Economics

Economic Crises

  • Economic Crises
    A Modest Step for the Eurozone
    The recent decision by European finance ministers to expand the eurozone bailout funds is an important political step, but by itself will not be enough to stem the tide of the debt crisis, says EU expert Thomas Klau.
  • Economic Crises
    World Economic Update
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    This series is presented by the Maurice R. Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies. Related readings: The Fed and the ECB Should be Trading Places by Sebastian Mallaby FT: How to Blow Away China's Gathering Storm Clouds by Martin Wolf Cigarette Taxes Can Help Cure Two of Greece's Ills by Peter Orszag No Great Firewall Will Save Europe by Steven Dunaway
  • Economic Crises
    World Economic Update
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    Experts analyze the state of the U.S. and world economies, discuss how emerging markets have been affected by the financial crisis, and offer predictions on what the preeminent economic risks will be in the coming months. This series is presented by the Maurice R. Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies.
  • Budget, Debt, and Deficits
    Will Student Debt Add to America’s Fiscal Woes?
        With a pair of new laws in 2008 and 2010, Congress fundamentally changed the student loan market, making the U.S. government the sole supplier of Federal student loans, rather than just the ultimate guarantor.  In itself, this does not affect the government’s net debt, because it acquires assets—student loans—which carry a market value.  This new direct lending does, however, add to the gross debt held by the public.  The $1.4 trillion in direct federal student loans that will be outstanding by 2020 will amount to roughly 7.7% of gross debt.  This is 6.3 percentage points higher than it would have been had the scheme not been nationalized.  To the extent that one worries about debt from the perspective of a “fiscal crisis,” in which government borrowing costs soar without warning, gross debt is more important than net debt, as student loans are not assets that can be readily sold to reduce borrowing requirements. Liberty Street Economics: Grading Student Loans Slate: Student-Loan Debt, School by School Orszag: Winds of Change Blow Away College Degree Video: Addressing the U.S. Deficit Problem
  • Budget, Debt, and Deficits
    U.S. Deficits and the National Debt
    The Obama administration’s 2013 budget plan has revived debate over the sustainability of U.S. spending. As the United States emerges from a deep recession, it must maintain a tricky policy balance.
  • Economic Crises
    CEO Speaker Series: It's a New World: So What Should We Do? with Laurence D. Fink, Chairman and CEO, BlackRock
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    Laurence D. Fink discusses the challenges facing the global financial system with CNBC anchor, Maria Bartiromo.
  • Economic Crises
    It's a New World: So What Should We Do?
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    Laurence D. Fink, chairman and chief executive officer of BlackRock, discusses the challenges facing the global financial system. This meeting is part of the CEO Speaker series.
  • Economic Crises
    No Great Firewall Will Save Europe
    Talk among major economies is intensifying over a "financial firewall" to contain the eurozone crisis. But CFR’s Steven Dunaway says the emphasis should be on pressing debt-saddled states to make reforms that will improve their growth prospects.
  • United States
    Debt-Driven Doldrums or the Promise of Prosperity: America at a Crossroads
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    STEPHEN FRIEDMAN: Good afternoon. We're at the appointed hour, so let me call this meeting to order. I'm Steve Friedman, and it's going to be my great pleasure to introduce Senator Rob Portman.First let me remind you of a few of the ground rules. Everyone really should turn off their cell phones and BlackBerrys, not just put them in vibrate, because of the systems here. Secondly, I'd like to remind you that this meeting is on the record.Now, Rob Portman is -- many of us in the room are great Rob Portman fans. He is -- after a distinguished career in the House, he's -- as you all know from the resume, won by a wide margin the senatorial seat. Rob when he was in Congress distinguished himself for being highly substantive and had that increasingly rare ability to work extraordinarily effectively across party lines. He's a man who is capable of getting deeply into the substance and the meat of issues, and as a result, he was made the special trade representative and subsequently headed the Office of Management and Budget, two of the most complex and really deeply substantive areas in Washington.He's off to a very distinguished career in government, and I'm looking forward, as you are, to hearing from Rob talk about debt-driven doldrums in this area -- era. Rob Portman. SENATOR ROB PORTMAN (R-OH): (Applause.) Steve, thank you very much.What Steve didn't mention is that I was one of those members of Congress that always came up to the White House when Steve was the director of the National Economic Council to give him advice and counsel, which he acted like he actually listened to sometimes. And it was great having Steve there. He was a breath of fresh air, both because he brought that private-sector experience and because of his style. You know, he woke up every morning, when he was in that job -- which is a tough job -- trying to figure out what was best to grow our economy, and never considering partisan advantage and never considering extraneous issues. So he served President Bush well during that first term.And I'm also joined today by another good friend, who's actually one of my top advisers and my 21-year-old son, Jed Portman -- where are you, Jed -- in the back -- who is here in New York City in school, so I told him he could get a free lunch if he came. And a lot of other great friends in the room. I'm going to miss saying hello to somebody, and I apologize, but I have to say that the last time I was here, which I think was 2006, Pete Peterson sat in the front row. And here he is again. And in the interim time we've had a lot of great opportunities to meet and talk about important issues, including this little issue of entitlement reform and deficit reduction that he is still taking a leadership role on in Washington.I want to thank Richard, too. I know Richard Haass couldn't be here today, he's out on the West Coast, but he invited me to come, found out that I could come, and he immediately left for California. But I appreciate him being persistent, and it's great to be here again, great to visit with a lot of friends. And I look forward to getting your input.I wanted to come today because this is a group that understands the economy and our challenges but also looks at it from a global perspective. And I think that's something that's often missing in Washington. I'm going to talk a little about that today. The title is "Debt-Driven Doldrums or the Promise of Prosperity: America at a Crossroads." And what I'm going to talk about is how we need, in my view, to reboot our economy. And it's in part because of the global economy in which we find ourselves, increasingly competitive, and I'm going to focus on just two issues today and try to dig a little deeper into those two, but again, look forward to your comments and questions on a much broader array of issues.I read the headlines again today about what's going on across the Atlantic. Many of you are involved in that, some of you very directly, and know a lot more about it than I do. But I think it's inescapable, when you read those headlines, that our economic woes are shared. More importantly, we are intertwined and interconnected, in ways that, frankly, we weren't a couple decades ago.And finally I would say that it's clear to me we are increasingly competing on a global stage, where the movement of goods and capital, services and people is more easily and more rapidly than ever crossing national boundaries. And so we are very much, you know, part of this global economy and we have to take it into account in terms of how we deal with our problems here in America.Overseas we see our European brethren facing a sovereign debt crisis that is devastating to them, the fundamental cause of which, by the way, is decades of unsustainable public-sector spending, excessive borrowing, leverage, and at the same time, of course, a recession that's making it much more difficult for these countries -- particularly Greece, but all these countries -- to close that gap between the revenues and their expenses.And I hope when we look at that we realize that we're not far behind. We've got a looming fiscal crisis right here on our own doorstep, and we've got a crisis of confidence which is resulting in an historically weak recovery that's not producing enough jobs, leaving millions of Americans deeply worried about their future, the security of their families. It's placed us in an uncertain and precarious position, and it's cast doubt on our ability to compete and prosper long-term in the global economy.For those who believe that Europe's woes are far worse than ours, let me give you a couple interesting statistics. One, our gross debt, as you know, now equals 100 percent of our economy. The top story in USA Today yesterday was about that, that this year we have achieved this distinction of having our gross debt equal the entire size of our economy. Spain's debt-to-GDP ratio is not 100 percent, it's 67 percent. In fact, the average in the EU is 80 percent. So those who think this is America, we'll be fine, we've got a stronger fiscal foundation -- we need to think again. Yes, there are some countries, like Greece, that have a debt-to-GDP ratio worse than ours, but on average the EU's doing better than us.We do see some signs of life here in our economy. Last Friday we had some job numbers come out that were highly touted, and I'm delighted to see some jobs coming back after four years from the recession, and a recovery that is felt -- at least in Ohio, where I've been the last couple days, talking to a lot of businesses and workers -- feels in Ohio like a continuation of the recession because it's been so weak.But let's look behind those job numbers for a second and better understand the enduring and historic weakness of this recovery. First, a lot of that improvement in the jobs numbers comes from the fact that people have stopped looking for work, hardly something to celebrate. So we've gone from 8.9 percent to 8.5 percent in the past two months in terms of our unemployment rate. Again, good news. During that time period, more than 350,000 Americans have stopped looking for work. So if that had not happened, if those Americans had not, through frustration, said, we're not even going to be part of the statistics anymore, our unemployment rate would have gone from 8.9 to 8.7, not to 8.5. So half of the improvement we're seeing is due to something bad, which is the fact that people are leaving the workplace, frustrated.Another interesting statistic is that based on the most recent figures we have, labor-force participation rate -- those looking for work or working as a percent of the population -- is at historic lows. It's at about 64 percent right now. That's lower than at any time in the past four recessions. In other words, at this point in a recovery, four years out it's never been this low. If the labor rate were at 66 percent, which is what it was in the late 1990s, our unemployment rate today would be 11.3 percent. So again, as you look at these statistics and you look at how the stock market responded, which was kind of tepid, there may be a reason of that, because some of these underlying issues when you look at the broader context here indicate that we're not out of the woods.Another point that I heard a lot about in the last couple days from employers in Ohio is they have people coming to work, looking for work, who have a huge resume gap and a skills gap. And I talked to some manufacturers who were saying, Rob, it's just tough to hire somebody who's been out of work for, you know, six, nine months, and part of it's just, you know, getting back into work. He said their accident rates are higher among those workers. Safety's not as keen. They're not as focused on the job and they've lost some of their skills.The average number of weeks on unemployment today is at historic levels, far higher than it has been in any of the last four recessions; 40 weeks is the average.So again, I -- great to see these new numbers; I hope we continue to see better numbers. But this notion that somehow we're back on track and out of the woods I think is naive.In terms of job growth, let's also look at this recession versus other recessions. We -- right now, four years after the recession, total nonfarm jobs in the United States of America are still 6.1 million below the level they were before the downturn began. So we're still 6 million jobs down.Let's compare this to other recessions. Four years from the start of the 2001 recession -- which, you should know, was called the jobless recovery -- we had recovered all of the jobs lost during the recession, in fact had added jobs, about 350,000 jobs at this point in the recovery.So if you look back to other recessions, four years from the recession that began in June 1990, jobs had grown by about 4 million, and four years after the '81 recession, which was the deepest recession, the U.S. economy had added about 6 million jobs from the pre-recession peak.So this is a true jobless recovery in that sense, and we've got a lot of work to do. We have 21 million Americans who are either unemployed or underemployed. And the chairman of the New York Fed I think said it well last week when these new numbers came out; he said, these new levels are a decrease, but still unacceptable. That was his word. And it is unacceptable.Now, I say all this not just to spread doom and gloom and to make us all feel more depressed about the economy, but to say that I think when you look at what's really going on in our economy -- and again, coming from Ohio, maybe I feel it more sharply because we still have not been able to get manufacturing back on its feet the way we'd like to; our employment numbers are slightly -- have been slightly worse than the national average -- they're actually equal to it right now -- but I say it because I believe we need to understand what's going on and have the right diagnosis of the problem to come up with the right prescriptions.And I think the predominant view in Washington, and certainly at the White House, is that this is a temporary cyclical business downturn largely due to the financial crisis -- a lot of fingers get pointed here to New York, Wall Street -- and that as in any other business cycle downturn, there are things that Washington can do in terms of spending -- therefore, stimulus -- in terms of temporary sweeteners -- therefore, the temporary tax cuts -- and that like any other business cycle, you know, over the past 50 years in this country, those Washington prescriptions would be the right thing to do.I think the diagnosis is wrong. I don't think this is a temporary business cycle downturn. Unfortunately, I think it's far deeper than that. I think it's a matter of our economy having deeper structural issues that cannot be addressed by the kinds of policies coming out of Washington.And I think that if we don't look at these more fundamental structural challenges that are holding back risk-taking, investment, and therefore, job creation, we're not going to be able to get out of the woods.We've got to make fundamental changes that add certainty to the economy, or else we'd risk long-term decline relative to our major competitors, many of whom have already tackled many of the challenges that we need to tackle.I think the evidence supports my view. We tried stimulus; it didn't work. The president's own economic advisers, as you know, confidently predicted that because of the stimulus package alone, unemployment would be under 6 percent today as we sit here. Washington, both under the Bush administration and the Obama administration, has tried short-term tax breaks. They haven't worked. And again, I don't think short-term sweeteners work because it's not a short-term problem.The right diagnosis, again, is that our economy has lost its competitive edge in the global economy due to a set of serious structural problems, most of which are of our making. And if we don't address these obstacles, I think we risk long-term decline relative to our major competitors, and a lack of economic growth in this country. And it's especially true because so many of our competitors have tackled these challenges and are tackling them.During the so-called supercommittee process, I decided to put up on the website a solicitation for ideas and received about 17,000 ideas for deficit reduction. I think half came from Pete Peterson. (Laughter.) But one of the ideas I liked the most was, the first couple of weeks, somebody sent a suggestion saying, merge with Canada. (Laughter.) And, you know, it was sort of funny until I started looking into it more, and Canada's done a lot of the right things to keep their economy on track during tough times, including some things I'll talk about in a second in the area of taxes and trade that make more sense.To alter the trajectory we're on -- we are currently on, obviously, we have to deal with our budget deficit. This is simply unsustainable. Fifteen trillion dollars -- we talked about earlier -- as our debt is bad enough; what's even worse is the trajectory for the future. You know, the supercommittee was asked to cut 1.2 (trillion dollars) or 1.5 trillion (dollars) in the face of an increase in debt during that same time period, the next 10 years, of anywhere from 5 (trillion dollars) to $10 trillion. As a former OMB director who looks at these numbers, you know, I try to look out five and 10 years more than what's happening now, and the trends and the trajectories are what are really concerning. That has to be addressed, because I don't think that the economy will recover the way we'd like to see it until we deal with restraining spending and reforming our major entitlement programs.Some say increase taxes. You can't catch up with the spending. It -- I mean, this is not a philosophical point of view, although you may take it as that; it's a question of math. You simply cannot raise taxes high enough to catch up with the spending. And, you know, I'm all for tax reform. I think there's much better ways to collect taxes and to increase revenue through pro-growth policies. But raising taxes alone will not catch up with soaring spending. And raising taxes, of course, in the wrong way damages an already fragile economy.But in addition to tackling the debt, writing the trajectory of our country requires a thoughtful pro-growth strategy to regain our competitive edge in the global economy. Unless we're growing at 6 (percent) or 7 (percent) or 8 percent, we're not going to be able to grow our way out of this. And that is not something that anybody predicts. But we can grow and grow at rates that are far higher than our current growth rate, and that will play a major role in getting us out of the deep fiscal hole that we're in.In my first months in the Senate, I laid out a seven-point plan to address what I consider the structural problems in our economy. It includes rebooting the economy by fiscal discipline -- again, I think that's kind of the wet blanket over the economy, a lot of uncertainty caused by that -- but also some very specific proposals: tax reform, much more bold tax reform than some have talked about; regulatory relief; education and worker retraining; a new commitment to domestic energy production -- energy efficiency needs to be part of that, by the way; health care cost containment; much more aggressive trade policy. So these are all issues that I think can and should and must be addressed that are more structural issues.Today I'm not going to walk through all of them, although again, in our Q-and-A period, if you -- if you have interest, I'd love to talk more about some of them. But if I could, I'd like to touch on just a couple that directly affect our international competitiveness.The first obstacle we need to overcome on the international side is the fact that we are underachieving in terms of exports. And, you know, America's had a great market here for many businesses, some of whom are represented in this room today. And frankly, we haven't been looking beyond our shores as we should.Exports equals jobs. The president talks about that a lot. He would like to double our exports over a five, 10-year period. We need to do much more and we can and should. Instead of being content to sell in our own market, we've got to look overseas much more. It's a key to jump-starting the economy.Let me give you a common measure which is used globally to look at exports, and that's as a percent of GDP. Where do you think America stands in terms of our exports as a percent of our GDP? Out of 170 countries that were rated, we're near the bottom. We're tied with Tonga at 163, which puts us just ahead of Ethiopia -- 163rd out of 170. Interesting, isn't it?There's also a new reality that's got to shake us from our complacency. That's that 95 percent of the world's consumers who live beyond our border now hold 75 percent of global purchasing power. In other words, we've always been 5 percent of the world's population, but now the other 95 percent is buying a lot more. And our global competitors, you know, whether it's Germany or Japan or China, are accessing those markets in ways much more aggressively than we are.We shouldn't be sheepish about selling our goods, our products, our services. I believe we have the best workforce in the world. I believe we have the best products in the world. We certainly know how to sell them domestically. We sometimes lose sight of the fact that trade is about opening as many markets as possible, but also leveling a playing field so that our partners in trade receive reciprocal treatment here, which benefits our consumers from greater choices, lower prices. Simply put, increased trade flows result in growing the economic pie, and it's something we should be doing much more aggressively. Let's take the services sector as an example where the United States has a great opportunity. We're a powerhouse there. You often hear about our ballooning trade deficits. Incidentally, our trade deficit is driven by two things: energy and China. When you add it up, our trade deficit with China, which, by the way, grew last month while China's trade deficit went down with others -- it grew with us partly because we don't have all the raw materials that some of these other countries do that they're sending to China. But. when you add up our trade deficit with China, at about $200 billion, and our trade deficit with regard to foreign imports of oil, that accounts for about 95 percent of our trade deficit. But we do have some great opportunities, as I've said. We have a trade surplus in banking and insurance for instance. In fact, in 2010, our services trade surplus exceeded $162 billion. So we can do it, and we should be working around the clock to increase our surpluses in other areas: services and goods. Part of the obstacle has to do with Washington. A perfect example is the length of time it took to get Washington to act on the free trade agreements with Korea and Colombia and Panama. The last time I was here before this group was almost six years ago. And for those of you who were here at the time, I'm sorry to be repeating myself, talking about Colombia, Panama -- (chuckles) -- and Korea, because that's what I've talked about then. And at that time we were very close to completing Colombia. I was able to sign that agreement when I was trade representative, and we were very close to completing the agreements also with Panama and Korea, which were signed after my tenure, but launched when I was in the trade rep's office. That was six years ago almost. After those trade agreements were signed, and people assumed we were going to move forward with these commercially beneficial agreements that also had enormous foreign policy benefits for the United States, they simply languished in Washington. President Bush, of course, proposed that Congress take them up. You know, he had negotiated them and thought they were good agreements. Democrats in the House at the time, as you recall, objected to allowing them to have a vote on the floor. The president has to send them forward in order to be ratified, but of course, Congress also has to ratify them. In this case, it was under trade promotion authority or fast-track authority. But getting them to the floor for a vote was impossible, and Speaker Pelosi effectively blocked them. President Obama was elected and, according to his advisers and even his comments, he understood that these trade agreements would create jobs. In fact, by his own metrics, he said they would create 250,000 jobs. But it took nine months after the president was elected, even to get him to send the agreements to Congress. For those of you who follow this closely -- and some of you are here, some of my Democrat friends who are here, who helped me when I was in the trade rep's office, and helped me in the last nine months to get these agreements to Congress -- and I did help create a path forward by supporting trade adjustment assistance, which is a -- or for a retraining program that the administration insisted upon, an expansion of the existing program. But it was like pulling teeth, I can -- I can tell you. And if you've followed this in the press, you saw that. Crazy. While we allowed these agreements to languish for five years, what happened in the rest of the world? Well, no one else slowed down or waited. Other countries negotiated and completed trade agreements right and left. I mentioned Canada earlier. You know, we negotiated an agreement with Colombia, completed it; President Uribe and I personally negotiated it. It was done. It was very tough for Colombia, but they agreed to lower their tariffs and open up to services and make fundamental reforms to their economy that are more free market-oriented. Canada started negotiating after us, finished before us, ratified it and took market share -- (chuckles) -- away from us. So our wheat sales to Colombia are less today than they would have been, but for the fact that Canada got in ahead of us. But this has happened all over the globe. There are over 100 bilateral trade agreements being negotiated right now -- over 100. The United States is party to zero, none. So, maybe in the old days, we could afford this, just as we could have afforded to access our own market and not worry about the 95 percent of consumers outside of our market as much, but things are moving fast. Other countries are moving quickly, and they're grabbing market share from us. You've heard a lot of statistics, but the European Union started negotiating with Korea before -- after we completed our agreement with Korea, they negotiated their agreement; got it ratified; and in the first couple of months over this past summer, before we could finish with Korea, they were grabbing market share from us. And that market share is tough to get back, as some of you know who are involved in international trade. So, instead of working around the clock to negotiate additional agreements and to move forward, the United States is sitting on the sidelines. And therefore, our workers, our farmers, our service providers are suffering because we're not getting the benefit of these lower tariffs and other nontariff barriers and creating more jobs here in this country. It works. If you add up all of the free trade agreements that we have, all around the world, including Canada, Mexico, the CAFTA (ph) countries now -- Chile, Peru, Singapore and so on, Australia -- all of those countries add up to less than 10 percent of global GDP. Think about it. We don't have a trade agreement with Europe or trade agreement(s) with China or Japan. So it's less than 10 percent of global GDP; latest number I have is 8.2 percent of global GDP. Yet, we send 41 percent of our exports to 8.2 percent of the world because of these trade agreements. So the next time you hear someone say exports equals jobs, they're right, and they're also saying something that's not happening. In other words, we're not creating the jobs we should be creating through trade.This president is the first president since FDR not to request the ability to negotiate trade agreements. Pretty interesting, isn't it? Two presidents actually didn't have to request it because they already had TPA or trade promotion authority, negotiating authority, before they were elected. So they came into office with the ability. Both happen to have been Republicans who were free traders. But President Obama has not asked for nor does he want trade promotion authority -- unbelievable! Because without trade promotion authority, other countries won't sit down with you to negotiate an agreement for a very good reason: because under our system, if they do that, then it goes to Congress, and Congress can amend it to death, and nickel and dime it, and they're not going to put their last, best offer on the table. It won't happen. The only negotiation we're doing right now is with the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which is a regional trade agreement. I'm supportive of it; I hope it works. Trade agreements tend to, you know, work on the basis of the least common denominator, meaning that some of those countries in the so-called TPP are unlikely to want to reduce their barriers as much as we could get in a bilateral agreement. Therefore, the whole agreement probably won't make a huge difference, at least initially, in terms of tariff reductions and nontariff barrier reductions, but it's the right thing to do. But we have no trade negotiating authority nor has the president asked for it, even to negotiate the trade promotion authority in the TPP, the Trans-Pacific Partnership. So this is an area where, again, Washington is shooting itself in the foot and therefore our country and our workers. The White House has been very effective in using extraordinary measures to pass other legislation. I would say the health care bill would be an example of that. I would say the recent activity in terms of NLRB and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau would be examples of that, where they're willing to be quite aggressive with Congress in getting things done. We simply haven't seen it with regard to export opening agreements. I have legislation that I've offered with Senator Joe Lieberman to give the president trade promotion authority, no strings attached. I've also offered to work with them on putting together whatever they want in terms of trade promotion authority. I think it's incredibly important we give this president the ability to negotiate on behalf of our country. And I'll continue to work with them on other issues, like Russia's accession to the WTO and the Trans-Pacific Partnership, with the hopes that we can get something done, but honestly it's frustrating and it doesn't have to be this way. While we have made some progress -- and I think it was the most bipartisan progress that was made on anything -- as these free trade agreements in the last year -- we need to do a lot more. And we need to do a lot more also of reducing obstacles of our own making here in this country. I'm going to mention one other important reform topic, and this is one that also, I believe, can and should be bipartisan, and we could move forward on even during this year, as political as this year will be. And that's tax reform and specifically corporate tax reform. If you look at our challenges globally, I think our outdated corporate tax code has to be at the top of the list. It effectively forces U.S. employers and workers to compete with one hand tied behind their backs.And there's been a lot of discussion about tax reform, how you do it. I think there's a very simple solution that involves a lot of complexity, because it's the tax code, after all, but it is simply to lower the rate, broaden the base on the corporate side. Our corporate tax code is build on a closed-economy assumption that basically, our corporations are going to be insulated from international competition.And the world has changed a lot, and that assumption is way out of step with today's integrated global economy. Our trading partners are competing hard for capital, investment and jobs. One measure of this is the increasing mobility of investment across borders. In 1980, not too long ago, cross-border foreign investment comprised 6 percent of global GDP. Today it exceeds 33 percent. Think about that.And like trade, I don't think we can afford to sit this one out. And as we do, as we have our businesses competing with one hand tied behind their backs, we are sitting it out. We need a tax system that helps U.S. businesses and workers compete on the global economic playing field.In the context of the supercommittee, which was spectacularly unsuccessful in reaching its hopeful result, we did get some things done. And one was sitting down as Republicans and Democrats together and talking about tax reform. (In fact ?), we spent hundreds of hours on this with staff from the committees of jurisdiction and with members. And one of the things that we were able to do is to craft a framework for an overhaul of the corporate tax code. Although the broader deal never came together, we did find more common ground on this than any other tax issue, and I think some sense, any other spending issue.So my goal now is to take that framework that we've developed and propose legislation soon in the new year and to do so on a bipartisan basis. I can't tell you how it'll be bipartisan yet because that'll depend on one of my Senate colleagues on the other side of the aisle stepping forward, but I think -- I think some are interested, from discussions.And our plan addresses what I think are the two major competitive disadvantages built into the corporate code. One is the high rate, which is globally, as you know, way out of line with other corporate tax rates, and then our outdated approach to international operations.On the first point, there is a wide consensus now among policymakers, economists, business leaders and so on that the 35 percent corporate tax rate has become a drag on our economy. It makes us noncompetitive. It's the second-highest corporate tax rate among the OECD countries. Only Japan has a higher rate. They have plans to lower theirs, by the way. Thirty-nine point two percent is the average combined federal and state burden, compared to a 25 percent average now among OECD countries. So when you combine our state and federal, we're 39.2 (percent). The average is 25 percent. When Japan's new rate cut takes effect on April 1st, ours will be the highest, actually.We talked about Canada earlier. It's interesting. Canada is going from 16 1/2 percent to 15 percent right now. And as you know, we have lots of companies that operate in both Canada and the United States. And it's interesting in Ohio talking to those companies. The U.S. companies are looking to Canada for their investments and maybe for their headquarters. Canadian companies are very interested in not just remaining Canadian companies, but doing a maximum amount of their business there so their revenues are there and they're taxed there. So it's a -- you know, it's a way to compete, and the United States has been left out of that competition.It's a fairly recent development. In 1986 under the Reagan administration, the corporate rate was cut from 46 (percent) to 34 percent. And that 34 percent was actually a rate below our global trading partners. So as recently as the mid-80s we were competitive. And you know, we were moving. We were -- we were -- we were acting on this issue to make ourselves competitive.In the interim period what has happened is that the OECD rate, which at that time was about where ours is now, about 39 percent, has come down to this 25 percent level. Every single one of the OECD countries in the last two decades have reformed their corporate tax code -- all of them -- to make it more competitive, all of them except us. (Chuckles.) We're the only ones. And again, while we have languished and had, you know, partisan discussions about taxing big corporations, this global trend has been fiercely competitive, and it has driven investment and jobs away from America.So it's true our effective tax rate is not 35 percent. It's probably closer to 28 percent. And the reason that's true is that we have hundreds of special preferences and exemptions in the code. But even at 28 percent, that's a full 5 percent above the OECD average. And much more important to me, our tax break-riddled code means resources are not being allocated to productive purposes. So even if the effective rate is lower, there are so many economic inefficiencies in the way we're doing it that we're still globally uncompetitive.Who's paying the price? The American workers. Just like trade, who pays the price? American workers. The office of the congressional -- the Congressional Budget Office, which, you know, is a nonpartisan group that gives Congress advice, has done some analysis of this. And their analysis would be that 70 percent or more of the burden of corporate taxes is borne by workers in the form of lower wages.Now, you know, again, this is a controversial issue, I suppose, among some. And certainly there are folks who say we shouldn't be helping big corporations; we should be making life tougher for them; they have too much cash on the sidelines. My view is if we're going to help workers and help make America competitive, we've got to have a tax system that makes sense globally.The chairmen of the Finance Committee and Ways and Means Committee have said this. The Simpson-Bowles commission said it. President Obama has said it. So this is not something that can't be done on a bipartisan basis.The proposal we're developing actually does it. It brings the top rate down from 35 (percent) to 25 percent. It does so in a revenue-neutral manner. The Joint Committee on Taxation has scored it. It's the only proposal of its kind. Some have said it can't be done. It can be done. You got to get rid of a lot of loopholes and tax breaks, but it certainly can be done.The tax rate cut is paid for primarily by reducing inefficiencies, preferences and exemptions in the code, so again, base broadening, lowering the rate. It will ensure that businesses succeed more based on the quality and value of their goods and services and not based on the sophistication of their tax planning. As a recovering lawyer myself, I will say it'll mean fewer corporate lawyers in house and fewer need for lawyers on the outside.And by the way, it also ensures that all corporations pay taxes. There's been a lot of publicity about some that don't or pay very little, and this'll be a 25 percent rate.We know from economic studies and international experience that the lower corporate rate will spark substantial economic growth and job creation. There's a study out by the Journal of Public Economics saying that reducing the rate by 10 percent would increase economic growth rates by between 1 (percent) and 2 percent, about a million jobs a year, not bad by something that, again, can be bipartisan, revenue-neutral.We know from the European experience that the growth effects can increase taxable income and revenue, an important consideration in our current fiscal climate. According to Ernst & Young, in Europe, for every 1 percentage point cut in the corporate rate, total corporate taxable income expanded by nearly half a percent. So again, raising revenue not by raising taxes, actually by lowering the rate, broadening the base, making the code more efficient. So we have strong evidence this will mean more jobs, more growth and more revenue.The second competitive disadvantage is the way we approach international taxation. With 95 percent of the consumers living outside the U.S., we can't afford a tax system that continues to impede U.S. businesses and workers from succeeding in foreign markets. That's what we do now. We compete, again, not just with a high rate, but with a worldwide taxation system rather than a territorial taxation system that penalizes U.S. businesses for reinvesting profits they earn overseas back here at home.The tax code basically gives firms a choice between keeping their earnings abroad tax-free or paying a steep tax bill if and when they choose to bring their money home. Some have noted that tax on repatriation of foreign earnings creates this lockout effect. They say we have trapped an estimated $1.4 trillion overseas. And that's foreign earnings overseas that could otherwise come to this country with a lower rate. So again, this is an obvious opportunity for us to increase investment here, increase jobs here and to get the economy moving.Bill Simon, former Treasury secretary, once said something interesting. He said we need a tax system that looks like it was actually designed on purpose. And that would be the idea of this corporate tax reform. So at a time with 21 million Americans underemployed or unemployed, it seems like that makes a lot of sense to go to a territorial regime and also to be sure that we have repatriation to bring some of those profits back.Some have asked, why should we care about helping U.S. companies compete overseas in Asia and Europe and elsewhere? I'll give you a quick example, which is Procter & Gamble in my hometown of Cincinnati, Ohio. They employ about 13,000 people in Cincinnati, our largest private sector employer. And Procter & Gamble does a lot of business overseas. Like most of the Fortune 200, they make most of their money in foreign sales.And people say, well, you know, why should we help them with their operations overseas? They're not going to export soap; they're going to make soap overseas and sell it overseas. But then, being headquartered in the United States, that money comes back to the United States, because that's where they do their research and development and back-office work and legal work and accounting work, and that's where their headquarters is. So of the 13,000 people who work in Cincinnati, 5,000 of them have their jobs because of the international sales. Expand the international sales, you expand the number of jobs in Cincinnati, Ohio. That's the concept.And again, I think we can take a lesson from other countries that have done this. It works. It means more jobs in the U.S. It means a territorial regime that will give businesses much more confidence to compete abroad and to invest more at home.I've laid out two what I think are big and important ways to strengthen the American economy. I think they're achievable reforms, too, and they'll help America regain its competitive edge: export expansion, corporate tax reform. There are so many others. We mentioned earlier a list of them. It includes domestic energy production; it includes worker retraining; it includes reforming our health care system to actually reduce costs of health care; it certainly includes dealing with the debt and deficit. And by doing these things -- restraining spending, surmounting these structural obstacles in our economy -- we can grow our economy. We can get out of the debt-driven doldrums and we can achieve the promise of prosperity. And we can do it for our kids and our grandkids, which is ultimately the American dream. When you think about it, it's being sure that our children and our grandchildren have more opportunities than we had. It's what my dad did for me and his grandparents did for him.But it's also about America's place in the world. And to be that beacon of hope and opportunity, to have America continue to lead in the world, we've got to sharpen our competitive edge. Some of you worked with me when I was U.S. Trade Rep and have this experience in common with me. But you go around the world, as many of you do with your businesses, and you talk to people from other countries -- in my case, foreign leaders -- and even if in public sometimes they were critical of the United States -- in my case, on trade issues and sometimes foreign policy issues -- in private, you generally get the same reaction, which is, you know: How did you do it? How did you create the greatest middle class on the face of the Earth? What is the trick of, you know, free-market economics? How does -- how does it work?And America continues to be the envy of the world in some respects, but frankly, we're falling behind. That question isn't asked as frequently. The question now being asked often is: Gosh, is there another model? Maybe state capitalism, practiced by China. They seem to be doing better.If the United States is not out there promoting trade liberalization, promoting human rights, promoting free markets and freedom, don't expect anybody else to. (Chuckles.) So you know this well -- again, so many of you here have tremendous experience globally. America's role in the world is in question. And what I've outlined today are just two of many things that we need to do to right the ship, and do it soon so that America (can ?) continue to be that beacon of hope and opportunity for the rest of the world.Thank you all very much. (Applause.)FRIEDMAN: (Off mic) -- questions, and let me just, as a reminder: Wait for the microphone, if you would, and speak directly into it, and state your name and your affiliation when you ask a question; and would, as always, remind you to keep it concise. I'm just going to kick this off, though, while you're gearing up.Rob, you mentioned, as part of your list of seven areas for work, regulatory reform. Do you want to comment on your general thoughts about that?PORTMAN: Steve, I think it fits perfectly in what we were talking about in making our economy more competitive, including more globally competitive.One quick story: This week, I had a business roundtable in Findlay, Ohio. A Danish company is investing there and they're very interested in our regulatory system, because they have found dealing with OSHA and EPA is a lot more difficult in the United States of America than dealing with any of their regulators in Denmark -- so, you know, changing kind of the conventional wisdom, which is that it must be so tough to do business in Europe. These folks are seeing firsthand that it's harder to do business here, in some respects.So this notion that our regulations are fine, we don't need to worry about it, we need to have strong regulations to protect safety and soundness and the health of our citizenry and so on -- we've got to do it in a smarter way. And we can and should, and regulators should work with business. Regulations are important, no question about it; but there's a much smarter way to do it.There is legislation that's bipartisan, I've introduced with Senator Pryor. Senator Pryor is a member of the Governmental Affairs Committee with me, which is a committee of jurisdiction. We've also got some other Democrat support for it. Senator Bill Nelson from Florida is a cosponsor, as is Susan Collins.It has almost identical legislation in the House that passed in November; it's called the Regulatory Accountability Act. I hope you'll check it out if you're interested. But it reforms the Administrative Procedure Act for the first time in about five decades -- hasn't been touched; again, we've fallen behind. And it simply says to the regulators: You've got to use a cost-benefit analysis that includes the impact on jobs; you also have to choose the least-burdensome alternative, so if there's a policy objective that's been laid out, fine. But right now, of course, there's no requirement to use the least-burdensome alternative, which is one reason the cost of some of these regulations is so high.The recent EPA regulation that would have affected Ohio quite negatively, power plants, was deemed, even by the EPA, to result in over a million jobs being lost. And that wasn't considered as part of their analysis as to how to come up with, again, a policy objective being met through the promulgation of regulations. So it's really commonsense stuff.It also requires more transparency in the process. It requires independent agencies be brought into this cost-benefit analysis. That is done for most executive branch agencies, but not for most independent ones. The president himself has said that's a good idea. But he can't do anything about it because they're independent agencies, so it has to be done by statute.It also requires judicial review -- not for every regulation, but for larger regulations -- so that agencies are actually held to the standards that are established by Congress. So I think this is good, commonsense, bipartisan legislation. I think it can get done this year. There's a lot of talk about regulations; this is something that could actually happen.I also support a number of other, more aggressive measures on regulations -- honestly, that I don't think is going to have bipartisan support. So my big push this year, just as it is with corporate tax reform and some of these trade measures, is to get some regulatory relief going that actually gives companies some sense of predictability and certainty. You would never have some of the regulations that have come out in the last year -- some of which have been postponed until after the election now -- if you'd had this sort of regulatory framework in place.So I think there's great opportunity here, Steve, and it definitely affects our global competitiveness.FRIEDMAN: Great. Thanks, Rob.Now we'll open it up. Sir.QUESTIONER: My name is Khalid Azim, Senator. My question to you, sir, is, I think you rightfully said that raising taxes can't keep pace with our expenditures, but wouldn't some part of the solution for the structural imbalances we have in our fiscal policy include raising taxes?PORTMAN: You sound like Peterson -- no -- (laughs, laughter).It's a -- it's a complicated question, in the sense that, as I said earlier, I believe strongly in tax reform, on the individual side and the corporate side. You will raise more revenue through that, and that's a much better way to go. So to me, it would actually be broadening the base, reducing the statutory rate and generating more income.Whether it's tax -- in a tax increase or not is sort of in the eye of the beholder. And, you know, there's this issue about, you know, Americans for Tax Reform and the so-called pledge and how it all works. The pledge does not mean that there can't and shouldn't be tax reform. In fact, I'm, again, a strong advocate of it, as are -- as are many Republicans who signed the pledge. So my view would be tax reform, generating more revenue.In the supercommittee process, I also supported a proposal that would have tax reform: lowering the rate; broadening the base; permanency with regard to the '01 and '03 rates; and also generating some additional income (for ?) the two top brackets -- $250 billion, to be precise -- of static-scored new revenue.But honestly, when you look at our spending issues and you look at spending as a percent of GDP -- which is probably the right way to look at it -- the historic average: 20 percent over the last 50 years. We're now at 24 1/2 percent, heading to 25 -- soon 27, soon 28, soon 30, soon 40. You simply can't tax enough to get there.Should we have a revenue base that is greater than the current revenue to GDP? Yes. You know, it's 14 1/2 to 15 percent right now. It's getting a little stronger as we're coming out of the recession. And as the recovery begins, this -- Congressional Budget Office thinks it'll get back to the historic levels, which is about 18 percent. If the $4 trillion tax increase happens a year from now, which is scheduled, it would be more like 21 percent -- (chuckles) -- which is way above the historic average.So I don't mean to give you such a complicated answer, but I think just raising taxes on the current base and in the current code would be a huge mistake. I think tax reform makes sense. I think you will generate more tax revenue from it. I think there are ways in which you could do that and even have some static score revenue, but it would have to be in the context of tax reform and predictability and certainty in the tax code.I mentioned being in Ohio. We did three factory tours and a lot of business roundtables, three different groups. And you know, this -- you hear a lot about certainty and predictability, and when you're out there -- as many of you are and many of you are invested in some of these companies, some of you run some of them -- you know, in Ohio there's a lot of uncertainty about the tax code. And most of these companies are pass-through entities. They're looking at a rate that's going to go from 35 to 39.7 (percent) at the end of the year, and you add the president's health care bill surcharge on top of that, they're looking at, you know, 42, 43 percent tax rates. And that means they take less money -- put less money into their businesses, so they take more out to pay their taxes. And most of these guys, what they do is -- they're Sub S owners. Some of them are partnerships. They take money out to pay their taxes. And they're going to invest less in their company. And that's one reason cash is on the sidelines, they tell me. They're getting a little more business, but they're not willing to take that risk. So part of the answer is certainty, predictability, not that anything's ever permanent in Washington. But there's total impermanence right now. Nobody knows what's going to happen. I would, you know, challenge anybody in this room to tell me what's going to happen a year from now on taxes. I don't know. And if you're an entrepreneur or investor, as many of you are in this room, you don't know either. And that is part of the reason, in my view, that we're not seeing the strong recovery that we need.FRIEDMAN: Sir.QUESTIONER: Thank you. I'm Dan Altman with North Yard Economics and NYU, and it's a pleasure to hear someone talk about things like corporate income tax reform and trade promotion authority that would seem to be noncontroversial on either side of the aisle. One thing that you didn't mention, though, in terms of America catching up to other countries is the public goods that we might need, like our infrastructure, which is probably decades behind in investment, potentially basic research as well, our educational system. Can you talk a little bit about what public goods you think we need and how we could pay for them?PORTMAN: Good question, Dan. And you know, I'm here, again, with the master, Peterson, on this, these budget issues, but if you imagine our budget as a pie, 60 percent of it is now on autopilot. So that would be Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, some other entitlements, and then interest on debt, and probably just under 40 percent would represent the rest. More than half of that is defense and the rest is what you're talking about. So in terms of public goods, whether it's transportation funding or research funding, that's done under the -- you know, the part of the annually appropriated budget that represents a smaller and smaller share of the budget because that 60 percent is the fastest-growing part of the budget, the so-called entitlement programs -- very important programs. But if they're not reformed, they will bankrupt the country, and they will continue to put more and more pressure and squeeze more and more on what you would term as "public goods" or domestic discretionary spending, outside of defense.So I mean, that's the -- that's the reality of what's happening. If you are a liberal Democrat or if you are a conservative Republican, I think you should find common cause in this -- in this endeavor, because many of those public goods are things that traditionally the Democratic Party has held dear, and what's going to happen, by protecting the entitlement programs, refusing to consider any sensible reforms, is you will squeeze that more and more. Again, the numbers just don't work. It's not philosophy. It's math.So yes, we need to invest in our infrastructure. There is a huge problem right now because our gas tax receipts are down, and that's how we fund the trust fund. And the question is, do you put more general revenues in -- we've already started down that track -- and you put more general revenues in, you're borrowing 42 cents of it, including a lot more from foreign investors, at a time when interest rates are historically low. What's going to happen there? So we've got to figure out, in my view, one, how to keep that section of the pie from shrinking by taking some pressure off from the rest of the pie and also, specifically with regard to infrastructure, a better way to fund infrastructure.But these are -- you know, these are the fundamental issues, I think, where we have a structural problem. I think we have a structural problem on the economy, we have a structural problem in terms of our fiscal condition. If we don't reform these major entitlement programs, there simply will not be funds available for those.You think about it. Even today, I mean, all of our revenue coming in pays for that 60 percent. That's it. I mean, to the extent we are borrowing 40 to 42 cents on the dollar, that 60 percent is all we're paying for today. We're not actually paying for any of the rest of government, including defense, including all those public goods. We're borrowing money to do that.One percent increase in interest rates, by the way, is another $130 billion a year, 1.3 trillion (dollars) over 10 years, of deficit. So the European situation is a drag on our economy, in my view, but it also has had an interesting impact, which is that we -- and some of -- some of you, again, know a lot more about this than I do, in terms of the bond market, but it has encouraged people to continue to invest in America as in some respects the least dirty shirt in the closet. And that has kept our interest rates relatively low, along with aggressive action by the Fed.That doesn't go on forever. And you know, this is the -- I think the window of opportunity -- right now we have to act, and act without having a tremendous dislocation by huge benefit cuts or huge tax increases.FRIEDMAN: David Malpass.PORTMAN: Hey, David.QUESTIONER: Hello, Senator. David Malpass with Encima Global. I wonder if you could comment on the debt limit. The increase went badly in August. Another one will come up a year from now, and it looks like it'll go just as badly. I think it should be replaced, so that we don't threaten default or government shutdown but instead can actually use it to cut spending. Is there any plan to change the debt limit or avoid that disaster that we had in August?PORTMAN: You're right, David. I think that was harmful to the economy. It was certainly one of the reasons Congress is at -- now at a 9 percent approval rating, which I think is family members like Jed and staff -- is 9 percent. So I don't know. Nobody else out there that approves, probably. FRIEDMAN: Can you count on Jed?PORTMAN: I'm not sure I can count on Jed anymore after that.You know, I thought it was a huge mistake for us to go into a post-debt limit period, because it's not even like shutting down the government when you come to the end of a continuing resolution. You know, this has been one of the big issues in Washington. You come to the end of a CR, and are you going to shut down government or not? We just did it, actually, for a day recently and -- that's hard, but shutting down government means you continue essential services, and you still have revenue coming in. When you're borrowing -- let's choose a number -- 40 cents on the dollar, to be conservative, and one day you're bringing in 40 cents of all your revenues from borrowing and the next day you cannot borrow, because you have exceeded your debt limit and your borrowing authority is gone, and your cash flowing -- in other words, on any given day, your expenses are going to be different, just as they are in your businesses -- you are tempting fate. And many of my colleagues on my side of the aisle, as you know, were willing to do that. I was not, because I felt as though there was a possibility of a truly deep cut in Social Security, because on any given day, you have a big Social Security payment, and you don't have the money for it, the government's going to have to make a decision.And by the way, Treasury had exhausted all of their tools, so other than selling gold, David, we'd done about everything, hadn't Treasury, I mean. So there was really no flexibility there. And so it's not a good way to run a railroad. (Chuckles.) And what I did like about it is that there was -- there was a theory that, OK, we'll raise the debt limit, but we will cut spending dollar for dollar -- over a 10-year period, admittedly, but over a 10-year period -- at the same level we increase the debt limit -- so increase it by a trillion dollars, a trillion dollars of deficit reduction over 10 years, which is what you're talking about. So I think that's the better way to go, but you've got to find common ground to do that. So I don't think we should tempt fate again. I think it's a mistake. I think it would be, you know, enormously harmful to what I described earlier as an increasingly tenuous situation internationally and a -- and a still very weak economy. I think the economic growth we're seeing is fragile and tenuous, and I think it would be a mistake to get back into that game of chicken.FRIEDMAN: We have tough strictures on time, so it's time for one more. And we'll take the gentleman in the back.QUESTIONER: Badinski (ph), Voice of America.PORTMAN: Yeah, good to see you.QUESTIONER: Senator, you said at the tail end of your remarks that you can't expect other countries to do things like promote human rights. So with that in mind, how do you see the sentiment in the Congress, the House and the Senate, regarding American foreign expenditures for things like foreign aid, embassies, military posts and public diplomacy?PORTMAN: Good question. I hope I didn't say that countries won't promote human rights, but I did say America tends to take the leadership role. And by the way, we take the leadership role on, you know, a lot of issues that relate to our national security as well and to global security. You know, the fight against terrorism, we tend to take the lead.But in terms of promoting human rights and promoting free elections and promoting free markets and promoting trade liberalization, often our allies who might benefit from some of those same structures are nowhere to be found, and we're out there in the lead. And so my point was that America's role in the world is outsized. We sort of box above our weight even. We're not just the remaining superpower -- a waning one, albeit -- but we're the one who is willing to step up and do some things that are hard but that are necessary. And sometimes in international fora I've found, at the World Trade Organization or other places, you know, that's our role.So the whole issue of this part of the budget we talked about that's not defense but is annually appropriated includes foreign assistance, foreign aid, includes the way in which, you know, America helps our allies and helps promote democracy and helps promote freedom. And there's a big debate about it right now. Republicans are split. When I go to speak to -- at town halls or have teletown hall meetings, often I get the -- you know, the response that, gee, if you want to reduce spending, just cut foreign aid.Well, it turns out, depending on how you describe foreign aid, if you include foreign military sales or not, it's 1 (percent) or 2 percent of the budget. And frankly, it's not going to balance the budget, and it does play an important role to the extent you believe it keeps us out of much more significant expenditures like wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that -- for a long period of time they were costing us over $150 billion a year.So I think there is a lot of support in Congress for continuing -- and you saw in the -- in the appropriations bills that made their way through the Congress this year, there was support for continuing foreign aid programs. But there is also a lot of pressure, as there will be on the entire budget, to make sure we're getting the most bang for the buck. So I think you're going to see a continued effort to be sure that we're seeing some results from our foreign aid.And as you know, over the -- really, the past decade there's been a movement toward U.S. foreign aid being more directed toward countries that are willing to encourage, you know, the fight against corruption and transparency and human rights and free elections and so on -- I think that's appropriate -- rather than just sending money to folks without having any longer-term progress to show for it. So I think there'll be more pressure on it, but I do think there's still support for keeping what I view as, in the latest continuing resolution and the budget, adequate support for foreign assistance.FRIEDMAN: Well, Rob, thank you. This is -- you've given us the realities, but also the path forward, if we can take it. So we thank you very much. It's been terrific. (Applause.)PORTMAN: Thank you all. STEPHEN FRIEDMAN: Good afternoon. We're at the appointed hour, so let me call this meeting to order. I'm Steve Friedman, and it's going to be my great pleasure to introduce Senator Rob Portman.First let me remind you of a few of the ground rules. Everyone really should turn off their cell phones and BlackBerrys, not just put them in vibrate, because of the systems here. Secondly, I'd like to remind you that this meeting is on the record.Now, Rob Portman is -- many of us in the room are great Rob Portman fans. He is -- after a distinguished career in the House, he's -- as you all know from the resume, won by a wide margin the senatorial seat. Rob when he was in Congress distinguished himself for being highly substantive and had that increasingly rare ability to work extraordinarily effectively across party lines. He's a man who is capable of getting deeply into the substance and the meat of issues, and as a result, he was made the special trade representative and subsequently headed the Office of Management and Budget, two of the most complex and really deeply substantive areas in Washington.He's off to a very distinguished career in government, and I'm looking forward, as you are, to hearing from Rob talk about debt-driven doldrums in this area -- era. Rob Portman. SENATOR ROB PORTMAN (R-OH): (Applause.) Steve, thank you very much.What Steve didn't mention is that I was one of those members of Congress that always came up to the White House when Steve was the director of the National Economic Council to give him advice and counsel, which he acted like he actually listened to sometimes. And it was great having Steve there. He was a breath of fresh air, both because he brought that private-sector experience and because of his style. You know, he woke up every morning, when he was in that job -- which is a tough job -- trying to figure out what was best to grow our economy, and never considering partisan advantage and never considering extraneous issues. So he served President Bush well during that first term.And I'm also joined today by another good friend, who's actually one of my top advisers and my 21-year-old son, Jed Portman -- where are you, Jed -- in the back -- who is here in New York City in school, so I told him he could get a free lunch if he came. And a lot of other great friends in the room. I'm going to miss saying hello to somebody, and I apologize, but I have to say that the last time I was here, which I think was 2006, Pete Peterson sat in the front row. And here he is again. And in the interim time we've had a lot of great opportunities to meet and talk about important issues, including this little issue of entitlement reform and deficit reduction that he is still taking a leadership role on in Washington.I want to thank Richard, too. I know Richard Haass couldn't be here today, he's out on the West Coast, but he invited me to come, found out that I could come, and he immediately left for California. But I appreciate him being persistent, and it's great to be here again, great to visit with a lot of friends. And I look forward to getting your input.I wanted to come today because this is a group that understands the economy and our challenges but also looks at it from a global perspective. And I think that's something that's often missing in Washington. I'm going to talk a little about that today. The title is "Debt-Driven Doldrums or the Promise of Prosperity: America at a Crossroads." And what I'm going to talk about is how we need, in my view, to reboot our economy. And it's in part because of the global economy in which we find ourselves, increasingly competitive, and I'm going to focus on just two issues today and try to dig a little deeper into those two, but again, look forward to your comments and questions on a much broader array of issues.I read the headlines again today about what's going on across the Atlantic. Many of you are involved in that, some of you very directly, and know a lot more about it than I do. But I think it's inescapable, when you read those headlines, that our economic woes are shared. More importantly, we are intertwined and interconnected, in ways that, frankly, we weren't a couple decades ago.And finally I would say that it's clear to me we are increasingly competing on a global stage, where the movement of goods and capital, services and people is more easily and more rapidly than ever crossing national boundaries. And so we are very much, you know, part of this global economy and we have to take it into account in terms of how we deal with our problems here in America.Overseas we see our European brethren facing a sovereign debt crisis that is devastating to them, the fundamental cause of which, by the way, is decades of unsustainable public-sector spending, excessive borrowing, leverage, and at the same time, of course, a recession that's making it much more difficult for these countries -- particularly Greece, but all these countries -- to close that gap between the revenues and their expenses.And I hope when we look at that we realize that we're not far behind. We've got a looming fiscal crisis right here on our own doorstep, and we've got a crisis of confidence which is resulting in an historically weak recovery that's not producing enough jobs, leaving millions of Americans deeply worried about their future, the security of their families. It's placed us in an uncertain and precarious position, and it's cast doubt on our ability to compete and prosper long-term in the global economy.For those who believe that Europe's woes are far worse than ours, let me give you a couple interesting statistics. One, our gross debt, as you know, now equals 100 percent of our economy. The top story in USA Today yesterday was about that, that this year we have achieved this distinction of having our gross debt equal the entire size of our economy. Spain's debt-to-GDP ratio is not 100 percent, it's 67 percent. In fact, the average in the EU is 80 percent. So those who think this is America, we'll be fine, we've got a stronger fiscal foundation -- we need to think again. Yes, there are some countries, like Greece, that have a debt-to-GDP ratio worse than ours, but on average the EU's doing better than us.We do see some signs of life here in our economy. Last Friday we had some job numbers come out that were highly touted, and I'm delighted to see some jobs coming back after four years from the recession, and a recovery that is felt -- at least in Ohio, where I've been the last couple days, talking to a lot of businesses and workers -- feels in Ohio like a continuation of the recession because it's been so weak.But let's look behind those job numbers for a second and better understand the enduring and historic weakness of this recovery. First, a lot of that improvement in the jobs numbers comes from the fact that people have stopped looking for work, hardly something to celebrate. So we've gone from 8.9 percent to 8.5 percent in the past two months in terms of our unemployment rate. Again, good news. During that time period, more than 350,000 Americans have stopped looking for work. So if that had not happened, if those Americans had not, through frustration, said, we're not even going to be part of the statistics anymore, our unemployment rate would have gone from 8.9 to 8.7, not to 8.5. So half of the improvement we're seeing is due to something bad, which is the fact that people are leaving the workplace, frustrated.Another interesting statistic is that based on the most recent figures we have, labor-force participation rate -- those looking for work or working as a percent of the population -- is at historic lows. It's at about 64 percent right now. That's lower than at any time in the past four recessions. In other words, at this point in a recovery, four years out it's never been this low. If the labor rate were at 66 percent, which is what it was in the late 1990s, our unemployment rate today would be 11.3 percent. So again, as you look at these statistics and you look at how the stock market responded, which was kind of tepid, there may be a reason of that, because some of these underlying issues when you look at the broader context here indicate that we're not out of the woods.Another point that I heard a lot about in the last couple days from employers in Ohio is they have people coming to work, looking for work, who have a huge resume gap and a skills gap. And I talked to some manufacturers who were saying, Rob, it's just tough to hire somebody who's been out of work for, you know, six, nine months, and part of it's just, you know, getting back into work. He said their accident rates are higher among those workers. Safety's not as keen. They're not as focused on the job and they've lost some of their skills.The average number of weeks on unemployment today is at historic levels, far higher than it has been in any of the last four recessions; 40 weeks is the average.So again, I -- great to see these new numbers; I hope we continue to see better numbers. But this notion that somehow we're back on track and out of the woods I think is naive.In terms of job growth, let's also look at this recession versus other recessions. We -- right now, four years after the recession, total nonfarm jobs in the United States of America are still 6.1 million below the level they were before the downturn began. So we're still 6 million jobs down.Let's compare this to other recessions. Four years from the start of the 2001 recession -- which, you should know, was called the jobless recovery -- we had recovered all of the jobs lost during the recession, in fact had added jobs, about 350,000 jobs at this point in the recovery.So if you look back to other recessions, four years from the recession that began in June 1990, jobs had grown by about 4 million, and four years after the '81 recession, which was the deepest recession, the U.S. economy had added about 6 million jobs from the pre-recession peak.So this is a true jobless recovery in that sense, and we've got a lot of work to do. We have 21 million Americans who are either unemployed or underemployed. And the chairman of the New York Fed I think said it well last week when these new numbers came out; he said, these new levels are a decrease, but still unacceptable. That was his word. And it is unacceptable.Now, I say all this not just to spread doom and gloom and to make us all feel more depressed about the economy, but to say that I think when you look at what's really going on in our economy -- and again, coming from Ohio, maybe I feel it more sharply because we still have not been able to get manufacturing back on its feet the way we'd like to; our employment numbers are slightly -- have been slightly worse than the national average -- they're actually equal to it right now -- but I say it because I believe we need to understand what's going on and have the right diagnosis of the problem to come up with the right prescriptions.And I think the predominant view in Washington, and certainly at the White House, is that this is a temporary cyclical business downturn largely due to the financial crisis -- a lot of fingers get pointed here to New York, Wall Street -- and that as in any other business cycle downturn, there are things that Washington can do in terms of spending -- therefore, stimulus -- in terms of temporary sweeteners -- therefore, the temporary tax cuts -- and that like any other business cycle, you know, over the past 50 years in this country, those Washington prescriptions would be the right thing to do.I think the diagnosis is wrong. I don't think this is a temporary business cycle downturn. Unfortunately, I think it's far deeper than that. I think it's a matter of our economy having deeper structural issues that cannot be addressed by the kinds of policies coming out of Washington.And I think that if we don't look at these more fundamental structural challenges that are holding back risk-taking, investment, and therefore, job creation, we're not going to be able to get out of the woods.We've got to make fundamental changes that add certainty to the economy, or else we'd risk long-term decline relative to our major competitors, many of whom have already tackled many of the challenges that we need to tackle.I think the evidence supports my view. We tried stimulus; it didn't work. The president's own economic advisers, as you know, confidently predicted that because of the stimulus package alone, unemployment would be under 6 percent today as we sit here. Washington, both under the Bush administration and the Obama administration, has tried short-term tax breaks. They haven't worked. And again, I don't think short-term sweeteners work because it's not a short-term problem.The right diagnosis, again, is that our economy has lost its competitive edge in the global economy due to a set of serious structural problems, most of which are of our making. And if we don't address these obstacles, I think we risk long-term decline relative to our major competitors, and a lack of economic growth in this country. And it's especially true because so many of our competitors have tackled these challenges and are tackling them.During the so-called supercommittee process, I decided to put up on the website a solicitation for ideas and received about 17,000 ideas for deficit reduction. I think half came from Pete Peterson. (Laughter.) But one of the ideas I liked the most was, the first couple of weeks, somebody sent a suggestion saying, merge with Canada. (Laughter.) And, you know, it was sort of funny until I started looking into it more, and Canada's done a lot of the right things to keep their economy on track during tough times, including some things I'll talk about in a second in the area of taxes and trade that make more sense.To alter the trajectory we're on -- we are currently on, obviously, we have to deal with our budget deficit. This is simply unsustainable. Fifteen trillion dollars -- we talked about earlier -- as our debt is bad enough; what's even worse is the trajectory for the future. You know, the supercommittee was asked to cut 1.2 (trillion dollars) or 1.5 trillion (dollars) in the face of an increase in debt during that same time period, the next 10 years, of anywhere from 5 (trillion dollars) to $10 trillion. As a former OMB director who looks at these numbers, you know, I try to look out five and 10 years more than what's happening now, and the trends and the trajectories are what are really concerning. That has to be addressed, because I don't think that the economy will recover the way we'd like to see it until we deal with restraining spending and reforming our major entitlement programs.Some say increase taxes. You can't catch up with the spending. It -- I mean, this is not a philosophical point of view, although you may take it as that; it's a question of math. You simply cannot raise taxes high enough to catch up with the spending. And, you know, I'm all for tax reform. I think there's much better ways to collect taxes and to increase revenue through pro-growth policies. But raising taxes alone will not catch up with soaring spending. And raising taxes, of course, in the wrong way damages an already fragile economy.But in addition to tackling the debt, writing the trajectory of our country requires a thoughtful pro-growth strategy to regain our competitive edge in the global economy. Unless we're growing at 6 (percent) or 7 (percent) or 8 percent, we're not going to be able to grow our way out of this. And that is not something that anybody predicts. But we can grow and grow at rates that are far higher than our current growth rate, and that will play a major role in getting us out of the deep fiscal hole that we're in.In my first months in the Senate, I laid out a seven-point plan to address what I consider the structural problems in our economy. It includes rebooting the economy by fiscal discipline -- again, I think that's kind of the wet blanket over the economy, a lot of uncertainty caused by that -- but also some very specific proposals: tax reform, much more bold tax reform than some have talked about; regulatory relief; education and worker retraining; a new commitment to domestic energy production -- energy efficiency needs to be part of that, by the way; health care cost containment; much more aggressive trade policy. So these are all issues that I think can and should and must be addressed that are more structural issues.Today I'm not going to walk through all of them, although again, in our Q-and-A period, if you -- if you have interest, I'd love to talk more about some of them. But if I could, I'd like to touch on just a couple that directly affect our international competitiveness.The first obstacle we need to overcome on the international side is the fact that we are underachieving in terms of exports. And, you know, America's had a great market here for many businesses, some of whom are represented in this room today. And frankly, we haven't been looking beyond our shores as we should.Exports equals jobs. The president talks about that a lot. He would like to double our exports over a five, 10-year period. We need to do much more and we can and should. Instead of being content to sell in our own market, we've got to look overseas much more. It's a key to jump-starting the economy.Let me give you a common measure which is used globally to look at exports, and that's as a percent of GDP. Where do you think America stands in terms of our exports as a percent of our GDP? Out of 170 countries that were rated, we're near the bottom. We're tied with Tonga at 163, which puts us just ahead of Ethiopia -- 163rd out of 170. Interesting, isn't it?There's also a new reality that's got to shake us from our complacency. That's that 95 percent of the world's consumers who live beyond our border now hold 75 percent of global purchasing power. In other words, we've always been 5 percent of the world's population, but now the other 95 percent is buying a lot more. And our global competitors, you know, whether it's Germany or Japan or China, are accessing those markets in ways much more aggressively than we are.We shouldn't be sheepish about selling our goods, our products, our services. I believe we have the best workforce in the world. I believe we have the best products in the world. We certainly know how to sell them domestically. We sometimes lose sight of the fact that trade is about opening as many markets as possible, but also leveling a playing field so that our partners in trade receive reciprocal treatment here, which benefits our consumers from greater choices, lower prices. Simply put, increased trade flows result in growing the economic pie, and it's something we should be doing much more aggressively. Let's take the services sector as an example where the United States has a great opportunity. We're a powerhouse there. You often hear about our ballooning trade deficits. Incidentally, our trade deficit is driven by two things: energy and China. When you add it up, our trade deficit with China, which, by the way, grew last month while China's trade deficit went down with others -- it grew with us partly because we don't have all the raw materials that some of these other countries do that they're sending to China. But. when you add up our trade deficit with China, at about $200 billion, and our trade deficit with regard to foreign imports of oil, that accounts for about 95 percent of our trade deficit. But we do have some great opportunities, as I've said. We have a trade surplus in banking and insurance for instance. In fact, in 2010, our services trade surplus exceeded $162 billion. So we can do it, and we should be working around the clock to increase our surpluses in other areas: services and goods. Part of the obstacle has to do with Washington. A perfect example is the length of time it took to get Washington to act on the free trade agreements with Korea and Colombia and Panama. The last time I was here before this group was almost six years ago. And for those of you who were here at the time, I'm sorry to be repeating myself, talking about Colombia, Panama -- (chuckles) -- and Korea, because that's what I've talked about then. And at that time we were very close to completing Colombia. I was able to sign that agreement when I was trade representative, and we were very close to completing the agreements also with Panama and Korea, which were signed after my tenure, but launched when I was in the trade rep's office. That was six years ago almost. After those trade agreements were signed, and people assumed we were going to move forward with these commercially beneficial agreements that also had enormous foreign policy benefits for the United States, they simply languished in Washington. President Bush, of course, proposed that Congress take them up. You know, he had negotiated them and thought they were good agreements. Democrats in the House at the time, as you recall, objected to allowing them to have a vote on the floor. The president has to send them forward in order to be ratified, but of course, Congress also has to ratify them. In this case, it was under trade promotion authority or fast-track authority. But getting them to the floor for a vote was impossible, and Speaker Pelosi effectively blocked them. President Obama was elected and, according to his advisers and even his comments, he understood that these trade agreements would create jobs. In fact, by his own metrics, he said they would create 250,000 jobs. But it took nine months after the president was elected, even to get him to send the agreements to Congress. For those of you who follow this closely -- and some of you are here, some of my Democrat friends who are here, who helped me when I was in the trade rep's office, and helped me in the last nine months to get these agreements to Congress -- and I did help create a path forward by supporting trade adjustment assistance, which is a -- or for a retraining program that the administration insisted upon, an expansion of the existing program. But it was like pulling teeth, I can -- I can tell you. And if you've followed this in the press, you saw that. Crazy. While we allowed these agreements to languish for five years, what happened in the rest of the world? Well, no one else slowed down or waited. Other countries negotiated and completed trade agreements right and left. I mentioned Canada earlier. You know, we negotiated an agreement with Colombia, completed it; President Uribe and I personally negotiated it. It was done. It was very tough for Colombia, but they agreed to lower their tariffs and open up to services and make fundamental reforms to their economy that are more free market-oriented. Canada started negotiating after us, finished before us, ratified it and took market share -- (chuckles) -- away from us. So our wheat sales to Colombia are less today than they would have been, but for the fact that Canada got in ahead of us. But this has happened all over the globe. There are over 100 bilateral trade agreements being negotiated right now -- over 100. The United States is party to zero, none. So, maybe in the old days, we could afford this, just as we could have afforded to access our own market and not worry about the 95 percent of consumers outside of our market as much, but things are moving fast. Other countries are moving quickly, and they're grabbing market share from us. You've heard a lot of statistics, but the European Union started negotiating with Korea before -- after we completed our agreement with Korea, they negotiated their agreement; got it ratified; and in the first couple of months over this past summer, before we could finish with Korea, they were grabbing market share from us. And that market share is tough to get back, as some of you know who are involved in international trade. So, instead of working around the clock to negotiate additional agreements and to move forward, the United States is sitting on the sidelines. And therefore, our workers, our farmers, our service providers are suffering because we're not getting the benefit of these lower tariffs and other nontariff barriers and creating more jobs here in this country. It works. If you add up all of the free trade agreements that we have, all around the world, including Canada, Mexico, the CAFTA (ph) countries now -- Chile, Peru, Singapore and so on, Australia -- all of those countries add up to less than 10 percent of global GDP. Think about it. We don't have a trade agreement with Europe or trade agreement(s) with China or Japan. So it's less than 10 percent of global GDP; latest number I have is 8.2 percent of global GDP. Yet, we send 41 percent of our exports to 8.2 percent of the world because of these trade agreements. So the next time you hear someone say exports equals jobs, they're right, and they're also saying something that's not happening. In other words, we're not creating the jobs we should be creating through trade.This president is the first president since FDR not to request the ability to negotiate trade agreements. Pretty interesting, isn't it? Two presidents actually didn't have to request it because they already had TPA or trade promotion authority, negotiating authority, before they were elected. So they came into office with the ability. Both happen to have been Republicans who were free traders. But President Obama has not asked for nor does he want trade promotion authority -- unbelievable! Because without trade promotion authority, other countries won't sit down with you to negotiate an agreement for a very good reason: because under our system, if they do that, then it goes to Congress, and Congress can amend it to death, and nickel and dime it, and they're not going to put their last, best offer on the table. It won't happen. The only negotiation we're doing right now is with the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which is a regional trade agreement. I'm supportive of it; I hope it works. Trade agreements tend to, you know, work on the basis of the least common denominator, meaning that some of those countries in the so-called TPP are unlikely to want to reduce their barriers as much as we could get in a bilateral agreement. Therefore, the whole agreement probably won't make a huge difference, at least initially, in terms of tariff reductions and nontariff barrier reductions, but it's the right thing to do. But we have no trade negotiating authority nor has the president asked for it, even to negotiate the trade promotion authority in the TPP, the Trans-Pacific Partnership. So this is an area where, again, Washington is shooting itself in the foot and therefore our country and our workers. The White House has been very effective in using extraordinary measures to pass other legislation. I would say the health care bill would be an example of that. I would say the recent activity in terms of NLRB and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau would be examples of that, where they're willing to be quite aggressive with Congress in getting things done. We simply haven't seen it with regard to export opening agreements. I have legislation that I've offered with Senator Joe Lieberman to give the president trade promotion authority, no strings attached. I've also offered to work with them on putting together whatever they want in terms of trade promotion authority. I think it's incredibly important we give this president the ability to negotiate on behalf of our country. And I'll continue to work with them on other issues, like Russia's accession to the WTO and the Trans-Pacific Partnership, with the hopes that we can get something done, but honestly it's frustrating and it doesn't have to be this way. While we have made some progress -- and I think it was the most bipartisan progress that was made on anything -- as these free trade agreements in the last year -- we need to do a lot more. And we need to do a lot more also of reducing obstacles of our own making here in this country. I'm going to mention one other important reform topic, and this is one that also, I believe, can and should be bipartisan, and we could move forward on even during this year, as political as this year will be. And that's tax reform and specifically corporate tax reform. If you look at our challenges globally, I think our outdated corporate tax code has to be at the top of the list. It effectively forces U.S. employers and workers to compete with one hand tied behind their backs.And there's been a lot of discussion about tax reform, how you do it. I think there's a very simple solution that involves a lot of complexity, because it's the tax code, after all, but it is simply to lower the rate, broaden the base on the corporate side. Our corporate tax code is build on a closed-economy assumption that basically, our corporations are going to be insulated from international competition.And the world has changed a lot, and that assumption is way out of step with today's integrated global economy. Our trading partners are competing hard for capital, investment and jobs. One measure of this is the increasing mobility of investment across borders. In 1980, not too long ago, cross-border foreign investment comprised 6 percent of global GDP. Today it exceeds 33 percent. Think about that.And like trade, I don't think we can afford to sit this one out. And as we do, as we have our businesses competing with one hand tied behind their backs, we are sitting it out. We need a tax system that helps U.S. businesses and workers compete on the global economic playing field.In the context of the supercommittee, which was spectacularly unsuccessful in reaching its hopeful result, we did get some things done. And one was sitting down as Republicans and Democrats together and talking about tax reform. (In fact ?), we spent hundreds of hours on this with staff from the committees of jurisdiction and with members. And one of the things that we were able to do is to craft a framework for an overhaul of the corporate tax code. Although the broader deal never came together, we did find more common ground on this than any other tax issue, and I think some sense, any other spending issue.So my goal now is to take that framework that we've developed and propose legislation soon in the new year and to do so on a bipartisan basis. I can't tell you how it'll be bipartisan yet because that'll depend on one of my Senate colleagues on the other side of the aisle stepping forward, but I think -- I think some are interested, from discussions.And our plan addresses what I think are the two major competitive disadvantages built into the corporate code. One is the high rate, which is globally, as you know, way out of line with other corporate tax rates, and then our outdated approach to international operations.On the first point, there is a wide consensus now among policymakers, economists, business leaders and so on that the 35 percent corporate tax rate has become a drag on our economy. It makes us noncompetitive. It's the second-highest corporate tax rate among the OECD countries. Only Japan has a higher rate. They have plans to lower theirs, by the way. Thirty-nine point two percent is the average combined federal and state burden, compared to a 25 percent average now among OECD countries. So when you combine our state and federal, we're 39.2 (percent). The average is 25 percent. When Japan's new rate cut takes effect on April 1st, ours will be the highest, actually.We talked about Canada earlier. It's interesting. Canada is going from 16 1/2 percent to 15 percent right now. And as you know, we have lots of companies that operate in both Canada and the United States. And it's interesting in Ohio talking to those companies. The U.S. companies are looking to Canada for their investments and maybe for their headquarters. Canadian companies are very interested in not just remaining Canadian companies, but doing a maximum amount of their business there so their revenues are there and they're taxed there. So it's a -- you know, it's a way to compete, and the United States has been left out of that competition.It's a fairly recent development. In 1986 under the Reagan administration, the corporate rate was cut from 46 (percent) to 34 percent. And that 34 percent was actually a rate below our global trading partners. So as recently as the mid-80s we were competitive. And you know, we were moving. We were -- we were -- we were acting on this issue to make ourselves competitive.In the interim period what has happened is that the OECD rate, which at that time was about where ours is now, about 39 percent, has come down to this 25 percent level. Every single one of the OECD countries in the last two decades have reformed their corporate tax code -- all of them -- to make it more competitive, all of them except us. (Chuckles.) We're the only ones. And again, while we have languished and had, you know, partisan discussions about taxing big corporations, this global trend has been fiercely competitive, and it has driven investment and jobs away from America.So it's true our effective tax rate is not 35 percent. It's probably closer to 28 percent. And the reason that's true is that we have hundreds of special preferences and exemptions in the code. But even at 28 percent, that's a full 5 percent above the OECD average. And much more important to me, our tax break-riddled code means resources are not being allocated to productive purposes. So even if the effective rate is lower, there are so many economic inefficiencies in the way we're doing it that we're still globally uncompetitive.Who's paying the price? The American workers. Just like trade, who pays the price? American workers. The office of the congressional -- the Congressional Budget Office, which, you know, is a nonpartisan group that gives Congress advice, has done some analysis of this. And their analysis would be that 70 percent or more of the burden of corporate taxes is borne by workers in the form of lower wages.Now, you know, again, this is a controversial issue, I suppose, among some. And certainly there are folks who say we shouldn't be helping big corporations; we should be making life tougher for them; they have too much cash on the sidelines. My view is if we're going to help workers and help make America competitive, we've got to have a tax system that makes sense globally.The chairmen of the Finance Committee and Ways and Means Committee have said this. The Simpson-Bowles commission said it. President Obama has said it. So this is not something that can't be done on a bipartisan basis.The proposal we're developing actually does it. It brings the top rate down from 35 (percent) to 25 percent. It does so in a revenue-neutral manner. The Joint Committee on Taxation has scored it. It's the only proposal of its kind. Some have said it can't be done. It can be done. You got to get rid of a lot of loopholes and tax breaks, but it certainly can be done.The tax rate cut is paid for primarily by reducing inefficiencies, preferences and exemptions in the code, so again, base broadening, lowering the rate. It will ensure that businesses succeed more based on the quality and value of their goods and services and not based on the sophistication of their tax planning. As a recovering lawyer myself, I will say it'll mean fewer corporate lawyers in house and fewer need for lawyers on the outside.And by the way, it also ensures that all corporations pay taxes. There's been a lot of publicity about some that don't or pay very little, and this'll be a 25 percent rate.We know from economic studies and international experience that the lower corporate rate will spark substantial economic growth and job creation. There's a study out by the Journal of Public Economics saying that reducing the rate by 10 percent would increase economic growth rates by between 1 (percent) and 2 percent, about a million jobs a year, not bad by something that, again, can be bipartisan, revenue-neutral.We know from the European experience that the growth effects can increase taxable income and revenue, an important consideration in our current fiscal climate. According to Ernst & Young, in Europe, for every 1 percentage point cut in the corporate rate, total corporate taxable income expanded by nearly half a percent. So again, raising revenue not by raising taxes, actually by lowering the rate, broadening the base, making the code more efficient. So we have strong evidence this will mean more jobs, more growth and more revenue.The second competitive disadvantage is the way we approach international taxation. With 95 percent of the consumers living outside the U.S., we can't afford a tax system that continues to impede U.S. businesses and workers from succeeding in foreign markets. That's what we do now. We compete, again, not just with a high rate, but with a worldwide taxation system rather than a territorial taxation system that penalizes U.S. businesses for reinvesting profits they earn overseas back here at home.The tax code basically gives firms a choice between keeping their earnings abroad tax-free or paying a steep tax bill if and when they choose to bring their money home. Some have noted that tax on repatriation of foreign earnings creates this lockout effect. They say we have trapped an estimated $1.4 trillion overseas. And that's foreign earnings overseas that could otherwise come to this country with a lower rate. So again, this is an obvious opportunity for us to increase investment here, increase jobs here and to get the economy moving.Bill Simon, former Treasury secretary, once said something interesting. He said we need a tax system that looks like it was actually designed on purpose. And that would be the idea of this corporate tax reform. So at a time with 21 million Americans underemployed or unemployed, it seems like that makes a lot of sense to go to a territorial regime and also to be sure that we have repatriation to bring some of those profits back.Some have asked, why should we care about helping U.S. companies compete overseas in Asia and Europe and elsewhere? I'll give you a quick example, which is Procter & Gamble in my hometown of Cincinnati, Ohio. They employ about 13,000 people in Cincinnati, our largest private sector employer. And Procter & Gamble does a lot of business overseas. Like most of the Fortune 200, they make most of their money in foreign sales.And people say, well, you know, why should we help them with their operations overseas? They're not going to export soap; they're going to make soap overseas and sell it overseas. But then, being headquartered in the United States, that money comes back to the United States, because that's where they do their research and development and back-office work and legal work and accounting work, and that's where their headquarters is. So of the 13,000 people who work in Cincinnati, 5,000 of them have their jobs because of the international sales. Expand the international sales, you expand the number of jobs in Cincinnati, Ohio. That's the concept.And again, I think we can take a lesson from other countries that have done this. It works. It means more jobs in the U.S. It means a territorial regime that will give businesses much more confidence to compete abroad and to invest more at home.I've laid out two what I think are big and important ways to strengthen the American economy. I think they're achievable reforms, too, and they'll help America regain its competitive edge: export expansion, corporate tax reform. There are so many others. We mentioned earlier a list of them. It includes domestic energy production; it includes worker retraining; it includes reforming our health care system to actually reduce costs of health care; it certainly includes dealing with the debt and deficit. And by doing these things -- restraining spending, surmounting these structural obstacles in our economy -- we can grow our economy. We can get out of the debt-driven doldrums and we can achieve the promise of prosperity. And we can do it for our kids and our grandkids, which is ultimately the American dream. When you think about it, it's being sure that our children and our grandchildren have more opportunities than we had. It's what my dad did for me and his grandparents did for him.But it's also about America's place in the world. And to be that beacon of hope and opportunity, to have America continue to lead in the world, we've got to sharpen our competitive edge. Some of you worked with me when I was U.S. Trade Rep and have this experience in common with me. But you go around the world, as many of you do with your businesses, and you talk to people from other countries -- in my case, foreign leaders -- and even if in public sometimes they were critical of the United States -- in my case, on trade issues and sometimes foreign policy issues -- in private, you generally get the same reaction, which is, you know: How did you do it? How did you create the greatest middle class on the face of the Earth? What is the trick of, you know, free-market economics? How does -- how does it work?And America continues to be the envy of the world in some respects, but frankly, we're falling behind. That question isn't asked as frequently. The question now being asked often is: Gosh, is there another model? Maybe state capitalism, practiced by China. They seem to be doing better.If the United States is not out there promoting trade liberalization, promoting human rights, promoting free markets and freedom, don't expect anybody else to. (Chuckles.) So you know this well -- again, so many of you here have tremendous experience globally. America's role in the world is in question. And what I've outlined today are just two of many things that we need to do to right the ship, and do it soon so that America (can ?) continue to be that beacon of hope and opportunity for the rest of the world.Thank you all very much. (Applause.)FRIEDMAN: (Off mic) -- questions, and let me just, as a reminder: Wait for the microphone, if you would, and speak directly into it, and state your name and your affiliation when you ask a question; and would, as always, remind you to keep it concise. I'm just going to kick this off, though, while you're gearing up.Rob, you mentioned, as part of your list of seven areas for work, regulatory reform. Do you want to comment on your general thoughts about that?PORTMAN: Steve, I think it fits perfectly in what we were talking about in making our economy more competitive, including more globally competitive.One quick story: This week, I had a business roundtable in Findlay, Ohio. A Danish company is investing there and they're very interested in our regulatory system, because they have found dealing with OSHA and EPA is a lot more difficult in the United States of America than dealing with any of their regulators in Denmark -- so, you know, changing kind of the conventional wisdom, which is that it must be so tough to do business in Europe. These folks are seeing firsthand that it's harder to do business here, in some respects.So this notion that our regulations are fine, we don't need to worry about it, we need to have strong regulations to protect safety and soundness and the health of our citizenry and so on -- we've got to do it in a smarter way. And we can and should, and regulators should work with business. Regulations are important, no question about it; but there's a much smarter way to do it.There is legislation that's bipartisan, I've introduced with Senator Pryor. Senator Pryor is a member of the Governmental Affairs Committee with me, which is a committee of jurisdiction. We've also got some other Democrat support for it. Senator Bill Nelson from Florida is a cosponsor, as is Susan Collins.It has almost identical legislation in the House that passed in November; it's called the Regulatory Accountability Act. I hope you'll check it out if you're interested. But it reforms the Administrative Procedure Act for the first time in about five decades -- hasn't been touched; again, we've fallen behind. And it simply says to the regulators: You've got to use a cost-benefit analysis that includes the impact on jobs; you also have to choose the least-burdensome alternative, so if there's a policy objective that's been laid out, fine. But right now, of course, there's no requirement to use the least-burdensome alternative, which is one reason the cost of some of these regulations is so high.The recent EPA regulation that would have affected Ohio quite negatively, power plants, was deemed, even by the EPA, to result in over a million jobs being lost. And that wasn't considered as part of their analysis as to how to come up with, again, a policy objective being met through the promulgation of regulations. So it's really commonsense stuff.It also requires more transparency in the process. It requires independent agencies be brought into this cost-benefit analysis. That is done for most executive branch agencies, but not for most independent ones. The president himself has said that's a good idea. But he can't do anything about it because they're independent agencies, so it has to be done by statute.It also requires judicial review -- not for every regulation, but for larger regulations -- so that agencies are actually held to the standards that are established by Congress. So I think this is good, commonsense, bipartisan legislation. I think it can get done this year. There's a lot of talk about regulations; this is something that could actually happen.I also support a number of other, more aggressive measures on regulations -- honestly, that I don't think is going to have bipartisan support. So my big push this year, just as it is with corporate tax reform and some of these trade measures, is to get some regulatory relief going that actually gives companies some sense of predictability and certainty. You would never have some of the regulations that have come out in the last year -- some of which have been postponed until after the election now -- if you'd had this sort of regulatory framework in place.So I think there's great opportunity here, Steve, and it definitely affects our global competitiveness.FRIEDMAN: Great. Thanks, Rob.Now we'll open it up. Sir.QUESTIONER: My name is Khalid Azim, Senator. My question to you, sir, is, I think you rightfully said that raising taxes can't keep pace with our expenditures, but wouldn't some part of the solution for the structural imbalances we have in our fiscal policy include raising taxes?PORTMAN: You sound like Peterson -- no -- (laughs, laughter).It's a -- it's a complicated question, in the sense that, as I said earlier, I believe strongly in tax reform, on the individual side and the corporate side. You will raise more revenue through that, and that's a much better way to go. So to me, it would actually be broadening the base, reducing the statutory rate and generating more income.Whether it's tax -- in a tax increase or not is sort of in the eye of the beholder. And, you know, there's this issue about, you know, Americans for Tax Reform and the so-called pledge and how it all works. The pledge does not mean that there can't and shouldn't be tax reform. In fact, I'm, again, a strong advocate of it, as are -- as are many Republicans who signed the pledge. So my view would be tax reform, generating more revenue.In the supercommittee process, I also supported a proposal that would have tax reform: lowering the rate; broadening the base; permanency with regard to the '01 and '03 rates; and also generating some additional income (for ?) the two top brackets -- $250 billion, to be precise -- of static-scored new revenue.But honestly, when you look at our spending issues and you look at spending as a percent of GDP -- which is probably the right way to look at it -- the historic average: 20 percent over the last 50 years. We're now at 24 1/2 percent, heading to 25 -- soon 27, soon 28, soon 30, soon 40. You simply can't tax enough to get there.Should we have a revenue base that is greater than the current revenue to GDP? Yes. You know, it's 14 1/2 to 15 percent right now. It's getting a little stronger as we're coming out of the recession. And as the recovery begins, this -- Congressional Budget Office thinks it'll get back to the historic levels, which is about 18 percent. If the $4 trillion tax increase happens a year from now, which is scheduled, it would be more like 21 percent -- (chuckles) -- which is way above the historic average.So I don't mean to give you such a complicated answer, but I think just raising taxes on the current base and in the current code would be a huge mistake. I think tax reform makes sense. I think you will generate more tax revenue from it. I think there are ways in which you could do that and even have some static score revenue, but it would have to be in the context of tax reform and predictability and certainty in the tax code.I mentioned being in Ohio. We did three factory tours and a lot of business roundtables, three different groups. And you know, this -- you hear a lot about certainty and predictability, and when you're out there -- as many of you are and many of you are invested in some of these companies, some of you run some of them -- you know, in Ohio there's a lot of uncertainty about the tax code. And most of these companies are pass-through entities. They're looking at a rate that's going to go from 35 to 39.7 (percent) at the end of the year, and you add the president's health care bill surcharge on top of that, they're looking at, you know, 42, 43 percent tax rates. And that means they take less money -- put less money into their businesses, so they take more out to pay their taxes. And most of these guys, what they do is -- they're Sub S owners. Some of them are partnerships. They take money out to pay their taxes. And they're going to invest less in their company. And that's one reason cash is on the sidelines, they tell me. They're getting a little more business, but they're not willing to take that risk. So part of the answer is certainty, predictability, not that anything's ever permanent in Washington. But there's total impermanence right now. Nobody knows what's going to happen. I would, you know, challenge anybody in this room to tell me what's going to happen a year from now on taxes. I don't know. And if you're an entrepreneur or investor, as many of you are in this room, you don't know either. And that is part of the reason, in my view, that we're not seeing the strong recovery that we need.FRIEDMAN: Sir.QUESTIONER: Thank you. I'm Dan Altman with North Yard Economics and NYU, and it's a pleasure to hear someone talk about things like corporate income tax reform and trade promotion authority that would seem to be noncontroversial on either side of the aisle. One thing that you didn't mention, though, in terms of America catching up to other countries is the public goods that we might need, like our infrastructure, which is probably decades behind in investment, potentially basic research as well, our educational system. Can you talk a little bit about what public goods you think we need and how we could pay for them?PORTMAN: Good question, Dan. And you know, I'm here, again, with the master, Peterson, on this, these budget issues, but if you imagine our budget as a pie, 60 percent of it is now on autopilot. So that would be Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, some other entitlements, and then interest on debt, and probably just under 40 percent would represent the rest. More than half of that is defense and the rest is what you're talking about. So in terms of public goods, whether it's transportation funding or research funding, that's done under the -- you know, the part of the annually appropriated budget that represents a smaller and smaller share of the budget because that 60 percent is the fastest-growing part of the budget, the so-called entitlement programs -- very important programs. But if they're not reformed, they will bankrupt the country, and they will continue to put more and more pressure and squeeze more and more on what you would term as "public goods" or domestic discretionary spending, outside of defense.So I mean, that's the -- that's the reality of what's happening. If you are a liberal Democrat or if you are a conservative Republican, I think you should find common cause in this -- in this endeavor, because many of those public goods are things that traditionally the Democratic Party has held dear, and what's going to happen, by protecting the entitlement programs, refusing to consider any sensible reforms, is you will squeeze that more and more. Again, the numbers just don't work. It's not philosophy. It's math.So yes, we need to invest in our infrastructure. There is a huge problem right now because our gas tax receipts are down, and that's how we fund the trust fund. And the question is, do you put more general revenues in -- we've already started down that track -- and you put more general revenues in, you're borrowing 42 cents of it, including a lot more from foreign investors, at a time when interest rates are historically low. What's going to happen there? So we've got to figure out, in my view, one, how to keep that section of the pie from shrinking by taking some pressure off from the rest of the pie and also, specifically with regard to infrastructure, a better way to fund infrastructure.But these are -- you know, these are the fundamental issues, I think, where we have a structural problem. I think we have a structural problem on the economy, we have a structural problem in terms of our fiscal condition. If we don't reform these major entitlement programs, there simply will not be funds available for those.You think about it. Even today, I mean, all of our revenue coming in pays for that 60 percent. That's it. I mean, to the extent we are borrowing 40 to 42 cents on the dollar, that 60 percent is all we're paying for today. We're not actually paying for any of the rest of government, including defense, including all those public goods. We're borrowing money to do that.One percent increase in interest rates, by the way, is another $130 billion a year, 1.3 trillion (dollars) over 10 years, of deficit. So the European situation is a drag on our economy, in my view, but it also has had an interesting impact, which is that we -- and some of -- some of you, again, know a lot more about this than I do, in terms of the bond market, but it has encouraged people to continue to invest in America as in some respects the least dirty shirt in the closet. And that has kept our interest rates relatively low, along with aggressive action by the Fed.That doesn't go on forever. And you know, this is the -- I think the window of opportunity -- right now we have to act, and act without having a tremendous dislocation by huge benefit cuts or huge tax increases.FRIEDMAN: David Malpass.PORTMAN: Hey, David.QUESTIONER: Hello, Senator. David Malpass with Encima Global. I wonder if you could comment on the debt limit. The increase went badly in August. Another one will come up a year from now, and it looks like it'll go just as badly. I think it should be replaced, so that we don't threaten default or government shutdown but instead can actually use it to cut spending. Is there any plan to change the debt limit or avoid that disaster that we had in August?PORTMAN: You're right, David. I think that was harmful to the economy. It was certainly one of the reasons Congress is at -- now at a 9 percent approval rating, which I think is family members like Jed and staff -- is 9 percent. So I don't know. Nobody else out there that approves, probably. FRIEDMAN: Can you count on Jed?PORTMAN: I'm not sure I can count on Jed anymore after that.You know, I thought it was a huge mistake for us to go into a post-debt limit period, because it's not even like shutting down the government when you come to the end of a continuing resolution. You know, this has been one of the big issues in Washington. You come to the end of a CR, and are you going to shut down government or not? We just did it, actually, for a day recently and -- that's hard, but shutting down government means you continue essential services, and you still have revenue coming in. When you're borrowing -- let's choose a number -- 40 cents on the dollar, to be conservative, and one day you're bringing in 40 cents of all your revenues from borrowing and the next day you cannot borrow, because you have exceeded your debt limit and your borrowing authority is gone, and your cash flowing -- in other words, on any given day, your expenses are going to be different, just as they are in your businesses -- you are tempting fate. And many of my colleagues on my side of the aisle, as you know, were willing to do that. I was not, because I felt as though there was a possibility of a truly deep cut in Social Security, because on any given day, you have a big Social Security payment, and you don't have the money for it, the government's going to have to make a decision.And by the way, Treasury had exhausted all of their tools, so other than selling gold, David, we'd done about everything, hadn't Treasury, I mean. So there was really no flexibility there. And so it's not a good way to run a railroad. (Chuckles.) And what I did like about it is that there was -- there was a theory that, OK, we'll raise the debt limit, but we will cut spending dollar for dollar -- over a 10-year period, admittedly, but over a 10-year period -- at the same level we increase the debt limit -- so increase it by a trillion dollars, a trillion dollars of deficit reduction over 10 years, which is what you're talking about. So I think that's the better way to go, but you've got to find common ground to do that. So I don't think we should tempt fate again. I think it's a mistake. I think it would be, you know, enormously harmful to what I described earlier as an increasingly tenuous situation internationally and a -- and a still very weak economy. I think the economic growth we're seeing is fragile and tenuous, and I think it would be a mistake to get back into that game of chicken.FRIEDMAN: We have tough strictures on time, so it's time for one more. And we'll take the gentleman in the back.QUESTIONER: Badinski (ph), Voice of America.PORTMAN: Yeah, good to see you.QUESTIONER: Senator, you said at the tail end of your remarks that you can't expect other countries to do things like promote human rights. So with that in mind, how do you see the sentiment in the Congress, the House and the Senate, regarding American foreign expenditures for things like foreign aid, embassies, military posts and public diplomacy?PORTMAN: Good question. I hope I didn't say that countries won't promote human rights, but I did say America tends to take the leadership role. And by the way, we take the leadership role on, you know, a lot of issues that relate to our national security as well and to global security. You know, the fight against terrorism, we tend to take the lead.But in terms of promoting human rights and promoting free elections and promoting free markets and promoting trade liberalization, often our allies who might benefit from some of those same structures are nowhere to be found, and we're out there in the lead. And so my point was that America's role in the world is outsized. We sort of box above our weight even. We're not just the remaining superpower -- a waning one, albeit -- but we're the one who is willing to step up and do some things that are hard but that are necessary. And sometimes in international fora I've found, at the World Trade Organization or other places, you know, that's our role.So the whole issue of this part of the budget we talked about that's not defense but is annually appropriated includes foreign assistance, foreign aid, includes the way in which, you know, America helps our allies and helps promote democracy and helps promote freedom. And there's a big debate about it right now. Republicans are split. When I go to speak to -- at town halls or have teletown hall meetings, often I get the -- you know, the response that, gee, if you want to reduce spending, just cut foreign aid.Well, it turns out, depending on how you describe foreign aid, if you include foreign military sales or not, it's 1 (percent) or 2 percent of the budget. And frankly, it's not going to balance the budget, and it does play an important role to the extent you believe it keeps us out of much more significant expenditures like wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that -- for a long period of time they were costing us over $150 billion a year.So I think there is a lot of support in Congress for continuing -- and you saw in the -- in the appropriations bills that made their way through the Congress this year, there was support for continuing foreign aid programs. But there is also a lot of pressure, as there will be on the entire budget, to make sure we're getting the most bang for the buck. So I think you're going to see a continued effort to be sure that we're seeing some results from our foreign aid.And as you know, over the -- really, the past decade there's been a movement toward U.S. foreign aid being more directed toward countries that are willing to encourage, you know, the fight against corruption and transparency and human rights and free elections and so on -- I think that's appropriate -- rather than just sending money to folks without having any longer-term progress to show for it. So I think there'll be more pressure on it, but I do think there's still support for keeping what I view as, in the latest continuing resolution and the budget, adequate support for foreign assistance.FRIEDMAN: Well, Rob, thank you. This is -- you've given us the realities, but also the path forward, if we can take it. So we thank you very much. It's been terrific. (Applause.)PORTMAN: Thank you all.
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    ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: Good afternoon, everybody. My name is Andrew Ross Sorkin with The New York Times and CNBC. I am pleased to introduce today Edmund Phelps -- Professor Edmund Phelps, I should say, director of the Center of Capitalism and Society at Columbia University and 2006 Nobel Laureate in economics. I should remind everybody to turn off -- not just put on vibrate -- your cellphones, BlackBerrys and all other wireless devices to avoid interference with the very sensitive sound system. And I'd also like to recommend happily -- not recommend, rather, but remind everybody happily that this is on the record, for those journalists who are in the room, and finally to remind everybody that there is another meeting, a very exciting meeting tomorrow called the "Europe Update" tomorrow morning at 9:45 to 9:00 a.m. (sic). Hope you all can make that. So with that very short introduction -- and then we're going to have a conversation in a little bit -- let me hand this over to the professor. Professor. EDMUND PHELPS: It's an enormous pleasure to be here. I'm all fired up over a number of issues, and I guess this'll be -- provide an opportunity to touch on some of them. As you know and as I know, we have descended into a pretty deep slump, measured by unemployment and labor force participation rates. It is some consolation that we have been gaining some ground of late, private sector in particular. Public sector has been discharging people in the unemployment pool almost as fast as the private sector has been hiring them. But still I regard the situation as having moderately improved. But my research suggests that we will not recover to the old normal, but to a new normal with, as a guess, an unemployment rate around 7 percent. We seek remedies for our ills, but the prescriptions we take will not have much value if they are not grounded in adequate economic theory, and that's where my -- where I come in today. From the point of view of my theoretical and statistical work dating back to my 1994 book, "Structural Slumps," and my later research on structural blooms, not to mention my more recent work on economic dynamism, the present slump is widely misdiagnosed and the widely debated policy prescriptions ill founded, not grounded -- not well grounded. Looking through my lenses, the present slump at this point appears to be structural. The previous structural slump, I would say, was Europe's slump in the 1980s. I'm inclined to think that the Great Depression was largely monetary, but more research could perhaps usefully be done. I see three structural mechanisms at work behind today's structural slump. First, a depression has emerged in the values put on business assets such as commercial structures, such as important kinds of trained employees, those who handle information and those who used to be engaged in the innovation and growth departments. Price earnings ratios are around 12, where 10 years ago, if I'm not mistaken, the ratios were around, oh, 16. And I think I can recall 20 or more in frothier times. The impact has been mainly -- the impact of these depression -- by this depression of business asset values per asset -- the impact has been mainly on business investment activity, and especially on innovative activity. Employment in the financial sector has also taken a big hit. Second, a real exchange rate depreciation has come to the U.S., with the result that companies have been -- under the -- under the protection of the -- of the real exchange rate depreciation, they've been tempted to raise their markups, which they proceeded to do. Last -- third and last, the collapse of the artificial and highly speculative housing boom eliminated a huge number of construction jobs and jobs in some of the financial industries connected with construction. I don't see the impairment of the banking industry by its -- by their -- by its poor balance sheets -- I don't see this impairment as a major cause of the slump, since the banks had ceased to be big lenders to business anyway. And I don't see the insolvency of households as a major source of the slump either. I don't think that consumer demand led the economy into the slump. Besides, production of consumer goods are far more capital-intensive than they are labor- intensive. And to put it crudely, investment activity is where the jobs are, including innovative activity -- development of -- development of projects that -- project development that is hoped to lead to innovation. What are the main underlying structural causes of this depression? The demographic prospect ahead of us is a large exodus of trained employees from the labor force, heavily over the 19 -- over the -- over the 2020s. There has been a staggering rise of private wealth. In America, which I'm focusing on, much of this bloating is in the category of what I call social wealth. The present value -- and by the rise -- by private wealth here I mean the present -- I'm talking about the present value of assets, so to speak, present -- and the social wealth I'm talking about is the present value of unfunded social entitlements: $35 trillion for Medicaid, $23 trillion for Medicare and $8 trillion for Social Security, and that's not counting the public debt. In Greece and maybe France, I think we're seeing something similar. In Europe, we see also a pathological excess of private saving, in part fueled by undertaxation, thus huge fiscal deficits and thus rising public debt. Now you might say, well, what's depressing about that? I thought capitalism was all about wealth accumulation, as one newspaper, I think is fond of saying. (Laughter.) Well, what's depressing about it is several things. It's not good for the labor force participation. If people are already as rich as Croesus, they may may not feel impelled to go out and get a job. And another thing is it can cause big problems for companies when the personnel don't really need to take all that guff and don't need to put shoulder to wheel because they're doing fine, thank you, with their investments. And I could go on and on. I could also argue the opposite side of this, but I won't do it. (Laughter.) Another cause of the structural slump (trivially ?) is the overhang of housing, which leads to an enormous theoretical tangle of forces, which I won't dare go into today. So that's my structural perspective. Oh, I wanted to say another thing. The -- perhaps the most -- single most important reason why we're in the doldrums is that we've been in a productivity slowdown since about 1973. And there were times when we forgot about it and thought it was over, because things were going so well; but then, after a while they weren't going so well any more. And it's now very clear, if you look at the data between 1973 or so and the present, that productivity growth is just a whole lot slower than it had been between, say, 1955 and 1973, or between 1921 and 1941. There's simply no comparison. Now, the -- of course, there are all these rival theoretical perspectives. I had the pleasure at the Reuters Keynes-Hayek debate last week to attack the Keynesian premise that the slump is a result of deficiency of effective demand. I'll just say here that there's no price deflation going on this slump, and there's not even any disinflation going on now. The Keynesian model simply has got -- not got to first base. And it's appalling that so many people out there in the business world and elsewhere don't seem to realize that that's a totally outmoded -- oh, I won't say outmoded -- it's a totally inapplicable theory. The last time we had a hundred percent slump that was monetary in origin was the Great Slump in Britain in 1926, when Churchill put the pound back at the old price in terms of the dollar, requiring a humongous drop in money wages and money prices if they were ever to get back to full employment. And I could also oppose supply-side theories just as well. But let me take the -- my remaining three minutes or so to say -- to articulate a couple of themes. People in this country have come to see the -- have been led to see the economy as a physical system that can be controlled by, so to speak, engineering the outcome you want to do, if necessary using rocket science. People -- and people have been led to that thinking because they're only provided with dumbed-down, highly mechanical, short-sighted, shallow theories like the rudimentary Keynesian theory and the rudimentary supply-side theory, which have no intertemporal depth to them whatsoever, because that would make them too hard. Now, my keen interest in coming here today, I think, is really -- grows out of two particular irritations. One is the irritation -- my irritation with my friends on the -- shall we say Republican supply side, who think that a general tax increase would bring austerity, as if austerity were not already here and going to intensify anyway, whether or not we have a tax increase. I should try to say more about that later, but I can't say everything in my 15 minutes. Also there's my irritation with the Democrat Keynesian group, who think that spending, and therefore employment, will be dashed by a cutback of 120 billion (dollars) in annual terms in government spending, as if the unfunded spending wasn't part of the problem, as if -- it's as if it's like recommending some guy with a terrible hangover that he go out and get another drink, the hair of the dog, you know? It just -- it boggles the mind. This latter faction, the Democratic Keynesian faction, says -- and, I'm sorry, the supply-sider faction -- says that the only way out of the debt is not tax increases but to grow out of the problem, as if the function of the economy were to cover for the politicians who had blundered and overspent and as if there were push-buttons available for speeding up growth, which is one of the things we least understand. I want to make just two crucial points in the last minute. One, since 1990 or so, we've needed to build up fiscal surpluses in view of the looming overhang of entitlements that will start becoming due in the year 2012. I think -- I mentioned that we've got Medicaid entitlements of -- I've lost the number here, but -- these entitlements add up to 66 trillion (dollars). I've asked myself, well, suppose we could get some insurance company in the Netherlands or something to annualize this for us so that the federal government would each year pay a constant flow. Well, how much would the insurance company require in constant flow to cover that 66 trillion (dollars)? And of course, it depends on what rate of return, so to speak, the insurance company requires. At 2 percent, the federal government would have to spend 1.52 trillion (dollars) per annum to the insurance company to take care of -- indefinitely, in perpetuity -- to take care of the problem. At 3 percent, it would 2.28 trillion (dollars). So we're just miles from getting into solvency the way we're going. And then there's finally -- my second point is, I think in all the discussion of the poor condition of the economy, we're overlooking the tremendous slowdown since 1973. We had the -- and now there are signs that we're having technological displacement of a lot of workers as a result of the Internet revolution before that. So we're in really a terrible pickle, but I think at least we can be -- the way forward is -- it's got to begin with applicable thinking about the root causes of our situation. Thank you. (Applause.) SORKIN: Thank you, professor. So what we're hoping to do -- and that was just a framework to really get everybody thinking about where the professor's head is. And what I'm hoping we can do is make this as interactive as possible. I have a couple of questions that your conversation's already raised for me, and then I'm hoping to throw it open to the audience, and I imagine you have much smarter questions than I do. Given the news of the day, which is the failure of the supercommittee, it occurs to me that if I could make you the supercommittee of one, given the framework that you just laid out, in a politically palatable way -- if you think that's even possible -- you would do what? PHELPS: (Sighs.) (Laughter.) Well, in that -- in the context of the supercommittee -- thanks for the question; it's nice. (Laughter.) Well, you sort of threw me with that last -- on the condition that it -- I not get assassinated the next morning by, or I wouldn't be -- SORKIN: Well, forget the politics. If you -- if you could do it your way -- PHELPS: -- chased by angry crowds burning torches? SORKIN: No, if you could do it your way -- PHELPS: Yeah. SORKIN: -- but recognizing the political climate that we're in -- PHELPS: But within the framework -- within the parameters of Western civilization, in other words, yeah. Yeah. (Laughter.) SORKIN: Yeah, we'll take that. PHELPS: (Laughs.) Right. I would go for a general tax increase, starting with the first bracket. I don't like the idea that the bottom 45 percent pay virtually no income taxes net of -- net of various sorts of entitlements. And I -- and I -- though I have no special sympathy for the rich, I do think that we'll get the -- we'll get the biggest bang in terms of employment, innovation and productivity growth if we go about raising our revenues more efficiently. And that means loading more of the burden on the early brackets -- on the first brackets, rather than focusing the heaviest burden on the higher brackets, which are marginal tax rates -- which are marginal tax rates for those people who are -- who are actually paying taxes. If you wanted to raise the highest revenue you could, you wouldn't tax -- you wouldn't have a positive marginal tax rate on that last dollar. What would be the point? SORKIN: Right. You -- but you would spend more attention on the taxes than you would on the cutting? PHELPS: Secondly, I would also be happy to -- I'd actually -- the one-sentence answer that I should have started with, probably, is I would like to roll things back to about the year 2000, before the Bush free pills, before the Bush tax cuts, before the myriad spending motivated -- driven by both Democrats and Republicans. I would be very -- I would -- I would like to go back to there. And so yeah, I would -- I would certainly get rid of the free pills. And I don't -- and I don't like that -- I don't like the -- those across-the-board tax cuts that Bush initiated, no. SORKIN: You mentioned the idea of 7 percent unemployment as a potentially realistic number that we could reach. PHELPS: Yeah, right. SORKIN: When could we reach that, and how? PHELPS: I've been more confident about the number than about the speed. (Chuckles.) That's one derivative too much for me -- (laughter) -- for those mathematicians in the audience. The recovery has certainly gone much slower than I thought. I may have been hoping and expecting a very strong recovery such as occurred -- such as began in 1934 in the U.S. at the bottom of the Depression. But I guess there's just too much -- too much damage done to the system. It's just -- it was -- I think -- we're not going to have a -- SORKIN: But we can get to -- PHELPS: We're not going to have a fast recovery to 7 (percent). On the other hand -- SORKIN: But we can get to 7 percent by doing everything -- (inaudible) -- PHELPS: Belief that we're going to 7 (percent) doesn't mean that we're going to crawl there decade by decade. Look, I -- look, I -- the collapse started in 2007. I think a lot of macroeconomists would agree that by 2020 it would look like most of the damage had been cleared away and things were looking pretty normal again. SORKIN: You made a comment about inflation versus deflation and suggested that we have not had any deflation. This was in the context of what would happen if we raised taxes. And I was going to suggest to you housing is a market that I think it would be hard to argue we haven't had deflation. PHELPS: Well, that gets into how we want to talk about monetary magnitudes and how we want to talk about structural or nonmonetary magnitudes. For me, the interesting price of houses is the real prices of houses, the price that -- expressed in terms of consumer goods, the price deflated by the Consumer Price Index. So yeah, we've had a tremendous decline in the real price of houses, but we would have had that decline even if we somehow could figure out a way to operate the economy without money. We've still had -- we would have still had a speculative boom in the relative price of housing and still had -- and could still have had that and could still have had the collapse. So -- there's a reason why the national income statisticians around the world fix on consumer goods when they talk about inflation. It's normal. Look, the decline in the real price of houses is on my side. It's a point in favor of the structural interpretation. You can't take that point away from me and say it's a point in favor of some monetary theory of the slump. That doesn't make any sense to me. SORKIN: OK. You know, in the conversation and debate between Hayek and Keynes, one of the comments you made that struck me was this idea that if we cut -- this was sort of the Keynes argument -- if we cut -- or the Democratic argument -- if we cut $120 billion -- I think was the number who had cited -- from the government, it wouldn't have an impact, or -- a lot of the Democrats would argue it would have a huge impact on the economy. You say it wouldn't. PHELPS: It's what I said here. SORKIN: That's what you just said. PHELPS: Yeah. SORKIN: Yes. (Laughter.) PHELPS: (Laughs.) I thought you were saying that I said it in the Keynes debate. SORKIN: No, I -- no, but I ask why, given that you're going to take that money directly out of the system tomorrow, maybe over a period of time, but the immediate has to be felt at some level, no? PHELPS: Well, I was making a lot of -- I made -- I already hinted at some of the thinking I have in mind. A lot of consumer -- a lot of the -- much of the production -- the production of much of the consumer goods is highly capital-intensive, so -- ever seen "North by Northwest," that scene where Cary Grant is in the field and the crop duster pilot is trying to kill Cary Grant? And all you see is this vast openness, this vast field, producing this vast amount of farm output with not a single person in sight except for the Cary Grant character. (Laughter.) That's food, but it's really all over the place. Now, I guess how many jobs you lost on that account would depend upon the details. The other thing is that -- a point behind my debunking or devaluing consumer demand, I mean, there are a number of things to say. I made one point -- just made one point against attaching so much importance to consumer demand; namely, the production is very capital intensive. Another point is, high consumer demand makes for a -- no, sorry, that's the wrong point. The other point is that if there's a -- you maybe think this is stretching things, but to the extent that the whole world thinks, oh, great, consumer demand, yes, let's offer more benefits to make people consumer more -- to the extent that that becomes a kind of endemic way of thinking in the Western world, that's going to drive up world real interest rates, and so you may lose more jobs indirectly by hitting investment activity on the head than you gain directly by the increased purchases of consumer goods. Now, that's a complicated argument. If it's just the United States alone that increases consumer demand, you might say that, OK, the U.S. is big but it's not all that big, and the effect on the world real rate of interest -- and even the U.S. real rate of interest because it's to some extent linked to the world real rate of interest -- won't rise so much. But -- so, I mean, I got a whole portfolio of reasons for de-emphasizing consumer demand and emphasizing investment demand. Finally, just if I can just add one more point, you can look at time series data for, let's say, the U.S. economy, and it's just extraordinary how output tends to be explained by one thing: namely, real investment expenditures. That just -- it just hits you. It strikes you that that is the -- it's naked on the face. It's -- output is driven by investment expenditures, which in (turn ?) becomes somebody's income, which leads to consumption. But the driver -- it's statistically pretty evident that the driver is investment demand, it's not consumption demand. SORKIN: You talked a lot about investment demand -- and this is my last question, then I will try to open it up. Virtually every CEO that I talk to suggests that one of the big problems that we're living in right now is this sense of remarkable uncertainty, that the regulatory environment, that -- which they suggest is impacting the economy unto itself, and that it is -- it is this general sense of uncertainty of what's coming next that is actually keeping people from making investments. Do you believe that? PHELPS: I certainly believe that there's something in it, but then I also -- and what's in it is, of course, that business people don't yet know what the details -- what the description will be of the eventual response of the U.S. Congress to the towering fiscal deficits. So businesses may be afraid that the whole burden of adjustment's going to be loaded onto higher tax rates, including or not excluding higher corporate tax rates. So it's understandable that that's another reason for businesses to wait about investment projects. On the other hand, there's a fair amount of mistaken thinking on this score, I think, because if there's one thing that we can be sure of is that there's going to be a contraction of one kind of demand or another: either there's going -- either there going -- either there's going to be less government spending or there's going to be less -- which could -- which would further impact on consumer spending possibly -- or there's going to be higher taxes, which may impact on investment spending. But either way, there's going to be less money and the impact is going to be to either take away -- people are either going to -- the impact on their pocketbooks from day one is either going to be -- is going to be negative whether they've -- whether households have lost benefits or whether households have to pay more taxes. So there's a certainty about that. SORKIN: Right, right. PHELPS: It's only the incidence of whose ox is going to be gored that there's uncertainty over. SORKIN: So the uncertainty is certain? PHELPS: (Inaudible.) SORKIN: On that note, why don't we open it for questions? I know many of you have one. Dan, you have a good seat here in the front. So the microphone's coming around. QUESTIONER: Hi, Dan Altman with North Yard Economics and NYU. Professor, you said that we're heading for 7 percent unemployment. When I was first taking economics courses, they said that the natural rate of unemployment was 6.5 percent. (Chuckles.) That wasn't so long ago, maybe 20 years. And so my question for you is, instead of having a structural slump now that's heading us to a new normal, could it be that we had a monetary-fueled boom, which is now taking us back to the old normal? (Laughter.) PHELPS: I'm not exactly sure when you were young and studying this -- (laughter) -- course. (Chuckles.) My benchmark has been the unemployment rate in the middle of the 1990s, which is 5.6 for two years in a row, with inflation neither rising nor falling, conditions pretty tranquil. It was just before the dawn of the age of the Internet. And so -- so then how did I get to 7 (percent)? So I got to thinking, well, those times were a bit brighter than the times now. For one thing, the overhang of -- the overhang of entitlements had not gotten to nearly the same proportions that it has now. Secondly, in 1995 and 1996, 2020 seemed remote. That's the time when the Baby Boomers will start leaving, en masse, the -- their jobs in the private sector. So for those two reasons alone, we would expect a higher natural unemployment rate now, in the sense of a steady-state, medium-term natural unemployment rate, than we had in the middle of the 1990s. Finally, in addition, I have become gloomier about innovation and economic growth than I and, I think, most people were in 1995 and 1996. We've just been through 10 or 11 years with slower growth than we had between 1990 and 1995. I'm hard pressed to think of a single reason why the natural unemployment rate should be lower now than it was in 1995 and 1996, but -- SORKIN: Yes, sir. QUESTIONER: I'm Kenneth Bialkin, Skadden Arps. I'm reminded, or I have to think about a statement made by President Roosevelt in the '30s, when he announced to the American public that the only thing we have to fear is fear itself. If we would translate that psychological observation to today, we'd define it in terms of optimism or pessimism, the willingness of businesses to invest and expand, the willingness of persons (and workers ?) to spend and look more optimistic about things. And if our objective was to restore optimism to America about the future, if the objective was to restore optimism in the businesses who think about investing and expanding, what steps would be taken to try to encourage that optimism? And to what extent would that optimism depend, to some extent, on the prospects of political change or development? We're coming up to an election next year. Different people have different attitudes about what might be the economic policy of -- (inaudible) -- and I wonder if you could speculate or comment on the validity of this observation, that all economic activity is a derivative of the attitude that people have about the future. PHELPS: Thanks a lot. I love that question. I think that the rebirth of optimism is going to depend upon the rebirth of something objective that you can hang your hat on, that you can hang your optimism on. In getting ready for -- in the preparations for this meeting, I had to write a few lines about what I wanted to talk about, and the lines in front of me I didn't get to at all. So let me, in answer to your question, say what I didn't -- what I said in my forecast of what I would say, which I didn't say here. I think -- I think what's required to get back to a genuine feeling of prosperity and flourishing is some long-needed surgery to shop the -- to stop the "short-termism," to restructure and innovate the financial sector, and to encourage the renewal of a culture of exploration and vision leading to economy-wide innovation -- and thus, a back seat for the money culture, which has been in the driver's seat for at least a decade. And of course, we have to put down -- as I was saying, we have to put down -- we have to stop this push-button mechanics mentality that, oh, the economy, all you have to do is just get right the tuning of the various instruments and we'll be -- we'll be fine again. We have to stop that. That goes for the Keynesians as well as the suppliers -- supply-siders. I would like to see the end of the "Know Nothings" in the free market camp. I'd like to see an end to the -- to the believers in scientism. That's the idea that all the fruits of Western civilization are owed to the scientists, and there's no creativity in the economy at all; nobody in the economy ever had a new idea in his or her life. And by the way, that goes back to Schumpeter and, before Schumpeter, Shpikov (sp). That's where Schumpeter got it. In Schumpeter, the new ideas are from scientists and navigators outside the economic system. We have to stop that, and you people in business should really be pushing to make it clear to the general public that you are engaged -- in your good days, anyway -- you're engaged -- or in your better days -- (laughs, laughter) -- you're engaged, or you were engaged, in innovating and having new ideas, and mulling them over and talking about them and developing some of them, and then trying to market them and, with luck, getting them adopted. And so that's -- I think that's -- we need to have a kind of reformation, a kind of restoration of the -- of the spirit of the country that I think prevailed between -- hard to say when it started, but prevailed -- it certainly was visible and present -- present and visible in the early 19th century, and was going full steam at least till the end of the 1940s. SORKIN: I have a quick follow-up on that. And I should also tell you I am going to out you. The font on that that you were reading is impossible to read, even for myself, and I -- PHELPS: (Laughs.) Glasses. SORKIN: It's the tiniest font you've ever seen, so -- You know, one of the things that strikes me as you were saying it, is I started to think a little bit about Occupy Wall Street, and the economic inequality story and argument that's been made for many years but is clearly now in focus. How important is it to bridge that divide for the long-term sustainability and success of our economy? Does it matter? PHELPS: Andrew, you ask such hard questions. That's a tough one. SORKIN: I only ask because you talk about the confidence that the entire economy needs to keep growing, and I'm curious how the inequality story relates to that, if it does. PHELPS: Well, let me say right away that I pride myself on having had an early interest in economic justice. And I was extraordinarily fortunate, and damn lucky, that for a year I sat in my office next to John Rawls, just across the wall, when he was writing his book, "A Theory of Economic (sic) Justice." But, you know, Rawls is not about inequality. He doesn't say you shouldn't have inequality. He says you're bound to have inequality; it's what you do with it that counts. And he wanted -- he was willing to harness inequality in the interests of people in the labor force who were disadvantaged and had the lowest wage rates. His idea was that the tax system and other levers of government should be operated in such a way as to pull up wage rates at the bottom, and pull up employment opportunities as well, to the maximum possible extent, by calibration of the economic system in such a way that it would -- it would create incentives for everybody to work hard and invest and save and so forth, and then thereby pull up the bottom. So I've been a little bit put off by the occupiers when they talk about inequality, but then I realize that's pedantic on my part. They're not saying that they never saw an inequality they never liked -- that they didn't like -- that they liked; they're saying that it's the particular inequalities that they see that they are appalled by. And I suppose they haven't -- I did go down there one day and I did talk to them one day, and I acknowledged that in my humble opinion, I think there has to be some radical restructuring of parts of the financial sector. I think we need a banking industry that serves the needs of business for financing innovation, things like that. Anyway, so -- but I think your question is really, is the economy, even in the most -- even in the more aggregative terms is the economy suffering from the inequality? And some crude Keynesians -- it's the only kind there are, but the -- (laughter) -- (laughs) -- the crude Keynesians, or for short, the Keynesians, suggest, of course, that, oh, the -- if there was -- if some income could be taken from the rich and be given to the poor, there would be higher consumer demand, and that would float the whole economy up and make everybody, maybe even the rich, better off, or make nearly everybody better off, in any case. I think, you know, as you will see -- as you must have noticed from everything I said, I disagree vehemently with that idea that you can -- yeah, I can think of -- there's one argument you can make why higher consumption demand could be good for employment, but it's very short-termist. You could say that high consumer demand pushes up the currency, pulls up the currency and that cuts mark-ups of companies and that leads to higher employment. The trouble is that the -- the higher -- the appreciation of the currency, or the real exchange rate appreciation will drive away customers; eventually the stock of customers will have settled -- will have declined to the point where output is right back to where it was before. So that's a lousy argument. (Pause.) SORKIN: Why don't we leave it there. PHELPS: I mean, I just -- I just -- I have an old-fashioned position. I want to redistribute -- to pull up wages at the bottom. I really don't give a damn much about inequality as such. SORKIN: OK. PHELPS: I'm not interested in whether Rockefeller -- Rockefellers own half of Maine or Ted Turner owns some big chunk of Montana. It doesn't affect me in my daily life. I have my work, my gratifications. (Laughter.) I'm sorry, it just doesn't -- I don't see where people are coming from when they talk about that. SORKIN: OK. Paul Steiger with a question, sir. QUESTIONER: Paul Steiger from ProPublica and from your Economics 10 class 50 years ago. (Laughter.) You talked about productivity and the attenuation of its growth. Could you talk a little more about that? What has caused it? Is it the reduction in manufacturing and its size in our economy? And how could that be turned around? And also, since increased productivity means, to some extent, fewer jobs, how do you reconcile those two objectives? PHELPS: Thanks, Paul. He really was a student 50-some years ago. We were both young. Well, funnily enough, the decline of productivity growth was rather abrupt. It was sudden. It was almost from one day to the next, (gone ?) by 1973. So it would be hard to say it was because of some long -- long, slow-moving, long-time shift in the structure of the economy. So it's -- I think it's to some extent a puzzle. And I'm not -- I'm not sure that -- I'm not sure that there are any easy answers. I think we're a long way from an understanding of that puzzle. I agree with you that it certainly hasn't helped that we've suffered a decline in the relative importance of manufacturing since 1973, maybe to some extent before that, too. So that since -- it seems to be easier to innovate in manufacturing than in some other sectors of the economy, that may be helping to account for slower productivity growth now than we had, let's say, in the 1950 and '60s. But manufacturing doesn't have any monopoly over productivity growth. There was phenomenal productivity growth in agriculture in the United States from the 1880s or so right through to 1930 or so. Let's leave the Dust Bowl out of it. And I think we've had significant productivity gains in services, medical care; maybe some of medical care falls under manufacturing, I don't know. I think it's a cultural thing. I think we cannot have rapid productivity growth without -- without its being broad-based and without its -- without there being to some extent activity everywhere in the economy oriented to trying out a different -- conceiving, developing and trying out a different way of doing things, or conceiving, developing and marketing a different product. I've read a little bit around about the 19th century. I'm finishing a book on the modern economy from 1815 or so to the present, so I've rummaged around quite a bit of literature, and I'm by no means a professional historian, but I got this sense that the 19th century was so exciting, because everybody in the little artisanal shops and everybody on the farms and everybody was tinkering. Everybody was exploring. Everybody was trying to look for a better way of doing things. There was a new culture. And I think -- I don't know -- I don't think we can just push buttons, enact some legislation and then sit back and watch the flowering begin. I think that we have to get back to the -- to the spirit of innovation. SORKIN: Yes, sir. QUESTIONER: I'm Gerald Pollack (sp). Professor Phelps, could you elaborate a little more your criticism of the Keynesian approach? Now, just assuming that we could have, you know, a longer-term solution to the budget problem, the debt problem, in the shorter term what's wrong with the government borrowing money now at currently low interest rates for the sake of spending money on behalf of infrastructure projects and to give to states so that they could maintain their employment rather than lay off as many people as they've been laying off? What's basically wrong with that? PHELPS: Well, in general, it's not wrong. In general I think there are good instincts there. Hoover instinctively -- he was an engineer, as you know -- he instinctively thought in terms of engineering projects -- infrastructure projects. And Roosevelt, I think -- and some have said that the differences between Roosevelt's program and Hoover's program are not all -- are not great. They don't bowl you over with their -- with their dissimilarity. And Keynes, of course -- and as you may know, in 1933 or so, he was -- or '32 -- he was always talking about infrastructure investments. So it's always been part of the popular instinct to go for infrastructure developments, and it is -- it's not -- it's not the worst economics because investment goods tend to be labor intensive. So, as I was saying before, it does make a certain amount of sense to go for them. The thing is, though, that we now have $66 trillion in -- of entitlements and $10 trillion of public debt, rising by $1 trillion every year, and we don't know what sort of a mess is going -- we're -- is going to be on our doorstep from Europe, and we don't even -- can't even be too sure about the health of the Chinese economy over the next two or three years. So I don't know. We're in a very precarious situation, and I would be extremely concerned, just downright worried, if the Congress were to say, OK, let's do another half trillion (dollars) a year in infrastructure projects. I would be worried about what would happen to the stock market and the bond market and the dollar. I don't want to see a further weakening of the dollar. It'll push up markups. I don't want to see the stock market drop. It'll reduce IPOs, tend to reduce new firm startups. SORKIN: And the market falls because? PHELPS: Higher expectations of people gagging on all the increase in debt in the future and -- SORKIN: The stock market, though, you're saying falls? PHELPS: Hmm? SORKIN: You're saying the stock market falls? Some people would -- PHELPS: Sure. SORKIN: -- argue the stock market would go up -- PHELPS: Some people would. SORKIN: -- with all that spending. PHELPS: (Chuckles.) In economics, you can always take the other side. (Laughter.) I can -- I can do it too, you know. (Laughter.) I have to -- at the end of the day, you have to use your intuition and judgment, and my intuition and judgment is this is not their -- we've gone as far as we can go. I think it's breathtaking that we were able to get this far and pay so little price for it. But I think now, the -- I think the day of reckoning is almost at hand, and we can't go in for the hair of the dog. We must not go -- it is not the time for more infrastructure projects. SORKIN: OK, I'm going to try to get two more questions in. You've had your hand up for a while, sir. Go ahead. And then we'll try to get to you, and then we'll -- QUESTIONER: Nye Zwaboff (ph), Pace University. How do you reconcile your view of the world with the Reinhart-Rogoff view of the world? PHELPS: I didn't know that there was a difference. I haven't read -- Carmen Reinhart's another student of mine in graduate school at Columbia. Ken Rogoff I know pretty well. They say -- (inaudible) -- the difference would be that -- the difference would be -- look, there are two differences. First of all, they don't really come down on the side of one theory or another, so you never know exactly where you are in terms of a -- of a -- of a theoretical framework. They just -- but look, they grind a lot of data; they put a lot of data into the hopper, and they -- and they grind out some patterns, and they show you nice pictures, and there we have it. Still, you know, it's reasonable to pay attention to those -- to those observations. And in one respect, they would -- they would support what I'm saying. They're saying look, you -- brace yourself for a long slump. When you get a deep slump, you don't come out of it right away. Usually, when you're having a deep slump, some pretty basic things are wrong, and it takes a while for them to get right. On the other hand, what I -- what -- I think that Reinhart and Rogoff are too narrow. They're narrowly focused on financial crises. And I don't think that the -- I don't think that the slump we in -- that we're in is primarily financial. I think it's primarily those other things I talked about. And I said -- made one point in my 15 minutes, namely that it's not as if the whole business sector was receiving massive loans from a kindly financial sector that was dutifully sifting good ideas from bad ideas and attentively hovering over the small-business men and helping them to innovate, and now -- and now that sector, which we love so much and on which we depended so much, has got sick. It's not as if that. They deserted us a long time ago. And they deserted the business sector a long time ago. So I think Reinhart and Rogoff have gone too far in suggesting that our whole problem is the banking industry. SORKIN: I promised I'd get one last question, so ask the question. We'll give you 60 seconds to answer it, since we are about -- we have about one minute left. QUESTIONER: Jeff Laurenti with The -- Jeff Laurenti with The Century Foundation. To close on a foreign relations note, you know, what's striking in the current economic crisis is that U.S., Europe, Japan -- all stagnant. And the big developing country economies -- Brazil, India, China -- after an initial wobble seem to have resumed major growth rates. So the economically untrained person scratches his head and asks, I thought these were all supposed to be dependent on getting their imports -- or their exports into our markets, and what's going on here. So what's going on here? (Laughter.) PHELPS: I go to China a lot, so -- in China, I think there's a lot of worry that things are not as rosy as you were suggesting they were. There's been a -- quite a correction in property prices, and this is -- politically, this is not a time when the government is prepared to take -- to conceive and to undertake some major new initiatives. It's the last year of the tenure of the present government. So I think it's an open question whether next year is going to be a good year for China. But I -- but I think that generally, you're right that the idea of a rising tide lifts all boats -- that was never terrifically good theory, and I think -- (laughter) -- I think -- and I think we're now seeing that the boats are on separate oceans. Brazil is doing just fine, and some of the -- probably some of the countries in Asia, including India and maybe Vietnam and maybe Indonesia are also doing just fine, and even Africa has got a couple of stars. And to me, the world looks extremely variegated at the moment. And Europe and the United States are sick in part for the same reasons, but in part for different reasons. SORKIN: Well, on that hopeful and somewhat depressing note at the same time -- (laughter) -- we would thank the professor. Thank you for being here. Appreciate it very, very much. (Applause.) Thank you for your questions. Have a great afternoon, everybody. Thanks. (C) COPYRIGHT 2011, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC., 1000 VERMONT AVE.NW; 5TH FLOOR; WASHINGTON, DC - 20005, USA. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. ANY REPRODUCTION, REDISTRIBUTION OR RETRANSMISSION IS EXPRESSLY PROHIBITED. UNAUTHORIZED REPRODUCTION, REDISTRIBUTION OR RETRANSMISSION CONSTITUTES A MISAPPROPRIATION UNDER APPLICABLE UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW, AND FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC. RESERVES THE RIGHT TO PURSUE ALL REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO IT IN RESPECT TO SUCH MISAPPROPRIATION. FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC. IS A PRIVATE FIRM AND IS NOT AFFILIATED WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. NO COPYRIGHT IS CLAIMED AS TO ANY PART OF THE ORIGINAL WORK PREPARED BY A UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE AS PART OF THAT PERSON'S OFFICIAL DUTIES. FOR INFORMATION ON SUBSCRIBING TO FNS, PLEASE CALL 202-347-1400 OR EMAIL [email protected]. THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: Good afternoon, everybody. My name is Andrew Ross Sorkin with The New York Times and CNBC. I am pleased to introduce today Edmund Phelps -- Professor Edmund Phelps, I should say, director of the Center of Capitalism and Society at Columbia University and 2006 Nobel Laureate in economics. I should remind everybody to turn off -- not just put on vibrate -- your cellphones, BlackBerrys and all other wireless devices to avoid interference with the very sensitive sound system. And I'd also like to recommend happily -- not recommend, rather, but remind everybody happily that this is on the record, for those journalists who are in the room, and finally to remind everybody that there is another meeting, a very exciting meeting tomorrow called the "Europe Update" tomorrow morning at 9:45 to 9:00 a.m. (sic). Hope you all can make that. So with that very short introduction -- and then we're going to have a conversation in a little bit -- let me hand this over to the professor. Professor. EDMUND PHELPS: It's an enormous pleasure to be here. I'm all fired up over a number of issues, and I guess this'll be -- provide an opportunity to touch on some of them. As you know and as I know, we have descended into a pretty deep slump, measured by unemployment and labor force participation rates. It is some consolation that we have been gaining some ground of late, private sector in particular. Public sector has been discharging people in the unemployment pool almost as fast as the private sector has been hiring them. But still I regard the situation as having moderately improved. But my research suggests that we will not recover to the old normal, but to a new normal with, as a guess, an unemployment rate around 7 percent. We seek remedies for our ills, but the prescriptions we take will not have much value if they are not grounded in adequate economic theory, and that's where my -- where I come in today. From the point of view of my theoretical and statistical work dating back to my 1994 book, "Structural Slumps," and my later research on structural blooms, not to mention my more recent work on economic dynamism, the present slump is widely misdiagnosed and the widely debated policy prescriptions ill founded, not grounded -- not well grounded. Looking through my lenses, the present slump at this point appears to be structural. The previous structural slump, I would say, was Europe's slump in the 1980s. I'm inclined to think that the Great Depression was largely monetary, but more research could perhaps usefully be done. I see three structural mechanisms at work behind today's structural slump. First, a depression has emerged in the values put on business assets such as commercial structures, such as important kinds of trained employees, those who handle information and those who used to be engaged in the innovation and growth departments. Price earnings ratios are around 12, where 10 years ago, if I'm not mistaken, the ratios were around, oh, 16. And I think I can recall 20 or more in frothier times. The impact has been mainly -- the impact of these depression -- by this depression of business asset values per asset -- the impact has been mainly on business investment activity, and especially on innovative activity. Employment in the financial sector has also taken a big hit. Second, a real exchange rate depreciation has come to the U.S., with the result that companies have been -- under the -- under the protection of the -- of the real exchange rate depreciation, they've been tempted to raise their markups, which they proceeded to do. Last -- third and last, the collapse of the artificial and highly speculative housing boom eliminated a huge number of construction jobs and jobs in some of the financial industries connected with construction. I don't see the impairment of the banking industry by its -- by their -- by its poor balance sheets -- I don't see this impairment as a major cause of the slump, since the banks had ceased to be big lenders to business anyway. And I don't see the insolvency of households as a major source of the slump either. I don't think that consumer demand led the economy into the slump. Besides, production of consumer goods are far more capital-intensive than they are labor- intensive. And to put it crudely, investment activity is where the jobs are, including innovative activity -- development of -- development of projects that -- project development that is hoped to lead to innovation. What are the main underlying structural causes of this depression? The demographic prospect ahead of us is a large exodus of trained employees from the labor force, heavily over the 19 -- over the -- over the 2020s. There has been a staggering rise of private wealth. In America, which I'm focusing on, much of this bloating is in the category of what I call social wealth. The present value -- and by the rise -- by private wealth here I mean the present -- I'm talking about the present value of assets, so to speak, present -- and the social wealth I'm talking about is the present value of unfunded social entitlements: $35 trillion for Medicaid, $23 trillion for Medicare and $8 trillion for Social Security, and that's not counting the public debt. In Greece and maybe France, I think we're seeing something similar. In Europe, we see also a pathological excess of private saving, in part fueled by undertaxation, thus huge fiscal deficits and thus rising public debt. Now you might say, well, what's depressing about that? I thought capitalism was all about wealth accumulation, as one newspaper, I think is fond of saying. (Laughter.) Well, what's depressing about it is several things. It's not good for the labor force participation. If people are already as rich as Croesus, they may may not feel impelled to go out and get a job. And another thing is it can cause big problems for companies when the personnel don't really need to take all that guff and don't need to put shoulder to wheel because they're doing fine, thank you, with their investments. And I could go on and on. I could also argue the opposite side of this, but I won't do it. (Laughter.) Another cause of the structural slump (trivially ?) is the overhang of housing, which leads to an enormous theoretical tangle of forces, which I won't dare go into today. So that's my structural perspective. Oh, I wanted to say another thing. The -- perhaps the most -- single most important reason why we're in the doldrums is that we've been in a productivity slowdown since about 1973. And there were times when we forgot about it and thought it was over, because things were going so well; but then, after a while they weren't going so well any more. And it's now very clear, if you look at the data between 1973 or so and the present, that productivity growth is just a whole lot slower than it had been between, say, 1955 and 1973, or between 1921 and 1941. There's simply no comparison. Now, the -- of course, there are all these rival theoretical perspectives. I had the pleasure at the Reuters Keynes-Hayek debate last week to attack the Keynesian premise that the slump is a result of deficiency of effective demand. I'll just say here that there's no price deflation going on this slump, and there's not even any disinflation going on now. The Keynesian model simply has got -- not got to first base. And it's appalling that so many people out there in the business world and elsewhere don't seem to realize that that's a totally outmoded -- oh, I won't say outmoded -- it's a totally inapplicable theory. The last time we had a hundred percent slump that was monetary in origin was the Great Slump in Britain in 1926, when Churchill put the pound back at the old price in terms of the dollar, requiring a humongous drop in money wages and money prices if they were ever to get back to full employment. And I could also oppose supply-side theories just as well. But let me take the -- my remaining three minutes or so to say -- to articulate a couple of themes. People in this country have come to see the -- have been led to see the economy as a physical system that can be controlled by, so to speak, engineering the outcome you want to do, if necessary using rocket science. People -- and people have been led to that thinking because they're only provided with dumbed-down, highly mechanical, short-sighted, shallow theories like the rudimentary Keynesian theory and the rudimentary supply-side theory, which have no intertemporal depth to them whatsoever, because that would make them too hard. Now, my keen interest in coming here today, I think, is really -- grows out of two particular irritations. One is the irritation -- my irritation with my friends on the -- shall we say Republican supply side, who think that a general tax increase would bring austerity, as if austerity were not already here and going to intensify anyway, whether or not we have a tax increase. I should try to say more about that later, but I can't say everything in my 15 minutes. Also there's my irritation with the Democrat Keynesian group, who think that spending, and therefore employment, will be dashed by a cutback of 120 billion (dollars) in annual terms in government spending, as if the unfunded spending wasn't part of the problem, as if -- it's as if it's like recommending some guy with a terrible hangover that he go out and get another drink, the hair of the dog, you know? It just -- it boggles the mind. This latter faction, the Democratic Keynesian faction, says -- and, I'm sorry, the supply-sider faction -- says that the only way out of the debt is not tax increases but to grow out of the problem, as if the function of the economy were to cover for the politicians who had blundered and overspent and as if there were push-buttons available for speeding up growth, which is one of the things we least understand. I want to make just two crucial points in the last minute. One, since 1990 or so, we've needed to build up fiscal surpluses in view of the looming overhang of entitlements that will start becoming due in the year 2012. I think -- I mentioned that we've got Medicaid entitlements of -- I've lost the number here, but -- these entitlements add up to 66 trillion (dollars). I've asked myself, well, suppose we could get some insurance company in the Netherlands or something to annualize this for us so that the federal government would each year pay a constant flow. Well, how much would the insurance company require in constant flow to cover that 66 trillion (dollars)? And of course, it depends on what rate of return, so to speak, the insurance company requires. At 2 percent, the federal government would have to spend 1.52 trillion (dollars) per annum to the insurance company to take care of -- indefinitely, in perpetuity -- to take care of the problem. At 3 percent, it would 2.28 trillion (dollars). So we're just miles from getting into solvency the way we're going. And then there's finally -- my second point is, I think in all the discussion of the poor condition of the economy, we're overlooking the tremendous slowdown since 1973. We had the -- and now there are signs that we're having technological displacement of a lot of workers as a result of the Internet revolution before that. So we're in really a terrible pickle, but I think at least we can be -- the way forward is -- it's got to begin with applicable thinking about the root causes of our situation. Thank you. (Applause.) SORKIN: Thank you, professor. So what we're hoping to do -- and that was just a framework to really get everybody thinking about where the professor's head is. And what I'm hoping we can do is make this as interactive as possible. I have a couple of questions that your conversation's already raised for me, and then I'm hoping to throw it open to the audience, and I imagine you have much smarter questions than I do. Given the news of the day, which is the failure of the supercommittee, it occurs to me that if I could make you the supercommittee of one, given the framework that you just laid out, in a politically palatable way -- if you think that's even possible -- you would do what? PHELPS: (Sighs.) (Laughter.) Well, in that -- in the context of the supercommittee -- thanks for the question; it's nice. (Laughter.) Well, you sort of threw me with that last -- on the condition that it -- I not get assassinated the next morning by, or I wouldn't be -- SORKIN: Well, forget the politics. If you -- if you could do it your way -- PHELPS: -- chased by angry crowds burning torches? SORKIN: No, if you could do it your way -- PHELPS: Yeah. SORKIN: -- but recognizing the political climate that we're in -- PHELPS: But within the framework -- within the parameters of Western civilization, in other words, yeah. Yeah. (Laughter.) SORKIN: Yeah, we'll take that. PHELPS: (Laughs.) Right. I would go for a general tax increase, starting with the first bracket. I don't like the idea that the bottom 45 percent pay virtually no income taxes net of -- net of various sorts of entitlements. And I -- and I -- though I have no special sympathy for the rich, I do think that we'll get the -- we'll get the biggest bang in terms of employment, innovation and productivity growth if we go about raising our revenues more efficiently. And that means loading more of the burden on the early brackets -- on the first brackets, rather than focusing the heaviest burden on the higher brackets, which are marginal tax rates -- which are marginal tax rates for those people who are -- who are actually paying taxes. If you wanted to raise the highest revenue you could, you wouldn't tax -- you wouldn't have a positive marginal tax rate on that last dollar. What would be the point? SORKIN: Right. You -- but you would spend more attention on the taxes than you would on the cutting? PHELPS: Secondly, I would also be happy to -- I'd actually -- the one-sentence answer that I should have started with, probably, is I would like to roll things back to about the year 2000, before the Bush free pills, before the Bush tax cuts, before the myriad spending motivated -- driven by both Democrats and Republicans. I would be very -- I would -- I would like to go back to there. And so yeah, I would -- I would certainly get rid of the free pills. And I don't -- and I don't like that -- I don't like the -- those across-the-board tax cuts that Bush initiated, no. SORKIN: You mentioned the idea of 7 percent unemployment as a potentially realistic number that we could reach. PHELPS: Yeah, right. SORKIN: When could we reach that, and how? PHELPS: I've been more confident about the number than about the speed. (Chuckles.) That's one derivative too much for me -- (laughter) -- for those mathematicians in the audience. The recovery has certainly gone much slower than I thought. I may have been hoping and expecting a very strong recovery such as occurred -- such as began in 1934 in the U.S. at the bottom of the Depression. But I guess there's just too much -- too much damage done to the system. It's just -- it was -- I think -- we're not going to have a -- SORKIN: But we can get to -- PHELPS: We're not going to have a fast recovery to 7 (percent). On the other hand -- SORKIN: But we can get to 7 percent by doing everything -- (inaudible) -- PHELPS: Belief that we're going to 7 (percent) doesn't mean that we're going to crawl there decade by decade. Look, I -- look, I -- the collapse started in 2007. I think a lot of macroeconomists would agree that by 2020 it would look like most of the damage had been cleared away and things were looking pretty normal again. SORKIN: You made a comment about inflation versus deflation and suggested that we have not had any deflation. This was in the context of what would happen if we raised taxes. And I was going to suggest to you housing is a market that I think it would be hard to argue we haven't had deflation. PHELPS: Well, that gets into how we want to talk about monetary magnitudes and how we want to talk about structural or nonmonetary magnitudes. For me, the interesting price of houses is the real prices of houses, the price that -- expressed in terms of consumer goods, the price deflated by the Consumer Price Index. So yeah, we've had a tremendous decline in the real price of houses, but we would have had that decline even if we somehow could figure out a way to operate the economy without money. We've still had -- we would have still had a speculative boom in the relative price of housing and still had -- and could still have had that and could still have had the collapse. So -- there's a reason why the national income statisticians around the world fix on consumer goods when they talk about inflation. It's normal. Look, the decline in the real price of houses is on my side. It's a point in favor of the structural interpretation. You can't take that point away from me and say it's a point in favor of some monetary theory of the slump. That doesn't make any sense to me. SORKIN: OK. You know, in the conversation and debate between Hayek and Keynes, one of the comments you made that struck me was this idea that if we cut -- this was sort of the Keynes argument -- if we cut -- or the Democratic argument -- if we cut $120 billion -- I think was the number who had cited -- from the government, it wouldn't have an impact, or -- a lot of the Democrats would argue it would have a huge impact on the economy. You say it wouldn't. PHELPS: It's what I said here. SORKIN: That's what you just said. PHELPS: Yeah. SORKIN: Yes. (Laughter.) PHELPS: (Laughs.) I thought you were saying that I said it in the Keynes debate. SORKIN: No, I -- no, but I ask why, given that you're going to take that money directly out of the system tomorrow, maybe over a period of time, but the immediate has to be felt at some level, no? PHELPS: Well, I was making a lot of -- I made -- I already hinted at some of the thinking I have in mind. A lot of consumer -- a lot of the -- much of the production -- the production of much of the consumer goods is highly capital-intensive, so -- ever seen "North by Northwest," that scene where Cary Grant is in the field and the crop duster pilot is trying to kill Cary Grant? And all you see is this vast openness, this vast field, producing this vast amount of farm output with not a single person in sight except for the Cary Grant character. (Laughter.) That's food, but it's really all over the place. Now, I guess how many jobs you lost on that account would depend upon the details. The other thing is that -- a point behind my debunking or devaluing consumer demand, I mean, there are a number of things to say. I made one point -- just made one point against attaching so much importance to consumer demand; namely, the production is very capital intensive. Another point is, high consumer demand makes for a -- no, sorry, that's the wrong point. The other point is that if there's a -- you maybe think this is stretching things, but to the extent that the whole world thinks, oh, great, consumer demand, yes, let's offer more benefits to make people consumer more -- to the extent that that becomes a kind of endemic way of thinking in the Western world, that's going to drive up world real interest rates, and so you may lose more jobs indirectly by hitting investment activity on the head than you gain directly by the increased purchases of consumer goods. Now, that's a complicated argument. If it's just the United States alone that increases consumer demand, you might say that, OK, the U.S. is big but it's not all that big, and the effect on the world real rate of interest -- and even the U.S. real rate of interest because it's to some extent linked to the world real rate of interest -- won't rise so much. But -- so, I mean, I got a whole portfolio of reasons for de-emphasizing consumer demand and emphasizing investment demand. Finally, just if I can just add one more point, you can look at time series data for, let's say, the U.S. economy, and it's just extraordinary how output tends to be explained by one thing: namely, real investment expenditures. That just -- it just hits you. It strikes you that that is the -- it's naked on the face. It's -- output is driven by investment expenditures, which in (turn ?) becomes somebody's income, which leads to consumption. But the driver -- it's statistically pretty evident that the driver is investment demand, it's not consumption demand. SORKIN: You talked a lot about investment demand -- and this is my last question, then I will try to open it up. Virtually every CEO that I talk to suggests that one of the big problems that we're living in right now is this sense of remarkable uncertainty, that the regulatory environment, that -- which they suggest is impacting the economy unto itself, and that it is -- it is this general sense of uncertainty of what's coming next that is actually keeping people from making investments. Do you believe that? PHELPS: I certainly believe that there's something in it, but then I also -- and what's in it is, of course, that business people don't yet know what the details -- what the description will be of the eventual response of the U.S. Congress to the towering fiscal deficits. So businesses may be afraid that the whole burden of adjustment's going to be loaded onto higher tax rates, including or not excluding higher corporate tax rates. So it's understandable that that's another reason for businesses to wait about investment projects. On the other hand, there's a fair amount of mistaken thinking on this score, I think, because if there's one thing that we can be sure of is that there's going to be a contraction of one kind of demand or another: either there's going -- either there going -- either there's going to be less government spending or there's going to be less -- which could -- which would further impact on consumer spending possibly -- or there's going to be higher taxes, which may impact on investment spending. But either way, there's going to be less money and the impact is going to be to either take away -- people are either going to -- the impact on their pocketbooks from day one is either going to be -- is going to be negative whether they've -- whether households have lost benefits or whether households have to pay more taxes. So there's a certainty about that. SORKIN: Right, right. PHELPS: It's only the incidence of whose ox is going to be gored that there's uncertainty over. SORKIN: So the uncertainty is certain? PHELPS: (Inaudible.) SORKIN: On that note, why don't we open it for questions? I know many of you have one. Dan, you have a good seat here in the front. So the microphone's coming around. QUESTIONER: Hi, Dan Altman with North Yard Economics and NYU. Professor, you said that we're heading for 7 percent unemployment. When I was first taking economics courses, they said that the natural rate of unemployment was 6.5 percent. (Chuckles.) That wasn't so long ago, maybe 20 years. And so my question for you is, instead of having a structural slump now that's heading us to a new normal, could it be that we had a monetary-fueled boom, which is now taking us back to the old normal? (Laughter.) PHELPS: I'm not exactly sure when you were young and studying this -- (laughter) -- course. (Chuckles.) My benchmark has been the unemployment rate in the middle of the 1990s, which is 5.6 for two years in a row, with inflation neither rising nor falling, conditions pretty tranquil. It was just before the dawn of the age of the Internet. And so -- so then how did I get to 7 (percent)? So I got to thinking, well, those times were a bit brighter than the times now. For one thing, the overhang of -- the overhang of entitlements had not gotten to nearly the same proportions that it has now. Secondly, in 1995 and 1996, 2020 seemed remote. That's the time when the Baby Boomers will start leaving, en masse, the -- their jobs in the private sector. So for those two reasons alone, we would expect a higher natural unemployment rate now, in the sense of a steady-state, medium-term natural unemployment rate, than we had in the middle of the 1990s. Finally, in addition, I have become gloomier about innovation and economic growth than I and, I think, most people were in 1995 and 1996. We've just been through 10 or 11 years with slower growth than we had between 1990 and 1995. I'm hard pressed to think of a single reason why the natural unemployment rate should be lower now than it was in 1995 and 1996, but -- SORKIN: Yes, sir. QUESTIONER: I'm Kenneth Bialkin, Skadden Arps. I'm reminded, or I have to think about a statement made by President Roosevelt in the '30s, when he announced to the American public that the only thing we have to fear is fear itself. If we would translate that psychological observation to today, we'd define it in terms of optimism or pessimism, the willingness of businesses to invest and expand, the willingness of persons (and workers ?) to spend and look more optimistic about things. And if our objective was to restore optimism to America about the future, if the objective was to restore optimism in the businesses who think about investing and expanding, what steps would be taken to try to encourage that optimism? And to what extent would that optimism depend, to some extent, on the prospects of political change or development? We're coming up to an election next year. Different people have different attitudes about what might be the economic policy of -- (inaudible) -- and I wonder if you could speculate or comment on the validity of this observation, that all economic activity is a derivative of the attitude that people have about the future. PHELPS: Thanks a lot. I love that question. I think that the rebirth of optimism is going to depend upon the rebirth of something objective that you can hang your hat on, that you can hang your optimism on. In getting ready for -- in the preparations for this meeting, I had to write a few lines about what I wanted to talk about, and the lines in front of me I didn't get to at all. So let me, in answer to your question, say what I didn't -- what I said in my forecast of what I would say, which I didn't say here. I think -- I think what's required to get back to a genuine feeling of prosperity and flourishing is some long-needed surgery to shop the -- to stop the "short-termism," to restructure and innovate the financial sector, and to encourage the renewal of a culture of exploration and vision leading to economy-wide innovation -- and thus, a back seat for the money culture, which has been in the driver's seat for at least a decade. And of course, we have to put down -- as I was saying, we have to put down -- we have to stop this push-button mechanics mentality that, oh, the economy, all you have to do is just get right the tuning of the various instruments and we'll be -- we'll be fine again. We have to stop that. That goes for the Keynesians as well as the suppliers -- supply-siders. I would like to see the end of the "Know Nothings" in the free market camp. I'd like to see an end to the -- to the believers in scientism. That's the idea that all the fruits of Western civilization are owed to the scientists, and there's no creativity in the economy at all; nobody in the economy ever had a new idea in his or her life. And by the way, that goes back to Schumpeter and, before Schumpeter, Shpikov (sp). That's where Schumpeter got it. In Schumpeter, the new ideas are from scientists and navigators outside the economic system. We have to stop that, and you people in business should really be pushing to make it clear to the general public that you are engaged -- in your good days, anyway -- you're engaged -- or in your better days -- (laughs, laughter) -- you're engaged, or you were engaged, in innovating and having new ideas, and mulling them over and talking about them and developing some of them, and then trying to market them and, with luck, getting them adopted. And so that's -- I think that's -- we need to have a kind of reformation, a kind of restoration of the -- of the spirit of the country that I think prevailed between -- hard to say when it started, but prevailed -- it certainly was visible and present -- present and visible in the early 19th century, and was going full steam at least till the end of the 1940s. SORKIN: I have a quick follow-up on that. And I should also tell you I am going to out you. The font on that that you were reading is impossible to read, even for myself, and I -- PHELPS: (Laughs.) Glasses. SORKIN: It's the tiniest font you've ever seen, so -- You know, one of the things that strikes me as you were saying it, is I started to think a little bit about Occupy Wall Street, and the economic inequality story and argument that's been made for many years but is clearly now in focus. How important is it to bridge that divide for the long-term sustainability and success of our economy? Does it matter? PHELPS: Andrew, you ask such hard questions. That's a tough one. SORKIN: I only ask because you talk about the confidence that the entire economy needs to keep growing, and I'm curious how the inequality story relates to that, if it does. PHELPS: Well, let me say right away that I pride myself on having had an early interest in economic justice. And I was extraordinarily fortunate, and damn lucky, that for a year I sat in my office next to John Rawls, just across the wall, when he was writing his book, "A Theory of Economic (sic) Justice." But, you know, Rawls is not about inequality. He doesn't say you shouldn't have inequality. He says you're bound to have inequality; it's what you do with it that counts. And he wanted -- he was willing to harness inequality in the interests of people in the labor force who were disadvantaged and had the lowest wage rates. His idea was that the tax system and other levers of government should be operated in such a way as to pull up wage rates at the bottom, and pull up employment opportunities as well, to the maximum possible extent, by calibration of the economic system in such a way that it would -- it would create incentives for everybody to work hard and invest and save and so forth, and then thereby pull up the bottom. So I've been a little bit put off by the occupiers when they talk about inequality, but then I realize that's pedantic on my part. They're not saying that they never saw an inequality they never liked -- that they didn't like -- that they liked; they're saying that it's the particular inequalities that they see that they are appalled by. And I suppose they haven't -- I did go down there one day and I did talk to them one day, and I acknowledged that in my humble opinion, I think there has to be some radical restructuring of parts of the financial sector. I think we need a banking industry that serves the needs of business for financing innovation, things like that. Anyway, so -- but I think your question is really, is the economy, even in the most -- even in the more aggregative terms is the economy suffering from the inequality? And some crude Keynesians -- it's the only kind there are, but the -- (laughter) -- (laughs) -- the crude Keynesians, or for short, the Keynesians, suggest, of course, that, oh, the -- if there was -- if some income could be taken from the rich and be given to the poor, there would be higher consumer demand, and that would float the whole economy up and make everybody, maybe even the rich, better off, or make nearly everybody better off, in any case. I think, you know, as you will see -- as you must have noticed from everything I said, I disagree vehemently with that idea that you can -- yeah, I can think of -- there's one argument you can make why higher consumption demand could be good for employment, but it's very short-termist. You could say that high consumer demand pushes up the currency, pulls up the currency and that cuts mark-ups of companies and that leads to higher employment. The trouble is that the -- the higher -- the appreciation of the currency, or the real exchange rate appreciation will drive away customers; eventually the stock of customers will have settled -- will have declined to the point where output is right back to where it was before. So that's a lousy argument. (Pause.) SORKIN: Why don't we leave it there. PHELPS: I mean, I just -- I just -- I have an old-fashioned position. I want to redistribute -- to pull up wages at the bottom. I really don't give a damn much about inequality as such. SORKIN: OK. PHELPS: I'm not interested in whether Rockefeller -- Rockefellers own half of Maine or Ted Turner owns some big chunk of Montana. It doesn't affect me in my daily life. I have my work, my gratifications. (Laughter.) I'm sorry, it just doesn't -- I don't see where people are coming from when they talk about that. SORKIN: OK. Paul Steiger with a question, sir. QUESTIONER: Paul Steiger from ProPublica and from your Economics 10 class 50 years ago. (Laughter.) You talked about productivity and the attenuation of its growth. Could you talk a little more about that? What has caused it? Is it the reduction in manufacturing and its size in our economy? And how could that be turned around? And also, since increased productivity means, to some extent, fewer jobs, how do you reconcile those two objectives? PHELPS: Thanks, Paul. He really was a student 50-some years ago. We were both young. Well, funnily enough, the decline of productivity growth was rather abrupt. It was sudden. It was almost from one day to the next, (gone ?) by 1973. So it would be hard to say it was because of some long -- long, slow-moving, long-time shift in the structure of the economy. So it's -- I think it's to some extent a puzzle. And I'm not -- I'm not sure that -- I'm not sure that there are any easy answers. I think we're a long way from an understanding of that puzzle. I agree with you that it certainly hasn't helped that we've suffered a decline in the relative importance of manufacturing since 1973, maybe to some extent before that, too. So that since -- it seems to be easier to innovate in manufacturing than in some other sectors of the economy, that may be helping to account for slower productivity growth now than we had, let's say, in the 1950 and '60s. But manufacturing doesn't have any monopoly over productivity growth. There was phenomenal productivity growth in agriculture in the United States from the 1880s or so right through to 1930 or so. Let's leave the Dust Bowl out of it. And I think we've had significant productivity gains in services, medical care; maybe some of medical care falls under manufacturing, I don't know. I think it's a cultural thing. I think we cannot have rapid productivity growth without -- without its being broad-based and without its -- without there being to some extent activity everywhere in the economy oriented to trying out a different -- conceiving, developing and trying out a different way of doing things, or conceiving, developing and marketing a different product. I've read a little bit around about the 19th century. I'm finishing a book on the modern economy from 1815 or so to the present, so I've rummaged around quite a bit of literature, and I'm by no means a professional historian, but I got this sense that the 19th century was so exciting, because everybody in the little artisanal shops and everybody on the farms and everybody was tinkering. Everybody was exploring. Everybody was trying to look for a better way of doing things. There was a new culture. And I think -- I don't know -- I don't think we can just push buttons, enact some legislation and then sit back and watch the flowering begin. I think that we have to get back to the -- to the spirit of innovation. SORKIN: Yes, sir. QUESTIONER: I'm Gerald Pollack (sp). Professor Phelps, could you elaborate a little more your criticism of the Keynesian approach? Now, just assuming that we could have, you know, a longer-term solution to the budget problem, the debt problem, in the shorter term what's wrong with the government borrowing money now at currently low interest rates for the sake of spending money on behalf of infrastructure projects and to give to states so that they could maintain their employment rather than lay off as many people as they've been laying off? What's basically wrong with that? PHELPS: Well, in general, it's not wrong. In general I think there are good instincts there. Hoover instinctively -- he was an engineer, as you know -- he instinctively thought in terms of engineering projects -- infrastructure projects. And Roosevelt, I think -- and some have said that the differences between Roosevelt's program and Hoover's program are not all -- are not great. They don't bowl you over with their -- with their dissimilarity. And Keynes, of course -- and as you may know, in 1933 or so, he was -- or '32 -- he was always talking about infrastructure investments. So it's always been part of the popular instinct to go for infrastructure developments, and it is -- it's not -- it's not the worst economics because investment goods tend to be labor intensive. So, as I was saying before, it does make a certain amount of sense to go for them. The thing is, though, that we now have $66 trillion in -- of entitlements and $10 trillion of public debt, rising by $1 trillion every year, and we don't know what sort of a mess is going -- we're -- is going to be on our doorstep from Europe, and we don't even -- can't even be too sure about the health of the Chinese economy over the next two or three years. So I don't know. We're in a very precarious situation, and I would be extremely concerned, just downright worried, if the Congress were to say, OK, let's do another half trillion (dollars) a year in infrastructure projects. I would be worried about what would happen to the stock market and the bond market and the dollar. I don't want to see a further weakening of the dollar. It'll push up markups. I don't want to see the stock market drop. It'll reduce IPOs, tend to reduce new firm startups. SORKIN: And the market falls because? PHELPS: Higher expectations of people gagging on all the increase in debt in the future and -- SORKIN: The stock market, though, you're saying falls? PHELPS: Hmm? SORKIN: You're saying the stock market falls? Some people would -- PHELPS: Sure. SORKIN: -- argue the stock market would go up -- PHELPS: Some people would. SORKIN: -- with all that spending. PHELPS: (Chuckles.) In economics, you can always take the other side. (Laughter.) I can -- I can do it too, you know. (Laughter.) I have to -- at the end of the day, you have to use your intuition and judgment, and my intuition and judgment is this is not their -- we've gone as far as we can go. I think it's breathtaking that we were able to get this far and pay so little price for it. But I think now, the -- I think the day of reckoning is almost at hand, and we can't go in for the hair of the dog. We must not go -- it is not the time for more infrastructure projects. SORKIN: OK, I'm going to try to get two more questions in. You've had your hand up for a while, sir. Go ahead. And then we'll try to get to you, and then we'll -- QUESTIONER: Nye Zwaboff (ph), Pace University. How do you reconcile your view of the world with the Reinhart-Rogoff view of the world? PHELPS: I didn't know that there was a difference. I haven't read -- Carmen Reinhart's another student of mine in graduate school at Columbia. Ken Rogoff I know pretty well. They say -- (inaudible) -- the difference would be that -- the difference would be -- look, there are two differences. First of all, they don't really come down on the side of one theory or another, so you never know exactly where you are in terms of a -- of a -- of a theoretical framework. They just -- but look, they grind a lot of data; they put a lot of data into the hopper, and they -- and they grind out some patterns, and they show you nice pictures, and there we have it. Still, you know, it's reasonable to pay attention to those -- to those observations. And in one respect, they would -- they would support what I'm saying. They're saying look, you -- brace yourself for a long slump. When you get a deep slump, you don't come out of it right away. Usually, when you're having a deep slump, some pretty basic things are wrong, and it takes a while for them to get right. On the other hand, what I -- what -- I think that Reinhart and Rogoff are too narrow. They're narrowly focused on financial crises. And I don't think that the -- I don't think that the slump we in -- that we're in is primarily financial. I think it's primarily those other things I talked about. And I said -- made one point in my 15 minutes, namely that it's not as if the whole business sector was receiving massive loans from a kindly financial sector that was dutifully sifting good ideas from bad ideas and attentively hovering over the small-business men and helping them to innovate, and now -- and now that sector, which we love so much and on which we depended so much, has got sick. It's not as if that. They deserted us a long time ago. And they deserted the business sector a long time ago. So I think Reinhart and Rogoff have gone too far in suggesting that our whole problem is the banking industry. SORKIN: I promised I'd get one last question, so ask the question. We'll give you 60 seconds to answer it, since we are about -- we have about one minute left. QUESTIONER: Jeff Laurenti with The -- Jeff Laurenti with The Century Foundation. To close on a foreign relations note, you know, what's striking in the current economic crisis is that U.S., Europe, Japan -- all stagnant. And the big developing country economies -- Brazil, India, China -- after an initial wobble seem to have resumed major growth rates. So the economically untrained person scratches his head and asks, I thought these were all supposed to be dependent on getting their imports -- or their exports into our markets, and what's going on here. So what's going on here? (Laughter.) PHELPS: I go to China a lot, so -- in China, I think there's a lot of worry that things are not as rosy as you were suggesting they were. There's been a -- quite a correction in property prices, and this is -- politically, this is not a time when the government is prepared to take -- to conceive and to undertake some major new initiatives. It's the last year of the tenure of the present government. So I think it's an open question whether next year is going to be a good year for China. But I -- but I think that generally, you're right that the idea of a rising tide lifts all boats -- that was never terrifically good theory, and I think -- (laughter) -- I think -- and I think we're now seeing that the boats are on separate oceans. Brazil is doing just fine, and some of the -- probably some of the countries in Asia, including India and maybe Vietnam and maybe Indonesia are also doing just fine, and even Africa has got a couple of stars. And to me, the world looks extremely variegated at the moment. And Europe and the United States are sick in part for the same reasons, but in part for different reasons. SORKIN: Well, on that hopeful and somewhat depressing note at the same time -- (laughter) -- we would thank the professor. Thank you for being here. Appreciate it very, very much. (Applause.) Thank you for your questions. Have a great afternoon, everybody. Thanks. 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