the Paris Agreement, but it is true that the pledges that governments have made so far to produce annually billions of dollars for the developing world have not materialized to the level that was promised. So we are behind on that, and this is a significant problem. There is a very legitimate equity claim being made here, which is that the developed world has enjoyed economic growth. GDP has risen. We’ve all achieved a level of wealth and middle class. I mean, I’m talking on average for the developed world, obviously not everyone. We have tremendous income inequality in this country and around the world, but relatively speaking, our societies have evolved and become richer because of industrialization. We’ve already produced all our greenhouse gas emissions to achieve this level of prosperity, and the notion that now countries that haven’t gotten there yet should just reduce their emissions to their own economic disbenefit, I think everyone agrees that is not a legitimate position to take without offering assistance and support. So I think the leading countries of the world understand this and agree to this. The question is, how do you operationalize this? How do you best support and help the developing world? Where are the investments best made? How do we make sure the governments of the world are held to their commitments and produce the money they promised to produce? And that is an integral part of the Paris Agreement process. So, you know, I don’t want to suggest this is an easy problem, but I do agree the question is absolutely the correct way to think about this, which is we do have to help the countries of the world if we expect for us to achieve our climate mitigation and adaptation goals. FASKIANOS: Thank you, I’m going to go next to a raised hand from Sally Eun Ji Son, I believe at Columbia. Q: Oh, yeah. Hello. My name is Sally. I’m currently at Stanford engineering and an incoming PhD student at Columbia in the Political Science Department. And sort of relevant—related to, like, how different countries are in different stages, what I’ve noticed, as someone between Gen Z and Millennial—what I’ve noticed is that I, as an individual, like to take environmentally-conscious decisions. Yet, there’s some—there’s sort of this, like—a debate going on, like your action will not do anything to the Earth, your action will not do anything to climate change. And when I sort of encounter those debates, how should I navigate myself? Like, should I say it’s maybe not a direct environmental effect, but it could be a symbolic effect, political effect? Sort of, like, how do I navigate that individuals could also have power or, like, have a stance or position in shaping climate policy around the world? FREEMAN: Well, first of all, I applaud you for engaging in those debates, and you know, sometimes when we come up against viewpoints that we don’t agree with, we run away because we’re not interested in engaging. And I would just encourage you all to engage, and I mean in the most respectful way. I’ll get to the heart of your question, but it just gives me this opportunity to make this one pitch to you. So allow me—indulge me in making this one pitch to you about engaging in the way you’re suggesting. You know, my law students what I ask them to do is in the classroom if they hear something they disagree with, sometimes very strongly, I ask them to put it at its highest—in other words, make it the best version of that argument before you criticize it. So, if somebody didn’t make the best version of their argument and it’s easy to take them down, actually elevate it and say, I think—I think what you’re saying is this, and then what I’m hearing is this and give it the best, most legitimate form you can, and then engage with it on the merits, not them as a person. You don’t attack them as a person, but say here’s where I think differently. Here’s my perspective on these issues. So just the idea that you’re prepared to go back and forth on this, I think, is very laudable, and I encourage you to do it in that very respectful way. And you may not convince people of your point of view, but you may give them something to think about. And so what I’d say is—a little bit following on my earlier comment—that individual action can be impactful cumulatively, of course it can. If an entire community makes a decision to compete in their consumption of energy—you know there are these competitions among neighborhoods to be more energy-efficient. You know, you get this little notice in the mail that says your home is good compared to your neighbors, and your home is—in some communities this works. It actually promotes competition. In other communities it annoys them. It really depends on the politics of the community. But the point of this is just to say, communities are just—it’s just a cumulative set of individual actions, right? So I do think there’s something to changing individual behavior, and if lots of people do that, that makes a difference. So I don’t accept the idea that nothing you do matters, so don’t do anything. I mean, that argument is a recipe for never doing anything about anything. That is a large problem—because your share is necessarily small, so why should you change, and that, to me, is an excuse for inaction and apathy so that can’t be the right argument. But you can accept that individuals alone, even aggregated behavior alone, can’t change the world’s energy systems, that the scope and scale of that challenge—that’s a hundred-year challenge that requires the governments of the world to lead. So you can talk about the individual difference you can make, but that’s not enough, right? And all of these things have to be done at the same time, and they fit together. You know, local, national—state level, national, global, this all must be done at the same time. That’s the scope and scale of this problem. It’s a really—climate is a really hard problem because the world’s energy system is important for everything from our economic prosperity to our national security, and you can’t transform the world’s energy system overnight without affecting—first of all, you can’t transform it overnight no matter what you do. But even as we transition, we have to think about national security implications, which is what the Ukraine war makes us do. There are geopolitical implications to how energy moves around the world, and who has energy power around the world. And as we shift to a different energy profile, those the power dynamics will shift, and we need to think about that. You know, we need to make sure that the United States has an energy policy that is strategically in our interest, and you can’t think about climate without thinking about that. Likewise, you can’t think about climate change without thinking about economic development and—and the flourishing—the ability of societies to flourish. So—and you can’t think about it without thinking about equality and equity and justice. So it’s a really hard problem, but that’s why it’s so fascinating to learn about. FASKIANOS: Thank you, the next question is from Chaney Howard, who is a senior honors international business major at Howard University. Going back to the war on Ukraine, how do you feel the argument for infrastructure development can be introduced into this conversation as new strategies and allegiance pledges are emerging? FREEMAN: I’m not sure I fully understand that. Can we have a little bit of clarification? FASIKANOS: All right, Chaney, are you able to unmute yourself to clarify, because I can’t divine from the written question. Q: Can you hear me now? FREEMAN: Yes, excellent. Q: OK, perfect. So my question is really surrounding ways that the conversation can be a little bit more direct. So you mentioned how there needs to be a development of infrastructure for overall environmental, like, sustainability, and you were talking about electric cars— FREEMAN: Right. Q: —and just kind of having that conversation with global powers. And so I’m curious how you think—now that we’re in this transitional period and some of the nations that are supporting Ukraine are working to develop new strategies and new partnerships, what are ways that we can encourage the government and then the global commerce centers to kind of establish those new strategies for environmental sustainability? FREEMAN: So I’m not a 100 percent sure how Ukraine fits there. But let me talk more generally about this idea of infrastructure and investment because I think what the IPCC report that we were talking about that’s projecting climate-related risks and saying what’s necessary to do in order to avoid them and what the Paris Agreement represents and what I think the current conversation around what’s necessary tells us—the strong message from all of these vehicles and processes and meetings, the strong message is we need massive investment from the private sector and government combined in partnership into what the new energy system of the globe has to look like. Meaning, you have to build the power plants of the future. You have to support commercial-scale renewable power. You have to build the charging infrastructure to electrify the transportation fleet to the extent possible. You have to build a modern grid, not just in this country but all around the world, that is capable of supporting the level of electrification that we need. Because to move sectors like transportation off oil and gas, you’re going to need—off oil, rather—transportation is mostly dependent on oil—you’re going to need to power them differently, and right now we’re thinking of mostly powering cars and many trucks from electricity, which means fortifying the nation’s and the globe’s grids. All of that is infrastructure. All of that requires investment. And there are massive R&D investments, you can imagine, necessary in the low carbon technology of the future. Hydrogen—eventually producing green hydrogen as a fuel source. There are techniques for removing carbon from—direct air capture. Carbon from the atmosphere, things like direct air capture. Or, you know, other carbon removal technologies, they’re controversial but they may be necessary. Carbon capture and sequestration, putting it underground, carbon dioxide underground—again, controversial. But if any of these future low-carbon technologies or remediation techniques are going to succeed, they will require trillions of dollars of investments. So, the kind of level of investment that people are talking about—I’ll just give you an example. At the latest COP meeting, the Conference of the Parties, meeting in Glasgow, Scotland, which is—these meetings are part of the international process of updating and checking in on the Paris Agreement. The world’s biggest companies and financial institutions came together, and 5,200 businesses pledged to meet net-zero carbon emissions by 2050 and 450 banks, insurers and investors representing $130 trillion in assets. Those are the assets they invest, which is 40 percent of the world’s private capital. And I’m giving you all these numbers because I want to impress you with the scale of the commitments you’re seeing from the private sector, from banks and lenders, investors and businesses. They committed to making their portfolios climate neutral by 2050. My point is there is a lot of activity in the private sector, both committing to net-zero goals themselves and also committing to investing capital, big money, trillions of dollars—up to $9 trillion annually is what is projected to be needed, that’s $105 trillion over thirty years. That’s how much money we need to put into the infrastructure you’re talking about, the new—next generation energy infrastructure. All of the things I’ve discussed—the future of power plants, the future of transportation, new breakthrough technologies, new remediation techniques, new resilience—all of this requires massive investment. And the governments of the world and the private sector are nowhere near what they need to do combined to pull off what amounts to a moon-shot kind of level of investment. So this is a long answer, but it’s a way of saying the infrastructure we’re talking about in a really concrete way is the energy system of the future, and it’s going to require a massive level of investment. FASKIANOS: Thank you. We’re going to go next to William Naeger, who is a law student at Washburn University. Q: Hi. Yeah, like she said, I’m at Washburn Law School. I’m wondering if your impression is that these kinds of issues will continue to mainly be governed internationally by COP or the Paris Agreement? Or, if over time, as it becomes more and more extreme, whether it will just become one factor in, like, national security and trade agreements and migration issues and kind of just run through everything else that we do already? FREEMAN: Well, I think this is very astute of you, because, in fact, I think climate change as a global challenge has actually come into the mainstream of all of these other fields. I do think that it is part of the discussion around national security. I do think that climate is part of the discussion around trade and that it will become more embedded and more central to these other domains over time. And I think that—people talk a lot about how we could pair climate commitments of countries with trade measures that countries— the trade relationships that countries have with each other. And people talk, for example, about eventually having countries pledge to reduce their emissions, and if they don’t reduce them, they may suffer a border tariff on goods that are produced in countries that don’t have climate policies, that impose costs for greenhouse gas emissions. So they’ll have to—there’ll be a tariff or a border tax on goods that are basically being produced and sold cheaper because they’re not subject to carbon constraints. That’s a merging of climate and trade policy that we may well see over time. Likewise, I think we’re learning to talk. We’re not there yet entirely, but we’re learning to talk about national security and climate together. Climate is really a national security issue. And you saw the Department of Defense and its reports and testimony to Congress from members of the military who are frequently called on to testify about the impact of climate change on the—they will acknowledge that climate change is a threat multiplier for the military and it’s a national security issue. Likewise, when we talk about the Ukraine conflict, the war, and we talk about the need to supply the world with oil and gas in times like this when one of the largest suppliers is engaged in very bad action and being sanctioned for it, how do we meet those short-term energy needs but stay on path with our climate goals? That’s a very hard thing to do. You have to be able to talk about the short-term, the medium-term, the long-term all at the same time. So I think your question is very smart in the sense that you understand that climate has to become embedded in all of these other fields and conversations, and I think that’s already happening. The Biden administration, I think, to its credit has announced what it calls a whole of government approach to climate, and I think it’s trying to do basically what you’re talking about, which is say the entire federal government that the Biden administration runs, right, say to all the agencies across federal government—from financial regulators like the Securities and Exchange Commission, which makes sure that markets are open and transparent and investors have the right information—even the financial regulators are saying, listen, companies, if you want to trade on this exchange, you better disclose your climate-related risks so investors can make decisions that are appropriate. That’s bringing climate into financial regulation. And so the Biden administration has basically said this issue should appear and be relevant to all the things we do. And so I think we’re seeing what you’re talking about happening to a greater extent, more and more. FASKIANOS: So, Jody, we’re at the end of our time. There are a lot of questions that we could not get to, and I apologize for that. Just to sum up, what do you think we all should be doing at the individual level to do our part to affect change and to help with the climate change crisis? FREEMAN: Well, like anybody who’s had media training I’m going to not answer your question and say what I want to say anyway, which is— FASKIANOS: Perfect. (Laughs.) FREEMAN: —yeah—because I actually think I’ve talked a little bit about what we can all do and why it makes sense to take individual action. But what I think I would say, rather, is just I know that there is a lot of reason for pessimism, and I really understand it. And I certainly sometimes feel it myself. I mean, you know, you guys have been through a very, very tough time—a global pandemic, which has been just an awful experience, scary, and disorienting. And you’re doing it while you’re trying to go to school and live young lives, and that’s been hugely disruptive. You now see this war in Ukraine, which is deeply, deeply upsetting, a horrific assault on the Ukrainian population, and you’re living at a time when you think climate change is a major challenge that, perhaps, the governments of the world aren’t up to. And you see a divided country and, in fact, divisions all around the world and threats to democracy, and restrictions on voting rights. I see what you see, and I can see why you would be upset and worried. But I also want to suggest to you that things are also changing, and there are lots of opportunities for good things to happen. And there’s a tremendous amount of innovation and creativity on all kinds of low carbon technologies. There are innovations all the time that open up possibilities. Just look at what’s happened with solar power and wind power, renewable power over time. The costs have dropped. The potential for wind and solar has increased exponentially. That’s a very hopeful thing. So technology change is very promising. There’s a possibility to affect politics in a positive direction. I encourage you to affect politics—this sort of answers your question, Irina. So affect politics in a positive direction, be active, be engaged, because you can effect change by—through activism and through voting. And I also encourage you to pursue professions where you can make a mark. I mean, you can make a difference by engaging with these issues from whatever professional occupation you choose. You can engage with one or another aspect of these challenges of climate, energy, national security. So I have reason for optimism. I think, as frustrating as it is to say, well, the Paris Agreement isn’t enough, there’s another way to look at it, which is there is an international agreement on climate change. It does have a level of ambition that is an initial step and can be built upon, if we can keep the structure together, if the U.S. continues to lead and look for partners in leading along with the EU. Maybe China will come back to the fold eventually. In other words, things change. Stay tuned, be engaged, and stay optimistic because I, frankly, think there is tremendous opportunity for your generation to engage with these issues in a really constructive and transformative way. And that is where I would leave it. FASKIANOS: Thank you so much, and I’m glad you left it there. It was a perfect way to end this webinar, and thanks to everybody for joining. You should follow Jody Freeman on Twitter at @JodyFreemanHLS, so go there to see what she continues to say. Our next Academic Webinar will be on Wednesday, April 6, at 1:00 p.m. Eastern Time. We’ll focus on China, India, and the narratives of great powers. And in the meantime, I encourage you to follow us at @CFR_academic and, of course, go to CFR.org, ForeignAffairs.com, and ThinkGlobalHealth.org for research and analysis on global issues. So thank you again, and thank you, Professor Freeman. (END)
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      Stewart Patrick: Welcome to this roundtable. Today we're going to be discussing an issue that was addressed by no less than Tom Friedman in his latest New York Times column this week: the possibility that, thanks to global warming, we may be approaching critical tipping points in important components of the earth system. Many of us, of course, are accustomed to thinking of climate change as something of a gradual and linear process, mirroring the steady accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. The latest IPCC report on climate change left little doubt that Earth's current trajectory is dismal. We're on course to blow well past the Paris climate targets, and the Glasgow pledges do not change this. Today we'll be discussing something even more worrisome: accumulating scientific evidence that rising temperatures may in fact reach critical thresholds in the subcomponents of the earth system in ways that themselves accelerate climate change with dire consequences. We will be discussing what these nonlinear discontinuities might look like and how they should shape or expand humanity's portfolio of strategies for managing climate risk. That portfolio currently consists of emissions abatement, adaptation and resilience, and carbon dioxide removal. We have two great speakers to walk us through the science of tipping points and its implications for us and global policymakers. I won't try to summarize their sterling biographies, which you undoubtedly have. Peter Cox is a professor of climate systems dynamics in mathematics at the University of Exeter, where he leads the university's interdisciplinary work on climate change and sustainable futures, with a particular focus on climate biosphere interactions. He has been a lead author of the last three IPCC assessment reports. Kelly Wanser is the executive director of SilverLining, an independent, nonprofit organization dedicated to ensuring that society has sufficient options to address climate risk. A serial technology entrepreneur, she's helped shape and help fund critical legislation on atmospheric science. She is also, fortunately for me, a member of my advisory committee for a CFR special report I’m writing on sunlight reflection, also known as solar climate intervention and solar geoengineering. Peter is going to begin by giving us an overview of what we currently know about climate-induced tipping points, how to think about these thresholds in their probabilities, and which ones might be of greater concern over different timeframes, and also press some of the research and methods we need for greater clarity. Kelly will then address some of the policy implications of these emerging findings for the U.S. and other governments, including for identifying and monitoring potential near-term tipping points, dampening their consequences, and perhaps, if possible, even preventing these abrupt transitions. So, with those preliminaries, over to you, Peter. Thank you. Peter Cox: Thank you, Stewart. Just going to share my screen now folks. Peter Cox: So, it's a great pleasure to be here. As Stewart said, I’m at the University of Exeter in the UK, and I am part of a group of scientists there working on tipping points from a mathematical and also from a climate research perspective. The stuff I’m going to share is thanks to Tim Lenton, who is a professor at Exeter; Paul Ritchie, who is my postdoc; and Isobel Parry, who is a master student who has been working with us all. I wanted to give you some rough idea, some sort of introduction that Kelly will build on, about what we mean by tipping points and how the issues about tipping points have become more prominent in the latest IPCC report—and, in general, actually. So, it's about the scientific evidence and research frontiers. There has been talk of abrupt changes in aspects of the earth system climate system like, for example, the Atlantic circulation, for a while, but actually, the first paper that laid down all the possible abrupt changes or tipping points that might occur was this paper by my colleague, Tim Lenton, which was published in PNAS in 2008. You can see here a list of possible abrupt changes that might occur under climate change. I'm going to talk about two of these in particular, very briefly. I already mentioned the Atlantic Ocean circulation, which is what we would term a slow tipping point. That's not to say that you don't get committed to change, but that it takes a while for the change to manifest. And the second one that has been particularly close to my own heart is the possibility of dieback of the Amazon Rainforest under climate change, and that's what we would call a fast tipping point—more on that in just a second. So those tipping points were proposed by Lenton et al. based on paleoclimate evidence and modeling runs from climate models and simple models often, but also abrupt change and tipping points have been detected in the climate models that were used in the last IPCC report. You could see it in five models. This is from a paper by Drijfhout, I think also in PNAS, showing abrupt changes seen in various models, in the Arctic, and in Amazonia, and lots of locations associated with those tipping points to Tim Lenton pointed out. And so, in the last IPCC report, which I was an author on, as Stewart said, we finally got a bit more on tipping points into the report. But actually, there's very little analysis done on abrupt change in complex models, partly because it's difficult and partly because we're always obsessed with climate change and global warming as a function of emissions. So, this is a definition of a tipping point used in that report that came out late last year. A tipping point is a critical threshold beyond which a system reorganizes, often abruptly and/or irreversibly—and back to that in a minute. And a tipping element is a component of the earth system that is susceptible to a tipping point. So that is, for example, the AMOC, the Atlantic circulation, or the Amazon Forest dieback—or permafrost release that I think Kelly will speak about. The other things, amongst many, that were said in the last IPCC report, the one that's still in draft phase actually in general, but the summary for policymakers is around. It said that there is evidence of abrupt change in Earth’s history, and some of these events have been interpreted as tipping points. I think it's fair to say it's pretty clear they are tipping points—abrupt changes before we start to foster the system. And the probability of low-likelihood, high-impact outcomes, which is another name for tipping points really, increases with high levels of global warming. This is despite the fact that the models seem to show a relatively linear warming with emissions. There is definitely evidence of abrupt change locally. And the archetypal tipping point, the sort of paradigm for tipping points, is what’s shown here: this is what's called a fold bifurcation by mathematicians, but it basically looks like a folded piece of paper. And the continuous lines here are our possible stable states, so the system. In this case, we've got them against global warming, so we might imagine some tipping element becoming more like this as a result of global warming. As you cross the threshold at about two degrees, just arbitrarily set here, then you enter a dotted line, which is an unstable state, and essentially the system state transitions to the lowest state. So that could be the case where the Gulf Stream shuts off or the forest dies back in the example I gave earlier. So basically, there's this notion of a very abrupt transition, and this is definitely an idealization which we've recently come to discuss in more detail in work by my colleague, Paul Ritchie, who I mentioned earlier. So, this is the basic idea: you've got an unstable equilibrium, stable equilibria, and a transition between them, that can occur quite quickly—there's nothing to do with the forcing, it's based on the properties of the system, rather than what we're doing to it, once you cross that threshold, that bifurcation point. My colleague, Paul Ritchie, produced a review in Nature, where we tried to extend this concept to consider the time scales of these different tipping elements. And when you've got slow tipping elements like, for example, ice sheet melt or the Atlantic overturning of circulation, you might have exactly the same underlying equilibria, but because the system is slow, you actually have an overshoot in a transit climate change, such that the transition takes a while to manifest, and this is important because it means that, in principle, for these slower tipping elements, you can imagine overshooting them, detecting, overshooting, and reversing it. And there's a couple of questions about that that we can discuss later. So, this is the example that Paul Ritchie had and, for example, for the AMOC, where you might have a rather large overshoot of the threshold, if you stay on the upper branch here, you might not have a transition. And this means, in principle, if you could detect you’re over the threshold and you had a mechanism to return to it quickly, you might save yourself from such a transition. So, a big question from my perspective, then, is how would we know that we are over the cliff edge. Actually, we don't have accurate methods to do that, yet; there are a few ideas about the way system resilience varies with time, but that is a key question. So, what Ritchie concluded is that fast tipping elements, like forest dieback, and these are things that might take decades to unfold, determine the dangerous peak warming, but slow tipping elements, like ice sheet melt or AMOC collapse, determine the dangerous overshoot of thresholds, especially how long you can overshoot them for. Turns out the duration of every shoot is more important than the magnitude. I just want to say one final thing about Amazon Forest diabetic, which I originally brought forward as a possibility, in the early 2000s, and then I convinced myself that the models were overestimating the sensitivity of the system, and I think they are in some ways, but recent experimental data and the latest model projections are much more convincing. This is work by Isobel Parry, the master student I mentioned earlier, and these are—I'm sorry the labels are quite small—but these are seven separate system models to show evidence of tipping points—the red areas are abrupt changes in forest cover—and the global warming scenarios, and this is something that we haven't seen quite so coherently as before. And it is connected with drying out in these regions in most models. Okay, so I'm going to conclude. Abrupt changes in tipping points are important because they may dominate the impacts of climate change, quite apart from whether they affect how global warming varies with emissions—that still looks to be quite linear in these models even where they have tipping points. The different timescales are of elements matter, especially in the rapidly changing contemporary planet. We're not in this paradigm of returning a system in equilibrium state—we're pushing it quite a long way away from that. And, as a result, it may be possible to temporarily overshoot thresholds to slow tipping elements and reverse-out, if you have the mechanisms to do it, but this is much less feasible for fasting elements like forest dieback. And I've just briefly shown you that there's some localized Amazon Forest dieback evident in a number of the latest models, which is a new thing that we hadn't seen before. And I would just say that much more needs to be done in analyzing abrupt changes in tipping points in these latest models. We look at lots of variables, but we rarely look at abrupt change in them and, when we do, we find all sorts of things. This actually requires new methods to detect and forewarn a tipping point when you've got a rapidly changing environment, which is the one we're in now. Thank you very much, Stewart. Stewart Patrick: Thank you very much, Peter. That's terrific, and I'm sure there are going to be a lot of questions out that we can get to about how you rate some of the importance of some of these and probabilities, and also timescale issues—but before we get to that, and I hope that our participants are thinking of some great questions, let's turn things over to Kelly, to provide her insights. Kelly Wanser: Thank you, thank you very much, Stewart, for inviting us here and entertaining this really critical topic. And thank you, Peter, for a terrific overview of a little bit of the state of the science. I want to pick up where Peter left off to talk about, you know, we appear to be in some uncertain state with respect to the probability of some of these major tipping events, and one of the contexts for policy for this type of risk is disaster risk management. So, I am going to speak a little bit, especially from the perspective of the U.S. context, where we work very actively, about some analogs for thinking about this type of major systemic risk and how work in this area might fit and, in particular, I have a picture here of the Siberian permafrost, one of the noteworthy things about these tipping point risks is that we are getting reports from observational studies in the past year or two that there are observations indicating that the probability of these kinds of big tipping events may be escalating. But these observations are relatively ad hoc and sparse, and so it appears that we see these things starting to emerge, but the information that we have is actually fairly weak. Peter alluded to that as well, and I'm going to talk about that a little bit further in the context of other kinds of programs that exist. So, the first in terms of systemic planetary risk is the asteroid risk, which is meeting its popular culture. There is a program for mitigating the risk that an asteroid would strike the planet in a way that would have a global systemic effect. That program is run out of the Planetary Defense Coordination Office at NASA, and the proposed FY22 funding for that program is about $200 million. It's an active program developing technology for doing detection and mitigation of asteroids. So that is one sort of model for this type of work. Another is a study that was undertaken to look at the threat of the eruption of the Yellowstone supervolcano, which is a high-capacity volcanic threat. There was a study done in 2017 by NASA to look at the possibilities for mitigating that threat. So, were that supervolcano to erupt, it would be an existential threat to North America—and a global threat. So, they developed, actually, or they conceived, a $3.5 billion plan to mitigate the volcano that would include drilling sideways to pull thermal energy out of the volcano and even to use the thermal energy as part of an energy program. And so, one of the scientists on both committees came to the conclusion that the supervolcano risk was actually significantly higher than the asteroid risk. And then, if we look at the sort of major tipping event risks that we're running now with respect to the climate system and you were to look at this sort of relative risk, especially since we have more than one type of tipping event risk here, right now, our funding against the actual risk profile of these global systemic events is probably steering towards the lower probability end of the spectrum, which is interesting. But the design of these programs is also really interesting. So, the Planetary Defense Coordination Office has sort of three main features of the asteroid mitigation program: develop programs to find and categorize the at-risk events represented by asteroids, to warn, to coordinate, and then finally to mitigate. And so that type of model is quite interesting when you think about other types of global systemic threats: how do we detect them; what type of coordination do we have with respect to their evolution, particularly as they begin to be proximate; and then what are our options for mitigation and do we have mitigation strategies in place. And so, if you think about the tipping point issue, and we start out with what Peter alluded to, which is the sort of find and warn gaps. At SilverLining, we spend a lot of time with U.S. federal agencies involved in climate research and some involved in policy, but we're particularly close to modeling new data types and capabilities. And right now, in the U.S. system—to the best of our knowledge and those of some of our agency partners—there are no concerted programs, to look at major tipping events, and particularly to look at them in the context of risk management. And so, what we have seen, and reflected in Peters comments, is that there are academic studies and there are sort of elements of different climate programs and assessments, but they tend to be academically driven and the field has been a bit theoretical. And so, one of the gaps, or a couple of the gaps that we see, one that Peter alluded to, is there are things to be done with current model studies to focus on the dynamics around tipping events that have been present in simulations and the precursors of those focus-study observational data that's there. They're even some observations of permafrost in Russia where there's microfiche we could look at it—so there's an opportunity to collect and collate data that we have in a concerted way that focuses on these questions and, particularly from our point of view, those tipping event risks that are both near-term and systemic. And then secondly on the observational side, and I'll talk about that in a little bit, the question is, are there things that we could rapidly roll out to improve spatial, temporal, and resolutional coverage of the observations of these critical systems where we have a much more ad hoc view, particularly of this sort of in situ information from the surface, the air, and the ocean, that we would like to have. And then finally, with respect to mitigation, so again to Peter's comments about the possibility that some of these evolving tipping threats might have the potential to be mitigated—either reversed or forestalled—if there were the means of rapidly reducing the warming stress on those systems. And one of the gaps that we have today is that our investments in mitigation of warming are primarily focused on things that operate over longer periods of time—both longer periods of time in terms of the scale-up of their influence to be able to meaningfully influence the climate system, and then the time it takes for greenhouse gases to evolve out of the climate system in a way that significantly affects warming. So, we at SilverLining became concerned about this sort of near-term gap: the ten, thirty, forty, year-gap that we have in options that could significantly reduce warming quickly, even within a matter of years. And that question was looked at by the Royal Society in the UK starting in 2009 and again in 2012, and more recently in the U.S., starting in 2015 and again last year. I'm showing here a couple of reports from last year, which are jointly related to this topic, although neither of them addresses it explicitly. One is the National Academies report on recommendations for the direction of the U.S. Global Change Research Program, and one of the big thrusts of that report was recommending a shift towards a risk management perspective. That was kind of one really interesting element in thinking about the organization of U.S. research and climate. And then the second was a report recommending a research agenda and elements of governance for research on one of the most promising methods, from the point of the scientific community, of reducing warming and in the climate system quickly. And that's the image that I'm showing you here, which is going to become an animation. So, when scientists and scientific bodies went forward with assessments of what were the most promising options for reducing warming in the climate system quickly—within a decade or within even a few years or less once developed—the most promising recommendation for research was increasing the reflection of sunlight from clouds and particles in the atmosphere. And what you're seeing here is a simulation from NASA of the reflection of sunlight from particles and clouds in the atmosphere, and scientists estimated, with lots of caveats around uncertainty, that it might be possible, by increasing the reflectivity of the atmosphere by just one percent, to offset two degrees or more of warming. There are a few different approaches that they've looked at closely, ranging from the outer atmosphere, the stratosphere, and inputting particles directly in a way that large volcanoes have done in the past, to brightening clouds in the lower atmosphere, the troposphere, which is actually a phenomenon that happens now as pollution particles are also brightening clouds in a way that is estimated to offset some of the warming that we would otherwise experience. So, these are potential approaches to the mitigation question. They are also very nascent in terms of the state of the research for a variety of reasons. So, we at SilverLinging, working with our government partners and others, we've been talking to folks about the importance of the proximity of the problem, the nature of the uncertainty (we have a real discomfort with that uncertainty), and the high stakes. So, the first thing that we think might be important is to work with Peter and others to quickly develop a roadmap of the most important, immediate things to be done in terms of looking at some of these proximate risks, and then to begin a rapid expert analysis program to try to start to characterize the biggest and most proximate of these tipping event risks. We actually have recommended some language in the FY22 and some money for the Department of Energy, which has some of both the sophisticated standard modeling tools, but also some of the other kinds of tools, AI and risk analysis tools, that you might want for that type of activity. And then there are other things to be done in terms of the idea of a coordinated interagency program on near-term risks and interventions, and there is some language being discussed for the appropriations report as well on that; and then, in particular, on the possibility for some rapid skilled observation programs, and I'll talk about some possibilities for that that might not be unrealistic; and then in the policy sphere, with respect to having some programs emerging that are rapidly looking at what analyses can we do, how can we develop/rapidly generate some risk information, and, at the same time, get some observations scaled out to these at-risk systems; then working on both scientific cooperation internationally and building our community science, so we can get sort of rapid research input on different aspects of the problem quickly; and then, looking at the context in terms of the disaster risk management and emergency preparedness missions and mandates that are in play and in question. Right now, these topics don't live in our disaster risk management emergency preparedness missions, so that's something for us to think about. I'll end on the note in terms of observations. The first question is of finding. We think that there's a possibility for rapidly increasing our in-situ observations of, in particular, greenhouse gas sources, including sources from natural systems like permafrost and changes in forests. One way to do that is by using platforms of opportunity. There's a convergence of technologies that make it possible for us to put sophisticated instruments on platforms that are already there. And NOAA piloted a program with Alaska Airlines and Boeing to put sophisticated greenhouse gas monitoring instruments on their ecodemonstrator aircraft. And we're working with them on trying to scale that program first with Alaska Airlines to their cargo flights that do hops around Alaska. So that could give us some rapid traction on visibility on some of the greenhouse gas emissions from natural systems in that region of the Arctic. We're pretty excited about similar opportunities that exist. We think that it's both critically important to increase our information resource-wise and observations—and also that it's possible. And we need to work in the art of the possible fairly quickly to manage these risks. So, with that, I’ll turn it back to you, Stewart. Thank you very much again, and I look forward to the conversation. Stewart Patrick: Thank you so much, Kelly, that was terrific. I really enjoyed it, and I liked the analogies to other aspects of disaster risk management and seeing, given the gravity of the climate emergency, the degree to which perhaps we might want to invest a little bit more in some of those thinking about different methods of finding and ideally responding to this crisis. I want to invite all of the participants on the call to please use the raise hand function if you have a question you'd like to offer to Peter or to Kelly. Most immediately, I guess I'll probably turn this to Peter. I'd love it if you could share your slide deck again, just to the map picture, in particular. That was quite fascinating. I know you focus mostly on the AMOC and the Amazon Rainforest dieback. There are obviously a number of other tipping points that folks have identified. Obviously, our knowledge base is still improving, but if you were going to prioritize some of these things, or could you just describe a little bit more about the nature of those particular tipping points? Is there any sense of sort of the time horizon over which these would be occurring? And the other question, which is sort of a more general question, is one of the frustrations of, well not frustrations, but one of the questions I have is beyond addressing greenhouse gas concentrations generally, are there things that, when it comes to these different tipping points, have been identified or things that one could do to adapt or build resilience against in specific contingencies? I know that there have been ideas about even building physical structures or pumps to prevent the breakup of Antarctic ice sheets, for instance. So, I realize that’s a tall order, but it'd be great if you could give just a little sort of a brief summary of some of the other tipping points folks are looking at. Peter Cox: So, these are tipping points that were, as I said, proposed in 2008. Some of them, we think, are more associated with air pollution, so the Indian monsoon and multistability are more likely to be caused by aerosol pollution. Permafrost and tundra loss is the one that I think we were most concerned about in the last IPCC report, in the chapter I was involved in about the carbon cycle, and Kelly mentioned that. That's basically because when permafrost melts, you get a lot of biogenic emissions of methane, which is a strong greenhouse gas, and CO2. There are issues about what you mean by a tipping element. It's irreversible in practical timescales, so we use this deliberately loose definition in the IPCC report. It takes longer to recover than it takes to live and the time it takes to lose it. So, I think permafrost and tundra are ones that could accelerate global warming; most of the others are local but no less important for that. I mean, if you live in the Amazon Rainforest carbon release would be important for climate change but very, very important for you, and I think many of our impacts of climate change that we worry about are going to be dominated by these extreme events and the risk of them—same with forest dieback in Boreal regions that might be a result of diseases that are more prevalent under warming. Some of the other ones are slower. They're like slippery slopes: melt of the Greenland ice sheet. We’ve got an idea about where the threshold for that is and it's quite low. But it's also a slow one, so there's a possibility of backing out. We're not showing much sign of doing that through committed mitigation yet, but there is a possibility of backing out. These changes have been added to, but these are the main ones, I would say, and feedback from permafrost loss is one of the key ones that could accelerate global warming. The others are dominant locally and can have an impact on the global climate, but I think in some ways we've gotten a bit obsessed with the feedback to the global when in fact when we're worried about the sort of risks that Kelly was talking about, they tend to be local. I mean, people experience an abrupt change locally, and it is catastrophic, regardless of whether feedback significantly impacts climate change or not. Stewart Patrick: One of the things that would be extremely interesting is the degree to which from there would be analysis, in addition to identifying and monitoring, perhaps early warning of some of these impending risks, one could imagine that, like climate change generally, many of these tipping points would have significant sort of distributional consequences for, you mention, the local aspect and certainly the regional aspect of some of these things. In certain areas, some of these things could have catastrophic effects, for instance, the change of the monsoon patterns. Peter Cox: Absolutely, so one of the things that has been suggested, and there's good evidence of this, is that for some tipping points, when you're close to it, the sort of crazy, equilibrium state with a static, steady-state, then you get a generic signal, which is called critical slowing down, in the variability of that system as you approach the tipping point, and that's basically like the well that the system sits within getting shallower and wider, so you get larger and slower oscillations—this is the critical slowing down. And that does work for slower tipping points, so, for example, recent papers have suggested the Atlantic overturning circulation is slowing down, and therefore it's becoming less resilient. It is a slightly more difficult thing and less reliable when you have rapid forcing, and that's the thing I was pointing out, I think. We probably need more system-specific precursors and early warning systems for these tipping points. In the case of the Amazon Rainforest, we found an interesting one, which is that if you just look at the amplitude of the temperature cycle in the Amazon, it tends to grow when the dry seasons get dry and therefore offset, and that is a precursor in all these models to dieback becoming a higher risk. So, there were things like that that can be measured. In this case, we've got reasonable measurements of those maximum temperatures, but in other places, we don't have good measurements really, of methane release and permafrost, for example. But those sort of things, these sort of system-specific warning systems, it would be fantastic if we had them for all sorts of reasons, quite apart from what we do subsequently, and— Kelly Wanser: If you don't mind, I just wanted to pile on that a little bit. What we think is so important and interesting about Dr. Cox's work is that there are some methodologies to apply, that the methodologies for kind of the way to go about the problem translate across these systems, and then there is specific work you need to do that pertains to the function of each system, but getting methodological approach and starting to do that in a very concerted way—it's exciting and promising that that's there to be done, and it's also concerning that's there to be done. Peter Cox: Yes. Stewart Patrick: Kelly, I'd like to just engage you on how, as I mentioned, we have this portfolio of responses to climate risk. There's adaptation and obviously, in particular areas, there's going to be a need for greater adaptation. As I mentioned, I'm not sure how plausible they are, but there are also the technological sort of efforts to try to, in Antarctica, reduce the amount of impact of ice sheet breakup, etc. But there's adaptation, obviously, which many people who are going to be in the regions and localities that are influenced by this are going to have to deal with. One can imagine just the extraordinary effects if the AMOC, the Atlantic Current, were to basically shut down. In effect, presumably, the ramifications would be huge for most of the folks living in temperate or formerly temperate Europe. But so, there's adaptation. Then there's emissions abatement. This obviously should make folks more and more aggressive in terms of the sort of emissions reductions. There's carbon dioxide removal. The problem with carbon dioxide removal, as well as emissions abatement, is it's taking a long time for many of these technologies to go to scale. Do you detect or think that there's going to be a greater appetite for at least looking into prospects for sunlight reflection if it's framed—because it's obviously been highly controversial—as solar geoengineering? Do you think that there is an opening, a political opening, for broader discussions of sunlight reflection as a contribution to this portfolio, as long as it's framed as a supplement rather than as a replacement for some of these other strategies? Kelly Wanser: Well, I’ll start in a practical sense by saying that's been our experience, but I think I'll answer your question in two different ways. One is thinking about disaster risk management. One of our advisors is the former head of research at Goldman Sachs, and he talks about the fact that climate policy to date has not actually been risk management in the sense that risk management looks at the full spectrum of risk, including planning against some of the worse scenarios and fluctuations and their probability. So, if you look just from a disaster management point of view, where we say well, let's look at scenarios where the probability in the evolution of these tipping events is on the higher side and then what's our plan. That's how the asteroid planetary defense system works and thinking about the Yellowstone volcano. So, then, if you look at sunlight reflection interventions and at least the activity of studying them and assessing them, in the context of a disaster risk management strategy, they start to look a little bit less radical because it's not about tradeoffs against bringing the system to a healthy sustainable state in terms of emissions, it's about the risk management of what are we looking at in terms of human life, infrastructure, economic security, and national security. And so, if you take the example of South Florida where my parents live and the tipping event like the collapse of the big ice sheets and a pop in sea level rise, then you've got a real disaster risk management issue for real people in Florida and elsewhere in the world. Then, if we look at that we say, what tools do we have in the portfolio if we're in a precipitous situation with respect to them. We're a science-led organization, so we're just looking at where the scientific community has landed on the best available options, which is how we end up with sunlight reflected from the atmosphere because, as they've looked at the other options, either in terms of scale or sort of the systemic problem that warming moves around, it's sort of landed there in terms of places to start. So, what we've seen in the dialogue so far with policymakers is that it's been a less controversial dialogue than it is in the media, where the conversations are in the more abstract context about some of these technologies. Stewart Patrick: Thank you. We have a question from Stu Feldman. Did you want to ask a question? Stu Feldman: Thanks. Two questions. What is the global impact of Amazon dieback? Is there a simple quantification, not the distributional-local but the global result, since we seem to be heading quite well toward it? And Kelly, nice to see you, I'm very curious about your line about international cooperation and observations. I'm curious, what is there? What significant work is already underway? What holes are there, because the U.S. provides a fair fraction of all the satellite data and we're not too good at sharing all of it, and so forth? So, I'm just curious what the state is. Sorry, two questions. Stewart Patrick: No worries. Mr. Feldman, could you identify yourself just by affiliation? Stu Feldman: Sorry, Stuart Feldman, chief scientist, Schmidt Futures. Stewart Patrick: Super. Kelly Wanser: Do you want to start Peter? Peter Cox: Yes, sure. I’ll do the Amazon dieback one. In the latest models, we don't see large-scale dieback, we see this kind of speckly pattern, so that's why I mentioned the fact that it’s the impact rather than the feedback, but in the early results that we got where we did get a lot of scammers and dieback, we lost about 150 gigatons of carbon over a couple of decades. That's something like ten to fifteen years of current emissions. So, it's not huge in terms of the addition to effective CO2 basically because we're emitting so much so fast. But it is a significant feedback, nonetheless, a bit like the methane feedbacks. The methane feedbacks would be amplifying the rate of warming, they wouldn't change the whole system to a different state, which is what some people have said, but it would certainly change local parts of the system radically in ways that would have bad impacts. It looks like it's in the order, in the worst case, of about ten to fifteen years of global emissions, if the Amazon went completely. Kelly Wanser: So, I'll answer the second part of the question about the observations. In particular, we follow quite closely work on the observational category, particularly the work of the NOAA Global Monitoring Lab. One of the big challenges is the limitations of what remote space-based observations can do. I think that it's been exciting in terms of the possibility of having the comprehensive observations you can get from space, but it's still the early days in terms of the techniques for leveraging space-based observations with algorithms to determine what's happening down below. Where you run into problems is that there are things you can't see directly from space, and space observation programs try to use algorithms and ground-truthing to then interpret what's happening down below. But the state of the art today means that there are some important things that you can't do, including local attribution of sources of greenhouse gases. And this is a problem for doing monitoring and detection for national commitments, for corporate commitments, but it's a really important problem for looking at changes in natural systems in terms of their emission of greenhouse gases. That's where we at SilverLining have been a little bit surprised at the weakness of surface and aerial in situ observations and subsurface observations. The same problem exists for having really widespread, adequate observations of ice melt under the surface. So, these gaps mean that we are flying blind in a lot of cases where we're very ad hoc. That's where, in terms of the tipping point observations and the opportunities that Peter’s work presents, that if you can analyze some indicators that indicate that you're approaching these changes in these systems and then you could go after widespread monitoring like we do with earthquakes, that layer appears to be mostly missing and not terribly solvable from space. Stewart Patrick: Thank you, Kelly. The next question is from Adam Wolfensohn. Adam Wolfensohn: Hi thanks very much for a super interesting, if not depressing conversation. So, moving off of that, your colleagues, I think I’m right, Professor Cox, at Exeter, also introduced the concept of energy system upward scaling to people as a more positive approach and using similar dynamics where people could manage a system to shift more rapidly, than perhaps you know we might think, to a low carbon energy system and such pathways, particularly in emerging markets. I wonder if both of you could talk about the potential from a mitigation perspective of targeted interventions that might [induce tipping points] we want to occur, where you have a more rapid energy transition, and how we might encourage those practically. Thank you. Peter Cox: Very good question Adam Thank you, and we are thinking more and more about what you might call positive tipping points and things that we would like to happen—abrupt changes, transitions, we'd like to see happen and would be necessary to deal with the climate problem where that happens. I think there's good evidence that human-social systems are more prone to tipping points, actually, than even the climate system, so I think there is some hope there, Adam, that some of the things we're learning about tipping points in the climate system might be useful to promote positive tipping points in human and social systems. Some of the techniques that Kelly spoke about for detecting when a system is approaching a possible bifurcation point and essentially choosing which direction it goes can in principle be applied to systems like networks, which are more consistent with the ways socioeconomic systems operate. I think we are working in that direction. I think it is one of these nice things where you get a transfer of knowledge from one field to another, but because we're talking about nonlinear systems, there are some generalities here that can be used in both directions, like detecting where you're getting a dangerous change you want to avoid, but also, as you're implying, Adam, in some systems, prompting a change when it's most sensitive to an input. Kelly Wanser: I’ll layer onto that as well. I also agree that there are these opportunities for applying these techniques across the human systems, and particularly in regards to innovation and technology transition. Technology transition in particular because that's where you've got this sort of bifurcation of choices and ways to tweak and tune the system for those things to go fast or slow. A lot of times the policies we have are placing downward pressure on the innovative transitions that could accelerate progress. So, I do think with some of these techniques, looking more consciously in a systemic way of hey, if you're trying to scale this, through the industry, what does that look like and what do you tune, there's really promising and hopeful opportunity there, which is one of the reasons why we want to make sure we address this ten-, twenty-, thirty-year time-horizon gap, because the potential of innovation and disruptive changes to human systems that really get traction on the greenhouse gas problem, I would say those are actually pretty strong. Adam Wolfensohn: Thanks very much to you both. Kelly Wanser: One more thing I'll say related to that, because I was at COP26 this year for the first time. I was told by people who were veterans that, even against a few years ago, at COP there was a massive corporate presence, and indeed there is, it’s like a trade show, but that corporate presence really represented a big, sizable shift in the involvement of industry in the financial sector of climate change. So, the level of investment that's going into the forward path of changing some of these practices and approaches is massive and it's pretty bound to have a systemic effect. It will be interesting to understand and study that more and help tune it correctly. Stewart Patrick: One of the things that I think needs to be a priority, both for research and also policy engagement on this issue, is, obviously not just in particularly highly divided societies or politically divided societies, to get folks to have tipping points in messaging and in sort of the recognition of the gravity of the situation. There are, I agree, Peter, some really interesting lessons from history where there are great divisions, but then sometimes sort of staring into the abyss or the prospect of a hanging concentrating the mind can induce some significant policy innovations and changes. But I think it's also important, both in terms of the basic science, I would imagine, but also in terms of building coalitions, that this be as international a process as possible—particularly the climate field, which has often seen lots of North-South fissures and disputes about historical responsibility, and also the burden of adjustment in these sorts of things, that things like tipping points would, I mean although some of them will have much more regional effects, perhaps reinforce the notion that we're all in this together. With respect to the research first Peter, could you talk a little bit about what you think the state of play is in terms of climate research around these issues and including the networks that might involve folks from the Global South, and then Kelly, I know that you’ve had some experience with building networks from an advocacy as well scientific perspective. Peter Cox: You're absolutely right, Stewart. These are global problems, even if the impacts are felt most strongly locally, which is often the case, and we've got collaborators in Brazil, of course, when we're looking on Amazon issues, where all the expertise lies. The observational-based concerns about the Amazon Forest turning from being a sink for carbon to becoming a source actually come from large-scale measurements of tree diameters’ free-time—an amazing activity that's done in Brazil. We're absolutely dependent on those, and they’re rare, in terms of raw, ground-based data that we've got, but they give us some idea of what's going on. So, the collaboration is absolutely key. The issue we are finding with all sorts of interventions, even with CO2 mitigation, is, of course, that you have to get an agreement across the globe to do it, and the governance issue with SRM is especially challenging because there are winners and losers with anything you do, actually—especially with SRM. I think that's one of the things that people get nervous about, is this idea that we might have to agree on something when we can't agree on the obvious, which is to cut emissions. But in terms of the rate at which you can do things, as you hinted Stewart and Kelly said, if you believe that you're approaching a threshold, there aren’t many options available to you that are fast enough in the conventional way of thinking about these things. Carbon capture would be too slow in most cases­—maybe for the slow tipping points you could do it, but for faster tipping points, there's no chance of that. So, we're always looking for things that might be, if we detected you're over the edge, what might we do about it, and they're a relatively small number of things that have to be fast and rapidly acting. Stewart Patrick: Great, and Kelly, and then we are going to have a question from Kilaparti Ramakrishna. Kelly Wanser: I'll be quick, but I would echo Peter’s point that the scientific cooperation between people in different parts of the world for a variety of reasons is profoundly important, and there are really good mechanisms in place actually especially around climate and environmental issues like the World Climate Research Program in the Western Hemisphere, the Inter-American Institute for Global Change Research, and so on. One of the proposals we have for FY23 is for the State Department to increase funding to those organizations in these particular areas because typically, in our experience we also have funded Global South researchers, there's a question of having those programs there that support scientific cooperation—and then there's funding. There's always a need for funding, and I'll say that to the philanthropists here too: funding Global South research on these topics is really important—and the technologies they need to do the research. But to the point of having a healthy approach to governance, our experience in observation is that those efforts that are strongly science-based and that are able to draw from strong scientific information or resources, like the Montreal Protocol, for these kinds of acute questions with environmental systemic risks, where you know the stakes are high, more information and a more scientific organization may help the dynamic quite a bit. So, we tend to take the approach of let's try to move things through a decision process that’s science-board and science-based, and open, so that the world can cooperate on these decisions, because there may be winners and losers, but, more likely, as we look at these questions and what the options are, many of us are in the same boat. So, we’re optimistic that with information in an open ring, you might have a better shot at agreement than you think. Stewart Patrick: Thank you. Can we have Kilaparti Ramakrishna, please. Kilaparti Ramakrishna: Thank you, Stewart, for the very important discussion. I'm glad that we're having it now. For some time, we’ve known about the tipping points, the biotic feedbacks, and so on and so forth. In fact, I can't believe I’m asking this question, but something that has been said in this conversation prompted me to ask this. We are talking about increased attention by every stakeholder in society to the climate crisis and the solutions. Something that Kelly also referred while talking about COP26 was about the number of private sector entities that are there. As we measure, I know it is more of a social-sense question for the IPCC authors, but as we measure the tipping point and what we are doing to the natural systems, is it possible to measure tipping points in terms of governmental and societal action? Can you see this going in parallel—one really going downhill in terms of the natural systems, and the other in the more positive direction—and would that be seen as a race? Somehow, on the other, will we see that, at the end of the day, the positive actions by society are going to meet the challenge of the tipping points and the diebacks, etc., etc.? Thank you. Stewart Patrick: Thank you very much. Kelly, would you like to— Kelly Wanser: Speak to that, yeah. Thank you for the question, because it's a great question and I think our concern is that there's uncertainty as to that question. One of the big problems is that we don't actually know the magnitude of the uncertainty, but there's a possibility that changes in human systems might address and prevent all of these major tipping event risks, but there appears an increasing possibility that they won’t. So, we're more concerned with the nonbinary question, which is hey, can we focus on understanding those uncertainties better, and can we look at what our strategies are for the case that's not good—and make sure we have some because of the magnitude of the risk. So, we're less concerned about the binary question. We want society to push as hard as possible, whether it's like fire insurance or the ripcords that you pull when you have a problem. Hopefully, you don't have to have that but, in the event that we've got some pretty substantial risks running, having those options, or at least evaluating them, seems like a really, really important thing at this time. Stewart Patrick: Just before turning it over, Peter, it seems that there's also the different methodologies and dimensions of political tipping points, and political deliberations, and the political climate that goes into that, and then there's, of course, the scientific process and trying to get those two processes in timetables lined up and latched up. And then there’s the question of how much scientific certainty versus uncertainty do we need to have to be able to take out some of these insurance policies that Kelly, you were talking about. But, Peter, over to you. Peter Cox: So that's another very good question. I think I get the sense that there is a high profile amongst populations worldwide in the importance of dealing with climate change, but there are lags in the system—they're quite large lags in the system. That means, based on what we can see, if you look at the model of the CO2 record, it's kept on going up—there's no sign of it stabilizing. Emissions have kept on going up, apart from mere, small perturbations associated with financial crisis and briefly with the COVID pandemic, but they carry on going up. So, we are hopeful that there will be a tipping point in action on climate change, but it's not evident yet. I'd be interested to see whether there's any way to detect such a thing, which I guess is part of the question. But that leads you to the view that we are probably going to cross thresholds that we haven't already, tipping point thresholds of various sorts, and we are on the lookout for those. Then you work out what you might do about those, and some of these might be local actions. You could imagine, for example, irrigation for a while, if you had a peek dealing with a drying, or changing vegetation type, or that sort of thing, as well as these more radical interactions that and interventions that Kelly spoke about. They need to be relatively quick, and you need to get enough warning of them. So, I think, yes, we're hopeful of a tipping point. I don't see why there shouldn't be a tipping point, and there is arguably a tipping point in innovation, with regard to renewable energy. It takes a while for that to feed through, but, based on the current knowledge of tipping points, we are still very light across the Paris targets as Kelly said, and associated with those thresholds that we believe are out there, those are uncertain thresholds so we can't be absolutely sure, but, therefore, the risk increases with every point one of warming and we need to be aware of that. That means better action, but where we've got lags in the system, it means having ways to deal with things that might need emergency interventions. Stewart Patrick: Well, thank you very much, both for trying to reinforce our timescales of the ongoing climate crisis, the science scientific inquiry, and then the political adjustment, and trying to make sure that those lags, or chasms in some cases, between those aren't so great that we find ourselves in a world of hurt. This has been really, really interesting, and I realize it's just a beginning of a fascinating research agenda for you, Peter, where there must be so many uncertainties. One could imagine a significant increase in research to support your work and that of your colleagues can be highly important. Kelly pointed out the importance of the U.S. government and other governments around the world taking this agenda seriously, funding this agenda, and also, perhaps, concentrating the mind on the near-term climate risks, as opposed to something that might happen in twenty, fifty years, or beyond. I think that, in Washington, we've only begun to grapple with those things, and perhaps that's true in other capitals around the world, but with those closing remarks, I just want to thank both of you for lending your time, and I hope that Peter, we can stay in touch. I'm in touch on a regular basis with Kelly, because of the mutual project we're working on, but Peter, I hope we will have a chance to hear from you again and wish you all the best in your research endeavors. Peter Cox: Thank you, Stewart. Thank you, Kelly. Kelly Wanser: We appreciate it.