Economics

Financial Markets

  • Fossil Fuels
    Market Madness
    Market Madness explores the conditions in which oil supply fears arise, gain popularity, and eventually wane, and demonstrates the significant effects these stories have on financial markets.
  • Americas
    Leveraging Tech Innovations in Development
    Over the past decade, technology has begun to revolutionize industries ranging from education and healthcare to financial services and commerce. These transformations are not limited to the developed world – in emerging economies rapid mobile technology proliferation and internet penetration have had profound and unforeseen effects, including expanding financial inclusion through mobile banking services and facilitating employment through online and mobile job platforms. These changes are just the start. Technology can be a powerful tool for neutralizing many of the challenges to emerging countries’ efforts to alleviate poverty, improve quality of life, and expand economic opportunities. Infrastructure failings, including poor road networks, inadequate power grids, and limited internet connectivity, often leave vulnerable communities outside major cities isolated. Low state capacity and finite state resources undermine efforts to administer social programs or deliver basic public services. Even identifying target populations can be difficult, as many never receive a birth certificate, a government ID, or other sort of official recognition. It is here where some organizations and public institutions are leveraging technology. One such example, written about extensively by my former colleague Isobel Coleman, is GiveDirectly, a philanthropic organization that leverages satellite imagery and mobile payment systems to identify poor beneficiaries in Kenya and Uganda and to send them cash transfers digitally. Last week, I hosted a CFR meeting on harnessing technology in the service of development with Michael Faye, GiveDirectly cofounder, and Tariq Malik, former chairman of the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) in Pakistan and a leading expert on applying technology to development issues. Faye discussed his new company Segovia Technology, which designs engineering platforms to address last-mile challenges of delivering services and goods to citizens in developing countries. With global spending on social cash transfers to unbanked populations totaling a half trillion every year, a World Economic Forum report estimates leakage rates for these programs range from 5 to 25 percent. This translates into $25 to $150 billion in benefits lost due to misidentification, misdirection, or fraud. The same report estimates that migrating government payments, including cash transfers, onto a digital platform could save as much as $46 billion per year. Malik’s experience with NADRA in Pakistan speaks to the broader promise of integrating technology into government. NADRA’s biometrically enabled identification systems, widely issued smart identification cards, and direct payment systems have helped the Pakistani government improve its social programs. The state successfully used NADRA technology to administer disaster relief to 20 million citizens after a devastating flood in 2010 and to enroll poor women in a national financial assistance scheme. NADRA’s digital system has provided powerful tools for exposing fraud and corruption, and enabling greater accountability, better ensuring that target beneficiaries in Pakistan receive their social aid intact. Still the benefits – in terms of efficiency and transparency – create potential adversaries in those that gain from opacity and leakages. Both speakers alluded to these potential challenges to the transformative use of technologies employed by NADRA and Segovia. Malik and Faye’s work digitizing social programs are examples of creating sophisticated solutions to development challenges, and reflect the broad opportunities for governments, nonprofits, and donor agencies to think outside the usual development toolbox to make progress on poverty alleviation, inclusive growth, and greater economic prosperity.
  • Financial Markets
    Quarterly Update: Foreign Ownership of U.S. Assets
    Foreign ownership of U.S. assets has increased significantly since 1945, growing especially quickly over the past two decades. This growth is the result of a general increase in cross-border investment, with rising foreign ownership of U.S. assets nearly matched by rising U.S. ownership of assets abroad. These graphs reflect the following shifts: U.S. ownership of foreign assets fell 2.3 percent in the third quarter of 2014, the first decline in over a year. Foreign ownership of U.S. bonds issued by government-sponsored enterprises (agencies) rose 2.4 percent in the third quarter of 2014, driven by a 4.8 percent increase in private holdings of agencies. Foreigners hold about half as many agency securities as they did in 2008.   Foreign ownership of treasuries rose 1.1 percent in the third quarter of 2014. Both private and official sector holdings increased. Figure 1: Ownership of Financial Assets (Percentage of U.S. GDP) Data Source: Federal Reserve, Bureau of Economic Analysis Cross-border investment has grown as financial markets have become increasingly globalized. Since 1985, foreigners have consistently owned more U.S. assets than Americans own foreign assets. Between the third quarter of 2013 and the third quarter of 2014, U.S. ownership of foreign assets increased 6 percent and foreign ownership of U.S. assets increased 10 percent. Figure 2: Market size* (Percentage of U.S. GDP) Data Source: Federal Reserve, Bureau of Economic Analysis If the Federal Reserve’s holdings are excluded, foreigners own nearly 60 percent of outstanding marketable treasuries. Foreigners own less-significant portions of other asset markets. Their holdings of equities, though large in dollar terms, are small relative to the size of the equity market. Figure 3: Foreign Ownership of U.S. Treasuries and Agencies (Percentage of Total Market) Data Source: Federal Reserve Foreign ownership of U.S. treasuries has risen considerably since the middle of the 1990s and has been keeping pace with the growth of the market since 2012. Before 2008, foreign ownership of the agency market was growing at a relatively rapid pace. Since 2008, foreign holdings of agencies have declined steadily. Figure 4: Foreign Ownership of U.S. Treasuries* (Percentage of Total Market) Data Source: Federal Reserve The growth in foreign ownership of treasuries has come from official buyers (i.e., foreign central banks and sovereign wealth funds). Foreign private holdings have not grown as a share of the market over the past ten years. The much-discussed “flight to safety,” which is presumed to underpin the dollar, largely reflects the huge policy-driven demand for dollar reserves from emerging-market central banks, rather than the preferences of private sector investors. Figure 5: Foreign Ownership of U.S. Agencies* (Percentage of Total Market) Data Source: Federal Reserve A significant portion of growth in foreign ownership of agencies prior to 2008 was driven by official buyers. Since 2008, foreign official buyers have dramatically reduced their holdings of agency securities, from nearly 16 percent of the market to 8 percent. Private foreign holdings of agencies rose 5 percent in the third quarter of 2014. Figure 6: Foreign Ownership of U.S. Corporate Bonds and Equities (Percentage of Total Market) Data Source: Federal Reserve Foreign ownership of corporate bonds as a percentage of the total market has grown since 1945. Although growth has been modest over the past two decades, foreign holdings are now at levels not seen since the late 1980s. Foreign ownership of U.S. equities has grown slowly but steadily since the 1970s. Figure 7: Foreigners’ U.S. Portfolios (Percentage of Total Foreign Holdings) Data Source: Federal Reserve The foreign preference for treasury ownership had been waning over the past forty years but has returned since the crisis. Since the crisis, foreigners have allocated a declining share of their U.S. portfolios to corporate bonds and agencies. Their allocation to equities and mutual funds has rebounded since 2008 and is now close to the 2000 peak. Figure 8: Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) by Region* (Billions of U.S. Dollars) Data Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis The United States invests more directly into foreign enterprises abroad than foreigners do into the United States. The sharpest contrast is in Latin America. Figure 9: Portfolio Risk* (Percentage of Total Portfolio) Data Source: Federal Reserve The United States tends to hold riskier assets abroad (equities) than foreigners hold in the United States. Figure 10: U.S. Net International Investment Position (NIIP) Versus Current Account (Percentage of GDP) Data Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis Because of persistent U.S. current account deficits and corresponding capital inflows, foreigners buy more U.S. assets than vice versa. But because U.S. holdings abroad usually have yielded higher returns than have foreign holdings in the United States, the U.S. net international investment position has deteriorated less—although there was a sharp decline in 2011. The net international investment position deteriorated further in 2013.
  • Europe and Eurasia
    Correcting Paul Krugman’s Austerity Chart for Monetary Effects Yields Very Different Results
    In two recent blog posts (1/6 and 1/7), Paul Krugman highlighted a chart he made that, he says, illustrates clearly the failure of “austerity” around the world.  We reproduce it above on the left. Krugman’s chart plots changes in real GDP against changes in real government purchases for 33 advanced countries between 2010 and 2013.  The slope of the trend line (which Krugman does not draw) is clearly positive (with R-squared of 0.31), suggesting strongly that cutting government spending (during that period) reduced growth, and that raising it increased growth. The problem with this figure is that it mixes countries that were able to use monetary policy with those that weren’t – such as those in the Eurozone or those with hard currency pegs.  Referring to this problem, Scott Sumner recently asked on his blog: “Why do Keynesians show cross-sectional graphs of fiscal austerity and growth, mixing in countries that have their own independent monetary policy with those that do not?” Sumner’s point is that countries that have independent monetary policy can, in principle, offset fiscal drag with more accommodative monetary policy.  Is he right? On the right-hand figure above, we re-did Krugman’s chart for advanced countries with independent monetary policies.  Lo and behold, Krugman’s spending-growth relationship collapses, as Sumner would have expected. This is not to say that austerity is good.  But it does undermine the empirical basis for Krugman’s claim that reducing government spending lowers growth, and that increasing government spending raises growth, at least in countries that can use monetary policy as well as fiscal policy.   Follow Benn on Twitter: @BennSteil Follow Geo-Graphics on Twitter: @CFR_GeoGraphics Read about Benn’s latest award-winning book, The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a New World Order, which the Financial Times has called “a triumph of economic and diplomatic history.”
  • Capital Flows
    Which Countries Should Fear a Rate Ruckus?
    For many Emerging Markets, May 22, 2013 is a day that will live in infamy.  It marks the start of the great Taper Tantrum, when Ben Bernanke’s carefully hedged remarks on prospects for slowing Fed asset purchases triggered a massive sell-off in EM bond and currency markets. Though the sell-off was widespread, it was not indiscriminate.  As the top figure above shows, EMs with large current account deficits were the hardest hit.  These were countries dependent on inflows of short-term capital facilitated by the $85 billion the Fed was pumping in monthly to buy Treasuries and mortgage-backed securities. So who is vulnerable now to a possible Rate Ruckus – an EM bond market sell-off triggered by an unexpectedly early or aggressive Fed rate hike? As the bottom figure suggests, many of the same countries are likely to be in the firing line – in particular, Ukraine, Turkey, South Africa, Peru, Brazil, Indonesia, Colombia, Mexico, and India.  Of these, only Ukraine has seen a significant improvement in its current account deficit, which has fallen from a whopping 9.2% to 2.5%.  Poland and Romania have moderate (2%) but higher deficits, and could receive a larger jolt this time around.  Only Thailand has moved into surplus, and looks likely to be spared. CFR Backgrounder: Currency Crises in Emerging Markets Financial Times: Fed Meeting May Add Pressure to Emerging Markets The Economist: The Dodgiest Duo in the Suspect Six Foreign Affairs: Taper Trouble   Follow Benn on Twitter: @BennSteil Follow Geo-Graphics on Twitter: @CFR_GeoGraphics Read about Benn’s latest award-winning book, The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a New World Order, which the Financial Times has called “a triumph of economic and diplomatic history.”
  • Monetary Policy
    Lessons from the Ruble’s Dive
    My thoughts on the ruble’s collapse are here. Three points to highlight in particular: Sanctions are a force multiplier. While oil is the dominant factor behind the ruble’s fall (see figure 1), western sanctions have taken away the usual buffers—such as foreign borrowing and expanding trade—that Russia relies on to insulate its economy from an oil shock. Over the past several months, western banks have cut their relationships and pulled back on lending, creating severe domestic market pressures. The financial system has fragmented, and any doubts that the central bank fully backs bank liabilities will lead to a run. Nonetheless, political pressures on the central bank remain intense. In fact, it was news of a central bank bailout of Rosneft that apparently triggered the most recent round of turmoil. Meanwhile, trade and investment have dropped sharply. These forces limit the capacity of the Russian economy to adjust to any shock. Perhaps Russia could have weathered an oil shock or sanctions alone, but not both together. Analogies to 1998 are too simplistic. Conditions in Russia and the global economy were much different in 1998, as global financial markets were dealing with the legacy of the Asian financial crisis and emerging strains in major money markets, so we shouldn’t overdraw the lessons from that time. Similarly, the fact that sanctions have caused western financial institutions to pull back from Russia makes the west less leveraged, less interconnected, and therefore less vulnerable to contagion than was the case in 1998. Therefore, I am not surprised to see a modest reaction in U.S. markets so far, with the exception of energy companies that are affected by the global energy shock. Further rate hikes are likely to be counterproductive. The central bank has already hiked interest rates to 17 percent and intervened (see figure 2). While they have produced a bounce in the currency, the sense of panic remains. I don’t think further rate hikes are helpful in the current environment. I expect capital controls are the next step, even though the history of controls in Russia is that they are usually ineffective. Evasion is simply too easy. But Russian policymakers need to do something. The real test of whether sanctions work starts now. I have for some time believed that it would be an upturn in inflation, and a deep recession, that would be the real test of whether sanctions would create conditions for peace, not a move in Russian stocks and bonds alone. That is because it is only now that the broader Russian public is feeling the costs of President Putin’s policies. No doubt the Russian’s searing experience with hyperinflation in 1998 still resonates with the Russian public. History also reminds us of the fragility of confidence. When crisis happens, exchange rates will move far and fast. Figure 1: The Ruble and the Price of Crude Oil Source: Bloomberg; Central Bank of Russia Figure 2: The Ruble and Official Central Bank Currency Intervention* Source: Central Bank of Russia *Note that this figure shows only officially reported intervention by the Central Bank of Russia and does not include unreported intervention or intervention carried out by other entities, including the Ministry of Finance.  
  • Europe and Eurasia
    The Politics of IMF Crisis-Country Growth Projections
    IMF GDP growth “projections” accompanying emergency lending programs are nothing of the sort; they are targets the level of which is necessarily set high enough to enable the interventions. Take Greece.  After committing to lending of €30 billion over 3 years in 2010, the Fund projected that the crisis-mired nation would return to growth by 2012.  As shown in the left figure above, Greece’s economy actually plunged by 7% that year – the year it completed the world’s largest sovereign restructuring, covering €206 billion of bonds. Take Ukraine.  After committing to lending $17 billion over 2 years in April, the Fund projected that its civil/Russian war would magically end and its economy bloom – achieving 2% growth in 2015.  Instead, its “adverse scenario” looks to be playing out according to script, with the economy on pace for a 7% decline.  There is now a massive $15 billion gap between what has been pledged by the official sector (IMF, World Bank, European Union, and others) and what is actually needed to fund the government. The point is not that the IMF is particularly incompetent or unlucky; few in the organization’s talented professional staff could be in the least surprised with how Greece and Ukraine have played out.  The point is that the IMF’s growth projections for crisis-hit client countries are deliberately being pegged at levels high enough to overcome its own prohibition against lending to countries that lack sufficient funding to cover government spending over the coming 12 months. This is a sound rule, intended to keep the Fund from getting sucked into the vortex of politics.  Greece’s insolvency clearly required write-offs and gifts; more debt, which is all the Fund has to offer, was never going to resolve the problem.  Ukraine requires at a minimum a cessation of hostilities.  By all means, the EU, U.S., and other friendly nations should step in financially and otherwise to show solidarity, but such is not the proper role of the Fund.  If it manages to avoid major losses on these interventions, it will only do so by having provided political cover for those who will – governments, such as those of Germany and the United States, which should have been up-front with their people about the likely cost and political purpose of their aid. Financial Times: IMF Warns Ukraine Bailout at Risk of Collapse Wall Street Journal: Ukraine Will Need More Bailout Funding, IMF’s Lagarde Says IMF: Ukraine Request for a Stand-By Arrangement IMF: Ex Post Evaluation of Greece's Exceptional Access   Follow Benn on Twitter: @BennSteil Follow Geo-Graphics on Twitter: @CFR_GeoGraphics Read about Benn’s latest award-winning book, The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a New World Order, which the Financial Times has called “a triumph of economic and diplomatic history.”
  • Japan
    Another Election in Tokyo
    Snap elections are a staple of parliamentary democracy, and every now and then, ruling politicians decide that an election is needed to ensure that they continue to have a popular mandate if they change course. Prime Minister Abe has just announced he will dissolve the Diet on November 21, and hold a snap election in December to gain the Japanese public’s endorsement of his leadership of Japan’s economic recovery. Prompted by worse than expected economic results for the third quarter of this year, Abe has decided to postpone a second tax hike that would have raised the consumption tax to 10 percent, and instead focus on stimulating Japan’s economy. Over the past two years, the Abe Cabinet has championed an economic policy designed specifically to stimulate economic growth. Yet Japan’s economy is struggling. After an initial quarter of growth, two consecutive quarters of negative growth have brought the country again to the verge of recession - the third time in the past four years. The Abe Cabinet’s efforts to stimulate growth were undermined by a simultaneous effort to curb Japan’s debt, now estimated at 240 percent of GDP. Japan’s long term fiscal health was the focus of a revision of the Consumption Tax Act of 2012, adopted while the Mr. Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was in opposition but with their explicit support. This year, the Abe Cabinet began with the first of two tax hikes, raising it from 5 to 8 percent, and this fall, Mr. Abe was expected to approve a second increase from 8 to 10 percent. Today, stepping back from that second tax hike, Abe argued instead to postpone the tax and seek the public’s approval for his broader economic growth strategy. Yet Abe cannot avoid raising Japan’s taxes altogether, he can only postpone a difficult choice. The LDP has been hurt before by popular fury over the consumption tax. Twice in the past the LDP has been punished for its decisions to raise this unpopular tax. A notable setback at the polls confronted former Prime Minister Nakasone in the upper house election of 1987, and former Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto was greeted with a resounding “No, thank you,” on election day in 1998. Both elections were in the Upper House, however, and thus neither fundamentally challenged the ruling party’s ability to govern. Instead, both prime ministers – popular at the time – stepped down, and allowed someone else to take their place as party leader. Today, Abe announced that if his ruling coalition of the LDP and Komeito did not regain a majority in the Diet, he would step down. At critical moments in the past, however, Abe’s predecessors have sought – and received – popular support for reforming Japan. The most recent example of that calculated risk was in the 2005 Lower House election when Junichiro Koizumi threw down the gauntlet against members of his own party who threatened his program of postal savings reform. Koizumi’s appeal to the Japanese public offered them a chance to weigh in on his vision for Japan’s future, and he artfully presented it as a choice between his vision and that of the Japanese bureaucrats. Today, Mr. Abe is asking the Japanese voter to approve of his decision to postpone the consumption tax, a policy that many in the Ministry of Finance have advocated for years. Abe’s announcement today emphasized his broader recipe for restoring Japan’s economic vitality – Abenomics, the defining priority of his cabinet. He too, like Koizumi before him, is presenting this election as a referendum on Japan’s future, and on his leadership of economic recovery. Two factors could complicate Prime Minister Abe’s plan to appeal to the Japanese people for support for his economic policy vision. The first is that this will be an election driven by the consumption tax, but Mr. Abe is not saying that he will eliminate the 2 percent   hike mandated by the 2012 law. He is simply saying he wants to postpone it. For many economists, delaying the consumption tax hike is “sensible.” But the political question is whether or not he needs to dissolve the Diet to do it. This referendum will be about postponing a difficult decision rather than about offering an alternative option. In addition, as Abe pointed out today, the decision to raise Japan’s taxes was endorsed by his party while they were out of government, and his Cabinet implemented the tax hike after they had returned to power. Thus, this is not a policy that belongs to someone else, and in light of today’s economic numbers, Japan’s voters may feel that Abe and his party helped cause this dilemma rather than seeing him as part of the solution. Much will depend on how Japan’s voters view the current state of the economy and who is responsible for it. It will also depend on how Japan’s voters view the LDP’s ambitions. Second, it is not clear that the ruling coalition will be in a better position to govern after election day  in December. Today, Mr. Abe’s party has a considerable majority in the Diet. The LDP alone has 294 seats, and with its coalition party, the Komeito, can muster a two-thirds super majority in the Lower House, making it easy to govern. A new election risks losing that advantage. So why not simply go back to the Diet with a new amendment to the existing legislation that postpones the tax hike? Here is where the rationale for an election seems less about economic policy and more about the LDP’s political future. An election that brings the LDP back with the same or even more seats in the Lower House will mean that Mr. Abe’s party will extend their time in office for another four years. Tactically, the current weakness of Japan’s opposition parties could allow the LDP to capitalize on the moment to prolong their time as ruling party of Japan. Even if Japanese voters see the LDP as responsible for the current state of Japan’s economy, the opposition parties will be hard pressed to persuade them to vote their way instead. Calling an election now will put a broad array of other policy initiatives on hold for the remainder of 2014. Abe has been seen abroad as a decisive and energetic leader. His support rating has dipped of late to 55 percent, according to the Yomiuri Shimbun’s latest poll. Yet his popularity seems to be holding at levels that would make leaders in many democracies around the globe green with envy. Popular sentiment in any democracy is rarely in favor of higher taxes, and in Japan, the latest polls show that over 80 percent of Japanese do not want another consumption tax increase. Who can blame them? The challenge for the ruling coalition, however, will be in presenting this election as a referendum on more than the consumption tax. The LDP and Komeito will need to go back to their constituencies and persuade the voters that this election, in fact, matters to their futures as much as it does to those in Tokyo who govern them.
  • Budget, Debt, and Deficits
    Japan’s Sensible Fiscal Retreat
    Surprisingly poor second quarter growth numbers in Japan have raised market expectations that there will be snap elections and a delay in the consumption tax hike that was scheduled for October 2015. GDP fell for a second consecutive quarter, by 1.6 percent (q/q, a.r), versus market expectations of a 2.2 percent increase. A huge miss. Falling corporate inventories were a large part of the story, but exports rose only modestly while household consumption and capital spending slowed. The yen sold off after the announcement, reaching a low of 117 against the dollar. Japanese stocks are higher. Most G-20 policymakers, concerned about global growth, will salute the move by the Japanese government to avoid a fiscal contraction. David Cameron, notably, saying that “red warning lights are flashing on the dashboard of the global economy”, captured the sour mood of this past weekend’s Brisbane Summit. More directly, U.S. Treasury Secretary Lew, in his speech ahead of the G-20 summit, called on Japan to pay “attention to short-term growth alongside medium-term fiscal objectives. To maintain the recovery and escape deflation, Japan needs to move proactively and decisively to more than fully offset the short-term contractionary impact of the expiration of past fiscal measures and the next consumption tax increase, should Prime Minister Abe decide to proceed with it on the current schedule. The most effective policy would give households short term relief to encourage consumption. A few years ago, in the United States, we implemented a temporary payroll tax holiday to accomplish a similar goal.” He went on to call for a renewed a structural reform effort, the “third arrow” of Abenomics, on which there has been little progress. Other G-20 leaders made similar remarks.  Larry Summers and Paul Krugman reinforced this call for a delay in the tax hike (Paul wouldn’t mind a permanent shift), with the IMF on the other side (though they may soften their view following release of these numbers).  Overall, policymakers are right to be concerned about growth, and in this context, Japan is doing the right thing. The G-20’s cautious endorsement of the delay in the consumption tax hike doesn’t mean that Japanese policy isn’t causing problems for global policy coordination following the recent aggressive monetary easing by the Bank of Japan (BOJ). I have previously endorsed the BOJ’s actions, doubling down on monetary policy, even in the absence of substantial success on the other two arrows of Abenomics. But that means, as far as support for recovery goes—it’s all about the money. A primary channel through which easier money will drive demand is through a significant and continuing depreciation of the yen. The market’s Abenomics (weak yen) trade lives on. One issue that has not received much attention is that, at the same time the BOJ announced its easing of policy, the government pension investment fund (GPIF) announced a shift in its portfolio away from domestic bonds and into domestic and foreign stocks. Combining monetary easing with direct purchases of foreign stocks is the economic equivalent of direct exchange rate intervention, something the G-20 has previously ruled out. Particularly if the Japanese moves bring forth copycat depreciations elsewhere, this will be a continuing issue for discussion in the coming months, and could find its way to Capitol Hill in the context of upcoming debates over trade policy.
  • Monetary Policy
    Paul Krugman Calls for "Weak-Dollar Policy"...Towards Mars?
    Paul Krugman routinely mocks Germany for wanting “everyone to run enormous trade surpluses at the same time.” As Martin Wolf has put it, this is impossible, as “the world cannot trade with Mars.” What we find amazing is that Krugman does not see a similar problem with his latest call for the United States to run “a weak-dollar policy.” Against whom should the U.S. pursue a weak dollar? As today’s Geo-Graphic shows, major economies outside the U.S. are in no condition to support stronger currencies.  Of the G-7 economies, as the main figure above indicates, only the U.S. and Canada – which have the second- and third-highest growth rates – have inflation near the developed-market standard of 2%.  The others, save the UK, have much lower growth and inflation.  The U.S. pursuing a weak-dollar policy towards its G-7 partners, therefore, would appear deeply damaging and misguided. The G-7 represents nearly half the global economy.  As for emerging markets, the small inset graph shows stagnant growth rates after years of decline.  Against this background, it looks difficult to justify a generalized appreciation of EM currencies. In short, we suspect that Krugman’s call for a weak-dollar policy can only mean one thing: currency war with Mars. CNBC: Why Currency Wars Could Stave Off a Fed Rate Hike Wall Street Journal: Fed Minutes Show Wariness Over Global Growth Financial Times: U.S. Dollar Surges After Strong Data WSJ's Real Time Economics: The Return of the Currency Wars   Follow Benn on Twitter: @BennSteil Follow Geo-Graphics on Twitter: @CFR_GeoGraphics Read about Benn’s latest award-winning book, The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a New World Order, which the Financial Times has called “a triumph of economic and diplomatic history.”
  • Europe
    Three Central Banks
    Today’s central bank news tells us a lot about the risks and rewards of proactive central banking. The Bank of Japan (BoJ) surprised me (and nearly everyone else ) with a dramatic expansion of its unconventional monetary policy this morning, citing renewed risks of deflation. The BOJ announced (i) an increase in the target for monetary base growth to ¥80 trillion ($730 billion) per annum from ¥60–70 trillion; (2) an increase in its Japanese government bond (JGB) purchases to an annual pace of ¥80 trillion from ¥50 trillion; (3) an extension of the average maturity of its JGB purchases to 7–10 years (3 years previously); and (4) a tripling of its targets for the annual purchases of Japan real estate investment trusts (J-REITs) and exchange-traded funds (ETFs). In addition, and more controversially, the Japanese Government Pension Investment Fund (GPIF) will shift its portfolio away from government bonds and towards equities, both domestic and foreign, doubling the share of equities to 50 percent. As a general rule it’s not such a good idea to use government wealth funds as an instrument of monetary policy in this way, but given that government policy in the past has been so heavily tilted towards support of the bond market, it can be argued that this is a good move from a longer-run perspective, and it does arguably strengthen the near-term wealth effects of quantitative easing. It is also worth noting that the BoJ has followed the lead of other central banks and moved away from date-based guidance (achieving 2 percent inflation within two years of the start of the program, a target that was always optimistic and now quickly slipping out of reach) to a focus on balance sheet targets. That makes sense. There was a fair degree of attention paid to the fact that the vote was 5-4 for easing. For most central banks, such a closely divided vote would be a negative. Here, however, I see decisiveness. As long as we assume BoJ Governor Haruhiko Kuroda can command a majority on critical decisions, which I do, his willingness to move proactively as soon as a majority exists shows strength. There is some speculation in the markets that the BoJ move was given a green light when the U.S. Treasury did not mention yen weakness as a concern in its recent exchange rate report. I think this is oversold as an explanation. What I do see at play is a central bank that--while motivated by domestic considerations--is taking advantage of the Fed’s turn toward normalization to make a dramatic move that, by emphasizing the divergence of policy, ensures a substantial market impact. Today the yen reached a six-year low against the dollar at 112.4 and stocks rose sharply. That said, I would not be surprised to see exchange rate tensions intensify in coming months and feature centrally in upcoming G-7 and G-20 debates. The BoJ’s move could put additional pressure of the European Central Bank (ECB) to act when it meets next week, though few analysts expect a move to purchase government bonds (sovereign QE) until December at the earliest and more likely next year. There may well be a narrow majority for such a move, but in contrast to the BOJ, failure to act (combined with muddy messaging) ensures that monetary policy will continue to provide weak support for the recovery. Europe needs its own “three arrows”, as well as more aggressive action to deal with the crushing debt overhang. Finally, the Central Bank of Russia surprised markets with a 150 bp increase in interest rates, raising the benchmark rate to 9.5 percent from 5.5 percent at the start of the tightening cycle. With inflation at 8.4 percent and rising (against a target of 5.5 percent), and food inflation several points higher, the central bank was pressured to act. However, the currency sold off following the announcement, despite announcement of an oil agreement with Ukraine, reading the move as a sign of a sharply weakening economy and recognition of the limited commitment of the central bank to defend the currency. I think that is right. The economy is headed for a deep recession, capital flight is continuing, and sanctions are more likely to be intensified than eased in coming months.  In sum, it’s hard not to expect that capital controls will soon follow.
  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    De Beers Diamond Moves Sales Army from London to Botswana
    For the past century or so, big mining corporations have pursued their operations in Africa, but their senior management, marketing, and sales have been in Europe or North America. That is changing. The government of Botswana and De Beers Group, the diamond company, agreed in 2011 that the latter would sort, value, and sell diamonds produced by the company Debswana, a joint 50/50 business venture between Botswana and De Beers that accounts for a third of Botswana’s GDP. For its part De Beers agreed to transfer its London based rough diamond sales to Botswana. The move involves the transfer of professionals, equipment and technology from London to Botswana’s capital, Gaborone. In November 2013, De Beers started diamond sales in Gaborone in a state-of-the-art facility. Batswana, nationals of Botswana, are about 50 percent of the de Beers’ employees in the sales division. The outlook for the diamond industry is good, with new consumers from China, especially.  But few new diamond mines have come on stream over the past decade, raising the possibility of a shortage of supply.  The Botswana-De Beers deal appears to be win/win.  Botswana retains direct access to the world market for its diamonds while De Beers has long-term and uninterrupted access to one of the largest diamond supplies in the world. Over the long term, the De Beers move sets the stage for Botswana to emerge as a major participant in all aspects of the diamond industry, not just diamond mining.  That’s good for the continued development of the country, already one of Africa’s success stories.
  • China
    Can Russia Escape Dollar Dependence?
    Russian president Vladimir Putin is determined to wean his country off the dollar, or so he says. In July, after insisting that the international monetary system depended too much “on the U.S. dollar, or, to be precise, on the monetary and financial policy of the U.S. authorities,” Putin signed off on a new BRICS development bank whose initial paid-in capital would be entirely in dollars – unlike the World Bank, where only 10% of paid-in capital was in dollars.  So the new BRICS bank actually creates a new source of demand for dollar assets. Now, he wants to diversify Russia’s holdings in its two sovereign wealth funds (SWF), the Reserve Fund and National Wealth Fund, away from dollars – and euros as well.  Finance minister Anton Siluanov has announced that funds will soon be directed into financial assets issued by its fellow BRICS nations – Brazil, India, China, and South Africa. There are some caveats, however.  Siluanov suggested that the shift would be mainly into “Eurobonds issued under English law,” which effectively means dollar- and euro-denominated bonds.  As the figure above shows, however, total international bond issuance by Brazil, India, China, and South Africa amounts to only $45 billion, or a mere 26% of the holdings of Russia’s SWFs.  Furthermore, Russia’s two funds are currently restricted to investments in securities rated AA- or better by Fitch, or Aa3 or better by Moody’s.  Only China’s international bonds meet these criteria, which would leave Russia with a potential pool of investable assets worth a mere $1.5 billion – less than 1% of Russia’s SWF assets. Russia could, of course, relax the constraint that the bonds be issued internationally, in hard currency, and invest in local currency bonds.  Brazil, for example, which Siluanov singled out as an investment destination, has issued about $800 billion worth of local-currency bonds.  But the Brazilian Real has depreciated by 10% against the dollar in the past month alone, and “capital preservation” is a fundamental investment objective of Russia’s SWFs.  With Russian capital flight approaching dangerous levels (Fitch projects $120 billion for this year), and rumors flying that capital controls will be imposed to staunch the outflow, would Russia really be willing to bet its solvency on the Real in order to make a political point of little or no consequence for the dollar’s global reserve status? Not a chance. Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation: National Wealth Fund Wall Street Journal: Did Russia Just Move Its Treasury Holdings Offshore? TesouroNacional: Brazil Federal Public Debt Annual Borrowing Plan 2014 Bank of Russia: International Reserves of the Russian Federation   Follow Benn on Twitter: @BennSteil Follow Geo-Graphics on Twitter: @CFR_GeoGraphics Read about Benn’s latest award-winning book, The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a New World Order, which the Financial Times has called “a triumph of economic and diplomatic history.”
  • Development
    Unlocking the Potential of Women Entrepreneurs
    This post is from Isobel Coleman, Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) senior fellow and director of the Civil Society, Markets, and Democracy initiative, and Dina Habib Powell, global head of corporate engagement at Goldman Sachs and president of the Goldman Sachs Foundation.  A staggering six hundred million new jobs are needed globally over the next fifteen years to keep employment rates at their current level. This is especially daunting given slowing global growth rates. One bright spot in this enormous challenge is a powerful, and often overlooked, source of job creation: women entrepreneurs. In the United States, women-owned businesses account for approximately 16 percent of all jobs in the economy, and with women graduating from university at higher rates than men, that percentage is expected to grow in coming years. Governments around the world are beginning to wake up to the economic benefits of women’s empowerment. Kathy Matsui of Goldman Sachs first wrote about "womenomics" in 1999 when she advocated that Japan could increase GDP by as much as 15 percent by tapping the potential of women. Fifteen years later, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has made greater female workforce participation the cornerstone of his strategy to accelerate the Japanese economy and has proposed new policies that will address childcare, tax distortions, and female representation in government. In most economies, significant barriers inhibiting women from reaching their full potential remain. A recent International Monetary Fund paper shows a GDP per capita loss as high as 27 percent in some regions as a result of not fully engaging women in the labor force. In certain countries, the loss is even bigger. The IMF paper estimates that in Egypt, for example, raising women’s workforce participation rate to that of men would lift the country’s GDP by more than a third. Globally, gains in women’s participation in the labor force have stalled; women continue to work in lower paying and less productive sectors than men; and there are still laws in many countries that restrict women’s movements and choices. A World Bank study shows that almost 90 percent of the 143 economies researched still have at least one legal restriction on women’s economic opportunities, including seventy-nine economies that restrict the types of jobs women can perform. There is also a lack of role models to inspire more women to join the workforce and change societal attitudes.  In addition, women are less likely than men to know other entrepreneurs and more likely to have weaker professional networks. Finally, access to capital remains a significant constraint to engaging women productively in the world economy. The International Finance Corporation (IFC) estimates that 70 percent of women-owned SMEs in the formal sector in developing countries lack access to capital, resulting in a global financing gap of $285 billion. In 2008, Goldman Sachs launched the 10,000 Women initiative to address the constraints facing women entrepreneurs in emerging markets by providing them with business training, mentoring, and networking opportunities. A new evaluation of the program conducted by Babson College, and released at the Council on Foreign Relations today, demonstrates that targeted interventions can indeed help women grow their businesses and create jobs. The study found that nearly 60 percent of graduates created new jobs, on average more than doubling the size of their workforce. Eighteen months after graduation, nearly 70 percent of the women had increased revenues, and the average growth across all participants was 480 percent. The potential to replicate these results on a broader scale by providing more women with greater access to business training, mentoring, networking, and capital is enormous. Goldman Sachs 10,000 Women is expanding its efforts and has recently launched a new partnership with IFC, a member of the World Bank Group, to create the first ever global finance facility dedicated to women entrepreneurs. The facility will enable approximately one hundred thousand women entrepreneurs around the world to access capital and grow their businesses. With 126 million women starting or running businesses in sixty-seven economies around the world, improving their growth prospects will reverberate throughout the global economy and ultimately lead to healthier, safer, and more prosperous communities—for everyone.
  • Europe
    The Geopolitical Paradox: Dangerous World, Resilient Markets
    Should we be worried by how well global markets are performing despite rising geopolitical volatility? I think so. In my September monthly, I look at the main arguments explaining the disconnect, and argue Europe is the region we should be most worried about a disruptive correction. Here are a few excerpts. • Far Away and Uncorrelated. Much of the market commentary has stressed that the risks that most worry political analysts—for example Russia, ISIL and Syria, Syria, an Ebola pandemic—are not necessarily central to global growth and market prospects. But small (in GDP terms)and far away does not mean inconsequential. As the debate over financial sanctions has shown, its Russia’s leverage and interconnectedness, rather than its global trade share, that makes comprehensive sanctions so powerful and potentially disruptive. • A Sea of Global Liquidity. There is little doubt that the highly accommodative monetary policies of the United States, eurozone, United Kingdom, and Japan have provided an important firewall against geopolitical risk. Looking ahead, global liquidity will remain ample, but with the U.S. and U.K. beginning to normalize, and the BOJ and ECB going in the other direction, the divergence of monetary policies creates conditions for increased market volatility. Foreign exchange markets in particular appear vulnerable, as history suggests these markets are often bellwethers of divergent monetary policies. • Confident Oil Markets. A stable and moderate global expansion that has limited demand, as well as the revolution in fracking and other technologies, has allowed Saudi Arabia to maintain substantial spare capacity, thereby limiting the potential for a supply disruption to roil markets in the near term (though the longer-term buffering effects on market prices from these developments can be overestimated). But it is hard to imagine that broad based turmoil in the middle east, and the possible rewriting of borders, can be achieved without a material disruption to supplies at some point. • Europe as the Weak Link. I see Europe as the channel through which political risk could reverberate in the global economy. The standoff with Russia, or a hard landing in China could significantly affect exports, particularly in Germany. Significantly, though, Europe also faces these challenges at a time of economic stress and limited resilience. Growth in the region has disappointed and leading indicators have tilted downward. Further, concern about deflation is beginning to weigh on sentiment and investment. The persistence of low inflation is symptomatic of deeper structural problems facing the eurozone, including an incomplete monetary union, deep-seated competitiveness problems in the periphery, and devastatingly high unemployment. Homegrown political risks also threaten to add to the turmoil, as rising discontent within Europe over the costs of austerity is undermining governing parties and fueling populism. The result is a monetary union with little capacity or resilience to defend against shocks. The ECB has responded to these risks with interest-rate cuts and asset purchases, and is expected to move to quantitative easing later this year or early next, but the move comes late, and is unlikely to do more than address the headwinds associated with the ongoing banking reform and continued fiscal austerity. Overall, a return to crisis is an increasing concern and political risks could be the trigger that we should be worried about.