Economics

Economic Crises

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  • Economics
    The Economic Outlook for 2021
    Play
    Panelists discuss the economic outlook for 2021, including post-pandemic global recovery expectations and the potential economic priorities of an incoming Joe Biden administration.    JOYCE: Good morning and good afternoon to everyone. Thank you for joining us. My name is Tom Joyce. I'm a capital markets strategist at MUFG. I'm going to lead our discussion today on the economic outlook for 2021. Absolutely no question that we entered 2021 with political risk, economic risk, and public health risk elevated. And to navigate that discussion I'm very pleased today to introduce our two panelists, Elga Bartsch, who is the head of macro research at BlackRock, as well as Jay Bryson, who is the chief economist for Wells Fargo here in the United States. In the course of this discussion, we're going to cover the global economy, we're going to cover the U.S. economy, the virus and the vaccine, the Biden policy agenda, and other such topics. I'm going to ask questions for approximately thirty minutes and then we'll turn it over to audience Q&A. Elga, let's start with you. Let's start really high-level, macro, the global economy, before we get into more details on specific issues. I think we all know that the recovery this year is exceptionally likely to be an uneven one, with huge differentiation across geographies, across industries, and across business. What is your assessment of the global economy for 2021? And what are the key drivers of this view? BARTSCH: Yes, thank you very much, Tom. That's a very good question. So to start out with, I'm not even sure that we should call it a recovery, because calling it a recovery would imply that the normal business cycle logic applies. And that's the starting point of my thinking about the global economic outlook is that this isn't a regular business cycle and therefore the normal dynamics are suspended. What this is, is a natural catastrophe where economic activity was deliberately stopped in order to protect public health. That natural catastrophe is to some extent still ongoing. We have seen a relief in the course of last year. But now it's intensifying again. And so that means that economic activity everywhere in the world is mostly driven by virus activity, the vaccine rollout, and mobility and the restrictions that governments put around this. So crucially, economic data doesn't really convey much information at this stage, because it's the consequence of other actions or other dynamics. And so that's why I prefer to speak of a restart, rather than a recovery, to also make clear with the choice of words that we're dealing with something very different. It's a stop-go economy to some extent. I think eventually, in the course of this year, we will see an accelerated restart of economic activity. At the moment in a number of places it seems to be disrupted, at least temporarily, by the spike in virus infections that we are seeing, by the spike in hospitalizations that we're seeing. But eventually, we will get back to pre-COVID activity levels. And, more importantly, we will also get back to the pre-COVID growth trend. And that is important because that means that this isn't a replay of the global financial crisis, which saw a material decline in long-term growth trends in the following ten years. That means that the cumulative loss in activity, even though sizable, will just be a fraction of that of the global financial crisis. And depending on virus activities, vaccine rollout, and governments’ policies around that, that will be the main driver of the restart this year. JOYCE: Elga, if I could take us back two months to mid-November, we had this extraordinary event, and that is the breakthroughs on the vaccine. And I think we were expecting the vaccine breakthrough back in November, but we weren't expecting this 90 to 95 percent efficacy. And so we became perhaps quite optimistic. And rightly so, that was a remarkable scientific achievement. But we stand here today now realizing that implementing this vaccine is going to be difficult and administering the doses. So far, since December, we basically have thirty-five million people in the world across fifty countries have received doses. That's not even half a percent of the global population. Has the slow vaccine rollout changed your view on the year ahead? Or are you substantively in a pretty similar place in terms of how you're looking at 2021? BARTSCH: Yeah, let me say at the outset that I think the vaccine breakthrough is a game-changer. And it's a game-changer from a qualitative point of view because it gives us and everybody in the private and the public sector greater visibility about what a post-COVID world will look like. And that's very important because it anchors private sector expectations for long-term growth, long-term revenues, long-term income streams, and that will materially affect behavior today. More importantly, for policymakers, it makes clear that they are building a bridge to somewhere as they're trying to support households and corporates through the disruptions caused by COVID-19. And that's another very important aspect of the vaccines being available. It strengthens the argument for policy support, whether it's fiscal or monetary, because you know that it's likely to be temporary. And you're absolutely right. It was an amazing breakthrough of science. These vaccines are very innovative. And yes, there are some initial bottlenecks in terms of production capacities, in terms of the administration of the vaccine rollout. But to be honest, I don't think that that is the main new development. I think the main new development is the presence of new virus versions that are a lot more easily transmitted between people. And we are obviously in a race between these faster viruses and the vaccine rollout. I think the emergence of those virus mutations are the really new development. And they will temporarily force us to keep a distance from each other, work from home, shop online, refrain from going to restaurants, maybe splurge on a takeout. But I think it's the new virus mutation more than the vaccine that is at the moment where the marginal news flow is. JOYCE: Well, that's a very good point. And let's bring Jay Bryson into the discussion here. Jay, the consensus view for 2021 in the United States, but I think beyond the United States, is this notion that virus resurgence, and of course amplified by mutation risk, is going to weigh heavily on Q1 activity but that as we get to mid-year we could have a significant pivot to above-trend growth actually finishing the year with pretty impressive growth numbers. Do you agree with that consensus view–a year in two halves, so to speak? And are the risks here to the upside or the downside in your view? BRYSON: Well– JOYCE: The preponderance of risks I should say, are they to the upside or downside in your view? BRYSON: Right. Tom, to start with your question, yes, we share that consensus view. In what we know right now, just looking at the data coming into the first part of the year, it's pretty weak. And so we're gonna clearly have a weak first quarter, not only in the United States, but if you look at the United Kingdom, you look at parts of the eurozone, it's all going to be very, very weak there. But under the assumption that the vaccines really start to accelerate here and the service sector starts to reopen you should get much stronger growth in the second half of the year. Now, there's two caveats to that. The first, and Elga already mentioned this, are these new mutations of the virus. God forbid those happen to be not affected at all by the vaccine, or they're resistant to the vaccine. That's going to delay that recovery. So we'll have to wait and see there. The other caveat to keep in mind here is we're talking about the developed world right now, you mentioned fifty countries. There's lots of parts of the emerging world where vaccines have not started to roll out yet. It's going to be quite some time before that happens. So you could have very, very strong recoveries in the United States and in the eurozone, etc. But many parts of the emerging world could potentially lag here as well. And then in terms of upside. Are there upside risks here? Yeah, the vaccines could be deployed much faster than we currently expect. And these mutations could also be put down by the vaccine. So there's just a lot of unknowns right now as it relates to COVID. And not being an epidemiologist, it's hard for me to know exactly which way the risks are balanced at this point. JOYCE: Jay, one of my lessons from last year when you look to that May to August timeframe, I think this is true in the U.S. in particular, is the speed with which the consumer reengaged the economy. Now let's put aside that we had a bit of a sloppy reopen in the U.S. for sure from a virus perspective. But the speed of reengagement was fairly impressive. As we progress, whether it be April, whether it be June, as we progress on this timeline of vaccine implementation, do you think we could see something even more powerful this year in terms of reengagement of the economy, pent up demand, and so forth? BRYSON: I don't think, Tom, it's going to be quite as strong as it was last year. And last year, you essentially shut down the entire economy and then it came roaring back. In the third quarter here in the United States, growth was at an annualized rate over 30 percent. And in many European countries you also had very, very strong growth rates. Are you going to have the same sort of thing this year? No, probably not, not 30 percent. I mean, when I look at our third quarter estimates, or projection at this point, it's 9 percent annualized. That's very, very strong. But again, it's not 30-some percent. The thing that brought about that really strong recovery, not only United States but in other countries as well, was the fiscal relief packages that were put in place, the income support that was done. So you know, in mid-March and April, people had nowhere to spend their money because everything was shut down. But they were getting checks from the government, either through unemployment benefits, or here in the United States direct payments as well. And so when May and June came around, the economy was open, people had a lot of excess savings pent up and that's part of what came roaring back, or brought about that big roaring back. We've had this second round of fiscal relief here in the United States and that will certainly help as we go forward. But again, I wouldn't expect the 30 percent growth rates later this year. JOYCE: Elga, I'm gonna come to you in a moment about the type of government stimulus and support in Europe. But Jay, let me just stick with you. President-elect Biden announced last night plans for a $1.9 trillion stimulus. In December, we had a $900 billion stimulus announcement. If you added it all up, you're talking about a $6 trillion type of number. Now, I think the real number we all know is a little lower, because some of the funds from the Cares Act are perhaps being reused. But suffice it to say, we've got some big numbers here, $1.9 trillion, the most recent announcement. As you look into 2021, what are your expectations for how much of this stimulus is put in place and when, and the impact that it has on your forecast? We talked about the consumer, let's talk about the role that the government is playing in supporting this economy. BRYSON: Right, so let's talk about what's in that package. So the first thing would be $1,400 checks on top of the $600 checks that were in December. Another thing that's in there is extended unemployment benefits, $400 a week through September. There’s money in there to help fight the pandemic, there's money in there to reopen schools, and there's money in there for state and local government. How much of that survives? I'm certainly going to take the under on $1.9 trillion. Now, how much of it actually makes it through? I don't know, that's a political question at the end of the day. But I could see broad support for more money to fight the pandemic. I could see broad support for money to open up schools. Are some senators going to sign on to $1,400 checks? Just last week, Senator Joe Manchin, Democrat from West Virginia, was skeptical about that notion. They're gonna need his vote because right now the Democrats have fifty in the Senate with Kamala Harris breaking the tie. And if he's skeptical about that notion, maybe that doesn't survive. Putting unemployment benefits out through September? I don't think that's gonna happen, frankly. So how big is this number? I think it's going to be significantly less than $1.9 trillion. There will be something, but I think it's going to be more targeted towards measures to fight the pandemic and aid to schools and things of that nature. JOYCE: So more relief, really, than fiscal stimulus so to speak. BRYSON: Yeah, well, things like reopening schools is relief. And there probably will be some sort of check. But I don't think it's going to be a $1,400 sort of thing. So most of this, and most of the Cares Act, and the act that was passed back in December, I would put in the bucket of relief rather than actual stimulus itself. It helps to prop the economy up, it eliminates downside risk, but it's not so much actual new stimulus per se. JOYCE: Elga, can you characterize for us where we are on the fiscal support and stimulus out of Europe? We're well aware of where the ECB is on monetary policy, but talk to us about the status of fiscal support across Europe, an economy in aggregate that is just as large as the United States. BARTSCH: Yes, I'm happy to. So, first of all, roughly the amount of fiscal relief that is provided in the euro area by individual governments is roughly on par with what they did last year. So it's roughly the same size fiscal stimulus. As you probably are aware, the pretty strict fiscal rules in Europe are suspended at the moment. They are still suspended until next year. And I think that already tells you how Europe is rethinking fiscal policy. And I think this would be a great opportunity to actually use this hiatus in the stability and growth plan to actually think about it a little bit more broadly. In addition, we have seen a very important initiative for Europe. The Recovery and Resilience [Facility] which is basically the pan-European response to the pandemic, which will allow individual countries to draw down significant grants that are jointly financed by the European Union countries. And that for the first time really is a very sizable joint response to what is, at the end of the day, an asymmetric shock to economies given which ones were hit harder by the virus than others. And so this is just getting underway. As you probably have seen this plan, which is part of the multi-annual budget process in Europe, was just approved before Christmas. And it's now on its way through ratification, also in the individual member states. And while that is happening, the different member states who want to and need to put together some recovery and resilience plans that are then going to be discussed with the European partners, before the fund starts to disperse funds in the second half of this year. So this is the pooling of the fiscal response in a pretty sizable way, is another very important qualitative change that we have seen in the way that Europe responds to this crisis, versus the global financial crisis or indeed the Europe crisis that followed. JOYCE: Elga, I think we need to discuss China as well. China, of course, being the world's second largest economy. They have outperformed in recent months on virus suppression, having achieved virus suppression in a way that Western economies have not. As we enter 2021, is this Chinese economy one that continues to have significant momentum? Or is it an economy that is slowing down and being dragged a touch lower by the virus resurgence that is taking place in the West? BARTSCH: So you're absolutely right. China was most successful in suppressing the virus by taking very radical restrictions to mobility and thus already last year saw a swift restart in its activity. As a result, the economy has not just moved back to the pre-COVID level of activity, but also converged back towards trend. So in that sense, China is leading the rest of the world and much of Asia is benefiting from this strength in economic growth as well as their own virus control measures. But this optimistic outlook on Asia also relies on continued effective virus control, and also on the vaccine programs being rolled out. And one aspect that already shows how different the situation is, is that China, if anything, is not really discussing about additional policy stimulus or additional policy support. If anything, [they’re] thinking about normalization, a very cautious and gradual normalization of policy. So there is a sort of strong economic performance and that will likely continue this year, despite a number of challenges that come from the rest of the world. Not least with the rest of the world struggling more with the renewed acceleration in infections, but also from the rewiring of globalization that we are seeing being accelerated by COVID-19. JOYCE: Jay, when I think about the risks for the year ahead—we've certainly spent quite a bit of time on the virus and the vaccine—but I would say the question I've been getting asked the most is inflation. What is your view on the upward pressures on inflation that we're seeing? Are they likely to be temporary? Or is there something going on here that we ought to pay more attention to? And what are the implications for Fed policy? BRYSON: Right. So right now, just to kind of level set, we got the December CPI out just the other day. On a year over year basis the core rate of inflation—I think that's kind of what you want to look at, that eliminates some of the volatility by oil and food prices— the core rate in December was up to about 1.6 percent. Now in coming months, we're going to see that go over 2 percent, just because of base effect. We got a collapse in prices last March and April when the pandemic really hit, and so you'll see that core rate go up above 2 percent. But it could probably get as high as two and a half percent as well. I mean, goods prices have come up here, there's been a lot of demand for goods. People are buying goods. They're not buying services. That's the part of the economy that's shut down. So again, you'll probably see that come up to about two and a half percent. Now we view this as more as a one-off price adjustment, rather than a continuance spiraling higher in the rate of inflation. I mean for that to happen, you have to really start to change people's expectations of what will happen with inflation. And so far, if you look at survey measures of inflation expectations, they remain very, very muted at this point. So we do believe you're going to get this one-time level effect on the price level that brings the inflation rate up marginally here, but we don't see it spiraling out of control. And I think what that means for the Fed then is, the Fed knows this as well, they know you're going to get this upwards creep in inflation in the near term. I don't think they'll be spooked by higher inflation numbers in the next few months. And so I would expect them, obviously, to keep the Fed funds rate, the Fed Funds target at zero for the foreseeable future. We also think they will continue their bond buying program through most of the year as well. And if anything, if the Fed's going to make a mistake here, they're going to tolerate a higher rate of inflation than they historically have. They want to get the inflation rate. And now we're not talking 1979-like inflation, but they would be happy with an inflation rate at two and a half percent. So we don't think they will be spooked by a little bit higher inflation rates later this year. JOYCE: We have seen a reset higher in the ten-year Treasury, 20-25 point move in recent weeks. The consensus view on the street is one and a half percent area. We don't have to get specific on where you think the ten-year is going, but are you concerned, given inflation risk, temporary as it may be, or other market dynamics, are you concerned that rates can get away from us a little bit here? Or do you think that the Fed will succeed in keeping them as low as they would like to? BRYSON: Well, certainly the Fed will have a have a role here. As I mentioned, we think they'll continue to buy Treasury securities at the pace of $80 billion per month, in coming months. But it's the private sector, as well. And we've seen this before, when you have a dislocation in the Treasury markets, rates snap higher. They may snap higher for a while, then they start to stabilize. And at that point, money floods back in again. And so, could we go from where we're sitting right now on the ten-year Treasury about 110 basis points, two weeks from now, can we be at 150 basis points? Sure. But if you get that dislocation, I do believe then that sets up more buyers coming in. Again I think what you have to worry about is inflation expectations getting out of control. And within an economy that still remains, I'll use the word–rather depressed–it's hard to see inflation getting really out of control in that sort of situation. JOYCE: Elga, certainly another topic high on the list of questions from clients, and this existed pre-COVID and it certainly has accelerated post-COVID, and that is this notion of elevated global debt. The United States has arguably, for example, done a full decade of debt build in one year when you think about where the CBO projections were, just a year ago, prior to COVID. We've done a full decade in a year, and many other geographies globally have done something similar. What is your assessment of elevated debt risk? Does debt matter in today's global economy? BARTSCH: It matters, but it probably matters less than it has done in the past. For the reason that real interest rates remain very low and could potentially fall even further. So I think the first thing to note is, it's not the level of debt that matters, but whether you can finance it. So something like debt service costs is probably something to look at. They are at near record lows, if not at record lows, depending on which country you're looking at, given the very low level of yields that we are having. And we have had a significant period of time now during which growth rates were above real interest rates. Which actually means that expansionary fiscal policy, if done correctly, and enhancing long-term activity and growth are actually leading to a lower, not a higher, level of debt over the medium-term. So in that sense, I think there are a number of important secular shifts that we need to take into account when we look at the debt dynamics. And of course, we also need to be aware that there were no alternatives but to provide the policy support and potentially to provide more policy support in the current juncture, because otherwise, you would really have seen some very serious harm to productive capacities globally, making things considerably worse. So I think especially what we have seen happening in the last twelve months, or a little bit less than that, which is obviously unprecedented in terms of speed, in terms of extent of coordination with monetary policy, was required. And what I think you can see now in amongst policymakers is that there is a very different mindset compared to what we saw, let's say, in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. There seems to be very little appetite to immediately tilt back towards austerity. And we've seen Christine Lagarde, we've seen Lael Brainard and also Jay Powell, sort of warning against a premature withdrawal of policy stimulus, whether it's monetary or fiscal. And I think that we really have to recognize that we are in a completely different situation today. That I think means that the traditional concerns about debt, for instance, in Europe that you shouldn't have more than 60 percent of GDP in terms of government debt, they're probably outdated. JOYCE: Well, before I shift it over to our audience questions, I feel compelled to pivot in a slightly more positive direction. We've been talking about the vaccine and elevated debt and inflation and risks and risks and risks. Jay, are we ignoring the potential for significant upside risk here in 2021? What is your assessment of that? We have a vaccine rollout that is likely to accelerate. We arguably have an improved global trade regime in 2021 than we've had in recent years. We certainly have an abundance of stimulus. And we have markets that are functioning quite well, albeit with maybe some valuation bubbles here or there. But our credit markets are very much available to middle and large cap companies in particular. Are we paying enough attention to the upside here in 2021? BRYSON: There certainly are upside risks that I can think of. I would start, if I'm just focusing on the United States, I would start with the elevated savings rates among households right now. And so once the service sector does start to open up again, many households have the financial wherewithal to start going out to restaurants and bars and start to travel again. And so that can be very, very positive. The other underlying fundamental here, which is good, is when this pandemic hit there were not a lot of major imbalances in the U.S. economy. It's not like it was back fifteen years ago, when we had a housing bubble. And when that collapsed, that put the financial system flat on its back, and many parts of the household system as well. And that deleveraging by the household sector, and by the financial sector, is one of the reasons why growth was so slow coming out of the last recession. We don't have those imbalances today. And so given the fact that you have a lot of pent up demand, given the fact that you have a very high savings rate, with not a lot of imbalances out there, growth in the second half of the year and heading into 2022 could be quite strong, certainly. Even stronger than the above average, with a bit above consensus forecast that we have for the second half of the year. I acknowledge, there certainly are some upside risks. JOYCE: And Elga, very quickly because we want to get to audience questions, areas of optimism that you would point to? BARTSCH: Yeah, I would sort of echo what Jay just said. But in addition also point to the turbocharged transformations that COVID-19 has brought on, whether it's towards digitalization, ecommerce, towards sustainability. And I think this is a period of accelerated structural change. And that could be very transformational, not just in terms of growth, but also in terms of the structure of the economy. I mean, one, I think, amazing feature of the current environment is the fast pace at which new businesses are founded, new businesses are created. Obviously, this is often out of dire need to earn a living. But the fact that we see these trends that were in play at a much slower pace before, now accelerated and really recharged. I think it's also reason to be optimistic, especially for the long run. JOYCE: Okay, well, I think that's a good note to end our prepared remarks on. I think you raised some very good points here on how COVID has accelerated a whole host of preexisting trends. Let me turn it back over to the Council to guide us through some questions from our participants. STAFF: We will take our first question from Mark McLaughlin. Q: Okay, can you hear me? BRYSON: Yes. Q: Great. Mark McLaughlin, lead strategist for the insurance industry for IBM. I was struck by Tom's comments about debt potential, or I'm sorry, interest rates potentially getting away from us a little bit. And just noting, obviously, the level of indebtedness of the U.S. is starting to reach World War Two levels. I don't think Europe is a whole lot farther behind. You know, the wild card in my view is sort of China and their economic might. Their much more opaque finances and their much more centrally controlled economy. Is there a potential for Chinese policy to upset the applecart a little bit and force either the EU or the United States into an environment where they've got a lot of bad policy choices, right? It's tough to raise rates for that level of debt without potentially destabilizing matters. It's tough to retire the debt, given the levels of debt relative to the economy. Is there a foreign policy risk that the U.S. and EU should be considering regarding Chinese activity and potential for forcing economic decisions on the U.S. and EU? JOYCE: Elga, should we pivot to you, given your global focus? BARTSCH: Sure. Thank you for the question. I'm less concerned in the context of debt dynamics in the U.S. or in Europe, partially because we're talking about reserve currencies, we're talking about currencies or government bonds that have the implicit backing and support of the central bank and where developed market economies borrowing in domestic currency. I do think where China comes in is the tensions or the rivalry between the U.S. and China in the technology space. And so we like to think of it in the context of the rewiring of the global trading system. Moving towards a more bipolar system, with one pole being the U.S. and the other being China, and tensions not so much playing out in trade anymore, or maybe capital flows into the developed market, government bond markets, but more in the technology space. And so, this rivalry is something that is here to stay. Even if with the change in the administration in the U.S., we are likely to get a different approach to global trade policies and also to China in terms of some of the communication around it. But the fundamental technology rivalry is here to stay. And that, I think, is where the tension is likely to lie, not so much on the interest rate side, because of the potential role of central banks in the U.S. or in Europe. BRYSON: Tom, can I chime in there just to offer a thought? JOYCE: Please. BRYSON: So there is a debt issue in China today. And it's largely in the non-financial corporate sector. Now, some of that is government, state owned enterprises and everything. But if there is going to be a debt problem in China, that's where it's going to show up. I don't think that if there was a debt crisis in China, knock on wood, that it would have the same effect as the debt crisis in the United States a decade ago, because most of that debt is held internally in China. European investors, American investors hold very, very little of that debt. Now, if there were a debt crisis in China, it would be an economic event for the world. The second largest economy slowing sharply would have a negative effect on growth in the world. But I don't think we'd be in a financial crisis for the rest of the world. And then Mark, to get back to your question, how that relates to government debt here in the United States and in Europe. If you were to have that, I think you would see a flood of investment buying U.S. Treasury securities. That is a huge risk-off move that money would flow into U.S. Treasury securities, German bunds would clearly benefit from that. It's an open question, what would happen to Italian bonds or Spanish bonds. But in general, there would be a flight to quality and I think in that situation, U.S. Treasury yields would come down even further. JOYCE: All very good points, the difference between an open and a closed financial system. Council, any further questions? STAFF: We do have another question from Yves Istel. Q: Hello, thank you all. Yves Istel, advisor at Rothchild. Could you just comment on what you see as the growth trend in global trade over the next years? Will it be the more restrained growth rate we've seen in recent years? Or will we have a shot at returning to the higher rates of global trade, which in turn, was a significant contributor to our domestic growth rate? JOYCE: I think that's an excellent question. This notion of deglobalization. And trade is certainly an important part of that. Elga, why don't we start with you? And, Jay, if you have anything you want to add on as well, but let's start with Elga on this question. BARTSCH: Yeah. So we think that global trade growth will normalize. But I don't think we're going to get back to the strong growth rates that were consistently and materially outpacing global GDP growth that we saw up and including to the global financial crisis, essentially. So already about ten years ago has that deepening in the international division of labor started to stall. So you by and large start to see trade growth broadly in line with GDP growth, maybe a little bit higher, but not at a pace that consistently and materially outpaced global GDP growth. And there are a number of reasons for that. One is obviously, the initial push of Central Eastern Europe, Asia, notably China, into the WTO and sort of opening up to trade was a major pivot, and we have seen no further opening of material size in the last ten years. In addition, you see countries such as China becoming increasingly reliant domestically in terms of capital goods. They also are having a rapidly increasing consumer sector that is increasingly focused on services. So again, in the course of their economic development, these countries become less reliant on global goods trade. And then of course, overall, there are a number of factors that I think have slowed this down. But I wouldn't talk about deglobalization. I think it's more the rewiring of globalization. Because it's not just trade that matters in this context. I mean, that's the one that we usually talk about and think about. But there is the flow of workers, of physical capital, of financial capital, across borders. And so we think it's not that there is no disengagement, but it's just that things are rewired a bit differently. Let me give you one example. I think COVID-19 has really driven the point home that you need to assess, every company needs to carefully assess, the resilience of its own supply chain against a whole host of different risks, whether it's trade protectionism, whether it's health emergencies, or natural catastrophes, or in the future could be climate risk. And so as a result, I think you see more diversification, a move away from the lowest cost producer in a very tight just-in-time production chain towards something that is more resilient and can better withstand major shocks. JOYCE: Jay, as you comment, maybe you could overlay some additional commentary on your expectations for the Biden administration on global trade policy. I know my view is that we're likely to see a significant change in tone. Probably not an unwind of tariffs with China. A return to multilateralism on the one hand, but at the same time, perhaps a reticence of getting involved in multilateral global free trade agreements. How do you think about Biden on trade? He's hardly a pure free-trader, so to speak. But what type of normalization are you expecting? And how does it impact your view of U.S. and global growth? BRYSON: Right, so I expect a more multilateral approach, if you will vis-à-vis our European allies. I think the Biden administration will quickly bury the hatchet there and ramp down trade tensions with our European allies. If for no other reason, to use that as leverage as it relates to China. We don't expect the Biden administration to reduce the tariffs when it comes into office. We think they will keep those in place as negotiating leverage. Now, certainly the rhetoric will get toned down vis-à-vis China. But, again, I think if you see more of a multilateral approach, at least initially, it'll be towards Europe. But I think the Biden administration does want to pursue, to use a term from the Trump years, a “Phase Two” trade agreement with China. And one way to do that is not to unilaterally get rid of the tariffs, keep them on in terms of negotiating leverage, and also do it in concert with our European allies. JOYCE: Any additional questions from our audience members dialing in today? STAFF: Yes, we have another question from Ryan Hill. Q: Hi, thank you. For wealthy Americans, they seem to be doing very well in the U.S. economy and housing prices and sales have gone up. But for less wealthy Americans the economy has been much more difficult. I believe the CDC moratorium on evictions, I think it ends this month. And many single family mortgages that are backed by the Federal Housing Administration have been delinquent of late. How do you see that affecting the economy and the sector? I mean, do you see a wave of foreclosures coming? Or how would that affect the larger U.S. economy? JOYCE: Jay, can you take that one? Thank you. BRYSON: Yeah, sure. Could you see some more foreclosures coming this year? Yes, absolutely. Because of the two points that you just pointed out. Most of the job losses have been concentrated in the lower-paying parts of the economy. Most of the job losses have been in the leisure and the hospitality sector, bars, restaurants, things of that nature. And that's the lowest paying sector in the economy. And then secondly many of these mortgages that these folks have, have been put on hold for a moratorium. So you could potentially see some of those defaults ramping up. Is this going to be another financial crisis a la 2007, 2009? Or to rephrase another burst in the housing bubble? No, I don't think so. And again you talk about the overall macroeconomic effects on the U.S. economy. If you look at the top 10 percent of income earners in the country, and these people have been largely [un]affected by the pandemic because they can work from home, etc. That top 10 percent accounts for 46 percent of the spending in the economy. If you look at the bottom 80 percent, they account for 40 percent of the spending in the economy. So in other words, the top 10 spend more than the bottom 80 combined. Now, that says something about the income distribution in the economy and I'm not going to opine on that. But the point is that if some of those people at the lower end part of the spectrum start losing their houses and start ramping back on their spending. Is that a drag on the macro economy? Yes. But we're talking a few tenths of a percentage point rather than something that would probably bring the economy to its knees because again, most of the spending is done, or a big part of the spending is done by the top 10 percent, or even the top 20 percent, account for more than half of the spending in the U.S. economy. So it's more of a micro effect in my view than it is a huge macro effect. JOYCE: I think we have time for one or two more questions. STAFF: At this time, we don't have any other questions in the queue. Oh, we just had a hand go up. Brandon Archuleta. Q: Hi. Thank you all for doing this. This is terrific. My name is Brandon Archuleta. I'm a Council on Foreign Relations international affairs fellow for 2020–2021 and I'm currently at the Treasury Department. I want to come back to Elga and this question of China vis-à-vis the debt sustainability initiative. The DSSI has really opened our eyes to Chinese bilateral lending and given us a sense of how much external PPG debt some of these countries owe to China, and it's pretty significant, especially in African countries. Do you anticipate the question of debt trap diplomacy? Perhaps vaccine diplomacy? Are the Chinese going to be slowing down their Belt and Road spending going into 2021? Or are they going to find a way to leverage the current state of play with vaccine distribution in the pandemic to flood the zone with additional Chinese economic policy? Thank you. BARTSCH: Yeah, that's I think, a very nuanced topic, because there is some indication that lending around the Belt and Road Initiative is slowing. The question is whether that's temporarily or something that is a more conscious slowdown. I think there are two aspects to it. One aspect is that it speaks to China's ambitions, especially on the technology side, and to ensure the appropriate access to raw materials. And it potentially also speaks to the fact that the Western world has not given enough attention to some of these continents, such as Africa, for instance. So there clearly, and this is not unique to China I think the Western world does this as well. We're using multilateral organizations typically rather than bilateral organizations, including sort of relief measures, health care support, and so on, to support countries, to stabilize them, and to make them allies, and functioning members of the international community and the international economy. So I think it just speaks to the longer-term ambitions of China to become a serious global player on a whole host of different dimensions that they also go down this route. And the difference maybe with Western efforts of development aid or development landing is that most of it is multilateral and there is more transparency around it. But I think it just speaks to the rivalry that I mentioned earlier, and the sort of bipolar nature of the geopolitical landscape that I already talked about. JOYCE: Do we have one final question? Otherwise, I'll wrap it up here. STAFF: We do not have any more hands raised. JOYCE: Okay. Well, we're at fifty-five minutes now. We've had an excellent discussion. Thank you, Elga. Thank you, Jay. Your many years of experience have brought quite a bit to this conversation. I would also like to thank the Council on Foreign Relations very sincerely for the fantastic programming that you've done through this entire COVID crisis. Everything from politics, to economics, to public health, and so forth. You're doing a great service for all of us. So thank you. Hope everybody enjoys the weekend. Thank you.
  • Americas
    Biden Can’t Pick Up in Latin America Where Obama Left Off
    Four years of malign U.S. neglect and continental upheaval will require a rethink of U.S. policy.
  • Economics
    Stephen C. Freidheim Symposium on Global Economics
    The 2020 Stephen C. Freidheim Symposium on Global Economics will discuss the implications of the coronavirus pandemic on global economic policy. The full agenda is available here. This symposium is presented by the Maurice R. Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies and is made possible through the generous support of Council Board member Stephen C. Freidheim.
  • Venezuela
    Young Professionals Briefing: Venezuela in Crisis
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    Panelists discuss the situation in Venezuela, including the country’s domestic political, economic, and humanitarian situation, and the possible policy options for the United States. The CFR Young Professionals Briefing Series provides an opportunity for those early in their careers to engage with CFR. The briefings feature remarks by experts on critical global issues and lessons learned in their careers. These events are intended for individuals who have completed their undergraduate studies and have not yet reached the age of thirty to be eligible for CFR term membership. Please note only U.S. citizens are eligible for CFR membership.
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  • Economics
    Revisiting the Ides of March, Part III: Scary Stories to Tell in the Dark
    This is a guest blog by Josh Younger, an interest rate strategist at J.P. Morgan. Joshua Younger is employed by the Research Department of J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. All views expressed in this forum are his own and may not align with those of the firm, but they are consistent with all research publications published under the firm brand for which he is listed as an author. This is the concluding post in a three part series.  By the middle of March, the train is really threatening to jump the track. As we discussed in Part I, a rapidly shifted fundamental backdrop had precipitated a collapse in market depth and severe liquidity tiering among fixed income products. In Part II, we described how this combined with operational risk concerns shook loose a $200-300bn, highly levered position that had mostly been accumulated as a placeholder. As dealers were forced to take on more and more inventory, the Treasury market became increasingly incapable of intermediating even modest transactions. For this last segment, it is important to bear in mind that Treasury cash/futures basis unwinds were arguably the more acutely concerning symptom of a much broader problem. A sudden and fast-moving economic shock of unknown but clearly massive proportions created a rush to hoard cash to better weather the storm. Individuals started to stockpile physical cash: Fed data shows that currency in circulation grew 6 percent in March and April, or roughly six times its longer-term growth rate. But, the actions of large institutions and even governments had much larger consequences. Non-financial corporates, for example, drew more as much as $300bn from their credit facilities at large commercial banks (based on Fed H.8 data) and redeemed more than $130bn of their prime money market fund holdings over the same period (comparable in pace and percentage to the weeks after the Lehman bankruptcy). U.S. Treasury data shows foreign central banks sold $128bn of assets as well, presumably to manage capital outflows and currency effects related to the pandemic. In all individuals and businesses were demanding $1tn in new cash and equivalents over just a few weeks (CHART 1). How were banks supposed to supply the liquidity the market was demanding? This is where two elements of the post-2008 regulatory framework started to conflict with each other, and inhibit the free flow of cash through the financial system. On the one hand, liquidity regulations, specifically the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR), require banks to hold stocks of high-quality liquid assets (HQLA) that can be monetized quickly and at low cost should the need arise. On the other, capital regulations like the Supplementary Leverage Ratio (SLR) and surcharges on Global Systematically Important Banks (GSIBs), limit the size, complexity, interconnectedness, and cross-jurisdictional exposure of any given institution. In normal times, these two sets of rules can co-exist quite peacefully with each other. But when the rainy day comes, their interaction can turn toxic. The central role and large market share held by bank-affiliated securities dealers meant that the banking system itself is largely responsible for the monetization of its own HQLA. In other words, when a bank is facing a spike in liquidity demand—including any of the sources listed above—it is other banks that intermediate asset sales, especially Treasuries, to source the necessary cash. As a result, when leverage and other constraints inhibit their ability to do so, as was certainly the case in March, banks can no longer monetize their HQLA at a reasonable cost—if they can do so at all. Other problems arise as a result of what happens to that liquidity. Draws on bank revolvers are particularly pernicious. By tapping these facilities, non-financial corporates are creating new assets (loans) and liabilities (wholesale deposits) on bank balance sheets. If the requisite transfers are funded by raising new capital, leverage can remain roughly the same. If banks rely on HQLA which largely remains in the banking system—e.g., reserves at the Fed, which are a closed system, or sales of Treasuries that linger in bank-affiliated dealer inventories, it can exacerbate the leverage problem that generated market dysfunction in the first place: a vicious cycle. Those new wholesale deposits posed another problem. Because they are being held ‘just in case’ rather than for everyday transactional activity, they are likely to be characterized as ‘non-operational’ for LCR purposes. That category of deposits is considered the highest run risk, and therefore assigned the most demanding coverage requirements. Thus, as liquidity demand spikes, the stock of HQLA banks are required to hold is increasing, not decreasing.  This is clear from 1Q 2020 regulatory disclosures, released a few months after the crisis. Liquidity Coverage Ratio weighted outflows, a measure of the HQLA required to satisfy regulatory minimums, were increasing rapidly at the same time as capital requirements related to total leverage and GSIB surcharges (CHART 2). When bank leverage is rising in this way, the most effective offset is shedding assets. Yet that was precisely the risk that regulators wanted to avoid. Disorderly delevering is manageable if it is isolated to a relatively narrow corner of the market (in this case, relative value hedge funds). But the same dynamic taking hold across the banking system was quite another thing. FRA/OIS and FX swaps, two common barometers of stress in the banking system, were flashing bright red within days (both are measures of how easily banks can raise funds). If things were allowed to continue along this path, fire sales of assets into a severely illiquid market risked a full-fledged panic and financial crisis in the midst of a historic economic shock. That is where the Fed comes in. Central banks control the money supply and issue the currency. If nothing else, this gives them the right set of tools to deal with a liquidity squeeze. Simply growing the monetary base could in principle supply the cash that the banking system could not. And grow it they did: the emergency cut announced on March 15 was paired with a commitment to purchase $700bn of Treasury and mortgage-backed securities, which was made unlimited shortly thereafter. After peaking around $75bn per day of Treasury purchases in the second half of March, their asset purchases slowed gradually to the current daily pace of roughly $4bn. The Fed also restarted the FX swap lines, re-introduced several 2008-vintage facilities authorized under Section 13(3) emergency lending powers, and introduced a suite of new facilities under the same authority. At the peak in early-June, the monetary base had increased more than $2.8tn (~13 percent of 1Q GDP) over just three months, the largest such expansion since Second World War (CHART 3). This intervention worked along a number of dimensions. Market depth in Treasuries bottomed out and transaction costs normalized as automated systems flicked back on, and futures quickly came back into alignment with their deliverable basket. Combining these elements, and some others, shows both how severely market functioning had broken down, and how rapidly it healed in the wake of this historic intervention (CHART 4). FRA/OIS and FX swap pricing also started to return to Earth, thanks in large part to the resuscitated swap lines as well as old (CPFF) and new (MMLF) 13(3) facilities. What does this tell us about the efficacy of the post-2008 bank regulatory regime? That suite of rules was arguably successful at transforming a credit crisis, which is quite difficult for central banks to solve, into a liquidity crisis, which is well within their wheelhouse. With market functioning back to something resembling ‘normal,’ and little sign of funding or credit market stress, they appear to have lived up to that assertion. In that sense, this is a success story. In another, however, we have simply substituted a fast-moving crisis for one which is slower moving. In aggressively expanding the monetary base, the Fed has mechanically increased the size and leverage of the banking system. Nearly $6tn of federal deficits over the next two fiscal years will likely compound the situation. In the 1940s, the last time such a thing happened, it took the banking system decades to delever as the post-War recovery drove renewed demand for private sector credit. With Supplementary Leverage Ratio and GSIB surcharges likely to become increasingly binding constraints on bank activity, the Fed risks simply delaying and spacing out, but not avoiding, asset sales and a sharp curtailment of credit. That brings us to the present day. There has been some effort to counteract the impact of rising banking system leverage with changes to some regulations. The Fed, FDIC, and OCC in particular have proposed temporarily excluding risk-free assets (cash and Treasuries) from the calculation of total leverage exposure when assessing Supplementary Leverage Ratio compliance. There are, however, significant gaps in this approach. As proposed, Supplementary Leverage Ratio relief comes with strings attached that may be difficult for many banks to accept. GSIB surcharges, which in practice are a strong constraint on bank behavior, are similarly implicated by a much larger Fed balance sheet but conspicuously absent from the discussion. Some other proposals, like a clearing mandate for the Treasury market, seek to reduce the intermediation frictions that generated this crisis without wholesale changes to the regulatory framework, but require quite a bit of further study and are unlikely to be a practical solution for some time. This all means the coming months will likely represent a balancing act, ensuring the safety and soundness of the banking system on the one hand, while seeking to minimize the financial stability risk associated with market dysfunction on the other. The only fundamental change is the Fed’s clear willingness to do what is needed when financial stability is threatened by these dynamics. Though things are calmer now, there is no way to rule out them being called upon to do so again.
  • Economics
    Revisiting the Ides of March, Part II: The Going Gets Weird
    This is a guest blog by Josh Younger, an interest rate strategist at J.P. Morgan. Joshua Younger is employed by the Research Department of J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. All views expressed in this forum are his own and may not align with those of the firm, but they are consistent with all research publications published under the firm brand for which he is listed as an author. This is part two of a three part series. In Part I of this series, we described how liquidity collapsed as markets were forced to rapidly come to grips with the economic implications of a global pandemic. That was arguably nothing new, however. Recent memory includes at least a few episodes: the 2008 financial crisis of course, several episodes related to the Euro crisis, the downgrade of the U.S. government’s credit rating, the ‘taper tantrum,’ the devaluation of the Chinese Yuan, Brexit, and the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election, just to name a few. Things really started to come apart this time around in a relatively obscure corner of financial markets. Hedge funds and other ‘sophisticated’ investors often hold short positions in futures (a contractual agreement to sell those bonds on some future date) against levered positions in the bonds they reference. Liquidity tiering among different fixed income instruments favored futures as the preferred hedging vehicle, leading to a widening price discrepancy between those contracts and the bonds in their deliverable basket. This had happened before, but there were a few key differences this time around. The net result threatened a new kind of financial crisis—one of collateral quantity rather than quality—which had the potential to be broader then the kind of disorderly systemic delevering policymakers had fought so hard to avoid in 2008. Why did these positions exist at all? Trading bonds versus futures has been at the core of relative value strategies in fixed income for decades. When prices on the futures are too high compared to the securities one can deliver, for example, there is money to be made in shorting the futures and buying securities—and vice versa when they were too low. This effectively enforces the tight theoretical relationship that should exist between these two connected instruments. Such trades were generally considered very low risk because losses should be limited; a short futures positions represents a committed buyer, and bonds can simply be delivered at the appointed time. Potential gains are small as well—only a few tenths of a percent. Thus, cash/futures basis trades tend to be very highly levered (20 or even 50 to 1, or more): securities are purchased using short-term borrowed funds for which they are pledged as collateral (repurchase agreements, or repos; often for no-money-down), and initial margin on the futures leg tends to be small (a few percent of notional, and potentially less if optimized against other positions). How large are these cash/futures positions? A full accounting is not possible with public data, but the impact can be seen in net positioning reports released by the CFTC. Gross short positions among ‘levered funds’ increased from less than $100bn in early-2010 to a peak of nearly $875bn in mid-2019 and still around $750-800bn to start this year (CHART 1). That this was related to basis trading is clear from the decoupling of positioning from economic exposure to moves in interest rates (CHART 2). In other words, hedge funds appeared to be accumulating larger and larger net short positions in futures even as their overall returns reflected a mix of net long and short exposure over time. This suggests another position that is not visible in the futures data—e.g., longs in securities, likely financed with repo. Why would this position grow so rapidly? If anything relative value opportunities were fewer and further between over the past ten years, in no small part due to the heavy involvement from the Fed. Rather than economic motivations, it had to do with shifting incentives imposed by new regulations. After the 2008 crisis, new rules put in place to address Too Big to Fail (TBTF) subsidized the social cost of size and complexity with capital surcharges that were agnostic to risk. Total leverage, for example, was measured capital against all assets, including Treasuries and cash. That made certain types of low-margin/low-risk transactions, like Treasury repo, potentially capital intensive. Banks responded by planning ahead, often offering repo to clients on a ‘use-it-or-lose-it’ basis. From the client perspective, that incentivized using their allocation without taking much market risk. Basis positions, with their repo-financed bond leg and theoretically limited downside, were ideal placeholders with which to maintain access to leverage in the event it was needed on some future date. Under normal circumstances, the dislocation in basis pricing that emerged in early March could be assumed to naturally resolve over time. The holders of these levered bond positions still had a committed buyer in the counterparty to their short futures contract. That is, if they could hold both legs until the delivery period. Hanging on was rapidly becoming far more complicated than anyone anticipated. As the pandemic accelerated and many dealers were forced to transition quickly to work-from-home arrangements, there was a risk that certain types of trades could get lost in the shuffle. Repo is particularly operationally intensive, and had suffered disruptions in the past (for example, September 2001). Hedge funds feared they could be forced out of basis trades early, and at a significant loss. Thus, focus shifted from managing market risk to managing operational risk. Even if in practice one thought that forced early unwinds were unlikely, the potential for others to come to that conclusion and unwind meant prices could become even more dislocated, and losses much larger. By mid-March, cash/futures basis pricing already implied 10-20 percent losses on some positions, and potentially more depending on the portfolio composition. The way things were going, it could have gotten much worse from there. For placeholders with little economic value, this was concerning to say the least. A classic run dynamic was taking hold. A full accounting of what came next is once again not possible with public data, but the evidence is clear. CFTC positioning data shows a roughly $200bn decline in gross short futures positions among levered funds in March and April. Over the same period, the Cayman Islands (a very common domicile for hedge funds) was a net seller of just over $200bn in Treasury securities YTD—a more than 4-sigma event—despite the fact that prices were rising rapidly (CHART 3). Margin calls likely accelerated this process: in late-March, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME; the clearinghouse for Treasury futures) increased the funds required to maintain existing futures positions, forcing hedge funds and others to come up with as much as $75bn in additional cash in just a couple of days (CHART 4; also discussed here). Though futures can be collapsed in an unwind—a short paired with a long position in the same contract becomes no position at all—securities always end up on someone’s balance sheet. In an ideal world, market makers would be pure intermediaries, lining up buyers and sellers in advance. When a match cannot be made quickly, however, the bonds reside on dealer balance sheets. Because most of that activity occurs among bank-affiliated dealers, this inventory is constrained by the same size and complexity regulations as other activities. At a certain point, these increasing capital charges make it more expensive to intermediate subsequent transfers, which is often priced into overall transaction costs. This materialized in rather dramatic fashion in March. Though yields were declining, and therefore Treasury prices increasing, that arguably had more to do with a shift in monetary policy expectations (zero or even negative short-term interest rates for an extended period, quantitative easing and even yield curve control) than a fundamental shift in the supply/demand balance among longer-term investors. In fact, if anything foreign central banks, a key component of demand for Treasury bonds, were significant sellers throughout the decline in yields (as discussed in a recent post by Brad Setser in this blog). Basis trade unwinds added to already heavy inventories, reducing capacity and exponentially increasing the costs of intermediation. The impact was greatest in longer maturity securities: the bid/ask spread (a measure of transaction costs) that dealers charged each other to trade 30-year Treasuries, for example, was 20x larger than typical levels for a few days in March. The shock percolated across the Treasury yield curve such that the relationship between otherwise very similar securities became very volatile and uncertain (CHART 5). As many observed at the time, Treasuries were suddenly trading more like emerging market debt than obligations backed by the full faith and credit of the U.S. government (see a related discussion here). Large risk transfers have, of course, occurred many times in the past. While they can have a significant impact on prices, they do not typically threaten financial stability. But the scale of the breakdown in market functioning in mid-March was unprecedented, and threatened a new kind of financial crisis—one driven not by the quality of collateral used for short-term lending, like in 2008, but one in which the quantity sloshing around on bank balance sheets risked becoming destabilizing. Though at first glance the events of March bear little resemblance to the Lehman bankruptcy, the risk they posed were very similar: a disorderly delevering of the banking system, including fire-sales of otherwise high quality assets, in the midst of a historic shock to the real economy. How could a disruption in the Treasury market expand to envelope the system as a whole? And how did we avoid the most destructive outcomes? We explore that in our third and final installment.
  • Economics
    Revisiting the Ides of March, Part I: A Thousand Year Flood
    This is a guest blog by Josh Younger, an interest rate strategist at J.P. Morgan. Joshua Younger is employed by the Research Department of J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. All views expressed in this forum are his own and may not align with those of the firm, but they are consistent with all research publications published under the firm brand for which he is listed as an author. This is part one of a three part series. Brad Setser notes that he believes this work is of great interest to the general public, given the scale of the market disruption in March. Among other superlatives that can be assigned to the COVID-19 pandemic, the re-pricing of global financial assets to reflect its economic implications was arguably the most rapid and unexpected of the modern era. For fixed income markets in particular, these moves were multiples of what the market considered plausible in the months prior. The decline in 10-year Treasury yields over the month ending in mid-March, for example, was nearly six times that implied by the cost of buying protection against those moves in the options market. By this measure—volatility-adjusted price change—that was the largest re-pricing of any monthly period in at least 30 years (CHART 1). This uniquely fast pace was consistent with the combination of a uniquely fast-moving event—even financial crises cannot approach the exponential growth exhibited by disease epidemics—and much more severe economic consequences—a synchronized global economic shutdown. Financial asset returns are famously fat-tailed, but a surprise of that magnitude should still be exceedingly rare. Even a conservative interpretation of the statistics suggests they should only occur once every thousand years or so. The ferocity of these moves put considerable strain on the basic functioning of markets that intermediate large transactions, even risk-free assets like Treasuries (see also Liberty Street Economics blog posts here and here). As a general matter, very large intraday price swings complicate the process of connecting buyers and sellers—market making. This reflects the fact that in many markets, including Treasuries, there is typically a time lag between the acquisition and placement of a security. If prices decline over that period, short though it may be, market makers could be forced to sell for less than what they paid, resulting in a loss. Traders guard against this risk to some degree by offering bonds for sale (the offer) at a higher price than they can buy them in the market (the bid). In principle they can widen this bid/ask spread to accommodate larger expected short-term price swings. But when volatility is rising, it can be difficult to keep up, and even a few minutes can quickly lead to significant losses. When market making risks becoming a money-losing enterprise, the solution is simple: reduce the size and/or pace of transactions or, in the extreme, simply stop trading all together. Though this was just as true of the street markets of medieval Paris as it is today, in modern electronic trading it is exacerbated by increased reliance on algorithms. Often referred to collectively as high frequency traders (HFTs), these computerized systems engage in an enormous number of transactions a day but only hold those positions for (ideally) a fraction of a second. That means their ideal environment is one of relatively stable prices and heavy volumes, so they can effectively monetize the bid/ask spread many times over. These strategies dominate activity across a number of markets, including Treasuries where the top four counterparties are far from household names and make up more than 60 percent of these transactions. HFT-style trading is also not limited to these dedicated outfits (i.e., principal trading firms, or PTFs)—many large bank-affiliated dealers now employ similar strategies for at least part of their market making business. HFT models have been quite successful in the relatively calm waters of the past few years, and they have grown to make up the vast majority of liquidity provided in the Treasury market. That means that ability to buy and sell large volumes at low cost has become increasingly dependent on their involvement. That all came crashing down in March as not only did prices oscillate violently over the course of the trading day, but the level of activity dried up as well (CHART 2). With fewer opportunities to profit from connecting buyers and sellers, and a much greater risk of losing money in the meantime, HFT-style market makers pulled back abruptly and in some cases likely shut down entirely. Thus the liquidity they provided dropped to a tiny fraction of its previous peak over the first couple weeks of March (CHART 3). When liquidity dries up, activity tends to migrate to the deepest, most actively traded, most transparent, and fungible product. For interest rates, that typically means Treasury futures, which are a contractual agreement to buy or sell a Treasury security on future date. These instruments have many advantages during periods of stress, not least among them the fact that they are a derivative rather than a ‘cash’ instrument, and that means they effectively offer leverage (aside from the required margin of course). If you need to quickly hedge significant interest rate risk without locking up or borrowing a lot of cash, this is an immensely valuable feature. When the going gets tough enough, this dynamic can have an impact on the relative pricing of different fixed income products with very similar underlying risk profiles, which we often refer to as liquidity tiering. Futures in particular tend to lead in disorderly market moves—dropping in price more than similar securities when interest rates are rising, and vice versa when they are falling. This is typically quantified by tracking the difference, or basis, between the futures contract price and the bond that is optimal (i.e., cheapest) to deliver into that contract (the cheapest-to-deliver, or CTD). Market convention is to quote the so-called cash/futures basis as the price of the CTD (with some adjustments, which we will not belabor here) minus that of the futures. Therefore, a drop in the value of this measure represents the outperformance of the futures contract. We are not talking about massive numbers here: among those who traffic in such things, even a 0.5 percent change in the pricing of futures relative to their CTD is considered a very large move indeed! But, as we will see, under the right circumstances even such a small discrepancy can have massive consequences. That leaves us with a sequence of events that should look very familiar to any interest rate trader: a spike in volatility led to a collapse in market depth and then a re-pricing of the cash/futures basis (CHART 4)*. Though markets had weathered episodes of severe illiquidity several times since 2008, financial stability was never directly threatened. This time was different, and anything but familiar. A confluence of events triggered by small shifts in relative pricing of different fixed income instruments ultimately threatened a financial crisis and disorderly deleveraging of the banking system in the middle of a historic shock to the real economy. The key lay in long dormant, highly levered positions held by professional investors but previously dismissed as having little impact on the market (if they were aware of it at all).     * Price impact is a complementary measure of liquidity to market depth, and quantifies the expected change in price for a imbalance of buyers versus sellers. More details on various measures of liquidity are available here.
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    Corporate Virtual Roundtable: Petrostates in Peril
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    Panelists discuss the geopolitical and economic ramifications of the current state of oil markets.   KRAUSS: Good morning. Welcome to today's Council on Foreign Relations meeting. I'm Clifford Krauss, national business correspondent for energy at the New York Times. We're in a historic moment. And a sidebar to this moment has been the oil story and energy at large. And it strikes me that we are facing a paradox. For decades since the Nixon administration, we as a country have been striving for energy independence and expanding our domestic fuel production. We reached this point, and now we have a collapse in demand, and so, in the face of coronavirus and the global economic downturn. So what does this mean for our country and the world and especially producers like Russia and Saudi Arabia? We know that Middle East producers cannot balance their books. What does this mean? We're fortunate today to have two fine experts to discuss, neither of whom needs a long introduction. Helima Croft of RBC Capital is one of the world's leading commodity experts. She knows energy and geopolitics and her commentary is closely watched by government officials and investors. And Arjun Murti is a senior advisor at Warburg Pincus and a director at ConocoPhillips. He is an advisory board member at Columbia University's Center for Global Energy Policy. So let's get on with it. So, let's start with looking at this from thirty thousand feet. Saudi Arabia and Russia face a dilemma that has produced tensions within OPEC+. They would like to force down American oil production, but at the same time they want to lift oil prices that support, uh, at the same time they are lifting oil prices or wish to and that only supports shale production in the United States. How do they get out of that box? Arjun, you want to start? MURTI: Well, so I think a lot of attention is placed on how Saudi and Russia are viewing U.S. shale. I think the interesting point to me is, U.S. investors, the public capital markets, had significantly soured on the shale E&Ps unrelated to what OPEC is doing or not doing. The shale E&Ps have been very successful in massively growing production. What they didn't grow was profits. Returns on capital were mid-single digit or worse, balance sheets for many companies are stretched. And so you had this issue where concerns about energy transition, what is the long term outlook for oil and gas demand, concerns about profitability, concerns about balance sheet help, all of these things are going to weigh on the shale E&Ps, actually irrespective of COVID-19. And irrespective what OPEC does or does not do, there's going to be a critical need, in my opinion for shale going forward. But investors funding these companies is a huge question mark. And I think the outlook for that is quite uncertain right now. KRAUSS: And Helima, how about the geopolitical piece to this? CROFT: Well, I think what's really interesting if we go back to what happened on March 6th, in Vienna, when we couldn't get an agreement between Russia and Saudi Arabia, I think part of the reason why Russia was reluctant to cut an additional three hundred thousand barrels of production and prop up the price then was because there was a view amongst some energy leaders in Russia that shale companies were weak and that they should not be giving a constant lifeline to these companies. And I think their view was, why should Russia continue to cut production, allow U.S. shale to grow, and allow a Russian energy company to be sanctioned? And so I think that part of the reason why they were willing to risk low prices, the view from Moscow was, could we potentially, you know, put some of these companies out of business and not have to deal with the foreign policy implications of having the U.S. believe that because of this resource endowment, that they could sanction companies and not pay a price in terms of U.S. consumers. I think for Saudi, it's a little bit different. I don't think that Saudi was primarily focused on U.S. energy companies, I think the Saudis were very focused on everybody having to basically pull their weight within OPEC and OPEC+, including Russia. I think Saudi is more willing, was more willing, to tolerate U.S. companies and their market share because Saudi I think, was more focused on getting a price that made their math work in terms of their budget. KRAUSS: And Saudi Arabia had attempted that same strategy in 2014 and 2015, and it didn't work out. I'm just, I'm wondering, going forward, is there a tension between Russia and Saudi Arabia that seems to be alleviated for the moment? Are we going to see that bubble up again? Arjun, do you want to take that? MURTI: Well, let me start with that 2014, 2015 didn't work out because why didn't it work out? The perception was the shale guys needed $80 or $100 a barrel, the price fell to $50. So that wasn't gonna work. There was, we were coming off a ten year, commodity boom in that period. There was a lot of fat to cut. It was early days in shale, so there was a lot of cost cutting, technology, drilling longer laterals, all the things that lowered the cost. The big kind of thing that didn't work out is the shale guys said, our wells work at $40 or $50 a barrel and they drilled accordingly and production ramped up massively. That was not accurate. Certain wells work at 40 to 50 (dollars). The vast bulk need $60 plus, you can see it in the full-cycle returns on capital. Again, companies were promising 30, 50, 100 percent, internal rates of returns on individual shale wells, they actually delivered 3, 4, 5 percent full-cycle returns. And so in 2015, capital markets flooded in to fund these programs that they thought were going to be very profitable. That did not work out at all. And so this cycle, you have capital markets, in some respects aligned with OPEC. We don't want shale to drill as much. We want more disciplined companies. And so I think I get why people look at 2015 and say, that didn't work out. But there was massive equity offerings, we're not having that this time. Companies are going to spend within cash flow before they would overspend cash flow, and I think everyone gets that the well IRR math just simply failed for the shale E&Ps, and that a different type of business model is going to be needed going forward. So in that respect, I actually think capital markets are more in line with Saudi and Russia, I think Helima will be more insightful and that dynamic between those two companies, but I'd say it's a strategy. I do think the capital markets will be aligned with OPEC in terms of limiting CapEx into shale. KRAUSS: So Helima, it feels to me like we have a different flavor here. And that is this morning, we have the reports of Chevron trying to take over Noble and, which is a relatively small deal, but maybe the beginning of a wave of consolidation, which would lower costs, eventually, if you have economies of scale. Is it possible that once again, the oil patch in the United States will accommodate this change from the international you know, oil patch? CROFT: Well, you know, Arjun is actually the expert on the U.S. story as well. I might actually take a little bit back when you go to Russia question and can that marriage stay together. I mean, I think one of the you know, the key things in 2014 as Arjun talked about is I think Saudi Arabia was really surprised and the OPEC planners who decided to not cut production in 2014 that capital markets remained open to those companies. They were not aiming to have $30 oil in 2014 and 2015. When they made that decision, they were surprised that the companies were able to survive that downturn. And so remember, when Ali Al-Naimi the Saudi oil minister said, I don't care if it's $30, I don't care if it's $20. We're not cutting. I don't think the Saudi leadership ever believed that you'd be looking at a $30 or $20 scenario. They thought you'd be looking maybe at a $70 or $60 scenario, it can be shorts day and the companies would fold. And I think what they learned from that, what they would say they learned from that, is OPEC was not sufficient to deal with U.S. shale, at least that's why you needed Russia. So I think that what 2014 taught them was you needed to bring somebody else into the arrangement to have market share power in terms of being able to manage the market. So I always talk about OPEC+ Saudi and Russia as that sort of shotgun marriage driven by shale. And I think that we had a test of it this year, clearly in March, in April, but when prices collapse and storage started to fill up, all the sudden people decided they needed to get their vows back together. And President Trump played a really important role in actually getting OPEC and Russia back together because when U.S. companies were threatened by the price collapse, and all of a sudden the American energy abundance and American energy dominance was threatened. President Trump had to drag that deal across the finish line and get everyone back together. So I think that is sort of where we are with Russia and Saudi, I think they're back because price dictated that they needed to get back. But again, the future in terms of a couple years from now will be determined. We don't know if this arrangement will last but right now I think they're in it. I will hand it back to Arjun to talk specifically about that Chevron-Noble. KRAUSS: Well, yeah. Arjun? Yeah. I'm glad you put, good. I want to move on to other things but before I do, Arjun, to the point of consolidation, which is widely expected, is that going to save shale? Is that going to improve the economics of shale as we move from the independence to the super majors getting into this driving down costs yet again, is that is that going to happen? MURTI: Not for the reasons typically articulated by the majority of folks. I think that and companies going out of business are the things most misunderstood. So there's always been throughout my thirty-year career, hundreds if not thousands of E&Ps and you merge a couple together, some of the management teams split off and start their own private equity or small cap E&P companies and that cycle just goes on and on and on. You're never, I mean, never is a long time but for, you're not going to have some super consolidated U.S. energy industry, there's just simply too many companies to do that. Consolidation in and of itself is only logical if you end up with a better company. If there are good assets to harvest that are at the low point of the cost curve that can be perpetuated, then it makes sense, but simply slamming two companies together in and of itself is not particularly relevant. As far as putting companies out of business, which is the other angle you always hear. I think that can be a fundamental misunderstanding of chapter eleven bankruptcy in this country, you go bankrupt, you wipe out your debt, you wipe out the equity holders, you simply have new equity holders, the company doesn't really go away. So what is needed here is either disciplined by capital markets for any number of reasons, discipline on the part of boards and managements to simply pursue their lowest cost assets that can generate good returns and good full cycle returns and free cash flow. And there are just too few companies today that do that, we need more companies that do that. And perhaps we'll see that going forward. KRAUSS: I want to go globally again, to Helima. This is something that you've written a lot about. And that is the kind of fiscal pressures that are being faced by Russia, Saudi Arabia, Algeria and these producers. What are the potential political impacts? And are we going to see or may we see more instability in the Middle East? CROFT: Well, you know, I love the question about, you know, people talk about bankruptcies for companies and can you put companies out of business? I think if Ali Al-Naimi was unsuccessful in putting a major U.S. shale company out of business, he put a country out of business. I mean that – KRAUSS: (Laughs.) CROFT: – price war essentially put Venezuela out of business. MURTI: (Laughs.) CROFT: We saw, I mean, really huge pain across the OPEC producers in 2014. And we think about where we stand now and it was extraordinary. If you look at 2012, the Middle East North African producers brought in $1 trillion in oil revenue in 2012. You go to 2019. That was $575 billion. In 2020, according to the IMF, the Middle East North African producers are expected to bring in only $300 billion. So in a span of eight years, we've gone from, you know, $1 trillion to $300 billion. And so that has really huge implications as you know Clif. I mean, the demographics of the Middle East, you know, where you have in certain countries, two thirds of the population under the age of thirty, very high youth unemployment, very high expectations of a social welfare safety net and employment opportunities provided by the state. And so when they don't have the revenue to provide those opportunities, you know, you really do risk social unrest. And if we look at what happened just last year, we saw multiple governments fall on the face of popular demonstrations over the failure to provide economic opportunity and poor governance, I mean Bouteflika and Algeria. He left the scene. You know, you had the government of Sudan fall, you had regime change in Iraq, and other places where the regime did not fall you have mass social demonstrations. You think about Iran, and Iran has been hit so hard by the combination of collapsing prices, but also sanctions. I mean, they've gone from being able to export, you know, over two million barrels a day to basically down to a couple hundred thousand because of U.S. sanctions. So it's not only their hit because of price, it's been hit by volume. And in that period, 2012 to you know, 2019 they've lost $80 billion in oil revenue. And so you know, countries like that really $40 Brent, the recovery of the $40s is not sufficient. I mean, RBC we estimate that the collective fiscal breakeven for OPEC+ is $90. And so this is recovery still means a lot of pain. It means going to the IMF for emergency funding. It means borrowing. It means cutting key social programs, tripling your VAT in the case of Saudi Arabia. So this is going to be an enormous challenge to get through this period of low prices. And then you think about a looming energy transition. And so the outlook is not great for these hydrocarbon states. KRAUSS: I'm glad you brought up the sanctions, because if it weren't for all of this expansion of U.S. oil production in recent years, you wouldn't have had the same sanctions regime on Iran and Venezuela, the United States would not have been able to do that, at least not to this extent. And of course, in the end, any instability in the Middle East while we may be cushioned, China's not cushioned. They're very dependent on Middle East, on Middle East oil, Japan, Korea, the world is interdependent and so this economic, this economic or this energy independence is a chimera. It's not real. If you're reducing dependence, but we remain interdependent in this global economic system. Arjun, this is, I think your wheelhouse. MURTI: I mean, you said it best. It's certainly better that we have some better balance between our production and our demand that that buffers extreme volatility, but certainly doesn't make us immune from it. You know, I think you noted earlier for the first time ever, a U.S. president as Helima mentioned actually helped support an OPEC deal that raised oil prices. I mean I'm fifty years old, that has not happened in my lifetime. And, you know, my former colleagues at Goldman Sachs, I think put out an analysis where these days, higher oil prices are a marginal net positive. Clearly the consumer loses on gasoline but the producing states benefit, it's, it's a marginal net positive from what years ago would have been a major net negative and it does allow us freedom to do things we didn't do before. But we're certainly not un-dependent on international markets. And if the price goes up some other part of the world, certainly consumers in this country will still, will still feel it. So. KRAUSS: Right, in the past oil shocks were spikes in price. Now we have, I live in, I live in Houston. Now the oil shock is a decline in oil prices. Oh, Helima you're, you're nodding and smiling. CROFT: I mean, absolutely. I think what's extraordinary is if you think about 2019, I remember flying into Abu Dhabi, and we had a report that you'd had tankers hit off the coast of Fujairah, that really important port, and oil didn't really move when you had, you know, potential disruption in the Strait of Hormuz, and then you went through a summer of 2019. We'll get pipelines attack, drone strike, tankers seized. And then on 20, September 14, we had a cruise missile and drone strike, knocking out more than half of Saudi's production temporarily, hitting the all-important Abqaiq facility, the world's largest oil processing facility, a facility that was seen as the nerve center of the global energy system. And you know, prices rallied, you know, one or two days, you know, ten bucks, but fell off. If you had said Cliff, ten years ago, Abqaiq is hit in an attack tied to the Iranians, where would you think oil would be? You'd think oil will be over $100. And you also would have thought the Carter Doctrine would have been invoked the doctrine that it was a core national security interest of the United States to protect Middle Eastern oil facilities. That doctrine has been in place since 1980. You would have thought an attack on Abqaiq tied to a sovereign state would have been enough to invoke the Carter Doctrine and President Trump was like, it's not an attack on the world, it's an attack on Saudi Arabia! Following up — KRAUSS: (Laughs.) The Trump Doctrine! CROFT: Right! Following up in January, I was actually in Abu Dhabi it was right after the killing of Soleimani and you had reprisal attacks on the Americans, you know, in Iraq. And you know, he said, we don't need Middle Eastern oil. I think that is what is really to me, which changes all the disruption and the attacks on facilities in 2019. Just didn't move the needle in terms of price and it meant the U.S. didn't feel compelled to have to intervene in a way it might have done so a decade ago. KRAUSS: And now we have these mysterious explosions in Iran, and all of the turmoil in Iran. At the same time, China and Iran are talking about oil deals and other kinds of relations, and I'm wondering what you both think of that. MURTI: Helima, why don't you start? CROFT: Well, I think what's interesting is that, you know, when this, when the U.S. pulled out of Iran nuclear deal, there had been this view in the market, it was not going to be effective, the U.S. was going alone, and that China would essentially back up the truck and essentially take all of those discounted Iranian barrels. What has been interesting, despite the deals that we've seen China sign recently with countries like Iran, these big investment energy deals, is they still abided largely by the U.S. sanctions, because of the ability of the United States now to essentially say, dollar transactions will be targeted. And if you want to do business in the United States, you have to make a choice. And so we have seen the sanctions be more effective, even China to a large extent had to go along with them, because of the power of the U.S. to basically lever the dollar and basically penalize these other companies and countries for doing business with states like Iran. We saw with Venezuela as well, the Chinese largely abided by the sanctions on Venezuela. And so I think we like to focus on the idea that you know China will go in there and take this. They're all to sign these deals. But the Chinese still for now, watch what Treasury is doing with extraterritorial sanctions. For now, they still have fight. Some people are starting to speculate, are we going to see more non-dollar transactions to get around sanctions, but I think that is something just to bear in mind as well. Like even China had to largely abide by the U.S. sanctions on Iran and Venezuela. KRAUSS: Arjun? MURTI: Clifford, the only thing I'd add is really these large oil importing countries of which China is the most meaningful one today, India is growing up in this world as well, is they're gonna have to figure out ways to ensure there is sufficient capital investment outside of the OPEC country. So if you go back over fifty years, OPEC production has gone up and down. But I would defy anyone to point to any individual country within OPEC that has had sustained production growth. Russia, part of OPEC+, has demonstrated that, Saudi has raised and lowered their production between eight and ten and a half million barrels a day numerous times, but never sustainably grown beyond that we know about Iran, Venezuela and so forth. And so whether it's shale, whether it's deep water, or whether it's other areas we're at a time of significantly diminished CapEx. It doesn't matter today, because demand is weak, and we've got COVID. But whether it's three years, five years, ten years down the road, I think people better hope there's an energy transition, because right now, investors significantly dislike the energy sector and there's very little capital investment going in and there will be a supply price to pay at some point, again it may not matter for the next couple years, but that deficit is coming. And so you look at China, they've generally been pretty smart about filling up their SPR when oil prices have been weak. So I think they certainly have an impetus to continue to expand that to try and provide their own buffer. But we are going to need more CapEx in the sector at some point by someone. KRAUSS: Well, well, when prices go up as presumably they would, wouldn't capital flow follow? MURTI: It should follow. I will say right now, when you look at how out of favor the sector is, I think companies are going to have to demonstrate again, I've said this a few times, they're gonna have to be more profitable going forward. But I think there's uncertainty even in shale development. We don't know what future administrations are going to do in terms of allowing fracking, in terms of allowing leasing and all these kind of things. There's always been challenges in many other areas, but I don't think you could just take it as a given, which is what I think people do. I think people presume prices going up and supply will be there. And undoubtedly, it probably will. But, but it can be a challenge. It just doesn't bubble out of the ground for free. It takes real companies with real effort and real capital markets backing and we have almost none of that today. KRAUSS: So, Arjun let's presume that production is in decline, well it is in decline and it remains lower in the U.S. And exports which are lower, remain lower. What does that mean, not just for the industry, but for energy independence in the U.S.? And then Helima, maybe you would also chime in on that. MURTI: You know, we probably have seen our peak minimum dependence, if that's the right word? KRAUSS: (Laughs.) MURTI: Or we've been sort of energy independent. And it does seem like it's going to be a little bit more challenging achieving that going forward. You know, we still are looking at, on my numbers at least, in the worst case of flattish U.S. demand outlook, once we recover from COVID. You can build in a slight growth or maybe even a modest decline, but something that does call for sort of continued healthy levels of demand going forward. And that may be hard to fill with domestic supply. I think you said it again earlier, Clifford. We're still part of the global energy world and so we might be a little less energy independent, going forward, but all these geopolitical risks, all this sort of dearth of CapEx, all these questions about timing of energy transition, the efficacy of the energy transition is going to be a big issue that we face. KRAUSS: Helima, this is a big idea. Please, speak up. CROFT: I always thought that there was a weakness, the whole American energy dominance argument that the Trump administration was making, because every time they had to call Saudi Arabia and ask them to put more barrels on the market. Like we saw that in the summer of 2018, when the U.S. pulled out of the Iranian nuclear deal, you had that rise in prices over the summer as they had talked about ending exemptions for importers of Iranian oil. We had Libyan supplies off the market temporarily. And we had President Trump putting a lot of pressure on Saudi Arabia that summer OPEC meeting to put a million extra barrels on the market. And so I always feel like if you have to still call Riyadh, it means that you are not independent. And then of course, the price collapsed when you had seven or eight exemptions offered in the fall. And I think that was the sort of back and forth between OPEC and Trump in terms of, we'll help you but we don't want to tank the old price. And again, we saw this year the fact that President Trump who'd been a critic of OPEC was having to basically at the eleventh hour, when the big deal to cut 9.7 million barrels was on the line and the Mexicans were stalling. The fact that President Trump was calling Lopez Obrador and Mexico and doing a workaround arrangement to get this thing across the finish line, again, shows that American energy dominance or that shale was always supported by an OPEC lifeline. There was always this interdependence between shale on this OPEC floor. So I think interesting enough going forward, I think the question is, are, is the U.S. going to be as willing to use the unilateral sanctions, you know, apparatus. I mean, are we going to be looking to do again what we did to Iran, on another country? I think those will be interesting questions. I do think a Biden administration, if we do get an incoming Biden administration, will look at sanctions in a different way. I think we could be thinking about next year, you know, not more sanctions on Iran, but potentially Iranian barrels coming back on the market if they react to the Iranian nuclear deal. So I do think we may have reached the kind of peak American energy dominance narrative, but again, I think that was undercut by the price collapse and the fact that shale needed that almost very explicit bailout from OPEC. KRAUSS: We'll open up for questions from our participants in just a moment. But let me ask one last question before we do that, and that is on Saudi Arabia. There's the other news this morning. The king, maybe ill, maybe having an operation. Why do, why should we care? Helima? CROFT: Well, I think we care because we still care about stability in the Middle East, irrespective, you know, we're not independent in terms of oil price of what happens in the Middle East. But we still care more broadly about stability in the Middle East. We still have troops in the Middle East, we still find moments where there is unrest in the Middle East and the U.S. is drawn back into the region. And I do think that it's a really important inflection point for the kingdom right now. I mean, one of the things about, you know, Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the Saudi Crown Prince is you know why there was initially so much enthusiasm about him? Would he really correctly assess the challenges facing Saudi Arabia and that they had to find a way to make this transition away from sole dependence on oil because it wasn't going to be able to fund future generations and so Vision 2030 was an accurate diagnosis of the problems that ailed Saudi Arabia. And so I do think that, you know, right now, it's a real inflection point in terms of will they be able to generate the millions of new jobs to accommodate, you know, university leaders in that country? So I think people will be watching if a potential sensation story comes. And of course, you know, a lot of these leaders are very old in the Middle East anyway. So we are looking at, you know, next generation leaders and Saudi Arabia is just so critical to the overall stability of the region. KRAUSS: Right, and will MBS have the support of the royal family going forward? This is, this is his moment, potentially. CROFT: Again, he has I mean, he has built his base of support on young Saudis. I mean, he's offered, explicitly offered, young Saudis a different at least social contract in terms of, you know, offering them more social freedom. And so it's a question of will he be able to generate the jobs to meet their economic ambitions as well? KRAUSS: At this time, I would like to invite participants to join in our conversation. A reminder, this conference call is on the record. Operator, may we have the first question. STAFF: (Gives queuing instructions.) Our first question comes from Mark Schaltuper. Q: Hi, Mark Schaltuper with AIG. I'm very interested in what you said earlier about, I guess kind of to rephrase it the cost benefit of CapEx versus transition that somebody mentioned, that you kind of better hope that transition accelerates. Would you mind commenting a little bit more about that? I'm just very curious in terms of the next couple of years, if more of the burden of maintaining access to reliable supply falls on China or other countries away from the U.S.? Is it going to be easier for them to accelerate that transition? Or are they going to have to kind of flex their own muscles to make sure that they have access to these strategic reserves? Thank you. MURTI: I mean, maybe I can start on that. So you know, I think energy transition is a huge topic. Clearly there is a need for the world and all countries to take positive steps to addressing climate change. But it's easier said than done. And so where you look at where energy transition, I think is most logical, and maybe has a clearest path and I still think it's going to take a long time is on power generation. We've always had many different ways to generate power. Coal, nuclear, in the old days diesel and residual fuel oil, today solar, wind, and you can like or dislike any of those, but you have choice. And you have opportunity. And clearly solar, wind, and some of these newer renewable forms, they're going to need battery storage going forward. But you can see a trend there where that makes sense. Where I am still very uncertain on how quickly this will happen is in transportation fuels. And so I am the proud owner of a Tesla Model 3, I will never go back to personally buying a gasoline car. But I also know I'm very lucky in my life. I did work at Goldman Sachs and I'm able to afford this Model 3. I think outside of Tesla, I defy anyone to point to car companies that are currently making cars that people want to drive. It's not that they won't, BMW, Mercedes, VW, all these folks will figure it out over time. That takes a while. And if you're someone in China, if you're someone in India, if you're someone in other parts of the developing world, the fossil fuel gasoline car is going to be overwhelmingly cost effective for you and you're gonna want the same benefits that we enjoy here in the United States and Europe. And so the transition when it comes to crude oil, I think it's actually much longer term, unless you have a much weaker economic environment, which is possible. Maybe global trade is peaked. At the same time, in crude oil, if you don't invest, supply declines. Not really true on a lot of those power generation alternatives. Some it's true, a lot it's not. In crude oil, if you don't invest, you're gonna have somewhere between a 5 to 10 percent annual decline in supply. It doesn't matter when we're in the heart of a pandemic. But I think there's a presumption, energy transitions here, we care about ESG. We care about all these things for sure. But you're still going to need a massive amount of CapEx to ensure especially the developing parts of the world have a chance to enjoy the same types of economic benefits we enjoy in the United States and Europe. And I think there are big question marks on that. Energy, traditional energy, traditional gases, very out of favor. Some of it's self-inflicted. A lot of it's self-inflicted, you don't generate good returns, but oil is $100. Why should they trust you when oil is 40 or 50 (dollars)? But you're going to need it, you're going to need CapEx. And I think there's so much emphasis on energy transition ESG I think we're at the risk of having a significant CapEx shortfall that again, may not matter for a couple years, but I think will bite at some point in the future. KRAUSS: Helima, you want to chime in? CROFT: I just want to follow up on Arjun's like terrific point about energy access, because we both go to these conferences all over the world. And I keep hearing from you know certain parts of the developing world, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, the whole idea that we still need access to energy. I mean, if you have millions of people using biomass to heat their home, they're not talking about going out and getting a Tesla. And so there is some pushback in some of these capitals in the developing world, where they say this is essentially Europe and the United States basically, putting a ceiling on our ability to basically grow our middle class. Like they still are deeply, deeply concerned about getting access to affordable energy. And so I do think there is this sort of tension in this debate that isn't accurately captured, because we're still missing the fact that there are really important parts of the world that still want sort of cheapest forms of energy and believe it's their right to have a stable, cost effective, you know, supply of energy to lift people out of poverty. KRAUSS: Let me, let me bring the conversation back to the pandemic for the moment, its implications for the future. I think we can expect some rather large stimulus packages around the world to get us out of this and it's probably going to take several years. Will that stimulus go make a difference for the development of alternative energy and conservation and the kind of things that we need to do to stem climate change? Arjun or Helima? MURTI: I mean, you know, the foundation for good clean energy programs is always going to be a strong economy first. So if people are in an economically secure position, I think you're more likely to have these things. Now Europe's enacting a very strong green stimulus program. Those kind of things probably are helpful. Under the current administration, that seems far less likely here. You can argue these kind of things do make sense in terms of going forward, but they're still very long term in nature. They end up being, with apologies, a drop in the bucket, if you will. I think what is most important is that you continue to spend money on the R&D and trying to push these technologies that enable people to have the choice. So if there are ways to incentivize auto companies as an example, to continue to pursue electric vehicles, ensuring you have much tougher fuel economy standards. Keep in mind, we've had almost no fuel economy gains in this country because people have subsidized, substituted SUVs for cars. And so yeah, the current SUVs are more fuel efficient than ones twenty years ago. But that SUV is still far less fuel efficient than a car, so we make lots of choices every day. And there's no evidence of that changing. People still generally buy the most luxurious car they can buy. And fuel economy tends to be probably the last reason people buy a car. KRAUSS: Consumers are not on board. MURTI: They, not, they, people don't actually spend their money that way. That's unproven. So can you force it through government action? Perhaps? I think it's hard to force seven billion people in a certain direction. Without the technic- again, Tesla's proven that those cars are not less expensive. They're more expensive. KRAUSS: So that's a fascinating contradiction. MURTI: Can you make something people want to buy? Then they'll buy it. They're not buying, no one buys a Tesla for green reasons, not even clear how green it is. But that's a different argument. You got to make things people want, or it has to be significantly cheaper and we've not seen that combination yet with clean energy. KRAUSS: Helima, you're smiling. CROFT: No, I have nothing to add to that, you know, great analysis. KRAUSS: I think there's a, I think there's an interesting dilemma and paradox here and that is the investors see one thing, and the consumers seem to see another. They still want a gas guzzling, gas guzzler. They may not see it that way. And the investors are not putting the money into the oil companies because there's a disconnect between the gas guzzlers and making a profit. I'm wondering, um, these tensions between the United States and China, what impact does that have on the world trying to push forward with the Paris Climate Agreement and coming to some kind of collective effort. Is that a problem? MURTI: I would say the thing I worry most about in terms of the energy outlook, all forms of energy, would be have we had globalism? And are we moving towards more nationalistic instincts? And you mentioned China - U.S. that's clearly one example. But global trade has been very good, or at least positively correlated with energy demand is probably the right way to say it. I think there is risk that for any number of reasons, those trends are changing, and the more you have protection, you know, the less you have free trade, you know, that could cast a pall on global economic growth and hence energy demand growth. CROFT: Yeah, the only thing I would add, which is interesting on this topic of protectionism, is I feel like the one place that we saw is countries are moving more inward thinking about securing supply chains because of COVID-19, you know, health care, food. We actually saw this in the case of energy, you know, when prices collapsed, we actually saw, you know, the G20 become this forum for addressing, how do we have an oil price that works for consumers and producers? Like I felt like energy in this one instance, was this one place when everyone was on the same page. Negative prices was not in anybody's interest. So you know, whether this holds or not remains to be seen. I actually think energy was the outlier as more countries become more inward looking. What we saw at least this post COVID-19 world at the beginning was an effort to sort of work together to stabilize prices for everybody. KRAUSS: Without embarrassing either one of you with an endorsement of a presidential campaign. We're not going to go there. But what difference could a Biden administration make for the energy transition or relations with oil producing countries? We've touched on Iran just a little bit, but there's also Venezuela and there's Russia. Let's think about that scenario, because it's coming up in a few months, possibly. CROFT: I mean, I'm not totally taken on the sanctions issue. And I certainly think when we think about physical bounces in the oil market, like what could potentially change in terms of a new administration, I do think, you know, there'll be a lot of stipulations on how do you resurrect the JCPOA nuclear deal, but I think that the door would be open to potentially resurrecting that deal if the Iranians would make, you know, significant concessions on enrichment levels and becoming once again compliant with the terms of that agreement. So I do think the path of you know, getting that deal resurrected would be there with the Biden administration. And that's, again, significant quantities of oil. I mean, we're talking about a loss of close to two million barrels of Iranian exports because of unilateral U.S. sanctions. And so I think that is something we would watch very carefully in terms of what could change physical market balances, but also, would we be as willing to sort of unilaterally sanction again, countries like Venezuela to really target their ability to sell their oil to essentially get you know, lending by basically foreign banks and debt restructuring all those things we've gone after in terms of punishing these countries would a Biden administration work more in concert without, I mean would they use the sanctions tool in the same way? I think that could really change under a new administration. It may even be there wouldn't be that the same type of focus though on OPEC, I don't think necessarily that would maybe be as front and center as President Trump was very focused on sort of managing the market. I actually think you could make a case if President Trump became the de facto secretary general of OPEC, I'm just not sure that will be as much of a Biden administration focus. MURTI: The only thing I'd add Clifford and that is a great point by Helima is, if I look at it from the perspective of U.S. oil producers, since you asked about the U.S. election. I think there's a perception that Republicans are good for oil and Democrats are bad for oil. And I don't think you can actually show that that was true in history. I mean, your two biggest oil crashes. This is probably coincidence. We're in 1986, President Reagan, and then the most recent crash to negative $37. And maybe with a crash in 2014 under President Obama, but the point being, you've seen oil companies do well and poorly under both Republicans and Democrats. The shale boom started as a gas boom under President Bush. It clearly expanded and turned into an oil boom under President Obama and then it sort of continued, but now petered out under Trump. And so yes, there'll be different areas of regulation that you'd expect from Biden versus a Trump probably a different emphasis positively on clean energy versus traditional fossil fuels. But whether that is actually good or bad for the U.S. oil industry specifically, I would push back that there's some automatic one side to the other side in fact. I don't think it's proven historically, I think you'll have different areas of emphasis. And maybe there is a competence in running government that one might look forward to under future governments, whoever that is that we've lacked here. Look at the examples of the DAPL pipeline and some of the pipeline blockages. You know, you've had steps taken that I think haven't been super helpful to the oil industry, even though that might have been the original intention. The point being, I don't think we can judge these automatically as good or bad. We'll see what the policies are. KRAUSS: Certainly enough to talk about, but I just want to remind participants that they can ask a question by clicking the raise hand icon. One point, when I got on this beat fourteen years ago, we were wondering where we were going to get the next barrel of oil. And now suddenly, there's the possibility that there's not only more oil out there in the ground, but if there was if there was a change in Iran, or a change in Venezuela, or a change in in Libya, that you would have millions of more barrels of oil coming on the market, which might be nice for consumers at the pump, but could be a disaster for American oil companies. Arjun, do you see that as a possibility? MURTI: I mean so I'd say, even during my most bullish days at Goldman Sachs during the height of the supercycle, our view was never that we were going to, quote run out of oil. I've never bought into the peak supply argument. I suppose it's true in some ultimate multiple thousands of years sensitives? KRAUSS: (Laughs.) MURTI: But there are clearly numerous places to continue to develop oil. It's always been a question to me of, is the investment climate favorable or unfavorable? So where I've been less favorable in OPEC in terms of their ability to sustainably grow supplies, I don't think the countries have had the types of investment climates, either for their own companies, or for foreign investors, whichever you prefer is fine to become a countries choice, but neither opportunities had the chance to develop the oil reserves. Venezuela had a favorable investment climate in the 1990s under Luis Giusti head of PDVSA was the oil minister and they went from some small amount of production to three and a half million barrels a day and then under Chavez and the current regime, three and a half down to effectively zero investment climate. But we've generally had a favorable investment climate in the United States through both Republican and Democratic administrations. North Sea has been a little more volatile, some of the West African countries very positive. But that's where you are, I think in all this. We are not running out of oil, we are very unlikely to run out of oil in anyone's multiple generational lifetime. It is a question of whether the investment climate is favorable or unfavorable. Today, it's unfavorable. Today, investors are out of, out of favor, while these countries are facing challenges. And again, I think that does create supply risks going forward. KRAUSS: Well, I wasn't referring to the geology, Helima I'm gonna set you up here. Not referring to the geology, I'm talking about the political situations in those producing countries. CROFT: Well, I say, I should say Arjun was a total legend at Goldman Sachs. I can tell you when I started my career in the U.S. government in 2001, you know, right after 9/11 with permanent energy security group at you know, U.S. government and you know, there was this sense. Matt Simmons was, you know, people were still reading his work and there was a sense of being dependent on foreign supplies and what does that mean in terms of U.S. policy? And I certainly, I was covering Nigeria, I mean part of the reason I can have a career in the U.S. government covering Nigeria was there was this hope that, you know, Nigeria, all these other Gulf of Guinea producers would grow their production, and we would be less, we wouldn't have concentration risk, wouldn't have to be as dependent on regions like the Middle East. And so I remember there was this expectation, Nigeria in 2001, was producing over two million. There was a view that by 2010, Nigeria will be producing 4 million barrels a day, and that was seen as good for the United States because 10 percent of our imports came from Nigeria in 2001. We wanted to grow that share. It was talked about in terms of political terms. Nigeria was a transitioning democracy. It was seen as favorable to the United States. We liked the new leadership there.  You know, what I think has been really interesting is is that the shale revolution has meant that we don't really need those barrels in Nigeria anymore. Are we as invested in the stability of that country as we were when we thought of ourselves as sort of needing that oil? And I was on actually a CFR task force. I was a visiting fellow at CFR, I was on the task force on energy and national security. I remember, the opening of that report was, you know, we'll never be able to draw our way out of dependence on foreign oil, we have to manage our dependence on these producer states, and that was pre-shale revolution, that report came out, but I certainly feel like we felt the U.S. government, you know, after 9/11 that we needed, not that we were running out of oil, but we needed every barrel because we wanted to make sure we weren't dependent on certain regions alone. There was a huge emphasis on energy security through multiple producers bringing that supply on, I think that's what has shifted. KRAUSS: So we have instead of peak oil, peak demand, potentially. But what I was, what I wanted to get at is we have, you know, large producers out there with political problems that may resolve themselves, at least to a point like Libya, like Iran, like Venezuela, if any one of those countries suddenly resolve the issues that they have, maybe not overnight, what would that mean, for the world? CROFT: Well, I think Cliff, a concentration in Libya, you know, we've missed... the trend line in Libya seems to be, you know, in many ways getting worse as more and more countries become involved in this sort of great game for Libya's natural resources. I mean, there was a fantastic piece in the Financial Times over the weekend, looking at Turkey's geopolitics of energy and their entry into the Libyan conflict as part of an ability to try to secure, you know, gas supplies out of the region. And so I, I guess I'm not as excited or optimistic that Libya can off-ramp as easily but certainly now in a situation where you have two million off of Iran, it could maybe come back with sanctions being removed. If you could have a settlement to Libya to get a million back. I think Venezuela is still a long way back, even if you have sanctions removed. I mean, that country has been in structural decline since Chavez, you can't flip a switch and bring those barrels back. But certainly, you know, as we're working off of the COVID-19 effects in terms of demand, if we start to get a million back from you know, Iran or half a million back from Libya, that certainly puts the burden back on OPEC to try to balance this market and not have it, the market soften further. KRAUSS: Operator, I think we have a question. STAFF: We do. We'll take our next question from Tracy Roou. Q: Hi. Good morning, everybody. I had a question on the title of the series today, petrostates in peril. But talking about or thinking about Russia in the OPEC+ agreements or disagreements in there. Would, do you put Russia in that category of a petrostate in peril right now? Thank you. KRAUSS: Helima? CROFT: Oh I'll...and then I'll hand it over to Arjun, I mean I think — MURTI: Helima has to start. CROFT: I think in March, when they made that decision, I was in Vienna, when the Russians basically said, we're not going to do it. We're not going to cut an extra three hundred thousand. Let's put the burden of adjustment on to shale. I think part of their calculation was that they had a lower fiscal breakeven than the rest of OPEC, they basically said, we're more diversified. We can balance our budget in the fifties. But what we're willing to risk a collapse to the fifties. I think even the Russians though, there were prices that fell through $50, and you started having storage fill up, that is not what they had anticipated, and the Saudis could borrow. I mean, that's one of the differences is that Saudi Arabia is not under sanction. And so while they have a higher fiscal breakeven they can access capital markets. It was harder for the Russians to borrow because of international sanctions. And so I do think that, you know, the Russians quickly had to understand that, you know, sustained low oil prices was putting their regime in political peril as well. I think that is why they were quick to get back to the negotiating table to take a cut that was three times larger than the one they had initially balked at, and why they are for the most part, much more compliant with OPEC than they had been since 2016. I think they saw what the future looked like in terms of price. And that was not going to work for the regime. KRAUSS: Just one point before Arjun, you get to add in. I just want to point out that one of the reasons why the Soviet Union collapsed, was a decline in oil prices. So Arjun? MURTI: I would just add to Helima's comments that I've always thought of the petrostates, they have a somewhat better business model in that they have these handful of sort of government owned, sort of private, but at least independently financed oil companies that ensures relative health to the oil industry, that you don't quite see in some of these other countries where there's one state and one state owned oil company, and they might be very dependent on allocations of dollars either from a monarch or some congress, or some other avenue that often isn't there because they have to do all the social programs and so forth. So there has always been this buffer in Russia that has allowed them a rate of oil production increase that you don't see elsewhere. I mean, only the U.S. frankly has achieved it on any sort of sustainable basis. Clearly, the government is still very dependent on the oil price and oil export revenues. But as Helima mentioned, they have lowered their fiscal breakevens to a much better degree, than you've seen in other parts of the world as far as the oil companies go, they've got a very inverse correlation where oil prices are high, more of the profits go to the government, but when oil prices are low, the taxation is much less so it's created a healthier oil industry, again, relatively speaking, than what you've seen in any of these other petrostates. And it's  to the credit of how Russia has run things, again, at least relative to some of the peer countries. KRAUSS: So Helima, do you want to respond to that, add to that? CROFT: Well there are a couple other things I would add to Arjun’s great points is they have exchange rate flexibility. And so their ability to adjust to lower prices initially was better if you look at 2014, I think they weathered that price collapse better. I think that again, what they didn't expect when they made that fateful decision in March. I think that they believed that the Saudis would blink first. I think they held stoically. I think they thought the Saudis would blink, they look at the Saudi fiscal breakeven being much higher. And they thought either shale collapses, or Saudi will have to just bear the burden themselves. And we're going to be off the hook on this one. And I think they just didn't anticipate that the Saudis would basically be prepared to borrow to basically door low prices to force the Russians back to the table. And again, I think it's been remarkable that even though they have a lower fiscal breakeven, even though they have these companies, that they still, for the most part are now compliant with this agreement. KRAUSS: So I think they may have also underestimated the power of the coronavirus and the impact — CROFT: Oh yeah. KRAUSS: —that it would have. And they're not the only ones that it would have on demand. CROFT: No absolutely, Cliff. I was inside. I was actually in the kingdom in Saudi Arabia for a big international energy conference that major stakeholders were at and there was a view in mid-February that coronavirus was basically contained. That it was contained to China, that we were seeing recovering numbers, and it had yet to spread to Italy. And I think that also influenced the calculus of the Russians, not wanting to cut they did not anticipate what was happening was going to happen in Europe with lockdown conditions. KRAUSS: Good, staying on Russia for a moment, if we have a prolonged period of moderate to lower oil prices, and then oil prices could go down from here, for sure. What impact could that have on Russia, its stability, and its outreach in foreign policy, which has been so aggressive in recent years? Including on elections. MURTI: Helima you want to start? CROFT: Well, I think it's, it's an interesting question again, I mean, they have lower fiscal breakevens. And, you know, we just had an OPEC meeting Cliff, and the Russians, were basically I think, happy that OPEC is going to start putting some more barrels on the market. And so I think that they believe that we're kind of in a sweet spot that sort of works for them, where you can keep shale depressed, and you've had a recovery from negative numbers. And so obviously, if we were to get a major reversal of fortune, I mean, I think it's really important to watch do we get re-position of shelter in place policies that are mandated that have a second wave effect on demand. And I think the Russians, again, they are in better shape than a lot of the OPEC producers, but they're not going to be in a good position if we head back into the twenties. Certainly. KRAUSS: We could go on and on, but it is unfortunately time for us to conclude. I want to thank you all for joining today's virtual meeting. And thank you to our speakers. (END)
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