Economics

Development

  • Women and Women's Rights
    Women on the Blockchain: Moving Beyond “Blockchain Bros”
    Cryptocurrencies have the potential to radically alter the world's financial systems. But could they also upend inequality?
  • Zimbabwe
    Wildlife Conservation in Africa, Outrage in the West, and Cecil the Lion
    Four years ago, on July 2, 2015, a Minneapolis dentist killed a well-known Lion, Cecil, in a Zimbabwe trophy hunt with a bow and arrow. Cecil was something of a star in the developed world. He attracted tourists, in part because his black mane made him readily identifiable, in part because he allowed safari sight-seeing vehicles to come up close. He was also part of an Oxford University wildlife study, and wore a GPS tracking collar. Cecil’s killing provoked outrage in Europe and the United States, and the resulting media storm made the dentist an international pariah, at least at the moment. Nevertheless, following an investigation, the Zimbabwe authorities determined that the dentist had a permit and that the hunt was legal. Neither the dentist nor his hunting guide were ever successfully prosecuted in Zimbabwe or elsewhere. Zimbabwean authorities have said the dentist is free to return to Zimbabwe whenever he likes, though not as a big-game hunter However, in the aftermath of the outcry over Cecil, American and British airlines banned the transport of hunting trophies, and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service added lions to its endangered species list, making it more difficult for Americans to hunt them under American law.  In Zimbabwe the killing caused hardly a ripple. Cecil was hardly known, according to the media. Lions, especially those living in close proximity to farms, are often viewed by local people as a dangerous menace. Some Zimbabweans took the Western hype over Cecil as yet more evidence that Europeans and Americans put a higher value on wild animals than on black people. Some African conservation officials expressed concern that if trophy hunting—and the huge fees that they command—were banned, essential funding for conservation programs would dry up.  Marking the fourth anniversary of Cecil’s killing, the Financial Times (FT) ran a story indicating that there is more money from wild animal tourism than from trophy hunting. The dentist allegedly paid $59,000 to kill Cecil. Charity LionAid (an NGO) has calculated that a male lion in the Serengeti brings Tanzania $890,000 in tourism revenue over a five-year period. Using a different set of calculations, an FT columnist concluded that the tourism value of a lion is about $179,000—still multiple times higher than the return for trophy hunting a lion.  Perhaps the bottom line of the Cecil episode is that it highlights the difficult trade-offs conservation, local opinion, tourism, and trophy hunting impose on African governments, many of which are poor and with limited bureaucratic and administrative capacity. They must balance local community concern about damage inflicted by wildlife on people and crops with often uncritical western support for “conservation”—protection of animals anywhere and all the time. They must also balance the revenue from trophy hunting—easy to determine and immediate—with income from tourism, perhaps harder to calculate and realized over a longer term. These dilemmas highlight the need for a little humility from Western critics from all perspectives.
  • China
    Is China Undermining Human Rights at the United Nations?
    Under President Xi Jinping, China is pressing the United Nations’ human rights body to favor national sovereignty and development over calling out domestic rights abuses.
  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    Nigeria’s River State Governor Abolishes School Fees
    It is widely recognized by Nigerians that a significant barrier to their country’s social and economic development is the limited extent and poor quality of public education, especially at the primary and secondary levels. As of 2010, it is estimated that only 66 percent of primary-age children are enrolled in school. Nigerians commonly recognize the importance of education. With respect to higher education, successive military and civilian governments at the federal and state level have greatly expanded the university system without providing the necessary funding, leading to disastrous consequences for the quality of what had once been an excellent university system. The wealthy enroll their children in private schools domestically or send them abroad. There are now 79 private universities in the country. However, for the poor—a majority of the population—private education is not an option. School fees, especially at the primary and secondary levels, are a high barrier for the poor to overcome, and many Nigerians struggle to find the funds to keep their children in school. Hence, the abolition of all school fees in Rivers State by its governor, Nyesom Wike, appears to be a highly positive step. On June 24, he announced, “From today, no child either in primary and secondary schools should pay fees and levies in any school across the state.” He also prohibited the charging of fees for examinations. He promised government grants to replace the lost revenue from fees. Implementation will be everything. Will the state government, in fact, find the funds to replace the school fees? Will school administrators cease charging fees? The governor charged the State Ministry of Education, the Rivers State Senior Secondary Schools Board, and the State Universal Basic Education Board to monitor state schools to ensure compliance. The governor also said, “If I hear that any school head collects any fees or levies…that school head would be sanctioned.” The governor also appears to have acknowledged the ‘elephant in the living room;’ too often school administrators have pocketed the fees they collected. The governor stated: “The monies you collect from these children are just used for your personal purposes.” The governor’s statement did not refer to other costs poor students often face, such as mandatory uniforms or the purchase of books and other supplies.  
  • Nigeria
    Nigeria’s “Emerging Middle Class” Is Leaving
    Boosters often like to talk about an “emerging middle class” in Africa. Leaving aside definitional issues—who is middle class varies from country to country—in some African countries a middle class does seem to be growing, though it is not as big or growing as fast as some of the media hype implies. Nigeria, with its huge population, is one of the countries that commentators often look to.  But Quartz Africa identified the fact that many of those who are tech-savvy or have other job qualifications in demand—current or potential members of such a middle class—are leaving. Many seek to raise their families abroad and do not intend to come back. Popular destinations include Canada and Australia, both of which have skills-based immigration programs. Others, for example, deliberately overstay their visas in the United States, which has led to a crackdown on U.S. visas for Nigerians.  Drivers of middle class immigration, according to Quartz, include the breakdown of the Nigerian educational system at virtually all levels, high unemployment and poverty levels in Nigeria, and a general disillusionment with the country’s political leadership. In the March 2019 presidential elections, only 35 percent of those registered actually voted. Even taking into account voter suppression, which did occur, the figure is not encouraging.   Quartz acknowledges that emigration is not cheap, that it is the well-off, not the poor, who can leave. According to an Afrobarometer survey of thirty-four African countries, the younger and more educated a person is, the more likely they are to consider emigrating. About half of Nigeria’s population lives in “extreme poverty,” in absolute number more than any other country in the world. The poor can emigrate, but they are more likely to cross an adjacent border in the search for work. According to the same Afrobarometer report, most Africans that consider immigrating, consider doing so to another African country. 
  • Trade
    African Continental Free Trade Area: A New Horizon For Trade in Africa
    Kanzanira Thorington is a research associate with the digital and cyberspace policy program at the Council on Foreign Relations. On May 30, the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) officially went into force. The agreement, signed by all but three of Africa’s fifty-five nations, establishes the largest free trade area in the world since the creation of the World Trade Organization in 1995. Once the remaining countries join, AfCFTA will cover more than 1.2 billion people and over $3 trillion in GDP. While AfCFTA promises to unlock Africa’s economic potential, the agreement still faces an uphill battle for implementation. The African Union launched AfCFTA negotiations back in 2015 with the hopes of boosting intra-African trade, which falls behind [PDF] trade within other regional blocs. Only 15 percent of African exports go to other African countries, compared to intra-trade levels of 58 percent in Asia and 67 percent in Europe. High tariffs and colonial-era infrastructure make it easier for African countries to export to Europe or the United States than to each other. Furthermore, overlapping membership in Africa’s eight Regional Economic Communities (RECs) hinders trade standardization and enforcement. AfCFTA, which establishes a single continental market for goods and services, seeks to increase intra-African trade by cutting tariffs by 90 percent and harmonizing trading rules at a regional and continental level. If successful, AfCFTA is expected to boost intra-African trade by 52.3 percent by 2022. The agreement comes at a critical moment for Africa. For centuries Europe, the United States, and more recently China have stripped the continent of its raw materials. Today, more than 75 percent of Africa’s external exports are extractives, namely oil and minerals. Increasingly, African nations hoping to secure sustainable economic growth are shifting away from the volatility associated with extractive exports towards industrialized goods. While overall intra-African trade is miniscule, 42 percent of it consists of industrial goods and this number is expected to grow under AfCFTA. A focus on industrial goods promotes African industrialization and the advancement of its manufacturing sector, providing more employment opportunities for the continent’s booming youth population. Amid growing U.S.-China trade tensions and China’s efforts to decrease its dependency on export markets, some are betting that Africa is a prime successor to become the manufacturing hub of the developing world. Nevertheless, AfCFTA will face a number of challenges before it can be considered a success. The agreement has been ratified by twenty-two African countries, but implementation will be gradual as countries continue to negotiate tariff schedules, rules of origin, and commitments for service sectors. The agreement’s most obvious shortcoming is the absence of Nigeria, which along with Benin and Eritrea, has not signed up to AfCFTA. Nigeria—Africa’s largest economy and most populous country—pulled out of negotiations due to concerns that AfCFTA membership would harm domestic manufacturers. While Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari is reconsidering Nigerian membership, Nigeria’s actions reflect larger concerns that protectionism could hinder the effectiveness of AfCFTA. Tariffs are a major source of revenue for African countries and many may be reluctant to forgo such income in favor of the trade agreement, as seen with the varying levels of compliance across RECs. Despite the remaining hurdles, AfCFTA’s potential impact should not be diminished. With free trade under attack in much of the developed world, Africa is forging a new path for itself to foster sustainable wealth and development for the continent.
  • Women and Women's Rights
    Five Questions on Women-Led Sustainable Development: Meagan Fallone
    The Five Questions Series is a forum for scholars, government officials, civil society leaders, and foreign policy practitioners to provide timely analysis of new developments related to the advancement of women and girls worldwide. In this interview Megan Fallone, the director of Barefoot College International, highlights how the Solar Mamas' initiative has empowered women and poor communities around the world.
  • Diplomacy and International Institutions
    The NBA's New Africa League Builds on Strong Foundation
    Jack McCaslin is a research associate for Africa policy studies at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, DC. Popular culture, including sports, has long been one of America’s most powerful exports. Athletes, in turn, have been influential ambassadors, if not for the U.S. government, then for America writ large. Last week, for the first time in National Basketball Association (NBA) history, the Finals tipped off outside of the United States, in Toronto. While only about two hours away from the U.S. border at Niagara Falls, the NBA has set its sights much farther afield.  In February, the National Basketball Association (NBA) announced that it would set up and help run a twelve-team-league, the Basketball Africa League. Slated to begin in 2020, it would be the first time that the NBA helped operate a league outside of the United States and Canada. The league would be in partnership with the International Basketball Federation (FIBA), and would build on FIBA’s Africa League. According to Adam Silver, the NBA’s commissioner, there is enormous interest from the U.S. business community and former President Barack Obama, who attended game two of the Finals in Toronto with the commissioner, wants to be involved.  In some ways, the NBA’s relationship with Africa dates back to 1984, when Nigeria’s Hakeem Olajuwon was drafted first overall by the Houston Rockets. He would go on to become one of the greatest NBA players of all time and be inducted into the Basketball Hall of Fame. Seven years later, the Denver Nuggets drafted another future-Hall-of-Famer, Dikembe Mutombo, from Democratic Republic of Congo. At the beginning of the 2018–2019 NBA season, rosters included thirteen players born in Africa, and many more born to African parents abroad. Africans are well represented in the Finals in Toronto. Serge Ibaka of Republic of Congo and Pascal Siakam of Cameroon play for the Toronto Raptors, as does OG Anunoby, who was born to Nigerian parents in the UK and was raised in Missouri. Masai Ujiri, Toronto’s president of basketball operations and former NBA Executive of the Year, was also born to Nigerian parents in the UK, and spent some of his childhood in Nigeria before moving to the United States to play basketball professionally; one of the Raptor’s assistant coaches, Patrick Mutombo, was born in Democratic Republic of Congo. The Golden State Warriors’ Andre Iguodala, a former Finals Most Valuable Player (MVP), was born in the United States to an American mother and a Nigerian father. As an institution, the NBA has been increasing its ties to the continent over the past two decades. Basketball Without Borders (BWB), another partnership between the NBA, WNBA, and FIBA, is a global basketball development and outreach initiative. Its first camp in Africa took place in 2003 (attended by Ujiri), though NBA players, including Dikembe Mutombo, participated in clinics in South Africa in the early 1990s. NBA Africa was officially launched in 2010 to “grow the game of basketball” by, among other things, building courts, cultivating top talent, and using NBA players “with ties to Africa to contribute to local communities and philanthropic causes.” Amadou Fall, a Senegalese NBA executive, has led that office, one of twelve offices outside the United States, since it was founded. He was recently named president of the new Africa league.  The NBA’s activities in Africa and around the world have enjoyed the active participation of current and former players. For example, from 2005 to 2017, the NBA and WNBA boasted over one hundred “sports envoys,” current and former players who travel abroad to lead clinics and speak on diversity and leadership in partnership with U.S. embassies. This is perhaps what sets the NBA’s initiatives in Africa apart: the personal investment of current and former players and executives, particularly those with ties to the continent. Far beyond simply finding the next Olajuwon, Mutombo, or Embiid, the NBA’s Africa League, should it fully materialize, will build personal relationships between North America and Africa, help achieve certain development objectives through its business and outreach, and improve America’s overall image on the continent.
  • Wars and Conflict
    Development Redefined--The Battles We Choose to Avoid Wars We Can’t Win
    Play
    Conflicts, crises in fragile states, and violent extremism are on the rise and a record number of people were forced from their homes last year. Short-term security interventions and humanitarian responses often only provide temporary relief. Achim Steiner discusses how development must be redefined in the twenty-first century to address the underlying causes of crises, citing results from the United Nations’ work in hotspots around the world, including Syria, Yemen, Iraq, Somalia, and the Sahel. The Sorensen Distinguished Lecture on the United Nations was established in 1996 by Gillian and Theodore C. Sorensen to highlight the United Nations and offer a special occasion for its most distinguished and experienced leaders to speak to the Council membership.
  • Southeast Asia
    Last Days of the Mighty Mekong: A Review
    By Nicholas Borroz The Last Days of the Mighty Mekong, by Brian Eyler, director of the Southeast Asia program at the Stimson Center, takes the reader on a journey from glaciers in China to rice fields in Vietnam, stopping along the way in Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand. The book describes how unsustainable human society’s current relationship is with the Mekong, which he defines not just as a river but as a complex ecological system that includes glaciers, lakes, deltas, and other smaller rivers in the region. The Mekong is important globally in terms of biodiversity—thirteen times more fish are caught annually from the Mekong than from all of North America’s lakes and rivers combined. It is also important strategically—the Mekong starts in China and flows through mainland Southeast Asia, an economically dynamic region where Beijing is increasingly the dominant external power. The Mekong has become increasingly important to trade as well, as the river has been made more navigable (controversially) through efforts by China to dredge rapids and remove rocks, among other strategies. Eyler demonstrates, through a mix of anecdotes and analysis, how economic development projects that fail to consider ecological consequences are, ultimately, unsustainable—such projects increasingly threaten the long-term health of the river and its basin. In the context of the Mekong, he shows, the impact on the river can occur locally, when a Cambodian fishing community for instance overfishes and depletes fish stocks, thus destroying its livelihood. It can happen on a national scale—for instance, when the Vietnamese government builds water management infrastructure that interrupts sedimentation distribution cycles, thus undermining the national agricultural sector the infrastructure is supposed to support. This damage also can happen on a regional scale. Thailand’s energy demands, for instance, are one reason for dam-building in Laos, and these dams ultimately damage biodiversity both in Laos and Thailand. Eyler shows that unsustainable economic development is destroying both the Mekong’s biodiversity and also the ways of life of communities along and near the river. Eyler cites numerous indicators that biodiversity is on the wane, such as declining Mekong Giant Catfish populations and the changing compositions of cyprinid harvests. To explain the community destruction threat, he provides numerous sobering examples, particularly in China and Cambodia, of ill-designed relocation programs that have hurt displaced communities’ societies and economies. Although all of the countries in the Mekong basin have, in various ways, undermined the river’s long-term viability, Eyler places the most blame on China for the Mekong’s dire future. As he notes early in the book, the Chinese model of economic development “is defined by top-down, investment-led capitalism at the expense of protecting communities and natural biodiversity.” At the end of the book, he circles back to his core claim, after reviewing a mountain of evidence, and reaffirms that China’s model of development is the Mekong’s biggest threat. Not only does dam-building in China (where the river is called the Lancang) disrupt the Mekong further downstream, but Chinese outbound investment and tourism to Southeast Asia potentially lead to harmful economic development projects in other countries. Eyler implies that economic development projects—which often proceed in the Mekong basin after weak or nonexistent environmental impact studies—must do much more to consider potential ecological and societal consequences before they are approved by regional governments. Only in this way, he notes, will the region’s states avoid catastrophe for the river basin. He provides a few examples of relatively sustainable economic development in the river basin. He does not, however, propose a clear, concrete plan for how states—either upstream China or downstream less powerful states—can enforce this shift. Nor does he explain how the region could more broadly avoid greater long-term damage to the health of the river and the people who depend on it. Perhaps he does not offer further recommendations because he sees little reason to believe China will reconsider the ecological and societal consequences of its dam-building activities, or seriously consult other stakeholders in the Mekong basin. Nicholas Borroz is an international business doctoral candidate at the University of Auckland.
  • India
    Development and the Indian Elections
    General elections for India’s lower house of  parliament began on April 11 and will last through May 19, with all ballots counted on May 23. This is the world’s largest democratic exercise. I had the chance to ask Dr. Aseema Sinha, Wagener Family professor of South Asian politics and George R. Roberts fellow at Claremont McKenna College, about India’s political economy, and development as an issue for voters. She is the author of Globalizing India: How Global Rules and Markets are Shaping India’s Rise to Power (2016) and the award-winning The Regional Roots of Developmental Politics in India: A Divided Leviathan (2005). Our exchange, the second of a series of Q & As on the Indian elections, appears below. The first of the series is here, the third here, and the fourth here. Your early work examined how some states in India managed to clock economic development gains better than others, even during the era of a centrally-planned economy. What is the picture across Indian states today? Today, as during the license-quota-raj period (the pre-reform era of bureaucratic dominance over the economy during the 1950s to 1980s), economic output, policy, and wellbeing varies by state. Indian states are as large as European nations and in some cases, such as with Uttar Pradesh [UP] and Bihar, larger. For example, Bihar’s population is 99 million, UP’s is 204 million, West Bengal’s is 90 million, and Karnataka’s is 64 million. Without understanding regional and local variations we will not understand India. I argued in 2005 that most approaches and our analytical vision understands the Indian state as a “unified actor, which either succeeds or fails but does so coherently.” Nothing could be farther from the truth. Subnational developmental states and regional party systems are the dominant reality of India. Economic conditions vary: the per capita annual income in Goa is $4,903, the highest in the country, while the per capita annual income in UP is $793. Bihar, UP, Manipur, Assam, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, and Odisha are the poorest states in terms of per capita income. In essence, development aspirations, wellbeing, and capacities vary across states, as does the politics. While some of this variation can be explained by diverse structural factors, political elites from states vie with each other to address their specific economic challenges by designing investment, technology, energy, and welfare policies. Thus, much of economic policy and developmental action takes place at the state-level. State-level economic conditions and economic strategies to take advantage of national, or central government initiatives and outline state-specific policies are very important. As an illustration, each state has launched literacy programs to address regional aspirations for education and to take advantage of national programs such as Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan, a program for girls’ literacy. Himachal Pradesh has witnessed many innovative primary literacy programs and great success in increasing literacy, as has Kerala, while Bihar’s literacy is much lower. Himachal Pradesh’s literacy rate in 2011 was 83.8% and Kerala’s literacy rate was 93.9%, while Bihar’s was 63.8% [2011 data]. However, since Bihar’s government in 2006 introduced an innovative program providing a mere $50 per girl for buying bicycles, school enrollment by girls has dramatically increased. These average variations affect women and minority populations disproportionately. For example, in Kerala 92% of women and 96% of men are literate, while in Bihar only 53.3% of women and 73.5% of men are literate. The gender literacy gap is, thus, much greater in Bihar than in Kerala or Tamil Nadu. If you are a poor woman in UP or Bihar, your life chances and opportunities are likely much worse than if you were poor woman in Kerala. In essence, well being and life chances vary dramatically by state. This is also true for a wide array of policy areas: industrial and investment policies, energy and renewal energy policies, and welfare and social policies such as those related to education and health. Observers have spoken of the Gujarat model, but there are multiple models across India’s regions: the Kerala model, the Tamil Nadu model, and the Bihar model of inclusion with social justice, for example. Even bureaucratic intentions and state capacity vary across states. The ability of different states to attract investment needs to be measured while keeping these differences in mind, as the Ministry of Commerce and Industry has also realized. However, it is important to note that state leaders act and re-order their economic fortunes shaped by larger contexts of the country and global forces. Regional decisions shape national intentions and initiatives and vice versa. A frame of reference encompassing interaction between the center and states is, thus, needed. For example, the central energy act of 2003 and the central solar policies have played an important role for state-level energy policies. So, there are some national forces—economic integration, central policies, diffusion, and competition across states—which affect all states, but different states respond in varied ways. Focusing only on the national or the subnational level will miss much of the policy and political economy dynamics that are subnational and interactional. It is, thus, important to adopt an interactive or polycentric framework to understand how states and their specific strategies shape and are shaped by larger processes of globalization and central policies. As I argued in a recent article, we need to move our line of focus to the subnational level while also using a framework that scales up and pays attention to diffusion and interactive dynamics. This scaling-down and scaling-up idea is very different from a Delhi-centric focus, which is the dominant focus when most observers view India. You’ve written about the emergence of a “contingent social coalition on behalf of development and economic growth across India.” How broad do you believe this coalition to be? Is it a coalition favoring economic reform, or more of a coalition favoring quality of life and human development improvements? The aspiration for higher incomes and development outcomes has extensive and wide support. Clear beneficiaries of the economic reform such as the middle classes, business classes, entrepreneurs, and small scale businesses support this focus. Support for a focus on economic and social welfare has also pervaded the aspirational neo-middle classes, lower middle class, migrants, and urban middle classes. The middle and aspirational middle classes hope for better roads, education, urban infrastructure, access to consumer choices, and health. Some sections that are struggling such as the urban and rural poor, agricultural landless, and informal sector workers seek their livelihoods at the periphery of semi-urban and urban economies, which further widens the support for economic change. A developmental coalition is, thus, quite broad, but the challenge in laying out its contours is that it does not map onto socio-economic categories like caste or class. Also, it is not pro-reform if reforms are understood as privatization or greater market reforms, unless they benefit the common people. In my view, economic and socioeconomic differentiation within many group and class categories has emerged and different sections of each grouping are beginning to demand economic services and benefits. For example, Professor Sudha Pai’s work has shown that some sections of the poorer Dalits in UP did not vote for the Bahujan Samaj Party, or BSP (a party devoted to Dalit empowerment), in 2014 as they preferred economic mobility more than caste expression. She and Sajjan Kumar also show that despite violence targeting Dalits, some poorer Dalits may not vote for the Samajwadi Party-BSP alliance in 2019 due to an economic logic. In contrast to the received wisdom about caste and political parties, urban poor and poorer middle classes—the aspirational groups—have a high demand for basic services such as water, electricity, subsidized health facilities and better public transport, and they may not vote only according to the caste group to which they belong. India’s development pattern has paradoxically become more capital intensive and service sector focused, which narrows the job opportunities that may open up. So, developmental demand is acquiring a renewed urgency due to joblessness and agrarian distress. I wrote about this in 2015 when I argued that a new dimension of development has opened up and most voters want to share in the economic changes they see happening around them. At the individual or community level (caste or region), there is a serious demand that the benefits of reforms reach the last Indian. Voters do not demand economic reform per se, but want higher incomes and more stable and secure livelihoods. Voters also want economic and social services such as health and education, and better infrastructure such as roads and trains. A recent survey confirms this trend. This may be the result of the revolution of rising expectations that the reforms of 1991, and the broadening of welfare and development schemes by the successive governments of Atal Behari Vajpayee (1998 to 2004) and Manmohan Singh (2004 to 2014), unleashed. The Indian National Congress (or “Congress”) party does not talk much about what Manmohan Singh’s government did, but he, especially during his first term, unleashed a remarkable social and economic revolution—a version of a New Deal—across India. This widespread development hunger has taken a specific Indian form. Even now, 29 years after the reform program of 1991, government jobs are in high demand, although this is also shaped by regional factors. Such demand is very strong in the north, east, and to some extent in Rajasthan and central India, but less so in the west and south. As a follow up, what are the political processes that are supporting this growing demand for development? I know you have done deep research into business associations as developmental associations, for example. Is this a major factor? Are the “rising expectations” among voters an important factor? India started its reform program in 1991, and by some accounts 1985. That would mean that reforms have continued for 34 years. The central government especially between 2004-2014 used some of the rising revenues to start new welfare programs. The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act was one such measure. Many state governments also have been active in providing welfare facilities such as education, health centers and e-governance initiatives. The cumulative effect created a revolution of rising expectations across diverse sections of India’s population. A desire for upward mobility has, for example, created new demands among the Dalits and Muslims. Those who have not benefited also want some of the benefits to reach them, such as with new health welfare programs targeting different sections of the middle classes. Prime Minister Narendra Modi understood this desire and tapped into it during the 2014 elections. An informal business mentality has pervaded large swathes of both urban and rural India, even though the big, national business associations only cater to a small urban and upwardly mobile elite, so their reach is by definition limited. There is another supply-side dynamic also at work. Since voters demand more economic benefits and India has a strong anti-incumbency preference (meaning that incumbency does not provide an advantage at election time), politicians and parties have realized the need to construct cross-caste coalitions and make election promises focused on local and national public goods like education and health. Paradoxically, the Bharatiya Janata Party [BJP] under Modi is also promising a national public good—national security—to appeal to a wider, broader coalition across India. So, there is both a demand-driven and supply-side logic at work. Let me ask you about global trade and Indian politics. Are there differences among Indian parties in their support for, or opposition to, trade liberalization? Are there some core beliefs that cross parties? The Congress party has supported trade liberalization along with compensation for its core support base. The BJP’s policies were transformed from an anti-globalization mindset to a more pro-globalization stance during the Vajpayee government (1998-2004). The Communist parties have been consistently against trade liberalization. Regional parties have become more pro-reform and even pro-globalization, although one needs to do a specific analysis keeping in mind regional factors. Interestingly, there are some reports that the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS, a Hindu nationalist volunteer organization) and the Swadeshi Jagran Manch, an organization affiliated with the RSS and BJP and focused on “self-reliance,” have become more active since 2014 when the Modi government came to power. Both organizations are against globalization. Modi is a long-term member of the RSS. This easy access for these organizations is a significant change from the Vajpayee era. Based on press accounts, their leaders seem to get more of a hearing with Modi. S. Gurumurthy, the co-convenor of the Swadeshi Jagran Manch, has been made a part-time director of the Reserve Bank of India, the country’s central bank. These groups criticized the highly regarded mainstream economists Raghuram Rajan and Arvind Panagariya during their tenures serving in the Indian government. One plausible reason for this shift is that Modi is one of the most election conscious BJP leaders and he is focused on how to get votes. The RSS and committed groups like the Swadeshi Jagran Manch provide grassroots volunteers to mobilize votes at election time, and they appear to have greater influence on the Modi government. This means that anti-globalization ideas may get more tacit government hearing. However, Modi has also seen the advantage of seeking a global audience and using that for domestic purposes. Modi uses foreign policy for his domestic ambitions. So, he is unlikely to be against globalization consistently, but India’s globalization has always been very different from what most people expect, as I have argued earlier. In essence, Indian leaders have learned to modify global forces to shape national interests in a distinct way. Modi will continue using globalization, imbuing it this time with his Hindu-centric nationalist imprint. Manmohan Singh, India’s PM from 2004-2014, also crafted his own version of globalization, which he called “globalization with a human face.” What will you be watching most closely during India’s 2019 general election? I am watching the states of West Bengal, Bihar, Assam, and Karnataka where the BJP is expected to make inroads. I will be watching different regions of UP and how the alliance between the Samajwadi Party and Bahujan Samaj Party [BSP] fares in western as well as eastern UP. The southern states of Kerala and Tamil Nadu are also fascinating; there is a subterranean anti-BJP feeling there and it will be interesting to see if that sentiment affects voting results. It is as if one country is having 29 different elections. Even the salience of the Pulwama attack in February and national security concerns vary across states and class/caste groups. How the focus on national security plays out will be important, as will be the issue of farmers’ votes. My expectation is that rural India will vote on economic and development related issues and not on national security. But, in the last 10 years, urban worlds have penetrated into the rural areas and I may be wrong, especially if rural voters are as aware of security concerns as their urban counterparts.  I am also interested in the women’s vote and voter-turnout, especially across states such as Bihar and Rajasthan where women’s literacy rates are lower. Initial indications suggest that we may be witnessing a third ‘gender revolution’ in voting across many states, and that is quite significant if it is confirmed by the 2019 participation data. While the first democratic revolution refers to the establishment of democracy procedures and elections in the 1950s, the second democratic revolution refers to a phenomenon that started in the 1990s when Dalits, groups termed “other backward classes/castes,” and the poor began to vote in equal or higher measure than the educated and well-off. India’s democratic journey seems to be becoming deeper and wider. I will be also watching how various Dalit subgroups vote. A fascinating social and economic revolution underway within larger groups such as “Dalits” and “Muslims” will affect this election. Modi’s effort to appeal to a broader cross-class and cross-state national citizenry—what observers call the Modi factor—is so relevant precisely because India’s lived reality is local, and regional. Most Indians also think in multiple ways—are bilingual for example— as residents of their state, but also embody caste, economic sensibilities, and citizenship of India. In sum, Indian elections will not be boring or predictable. My book about India’s rise on the world stage, Our Time Has Come: How India Is Making Its Place in the World, was published by Oxford University Press in January 2018. Follow me on Twitter: @AyresAlyssa. Or like me on Facebook (fb.me/ayresalyssa) or Instagram (instagr.am/ayresalyssa).
  • Infectious Diseases
    The Simple Solution That Saved Fifty-Four Million Lives
    In 1968, two recent U.S. medical school graduates working in Dhaka, Bangladesh, developed oral rehydration solution—a mixture of water, sugar, and salt—that the British medical journal the Lancet has hailed “potentially the most important medical advance of the twentieth century.” These two doctors, Richard Cash, senior lecturer in the Department of Global Health and Population at the Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health, and David Nalin, professor emeritus at the Center for Immunology and Microbial Diseases at Albany Medical College, discussed the fifty-year legacy of their invention and the lessons that legacy offers to the health challenges emerging in lower income nations today.
  • Women and Women's Rights
    The Power of Parity: Closing the Gender Gap in the Workforce
    Podcast
    The event explores innovative approaches by governments and the private sector to promote women’s participation in the global workforce. Kathryn Kaufman reflects on the U.S. government's new Women's Global Development and Prosperity Initiative, launched by the White House last month. She also shares opportunities and challenges for OPIC’s 2X Women’s Initiative, including its commitment to mobilize $1 billion for projects that will support lending to women-owned businesses, female entrepreneurs, and women-owned and women-led emerging market private equity funds, as well as OPIC's work to expand this effort to other development finance institutions through the G7 2X Challenge. Kweilin Ellingrud shares new research by McKinsey, both from the Power of Parity global research as well as the Women in the Workplace benchmarking from 2018 on how progress on gender diversity at work has stalled, and recommendations for companies to turn good intentions into concrete actions. BIGIO: Hi, everybody, welcome. Welcome to the Council on Foreign Relations. My name is Jamille Bigio. I’m a senior fellow with the Council’s Women in Foreign Policy Program. Our program has worked with leading scholars for more than fifteen years to analyze how elevating the status of women and girls advances U.S. foreign policy objectives, including prosperity and stability. I want to take a moment before we begin to thank the Gates Foundation and our advisory council for their generous support of today’s discussion. I also want to remind everyone that the presentation, discussion, question and answer period will all be on the record. We’re gathered today to look at the advantages that countries, companies, societies gain by closing the gender gap in the workforce. There are estimates that McKinsey Global Institute has produced that closing that gender gap in the workforce would add a staggering $28 trillion to the global GDP, in a best-case scenario, and $12 trillion in alternate, best in region scenario. But despite the potential gains from women’s economic participation there remains significant legal, structural, and cultural barriers still make it hard for women to work in the first place. Today we’ll look at the role of governments and the private sector in promoting women’s participation in the workforce, in helping to overcome some of these barriers, to help ensure that companies, societies, and countries all can benefit by being able to bring half the population into the economy. We are joined by two speakers who will represent those two different perspectives and experiences. Katie Kaufman, who’s the managing director for global women’s issues at the U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation - the U.S.’s development finance institution. And Kweilin Ellingrud, who is the senior partner at McKinsey and Company, and leads McKinsey’s Closing the Global Gender Gap initiative. Let’s start off on the research side. So, Kweilin, McKinsey has produced seminal research on why countries and corporations alike should focus on closing the gender gap in the workforce. Can you share what’s the latest? What do you see globally? What does that picture look like in the United States? And where do major corporations stand? ELLINGRUD: Absolutely. I’m going to give you a quick tour of that, at all three levels—the global level, the U.S. level, and then the Fortune 500 level. What I won’t be covering today is actually some broader interesting work. For example, U.N. Foundation, Ryan and others, Bank of New York Mellon, have done other work not included here in terms of how do you accelerate investment in SDG number five in particular? So we won’t cover that. We also won’t cover work that is underway but will be released over the next couple works in terms of the future of work. Trends like automation, how does that affect women versus men differently? How do we think about that by geographic cut, but industry cut, and how can companies and governments get ahead of those trends so we’re doing the right thing for employees? So that’s a broader set of research that stands outside of this, but what I’ll do is a very quick tour of the highlights of the research that McKinsey’s been investing in over the last fifteen years, both in terms of Power of Parity, which is more of that global view, and then Women in the Workplace, which is our partnership with the Wall Street Journal on more of a domestic Fortune 500 view. Starting at that global level, as you mentioned, the economic opportunity is significant. And we took a look at 95 countries around the world, over 90 percent of women in the world, and we said: What would happen if women were to match men’s participation in the workplace much more equally? And what would happen is an economic opportunity of about $28 trillion. That’s the size of the economies of the U.S. and China put together. It’s a staggering number. But frankly, it’s not a realistic number, and certainly not in the near future are we going to be achieving that—like, truly closing the full gap. And so we took a look at what would be a more realistic achievable number over the next ten years? And that gets us to about 40 percent of the opportunity, or $12 trillion. That’s the economies of the U.K., Germany and Japan put together, so significant GDP growth. About 11 percent over the next ten years. And the way we got to that is we looked historically region by region and we said: What has empirically happened? So what is the fastest rate of improvement in terms of gender equality elements in Western Europe? So what if all countries in Western Europe were to match the best rate of improvement in Spain? What if all countries in South America were to match the best rate of improvement, which happens to be in Argentina? That is what would result $12 trillion in economic growth. And that comes from three sources. Sixty percent of it is just more women working who aren’t currently working in the workplace. Another 20 percent of it is from part time versus full time mix. So women around the world have the majority of part-time jobs and the minority of full-time jobs. If that were to be more equal across the genders, that would drive about 20 percent of it. And the last 20 percent is from sector mix. So women tend to be concentrated in lower average output per employees sectors around the world—services sectors, less manufacturing, less engineering sectors. And if that were to be more equalized, that would drive the final 20 percent. So that’s the economic opportunity. But that’s only half of the story. We looked also at the societal gaps around the world. And what we show here, and I’ll get into exactly what this is, is that no country can really capture their share of that $12 trillion we were just talking about unless they tackle the societal gaps that are holding women back on a global basis. So what you see here on the Y-axis is equality in work. Basically, what share of that $12 trillion that we just talked about has your country captured. And every dot, square, triangle on this page is a different country, so those 95 countries I was describing earlier. You can see the legend here based on GDP per capita. And then on the X-axis we have gender equality and society. So to what extent can women vote, own property, drive without asking permission from a spouse or a father? Are they equal in school attainment? Do they have equal access to financial services and other elements? Are they equal in leadership roles, in political representation? All of those elements are kind of combined together on the X-axis. And what you see is an R squared of over 50 percent which, you know, while it’s not 90 percent-plus, it’s still pretty high given this is a global view. So more than 50 percent of your share of that $12 trillion is explained by how much you tackle these societal gaps. So that was—it’s not just a big economic opportunity. It’s tied to how much you tackle these societal gaps. And the last thing we did on a global basis, before we take a look at the U.S. level, is look at what we call impact zones. And an impact zone is a combination of a country or a region with a particular issue. And we found five global impact zones and five regional impact zones. And the global impact zones are challenges where, frankly, no country, no region around the world has figured it out. It is bad pretty much everywhere. Now, can debate less bad in some areas—for example, fewer legal rights and, you know, worse in others. But really, there’s not equality anywhere in the world across these elements. And we’ll talk a bit more about these in a moment. The regional impact zones are much more concentrated in specific regions. And the great news about this is that we expect as GDP per capita increases around the world that you will grow you way out of these impact zones, which is really encouraging. Now, countries and regions can do more to accelerate their growing out of these impact zones or these challenges, but we fully do expect these to go away over time as GDP per capita rises. So things like unequal educational levels in India, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa, or maternal mortality challenges in Sub-Saharan Africa. Those are all issues that we should grow our way out of over time. So that’s a quick global scan. It’s a big economic opportunity. It’s linked to the societal gaps. And some of those gaps we will grow our way out of. Frankly, a bunch of them we won’t grow our way out of. So we need to really get after those global ones. Let me take that down now to the U.S. level. And after the broader Power of Parity was published a number of years ago, we’ve done a number of deep dives in the U.K., in Canada, across Asia, in India in particular as well. And this is the U.S. deep dive that we’ve done. Now, you remember that $12 trillion overall on a global level? The U.S. share of that is $2 trillion. That’s the economy of the size of the state of Texas. It’s just shy of the economy of Canada. And our share of where that $2 trillion comes from, it’s also 10 percent of our GDP, so pretty significant. One percent GDP growth per year, which given current growth rates is—(laughs)—quite a bit. But our mix of where that comes from is a little bit different than that global mix. So you’ll remember, it was 60/20/20. Here in the U.S., we actually have more women working than the global average, so our share is a little bit lower from participation, and it’s 40/30/30. So forty percent of our 2 trillion (dollars) is from workforce participation. Thirty percent of it from that part time/full time mix. And 30 percent from sector mix. Similarly in the U.S., we link that economic opportunity, that $2 trillion, to the societal gaps. And the societal gaps where we both see the biggest challenge but also a lot of variability across states are these six impact zones here in the United States. And you’ll remember, many of these are highly overlapping with the global impact zones that we saw just now on the global level. The first is representation in leadership and managerial positions. We’ll talk a bit more about this in a Fortune 500 context, so I’ll save most of it for that. But for every hundred men in managerial positions, we have about sixty-six women. Time spent in unpaid care work. Around the world, women do three times more unpaid care work as men. In some countries, like India, that’s nine or ten times as much unpaid care work as men. Here in the U.S., it’s about two times as much. And I’m the mother of three daughters, so I thought, well, I want more unpaid care work. I want more time with my daughters. But it turns out, only about 15 percent of that unpaid care work time is time with your kids. Eighty-five percent of it is shopping, cooking, cleaning. It’s all the stuff that if we were either to eliminate or share more equally with partners, none of us would miss. And that is one of the barriers for more women getting into the workplace. Single mothers. This is one of the ones that is unique both to the U.S. and a couple of other regions. You know, and in this day in age women in the United States, as well as in Europe, are sometimes, you know, single mothers by choice. That’s not what we’re talking about here. What we’re talking about here is the fact that 60 percent of families in poverty in this country are led by a single mother. And that’s intergenerational cycle of poverty, where the mother can’t finish either high school or college and get the job that she needs to provide for her children. There’s a number of interesting organizations, Jerimiah Project, there’s a number of others, who address this both by coaching the mother to get the job and the right job training, as well as the child. And they’re seeing good, early success. It’s linked to the fourth impact zone, which is teenage pregnancy. Of all of the impact zones we looked at, this is the one that gave us the most hope, and we’ve certainly seen the most improvement over the last ten to fifteen years. It comes from—well, first, I think the facts are 600,000 girls between fifteen and nineteen every single years in the U.S. get pregnant. That’s not even counting the girls at twenty, twenty-one, twenty-two who get pregnant too early and can’t finish what their original plans were in terms of school or getting a job. But the improvement that we’ve seen comes from two sources. The first is MTV Teen Moms. If anybody saw the reality TV show in the ’80s, I certainly grew up watching certain episodes of it, but it basically traces teenage mothers in high school, typically with a deadbeat boyfriend, and gives you a real live sense of what it feels like to have a kid. And when it first came out, there was an uproar. People were upset. And they said, how can you glamorize being a teenage mother? We’re going to see huge spikes in teenage motherhood. Well, it turns out that you can do the closest thing to a scientific experiment with MTV Teen Moms. So you show it some states, you don’t show it others. And then you just monitor the Google search results. And what you get is a whole bunch of, oh my gosh, how do I avoid getting pregnant? How do I get birth control? And so MTV Teen Moms has driven about a third of the drop in teenage pregnancy here in the United States, which is incredible. The other two-thirds of it is long-acting birth control available day-of. And they’ve done both research and work in Colorado, which is where it started, and they’ve now expanded that to the state of Delaware. And organizations like Upstream are taking this nationally across Georgia, the state of Washington. And it’s basically making available long-acting birth control that same day. So patches, injections, IUDs, et cetera, because it turns out when you depend on teenagers to either remember to take the pill every day, or condoms, or other methods, it’s just not dependable and it doesn’t really work. The last two: Political representation. And this data was from before the most recent election in the United States, so I think we’ve seen a big jump even in the last year or so. But what we see across the board is for every hundred men at a national office—so, governor, senator, congressman—there are thirty women, which is a huge gap. And what we know about women in politics is two main things. One, and I think we saw this in an Amy Klobuchar recent quote, women are much less likely to come to politics because they thought they would be a politician their own life, right? Men are much more likely to say: Since I was young boy, I always thought I would be a politician. Women come to politics, number one, much later, and typically for a very specific cause. So I want to change health care, because this was my experience. Or, I want to change safety for kids, because this is my life. And so that is quite different in terms of the age and the reason why they come into politics. And the second big difference is when women and men lose elections they react differently. So the encouraging news is that when men and women run in politics, they win and lose the first time around at the same rates, which I was deeply encouraged by. But what’s different is that men are much more likely to pick themselves up from that very public humiliation of a loss and run again. And if you think about most of the leaders on a national stage right now, most of them have lost as least one election at some point. And so how do we change the reaction to that loss and encourage more women to run again and take what they’ve learned? The last one is violence against women. And across the board, the United States was in the top quartile on almost every factor in terms of gender equality. Violence against women was at the global average, which is an abysmal average. One in three women around the world experience violence from an intimate partner. That’s not even counting people that you don’t know or acquaintances. If you add all the different types of sexual violence together, one in two women experience sexual violence here in the United States, which is—you know, we’ve got a long way to go. And so as we looked around the world at who does this better than us, actually our neighbors to the north, Canada, does a great job on this. So only 6 percent of women in Canada experience violence from an intimate partner. And there’s two main differences. One, the police are much more likely to treat this as a public safety issue. It’s not a personal issue. It’s not a private issue. This is a public safety issue, and we will intervene if needed. And then, second, once it happens the court system is much more lined up to help that victim, or potential victim, through the process much more quickly. So what we know about violence against women is it’s typically accompanied with other challenges. So purposefully ruining the woman’s credit so she can’t rent an apartment and be independent and get out on her own. And all of these other elements pile up and make it very, very difficult to break free, even if you want to. The state of New York, actually, is probably the best example in the United States of streamlining that court process to be more like Canada and other countries, so that you can actually get through it in a reasonable amount of time. So that is the U.S. level in this quick tour. I want to now take it down to the company level. What do we know about diversity in Fortune 500 companies, what’s the case for diversity overall? So we’ve looked globally. And what we see across industries is that gender-diverse companies—so, companies in that top quartile of gender diversity—are 21 percent more likely to out-perform their peers on an EBIT basis. And if you are ethnically diverse, interestingly, you are even more likely to out-perform—so, 33 percent more likely to out-perform your peers. Now, you can’t make a scientific experiment of this, because you can’t put companies through a double-blind scientific test in any way. So correlation is the best we’ve got. We don’t have causation, per se. But in a highly competitive industry, like we’ve got, and highly competitive markets, I’ll take causation any day. Now, this is the last piece of what I wanted to share, which is part of our collaboration with Women in the Workplace, and Lean In, and the Wall Street Journal. And so we surveyed over two hundred companies around the United States and North America broadly. And this pipeline is basically the typical average pipeline that you see across Fortune 500 companies. If you look at the bottom of the page, 47 percent of that entry level is women. It drops down to about one in five at the SVP level and the C-suite. And you might look at that 47 percent and think, oh, pretty good. Almost to parity. But do keep in mind that here in the United States 57 percent of college degree go to women today. It’s the majority of valedictorians, higher average GPAs, and 57 percent of college degrees. Also, the majority of master’s degrees and Ph.Ds. So if Fortune 500 companies were getting their fair share of the talent that they’re recruiting from, there’s no reason why that 47 percent shouldn’t be more than 50 (percent). Two other kind of takeaways from this. We did, over the last couple years, cut this by race for the first time. And so what you’ll see on the sort of next line above that, starting at 17 percent women of color—which in our definition is black, Latina, and Asian all added together—are 17 percent of that entry-level pipeline. It drops dramatically down to 3 percent in the C-suite. And when we first saw this data we thought, that can’t be true. And we kept adding the data back up and checked it multiple, multiple times. It is truly 3 percent of the C-suite in the United States is Black, Latina, and Asian, all added together, women. The men of color start at 16 percent, and then drop down to about 12 percent. A couple notes on this before we wrap it up. One, you know, one of the early hypotheses that actually a number of men shared was, well, it’s just—and we were talking about this earlier—it’s just that women are voting with their feet. They’re leaving the workplace and they’re going to take care of their children because that’s what they want to do. No. They are not leaving the workplace. So we did this survey across literally tens of thousands of employees. And men and women are wanting to leave the workplace at the same rate. And when they do, at roughly the same rate, they’re doing that to take care of children. What’s actually happening is women are stagnating in role and they’re staying in the pipeline, but they’re staying at each level for a longer period of time. So by the time they get promoted, they have a couple more years of experience in that role than their male peers. A couple other things. At this first level, this 47 percent to 37 percent jump, that drop—that ten-percentage point drop, after that extensive other drop at that first promotion level, there’s almost nothing you can do to make up that ground in the rest of the talent pipeline. Now, there’s levers that we can pull to make it less bad, and less uneven, but we can never make it equal after that first drop. So women, overall, are 20 percent less likely to get that first promotion to manager. And Black women are 40 percent less likely to get that first promotion. We need to fix that as the biggest choke point in this talent pipeline. Five other observations about this before I hand it over. One is, this 20 percent in the C-suite—right, so C-suite would be direct reports to a CEO. Even that belies a bit of a power balance, because women are much more likely in many of these C-suites to have staff roles versus line roles. So they’re much more likely to be the head of HR, head of IT, CFO, versus run the biggest business unit. And if you look at S&P 500 CEOs who are promoted from within, they are almost always—literally 99 or 100 percent of the time—promoted from running the biggest business unit or the number-two business unit into that CEO role, right? You never promote your head of HR into the CEO role, or almost never. And so if we want to budget that 5 percent of S&P 500 CEOs that are women back up to the 6 percent where it was at one point, but anywhere, you know, past that, we’re going to have to shift that balance of power in terms of staff roles versus line roles in the SVP and C-suite. The other thing we found was that feedback is uneven by gender. So when we asked managers and also employees: Do you get regular, tough feedback? Women were much more likely to say no. And their managers corroborated this. And when we said why? The managers, both men and women, would say: I don’t want to appear mean and I’m afraid of tears. And these are real reactions from managers, but you compound that across a woman’s career and if I’m not getting the real feedback of, like, Kweilin, this is what you need to learn the business, and to run the business, I’m not going to be able to grow at the same rate. And so we need that honest feedback, that tough feedback over time. We also looked at what we called substantive exposure. And substantive exposure is a meeting where we’re presenting to each other, we’re having a dialogue—not, you know, some senior person’s presenting to me. And I thought, well, wouldn’t women, especially at the tail end of this funnel where it’s so uneven, wouldn’t our few women who are there get amazing opportunities, because there’s so darn few of them? It turns out, no. So there is a gap in terms of substantive interaction at the mid-level. At senior manager versus director level there’s about a ten-percentage point gap between men and women who get substantive interaction. And that gap actually widens at the more senior levels to about 20 percent. The hypothesis is it’s tied to the staff roles versus line roles, and who’s actually driving critical projects in critical businesses. But that substantive interaction is really difficult, because if you don’t see me in a real every day, every week interaction, you won’t be able to judge if I’m ready to grow into the next role or not. Last year—or, this year’s results we added two elements, one being an only. So, being an only woman in a room of men, or being the only back person in a group of white people. As well as what we call microaggressions. And a microaggression is often unintentionally, sometimes intentionally, but it’s small things that add up. So questioning your expertise in your particular area or field. It’s mistaking you for a much more junior person or asking you to get the copies or water for the group. Small things, but things that certainly add up. And the two insights we found around onlys was that, number one, onlys wanted to aspire to get promoted at a higher rate than people who were in a group that was more homogenous and more diverse. But they also thought about leaving much more frequently, both in the near term and in the long term, because it was very difficult to kind of sustain this being an only and being high observed in that environment. On the microaggressions, and we saw this pattern pretty much across the board, women overall were much more likely to experience these microaggressions. And if you breakdown women overall, white women were closer to men overall, and then you see a pretty dramatic jump—Latina, Asian—well, Asian, and then followed by Latina, and then black and lesbian women were most likely to experience microaggressions on a very—a pretty regular basis. And that’s pretty much the pattern that we see across most questions that we ask around do you think promotions are fair? Do the right opportunities go to the most deserving people? We see that pattern of white women closest to men—although, there’s still a pretty big gap—followed by Asian, Latina, black and lesbian or lesbian and black. And then the last thing I’ll say is there is a double shift. So even for women at the more senior level, at the SVP and C-suite, this double shift of working and then going home and taking care of everything else is true. So we looked at the data. And actually women, 54 percent of women are likely to do either most of or all of the housework, versus only about 22 percent of men who are working. And this is true even if you are the primary breadwinner. So we asked only primary breadwinners, who made the majority of money in their family: Do you continue to do all or most of the housework? Twelve percent of the men said yes, and 43 percent of the women said yes. So likely, even—you know, the few women who are at that SVP and C-suite level, 43 percent of them on average continue to do all or most of the housework as well. So that double burden is quite real. So those are the highlights. Happy to share more later. But thanks. BIGIO: Thank you, Kweilin. Incredibly helpful to see the research and data at each of those levels. And I wanted to just share quickly, we have in fact worked with McKinsey Global Institute to help bring the Power of Parity research to decisionmakers. We’ve created an interactive that—for example, breaks down the 28 trillion (dollar) number by region and by number, so you can go in and actually explore down to region and country level what gains can be realized when women participate more. You can compare between countries on this interactive. You can also then look at the gender parity data that Kweilin mentioned of measuring where women stand when it comes to gender parity at work, and physical security, legal protection, and political voice, and essential services. And you can select by any of the nearly a hundred countries that were in the dataset and see by country what this means. We’ve created another interactive that digs into the legal barriers aspect of how laws on the books make it harder for women to work in the first place. The Women’s Workplace Equality Index, which is the first index to actually rank countries based on the legal equality for women when it comes to the workplace. And this uses the World Bank’s Women, Business and the Law dataset. You can see from here, we’ve highlighted the top ten, bottom ten countries. But you can dig in and actually see by country where are the barriers—what areas, and what specific laws are an issue. And I will note that the World Bank’s dataset compiles this by the largest commercial city in a country. You’ll see it in the U.S. too, where our situation is determined using New York as an example. And we show, for example, that over a hundred countries have at least one law that restricts the kinds of jobs that women can hold. They can’t drive a truck, they can’t work the night shift—making it illegal for women to even work that job in the first place. Another example, nearly sixty countries don’t have any legal protections against sexual harassment in the workplace. So if you see with the #MeToo movement, how hard it is to even protect women in the workplace when they have the laws there to begin with. These interactives are meant to help bring the data to bear for decision makers, so they can actually see as they’re creating their policies for a given region or a country, what this all means in practice. And there, we see that Katie Kaufman at OPIC has been leading some incredible work building off of this research to make the case for OPIC to transform what kind of investments that it’s making in women-owned businesses. So, Katie, we’d love to hear from you about what is happening at OPIC now. How have you mobilized this new lending? What have the road bumps been? And what do you see as the steps moving forward? KAUFMAN: All right. I first want to just say thank you so much to Council on Foreign Relations for hosting this lunch. It’s fantastic. The group of people assembled here, I’m most excited for the Q&A period, so I’m going to try to get through my comments quickly to hear from all of you. But I also just want to quickly comment on Jamille -- I work in Washington, D.C., to have the level of intellect with this amount of humility and graciousness is very rare. I’m delighted to be a colleague. And also, one of the reasons we have deployed our women’s empowerment at OPIC is because of the work of McKinsey. And it’s just such an honor to be here and hear that they’re continuing to push these amazing statistics. Men may be afraid of tears in the workplace. I’m about to break into them after hearing that. (Laughter.) But I’m hoping that what I can tell you about OPIC’s story is going to give you an element of hope and progress, at least where finance is concerned. So just to frame my comments a little bit, I just want to make sure that everyone knows what OPIC is. It’s not an oil cartel. (Laughter.) We are the United States development finance institution. Our mission is to invest to support private sector growth in emerging markets. The private sector creates nine out of ten jobs in emerging markets, and we want to give people the dignity of work. And we do that through investments which we expect to spur economic prosperity and foster global stability. OPIC has been around since 1971 with this mission, but we only this year realized that women are actually the key to both growth and stability. So it took us a little while, but we got there. We launched “2X”. We branded it as 2X to, OK, slight nod to the female chromosome, but mostly to represent that multiplier effect of investing in women. When women earn a competitive income, they reinvest 90 percent of that back into their families. And, by comparison, men reinvest about 30 percent. So, again, when we’re looking to foster stability, we’re seeing that the most effective way to do that is through women. All of the statistics that Kweilin and McKinsey has put forward show the full spectrum of growth that can be realized with investing in women.  I was hired last year to launch a women’s initiative. And we didn’t really know what that would mean. Frankly, my background is not in gender at all. I was a partner in a venture capital firm and before that worked for Secretary Gates on U.S.-China defense relations.  I thought that a Women’s Initiative at OPIC would mean investing in women-owned companies. We decided OPIC would launch a billion-dollar commitment, which would be the U.S. government’s largest financing commitment, to women in emerging markets. Initially, 2X was a $1 billion dollar commitment to women-owned businesses.  And that was really an exercise of counting how many women can we invest in. And we launched this. We told the media we were doing it. We were very excited about it. And then we went back to our previous years—so 2017’s investment portfolio. And of 137 projects that we underwrote in 2017, how many do you think would have met that criteria? Four. OK, so then we were became very nervous that we were not going to meet this. So let’s do the Washington thing and not put a timeline on it, which is what we did. (Laughter.) But then we really dug into it as a financial institution. And OPIC is a group of investment bankers. They are the most—completely unbiased opinion—the most talented people in Washington. And we got training in gender-lens investing. We started understanding what is the value of understanding gender patterns, and might those gender patterns have an impact on financial performance? So we started digging into things like, OK, we’re investing in the largest agriculture production of flowers in Africa, for example. And we know that women make up 80 percent of the workforce in agriculture. What kind of gender pattern can we tease out of this to get to a better investment decision? So for example, we are now asking our private sector clients from a financial fiduciary standpoint: Tell us about your workforce. Are all your base employees women and are all your management men? And you won’t be surprised at that answer. It is always the case that the lowest-paid employees are women and the higher paid employees are men. And for us, that’s a financial risk. It’s a financial risk not only because you’re not attracting and retaining the best talent or strong worker satisfaction, but it’s also a safety risk. There are power dynamics included there that we know result in gender-based violence, harassment in the workplace. We don’t have to look farther than the #MeToo movement here in the United States. A law did not have to pass for that to become a financial risk for companies. Women just got fed-up. And we don’t want to take that risk. So from a financial standpoint, we’re getting trained at OPIC to understand these gender patterns, and work with our private sector clients to remedy that. And this is—this is something that we’re deploying across our portfolio. So where we started with OPIC is going to invest a billion dollars in women-owned company, we shifted—well, I should celebrate the fact that we launched that last year. And because we have been every single piece of our agency is so committed to this, and we’ve been promoting it so much, we just underwrote $1.4 billion to women-owned, women-led, and women-supporting enterprises in a year. So I’m super proud about that. But we’ve now shifted to say: If we’re underwriting microfinance or if we’re building a toll road, gender is material. It matters. And we’re going to push—we’re going to use systems of finance to create gender-equitable change. So as we were talking about the society change—there’s legal barriers, there’s cultural barriers, and there are different levers that we can use to change all of those. OPIC is one tool. We’re a system of finance. And we are completely committed to using that as a tool for gender-equitable change. So I wanted to touch on three things. First, we were counting women. Super important. It’s so important for us to say we could only invest in four, and now we’re growing that. So the counting exercise cannot be undervalued. Two, we’re moving from counting to valuing women. So it’s not just about how many women are there, it’s how do we value women as leaders, value them as members of the workforce, and value them as consumers, and members of society from a financial perspective? And then the last thing that I want to mention is the mirror. When I pitched to OPIC’s board—a sixteen-person board—that we would be launching a women’s economic empowerment initiative, it was met with a loud applause, which is not normal for a board meeting. People were so excited. It was an all-male board, with one woman rolling off. And you know, our job, at 2X, is now to say to companies in El Salvador: We expect you to have 30 percent board representation. (Laughter.) Well, here I am in Washington, D.C. You know, you just can’t do that. You have to be able to hold that mirror up to yourself. And we have found for us, and we are pushing our private sector clients to do the same, we will be the first U.S. government agency to get EDGE certified. For those of you who are not familiar with EDGE, it’s an internationally recognized standard, like LEED certification for a building. But EDGE is about equality in an enterprise. It looks at every policy, it looks at your culture, it talks to almost every employee that’s willing to participate. And then it gives you a roadmap to be sure that you have a gender equitable workplace. And I just want to emphasize the word “equitable.” Women are not looking for a leg up. We literally want a level playing field. And that’s what EDGE certification helps an enterprise do. I wish I got commission for anytime I got them a new client—(laughter)—because it’s very economical to do it, an it’s the best way to put your money where your mouth is. For example, McKinsey, you should get EDGE certified, if you’re not. (Laughter.) I say it to everyone that we meet with because I think it’s the best way to bring down the systematic barriers and the unconscious bias issues that we face. So those are the three things I wanted to mention. Thank you so much. BIGIO: That’s wonderful. Thank you. So we’ll now open it up to questions from the audience. So please raise your placard and introduce yourself with your question. Please. Q: Mariam Safi. I’m currently doing the CFR international affairs fellowship, but formerly was at the State Department, Foreign Service. So one of the issues—you know, I think this kind of—it crosses sectors in terms of, you know, the retention of women and women of color in particular at sort of the higher levels. And, you know, I think the State Department’s looking at, you know, taking, you know, sort of steps towards mitigating unconscious bias. What are some of the tactical—one idea that’s been floating around, and I think another agency experimented with, was blind review in the performance sort of review process, of just basically deleting gender pronouns, which would also—and names. So, like, for ethnically identifiably names, for example. If any of you have any thoughts on that, I guess. ELLINGRUD: I’ll share a couple thoughts, and then others please jump in. So I have mixed thoughts on that. I think it can be helpful. But at some point, that interviewee is going to meet a human being. And we need to address both the conscious and the unconscious bias, and all of the pattern recognition that that person may have in their head that may be unfounded. We have the same problem when we use advanced analytics to do recruiting selection based on historical patterns that also have had bias embedded. So I think it can help a bit, but I would be wary of thinking that it’s going to be the majority of the solution or certainly—not even close to all the solution. And I’m sure many of you have seen some of the research on resumes, right? If I have John Doe and Jane Doe, literally identity resumes down to the font type, font size, and so I’m seeing a lot of nodding. You’ve certainly seen both women and men—or, men and women—will ascribe much greater both leadership and potential to the male resume, this identical resume. And should that woman put active PTA member on that resume—again, otherwise identical—87 percent less likely to get called in for an interview. And if we have John Doe and Jamal Joe, that’s worth eight years of experience, 50 percent less likely. And John Doe and Mohammad Doe is, I think, three or four times less likely to get called in. So you can do scientific experiments with these identical resumes. And even in this day of age, when we say we care about diversity and getting the best talent, we clearly are not. And so just systematically addressing the unconscious bias and conscious bias issues through those means, but frankly a whole bunch of others, is going to be key. BIGIO: Thank you. Let’s make our way down the line, please. Yes. Q: Hi. Is it on? BIGIO: Yes. Q: I’m Anju. I lead gender measurement at UNICEF. So congratulations. It’s so nice to hear sort of both sides of the research and the practice that is really moving us forward. And I just wanted to raise two issues. One is this whole issue of the focus on the tactical versus the structural. So a lot of the things that, Kweilin, you presented, are structural. And some of the changes, Katheryn, that you are trying to bring are very structural, be investing in particular kinds of businesses. But and I think that perhaps the next step is to not just go in women-led businesses, but businesses that actually serve and advance women’s interests in substantial ways. So one area of work that I saw missing from both of your conversations is paid care work. So you talked a little bit about occupational sex segregation. And one of the areas that we’re working on right now at UNICEF, and that, you know, in the last two to three years I’ve been giving greater visibility to, we know that women do a lot of paid and semi-paid work, care work, take child care, primary school teaching, health work. And it’s interesting how the dynamics of that work change as it becomes better paid and more professionalized. So take nursing in the U.S., for example. All of a sudden it’s better paid, and we see more male nurses. And the power dynamic and the pay starts shifting. So it would be really important to bring that factor into—I saw, you know, the six factors that you laid out. In fact, I think paid care work, informal work, would be actually a very important area to put into it. And then the second is I think generational change. So most structural change happens—I mean, whatever policies we put in, whatever investments we made, the gainers of that will be people ten years from now, as things really start to change. And I sometimes worry about the focus on tactical things like microaggression, for example, because it creates an entire buzz around things that, you know, even in the #MeToo Movement, we’re now starting to call out a lot of very small things that may make a difference but forgetting how some very egregious violations of rights and sexual abuse and harassment are being now created with fairly small aggressions. And they’re not the same thing. There are violations that are very huge. And I work in countries where, you know, we’re not talking about somebody saying the wrong thing or talking to you the wrong way, but systematic abuse. So we do need to think about how do we prevent those opportunities, that type of power imbalance? And I think that is working with our young people today. It is working with the next generation. And I’d love to hear your thoughts on that. KAUFMAN: Could I comment quickly on your first point? I didn’t spend too much time dwelling on this, even though it is my true passion and what I spend most of my time on at 2X, is the definition of what qualifies to be a 2X investment. And that is women-owned, women-led, and women-supporting. And I think that’s what you were alluding to in your last point, is the women-supporting. So for us that’s investing in clean water—access to clean water, access to affordable energy, providing access to credit. Things like that are things that we also are using our investments to improve the lives of women through those things. And the reason the definitional piece is so important to hopefully me personally and then globally—we created this definition at OPIC. We then went to the G-7, our sister G-7 development finance institutions, and we together joined the 2X Challenge, which was a $3 billion commitment to invest against that criteria. And we spent six months creating evidence-based criteria for women-owned, women-led, and women-supporting enterprises. And the reason this criteria and this definitional piece is so important is so that we can have a harmonized view on what it means to invest in women, not for governments but for our private-sector partners. So I think your point is absolutely on target, and it is not lost on us at OPIC at least. BIGIO: Yeah. Please, here. Q: I’m Ellen Chesler from the Roosevelt Institute and a longtime member of the Women and Foreign Policy Program. In fact, one of the first—when I worked with George Soros—people to give grant to start the program, so I’m thrilled to be here and particularly thrilled to hear two such upbeat and optimistic and well-shaped and articulate—(laughter)—presentations. I think as somebody who’s been around the women and development world since the 1970s when it really began, you know, I couldn’t welcome more of the OPICs and the McKinseys and the World Banks to the table because I think we’re at a transformational moment. Having said that, I do want to pose the following concern, which—and ask both of you to comment on it. We are at a—you know, a deeply significant point in global economic development because of the huge growth of population under the age of twenty-five, and particularly in the most vulnerable parts of the world like the MENA region. We have huge unemployment. You may have seen the Times today, a column to that effect, about 30 percent rates of unemployment in that demographic group in places like Jordan. So adding women to the mix is particularly complicated because there is, obviously, a resistance in the view that we don’t have enough jobs for men, so how are we going to grow the economy by adding more women? So I’d like you to comment on that sort of larger demographic picture. But also, in asking you to do that, I want to point out that Kweilin’s comments that so beautifully showed the intersection between economic development and other public policy initiatives like investment in LARCs needs, I think, a little bit of underlining of the public policy aspect of that change. We have long-acting reproductive contraception in this country because Obamacare mandates that it be paid for by public health insurance. Without that mandate, we wouldn’t have it. I mean, the experiments were wonderful in the Midwest and now in places like on the East Coast particularly Baltimore, but we need something to pay for that. So you have to have public polices that support that. Similarly, I worry that investments in OPIC will be canceled out by cancellation of investments in population policies and reproductive health and rights polices elsewhere in the world. So I mean, I hate to be the skunk at the table here. I want positive news. But I’d like you to comment about the larger economic picture and how dire it is, particularly in the most vulnerable regions, and what that means for accomplishing these gains. ELLINGRUD: Thank you for bringing that. I’ll share a couple of quick thoughts. We would agree in some of these—in MENA, for example, actually, we’ve got—McKinsey Social Initiative has a global effort on youth employment and how to connect much more deeply with companies that have real growth in employment needs but aren’t getting them met in the right ways. And so how do you deepen that connection for, frankly, just more efficient employment across all age groups, but particularly youth? So I think that’s a really critical issue. What we looked at was country by country—and even in the U.S. state by state, city by city, but around the world we did the same thing—and looked at how many women have attained a graduate degree, a college degree, a high school degree, or don’t have a degree who are ready to work and fill some of these jobs. And then, to your broader point, what is the government investment and the broader policy required to invest in industries, across industries to create some of this job growth? Because it can’t be a zero-sum game where you’re just taking from one group and giving to another; it has to be a true economic growth platform where we’re investing in creating more jobs. And the talent is there to do that. I mean, we have one of the lowest unemployment rates in a long time, so it’s a little bit different for us than what you’re describing in MENA. KAUFMAN: I guess for my note of optimism, we’re absolutely committed to women’s health at OPIC. We’re about to launch a 2X health bond which will focus on maternal health and really giving women access to the type of care that they need, the type of quality care that they need. Obviously, we have constraints because we’re U.S. government on what we can and cannot fund. I’m not going to go into that. But I do want you to know that I think from a broader interagency perspective women’s health remains at the forefront of where we think investments need to be made, and we will continue to do that. BIGIO: If you could keep your questions short, we’ll try to bring in a few more— Q: Absolutely. Question for each, although Katie may have answered my question in large part already. Kweilin, on your twenty-eight trillion/twelve trillion numbers, when you show parity on full-time work/part-time work, things like that, what are the assumptions behind that to—that really ground those numbers? Because I’m assuming you’re not bringing men down to women; I’m assuming you’re bringing women up to men, which then does bring in the question you just raised of you can’t be kicking the men out to get the women up there. So how are you increasing—because there will not be infinitely expanding jobs—how are you increasing jobs? And then, for Katie, precisely because U.N., IFC—I think IFC potentially better than the U.N., although they do great stuff on global women’s work. You did say you worked with your G-7 colleagues, but I think your learnings, you know, much as there are sustainability principles that are used in all private investment projects, it would be great if—to know that you guys were sharing with other private investment agencies around the world, and it sounds like you may be doing that with G-7. ELLINGRUD: So on your first point, absolutely, and we have a whole ‘nother paper that breaks it down by country, by industry of the investment required to create the job growth. So it is bringing women up to men’s participation levels or full-time mix, and then the investment required to create that. Q: And it’s not implausible. ELLINGRUD: No, it’s a—it’s a realistic—it’s a doable number. Q: Got you. KAUFMAN: So in terms of sharing our findings, one of the reasons that we joined with the G-7 was exactly that, to demonstrate that this can be done and bring others with us. So we went from the billion-dollar target at OPIC to the $3 billion target globally. One of the reasons we were able to convince our G-7 counterparts to come with us is because we now had the real practice of saying we don’t have a pipeline problem; we have a bias problem. So we can demonstrate that because we’ve already underwrote over 1.4 billion (dollars), and please come with us. And then the second piece on that is we are asking, we are looking at the next G-7 to go to pension funds, bulge-bracket banks, sovereign wealth funds to get a match, again, because we have already demonstrated. Not only are we—to be very clear, we’re commercial investors. We are not lowering our IRRs. We are not compromising our due diligence process. We are simply adding an extra layer that says you can actually expect better performance—although we don’t say that—but yeah, so it’s all doable. Q: Excellent. KAUFMAN: We are very interested in sharing and bringing more folks into the fold. Q: OK. Great. BIGIO: We have time for one more quick question. Q: I don’t know if this works. Masuda Sultan, entrepreneur and women’s rights activist. I actually wanted to ask you, Kathryn, if there were any particular business models that you saw as very successful. I know you’ve just recently made these investments, so it might take some time to figure out what worked best. But if there’s anything really scalable that you see, particular regions that you think could make real success stories, number one. Number two is any projects on financial inclusion in the private sector that make you excited. KAUFMAN: Yeah. So on the financial inclusion side, if you looked at the OPIC portfolio, that’s our second-largest sector, so we do a lot with commercial banks. So we’ll provide loan guarantees or direct loans to commercial banks so that they can then on-lend to SMEs in their market. And what we’ve done there is rather than having a one-off so that we’re saying: OK, here’s 200 million (dollars), invest 30 percent or please on-lend 30 percent to women and then it’s done, we’re trying to actually change the way these commercial institutions and the markets do business. So, yes, we’re providing the hundred to 200 million (dollars), and then we’re saying 30 percent of this must go to female borrowers—and, by the way, we’re going to decrease our fees by the amount it costs you as a commercial financial institution to join the Global Banking Alliance for Women, which is an organization that helps commercial banks understand the business opportunity and help capture the business opportunity of servicing more female clients. So that’s creating products that intentionally are marketable toward women, and then hopefully that changes the way that banks do business going forward. So I always love to bring up that example. And then, just very quickly, we have a website, called 2XChallenge.org where we highlight all of our projects. It’s so transparent. That’s another piece about this, transparency and accountability. We want you to know where the money is going. So you can actually go on that website and see where the investments are being made and see the different business models that are being invested in. BIGIO: OK. Thank you all. Please join me in thanking Katie and Kweilin for their leadership in this space. (Applause.) And thank you all for joining us. (END)
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