Economics

Financial Markets

  • Europe and Eurasia
    Does "More Europe" Mean More Pro-Cyclical Fiscal Policy?
    “It is time for a breakthrough to a new Europe,” German Chancellor Angela Merkel said on November 9th.  “That will mean more Europe, not less.” Merkel wants a stronger fiscal union with strict controls on eurozone national budgets.  Yet to date EU fiscal policy, such as it is, has meant ill-considered pro-cyclical spending programs – as shown in the graphic above.  Greece was and is a large recipient of EU transfers, yet those transfers collapsed by 1.3% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) after it was forced to cut back on its contributions to EU-subsidized projects in an effort to slash government spending.  This additional fiscal squeeze hurt growth; Greek GDP fell an annual average of 3.5% in 2009 and 2010. Reuters: Italy At Breaking Point; Fears Grow of Euro Zone Split Mallaby: Franco-German Misstep on Eurozone Steil: Why Draghi Can't Be Bernanke Video: Europe Update
  • Budget, Debt, and Deficits
    Quarterly Update: BRIC Financial Holdings
    Since our August update, the eurozone crisis and poor global growth have fueled investor flight to dollars, despite the recent downgrading of the U.S. credit rating. As fund managers have moved money into dollars, withdrawing from emerging markets, dollar appreciation has meant that BRIC central banks need to intervene less in currency markets in order to keep their exchange rates competitive. While BRIC governments continue to accumulate U.S. assets, the pace has slowed. Four points stand out: - Both the level and growth of China's reserves dwarf those of the other BRIC countries. Chinese reserve accumulation over the past twelve months exceeds Brazil's, Russia's, and India's stocks of reserves. - Reserve growth slowed during the crisis of 2008 for all of the BRICs. In the past few months, a similar slowdown has taken place. - Risky U.S. assets remain out of favor. During and after the financial crisis, the BRICs sought refuge in low-risk U.S. treasuries; they are sticking to this pattern now. - Reserve growth is a byproduct of currency intervention, but its implications vary across countries. In China's case, reserve growth helps maintain an undervalued currency and hence a large current account surplus, fueling the imbalances that destabilize the global economy (see the Geo-Graphics blog post "China's Imbalances Are Bigger than Reckoned"). In Brazil's case, reserve growth helps contain its current account deficit in the face of strong investment inflows that threaten an overvaluation of the Brazilian real; thus Brazil's reserve accumulation arguably serves to reduce imbalances. For a broader picture of foreign capital flows into the United States, please see our companion Chart Book here. There is much talk about the BRIC countries as a group, but when it comes to financing the United States, China stands apart. Chinese concern about the weakness of the U.S. dollar stems from the fact that the majority of the government's foreign assets are composed of dollar assets. However, the dollar share is falling. It stood at over 71 percent of the total in January 2005 but is only 60 percent now. China's foreign assets grew at a slower rate during the crisis, but growth was still rapid. The bulk of the U.S. assets purchased by China are treasuries, unlike before the crisis, when Chinese official purchasers bought agencies, equities, and corporate debt. Brazil continues to keep most of its reserves in U.S. treasuries. Its holdings of U.S. corporate debt and U.S. equities are so small as to be virtually invisible in the picture. Before the crisis, Brazil's reserves were almost exclusively in U.S. financial assets. In the last two months, Brazil stopped accumulating reserves as the dollar rapidly appreciated against the real. In the midst of the crisis, when reserve growth was flat, Brazil diversified its reserves away from the dollar by selling dollar assets. As reserve growth resumed, so did the accumulation of dollar assets. But recent reserve growth has been much stronger than dollar asset accumulation, despite an increase in Treasury buying. Russia's reserves fell sharply in 2008 and early 2009. By 2010, both total reserves and dollar holdings resumed their upward march. Reflecting its economic proximity to the eurozone, Russia began to diversify its reserves out of dollars in the mid-2000s; in 2007, the dollar share of reserves averaged 45 percent, down from 70 percent in 2005. Even as its reserves fell in the crisis, Russia began to purchase U.S. treasuries, raising the money by selling all of its agencies (see the pink and green areas of the chart above). These purchases of U.S. treasuries have now leveled off. Indeed, Russia's total holdings of treasuries have recently decreased (green bars, below), likely driven by a decrease in holdings of short-term U.S. government debt. Although Russia's total reserves have been increasing since late 2009 (red line, chart above), recent change has been driven mainly by currency valuation, not purchases of reserves. Because Russia holds approximately 55 percent of reserves in non-dollar assets, its reserves measured in dollars rise as the dollar falls. The yellow line in the chart shows that Russia did not add U.S. assets as much as its total reserves accumulated. India's reserves are held mostly as bank deposits. A large share is likely held at the Bank for International Settlements. As a result, the U.S. data do not provide much insight into the currency composition of India's assets. The white space in the chart below, showing the large gap between reported dollar assets and total reserves, reflects this lack of information rather than large Indian nondollar holdings. However, the small portion that is observable in the U.S. TIC data suggests an increased appetite for U.S. treasuries after the crisis, following the pattern in China, Russia, and elsewhere. Total central bank (not just BRIC) demand for agency bonds fell sharply in late 2009 while demand for treasuries rose. Looking at all central bank purchases (not just the BRICs'), the dollar dominance has diminished. Starting in about 2005, the dollar represented a lower share of fresh accumulation than in the past, although dollar purchases remained elevated. During the crisis, reserve accumulation plummeted while dollar purchases did not, reflecting the dollar's continuing role as a perceived safe haven. Note: Reserves data come from the IMF's COFER data series. The quarterly data have been adjusted to a monthly series. These data include all central bank purchases, not just those by the BRIC countries. *A note on methodology: These charts are derived from reserve data produced by the BRIC central banks, from capital flows data produced by the U.S. Treasury in its International Capital System series (TIC), from the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves (COFER), and from Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies estimates. China's reserves data have been adjusted to include China's hidden reserves, which include an amount listed on the balance sheet of the People's Bank of China under the heading "other foreign assets," and an estimate of foreign assets held at the China Investment Corporation (China's sovereign wealth fund). The U.S. TIC data have been adjusted to include purchases made through London and Hong Kong. These adjustments anticipate revisions that are likely to be made when the Treasury's annual survey is published; by looking at the pattern of past revisions, it is possible to estimate future ones. Unless otherwise noted, foreign asset growth or reserve growth has not been adjusted for valuation changes due to currency moves.
  • China
    Confronting U.S.-China Economic Imbalances
    An undervalued Chinese yuan remains a contributing factor to the U.S.-China trade imbalance, but experts warn that labeling China a "currency manipulator" will not rein in mounting U.S. deficits.
  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    Nigeria’s Sovereign Wealth Fund: The Issue Is Governance
    State Governors Timipre Sylva of Bayelsa State (L-R), Emmanuel Uduaghan of Delta State and Rotimi Amaechi of Rivers State, meet at the South-South Summit to discuss the 2011 presidential election in Nigeria's Port Harcourt July 26, 2010. (Austin Ekeinde/Courtesy Reuters) The Jonathan government, following the example of other oil-rich states, wants to establish a sovereign wealth fund, and it has deposited a reported one billion U.S. dollars as seed money in it. The New York Times reports that big Wall Street firms are angling to get some of the action. Not so fast. Nigeria’s oil revenue is distributed among the federal, state, and local governments according to a set formula. The diversion of some of that oil revenue into a sovereign wealth fund reduces the amount available for distribution, and the powerful governors are objecting. Some governors are going to court to block the establishment of the fund. Another, the current head of the governors’ conference, is calling for the governors themselves to determine how much of their state’s oil revenue should be deposited in the fund. It is an open secret in Nigeria that governors are largely unaccountable for how they use their state’s oil money allocation. In theory, state legislatures should hold them accountable. But, in many or most cases, legislatures are dominated by the governors’ patronage networks. So, a sovereign wealth fund gores the governors’ ox. And governors are increasingly powerful as the federal government weakens. The federal government could, of course, deposit a percentage of its own share of the oil revenue in a sovereign wealth fund. To be successful, however, will require strict controls over withdrawals – especially for political purposes. Nigeria has an excess crude account, in which all revenue was deposited above a benchmark per barrel of oil. At one point, the account reached 30 billion U.S. dollars, and then dropped to one billion dollars, according to the New York Times. Clearly, there have been raids on the cookie jar. That is a cautionary note for the sovereign wealth fund. A successful sovereign wealth fund, like the excess crude account, is less about finance and more about the quality of governance.
  • Fossil Fuels
    Does Expensive Oil Inevitably Cause Recession?
    There is a popular belief that once U.S. petroleum expenditures exceed some threshold, recession results. Writing at the Harvard Business Review blog, Chris Nelder and Gregor MacDonald present this position clearly:   “The connection between oil shocks and recessions has been understood for decades. We have ample historical evidence that when petroleum expenditures reach 5% of GDP, recession typically follows. Annual energy expenditures rose from 6.2% of U.S. GDP in 2002 to a painful 9.8% in 2008, which was immediately followed by an economic crash. And now oil is sending energy expenditures back above 9% of GDP, just as we see fresh indications that the recession persists. This is not a coincidence.”   Some variation on this theme is a consistent feature of both peak oil writings and more moderate warnings about the economic threats posed by expensive oil. Indeed it would not be an exaggeration to say that this sort of worry motivates a large slice of energy policy thinking.   If you scratch the surface, though, claims of a threshold beyond which the economy goes into recession turn out to be pretty shaky.   Let’s start with a basic theoretical point: There is no fundamental reason to believe that 5 percent (or anything similar) should be a magic number. Petroleum expenditures were equal to 4.5, 4.5, and 4.3 percent of GDP in 1970, 1971, and 1972 respectively. Does anyone really believe that the U.S. economy would have gone into recession had that spending been half a percentage point higher?   There’s also an empirical problem: there are many years – 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1983, 1984, 1985, 2006 – in which petroleum expenditures have exceeded five percent that have not coincided with recessions.   In fact the five percent claim rests on only three data points: the two 1970s recessions and the 2007-2009 one.   There is a huge literature attempting to explain all three recessions. None of them, though, tend to be chalked up to high oil spending per se. What does appear to play a large role, particularly in the 1970s cases, is a rapid increase in oil costs that temporarily overwhelms the economy’s ability to adjust. The corollary, though, is that high oil costs reached through gradual increases probably won’t do the same sort of harm.   There is, however, a possible back door explanation for why high petroleum expenditures relative to GDP  seem to correlate with recessions even if they don’t do a good job explaining them: it is easier for petroleum expenditures to undergo big changes in short periods of time if they are starting from a high level. If, say, the price of oil rises 50% from a starting point where petroleum expenditures are 2% of GDP, the change in spending is 1% of GDP; in contrast, if the price of oil rises the same 50% from a starting point where petroleum expenditures are 6% of GDP, the change in spending is 3% of GDP. Whatever your transmission mechanism – supply side contraction, demand destruction, shifts in consumer preferences for durable goods – the 3% jump is going to be far more economically damaging than the 1% one. Indeed the years where oil spending was high but recession was absent generally come from a period where prices were fairly stable.   This is a subtle but important distinction from the oft asserted five percent rule. It suggests that while rising oil costs can lead to substantial economic harm, they do not necessarily need to.  Specifically, it points to the increasing importance of blunting both price volatility and its consequences so long as the world remains in expensive oil territory. Bob McNally and I discussed the volatility problem at some length in a recent Foreign Affairs essay. The compound danger of high and volatile oil prices makes focusing on remedies to that problem all the more important.
  • Global
    World Economic Update
    Play
    This series is presented by the Maurice R. Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies. Related readings: Four Ways Congress Can Upgrade Our Credit Rating by Peter R. Orszag U.S Solvency Rests with 12 Angry Men by Benn Steil U.S Debt Crisis: Implications for Asia by David Abraham and Meredith Ludlow American Power Requires Economic Sacrifice by Sebastian Mallaby  
  • Global
    World Economic Update
    Play
    Experts discuss the state of the U.S. and world economies and the need for tighter U.S. fiscal policy. This series is presented by the Maurice R. Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies.
  • United States
    Market Turmoil and U.S. Foreign Policy
    Global markets’ reaction to eurozone turbulence and S&P’s downgrade of U.S. debt add uncertainty to U.S. foreign policy, raising questions about which goals the country has the means to pursue, says CFR’s James M. Lindsay.
  • Climate Change
    Another Way to Think About Alternative Fuels
    Some people assess the relative attractiveness of alternative transportation fuels by comparing their greenhouse gas emissions to those associated with oil. Others compare different fuels based mainly on price: cheaper fuels, in this view, are invariably the most desireable ones. A third crowd, meanwhile, focuses first on whether any particular fuel can be produced at home rather than abroad. Each of these lenses leads to different conclusions: corn ethanol, for example, scores poorly on the first measure, moderately on the second, and well on the third. In our recent article in Foreign Affairs, Bob McNally and I emphasized another priority for energy policy: tamping down the sort of fuel price volatility that can pitch economies into recession. Indeed the importance of dealing with volatility is increasingly recognized by analysts and policymakers alike. To the best of my knowledge, though, there’s no assessment out there of the relative merits of various alternative fuels when views judged by this criterion. I thought I’d take a stab, in this post, at sketching out what such an assessment might look like. I come to pretty pessimistic conclusions regarding the potential contribution of alternative fuels to damping volatility. Fleshing this out would be a great project for a public policy student. Consider four different alternative transportation fuel sources: biofuels (ethanol or biodiesel), synthetic liquids (gas-to-liquids, coal-to-liquids, or biomass-to-liquids), natural gas in vehicles, and electricity. What we’re interested in is the short-run elasticity of supply for each fuel. If availability of a given fuel can grow quickly in response to rising prices, that can blunt the price rise, all of which dampens volatility. If availability is fixed, though, we wouldn’t see any supply response to rising prices, and hence wouldn’t expect any diminution of volatility. First generation biofuels may score pretty decently on this count. Their cost is heavily dependent on feedstock and operating expenses. A rising fuel fuel price environment, then, could spur additional production. The big variables, it seems to me, would be the availability of spare distilling capacity, and, if there isn’t much, the time required to build more plants. Cellulosic ethanol would probably perform less impressively. Capital costs for cellulosic ethanol are expected to dominate feedstock ones. That makes it more likely that whatever facilities exist will already be running at full capacity when a price shock hits. That would leave them without any room to expand supply in response. Synthetic liquids also hold out little promise. The economics of GTL and CTL would look pretty attractive right now if investors could bank on current commodity prices lasting forever. But both sorts of plants cost a ton of money (and GTL ones entail substantial technical risk too). Investors probably won’t build them en masse unless they’re super-confident that long-term commodity prices will make them profitable. This means that once plants are built, they’ll probably be operated at full tilt, leaving no room for rapidly expanding fuel production in response to high prices. The two exceptions would be in the case of mass miscalculation by investors, which could leave the world with lots of spare (X)TL capacity (analogous to the overinvestment in oil in the 1970s that left OPEC with a long spare capacity hangover) and strategic investment in spare capacity by states. Electricity is a bit trickier to think through. Once I buy an electric car, it’s almost invariably cheaper to use it than to drive using gasoline or diesel. If I’m already using electricity, then, I won’t change my behavior in response to an oil price shock, and hence won’t implicitly expand the supply of electricity used in transportation. Ditto for natural gas vehicles. But I can think of a couple possible exceptions. If I’ve got a plug-in hybrid electric vehicle, and oil prices jump, I might make more of an effort to charge it frequently enough to avoid switching to the gasoline engine. And if I’ve got two cars – a gasoline powered one and an electric one – I might lean harder toward using the electric one only. This actually suggests another angle: behavioral flexibility (which is really a demand side option) might be more powerful than having multiple fuel options. Having public transit options, for example, allows people to switch rapidly to transit as their source of mobility and away from gasoline. And since transit tends to be publically subsidized, “spare capacity” of mobility is more likely to develop. Like I said, though, this is all pretty preliminary thinking. If anyone decides to flesh out this exercise, or if I’ve missed the publication that already does it, let me know – I’d love to see the results.
  • Budget, Debt, and Deficits
    The Dangerous Mirage of Washington Deficit Plans
    The rapidly approaching August 2nd deadline, as proclaimed by the U.S. Treasury, for raising Congress’s self-imposed debt ceiling is producing a flurry of deficit-reduction plans – or, more accurately, plans for having plans.  Whereas a U.S. default triggered by a failure to raise the debt ceiling is the worst possible way to address the country’s unsustainable deficits, as it would cause borrowing rates to soar and pummel growth prospects, raising the debt ceiling without a credible deficit-cutting agreement still poses real risks of imminent, damaging market turmoil.  This is because of the regrettable but real power of the credit ratings agencies, whose downgrade pronouncements trigger automatic selling and purchase-restriction directives hardwired into public and private investment fund guidelines.  S&P has announced that it needs to see a $4 trillion deficit reduction commitment over 10 years—consistent with stabilizing U.S. debt as a percentage of GDP—in order to sustain the United States’ AAA rating.  Speaker Boehner’s plan aims at only $3 trillion in cuts; Senator Reid’s plan at $2.7 trillion.  Rep. Ryan’s plan is, from a practical perspective, meaningless, as its big spending cuts don’t materialize until well after 10 years.  President Obama’s budget also falls well short of the mark, relying on wildly optimistic near-term growth forecasts to juice the GDP denominator (see the Geo-Graphic here).  As the spending graph above-left shows, both Ryan and Obama set the country off on a path of much higher spending than the average over the past 50 years.  In short, debt ceilings and ratings agencies may be stupid inventions, but they will drive us into a major economic crisis if Congress doesn’t take serious action now. Standard & Poor’s: United States of America ‘AAA/A-1+’ Ratings Placed on CreditWatch Haass and Altman: How to Reduce the National Debt Mallaby: Debt Crisis Implications Expert Roundup: The Budget Deficit and U.S. Competitiveness
  • Financial Markets
    C. Peter McColough Series on International Economics: Challenges and Opportunities for the World Economy and the IMF
    Play
    The C. Peter McColough Series on International Economics is presented by the Corporate Program and the Maurice R. Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies.
  • Financial Markets
    Challenges and Opportunities for the World Economy and the IMF
    Play
    Christine Lagarde, managing director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), discusses fragility in the global economy and how the IMF can mitigate international financial crises. This meeting was part of the C. Peter McColough series on International Economics.
  • International Organizations
    Three Challenges for New IMF Director
    New IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde has to move quickly to establish independence from the European authorities who got her the job, enhance the IMF’s legitimacy, and display her ability to manage the fund, says CFR’s Steven Dunaway.
  • Financial Markets
    Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala: Nigeria’s Next Finance Minister?
    Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, managing director at the World Bank, participates in a panel discussion at the Clinton Global Initiative in New York. (Chip East/Courtesy Reuters) The Nigerian press reports that President Goodluck Jonathan is wooing Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala to be his finance minister, with expanded responsibilities and powers. If Jonathan succeeds, it will boost his administration’s standing with members of the international business and finance community who will take her appointment as a sign that he will prioritize Nigeria’s deep-seated economic and financial problems during his first full term in office. President Olusegun Obasanjo recruited Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala from the World Bank and made her Nigeria’s finance minister from 2003 to 2006, and briefly foreign minister in 2006. During her time in office, she was probably the most successful and highest profile minister in Obasanjo’s government. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala promoted transparency into the Nigerian government’s finances by publishing in the newspapers Abuja’s monthly funding allocations (largely based on oil revenue) to each of the thirty six states. She also oversaw Nigeria’s first sovereign credit ratings from Fitch and Standard and Poor’s, BB- at the time. Perhaps her highest profile achievement was framing and leading the negotiations by which the Paris Club wrote off $18 billion in Nigeria’s external debt in return for Abuja’s payment to creditors of $12 billion. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala was part of Obasanjo’s economic reform "Dream Team" that also included Obi Ezekwesili, who was minister for solid minerals and then of education; Charles Soludo, who was chairman of the central bank; and Nasir el-Rufai, who as minister of the Federal Capital Territory headed the largest department in the federal government. Obasanjo’s shift of Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala from finance to the foreign ministry in 2006 was regarded by many as a demotion. Obasanjo then removed her abruptly from her position as the head of the Nigerian Economic Intelligence Team while she was in London on negotiations. She resigned shortly thereafter and returned to the World Bank, where she has been Managing Director since 2007. Why Obasanjo made her foreign minister and then removed her from her position on the Nigerian Economic Intelligence Team leading to her resignation has never been satisfactorily explained. Ngozi Okonjo Iweala was educated at Harvard and MIT. Except for her ministerial stint in Nigeria, most of her career has been spent in the United States. Given the immense challenges facing the Jonathan government, some of which Asch Harwood and I profiled in an 0nline article for The Atlantic, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala will have to weigh the benefits of any potential position against the possible drawbacks. Like the other members of Obasanjo’s "Dream Team," she has no independent power base in Nigeria.
  • Fossil Fuels
    Why Volatile Oil Prices Are a Distinct Problem
    I’m planning to write more about what Bob McNally and I have to say in our new article in Foreign Affairs. I’m going to start, though, with a response from both of us to some misunderstandings in Steve LeVine’s post on the article over at ForeignPolicy.com. Here’s LeVine: “Robert McNally and Michael Levi try to plumb the mysteries of oil prices (temporary access to the subscription-only site). They do not get far -- their anti-climactic top-line conclusion is that oil prices are volatile, and will remain so, a deduction that every person on Earth with a driver’s license no doubt made quite some time ago.” Really? Had you polled drivers a year ago, what fraction would have predicted that four dollar a gallon gasoline was possible by this spring? Everyone now thinks crude price gyrations up to the mid-$100 range and down to the low $30s within a few years are the new normal?  LeVine may have figured it out years ago, but we don’t think all the world’s motorists, macro policy officials, airline executives, and investors - not to mention traders - have gotten that memo just yet. LeVine continues with an argument that might explain why he’s confused: “McNally and Levi assert that the ‘economic and national security implications are stark,’ but surely they do not mean as a result of volatility: Volatile low oil prices, say in the $50-$60 a barrel range, are not economic or security threats, at least to consuming nations. So one presumes that, without actually saying so, McNally and Levi actually are predicting relatively high and volatile prices.” We suspect that when LeVine writes that our conclusion is one “that every person on Earth with a driver’s license no doubt made quite some time ago”, he’s assuming that we’re talking about high prices – and indeed many Americans seem to be concluding that higher prices are here to stay. But that’s not what we’re saying. Yes, we note early on that average prices are going to be higher than they’ve been in the past, but we then emphasize that our essay is about something else: we’re talking about swinging prices, which are a different thing. Let’s go a bit deeper. LeVine writes that we “surely… do not mean [that economic and security implications are] a result of volatility”. Actually, we do, as we explain at great length in the essay. Uncertain prices complicate (and tend to defer) investment by individuals and firms, and wreak havoc with monetary policy. These are distinct challenges that high or low prices alone don’t present. The fact that wild price swings result from low spare capacity, a point that’s core to our argument, also means that world economies are more sensitive to geopolitical unrest; hence the stark security implications. If prices were high or low but stable, these geopolitical issues wouldn’t matter. LeVine also writes puzzlingly that “volatile low oil prices, say in the $50-$60 a barrel range, are not economic or security threats”. We can’t say we understand how it’s possible for oil prices to be both in the $50-$60 range and volatile at the same time – that’s a pretty narrow range. LeVine’s post finishes thusly: “Such a forecast [of high prices] would align McNally and Levi with Goldman Sachs and other pure commodities analysts, who do not foresee supply catching up to demand any time soon. On the other hand, a new report by James West at Barclays Capital reports that oil companies around the world are in an explosion of spending on exploration -- Big Oil as well as smaller, independent companies are on course to fork out more than half a trillion dollars on exploration this year ($529 billion to be precise), or 16 percent more than the $458 billion that they spent in 2010. These companies are so spending partly because of the above forecasts of high oil prices. Of course, if they produce too much, prices will again head down.” Exactly. If prices head up (which Barclays, among others, still predicts) and then crash because of overinvestment in supply (which, to be honest, we suspect isn’t likely any time soon), that wouldn’t be a counterpoint to our analysis – it would be evidence for it. Big ups and downs are precisely what an era of swinging oil prices is all about.