Donald Trump

  • Donald Trump
    Foreign Affairs Issue Launch: Letting Go: Trump, America, and the World
    Play
    Daniel Kurtz-Phelan discusses the March/April 2018 issue of Foreign Affairs magazine with contributors Sarah Margon and Jake Sullivan. 
  • China
    Trump and Xi Agree: Short-Term Gain for Long-Term Pain
    Perhaps President Trump will succeed in reducing the bilateral trade deficit with China simply by reducing bilateral trade.
  • China
    Emperor Xi Meets Donald Trump Thought
    Together, China’s rise and Trump’s reactions threaten to bury the liberal international order and limit Sino-American cooperation, and tensions could well spill over into other regions and global challenges.
  • Trade
    The Trump Tariffs on China: A Perilous Moment
    The new tariffs are a high-stake gamble that economic shock and awe can succeed where negotiations have failed.
  • United States
    Mara Karlin on National Defense
    Podcast
    Mara Karlin, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, joins CFR's James M. Lindsay to discuss the 2018 National Defense Strategy report.
  • World Order
    Liberal World Order, R.I.P.
    The liberal world order is under threat from its principal architect: the United States.
  • Energy and Climate Policy
    Why Fuel Economy Standards Matter to U.S. Energy Dominance
    During last week’s international energy industry gathering in Houston, CERA Week, U.S. Secretary of Energy Rick Perry introduced a new buzzword for the Trump administration’s energy policy: “energy realism.” 
  • Donald Trump
    Secretary of State Rex Tillerson is Fired
    Podcast
    CFR's Stephen Sestanovich and Paul Stares join James M. Lindsay to discuss Rex Tillerson's firing and other planned personnel changes within the Trump administration.
  • U.S. Foreign Policy
    "National Security Leaders" Adopt the Palestinian Narrative
    On March 2, seventeen “National Security Leaders” issued an alarming statement about Israel-Palestinian peace and U.S. policy. The statement was carried as an ad in The New York Times and a PDF version can be found here. In my view, the statement is fairly radical in its departure from what has been U.S. policy for decades. How?  --The Statement claims that “previous U.S. administrations” have “accepted” a Palestinian demand for “equal and minimal land swaps.” I will speak only about the George W. Bush administration. We understood that land swaps were a very useful idea to make the two-state solution work, but we did not back any demand that they be “equal and minimal.” That was to be negotiated by the parties. --The Statement says that “Jerusalem [is] to be the capital of Israel and Palestine, in the west and the east of the city respectively, an open city for the faithful of the three monotheistic religions.” The Bush administration also left the borders of Jerusalem to be determined by the parties, and never insisted on an “open city”—whatever that means. --The Statement calls for “Ensuring the security of the two states consistent with their respective sovereignty and supported by a third-party security mechanism.” The Bush administration understood that security was an enormously complex and dangerous issue, but did not demand a “third-party security mechanism.” Again, the meaning of that phrase is entirely unclear, while it has long been entirely clear that Israel would not hand its security over to the United Nations, the United States, NATO troops, or any other possible “mechanism.” --The Statement says our goal should be “Two states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side in peace and security.” What’s missing here? Compare the words of President Bush when addressing the United Nations General Assembly in 2002: “In the Middle East there can be no peace for either side without freedom for both sides. America stands committed to an independent and democratic Palestine, living side by side with Israel in peace and security. Like all other people, Palestinians deserve a government that serves their interests and listens to their voices.” The Statement makes no mention whatsoever of freedom or democracy, simply abandoning the hopes and indeed the rights of the Palestinian people in this regard. --The Statement says that a deal between the Israelis and Palestinians “remains a core U.S. national interest.” Really? A desirable goal to be sure, but as one thinks of the rise of China, American military preparedness, missile defense, Iranian and North Korean nukes, energy issues, and the like, does solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict qualify as a “core national interest?” The Statement is radical in a more significant way in embracing the Palestinian view that only Israel is to blame for the failure of peace negotiations. It says that “Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, addressing the United Nations Security Council on Tuesday, February 20, affirmed the Palestinian commitment to a peaceful negotiated path….” Nowhere does it note that for nine years running now, the PLO has refused to come to the table and negotiate. If Abbas is committed to the path of negotiations, why did he not take it—especially in the years when Secretary of State Kerry was energetically trying to make that happen. It is worth recalling the comment of Martin Indyk, who was part of the American team under Obama: while PLO chairman Mahmoud Abbas “checked out of the negotiations," Israeli prime minister Netanyahu "moved into the zone of a possible agreement." Indyk spreads blame to both parties, but his statement fully contradicts the Palestinian “narrative” that the Statement adopts. The Statement does say that “The Palestinian leadership has reiterated its commitment to a non-violent path of diplomatic negotiations and dialogue. Having articulated principles for a peaceful settlement, Palestinian leaders must also demonstrate this commitment in words and deeds….” That’s fine, but nowhere does the Statement actually demand that the PLO do the single thing that should be most obvious: agree to get back to the negotiating table. The statement is radical in holding that the American role over the years is blameworthy: “Addressing legitimate Palestinian grievances, and America's role in their prolongation, is…crucial to the goal of de-radicalization, denying oxygen to extremists, and resetting America's standing and relationships.” Note that “legitimate Israeli grievances” are not even mentioned. But how exactly has the United States “prolonged Palestinian grievances?” This is not explained. It must be assumed, given the overall tone of the Statement, that the answer is simple: the United States has been too “pro-Israel” and has not crammed a deal down Israel’s throat. So again, according to this Statement the blame does not lie with the Palestinians, led for decades by the terrorist Yasser Arafat and now by someone who refused a peace deal in 2008 and has for nine years refused to negotiate. The Statement is radical in backing fully the Palestinian demand that the traditional American role in fostering negotiations must be usurped by others. The Statement backs the Palestinian call for a grand international conference whose ambitions and participants are worth noting: “with the participation of the parties themselves, the International Quartet, as well as the permanent members of the Security Council and regional stakeholders, creating a multilateral mechanism to assist the Israelis and Palestinians in negotiations, and to realize the Arab Peace Initiative and conclude a regional peace based on an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement consistent with UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.” That formulation would bring China into the mix, and Syria as well (isn’t it a “regional stakeholder?”). And what does concluding “a regional peace” mean, exactly? Israeli-Palestinian negotiations may be insufficiently complicated, so peace between Israel and Lebanon and Israel and Syria should now be in the mix? Lest there be any confusion as to its intent, the Statement concludes this way: “If the Administration rejects two states and these reasonable parameters, then other members of the Quartet, of the Security Council and International Community should move forward with parameters and a mechanism to re-focus efforts on an early return to the two-state solution.” So what is this all about? Clearly the signers believe the United States has long been much too pro-Israel. And now the dreaded Trump administration has gone even further in that direction (for example, one must suppose, by recognizing that Israel’s capital, Jerusalem, is Israel’s capital) --and this is intolerable. Therefore the signers demand that the “International Community” take over. This is not entirely unreasonable in one way: we can surely count on the “International Community” to abandon the support of Israel that has characterized American foreign policy, and to try to force a solution unfavorable to Israel. Israel has seventy years of experience with the “International Community” and it is bitter. After all, that “International Community” includes 57 Islamic states, the EU, and countries hostile to Israel such as Sweden and Cuba. The Statement is, then, is a cry of anguish about the Trump administration’s strong support of Israel and a demand that someone, somewhere, start meeting to take the Palestinian side and pressure Israel for concessions. Most surprising about this Statement is the thought that its many distinguished signers believe this can possibly work. Admittedly, not all signers are distinguished: one is distinguished only for hostility to Israel (see here and here); several others are quite distinguished but have no particular expertise in this subject area. But what of those who have long experience? Do they really think any of this can happen, or would have any positive effect? A gigantic international conference “by mid 2018”—this is in the Statement—in other words with minimal preparation? I have an elixir that can calm the signers down. I suggest they travel in the Arab world, where the main topics are Iran and (as always) regime survival. There they will find as I have that the sense of emerging calamity because Israel and the PLO have not made peace is missing. No one is demanding vast conferences or is seeking to exclude the United States. But the Arab world is far, so an alternative is traveling to Capitol Hill. There as well they will find no sense that America’s relationship with Israel requires that the “International Community” push us aside and take over, nor any belief among the leaders of either party that America is to blame for “prolonging” the Palestinians’ problems. They will find plenty of opposition to the Trump Administration, but happily it has not been translated into an analysis of the Middle East that blames Israel and the United States for the region’s troubles. The Statement, like so many of its intellectual predecessors, infantilizes the Palestinians: they are victims and little else. But the past suggests, to me at least, that only when Palestinians take responsibility for their politics, their civic culture, their society, and their future can peace really be possible.  
  • World Trade Organization (WTO)
    Trump, China, and Steel Tariffs: The Day the WTO Died
    President Donald Trump's decision to impose tariffs on steel and aluminum will destroy an already weakened World Trade Organization.
  • North Korea
    Kim Jong-un’s Invitation and Donald Trump’s Response
    Kim Jong-un’s invitation to Donald Trump to meet, delivered through South Korean intermediaries, is both stunning and predictable. After all, Trump has telegraphed his desire for a meeting with Kim ever since he suggested a hamburger summit with Kim as a candidate for president in 2016. Now that Trump has his invitation, the question is whether he can exploit it to bring a runaway North Korean nuclear and missile threat under control without being advanced by an accompanying intensive negotiation process that would inevitably rely on specialized expertise within the U.S. government to craft the level of agreement and verification measures necessary to pin Kim down. At a minimum, a prospective summit should provide momentum to secure the release of three Americans currently detained in Pyongyang. Historically, the American president has been the “closer” of such deals, but an early meeting between Trump and Kim would sacrifice that role in favor of a reshaping of the relationship with the North Korean leader by setting the tone surrounding the U.S.-North Korea relationship without an accompanying (decades-long) process and verification of North Korea’s implementation of denuclearization. Past denuclearization efforts have foundered on a combination of failures to secure verification and North Korean subterfuge, but have never gone so far in giving the Kim family the prestige or treating North Korea with the strategic weight that it has sought for decades. Trump’s strongest argument for such an approach: everything else has failed, and a U.S.-North Korea summit has never been tried. Oddly, Trump’s own threats to annihilate North Korea, while challenging North Korean assumptions about how the United States would respond to its nuclear advances, has generated political space for Trump: even a bad deal with Kim may be perceived as a better outcome than a catastrophic conflict with North Korea. But why would Kim reach out now and offer a meeting with Trump? Speculation on the range of possible motives for Kim will range from desperation to uncanny strategic intuition. But the most interesting aspect of Kim’s outreach and its timing is that it combines a high personal propensity to take risk with a strong desire to actively manage uncertainties generated by the growing risks to North Korea’s regime survival. Alongside the Kim family’s desire to assert independence and centrality as narratives that undergird and reinforce its control over the regime is a deep desire for external affirmation that can only come from improving North Korea’s relationship with the United States. That is why North Korea has consistently asserted that it would only abandon its nuclear program if the United States were to drop its “hostile policy”—normalization and acceptance of the regime by the United States as an alternative regime survival guarantee to that provided by nuclear weapons. In essence, the Kim family has always wanted Washington to impute to Pyongyang the same strategic weight that Richard Nixon gave to Beijing when he used the China card to balance the Soviet Union. At the same time, Kim’s move smacks of both desperation and an astute recognition that international economic pressure, political isolation, and the threat of military conflict could eventually checkmate the regime. Instead of furthering regime survival, North Korea’s pursuit of the capability to strike the United States with nuclear weapons raised the risks of accidental conflict and preventive war. For Kim, the prospect of an early summit with Trump provides the best prospect of removing international sanctions pressure while giving Kim room for maneuver to possibly keep his nuclear deterrent in place. Moreover, a prospective nuclear deal with Trump provides Kim with an opportunity to secure external symbols of regime legitimacy without having to address North Korea’s atrocious human rights record. (After all, only Trump can offer a Trump-branded hotel in Pyongyang, payable in fissile material.) Given the stakes, risks, and blowback that inevitably will accompany a Trump-Kim hamburger summit, a safer course, if indeed a summit is inevitable, would be to retain South Korean involvement by securing an invitation for Trump to join the inter-Korean summit already announced for the end of April at Panmunjom. South Korea shares with the United States an existential interest in denuclearization, but only the United States has the standing in North Korean eyes as a counterpart in that discussion. But South Korean involvement would help address American staffing deficiencies while keeping denuclearization front and center, all the while blunting North Korean efforts to drive a wedge in the U.S.-South Korea alliance. Scott Snyder is senior fellow for Korea studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and author of South Korea at the Crossroads: Autonomy and Alliance in an Era of Rival Powers.