Economics

Development

  • Nigeria
    Lassa Fever in a Time of Coronavirus in Nigeria
    These are still early days for coronavirus in Nigeria, whose first case was reported on February 25. As of the morning of March 24, Nigeria had forty-two confirmed cases and one confirmed death, according to coronavirus tracking by Johns Hopkins University. But an outbreak of Lassa fever, caused by a more common virus, has been active in Nigeria for the past few months and has even prompted calls for the declaration of a national health emergency. Between January 1 and March 15, the Nigerian Center for Disease Control reported 161 deaths of Lassa fever patients, with 3,735 suspected cases and 906 confirmed cases, across twenty-seven of Nigeria’s thirty-six states. For the same period in 2019, Lassa killed 114 with 1801 suspected cases and 455 confirmed cases across twenty-one states, but the 906 confirmed cases for 2020 is already greater than the 810 confirmed cases for all of 2019. Lassa fever is known to have a case fatality rate as high as 23 percent, much higher than the 3.4 percent estimated by the WHO for COVID-19 as of March 5. There have even been calls for the Nigerian government to declare a state of emergency for Lassa fever. Explanations for the rising number of Lassa fever cases since 2015, when there were just sixty-four confirmed cases, includes both better diagnosis and increasingly poor sanitation and living situations. Thus far, there is no evidence of a link between the two diseases.  Lassa fever is named after the Nigerian town where it was first identified in 1969. It is an acute viral disease of animal origins with early symptoms similar to malaria and COVID-19. It is now found in other West African countries. Epidemics have historically occurred during the dry season, which runs roughly from November to April. According to the U.S. Centers for Disease control, during various periods, Lassa fever patients accounted for between 10 and 16 percent of hospital admissions in parts of Sierra Leone and Liberia. Though crude, such estimates help illustrate the potential impact outbreaks of Lassa fever can have on West African health systems.  In Nigeria, as elsewhere, the disease is disproportionately found among younger adults, between twenty and thirty years of age. The most devastating consequences of the disease can be deafness. The most common vector for the disease is the urine and feces of the multimammate rat, a rodent found in rural areas that colonizes areas where people live and where food is available. The disease can be transmitted from human to human through contact with bodily fluids, but not as easily as Ebola or coronavirus. Lassa can be treated with an antiviral drug and by supportive care. Its victims in hospitals are typically isolated, so that they may compete for space with coronavirus patients.  The spread of coronavirus has led to the World Health Organization, African governments, and non-governmental organizations to publicize the underdeveloped public health systems in most African countries and to request international assistance. There has been already some international response. But for many Africans, the coronavirus, like the much deadlier Ebola or HIV/AIDS epidemics, are seen in the context of more common diseases that sicken many more people, have high mortality rates, but that do not receive sustained attention from outsiders. Indeed, many observers are concerned that the appearance of the high profile disease caused by coronavirus, COVID-19, will divert precious resources away from the more commonplace killers. This season’s outbreak of Lassa fever—the worst such outbreak in years—is a case in point. 
  • COVID-19
    How One Small Change Could Better Prepare Africa for the Coronavirus
    Brad Cunningham is the COO of SystemOne and has been working in connected diagnostics for infectious diseases in low and middle income countries for the last ten years.  As of March 20, 254,653 COVID-19 cases have been confirmed in 183 countries. Africa has reported a total of 745 COVID-19 cases from 34 countries, or 0.3 percent of global infections. The other 20 African nations have not yet officially declared any cases. The pandemic’s speed in reaching and spreading in Africa currently lags behind that of the developed world, perhaps due to the fact that Africa constitutes only 5 percent of international tourists and only 3.5 percent of outbound travelers. But this does not mean our concern should be less urgent. Many of Africa’s health systems are already over-burdened with ongoing HIV and TB co-pandemics. COVID-19 will have disproportionate lethality on these vulnerable populations. Africa has a small window to get out ahead of this new pandemic.  Currently, African healthcare predominantly relies on transcription and transport of physical paper from point A to point B. Paper orders can often travel hundreds of kilometers by motorcycle from clinics to a centralized diagnostic lab. Once tests are run, results are printed, piled up, and held for the next transport back to the clinics in the hopes that they’re still valid by the time they arrive (if they arrive at all). Health Care Workers must sift through papers to find their patient’s results and then search for the patient folder to store it, once they’re done treating all the other patients too, of course. This antiquated paper-based centralized lab system creates a bottleneck of diagnostic data leading to potentially catastrophic delays and errors. But it doesn’t have to be this way with COVID-19. A similar diagnostic data bottleneck was discretely observed in the Ebola outbreak in West-Africa in 2014–2016 and digital solutions were successfully implemented. The digitization of the diagnostic results introduced a “diagnostic accountability” that was critical to stopping that outbreak. Diagnostic accountability means the ability for all stakeholders to know a test has been conducted, what the result is, and that something has been done with that result.  The simple innovation of integrating diagnostic instruments with an “internet of things” approach by connecting a router and SIM card to the instrument unleashes the power of moving the data back to the right people, in real-time. For example, connecting diagnostic instruments into national health systems has been shown in various countries like Nigeria, Mozambique and Papua New Guinea to reduce the time it takes to initiate patient treatment, improve the number of patients placed onto treatment, and ultimately save lives.  The World Bank estimates that the annual global cost of moderately severe to severe pandemics is $570bn (0.7 percent) of global income. Already, analysts are predicting a shrinkage of 0.4 percent of global GDP based on the current COVID-19 status. The technology and infrastructure to minimize the effects of these global pandemics is readily available. We can move data faster than disease in Africa. And we must.
  • Bangladesh
    One Year After a Contentious Election, Bangladeshis are Satisfied With the Country’s Direction
    Geoffrey Macdonald is resident program director for Bangladesh and Vivek Shivaram is program officer for South Asia at the International Republican Institute. !function(){"use strict";window.addEventListener("message",function(a){if(void 0!==a.data["datawrapper-height"])for(var e in a.data["datawrapper-height"]){var t=document.getElementById("datawrapper-chart-"+e)||document.querySelector("iframe[src*='"+e+"']");t&&(t.style.height=a.data["datawrapper-height"][e]+"px")}})}(); Around Dhaka, fresh candidate posters line city streets and commandeered rickshaws cruise neighborhoods with loudspeakers blaring political slogans. Dhaka’s municipal elections will be held on February 1—marking the largest scale election in Bangladesh since the Awami League (AL) and its leader Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina won a third five-year term in an election marred by claims of fraud in December 2018. In the aftermath of the 2018 general election, the opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) boycotted local elections, alleging they would be rigged against them. But the BNP is back on the campaign trail. Despite fears of electoral manipulation, the Dhaka municipal election presents yet another showdown between the AL and BNP in Bangladesh’s political and population center. The AL enters 2020 buoyed by strong economic and development achievements, but dogged by corruption, student wing violence, rising inequality, and persistent critiques of its democratic record. According to the new public opinion survey of Bangladeshis conducted by the International Republican Institute (IRI) in August and September 2019, positivity about the government and country has rebounded since IRI’s May 2018 survey, but an undercurrent of frustration remains. If key domestic issues continue to go unaddressed, the government may find it difficult to maintain its current levels of support. Development and Growth Drive Optimism, Government Support Improvements in development and the economy have driven public optimism in Bangladesh. From 2018 to 2019, the belief that Bangladesh is heading in the right direction rose 14 percentage points to 76 percent, its highest level in the last seven years of IRI’s polling. Large majorities of the public positively rate the economy, security, and political stability and 54 percent believe the economy will improve over the next year. Bangladeshis praised the government’s performance on a wide range of issues, such as providing education and electricity and fighting extremism. In the last year, approval for the Awami League-led national government rose 19 percentage points to 83 percent. Political and Governance Concerns Continue In the wake of the controversial December 2018 election, significant portions of the public remain disillusioned with the state of politics and political competition. Three-quarters say the gap between political elites and citizens is growing and roughly half say they are fearful to express political opinions in public. Seventy percent say the Awami League, whose governing coalition holds over 95 percent of the elected seats in Parliament, should include other political parties in its decision-making process. The top-rated concerns among Bangladeshis are corruption, drug abuse, and unemployment, issues on which the government gets its lowest performance marks. Three-quarters of the public say income inequality is rising. Corruption has “a lot” or “some” impact on 31 percent of Bangladeshis’ lives, and a plurality (19 percent) say corruption is the single most important problem facing the country. The Awami League has recently tried to allay public concerns with a high-profile crackdown on corruption. Amid violent campus politics, Bangladeshi youth appear disillusioned with formal politics. Over 70 percent of youth respondents say they are unlikely to run for office and over 80 percent have never contacted an elected official, signed a petition, or engaged in other forms of democratic activism. In a country governed almost exclusively by female leaders since 1991, 56 percent prefer male candidates to female candidates, all other things being equal. But there is a stark gender divide in the results: a plurality of women would prefer a female candidate, whereas 72 percent of men would prefer a male candidate. International and Transnational Issues Bangladeshis are deeply concerned about the Rohingya refugee crisis. In 2017, approximately 750,000 Rohingya refugees fled to Bangladesh from Myanmar amid a military crackdown. The refugees settled in over thirty camps along the Bangladesh-Myanmar border and have benefited from an enormous Bangladeshi and international relief effort. Initially supportive of their co-religionists from Myanmar, Bangladeshis are clearly frustrated by the strain and instability created by the camps. Only 37 percent rate the government’s handling of the refugee crisis positively. Recent studies show the refugee population has disrupted medical care, reduced wages and job opportunities, and increased social tension in the areas around the camps. In an era of rising great power competition in South Asia, Bangladeshis are split between the major players in the region. Asked about the impact of India, China, and the United States on Bangladesh, a small majority say India has a positive effect (52 percent), with China (47 percent) and the United States (42 percent) trailing slightly behind. However, this survey was fielded mostly before recent controversies in Bangladesh around India’s Citizenship Amendment Act (which accuses Bangladesh of persecuting religious minorities, a charge that rankles Dhaka, and provides fast-track naturalization for six religions but excludes Muslims), and the National Register of Citizens in Assam (in which people unable to prove Indian citizenship could potentially be rendered stateless and deported to Bangladesh, which could further inflame anti-migrant sentiment there). The Awami League-led government, which is closely aligned with India, initially said these issues were India’s “internal matters” but Prime Minister Hasina recently called the citizenship act “unnecessary.” Anti-Indian protest movements have sprouted in Bangladesh and unprovoked violence against Bangladeshi citizens along the India-Bangladesh border has risen recently. There is good reason to believe public sentiment toward India could be shifting. Renewed Confidence, Persistent Challenges IRI’s survey shows Bangladeshis have renewed confidence in the country’s economic and development outlook and the government’s performance on some kitchen table issues. Yet problems of corruption, inequality, and dysfunctional political competition persist, and the Rohingya refugee crisis shows no signs of abatement. The BNP is pressing these issues on the campaign trail in Dhaka, with the hopes of winning back power in the nation’s capital. If the country’s challenges go unsolved, it could wear on the Awami League’s favorable standing nationally over the course of its third term.
  • Nigeria
    Middle Class Nigerians Struggle to Afford Housing in Lagos
    Housing for professionals working in the modern economy are challenged in most of the world’s mega-cities. Lagos is no exception, as profiled by the BBC. Its reporter estimates that “middle-to-high-income” housing can cost between $5,000 and $40,000 a year. But the practice of paying a year’s worth of rent upfront sets Lagos apart: the BBC’s reporter was asked for between $11,000 and $22,000 for a two-bedroom apartment with electricity in a good Lagos neighborhood, Victoria Island. For context, according to one estimate, average rent for an apartment in Manhattan is as high as $4,336 per month, or $52,032 per year, and about 97 percent of apartments in the borough rent for more than $2,000 per month. In New York and Lagos, the shortage of housing at all levels in acute. The New York metropolitan area’s population was 20 million in 2016, while that of Lagos state is often estimated to be 22 million. Both cities are built on islands next to the ocean, limiting the amount of land available for development.  But Lagos has particular challenges. Real estate financing and consumer mortgages are usually short-term, often five years or less. Such short term financial arrangements encourage developers to seek short-term profits, which, too often, result in poor construction and shoddy maintenance. The practice of paying rent in advance in Lagos also reflects the difficulty landlords often face in collecting rents.  Nigerians like to see Lagos as their New York. Indeed, the two cities are the cultural, economic, education, luxury, and transportation hubs of their respective countries. They both attract residents from a nation-wide catchment area. Both cities are characterized by gross inequality of wealth, with a small number of rich people and a much larger number of poor, though New York has a proportionally larger middle class. The BBC report cited here reflects the realities faced by a very small middle class in Lagos. In both cities, much cheaper rents are found outside the city center. But the trade-off is long commutes—much longer in Lagos where the transportation infrastructure is still developing. Nevertheless, the most profound difference between the two is that New York is one of the world’s richest cities while Lagos is one of the poorest. That reality intrudes on all aspects of daily life, from housing to education to transportation infrastructure. 
  • United States
    Connecting the World: The Internet's Next Billion Users
    Play
    Panelists discuss the prospect of an inclusive internet, how the technology industry is reaching and interacting with developing countries, and the policy implications of a connected world. HAMMER: OK. Ladies and gentlemen, welcome to today’s Council on Foreign Relations meeting. The topic is “Connecting the World: The Internet’s Next Billion Users.” I am Craig Hammer. I’m a program manager at the World Bank, and I’ll be presiding over our discussion this evening. Our discussion will take two parts this evening. I’ll kick things off with a facilitated discussion until about seven p.m., and then we’ll open up to members for a thirty-minute Q&A, and we’ll end at 7:30 sharp. Let me begin by briefly introducing our distinguished speakers by their titles, since you have their detailed bios. Robert Pepper is head of global connectivity policy and planning at Facebook. Jen Spies is product manager of the Next Billion Users Initiative at Google. And Mike Pisa is a policy fellow at the Center for Global Development here in D.C. Welcome. The implications of adding a billion users to the internet from across the world from a range of cultures and contexts, with all their infinite complexities, is vast. The pendulum swings a full 180 degrees, from the tremendous potential of the social and economic development implications of internet connectivity to the truly terrifying: from the collision between social media and surveillance, to the incitement of genocide through social media platforms. My sense is that we’ll cover a lot of ground in our discussion this evening. But I’d like to begin on a slightly more positive side of the spectrum. Jen, Google’s Next Billion Users Initiative is making products specifically with emerging markets in mind. Talk about the local benefits that can occur with the expansion of large digital platforms in emerging markets. SPIES: Sure. And thanks for having us tonight. I think from Google’s perspective on of the primary benefits of building for the next billion users is that in 2019 if you can make a product that succeeds in emerging markets, it’s really a product that can succeed globally in scale. And I think one of the key factors contributing to that is building a product that works on a mobile device. So I think one of the key trends that we see in this market is what we call the leapfrog effect. So if you think about who are these users getting online today, they’ve often never been on a desktop PC. If you think about my internet user journey, I came online first on a computer, and then around 2010 there was this huge shift to mobile where people actually started spending more time on mobile than they did on a desktop PC. And actually, the internal team structure of these companies, Google and Facebook, was completely pivoted to accommodate this shift in time spent that was seen. If you think about, you know, a twenty-year-old coming online in South Africa today, they’re coming online through perhaps a $20 smartphone, and that’s their experience of the internet. And so understanding how to build products that are mobile first and that are native to that platform is really critical to winning in NBU markets. So I think that that’s a key component that can contribute success both in the U.S. and in these markets. HAMMER: In terms of the local development, though, I mean, speak to what NBU is thinking about in terms of local economic growth and social development. SPIES: Yeah. One of our key tenets is to grow economies in NBU markets, and the internet is a true democratizing force that can help do that. I think if you think about—one of the really big engines of growth we’ve seen is small business empowerment. In many regions in NBU you have shopkeepers coming online. Oftentimes they’re inheriting these businesses from an older generation, and they really understand the power of digital and the power of using their phone and internet platforms to sell goods. And so using platforms like Google and Facebook and WhatsApp to help find new customers, to grow their business, to have secure payments and secure transaction is really something that we’re seeing happening in NBU markets that’s sort of growing the size of the digital economy, and helping local economies, and helping people participate in the digital economy in a way that is accelerating every year. HAMMER: Robert, Facebook is working with governments and others around the world to extend connectivity to the 49 percent of the global population that’s not yet connected. Can you talk about some of the major issues or barriers that you see and what’s happening as you address them? PEPPER: Sure. Thank you. And again, thanks for putting this together. So the 49 percent is a reference to the fact that there’s three-and-a-half—3.8 billion people connected and 3.8 billion people not connected. There’s a little bit more—the ITU just came out just recently and said it’s just crossed that line. That’s a real milestone. So we think of it not as the next billion, but as the next 3.8 billion. And so—and the reason that that’s really important goes to some of the reasons that Jen just talked about. Each year now for the last four—we’re into our fourth year—we do a study with the Economist Intelligence Unit called the Inclusive Internet Index. And it looks at over time 120 countries, fifty-three indicators for each country, looking at availability, affordability, relevance, and readiness. And one of the things that the Economist found in the most recent study, released earlier this year, was that the progress that we’ve seen over the last decade seems to have stalled out for the lowest-income countries. In other words, the upper-income, upper-middle-, and lower-middle-income countries are continuing to improve; the lowest-income countries did not improve year over year. So you look at that, and then you combine that with something we do as part of that project, a study called the Value of Internet Survey, and each year the theme shifts. The theme last year that we looked at was how do people view the internet in terms of livelihood. And this is across the globe, so this is, right, low income—I mean, it’s all one hundred countries. It didn’t make any difference: 75—73 to 78 percent, so call it 75 percent of people in a country said the internet helped them get a job, they used the internet to help them do better at work, they used the internet to learn more as it relates to their livelihood. If that’s the case, the fact that we have this, you know, stalling out at the lowest income, at the bottom of the pyramid, that’s a real problem, right? We don’t know whether it was a one-year data anomaly. We’ll find out when our—we get the latest data in. That’s bad enough, but if it’s a trend that’s really bad. And that’s why, if you’re looking at the economic development and the benefits—whether it’s small business or individuals or healthcare, education—it can’t be about the next billion. It has to be about everybody. And that’s why we’re looking at it in that respect. So in terms of the barriers, going back to the analysis, the barriers to getting another billion, two billion, four billion—by the way, out of the 3.8 (billion), probably a billion and a half are children you don’t want online. So it’s not quite as big a number, but it’s still important. It’s a combination of supply side and demand side. The prerequisite, you need the network. You need the connection. You need a minimum of 3G, preferably 4G connection. It’s all mobile. That’s the minimum that you need. If it doesn’t exist, you have to have it. But that’s only the necessary but not sufficient prerequisite. It’s all about the applications, the demand driving local content, local language, relevant content, including e-gov applications, e-commerce, e-entertainment. Those are all things that you need. And people on the readiness side need to know how to get on safely. So it’s about digital literacy. It’s about knowing how to set your settings. It’s knowing how to prevent not just spam, but fraud, phishing attacks. So all of those things need to be in place for people to be able to get online and then benefit from being online. So some of the things that, you know, we’ve been doing—and we work with government—those are the barriers. We work with governments, using the analysis from the Inclusive Internet Index as a diagnostic, on how to build digital—national digital strategies. But for example, in Uganda, there’s an—multiple operators. Airtel, which is an Indian company which has networks in Africa, has a 3G network. They’re building out a 4G network in Kampala and the cities, but not in the rural areas. In the rural areas, what prevents them from doing that is they don’t have what’s called backhaul, right? They’re using narrowband microwave, which won’t even support a single smartphone, right? They need fiber to the towers. So we coinvested with them and jointly built a 770-kilometer fiberoptic network. It’s an open fiber. We do everything on an open basis. Any of the operators can use dark fibers. They’ve now connected cell sites and they’re converting from 2G directly to 4G. They’re leapfrogging, all right? That’s supply side. That’s a prerequisite. We’ve co-built—we’re building a subsea cable from Brazil to Argentina which is the first new subsea cable to Argentina in eighteen years. The single cable is going to triple the international capacity to Argentina. Again, open fiber; it’s not just for us. So those are, you know—and we can talk more about some of the other infrastructure investments with technologies, but we’re also working on the applications side with zero-rated services, digital literacy, education applications, just like you are. I mean, there—you know, the internet companies all have programs to build local content, local language, relevant content, working with governments to create those kinds of applications. HAMMER: Let’s zoom out a bit and talk about the larger kind of governance context. So, Mike, we’ve had some discussion already of the pros of digital platform penetration to emerging economies. Let’s talk about the greater international cooperation, what it could or should look like. Is some version of some global governance mechanism feasible, from a policy perspective? PISA: Well, so let me start by—I know we’ve heard about the pros, but I think because I focus on governance, and often the discussions about governance kind of drift towards dealing with challenges and mitigating risks, they kind of have a negative—take a negative tint. So before I start talking about the governance issues, I do want to underline, especially from a lower-income-country perspective, the benefits that the things we have I think started to take for granted here—you know, reducing transaction costs, reducing the cost of search, enabling greater access to information—what this means. And I think oftentimes when we’re talking about this through a development lens we tend to forget that some of the benefits that we’re debating here in OECD and rich countries play out very differently in lower-income countries. So one quick example would be the gig economy that shared—that two-sided platforms enable. I mean, here we have concerns about what gig workers—are gig workers losing out in terms of the level of informality attached to their jobs, the level of worker protections? Whereas in poorer countries this is not a debate, right? First of all, those worker protections don’t exist. And they actually can be a step—and most of the economic activity is in the informal economy, so there’s actually a step towards formalization by just participating on one of these platforms. So I think another issue is that these benefits are quite diffuse, so they tend to I think get discounted in debates around the benefits of certain policies. So, actually, I want to start at a national level rather than go into global governance first, if you don’t mind, and that’s because I think you have to understand this from the perspective of national policymakers. And actually, I think where I want to start is the idea of why are governments in the position of assessing or reassessing how they approach data governance? Which inevitably means: Why are they assessing or reassessing their relationship vis-à-vis big tech platforms? And I think it’s two reasons. One is, you know, we’re more aware today of the risks of the misuse of personal data. And, two, there’s a growing recognition of the value of data as an economic input. And so I’ll start with the second, actually. From the perspective of policymakers—and let’s just say policymakers in poorer countries—again, the benefits are diffuse, but they also—there’s also an aspect of very concentrated wealth being generated from personal data. So if you look at—you know, one quick stat is 90 percent of the—let’s just start with market capitalization. Ninety percent of market capitalization of digital platforms in the world accrues to companies in the U.S. and China, and two-thirds of that value accrues to eight companies, and we all know their names. Now, if you’re a policymaker in a poorer country, and you’ve listened to the World Bank and others rightfully tell you that in order to take the next step in the global economy and the digital economy you need to build an enabling framework, and that will lead to wealth creation, you’re going to look—first of all, the benefits, again, diffuse, oftentimes not feeding into GDP statistics for reasons we can touch on, oftentimes not feeding into revenue. And yet, you see the pie growing elsewhere. And to me, I think that leads to—that’s why the data-as-oil metaphor has had so much staying—sticking power. It’s not—we all know that it’s not a very apt metaphor for a number of reasons, right? But there is a feeling among at least the policymakers we’ve spoken to at the Center for Global Development, where I work—and maybe it’s because we talk to folks from ministries of finance and central banks more often than not—but that they’re being shortchanged somehow in this—in this interaction. And I think the worst thing about the data-as-oil metaphor is it leads to this idea that data is inherently valuable or valuable on its own, right? And it’s kind of like the flip of the Hal Varian argument, that the real value that platforms provide is not the data—not the value they derive from the data, but it’s the knowhow and it’s the—you know, the proprietary algorithms and it’s the human capital. And of course, the truth is somewhere in the middle. But once you’ve kind of accepted this frame as data-as-oil, it becomes all about this idea of, oh, well, I have to somehow grasp or hold that data to have a better negotiating position in this discussion. And that leads to forced localization. And I think—I mean, and these localization policies have been around since the internet, but there has been an acceleration of their use and there also has been a change in the rhetoric around them. It’s much more—you see it much more frequently that countries justify the use of localization policy for economic reasons. I think the clearest example is the India—the draft data protection bill, which says we are arguing in favor of localization because it’s going to help India develop its digital infrastructure and its AI industry. And I think—my concern in this space is that right now the policymakers we talk to seem to think that there’s a continuum of policies: on one hand you let big tech platforms run free, and on the other you kind of pursue these forced data-localization policies, and there’s not much in the middle. I do think eventually you’ll have to have some enlightened taxation policies that will fill that middle, and that’s maybe something we can talk about in the future. HAMMER: So, Jen, how are technologies of the internet impacting users in sub-Saharan Africa specifically? SPIES: Yeah. We think about it in terms of a multistep journey. And in sub-Saharan Africa specifically, the first pillar of that is access and affordability. I think if you compare those economies to others in Asia, Southeast Asia, Latin America, data as a percent of income is the highest, there’s the lowest smartphone penetration. And so access to internet, access to smartphones is really the key pillar to participating in the digital economy, to getting online. That’s step one. Step two is what we sort of call ecosystem and platform development. So you can imagine you bought your first smartphone, you bought a prepaid data plan, you’re getting online; if there’s not content that’s locally translated, that’s relevant for you—if you’re going on YouTube to watch celebrities that you care about and you don’t recognize any of the names—that’s not a great experience. And like you said, there’s a lot of job hunting that happens online. I think the behaviors on the internet are fairly similar. Like, people are talking to their friends. They are watching content that they care about. They are searching for jobs or ways to make money. And if that is not comprehensible or relevant or localized to you, then it’s also inaccessible. So a lot of parts of Google are focused on making sure that there are local Indian content creators uploading videos on YouTube and using machine learning algorithms to translate into local dialects and making sure that Google Assistant can translate into vernacular languages that are maybe more intuitive for a first-time internet user to talk to and to access. And I think the third stage, and the pillar that we think about, is platform development and business creation. And so once you have all of these stages of, you know, you’re online, you can afford a device, you can afford internet there is content in your local language, you can sort of participate in the internet as we experience it in the U.S., then there’s this opportunity to create businesses that are localized, that are taking advantage of trends like social commerce, of digital payments, of, you know, people really sort of hacking our products and using them in interesting ways. But you can build an ecosystem on top of that. So I think this trend of leapfrogging to mobile, of really leaning into social commerce and using platforms like WhatsApp to sort of run a business end-to-end on a mobile device, of developing content locally in local languages are all trends we see that are really pronounced in sub-Saharan Africa, but also apply to other NBU markets. HAMMER: Robert, maybe you can speak to some of the public goods that Facebook is doing to help support that leapfrogging process. PEPPER: Yeah. So just picking up a little bit on that. One of the things that we’ve looked at in terms of analysis goes to the devices. Out of the three-point-eight billion people., we believe that there’s about a billion people who actually could receive a 3G or 4G signal but cannot afford the device. In Africa, it’s 240 million people. So I mean, you don’t have to build a new network, right? You have to make the device more affordable, but it has to be a good enough device so that it’s actually either a very high-end feature phone or a low-end smartphone. But that actually works and that’s not hackable, in terms of the device. So you know, as we were discussing earlier, one of the things they are doing is working on that, plus other variables, with the World Bank on its Africa moonshot project, which was just launched. I guess it was at the annual meeting about ten days ago. And if you haven’t—if any people here haven’t seen that, you should take a look at it. It’s a great document. It was actually a working group paper that was released by the U.N. Broadband Commission, put together by the Bank in conjunction with the Bank on the Africa moonshot. And it goes through, you know, what needs to be done. And, you know, it’s—you have to take a deep breath, right? The goal of the moonshot is to have everybody over ten years old in Africa connected by 2030—eleven years, right? They estimate it’s going to cost $100 billion. What’s interesting is about twenty-three, twenty-four billion (dollars) is capex for networks, supply—pure supply side. Eighteen billion (dollars) is the demand side. It’s building the applications, the local content, the e-gov applications. Creating local businesses that do that. There’s a small policy piece and some others. The biggest chunk, over forty-five billion (dollars), is what you don’t even think about, which is opex, maintenance, replacement, right? The really boring stuff that makes it work, right? And so the question is, where does that come from? And that’s going to have to be—and the Bank’s talking about putting a lot of money into it. And the device affordability is a chunk, and that’s one of the things we’re working on. So there are these great opportunities. And in terms of some of the public good aspects, you know, what we’ve seen is that there are literally thousands of businesses that in just sub-Saharan Africa—that exist only online. There is no brick and mortar. So it’s not like there was a shop that then went online. These are businesses that would not exist if they were not online. And they’re selling things not just in their communities but broadly in their—in their region, or their country, and even sometimes to other countries in the region, or internationally outside of their continent. So we know these benefits, but they’re—again, I want to come back on to—there are these, you know, very legitimate concerns and questions. And I think you have to separate—and I thought it was really good the way you laid out, for example, data localization. Data localization in many places is really sort of an industrial policy that, you know, usually starts off as being dressed up as we need it for security. But localizing data actually makes your data less secure. We know that. And the irony, by the way, of the India draft localization bill, if you think about the India BPO industry, their back-office industry, literally it employs millions of people, it’s worth billions of dollars. And it only existed because Indian companies could process data and build call centers for companies based in the U.S. and Europe and have customers in the U.S. and Europe. If there was data localization, right, and it applied in the reverse, that industry would never exist in India, right? They don’t think about it that way. HAMMER: So, Mike, let me ask you one question. I think, just because these issues are very much alive in much of the work where we happen to be, it may not be the case elsewhere around the world, but let’s talk briefly about data privacy, disinformation. As the digital platform market concentration expands, let’s say, to emerging economies, have these issues like data privacy and disinformation manifested in lower-income countries? And how have policymakers in those countries begun to respond? PISA: So I think all countries are grappling with these issues. I mean, I’m not going to go through the list of how they’ve manifested themselves—(laughs)—but I think all countries are grappling with these issues in different ways. I’m actually—since I punted on your question on the global governance I’m going to punt back to that global governance question around these issues, because I think it’s going to point to why governance is going to be so tricky to do at the global level on these questions. So I think you can make an argument around data privacy and data protection. I’m going to stick with data protection, because I think privacy is such a culturally laden term. That there are efficiency gains to be made by having a harmonized approach globally, right, that would allow companies—big tech companies—to apply the same standards globally, rather than having bespoke models for different countries that they work in. And frankly, I mean, you know, countries have been willing—I’m sorry—companies have been willing to change, often at great cost, how they go about their business in order to comply with GDPR because Europe is the world’s second-biggest market. If Benin, or Bhutan, or another country asked—you know, enacts privacy regulations that are quite different and viewed by industry as quite onerous, then they probably won’t make that same distinction. So I think there’s a stronger argument for harmonization in that space. Other rationales for global governance. When you have cross-border spillovers. So I came from U.S. Treasury, where there’s a—you know, a large architecture around protecting against banking crisis spillovers, right? So we have the FSB, we have the Basel Committee, and many other structures. And we don’t have those similar things for digital platforms, even though there may be some spillovers—I think the spillovers are less acute and less immediate. But you can have some arguments around, you know, whether there are spillovers, about how companies managed or regulated in one country affect political stability in another country. And there are more clear spillovers in the areas like cybersecurity. But I think the one argument I want to make is I think the overarching need for global governance in this space is we need to make the experience for individual users, but also for governments of using the open internet better, in the sense that there is now a more clear challenge to the open internet. And actually, I watched Robert’s—his Turing speech in 2015 over the weekend, like we talked about it. He said in 2015, we’re at the crossroads because national governments are reasserting more control over internet policy, and they’re often going towards a more closed model. You said this two years before President Xi in China says, you know, we’re going to make China a cyber superpower, and we are going to treat—we are going to, you know, kind of set China as a model, in his words it was, for countries who want to speed development while preserving independence, which I think is code for closed—have a closed internet system. So I think we’re still at the crossroads. We’ve probably gone a few steps in the wrong direction. But these debates are still happening. And my view is, the reason you want to pursue—you might want to think about pursuing global governance over specific issues areas related to how you regulate digital platforms, is because you want to make governments more comfortable with the open internet model. And right now, there’s a lot of reasons to not be comfortable. Having said all that, I think the challenges of having effective global governance in this space are huge. I mean, just take disinformation. I mean, how countries go about regulating, or monitoring, or treating, or dealing with disinformation is going to depend on how they value privacy, how they value transparency, how they value freedom of speech. As we can tell from debates that have happened here in Washington over the last few weeks, and speeches, that we’re still figuring this out. And why do we have any belief that having, you know, a global discussion on disinformation on digital platforms would be any different than a discussion on freedom of press in the more analog world? So I don’t think we’re likely to actually have productive conversations unless we take very narrow, specific areas where cross-border spillovers are real, and the efficiency gains from cooperation are really clear. HAMMER: Thank you, Mike. PISA: Yeah. HAMMER: So at this time I’d like to invite members to join our conversation with your questions. So let me first begin by reminding everyone this meeting is on the record. When I call you, please wait for the microphone and speak directly into it. Please stand and state your name and affiliation before asking a question. And please do limit yourself to one question and keep it concise. This will allow as many members as possible to ask questions and share insights. So let’s begin here. Q: All right. Thank you. My name’s Dave Harden, and actually my colleague Sara Agarwal is over there. And we run a tech company that has its research and development lab in Ramallah. So imagine kind of all the big challenges that you all have described and think about, and then add the political overview on that. All of our employees have stock options, and there could be a dramatic impact if we were able to drive a big exit. One of the challenges that we have, and this goes to the question of how do you get to the next billion or three-point-eight billion, if they’re only users as opposed to developers, or creators, or value-adders into the internet. And so it’s very easy to pick up rick capital in Palo Alto, or in Cambridge, or in Shanghai. Not so easy to do it when you have operations in Ramallah, and Amman, and you’re struggling to do that. So how do you see kind of the nature of capital over the next—this next ten-year period where you’re trying to increase the number of actors that have access to the internet? Thank you. HAMMER: So I think should looking, I think, closely at Jen and Robert on this one. But I think we can start with you. SPIES: Yeah. I can answer somewhat narrowly, in terms of how the company has thought about expanding in a probably conservative but effective way in these markets. So we’ve actually opened offices globally. And we think about product development offices, which are probably the analog to the startups, and the engineers, and coders, and people building these products. We’ve opened tech hubs in Bangalore and in Singapore, in markets that are just closer than mountain view to our next billion users. So I know there is a balance between rapidly expanding everywhere and trying to be in every market, and have engineers in every market, and trying to build centers where you have sort of hubs and knowledge that builds up over time. I know that’s one way that the companies thought about just sort of expanding slowly and methodically and trying to find a product market fit with various initiatives before expanding too quickly. So it’s perhaps not like on the capital allocation side, but at least internally it’s who we’ve thought about expanding our footprint. PEPPER: No, we think about it very similarly in terms of, you know, where the engineers are, and growing globally. But that doesn’t—I mean, that’s toward Facebook. That’s not really your question. Your question is, you know, where are the—where’s the venture capital going to come from to fund startups in Ramallah, Kinshasa, you know, Cape Town, Bangkok? And that—and that is a challenge. In fact, earlier today I was having a conversation with a former minister from an African country, who is trying—he’s now in the U.S., at one of our major universities, two-year fellowship. And one of the things that he’s working on is trying to figure out exactly that. He was telling me that, you know, there’s capital available in Africa, but the—but the people in Africa who can write the checks are writing checks in Europe, not in Africa. And that really bothers him. The question is, why and what can be done about that. And what he was saying is that, you know, you have to have the right—create an ecosystem in terms of law, local law, and also taxation, bankruptcy law, rule of—you know, rule of law—all of the things that we take for granted—before people are going to write checks, whether it’s at—you know, for a startup, an angel writing a small check, or a VC writing a large check. And that’s not always easy. So this is—this is one of the big questions. The only optimism I see, right, near-term optimism, is if you go back ten years, fifteen years—no, not even fifteen. Ten years, when I was having meetings with startups in China, when I was—actually I worked for CISCO then—they were asking the same question, right? They now have loads of money, capital markets. You went to Europe, you went to Berlin and talked to startups, they were struggling. They couldn’t get capital, right? At that point it was beginning to go to London, right? So I think that they’re—you know, the optimism is that it is happening, but it’s happening too slowly. But that is an issue, because we see huge talent globally. Huge talent—for example, there are startups in—and incubators, for example, in Kenya that are struggling to get capital to get to the next stage, right? It’s not for the lack of talent. It’s not for the lack of effort. It’s not for the lack of market, right? And so it’s—this is something that as a broader global community I think we need to—need to address. HAMMER: Let’s come here, please. Q: Thank you very much. Miriam Sapiro from— PEPPER: Put the mic closer, Miriam. Q: Oh! Can you hear me now? Is that better? Closer? I don’t—I have to eat it, like an ice cream code? How’s that? HAMMER: There you go. (Laughter.) Q: (Laughs.) Mmm, delicious. Anyway, I want to focus for a minute more on the challenges because in some ways part of the conversation hasn’t really changed much in the last five, ten, fifteen years. Pepper’s nodding. And so, whether we’re talking about capital or infrastructure, we’re also talking about governments that either need to get out of the way or, better scenario, is to facilitate the kind of investment that’s needed. And yet, in the last few years, we’ve seen how in the developed world, especially in the U.S., the darker side of the internet has become more obvious. Whether it’s influencing elections, or cybercrime, or extremism, et cetera. And so how—you know, what do each of you, in your different roles, say to the governments, especially middle-income and lower where we really do want to be able to help more people get online, what is the ability that you think we have to try to make a difference in that regard and build, if not a governance structure, which is proving very challenging, at least some ways to acknowledge that we’ve learned some lessons from what we’ve seen in the developed world. And we will be able to try to help the less-developed world learn from them. PISA: So maybe I’ll start on that. I think—so the Pathways for Prosperity Commission from Oxford University Blavatnik School just did a survey of developing country policymakers, and what were their priorities around digital technology and the internet? And their first priority was job creation and the second was digital infrastructure. And much further down were these issues of data protection and data privacy. And then cybersecurity was up near the top, and also revenue collection—which I kind of alluded to before, right? So they want to see some direct benefit into their own coffers, but again the highest priority for poorer countries—at least in the policymakers in that sample—were: How do we make the digital economy work for us? And I think the trust issue—you know, we’ve—my remarks have focused on governance, and I’ve talked about why I’m skeptical of a broad-based global governance framework. I think one step could be the U.S. taking useful steps to regulate the industry from here. And then the other, and I’ll turn this over to you guys, is the large platforms convincing their users and the governments where they operate, the countries where they operate, that they’ve kind of corrected from, learned from some of the missteps in the past. SPIES: And I can give a really specific, but hopefully enlightening, example. I’m a product manager on Google Station, which is Google’s free public wi-fi initiative in emerging markets. And we generally have, like, the most success when we go into a market and at launch we are partnering with local governments and, you know, the minister of telecommunications is on stage with us at launch championing the arrival of free public wi-fi to his country. So we like to look at this as a partnership with local government. And often we find partners in government who are really excited to bring this product to their country and champion it. I think on the—on the technical and regulatory aspect of it, we try to hold our product to the same data standards as GDPR, which means oftentimes when we’re evaluating new markets to go into if the local government has requests around data sharing or data—like, data regulation that is outside of the bounds of that threshold, it prevents us from going into market. And we just don’t have the—I think, the technical capabilities, because we do really value encrypted data and user privacy in a way that’s incompatible with some requests from governments that would like Station to be in market. So I think that’s just a concrete example, where we’re prevented in operating in certain markets where we are holding ourselves to the standard that’s perhaps different than, like, the local government. PEPPER: In terms of the product—very similar. We have something called Express Wi-Fi, which is very similar to the Google Station. And there are issues, right, because there are some countries in which they want it to be open, so they have access to the data. And that’s not what we do. But going to another way to think about your question is, you know, you’re all familiar with Mark’s op-ed back in April, where he called for sensible regulation. It’s not—it’s no—you know, the shift has been—again, from ten years ago to today it was the internet is different, the internet is special, don’t regulate the internet, all right? The internet has now grown up. And we realize that there will be regulation. The question is, what form, what type? And, you know, we think the regulation needs to be not only—you know, how do you—what do you mean by sensible, proportionate, targeted, and not sort of overreaching? And you have to get this balance between—you want to continue the innovation, but you’d need frameworks and guardrails. You also have a continuum of what we mean by regulation. There are some things in which we think it’s completely appropriate, it’s within the remit of government. One of the big issues is election advertising. We think actually just tell us what the law is; we will abide by it. We don’t think we should be making law based upon, or decisions about—we probably have greater transparency than any medium—broadcast, print, certainly more than print. We have more transparency on election advertising than anybody anywhere. You want to take a—you want to find an ad and find out who bought it, where it ran, how many people saw it—in political advertising, we make that available. But that’s not the regulatory side, so what should the framework be? What should the rules be? So there are some things—and we believe, by the way—again, picking up on what Mike said, having harmonized privacy regulation we think is actually very important, because you don’t want—in the U.S. we don’t want 51 different flavors. And globally, you can’t be a global company without having a framework. GDPR’s a good starting point. We abide by it. Could it be improved here and there? Absolutely. But as a place to start for an approach to being able to have a global framework of, in quotes, “governance for privacy,” yeah. And that’s a regulation. But there are other things that we believe are going to be sort of regulated in more traditional self-regulatory ways, but there’s still going to be—so there’ll be industry codes. And the analogies there in the U.S., for example, are the ratings from MPA—it’s now MPA; it’s no longer MPAA—MPA promotion of pictures. So again, that’s a form of self-regulation. So you’re going to see, I think, a range of what the instruments are and the relative participation of governments in that process. But we’re already regulated and the question is what type of regulation makes the most sense to get the balance right between protecting users/consumers, protecting democracy and protecting and fostering continuing—to foster innovation and investment. HAMMER: More questions? Here, please? Q: Thanks. Hi. I’m Sabeen Dhanani with the Center for Digital Development at USAID. One thing we hear a lot about is 5G and how it’s going to completely again change the digital landscape. Given the infrastructure challenges you mentioned earlier and the regulatory challenges, what really—what is the realistic timeline on 5G in some of the emerging markets, and how should we all prepare to deal with the new set of challenges that that might pose? PEPPER: I’m somewhat of a 5G cynic. I think 5G actually is going to be transformational, but not in the way we’re hearing about the hype. Most people talk about—especially at a very publicity-driven level or certainly globally at the political level, it’s being characterized as this is going to be super AK, high-definition video to your smart phone. No. Maybe eventually. That’s not the transformational part of it. To me, 5G’s transformational, first of all, in terms of the types of applications that will be enabled by 5G are, in the first instance, the most transformational ones are going to be on the industrial side. It’s going to be smart factories. It’s going to be augmented transportation. It’s going to be precision agriculture. In previous years people called it the internet of things. That will be enabled by 5G. That is going to have very significant transformational impact in terms of economies globally in the developed world and developing world. That architecture and the types of deployments that are going to happen with that are very different than sort of rebuilding our consumer-oriented mobile networks. They are converting to 5G, but I can tell you that I’ve talked to CEOs of operators in developing countries, one in particular in the Middle East, and it’s a state-owned operator and he was told by the government, the king, this 5G thing, this is really important. I want you to build 5G right away. So he did. He converted his network to 5G. He said, I’m dying. I have no business case. Nobody’ll pay extra. My margins are crushed. I had to make these big investments. He said maybe, I hope someday, I’ll be able to justify that investment. So we hear a lot about 5G and I think it is going to be transformational, but not necessarily in the near term in the ways we’re hearing about. But I think it’s really important. But that’s going to be a very different type of deployment. The last point on that, what’s interesting is Germany just made some 5G spectrum available. Guess who won the auction for it? It was not a mobile operator. It was Siemens. They wanted that spectrum for 5G for smart factories and building smart factory systems. To me that was really interesting and a harbinger, I think, of what we may be seeing. HAMMER: We have a question here. Q: Welby Leaman, from Walmart. I totally buy the importance of social media, search, e-government to create that critical mass of demand for the next billion users to come online. Where do you rank retail in that, among the other sectors? Does retail have a big role to play in pulling people into the digital economy? And since the retail world’s now in sort of a big fight between Walmart and Amazon and others, between sort of a digital native approach and a Walmart approach which would be basically blending increasingly digitally enabled stores with e-commerce, do you see one or the other as more likely to pull people into the digital economy? Because our proposition has been that the blending gives people more on-ramps. So for example digital payment, you can go into a store, digitize your cash in Walmart Mexico and thus join the digital economy. SPIES: I think from everything I’ve seen it is—it can be really tough to go completely digitally native from a retail perspective in these markets. And the challenges often look very different than what a U.S. retailer would think about. So cash on demand, or cash on delivery is still a huge percentage of payments in many of these markets and a lot of major retailers have built the option to pay through credit card, through online payments and then cash on delivery. I think Uber offered this option before offering it in the U.S., Trust and Safety. So there’s a ton of issues with scam and fraud and being able to have a verified checkmark by your badge or by your store and know that you’re not participating in a fraudulent purchase is incredibly important, more so than it is in the U.S. And I think lastly even just logistics. So there’s a ton of focus on being able to map out cities that previously maybe didn’t have a formal address system and it was informal directions that even the national post office wasn’t delivering to, like building an e-commerce company around those logistics is often something that’s going to be done, often it’s proprietary to local startups, if they’re able to crack that in a city. So yeah, I would say that for retail and e-commerce specifically, localization is incredibly important because the challenges are so unique to these markets. Retail is still a much bigger percent of online shopping than e-commerce, and often this blended approach is something that has to happen just by nature of business there. HAMMER: We’ll come here. Q: Mike Jobbins with Search for Common Ground. A lot of the societies that you’re talking about—Congo, Mali, Yemen, where these next billion people live, are as divided as Myanmar was five years ago and have the same level of internet penetration as Myanmar did. So what are the lessons that you take from Myanmar or any of these places as they come online to shift the social norms of accepted and expected behavior on your platforms? PEPPER: So Myanmar’s a good example, but it’s not alone. That I mentioned earlier being prepared and digital literacy. Getting the first 3 billion people, 3.5 billion people online was relatively easy, compared to the next 3.5 billion. You take a look at basic literacy rates, you take a look at who’s connected and who’s not, even in emerging markets, and so the needs for even very basic digital literacy are extremely important. The training—and I mentioned earlier, giving people basic skills that when they go online, how do they set their settings on their phone? How do they—how can they know if there’s a somebody’s—a phishing attack for information? How do they keep their passwords safe, or even know that they’re supposed to? So these actually, I think, are extremely important and—for example, we’re working—we have multiple digital literacy programs that we have in place and others, new ones that we’re building all the time. And in fact, one of the most effective ones which we used to call OTG, On The Ground, which nobody knew what that meant, and I kept saying, OK, it’s a great program but that’s a silly name. They actually now call it Internet 101, which I thought was—makes more sense. The first place they launched it was in Myanmar, and it’s been actually quite effective. And if you’re interested, I can get you information about that. But that to us is extremely important for a safe internet experience going forward, especially in places with low literacy and very limited digital literacy. We’re also working with NGOs, for NGOs to develop their own digital literacy programs in particular countries. SPIES: I’d say for us, often our values are baked into the product itself. With free wi-fi specifically, as we’ve looked into other companies, what you see is there’s a much lower standard of user data privacy and protection. A lot of people have gotten onto wi-fi networks that are not secure and they get hacked in some ways. And so we’ve talked a lot internally about how do you even shift the perception of this product experience in this industry, because what we’re offering is a much more secure encrypted experience that really prioritizes user privacy. HAMMER: (Off mic.) PISA: Sure, I think it’s a great question. I think if you look at the infrastructure that Facebook very belatedly put in place in Myanmar, the thing that’s striking to me is how expensive it must have been to deal with that problem ex-post. They have hundreds of local language content moderators. Obviously the development of new AI systems, those can scale rather cheaply. But I think as digital platforms broadly step into new countries and are used en masse in new countries where they have to kind of get up to speed with local language content moderation, it seems like to me that one question that arises is when is it not going to make sense as a business proposition? Because if you look at—I know the Facebook average revenue per user last year in the United States was $27 per user, and in most—in sub-Saharan Africa was less than two dollars. So at a certain stage—and the next billion users, it’s a long game, right? And it’s a numbers game, but it’s not hugely profitable in the short term, or maybe even the medium term. And then the questions around how you do—how do you mitigate those risks, it seems like it can be a very costly exercise. So I wonder at some point does it become—do companies just kind of wash their hands of certain problematic situations? HAMMER: I think we have one more in the back, please. Q: Hi. Thank you for this session. My name is Ibrahim. I’m from Deloitte. My question is around cybersecurity and future threats with Google’s Sycamore quantum computer. We have things in place that ensure that these nations are secured in the future, especially around cybersecurity, encryption algorithm, and things like that? Also, looking atm, like, the World Bank report, which is set from I believe 2020 to 2030, which is around the time that quantum computer and things like that will start being really widespread. Are there strategies in place to ensure that these nations are also secured from infrastructure and capacity building? SPIES: Yeah, and I wish I could speak more specifically to quantum computing and some of the cybersecurity efforts. I know on the policy side we are working mostly with some of the transnational bodies that are thinking about policies to put in place and what are global regulations that could be a template for countries on this. Some of the points raised earlier, any time you can get a framework that is globally applicable and scalable, that’s easier for a company whether you’re talking about privacy or cybersecurity. So I know we’re participating in those forums, but I don’t have more detail on them. Maybe Robert can speak to the Facebook efforts. PEPPER: We’re not doing quantum at this point. (Laughter.) SPIES: Yeah, just to pass that over to you. PISA: Neither is CGD, so—yeah. (Laughter.) HAMMER: Neither is the World Bank. And so, with that—(laughter)—I am so grateful to each of you for coming this evening. Thank you very much for spending your time and please thank your panelists for the insight they shared. (Applause.)
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  • Nigeria
    Home to Over Half the Population, Nigeria's Cities Continue to Boom
    In an article for Bloomberg, Judd Devremont and Todd Moss highlight the rapid urbanization of Africa, arguing that the success or failure of Africa in the global economy will depend on its cities. In Nigeria, this can be seen most clearly in Lagos.  At independence in 1960, Lagos had an estimated population of 763,000; today it is about 13 million. Together with Lagos state, the population reaches 21 million. While Lagos is by far the largest city in Nigeria, security concerns, rural poverty, and hopes for greater economic opportunity are driving people to cities all over the country. In the decade between 2007 and 2017, Nigeria’s urban dwellers increased from 41 percent of the population to about 50 percent. In 2019, there were 7 cities with a population of one million or more, 80 with a population ranging between one hundred thousand and one million, and 248 with a population between ten thousand and one hundred thousand. But much of this urbanization is unplanned and chaotic. According to a World Bank report about African cities, "Africa’s cities feel crowded precisely because they are not dense with economic activity, infrastructure, or housing and commercial structures." They lack "formal housing in reach of jobs, and without transport systems to connect people living farther away," forcing residents to "forgo services and amenities to live in cramped quarters near their work." The realities of life in Nigerian cities are hard. In Lagos, about two of every three people live in a slum. Less than 10 percent of residents have access to piped water (for those that do, it is often riddled with sediment and unsafe to drink), forcing urban households to purchase water from vendors at up to three times the normal price charged by Lagos state. Only six percent of urban households have a flushing toilet that is connected to a sewage system. But life goes on. For all its shortcomings, Lagos is the center of much of what is dynamic and vibrant about Nigeria, a point Judd and Todd stress about African cities in general. The informal economy provides employment incompletely captured by statistics. In Lagos, there are few beggars; everyone has a hustle. Vendors working the city’s ubiquitous traffic jams (“go slows”) sell everything from mops and buckets to juju materials to the complete works of Shakespeare. Others provide services, such as washing the feet of market ladies several times a day. It is the home of Nollywood, a home-grown film industry that is widely influential in Africa and spreading around the world. It is the center of Nigerian telecommunications, and cell phone use is ubiquitous. The Nigerian Communications Commission stated that Internet users in Nigeria numbered 116 million in March 2019—well over half of the country’s estimated population. The most modern of financial and other services are available to clients in the Lagos-Ibadan corridor, the capital Abuja, and sporadically elsewhere. Information technology and sophisticated financial services are starting to power the modern sectors of the economy, though not to the same extent as in South Africa or Kenya, though the economy of Lagos state is larger than that of Kenya. Hence, as Judd and Todd argue, they require attention for their enormous potential, both good and bad.
  • Nigeria
    Debt Servicing, Tax Revenue, and Oil in Nigeria
    President Muhammadu Buhari is publicly asking the Federal Inland Revenue Service about its failure to meet tax-collecting targets since 2015. The president’s spokesman, Garba Shehu, commented, “it would appear that the country might be heading for a fiscal crisis if urgent steps are not taken to halt the negative trends in target setting and target realization in tax revenue.” Nigerian federal and state entities have borrowed so much money that debt service now consumes more than 70 percent of revenue, according to the finance ministry.  Since the early 1970s, the Nigerian government has been dependent on oil revenue for more the majority of its budget—at present it’s about half—and more than 90 percent of its foreign exchange. Hence, the government is hostage to the world price of oil. Prices have been low throughout Buhari’s presidency, leaving his administration with few options: it can either cut expenditure to fit revenue or borrow to make up for the revenue short-fall. As every government knows, cutting expenditure is difficult. Even reducing the growth of expenditure is hard. State governments also borrow, but when they approach bankruptcy, it is the Federal government that must bail them out. During this current period of relatively low international oil prices and a decline in Nigeria’s oil production, the government has been forced to borrow. During his second term (2003-2007), when oil prices were high, President Olusegun Obasanjo successfully renegotiated Nigeria’s Paris Club debt in 2005. In return for a single payment (possible because of high oil prices), the accumulated debt was largely eliminated. Subsequently, the Nigerian government established a sinking fund. It set a target price per barrel for oil as the basis for government expenditure. When oil was higher than the target, the surplus went into a special fund. When it was lower, the resulting shortfall could be made up by drawing from the special fund. Unfortunately, the fund was largely depleted under murky circumstances during the Yar’Adua and Jonathan administrations, also a period of the great economic downturn starting in 2008.  Successive Nigerian administrations have recognized that the long-term solution is to move away from dependence on oil revenue. That is easier said than done and will require massive amounts of investment. The ongoing security issues that plague the country discourage foreign investment. Perhaps more important, it also discourages Nigerians from investing in their own country and encourages them to export their capital. For Nigeria, oil really has been a curse. Arguably, the country was more developed in 1960 at the time of independence than it is now. Then, it exported food and there was a dynamic manufacturing sector, especially involving textile. Nigeria probably had the best roads, railways, and other infrastructure in West Africa then. But oil and its quick profits sucked up the available capital, and successive military governments pursued bad policies. There are other factors as well: the population is now a multiple of what it was in 1960; too rapid urbanization has introduced economic distortions, and degradation of the environment has accelerated. Taken together, history has not been kind to Nigeria.
  • Women and Economic Growth
    Investing in Girls’ STEM Education in Developing Countries
    The education gender gap costs the world between $15 trillion and $30 trillion in human capital. U.S. aid programs need to equip girls and women to participate in the modern digital economy.
  • Rwanda
    Alongside Real Progress, Kagame’s Human Rights Abuses Persist
    Neil Edwards is the volunteer intern for CFR's Africa Program in Washington, DC. He is a master's candidate at the School of International Service at American University and is a returned Peace Corps Rwanda volunteer. President Paul Kagame’s Vision 2020 roadmap for Rwanda has led to remarkable progress with respect to women’s rights. One of the most visible markers is Rwanda’s parliament, which has the world’s highest proportion of women at 61.3 percent—nearly triple the world’s average. Parliament has passed laws on gender-based violence, inheritance, discrimination, and rape. Furthermore, a near-universal healthcare system covers almost 90 percent of the nation, and Rwanda is on pace to become the first nation in the world to eliminate cervical cancer. Almost all Rwandan adolescent girls are vaccinated against it, while in the United States, only four in ten girls are vaccinated. But these great strides in gender equality occur alongside Kagame’s persistent human rights abuses.  In an open letter, former presidential candidate Shima Diane Rwigara calls out Kagame for these abuses. The letter was presumably motivated by the murder of Jean Paul Mwiseneza, a prison guard who was stabbed and beheaded in a Kigali prison on June 10. She writes, “Rwandans experienced enough trauma, anguish and loss during the slaughter of their countrymen and women; the last thing they need is oppression from their liberators. I humbly ask: what to do when those designated to protect are the ones persecuting?”   Rwigara has been a fierce public critic of President Kagame, targeting the regime’s human rights record, weak rule of law, and restrictions on freedoms of expression. She has faced the wrath of the Kagame regime first hand. During her 2017 bid for president, naked photos of Rwigara were leaked to the media. Soon after, she and her family were arrested for tax evasion and inciting an insurrection, and she spent over a year in prison facing those likely spurious charges. Similarly, Victoire Ingabire Umuhoza, another female presidential candidate, was arrested and served eight years of a fifteen year sentence on charges of terrorism and threatening national security. These charges are also widely understood to have been ginned-up for political purposes.    President Kagame often cites Rwanda’s progress on gender representation, access to health care, and improved development statistics to mask his human rights abuses. In an interview with France 24, Kagame was asked about presidential candidates, journalists, and human rights defenders being jailed, physically attacked, killed, silenced, or even forced into exile. Kagame dismissed these allegations entirely, claiming it as “just ridiculous.” He pivoted to Rwanda’s development, saying “what we are talking about in terms of development, these are human rights: development, schools, education, health, and food security. The level of poverty has decreased by 60 percent.” But one does not justify the other.  Still, Kagame’s regular appearances in the international spotlight reflect his successful self-promotion. Kagame makes appearances at NBA basketball games and regularly in international media. He has built a global image as a war hero who rebuilt the nation after he led an army to stop the 1994 genocide. Casual viewers of his interviews and public appearances may not be aware of his regime’s political repression.  Kagame is now serving his third term as president, and after changing the constitution in 2015, he now has the ability to rule until 2034. The president’s clampdown on political freedoms dampened checks on his power. Political activism and a truly independent civil society are almost non-existent for fears of prosecution. According to Rwigara, certain “organizations…which are responsible for seeking justice for survivors—are too afraid to stand up to the ruling party.” Despite Rwanda’s world-leading representation of women in parliament—and its likely positive impact on policy—the legislature is not able to check Kagame’s political repression. Instead, parliament is complicit in the adoption of policies that compromise Rwandans’ civil liberties. Members of parliament—both male and female—are necessarily loyal to the ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front party, rather than owing their full allegiance to their constituents who elected them. Amidst the democratic backsliding occurring across Sub-Saharan Africa, policymakers must applaud social progress, but continue to remain vigilant to ongoing human rights abuses. 
  • Development
    Last Month, Over Half-a-Billion Africans Accessed the Internet
    Last month, more people in Africa accessed the internet than did in Latin America, North America, or the Middle East. There were 525 million internet users in Africa, 447 million in Latin America and the Caribbean, 328 million in North America, and 174 million in the Middle East. About 40 percent of all Africans were online last month, but usage varies from country to country. In Kenya it was 83 percent; in South Africa, 56 percent; and in Nigeria, 60 percent. However, Nigeria is so much bigger in population than any other African country, its citizens comprised about 20 percent of all African internet users. Though Africa is behind only Asia and Europe in the absolute number of internet users, it lags behind every other region in the proportion of internet users. June internet users comprised 52 percent of Asians, 87 percent of Europeans, and 89 percent of North Americans.  The good news, simply put, is that 40 percent of all Africans have access of some sort to the internet. On a continent in which, by and large, newspapers are expensive, telephone landlines are underdeveloped, authoritarian governments seek to manipulate the media, and most people have traditionally received news from the radio, often broadcasting in local languages, the internet provides access to a new and much bigger world. The downside, of course, is that the internet is unfiltered, with both wisdom and garbage. There are also fewer ways to verify internet stories than in other parts of the world where other forms of media are more developed. Internet penetration is likely to grow at a faster rate than elsewhere in the world, and the fact that there are already more than half a billion internet users in Africa raises the possibility of a greater number of profound social, political, and economic changes. Internet usage may be a sign that the African giant is awakening. 
  • Development
    Why Investing in Women Matters: Mainstreaming Women’s Economic Empowerment in the World’s Poorest Countries
    Voices from the Field features contributions from scholars and practitioners highlighting new research, thinking, and approaches to development challenges. This post is authored by Esther Pan Sloane, Head of Partnerships, Policy, and Communications at the UN Capital Development Fund (UNCDF).
  • Development
    Development Turns Competitive With Mixed Results
    A vast gulf remains between development financing and development goals. International competition could help bridge that gap, but has produced mixed results to date.
  • Sustainable Development Goals (UN)
    Taking Stock of the UN Sustainable Development Goals
    This week, representatives from UN member states meet to discuss progress on six goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.