Energy and Environment

Climate Change

  • India
    Bahar Dutt: U.S.-India Climate Change Cooperation Needs a Revamp
    India has made ambitious pledges to reduce its emissions. The United States can help it transition to green energy.
  • Climate Change
    Climate Resilience Strategies
    Play
    Alice C. Hill, CFR’s David M. Rubenstein senior fellow for energy and the environment, and Matthew J. Gonser, chief resilience officer and executive director of the Office of Climate Change, Sustainability, and Resiliency for the City and County of Honolulu, will discuss resilience policies to prepare for the effects of climate change and best practices for implementing them.    FASKIANOS: Welcome to the Council on Foreign Relations State and Local Officials webinar. I’m Irina Faskianos, vice president for the National Program and Outreach at CFR. We’re delighted to have participants from forty-three U.S. states and territories with us. We thank you for taking the time to join us. This discussion is on the record. As you know, CFR is an independent and nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher focusing on U.S. foreign policy. CFR is also the publisher of Foreign Affairs magazine. Through our State and Local Officials initiative, we serve as a resource on international issues affecting the priorities and agendas of state and local governments by providing analysis on a wide range of policy topics. We are pleased to have Alice Hill and Matthew Gonser with us to talk about climate resilience strategies. We’ve shared their bios with you so I will give just a few highlights. Alice Hill is a David M. Rubenstein Senior Fellow for Energy and Environment at CFR. Previously, Judge Hill served as special assistant to President Obama and senior director for resilience policy on the National Security Council. She’s also co-author of Building a Resilient Tomorrow and her latest book is called The Fight for Climate After COVID-19. So I commend that to all of you. Matthew Gonser is the executive director and chief resilience officer for the Office of Climate Change, Sustainability, and Resilience in the city and county of Honolulu, Hawaii. Before that, he served as the office’s coastal and water program manager for three years. Mr. Gonser is responsible for developing and launching Honolulu’s climate resilience initiatives including the Oahu Resilience Strategy Climate Action Plan and Climate Ready Oahu Adaptation Strategy. And Matt, you’re going to have to correct me on how to pronounce that correctly. (Laughs.) So, Alice, let’s turn, first, to you to talk about the trends that we’re seeing in extreme weather events. We just saw the horrible devastation that the tornadoes wreaked havoc in Kentucky, and what’s in the infrastructure bill in terms of helping with climate change, resilience, and adaptation? HILL: Well, thank you so much for having me here today, Irina, and I’m so delighted to join Matt on this important panel. I don’t think I have to tell anyone in the audience that 2021 has been a year full of disasters for the United States as well as across the globe. As you mentioned, we saw the really saddening pictures of the devastation of the tornadoes that had appeared in areas where, traditionally, we wouldn’t expect tornadoes, certainly, not at this time of year, and in some of these geographic regions. We also just yesterday had enormous wind events occurring in large swaths of the nation. Earlier in the year, Hurricane Ida caused $65 billion in damage and killed ninety-six people as it swept from Louisiana all the way up to New York. You’ll recall last February a cold snap in Texas caused massive power outages. A hundred and seventy two people lost their lives, 21 billion (dollars) in damage, and some people simply died of cold in their beds. The tornadoes that we’ve seen will likely be the nineteenth billion-dollar disaster chronicled by the National Association—National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration. NOAA has been keeping records since 1980 of billion-dollar disasters within the nation. That is a disaster that caused us at least a billion dollars’ worth of damage. 2021 will rank second, but we’ve just had additional damage from these windstorms so maybe it’ll rank first. But, certainly, it ranks second in the number of billion-dollar disasters since 1980 and it’s only coming in behind last year, which had twenty-two billion-dollar events. Unfortunately, the science is clear that worse is ahead because of human activity and, recently, in this summer a report was issued making clear—a consensus report—scientists across the globe agreed to and the report was agreed to—virtually agreed to, at least its executive summary, by virtually every nation in the world and that report found that, unequivocally, that human activity, agriculture, transportation, building, was causing harmful greenhouse gas emissions, carbon dioxide, primarily, to accumulate in the atmosphere, which is causing the Earth to heat up beyond pre-industrial times, and we have heated up about 1.2 degrees Celsius since pre-industrial times and that’s what’s bringing us these types of events. Now, you can’t always find the fingerprints on every event. We don’t know if tornadoes and, particularly, these tornadoes were influenced by climate change. But scientists now can, essentially, determine how much different events are made worse by climate change and we know that heat events like we saw in the Pacific Northwest earlier this year and some increasing storm intensity are very closely tied to warming temperatures. Just yesterday news that we may have underestimated the amount of heating that’s already going on. The Arctic and the Antarctic, both polar regions, are very important for the world’s weather, and scientists have identified that we have heated up four times—the Arctic has heated up four times more than the rest of the world. So we are, it’s predicted, facing many more extremes, going forward, and that’s why it’s so important that we have some relief on its way to state and local, tribal, territorial governments to help them in addressing these impacts. It’s important to realize that virtually all of our built-in systems—our infrastructure, our built environment, our housing—they’re all built to the extremes of the past, to the weather of the past, and now we’ve seen we’re getting these worse and worse events. So we’re going to have more damage in the future and that’s why it’s so important to begin to think about how are we resilient to climate change. The Biden administration pushed the $1.2 trillion Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, which did pass Congress. It was billed as a once-in-a-generation investment in America’s infrastructure and it aims to rebuild transportation systems, strengthen supply chains, and expand funding access to communities that have historically been excluded from reaping the benefits of many government programs, and it has $550 billion dollars in new federal spending over the next five years coming with that legislation. So the hope is that, as during the coronavirus we’ve seen many infrastructure gaps appear across our nation—unstable access to broadband services, poor road maintenance, utilities that fail in the face of extremes, and other infrastructure challenges—it’s hoped that this Act will help state and local officials in making the necessary changes that can improve their communities’ quality of life and, importantly, their safety. So I’m happy to later on to go into more detail on that. But that will be a significant investment in on-the-ground improvements that, I think, will be important for any state, local, tribal, territorial leader as they plan to help their communities thrive in a warming world. FASKIANOS: Thank you, Alice. Let’s go now to you, Matt, to talk about what you’re doing in Honolulu and the ways in which you would share best practices with your colleagues on what cities, counties, and states can be doing. GONSER: Great. Thank you, Irina, and thank you, Alice, for that important introduction, and also just thank you to CFR for the opportunity to join in this discussion. It was really overwhelming, quite frankly, to see the registration list, including my state representative, who’s here on the call today, Della Au Belatti. Great to see you here as well, including other state and local leaders across the counties of Hawaii and the state of Hawaii, and also individuals from my home state and my home island of Long Island, New York, and above, below, and everywhere in between. As much as I’m pleased to share our perspective from our perch out here in the Pacific, obviously, context matters and your local conditions are, really, what’s going to be important, and you should all feel proud that you are stepping up and leaning into these discussions because they will become more and more important as we progress into this century, as Alice just shared. And, very quickly, it is quite irrefutable and indisputable out here in the state of Hawaii, on the island of Oahu and elsewhere, that climate change is clear, present, and here, and the voters actually leaned in and recognized this and created the office that I have the pleasure and privilege to work in via a city charter amendment in the year 2016. And there are big expectations. Highlighting a few things here in terms of city operations, obviously, coordination, as Alice just mentioned, across different levels of government because we do need a whole of government approach and there are things that are going to be needed at different scales with different resources. Generally, we try to talk about resilience, which can be a pretty heady topic, in some simpler terms around sort of how we, as organizations, institutions, and systems, survive, adapt, and thrive. Surviving is not what we want. We need continued prosperity into the future in the face of growing and challenging uncertainty across these different stresses or shocks. And we know what’s changing. It is our climate, as Alice just mentioned, and, quite frankly, we know the direct cause of this and the direct driver. It is our continued use of fossil fuel for various purposes, including our energy systems, our buildings, our transportation networks, and some of the other sectors that Alice provided. And, you know, the foundational science has actually been measured here in the state of Hawaii atop Mauna Loa, measuring the increasing and seasonal uptick of carbon dioxide, in particular, in our atmosphere. And climate change is not a thing unto itself. It really is a threat multiplier, and Alice shared some insights into that. We know that climate is changing certain conditions and it’s those changes that then result in impacts and have the consequences for people and place, the environment of that place, but also the economy of your local jurisdiction or your region as a whole, and we’re really coming to grips with this across the nation. This wasn’t coordinated but I’m glad to see that we’re totally on the same page of recognizing and extending some of this information that NOAA has been tracking, and, certainly, we’re not out of 2021 and a lot of things are still being measured and, actually, this doesn’t even include some of the costs and consequences from both the wildfire season, the heat waves that Alice mentioned, and an earlier hurricane from this fall. And it’s really important to know, like, where these are happening, right. It’s affecting all of us. It’s affecting all of us in different places at different times of the year, sometimes at very strange times of the year now, and that makes it difficult as local government leaders to anticipate how to think about the systems that we need to adapt and change for. Uncertainty is risk and that can be very challenging for businesses and, certainly, can be very challenging for local government leaders. Bringing it back here to Hawaii, as I mentioned, people understand this. We’ve already measured a decline in our normal trade wind days, which is affecting heat, comfort, and our rainfall. We’ve already measured and are projecting different scenarios for sea level rise, which will affect a whole variety of sectors as well as public trust resources and where we all go to relax and recharge in these very stressful times, along the shoreline. And, similarly, we’ve already measured increasing temperatures, and what we do or don’t do in the coming decades will determine what trajectory we end up on in terms of ever-growing and increasing temperatures. And, you know, graphs and data are important, but it’s really the images and the experiences that speak to what we are acknowledging and recognizing and need to overcome—a compilation of some images here. And while a lot of these examples are going to be local for my condition and context, certainly, I’m sure you have some documentation of these things within your communities as well. Keying in on sea level rise and coastal hazards, in particular, we’ve already seen impacts to our recreation and community facilities where we’ve had to remove comfort stations and other elements of our city and county beach parks, real and significant impacts to private residences and the public trust resource, which is the beach, and then challenges as we think about doing infill, maximizing the investments of a mass transit project and how that can and should be an opportunity to grow communities and provide more affordable housing, really coming to terms with some of the challenges in some of those areas and the business disruption, continuity challenges, and impacts on redevelopment. But even on our public infrastructure as well, we see issues with our wastewater treatment systems and concerns around erosion and outfalls were impacted by increasing groundwater elevations, which make it more challenging for our water utility to respond to water main breaks where they actually have to pump out water or wait for low tide before they can access it, or through some heavy rain events, right, just ripping through our systems that were designed, as Alice mentioned, for a previous condition, and we need to think across public infrastructure, private facilities, land uses, and other natural and built infrastructure to overcome some of these challenges into the future. But just as I had mentioned that context matters for you in your places, even in an island setting like here on Oahu and the city and county of Honolulu, we have very different kinds of communities that have very different contexts, from ultra-urban, Honolulu urban core and the resident and visitor area in Waikiki to very rural conditions, and how we ensure equity in the distribution of resources really needs to be front and center as we’re thinking about how to address these issues in coordination with the state on their infrastructure. And, again, I’m just going to very quickly go through, because not all participants here are coastal communities, but, certainly, sea level rise and coastal erosion are a concern for us here and for many places around the nation. Changes in rainfall patterns—very heavy events are very difficult to both forecast and prepare for. So they can come at you in a very quick moment and then the ability to provide notice is challenged. Our weather service is strained in coming to grips with the need for different kinds of public communication tools here locally. Again, as I mentioned, increasing temperatures, and this can really be anywhere, just thinking about how we need to invest today to make sure that our communities can remain socially connected in the future is really, really critical. And sometimes we might have too much rain but also in a lot of places we’re having too little rain, and the impacts on land uses, soil stability, or your agricultural sectors, and then something like a hurricane, bringing those triple threat concerns of both heavy rain—sorry, heavy rain, high winds, and then storm surge. So, obviously, when change is coming at us we can’t assume we can just continue to do the same things. Climate change is requiring us to change, and that doesn’t necessarily mean that it’s doing new things. But, certainly, we need to be aligned and think about the practices that we already have, the things that we’re investing in, and really looking at those projects and those investments so that we can drive down risk over time. And very quickly, to wrap up here so we can get to the Q&A, the process that we’ve gone through the last couple of years started with a lot of community discussion and really thinking about what a thriving community is into the future. And it’s not just addressing climate change but it’s addressing affordability challenges, social and community resilience and staying connected, and thinking about preparedness as well. So it’s important to embark on that process, engage and communicate with community as well as elected officials, and then really put yourself out there and put a line in the sand in terms of the values and the policies that you’re hoping to address and then adopt it and commit to it and say you’re going to work on it because people have provided their time. You need to validate that participation. We’re fortunate that we had some additional clarity in our office’s roles and responsibilities to find an ordinance, which we are very pleased to act upon. But you also need to measure and track and report back out. We need to be held accountable for the things that we say we’re going to do and also be open to explaining why things are not working, where the risks and challenges are, and provide that back. And then since we know the drivers of climate change, we all, undoubtedly, need our own climate action plans because, collectively, we need to bend that curve over time because if we don’t we’ll just have to find more ways and different ways to invest to prepare communities to adapt to the changes that we’re already experiencing, and I’ve already spoken about that quite a bit in terms of the things that we’re concerned about here locally. But it’s having those discussions out in community, which is really going to even empower us to engage in these difficult conversations and the federal government has really put a thumbprint on this in terms of the Justice 40 Initiative and expecting and explaining how those kinds of benefits need to accrue to places that have been on the frontline of impacts historically and now, increasingly, as a result of climate change. And lastly, you know, we, in local government and state government and everywhere in between, the rules that we establish for ourselves and for community they’re really about ensuring expectation and the opportunity for a thriving community and economic prosperity. But we know those rules were for a different condition, like Alice had said, and we need to think about those different expectations and modify them so that people understand what’s needed, moving forward, because if we don’t make those changes local government will continue to take on obligations and future risks. We know that we’re challenged already today and we need to prepare ourselves to think about what’s the course correction needed to not obligate future generations for some of those future risks. So with that, I probably went already too long. But thank you for entertaining some of that and look forward to the Q&A. FASKIANOS: That was fantastic. Thank you so much. And now we want to go to all of you. (Gives queuing instructions.) The first question comes from Liz Ellis. How can cities work with the federal government to change the design of levees and sea walls to meet a longer-term sea rise when the feds currently just require designs to meet current and maybe hundred-year flood levels? And Liz Ellis is a city council member in Aberdeen, Washington. GONSER: That’s a great question, Liz, and, certainly, we know FEMA is acknowledging some of the issues of the historical mapping. We know there are a lot of places across the nation that even don’t—still don’t benefit from mapping, and they’re investing a lot. We’re fortunate that there’s investments into FEMA’s processes but also acknowledging that how they measure risk and account for that flood risk is evolving. Right now, they’re—we’re already underway with a risk rating 2.0, efforts to move towards more of an actuarial rate, which would be very shocking, and actually had been done several years ago through the Biggert-Waters Act, and then Congress immediately pulled back because it was extremely impactful for communities around the nation. We’ve had good experiences in terms of incorporating and advocating for the kind of data that gets incorporated. I know the Army Corps, in particular, they, for years, have had their own sea level rise calculator and they use that for their design specifications. But to your question around, you know, this notion of a one hundred-year flood, which was intended to make it a little bit more comprehensible in terms of risks, really created a misnomer and a misunderstanding about what an annual risk is, and we’re fortunate that in working with FEMA locally and working with our state NFIP program that narrative is shifting a little bit. But there are many leaders across the country, cities like Boston and New York, recognizing that FEMA’s maps are just—they’re just the minimum, and any community is empowered and can, should they have the resources, to create your own rules, regulations, and guidance, including flood maps above and beyond what we have access to through FEMA. And that’s a trend that, I think, will need to grow as we progress because we can’t expect and always wait for the federal government to take the lead on things. It’s a big country. FASKIANOS: Thank you. Alice, do you want to—you’re muted, Alice. HILL: Thanks. Sure. I think it points to—the question points to a challenge that we have. All of the federal agencies, just as state and local governments, are dealing with this issue for the first time. They are figuring out what needs to be done and they have all submitted—each of the federal agencies, pursuant to an executive order that President Biden issued on his very first day in office, have submitted adaptation plans. One of the challenges is to make sure that we’re planning for the same thing when we’re talking about working with communities, and you have pointed out that the Army Corps of Engineers sometimes has different planning scenarios and assumptions than others do. This is an issue that the federal government will need to resolve and work on so that vulnerability assessments are shared across the community. We don’t yet have readily available vulnerability assessments that are produced by the federal government. We have the National Climate Assessment, which is very broad and not downscaled in sufficient ways, and then we have some communities like Hawaii, California, New York, who’ve marched out and done their own vulnerability assessments. But for other communities we still may need those and we need for the federal government to share its ideas about what we should be assuming are the future conditions we’re planning for. I will just add to what Matt said. Those FEMA flood maps are widely recognized as being, largely, out of date. He’s correctly said, and it’s unfortunate that we use the one in one-hundred-year flood when we know it might be the one in twenty-five-year flood now. Of course, those flood maps define who’s in and out of the National Flood Insurance Program run by FEMA. I will just for this audience flag that there is new flood information available, particularly for residential property. The First Street Foundation had a project where they have mapped flooding for the entire United States. So you can type in your own home address and get your flood score and now many of the real estate aggregators—Zillow, I think Redfin—carry the flood factor. So that’s a way to inform your community. It’s more accurate and FEMA has said go ahead and use the First Street Foundation maps in recognition that they haven’t produced accurate maps yet, and there are many reasons for that—pushback from communities sometimes, as well as simply lack of funding to do this. But now we’ve had a philanthropist move into this space and that should help with evening the understanding of what is reasonable to anticipate within the next thirty years, for example. FASKIANOS: Thank you. So Hawaii State Representative Amy Perruso has written a question and I want to see if she would like to ask it herself. Otherwise, I will read it. Q: I can ask. So it doesn’t seem like this question connects to the topic but, in my view, it really does because we’re facing this crisis around water on Oahu, that threatens kind of the backup system that our Board of Water Supply had set up in case of hurricane. So my question is, really, around how do we—we’re talking mostly at the state and local level. But then when we have actors in our communities who we are struggling to hold accountable to the same standards, how can we bring them into alignment? GONSER: Yeah. Aloha. Good morning, Rep. Perruso from central Oahu. I mean, you, certainly, know this just as acutely as any of us, and for people on the call we had—what a month we had last week here across the state in terms of record rainfalls and a statewide disaster declaration, also critical water contamination and the displacement of thousands of households as a result of jet fuel getting into the water system, and then several cyberattacks that affected both our public transit system and other accounting and payroll services both in the public and private. And, Rep. Perruso, I wish I had a better response to address that specific question, but this recognition, again, I think, the linkage to today’s topic and the drivers of climate change and how climate change and greenhouse gas pollution are affecting both national and international relations and local security is completely aligned with the truth and reality of needing to get off these fuel sources and also how we manage them in different places around the nation and the globe. FASKIANOS: Alice? HILL: I will step in. Yes, it’s—this is a very important question. We know that there are linkages between national security and climate change. The military—the Department of Defense did come out recently with a series of plans for dealing with climate change both in terms of the increased impacts because, as you can imagine, there’s the demand for humanitarian aid both through the National Guard here in the United States. The National Guard is being called on increasingly to help with fire—management of wildfires in a way they’ve never been called on before—our reservists—and then we are called to help in international—the international arena as we see ever greater humanitarian disasters. And there will be increasing immigration pressures because we’re going to see many more people on the move as their survival, their livelihoods, their shelter, their access to food and water, are threatened by climate change. So this is a significant problem for our military and they are also a significant contributor to the emissions. So there’s a multi-prong approach, but one is to determine how emissions can be reduced in the military. There are some areas that are impossible to abate, for example, in aviation right now so for our fighter jets we won’t be able to get to that. But you’ll see—in my experience within the military there is a demand to reduce the dependence on fossil fuels because in war time that dependence can have—can cause loss of life of American soldiers as they attempt to refuel in dangerous places. Much more to be done. I think we have to step back and say, honestly, we all hope the federal government can step forward to help more, but we are a deeply polarized nation on this issue and that polarization is reflected in Congress. So it becomes difficult to enact some of the types of solutions that have been put forward widely because we simply can’t get to agreement amongst our representatives on what the best course forward is on climate change. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I’ll take the next question from Iowa State Representative Chuck Isenhart. And if you can unmute yourself. You’re still muted. There we go. Q: All right. FASKIANOS: You’re—all right. Q: Didn’t know if it was my button or yours that wasn’t working. FASKIANOS: OK. Q: So the discussion here is state versus federal initiative, kind of like who’s on first, who’s going to go first. How much would state-level constitutional amendments, environmental rights amendments like the one just passed in New York, help in jumpstarting or mandating state-level initiatives? And I’m not sure you’re familiar with that but there are at least three states that have constitutional amendments, basically, saying that citizens have a right to a clean environment. HILL: Well, I can jump in a little bit. Once you have a constitutional right there—I’m a former judge and a former prosecutor, and once you have a law on the books that says there’s a right, there probably will be litigation following to enforce that right. And I haven’t—I’m not familiar with any litigation in the United States based on the amendments that you’re mentioning. There is litigation in the United States. It’s still active, most notably, by children saying that they have a right, essentially, to a better future and that the federal government is failing in that. A very interesting development in the law, and the law moves slowly. The wheels of justice can move slowly in this context. But it has revealed a difference in philosophy among judges and you can see that in dissenting opinions and the opinions written. And the question is, is this an issue for governments to solve—the federal government—or is this an issue that is left to the legislature to solve. Just as we said, you know, if the legislature can’t agree, but does that mean the court has to step in, and we still don’t have that answer yet. We have seen some judge, including the district court judge in this case called Juliana v. the United States, I believe, coming out of the Ninth Circuit. The trial court was very impassioned about the need for protection of children in the future because, after all, it’s future generations who will suffer even more than the pain we are suffering now. Worldwide, this has begun to take on some kind of liability, going forward, and we have seen some—for example, in Pakistan, the supreme court there said—after a lawsuit was filed, said the Pakistani government wasn’t doing enough to protect people, going forward. So it’s a(n) emerging field. With more fodder in the cannon, I am sure there’ll be more litigation and perhaps there will be greater pressure on governments to act. And we’ve seen, I think, in the Netherlands also the Dutch supreme court saying that the Dutch government wasn’t moving quickly enough to act on climate. Not here yet in the United States, even though we’re the litigation capital of the world but, certainly, numerous attempts to try to get clarity on who will, ultimately, be responsible, as you’ve just said. FASKIANOS: Matt? GONSER: Yeah, not much to add. FASKIANOS: OK. GONSER: I have less awareness on the importance and the opportunity at the state level, but at least on the county level we try to make sure—our office is new. A lot of the things that we’re doing are new documents, new planning processes, et cetera. That’s why we actually went through a process to try to create the ordinance that further defined explicitly some of the things that we needed to do because that’s where we thought there was that political hook and the importance to have things on the books so that there is accountability and an awareness of what needs to be done so that people can say and point when it’s not being done. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I’m going to go next to Megan Levy, who’s a program manager in the Wisconsin State Energy Office. Megan, do you want to ask your question yourself or—I’ll give you a minute if you want to unmute yourself. Otherwise, I will read it. If you’d just unmute yourself. I see you. OK. I will read it. So it seems that the days of using previous disasters to prepare for the next event are over. How do we anticipate these rain bombs and atmospheric rivers or whatever the next natural disaster is, and how do we prepare? GONSER: Yeah, I can take a stab at that, and I think I saw some other question around some of this. I mean, quite frankly, this adds to that component of uncertainty, which then adds some additional level and recognition for some precautionary practices, right. If we understand that the risks are changing faster than our minimum standards, rules, and regulations are changing, we need to advocate as much as we can or rapidly try to address those through floodplain ordinances, land use practices, thinking about where existing development is, how do we redirect it and communicate that with community, like, share that recognition that, no, the banks of the storm drainage channel didn’t necessarily overtop because of perception of blockage. It was because we got two inches of rain in an hour for a condition that’s designed for a very different scenario, and that that can be very unsatisfying and very difficult to have those conversations. But the more that we are honest and up front about it and continuing to communicate it, hopefully, that then provides some of the motivation and support for making the changes. I was looking through some old notes from an old study tour and I found this quote of something called a zoning time bomb and that’s, basically, this idea of a property or a parcel that hasn’t exercised its development rights yet and probably shouldn’t because we really hope that we don’t have to take on that future risk, whether it’s a coastal area or along a riverine condition. And I think the more we assess and understand our local conditions we need to try to get ahead of that and then just continue to communicate on preparedness and supporting people to have their own plans while we’re also working on the public side. FASKIANOS: Alice, I know you have something to say about that. HILL: Yes, I do. I think, first of all, because there is a great deal of uncertainty as to when these things will arrive, one of the first places to start for greater preparedness is focus on early warning systems and that requires strong meteorological services and it also requires understanding human cognition and social science and how people respond to these warnings. But we’re, undoubtedly, going to hear a lot more about failures in the tornado warning systems that we had, failures either to communicate or act on those warnings. But for a community that is an easy place to—not an easy but important place to start and, in fact, the Global Commission on Adaptation that’s one of the major call outs. We need to just improve early warning. I love this idea or this concept of a zoning time bomb, and I will say that in at least one community I’m aware of the—this is in Norfolk, Virginia, which faces a(n) increased risk of sea level rise that’s coupled with subsidence. So they really have a lot of water coming in. And the Norfolk community, there was an area very prone to flooding and it rezoned to reduce development and change the requirements for development to keep the community safer. They were sued. They eventually won that lawsuit because there’s greater understanding that the zoning laws are designed to protect people. This will be a challenge both with building codes and zoning laws for local communities as they try to march out and protect and, of course, those decisions are solely in the hands of either state and local authorities under the Constitution. The federal government does not decide where building occurs or how it occurs. Those are left to—those decisions are left to the local governments. But I’m sure the federal government will try to encourage better decision-making in these areas in the face of this growing risk. But we will see much greater litigation. There was a case after Sandy in a small town. I can’t—I think it was in New York, but I can’t recall. Anyway, the town had a zoning requirement that you couldn’t—that you couldn’t elevate the homes because it would ruin the aesthetics of the street to have a home ten feet higher than the rest of the homes, and this family had had their home wiped out and they wanted to rebuild in the same location and they wanted to have that height to protect them against future flooding and they’re in a coastal region. And in that case, the court ruled that it may be the local ordinance may require this but we can’t leave common sense at the door and they’re going to be able to elevate their home. And that’s the kind of thing we will be confronting because our systems all right now reflect decisions based on the assumption that the past is a good guide for the future and we are rapidly seeing that’s a poor assumption. And as Matt has said, we’re going to have to move quickly either to change those rules, and if we don’t we will leave people in the zone of danger. In fact, we’ve seen more people move into areas of risk near the—and this is proven out by Redfin—near coastal areas at risk of flooding than not in recent decades. We have to change that paradigm. And that will fall on state and local governments to figure out how they will thrive and what effect that will take on their tax bases as they go forward. But— GONSER: And— HILL: Go ahead, Matt. GONSER: And I know, Irina, you’re going to ask another question. But very quickly, you know, local governments, when supported by sound science, information, and risk mitigation proposals as well as the need to ensure fiscal solvency within the local government shouldn’t hesitate to do what they think is right. Obviously, there will be people that give pause or anytime something sniffs of a takings claim. Those are just going to have to proceed. I mean, that those things will likely come up. But as government actors, we have a responsibility to the public health and safety and welfare of our communities and when we are making rational and sound decisions. Hopefully, that gets upheld, and we are stepping into new terrain in terms of a climate change future. FASKIANOS: There is a written question from Jon Thompson, who is a city council member in Sedona, Arizona. Matt, as a popular visitor destination, how are you dealing with the climate effects of tourism? Specifically, are you trying to take responsibility for mitigating travel and other emissions of tourists? GONSER: Yeah, great question. So it’s twofold, right. It’s both energy, water, and waste once people are here and managing those implications. But the biggest challenge for us, quite frankly, as an island community and as a visitor-dependent community, which, hopefully, we’re on the verge of transforming as we bounce back better from the truth and reality that COVID laid bare here locally, our greenhouse gas emissions inventory, though we had been static for a couple of years in the 20-teens, we did see an uptick 2017, ’18, and ’19 primarily driven by aviation. So within our transportation sector, which is a huge slice of our pie, second to buildings and energy. It really was that aviation fuel use that drove up our increase. But across the methodology, you know, we’re only accounting for a portion of flight travel, not necessarily its departure destination but, certainly, around the fuel used within our jurisdiction and that’s something that we’re going to have to really grapple with. We’re excited by some progress in terms of inter-island travel, which is—you know, a lot of people depend on that either for health care, connecting with family, but also for travel. We’ve seen some exciting things benefiting from venture capital and other accelerator programs, namely, the Elemental Excelerator group and some promise, actually, for—they call them either sea planes—they’re not quite boats, they’re not quite planes—but also some solar—some potentials for solar inter-island flights and battery backup within those planes. But aviation is going to be one of those things, including marine transportation, that will need more federal leadership and support to affect that sector as a whole. That’s going to be a very difficult thing for local governments to be the main influencer on. FASKIANOS: Great. Thank you. I’m going to go next to Dave Reid, who is the director of Office of Resilience—Response, Recovery, and Resilience for Santa Cruz. What are some ways that you and other communities are centering equity in these efforts? It’s been clear from COVID that there’s a disproportionate impact on those disadvantaged and marginalized communities and is a likely harbinger of how climate change will impact vulnerable populations. GONSER: This subject warrants a whole session in and of itself. But, certainly, locally, it really proved and showed what, generally, people knew across community, that there was not—there are a lot of things that weren’t working for people before the pandemic and if we just go back to it we’ll have done—we’ll have learned nothing and have done a complete disservice to this once-in-a-lifetime opportunity in terms of the federal resources through multiple bills, multiple relief packages, and we need to change both our information management and how we think about what a good job is here locally. We learned even from the last economic downturn prior to 2010 that post that our visitor industry did not rebound in the same way. You know, it didn’t necessarily bring everyone back to work. It’s not likely to be that kind of rebound this time either, and what are the different sectors and fields that we really need to think about to transform our local community and innovate and keep people connected to place and thinking about food systems, conservation, health care, education, IT as well. One really great anecdote that I learned recently, even though I’ve been working with this individual for the last year and a half, I only learned recently that she herself went to the mayor’s office last summer and said, you need someone directly within city government on the COVID response team who is a Pacific Islander. My community is suffering. No one understands how we behave or what the value systems are and they have no notion on how to connect with local government. And she forced and created a position. And it’s too much for any one person to do, but it’s a specific example of how even within our city workforce we need to assess do we reflect the community that we serve, and we’re fortunate that we’re part of a national association of counties cohort and benefiting from some technical support to look at that spectrum and make sure we’re thinking about disaggregated data so that we understand the disparate impacts and then know specifically what we need to do better to address those impacts. FASKIANOS: Great. I’m going to go next to Jessica Vealitzek. I’m not pronouncing her name correctly. She’s a board member in Illinois—Lake County, Illinois. What are some innovative policies you’ve seen coming out of counties, which often have jurisdiction across a broad area, including building and planning, storm water management, transportation, particularly in unincorporated areas? GONSER: I can’t directly answer that. So we’re unique in terms of our geographic boundary. The mayor is the mayor of the whole of this island, which is the city and county of Honolulu. So we don’t have unincorporated areas or the—you know, the challenges in terms of, like, a city within a county, perhaps. But that laundry list in the question are the kinds of things that, you know, we and others need to innovate on because they’re the ways that we address either energy use in buildings, managing rain where it falls, and all of the other concerns that we’ve spoken about here on the panel. FASKIANOS: Alice, do you have— GONSER: Sorry. That’s probably a little bit of an insufficient answer. HILL: Sure. I think often where we see innovation is after a disaster because the challenge here, as you all are well aware, is political will, and whether the community wants to take on added requirements and they sometimes can carry additional costs to prepare for something that may be perceived as unlikely. Of course, immediately after the disaster, just based on how humans assess risk, the risk is foremost in their minds and you can get the political will to act. Where this was very evident is in Houston, where there had been great resistance to building codes as well as to, really, flood management in a way that would protect communities. There was a lot of building in areas that were identified on the map, perhaps, at risk of flooding. Post-Hurricane Harvey, which, of course, dumped about four feet of rain in just a very short amount of time and in the very flat Houston area caused massive flooding, Houston was able to put in place building codes which required elevation of homes, and, I think for government leaders, remembering what Rahm Emanuel famously said—he was President Obama’s first chief of staff—and it sounds flippant, but I think for leadership it’s important. He said, never let a good crisis go to waste, and by that he meant take advantage of that moment when people are focused on this issue to really put in place the kind of change you need and you’ll be better able to do that if you’ve thought through what could we use and when that moment arrives you’re ready—at the ready to drive—for example, in the areas that were just hit by tornadoes drive better early warning systems, better construction, making sure that schools have safe rooms inside or where there were buildings have safe rooms, all those things. You can take this moment to have better improvement. Ideally, that’s not the way we want to move forward. We’d like to have a massive plan and be able to do it all correctly. But sometimes the politics here just get completely in the way. So I think, as leaders, you can plan for a bad event and then take advantage of it. FASKIANOS: Great. We have five minutes left so I want to package a couple of questions. There’s one from Andrew Manavel (ph). Federal, state, and local governments have many roles in this. Is one of them to discourage or preclude development in exposed areas? If so, what is the recommended manner? Also, what is a good enforceable role through the insurance industry? And then another one just about how do you—what do you do about climate change deniers. GONSER: I guess I’ll try to quickly go through that one. Quite frankly, that’s not something that we—there are, obviously, differences of opinions even in a place like Hawaii, even in a place that voted for such an office. But we just direct it head on and we clearly articulate how it’s incorrect and how the abundance of evidence is clear and present, and then we move on as to why we need to take action. But also it’s important to communicate out, you know, different messages for different people. Sometimes easier ways to talk about climate change issues are to explain how climate mitigation can be good business, how it can improve quality of life in neighborhoods, how it can make it safer for kids to walk to school, how it can help a senior get off a bus and go to a grocery store. Like, there are different ways you can package it. But I would never hesitate to address the truth and reality because it’s our responsibility to communicate what’s happening. The previous question, I’ve quite forgotten it. Yeah, we do have—we have a responsibility, as Alice and I have both shared, in terms of life, safety, health, and welfare and in terms of the land use practices that we deploy, the community conversations to set up those plans. It is our responsibility and I think as much as we hope and expect and sometimes want to use as a crutch in terms of federal rules or federal ordinances, it really is the responsibility of the state and local governments to set the tone for what needs to be accomplished. FASKIANOS: Thank you. Alice? HILL: Sure. Let me quickly go through this. I’ll start with the last first, the insurance industry. Insurers write policies on an annualized basis just for one year—primary insurers—and I think what you’ll see as these events continue is a constriction of insurance. We’re seeing that already in the wildfire space. Of course, we have a National Flood Insurance Program, as Matt has said. That program has, essentially, been bankrupt because the government has not charged premiums that reflect the true risk of flooding. FEMA is just rolling out a program to try to tackle that. We’ll see how it goes. It’s very politically charged. Both sides of the aisle do not like to see premiums increased on their constituents. So it remains to be seen. But in the private insurance market you’ll see in my—over time a reduction in the availability of property and casualty insurance. The premiums will get too high to be attractive. As to the role of the federal government, I think the federal government has an important role in encouraging sound business—sound building choices and it has already demonstrated how it can do that with the Coastal Barrier Resources Act that was passed in the 1960s. We have those thin barrier islands on the Atlantic coast and, basically, the federal government said, you know, these are really risky places to be making deep investments in. We, in the federal government, aren’t going to be investing that. We’re not going to do disaster recovery. We’re not going to help you with infrastructure here. You’re on your own because it’s just too risky. And I think as we see more areas in the United States develop in that manner, if local governments continue to insist that they’re going to allow development either in areas that we know are at high risk or in ways that make them at high risk because it’s not sound building practices, the federal government could provide greater incentives to places that are better suited and then withdraw resources to areas that are at great risk. And the final—on the climate deniers, I’ll just add I have taken very seriously the latest report by the International (sic; Intergovernmental) Panel on Climate Change. I will say it’s based on peer—review of fourteen thousand peer-reviewed scientific journal articles about climate science. The executive summary of that report, which is produced by scientists from over sixty nations, two hundred and thirty of them, and every nation agrees to every single word. A hundred and ninety-seven nations agree to every single word in that executive summary, and that summary concludes, based on that floor of peer-reviewed articles, that it’s unequivocal that the climate is changing at an unprecedented rate and it’s unequivocal it’s changing because of human activity. And as a former judge, it’s easy for me to say the evidence is in. We need to be moving on to solutions. So I don’t engage on a debate on the science because the scientists have already concluded and all nations have agreed to that conclusion that it’s here, it’s real, and it’s human caused. FASKIANOS: Thank you very much to both of you. This has been—this hour flew by. Really appreciate your taking the time to do this. I apologize to all of you that we couldn’t get to your questions. There’s an interesting comment from Veronica Payez (ph) in, I think, Michigan about what they’re doing in their communities. So you should take a look at that before we close out. Alice Hill and Matthew Gonser, thank you very much again, and thanks to all of you for being on this call and for what you’re doing. We will send out a link to the webinars and a transcript so you can review it after the fact. You can follow Matthew Gonser’s work at www.resilientoahu.org and on Twitter at @ResilientOahu, and you can follow Alice Hill on Twitter at @Alice_C_Hill. You can also follow us on State and Local Officials Initiative on Twitter at @CFR_Local and, as always, we encourage you to visit CFR.org and foreign affairs.com for more expertise and analysis. And as always, we look to you for your comments, suggestions, feedback. Email us at [email protected]. I hope you all have a very happy and safe and healthy holiday season. Thank you for all your work in your communities and we look forward to reconvening in 2022. (END)
  • Climate Change
    Will the World Meet the Challenge of Climate Change?
    Podcast
    Richard Haass and economist Nicholas Stern, chair of the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, discuss the realities of climate change as well as renewable energy, carbon pricing, and the prospect of building a carbon-neutral economy.
  • Global
    Trailer: Nine Questions for the World
    Podcast
    The world is changing, and its future is forming around high-stakes challenges such as climate change and shifting geopolitical power. In this limited series, Council on Foreign Relations President Richard Haass sits down with nine extraordinary thinkers to explore fundamental questions about the century to come.
  • Climate Change
    Keeping the Lights on: Adapting the Electricity Grid to Climate Change
    Play
    Our panelists discuss recent climate-related effects on the electricity grid, including defects of the current system and how the U.S. government and the private sector can better adapt the electricity grid to withstand climate change. 
  • World Trade Organization (WTO)
    An Environmentalist Case for Resurrecting the WTO Appellate Body
    As countries confront the environmental effects of global trade, the potential for disputes and abuses rises. A venue for addressing such concerns exists in principle—but is in desperate need of resuscitation. 
  • Energy and Environment
    Biden Wants to Increase U.S. Offshore Wind Energy. Can He Do It?
    The Biden administration has unveiled plans to dramatically ramp up the nation’s offshore wind industry to help fulfill U.S. climate pledges. How realistic is the roadmap?
  • Climate Change
    After Glasgow: The Good, the Bad, and the Hopeful
    Play
    Our panelists review the recent COP26 climate summit in Glasgow, including climate action since the Paris Accords and how governments and businesses can step up to address the complex challenges of climate change and adaptation. 
  • Climate Change
    A New Transatlantic Agreement Could Hold the Key to Green Steel and Aluminum
    An imperfect U.S.-EU deal could set the stage for decarbonizing global steel and aluminum production—but only if negotiators can avoid certain pitfalls. 
  • Energy and Climate Policy
    Academic Webinar: Energy Policy and Efforts to Combat Climate Change
    Play
    Jason Bordoff, cofounding dean, Columbia Climate School, founding director of the Center on Global Energy Policy, and professor of professional practice in international and public affairs at Columbia University, leads a conversation on energy policy and efforts to combat climate change.   FASKIANOS: Welcome to today’s session of the CFR Fall 2021 Academic Webinar Series. I am Irina Faskianos, vice president of the National Program and Outreach here at CFR. Today’s discussion is on the record. And the video and transcript will be available on our website, CFR.org/academic. As always, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy. We are delighted to have with us today Jason Bordoff to talk about energy policy and efforts to combat climate change. Jason Bordoff is cofounding dean of the Columbia Climate School, founding director of the Center on Global Energy Policy, and professor of professional practice in international and public affairs at Columbia University. He previously served as special assistant to President Obama and senior director for energy and climate change on the National Security Council, and he has held senior policy positions on the White House’s National Economic Council and Council on Environmental Quality. He is a columnist for Foreign Policy magazine and is often on TV and radio. So, we’re really happy to have him with us today. So, Jason, thank you very much. We are just coming off the COP26 conference that took place in Glasgow that started on October 31, I believe, and concluded last Friday, November 12. Could you talk about what came out of the conference at a high level, if you think that the agreements that were reached went far enough or didn’t go far enough, and what your policy recommendations are to really advance and fight the countdown that we have to the Earth warming? BORDOFF: Yeah. Thanks. Well, first, thanks to you, Irina, and thanks to CFR for the invitation to be with you all today. Really delighted to have the chance to talk about these important issues. I was there for much of the two-week period in Glasgow representing the Energy Center and the Climate School here at Columbia. I think it’s kind of a glass half-full/glass half-empty outlook coming out of Glasgow. So I think the Glasgow conference was notable in several respects. We’ll look back on it, I think, and some of the things we will remember are—some of the things we’ll remember—(dog barking)—sorry—are the role of the private sector and private finance, I think, was much more prominent in Glasgow this year. I think there were commitments around some important things like methane, a very potent greenhouse gas, was much higher on the priority list in this U.N. climate meeting than in prior ones. You had pledges on deforestation and other things that are important. And then the final agreement did have some important elements to it, particularly around Article 6, how you design carbon markets around the world. But the glass half-empty outlook is still we are nowhere close to being on track for the kind of targets that countries and companies are committing to: net zero by 2050 or 1.5 degrees of warming. I think there were—there should be hope and optimism coming out of COP. The role of the youth—at Columbia, we were honored to organize a private roundtable for President Obama with youth climate activists. It’s hard to spend time with young people in COP or on campus here at Columbia or anywhere else and not be inspired by how passionately they take these issues. So the activism you saw in the streets, the sense of urgency among everyone—activists, civil society, governments, the private sector—felt different, I think, at this COP than other COPs that I have attended or probably the ones I haven’t attended. But there was also for some I saw kind of we’re coming out of this and we’re on track for below two degrees. Or, you know, Fatih Birol, the head of the International Energy Agency, tweeted that when you add up all the pledges we’re on track for 1.8 degrees Celsius warming. He’s talking about all of the pledges meaning every country who’s promised to be net zero by 2050, 2060, 2070, and at least from my standpoint there’s a good reason to take those with a grain of salt. They’re not often backed up by concrete plans or ideas about how you would get anywhere close to achieving those goals. So it’s good that we have elevated ambition, which is kind of one of the core outcomes of the COP in Glasgow. But it is also the case that when you elevate ambition and the reality doesn’t change as fast or maybe faster than the ambition is changing, what you have is a growing gap between ambition and reality. And I think that’s where we are today. Oil use is rising each and every year. Gas use is rising. Coal use is going up this year. I don’t know if it’s going to keep going up, but at a minimum it’s going to plateau. It’s not falling off a cliff. So the reality of the energy world today—which is 75 percent of emissions are energy—is not anything close to net zero by 2050. It is the case that progress is possible. So if you go back to before the Paris agreement, we were on track for something like maybe 3.7 degrees Celsius of warming. If you look at a current outlook, it’s maybe 2.7, 2.8 (degrees), so just below three degrees. So progress is possible. That’s good. If you look at the nationally determined contribution pledges—so the commitments countries made that are more near term, more accountability for them; the commitments they made to reduce emissions by 2030, their NDCs—we would be on track for about 2.4 degrees Celsius warming, assuming all those pledges are fulfilled. But history would suggest a reason to be a little skeptical about that. The U.S. has a pledge to get to a 50 to 52 percent reduction in emissions by 2030, and look at how things are working or not working in Washington and make your own judgment about how likely it is that we’ll put in place the set of policies that would be required to get to that ambitious level of decarbonization by 2030. And I think the same healthy dose of skepticism is warranted when you look elsewhere in the world. But even if we achieve all of those, we’re still falling short of below two degrees, nevertheless 1.5 (degrees). And so, again, I think the outcome from COP for me was optimism that progress is possible—we have made a lot of progress in the last ten years—but acute concern that we’re nowhere close to being on track to take targets like 1.5 degrees Celsius or net zero by 2050 seriously. And we just need to be honest as a climate and energy community—and I live in both of those worlds; there’s a lot of overlap between them, obviously—about how hard it is to achieve the goals we are talking about. Renewables have grown incredibly quickly. Optimistic headlines every day about what is happening in solar and wind. Costs have come down more than 90 percent. Battery costs have come down more than 90 percent in the last decade. But solar and wind create electricity, and electricity is 20 percent of global final energy consumption. The outlook for electric vehicles is much more promising today. Lots of companies like Ford and others are committing to be all-electric by a certain date ten or twenty years from now. Cars are 20 percent of global oil demand. About half of the emission reductions—cumulative emission reductions between now and 2050 will need to come from technologies that are not yet available at commercial scale and sectors of the economy that are really hard to decarbonize like steel and cement and ships and airplanes. We’re not—we don’t have all the tools we need to do those yet. And then, in Glasgow, the focus of a lot of what we did at Columbia was on—we did a lot of different things, but one of the key areas of focus was the challenge of thinking about decarbonization in emerging and developing economies. I don’t think we talk about that enough. The issue of historical responsibility of loss and damage was more on the agenda this year, and I think you’ll hear even more about it in the year ahead. The next COP is in Africa. There was growing tension between rich and poor countries at this COP. I think a starting point was what we see in the pandemic alone and how inequitable around the world the impacts of the pandemic are. Many people couldn’t even travel to Glasgow from the Global South because they couldn’t get vaccinated. We need, between now and 2050, estimates are—a ballpark—$100 trillion of additional investment in clean energy if we’re going to get on track for 1.5 (degrees)/net zero by 2050. So the question that should obsess all of us who work in this space: Where will that money come from? Most of it’s going to be private sector, not public. Most of it is going to be in developing and emerging economies. That is where the growth in energy is going to come from. Eight hundred million people have no access to energy at all. Nevertheless, if you model what energy access means, it’s often defined as, you have enough to turn on lights or charge your cellphone. But when you talk about even a fraction of the standard of living we take for granted—driving a car, having a refrigerator, having an air conditioner—the numbers are massive. They’re just huge, and the population of Africa’s going to double to 2.2 billion by the year 2050. So these are really big numbers and we need to recognize how hard this is. But we should also recognize that it is possible. We have a lot of the tools we need. We need innovation in technology and we need stronger policy, whether that’s a carbon price or standards for different sectors. And then, of course, we need private-sector actors to step up as well, and all of us. And we have these great commitments to achieve these goals with a lot of capital being put to work, and now we need to hold people accountable to make sure that they do that. So, again, I look back on the last two weeks or before, two weeks of COP, the gap between ambition and reality got bigger. Not necessarily a bad thing—ambition is a good thing—but now it’s time to turn the ambition into action. We need governments to follow through on their pledges. Good news is we have a wide menu of options for reducing emissions. The bad news is there’s not a lot of time at our current rate of emissions. And emissions are still going up each and every year. They’re not even falling yet. Remember, what matters is the cumulative total, not the annual flow. At our current rate of emissions, the budget—carbon budget for staying below 1.5 (degrees) is used up in, around a decade or so, so there’s not much time to get to work. But I’m really excited about what we’re building with the first climate school in the country here at Columbia. When it comes to pushing—turning ambition into action, that requires research, it requires education, and it requires engaging with partners in civil society and the public sector and the private sector to help turn that research into action. And the people we’re working with here every day on campus are the ones who are going to be the leaders that are going to hopefully do a better job—(laughs)—than we’ve done over the last few decades. So whatever you’re doing at your educational institution—be it teaching or research or learning—we all have a role to play in the implementation of responsible, forward-thinking energy policy. I’m really excited to have the chance to talk with you all today. Look forward to your questions and to the conversation. Thank you again. FASKIANOS: Jason, that’s fantastic. Thank you very much for that informative and sobering view. So let’s turn to all of you now for your questions. So I’m going to go first to—I have one raised hand from Stephen Kass. Q: OK. Thank you. Jason, thank you for the very useful and concise summary. What specific kinds of energy programs do you think developing countries should now be pursuing? Should they be giving up coal entirely? Should they be importing natural gas? Should they be investing in renewables or nuclear? What recipe would you advise developing countries to pursue for their own energy needs? BORDOFF: It’s going to need to be a lot of different things, so there’s no single answer to that, of course. And by the way, I’ll just say it would be super helpful if people don’t mind just introducing yourself when you ask a question. That would be helpful to me, at least. I appreciate it. I think they need to do a lot of different things. I think I would start with low-hanging fruit, and renewable electricity is not the entire answer. The sun and wind are intermittent. Electricity can’t do certain things yet, like power ships and airplanes. But the low cost of solar and wind, I think, does mean it’s a good place to start, and then we need to think about those other sectors as well. I think a key thing there comes back to finance, and that’s why we’re spending so much time on it with our research agenda here. Access to financing and cost of capital are really important. Clean energy tends to be more capital-intensive and then, like solar and wind, more CAPEX, less OPEX over time. But attaining financing in poor countries is really difficult and expensive. Lack of experience with renewable energy, local banks are often reluctant to lend to those kinds of projects. And then foreign investors, where most of that capital is going to come from, view projects often in emerging markets and developing economies particularly as more risky. Local utilities may not be creditworthy. There’s currency inflation risk in many developing countries, people worry about recouping their upfront investment if bills are paid in local currency. There’s political risk, maybe corruption, inconsistently enforced regulations. And it can be harder to build clean energy infrastructure if you don’t have other kinds of infrastructure, like ports, and roads, and bridges and a good electrical grid. So I would start there. And I think there’s a role for those countries to scale up their clean energy sectors, but also for policymakers and multilateral development banks and governments elsewhere—there was a lot of focus in Glasgow on whether the developed countries would make good on their promise made in Copenhagen to send $100 billion a year in climate finance to developing countries. And they fell short of that. But even that is kind of a rounding error, compared to the one to two trillion (dollars) a year that the International Energy Agency estimates is needed. So there are many other things besides just writing a check that government, like in the U.S. or elsewhere, can do. The Development Finance Corporation, for example, can lend to banks in local and affordable rates, finance projects in local currency, expand the availability of loan guarantees. I’ve written before about how I think even what often gets called industrial policy, let’s think about some sectors—in the same way China did with solar or batteries fifteen years ago. Are there sectors where governments might help to grow domestic industries and, by doing that, scale—bring down the cost of technologies that are expensive now, the premium for low-carbon or zero-carbon cement or steel. It’s just—it’s not reasonable to ask a developing country to build new cities, and new highways, and all the new construction they’re going to do with zero-carbon steel and cement because it’s just way too expensive. So how do you bring those costs down? If we think about investments, we can make through U.S. infrastructure or other spending to do that, that not only may help to grow some domestic industries and jobs here, that can be its own form of global leadership if we’re driving those costs of those technologies down to make it cheaper for others to pick up. So I think that’s one of the places I’d start. But there are a lot of other things we need to do too. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I’m going to take the next question—and let me just go back. Stephen Kass is an adjunct professor at NYU. So the next question is a written question from Wei Liang, who is an assistant professor of international policy studies at Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey. And the question is: I wonder if you could briefly address the Green Climate Fund and individual countries’ pledge on that. BORDOFF: Yeah, I mean, it touches a little bit on what I said a moment ago about the need for developed countries to provide climate finance to developing countries. And so I think that’s—it’s important that we take those obligations seriously, and that we, in advanced economies, step up and make those funds available. And but, again, we’re talking—the amount we’re still talking about is so small compared to the amounts that are needed to deal both with the impacts of climate change, and then also to curb climate change, to mitigate climate change. Because we know that developing countries are in the parts of the world that will often be most adversely impacted by climate impacts—droughts, and heat waves, and storms, and food security issues—from a standpoint of equity are the parts of the world that have done the least to cause this problem, responsible for very few emissions. If you look cumulatively at emissions since the start of the industrial age, about half—nearly half have come from the U.S. and EU combined. Two percent from the entire continent of Africa. So they are using very little energy today, haven’t therefore contributed to the problems, and have the fewest resources, of course, to cope with the impacts, and also to develop in a cleaner way. Sometimes it’s cheaper to develop in a cleaner way. Renewables are often today competitive with coal, even without subsidy. But there are many areas where that’s not the case, and there is a cost. And we need to help make sure that, you know, we’re thinking about what a just transition looks like. And that means many different things for different communities, whether you’re a coal worker or an agricultural worker in California that may, you know, be working outside in worse and worse heat. But it also means thinking about the parts of the world that need assistance to make this transition. So I think we need to be taking that much more seriously. FASKIANOS: Next question is a raised hand from Tara Weil, who is an undergraduate student at Pomona College. Q: Hi. So, given that developed nations are the largest contributors to carbon emissions, as you’ve said, how can larger powers be convinced as to the importance of addressing global inequality with regards to climate change? And thank you so much, also, for giving this talk. BORDOFF: Yeah. Thank you for being here. I don’t have a great answer to your question. I mean, the politics of foreign aid in general are not great, as we often hear in events at CFR. So I do think one—we need to continue to encourage, through political advocacy, civil society, and other ways, governments in advanced economies to think about all the tools they have at their disposal. I think the ones that are going to be—I’m reluctant to try to speak as a political commenter rather than a climate and energy commenter on what’s going to work politically. But part of that is demonstrating what—it’s not just generosity. It is also in one’s self-interest to do these things. And just look at the pandemic, right? What would it look like for the U.S. to show greater leadership, or any country to show even greater leadership and help cope with the pandemic all around the world in parts of the world that are struggling to vaccinate their people? That is not only an act of generosity, but it is clearly one of self-interest too, because it’s a pretty globalized economy and you’re not going to be able to get a pandemic under control at home if it’s not under control abroad. Of course, the same is true of the impacts of climate change. It doesn’t matter where a ton of CO2 comes from. And we can decarbonize our own economy, but the U.S. is only 15 percent of annual emissions globally. So it’s not going to make a huge difference unless everyone else does that as well. There is also the potential, I think, to—and we see this increasingly when you look at the discussion of the Biden infrastructure bill, how they talk about the U.S.-China relationship, which of course are the two most important countries from the standpoint of climate change. It is one of cooperation. That was one of the success stories in Glasgow, was a commitment to cooperate more. We’ll see if we can actually do it, because it’s a pretty difficult and tense U.S.-China relationship right now. So the question is, can you separate climate from all those other problems on human rights, and intellectual property, and everything else and then cooperate on climate? It’s been hard, but there’s a renewed commitment to try to do that. But also, a recognition that action in the clean energy space is not only about cooperation but it’s also about economic competition. And you have seen more and more focus on both the Republican and Democratic sides of the aisle on thinking about the security of supply chains, and critical minerals, and the inputs in lithium and rare earth elements that go into many aspects of clean energy. To my point before about aspects of industrial policy that might help grow your own domestic economy, I think there are ways in which countries can take measures that help—that help their own economies and help workers and help create jobs, and that in the process are helping to drive forward more quickly the clean energy technologies we need, and bring down the cost of those technologies to make them more accessible and available in some of the less-developed countries. So I think trying to frame it less as do we keep funds at home, do we write a check abroad? But there are actually many steps you could do to create economic opportunities and are win-win. Without being pollyannish about it, I think there is some truth to some of those. And I think we can focus on those politically as well. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I’m going to take an international question from Luciana Alexandra Ghica, who is an associate professor for international cooperation at the University of Bucharest. What type of topics do you think we should address immediately in university programs that provide training in climate, development, global policies, or international public affairs, so that a new generation of leaders really pushes forward the agenda on climate change? BORDOFF: Yeah. Well, I’ll say a quick word about what we’re doing at Columbia, and maybe it’s relevant to that question, because Columbia has made this historic commitment to build a climate school. There are many initiatives, and centers, and institutes. There was not only a handful of schools—law school, business school, medical school, engineering school. And it is the largest commitment a university can make to any particular topic, is something on the scale of a school with degree-granting authority and tenure-granting authority, and all the things that come with a school. And it’s just the scale at a place like Columbia, and many other places, is just enormous. That’s what we’re doing on climate. We have created a climate school. And I’m honored President Bollinger asked me to help lead it. And we’re going to build a faculty. We have our first inaugural class of masters’ students, about ninety students that are going through the program right now, and we have a building in Manhattan for the climate school, and on and on. The idea—but the question is, what is climate, right? Because academia has been historically organized into traditional academic disciplines. So you have people who you hire through a tenured search, and they go to the engineering faculty and build their lab there. And there’s law professors, and their business school professors, and on and on and on, social work. But for climate, you need all of those, right? They all kind of need to come together. And, like, interdisciplinary doesn’t even sort of do justice to what it means to think about approaching this systemic—it’s a systemic challenge. The system has to change. And so whatever solution you’re talking about—if you want to get hydrogen to scale in the world, let’s—you know, for certain sectors of the economy that may be hard to do with renewable energy, or in terms of renewable energy and, say, green hydrogen. You need engineering breakthroughs to bring down the cost of electrolyzers, or you need new business models, or you need financial institution frameworks that figure out how you’re going to put the capital into these things. You need the policy incentives. How are you going to—you need permitting and regulation. How do we permit hydrogen infrastructure? It’s barely been done before. There are concerns in the environmental justice community about some aspects of technologies like that or carbon capture that need to be taken seriously and addressed. There are geopolitical implications, potentially, to starting to build a global trade in ammonia or hydrogen, and what security concerns—energy security concerns might accompany those, the way we thought about oil or gas from Russia into Europe. I have an article coming out in the next issue of Foreign Affairs about the geopolitics of the energy transition. So we need disciplines that come together and look at a problem like that in all of those multifaceted dimensions, so we can figure out how to get from a lab to scale out in the world. And so when we think about the areas of concentration here, climate finance, climate justice, climate in society, climate in international security—I mean, a range of things that I think are really important to help people understand. And that’s going to be a major focus of what we do at the climate school here. FASKIANOS: Fantastic. Let’s go next to Sean Grossnickle, who has raised his hand. A graduate student at Fordham University. Q: Speak now? Hi, this is not Sean but Henry Schwalbenberg, also at Fordham, where I teach in our international political economy and development program. I went to a conference about a month ago in Rome. And there was a physicist from CERN. And he was a big advocate of something I’d never heard of, and this is this thorium for nuclear reactors. And he was going through all the pros, but I wanted a more balanced perspective on it. And I’m hoping that you might give me a little pros and cons of this thorium nuclear reactor technique. BORDOFF: Yeah. I will be honest and say that nuclear is not my area of focus. We have a pretty strong team here that works in nuclear, and I think is optimistic about the breakthroughs we’re going to see in several potential areas of nuclear—advanced nuclear technology, that being one of them, or small modular reactors, and others. At a high level, I will say I do think if you’re serious about the math of decarbonization and getting to net zero by 2050, it’s hard to do without zero-carbon nuclear power. It’s firm, baseload power. It runs all the time. Obviously, there are challenges with intermittency of solar and wind, although they can be addressed to some extent with energy story. Most of the analyses that are done show not necessarily in the U.S. but in other parts of the world significant growth in nuclear power. The International Energy Agency just modeled what it looks like to get to net zero by 2050, and this pathway that got a lot of attention for saying things like we would not be investing in new oil and gas supply. The world has to change a lot pretty quickly. And they have about a hundred new nuclear plants being built by 2030, so that’s a pretty big number. So we’re going to need all tools—(laughs)—that we have at our disposal. And unfortunately, I worry we may still fall short. So I think at a high level we need to think really hard about how to improve nuclear technology. The people who know that really well I think are optimistic about our ability to do that. And I will follow up on thorium in particular with my colleagues at Columbia, and happy to follow up with you offline about it. FASKIANOS: Great. I’m going to take a written question from Stephen Bird, who’s an associate professor of political science at Clarkson University. He thanks you, and he wanted you to talk a little bit more about political will. The overall dollar amounts are clear. Much cheaper to address climate change than to ignore it. That said, countries are, clearly, lagging. Is it a case of countries just don’t want to take action now because of issues of fairness or because of lack of domestic political support, i.e., citizens aren’t convinced that they should pay costs now with payoffs that come later, and what might we do to improve that issue in terms of persuading or arguing for more political will? BORDOFF: Yeah. It’s a question for, you know, a political scientist as much as an energy or climate expert, and I wish I had a better answer to it. I think it is—climate is one of the trickiest problems for so many reasons but one of those is there is no acute event now that you sort of respond to, hopefully, and pull everyone together. It’s a set of things that, you know, of course, there would have been storms and droughts before but we know they’re intensified and made worse. It’s hard to rally public support. We often respond to a crisis kind of proverbial, you know, frog in the boiling water kind of thing. So that makes it hard. There are huge issues—we talked about a just transition a few minutes ago—there are huge issues with intergenerational equity when we talk about climate. There are, clearly, climate impacts and damages today but some of the worst will be in the future, including for people who may not be born yet, and we don’t do a great job in our political environment about thinking about those and valuing them today and how you do that, and from an economic standpoint, of course, there are questions about discount rates you apply and everything else. I think, politically, one of the things that has mobilized stronger climate—support for climate action, so it is encouraging that if you look at polling on climate change, the level of urgency that the public in many countries, including the U.S., broadly, ascribe to acting on climate has gone up a lot. It’s higher today than it was, you know, a decade or so ago. That’s a result of people seeing the impacts and also advocacy campaigns and political campaigns. It is often tied to—it’s like a win-win. Like, President Biden says when he thinks of climate he thinks of jobs, and so we’re going to deal with climate and we’re going to grow the economy faster and we’re going to create jobs, and there is truth to that. It is also the case that there are costs. The cost of inaction are higher, but there are costs associated with the transition itself. So if you survey the American public, I think, climate, according to the latest YouGov/Economist poll I saw, you know, it was number two on the list of things they cared the most about. That’s much higher than in the past. And then if you ask the American public are they willing to pay $0.25 a gallon more at the pump to act on climate, 75 percent say no. And you look at the challenges the Biden administration is having right now sort of thinking about a really strong set of measures to put in place to move the ball forward on climate, but acute concern today about where oil prices are and inflation and natural gas prices as we head into the winter. If the weather is cold then it’s going to be really expensive for people to heat their homes in parts—some parts of the country like New England, maybe. So that’s a reality, and I think we need to—it was interesting, in the roundtable we did with President Obama with climate activists, that was a message he had for them. You know, be impatient, be angry, keep the pressure on, but also be pragmatic. And by that he means, like, you know, try to see the world through the eyes of others and people who are worried about the cost of filling up at the pump, the cost of paying their heating bills. They’re not—some of them may not be where you are yet. They may not have the same sense of urgency with acting on climate that many of us on this Zoom do and need to take those concerns seriously. So I think that’s a real challenge, and it can be addressed with good policy, to some extent, right, if you think about the revenue raised from a carbon tax and how it could be redistributed in a way that reduce the regressive impacts. I’ve written about how, at a high level—I’ll say one last point—if we get on track for an energy transition, which we’re not on yet, right. (Laughs.) Oil and gas use are going up each and every year. But imagine we started to get on track where those were falling year after year. It’s still going to take decades, and that process of transition is going to be really messy. It’s going to be really volatile. We’re going to have fits and starts in policy from Obama to Trump to Biden. We’re going to make estimate—we’re going to make bets on technologies and maybe get those technologies wrong or misunderstand the cost curves, the potential to shut down investment in certain forms of energy before the rest are ready to pick up the slack. If it’s messy and volatile and bumpy, that’s not only harmful economically and geopolitically, it will undermine public support for stronger climate action. So you see, like, in Washington they’re selling off the Strategic Petroleum Reserve because we’re moving to a world beyond oil and also we have all this domestic oil now with shale. We need more, not fewer, tools to mitigate volatility for the next several decades if we’re serious about making this transition, and I think the same is true for thinking about sort of buffers you could build into geopolitics, foreign policy, and national security, because there will be—in a post-oil and gas world, you know, you may say, well, we’re not going to worry as much about the Middle East or about, you know, Russia’s leverage in Europe. But there will be new risks created and we can talk about what some of those might be, and we need new tools of foreign policy to mitigate those potential foreign policy risks. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I’m going to take the next question. Raised hand from Chloe Demrovsky, adjunct instructor at NYU. Q: Hey, can you hear me? BORDOFF: Yes. Thank you. FASKIANOS: Yes. Q: Hi. Chloe Demrovsky, adjunct at NYU and president and CEO of Disaster Recovery Institute International. Thanks for being with us, Jason. So my question is about the feasibility and your thoughts on artificially altered clouds or solar geoengineering. What are the ethical and geopolitical implications of, perhaps, using this to buy a little time for our energy transition? Thanks. BORDOFF: Yeah. A super interesting question, and I will say, again, I’m sort of—think of myself as an energy expert. So that is where I spend more time than thinking about tools like solar geoengineering. I guess, it seems there’s, obviously, huge risks associated with something like that and we need to understand them. We need to do research. We need to figure out what those risks may be. There are global governance concerns. It’s actually pretty cheap to do solar geoengineering. So what happens when some country or some billionaire decides they want to start spraying stuff into the atmosphere to cool the planet? And for those who don’t know that, you know, solar—I mean, you think of after a volcano the planet cools a little bit because of all the particulates up in the atmosphere. When you model in an energy system model how much phasing out coal will reduce warming, you, obviously, have much less carbon dioxide emissions but that’s offset slightly—not completely, of course—it’s offset a little bit by the fact that you have less local air pollution, which is a good thing from air pollution. But air pollution has a slightly cooling effect, because you have these little particles floating around that reflect sunlight. So the idea is can we create that artificially and cool the planet, and you can imagine lots of reasons why that could go wrong when you’re trying to figure out what—how much to put in there, what unintended consequences could be. You still have other impacts of carbon dioxide like ocean acidification. Maybe you go too far in one direction, that’s like you’re setting the thermostat. That’s why one of the companies doing carbon removal is called Global Thermostat. You’re kind of figuring out what temperature it should be. But I will say so it’s an area that needs research and I think, given how far we are away from achieving goals like 1.5 and net-zero 2050, I guess what I would say is in the same way that when I worked in the Obama administration it was—I wouldn’t say controversial, but there were some people who didn’t want to talk about adaptation because it was kind of a more—there was a moral hazard problem there. It was, you know, less pressure to mitigate and reduce emissions if we thought adaptation was a solution. People worry about that from the standpoint of solar geoengineering. But the likelihood—I hope I’m wrong, but the likelihood that we roll the clock forward, you know, later this decade and we realize we’ve made progress but we’re still pretty far short, and the impacts of climate change in the same way the IPCC 1.5 report said, you know what, 1.5 is going to be pretty bad, too, and that’s even worse than we thought, the more we learn about climate the more reason there is to be concerned, not less concerned. It seems very plausible to me that we will kind of come to a growing consensus that we have to think about whether this technology can, as you said, buy us time. This is not something you do permanently. You need to get to net zero to stop global warming. But if you want to reduce the impacts of warming on the rate of Arctic sea ice melt and all the rest, can you buy time, extend the runway, by doing this for some number of decades. And I think—I don’t have a strong view on the right answer to that. But I think it’s something we, certainly, need to be thinking about researching and understanding what the consequences would be because we’re going to have to figure out how to take more abrupt actions to close that gap between ambition and reality unless the reality starts to change much more quickly than is the case right now. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I saw a raised hand from Maya but she lowered it. So if you want to raise your hand again, please do so. And in the meantime, I’m going to take a written question from Jennifer Sklarew, who’s an assistant professor of energy and sustainability at George Mason University. Was CCS/CCUS, which carbon capture and storage/carbon capture utilization and storage, to write out those acronyms, promoted as a climate change solution in Glasgow and was there a pushback against this technology option as both a climate change solution and a support mechanism for continued fossil fuel use? BORDOFF: There was some pushback but, I think, actually, more in the other direction. So I think there has been a growing recognition from many in the climate world that carbon capture technology, carbon removal technology, need to be part of the solution. I think there’s almost no climate model at this point that shows how you would get to 1.5 degrees or net zero—1.5 degrees without huge amounts of negative emissions—carbon removal. Some of that can be nature based, but a lot of it will be—some of it will be technology based as well and focusing on what we care about, which is the emissions, is the most important thing. So and this is not, I don’t think, the primary thing you’re going to do. You want to do the things that are easiest and cheapest and present the fewest risks. So putting a lot of renewables into the grid, getting electrification into the vehicle fleet—there’s a lot of things that you would do before that. But if you think about some of the sectors in the economy we talked about before that are hard to decarbonize like steel and cement, it may well be the case that carbon capture is part of the technology there. There was a big announcement yesterday from the NET Power Allam Cycle gas plant in Texas that they had finally come online with delivering net-zero power to the grid. It was sort of a milestone in that technology. So we need to advance this technology and figure out how we’re going to—how we’re going to get where we need to be. We need to hold that kind of technology accountable to make sure that it’s actually meeting the standards we’re talking about so that it actually is very low, if not zero, carbon. But if you look at, you know, most of the scenarios I’m aware of, whether it’s—Princeton did the study “Net-Zero America,” how we get to net zero by 2050 in the U.S. The International Energy Agency, as I said, did it for net zero globally. There is a meaningful role for carbon capture, to some extent, in the power sector in these heavy industry sectors like steel and cement, and then making, say, hydrogen some of that will be blue hydrogen. Most of it, eventually, will be green, but there may be some role for blue hydrogen, which is—which is gas with carbon capture. So I think, if anything, there’s been a growing understanding that we need all tools on deck right away and, again, I fear even with all the tools we may still fall short. FASKIANOS: Great. There’s a written question from Laila Bichara, who’s at SUNY Farmingdale, international business. There was a New York Times article, “Business Schools Respond to a Flood of Interest in ESG,” talking about the issue of the scarcity of skills in recent graduates to help with social impact, sustainable investments, climate finance, and social entrepreneurship. And she wanted to know if there are resources that you could point the group to in terms of foundation courses or certification that would provide all students with a basic foundation. BORDOFF: Yeah. That’s a really good question and it’s a growing area of focus and I think universities should be doing more in. The Tamer Center of Columbia Business School does a lot of work in ESG. We hosted a really interesting roundtable at the Center on Global Energy Policy yesterday on ESG and actually been doing a lot of work thinking about that in the context of state-owned enterprises and national oil companies, which we don’t talk about enough. But they’re a really, really big part of the problem we’re talking about. We tend to focus more on these very well-known private sector companies or financial institutions in places like New York. So there—Bloomberg Philanthropies has done a huge amount in this space. I think there’s some really good educational programs with some universities and business schools that have done a lot in the ESG space. But I think it’s a need, to be frank. I mean, the fact that you’re asking the question and I’m pointing to a few examples, but not a huge number, and it is something that universities need to educate themselves about but then is an opportunity for us to educate others. Maybe a revenue one, too, with executive education or something. But there’s a lot of companies and financial institutions that want to understand this better. I worry that while there’s a huge growing focus on climate, which is a good thing, in the financial community, the phrase ESG kind of means so many different things right now. It’s this alphabet soup of regulations and standards and disclosure requirements, and some may make a difference and some may not and it’s hard to figure out which ones matter, and for people who want to do the responsible thing what does that really mean. That’s an area where research is needed. I mean, that’s a role for what we do every day to think about if the SEC is going to regulate what makes a difference and what doesn’t, if you’re going to create green bonds. If you’re going to call everything green in the finance community, what’s real and what’s not? What moves the needle? What doesn’t? What are the returns for greener portfolios? How is that affecting the cost of capital for clean energy versus dirty energy? You know, on and on. I think those are important research questions for us to take on and then it’s our job to help educate others as well. FASKIANOS: Great. So the next question I’m going to take from—oh, OK. Good. Maya Copeland (sp) has written her question. She’s a political science major at Delaware State University. Do you believe developed nations like the U.S. have done a lot in reference to climate change or mostly talk? If you believe nations like the U.S. have dropped the ball in this aspect, what do you think it would take to get those powerhouses serious about environmental change? BORDOFF: I think advanced economies have done—many have done a lot. I mean, the European Union has taken climate seriously and has reduced emissions and has pretty strong measures in place with a carbon market, for example, with a pretty high carbon price right now. The politics of this issue are not quite as favorable in the U.S., but the U.S. has seen emissions decline more than most over the last decade and a half, in part because of policy measures that have, you know, advanced renewable energy and brought the cost of that down as well as cheaper natural gas displacing coal for a while. But at a broader level, you know, have we done enough? The answer is no one’s done enough—(laughs)—which is why emissions are still going up every single year. So that—so the answer is no, we haven’t done enough. Almost no country has done enough at home to be on a trajectory for net zero 2050. You saw the announcements from countries like India saying, we’ll get to net zero by 2070, and, you know, people said, oh, well, that’s terrible. They’re not saying 2050. And implicit in that is sort of saying, well, if you want to get global to net zero by 2050 we’re not all going to move at the same speed, right. Some countries have advanced with the benefit of hydrocarbons since the Industrial Age and some haven’t. So, presumably, the pathways are going to look different, right. And, you know, that’s not always how countries in the advanced—in the developing—in the developed world talk about it. The commitment from the Biden administration is net zero by 2050. So I would say there’s been—there are some models to point to of countries that have taken this issue seriously but we’re not doing enough and partly because the political will is not there and partly—I come back to what I said before—this problem is harder than people realize. So you say which countries are doing enough, like, point to some models, right, and somebody might point to Norway, which, you know, the share of new vehicles sold that are electric in Norway went from zero to, I think, it’s 70 percent now. I mean, that’s amazing. Seventy percent of new car sales are electric. And if you go back to the start of that trajectory, about a decade or decade and a half, oil demand is unchanged in Norway. So we can talk about why that is and it’s because a lot—as I said earlier, a lot of oil is used for things other than cars, and it’s increased for trucks and planes and petrochemicals. It takes time for the vehicle fleet to turn over. So when you start selling a bunch of electric cars, you know, average car is on the road for fifteen years so it takes a while before that—the vehicle stock turns over. So I saw that kind of mapped out on a chart recently, just two lines—one is electric vehicle sales going straight up and then the other is oil demand in a flat line. It’s a reminder of how unforgiving the math of decarbonization is. The math of climate is really unforgiving, like, you know, the kind of harmful impacts we’re going to see with even 1.5 degrees warming. But the math of energy and decarbonization is really unforgiving, too. It’s—and we just need to be honest with ourselves about what it takes to get where we need to go. Because I think it’s good to have optimism and ambition, but I worry there should be optimism but not happy talk. We should recognize that there’s a lot of work to do and let’s get to work doing it. FASKIANOS: Great. So there are several questions in the chat about China. I’m going to start off with Andrew Campbell, who’s a student at George Mason University. Is LNG—liquefied natural gas—a bridge toward renewable energy still being considered? If not, how are India and China’s expected growth and increase in coal use going to be addressed? And then there are a couple of other comments or questions about China. You know, what’s your take on China as the biggest emitter and return somewhat to coal? Can we actually even make stated and adequate new goals? And, you know, given the relationship between U.S. and China, which is contentious, you know, what is the cooperation going to be between U.S. and China on climate? So there’s a lot packed in there, but I know you can address it all. (Laughs.) BORDOFF: Yeah. I think the China question is really hard, as I said earlier, this kind of, like, competition and cooperation and we’re going to try to do both, and I think there was a hope early on—Secretary Kerry said it—that climate could be segmented from the broader challenges in the U.S.-China relationship, and I think that has proven harder to do than people had hoped, in part, because, you know, you need both parties to want to do that. I think China has signaled it’s not necessarily willing to segment cooperation on climate from lots of other issues. And then these things bleed together where, you know, there’s measures being taken in Washington to restrict imports of solar panels from China, that there were concerns that were made with—in ways that have human rights abuses associated with them with forced labor or maybe have unfair trade practices in terms of subsidies. China is—you know, the leadership in China takes climate seriously. This is a country that recognizes, I think, climate change is real and that needs to be addressed. They have a set of national interests that matter a lot, obviously, to them in terms of economic growth, and the pathway to get there is challenging. So it’s a country that’s growing clean energy incredibly quickly, as we’re seeing right now, in part because there’s a(n) energy crunch throughout Europe and Asia. They are ramping up the use of coal quite a bit again, but also taking some pretty strong measures to advance clean energy and, over time, hopefully, move in a lower carbon direction for reasons both about concerns over climate but also local air pollution, which is much, much worse in many parts of China than it is here and that’s a huge source of concern for the public there. So when it comes to things like coal they need to figure out how to address those air pollution problems. And then for reasons of economic competition, like I mentioned a minute ago. I mean, China dominates the global market for refining and processing of critical minerals for solar panels, and there are economic and national competitiveness and strategic reasons to do that. So all of those things motivate them to move in the direction of clean energy, but they need to be moving faster to phase down hydrocarbon energy for sure. And then you ask a really hard question about—not hard, but one of the most contentious questions is about the role of natural gas in the transition, and we can have a whole separate session about that. I think there is a view of many in the climate community and many in developing countries—in developed countries that there’s not space left in the carbon budget for natural gas, and you saw the Biden administration recently declare through the Treasury Department that, except in very rare cases of the poorest of the poor like Sierra Leone or something, they would not finance natural gas projects through the multilateral development banks. The vice president of Nigeria, I think, responded—speaking of CFR—in Foreign Affairs by writing that this was not fair and you need to think about a viable pathway for a country like Nigeria to develop and it just—it doesn’t work to get there that fast. There has to be a bridge. The role of gas looks very different in different parts of the world. It looks different in the U.S. than it does in an emerging or a developing economy. It looks different in the power sector, where there are a lot more alternatives like renewables than it does in heavy industry or how we heat our homes. It looks different for, say, in the Global South, where you’re talking about people who are still using coal and charcoal and dung for cooking to think about solutions like liquefied petroleum gas. So all of those things are true, but we need to think about gas also with the carbon budget in mind. I mean, the math is just the math. (Laughs.) If you’re going to build any gas infrastructure and not have it blow through the carbon budget, it’s going to have to be retired before the end of its normal economic life and you need to think about how that might look in different parts of the world. So you need to be fair to people, to allow them to grow, but also recognize that the math of carbon, you know, is what it is. FASKIANOS: Great. I just want to credit those last—the China questions came from Lada Kochtcheeva at North Carolina State University and Joan Kaufman, who’s director of Schwarzman Scholars based in China. We are really at the end of our time—we started a couple minutes late—and I just wanted to go back to—there are students on the call who are following with a professor on the webinar who wanted you just to comment on blue hydrogen, whether or not it is contributing or helping to reduce greenhouse gases. BORDOFF: I think the answer is it can. You just need to make sure that it actually does. So the question of—and by blue hydrogen we mean, you know, using gas with carbon capture to create hydrogen. It needs to have very low methane leakage rates. It needs to have very high capture rates, and we know that is technically possible. It doesn’t mean it will be done that way. So if people are going to pursue blue hydrogen as part of the solution in the—particularly in the near term, you need to make sure that it’s meeting those standards. I think in the long run my guess and, I think, most guesses would be that green hydrogen is going to make more sense. It’s going to be cheaper. The cost is going to come down. And so if we have a significant part of the energy sector that is hydrogen and ammonia in, say, 2050, more of that’s going to be green than blue. But there can be a role for blue if you make sure it’s done the right way. You just have to actually make sure it’s done the right way. FASKIANOS: Great. And, Jason, we are out of time, but I wanted to give you one last, you know, one-minute or thirty seconds, whatever you want, just to say some parting words on your work at the center or, you know, to leave the group with what they can do, again. So— BORDOFF: Well, I would just say thanks for the chance to be with you all and for the work that you’re doing every day. You know, I think Glasgow was a moment when the world came together to elevate ambition and roll up our sleeves and say this is—this is the decisive decade. Like, we’ll know ten years from now—(laughs)—if we got anywhere close to making it or not. And so it’s time for everyone to kind of roll up their sleeves and say, what can we do? We’re doing that, I think, at Columbia with the creation of this new climate school. We do that every day at the Center on Global Energy Policy. And so just in all of your institutions, you know, what does that mean for you? What does it mean for the institution? What does that mean for your own research and time and how you allocate it? How do we step up and say, what can we do in the biggest and boldest way we can? Because we need—we’re creating a climate school because I think the view is—you know, a hundred years ago there were no schools of public health and now it’s how would you deal with a pandemic without a school of public health? So I think our view is decades from now we’ll look back and wonder how we ever thought it was possible to handle a problem as complex and urgent as climate change without universities devoting their greatest kind of resource to them. And the measure of success for universities has to be research and new knowledge creation. It has to be education. It has to be serving our own communities. For us, it’s, you know, the community here in New York, Harlem. But also are we focusing the extraordinary resources and capacity and expertise of these great institutions to solve humanity’s greatest problems? That has to be a motivating force, too, for much of—maybe not all of but a lot of what universities do. So I’d just ask all of us to go back and think about how we can do that in our own work every day. and we have to do it through partnerships. I think universities don’t work together as well as they need to. But this is only going to work if we work together. FASKIANOS: Great way to end. Thank you very much, Jason Bordoff. We really appreciate it. We’ll have to look for your article in Foreign Affairs magazine, which is published by CFR. So, we are excited that you continue to contribute to the magazine. You can follow Jason Bordoff on Twitter at @JasonBordoff. Very easy to remember. Our final academic webinar of the semester will be on Wednesday, December 1, at 1:00 p.m. (ET). Michelle Gavin, who is CFR’s Ralph Bunche senior fellow for Africa policy studies, will talk about African politics and security issues. So in the meantime, follow us at @CFR_Academic. Come to CFR.org, ForeignAffairs.com, and ThinkGlobalHealth.org for research and analysis on global issues, and we look forward to continuing the conversation with you. Take care. BORDOFF: Thank you. (END)
  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    Meaningful Climate Action Requires Taking Africa’s Needs Seriously
    Climate policy should be an integral facet of relations between Africa and the West.
  • Climate Change
    What COP26 Did and Didn’t Accomplish
    Countries made notable commitments in the Glasgow Climate Pact, but they still fell short of the action needed to keep global warming within manageable levels.