Donald Trump

  • Russia
    The Oil Context of the Trump-Putin Meeting
    There appears to be a list of conflicts and other kinds of issues that U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian leader Vladimir Putin touched upon during their meeting in Helsinki, and progress on any of them is bound to be slow. Oil made a headline during Putin’s remarks in the public session: Specifically, Putin reminded the U.S. president in front of the international media that “neither of us is interested in the plummeting of (oil) prices and the consumers will suffer as well” and called out oil as an area for collaboration, as expected. Whether it’s a threat or an offer is always hard to say with the Russian leader. But there are good reasons for U.S. officials to be cautious in the coming weeks and months about looking to Russia for “assistance” in the complicated geopolitics of oil and gas. Like many other conflicts and issues, Putin is promising all sides goods he likely cannot fully deliver. The United States should think longer and harder about what assistance Russia could actually provide to U.S. interests. My view is the bilateral dialogue should stick to more achievable priorities like arms control and improved bilateral lines of communications among top U.S. and Russian military brass to avoid accidental direct clashes. Unilaterally reducing vulnerability to the national security and cyber threats Russia can make against U.S. domestic targets should remain top priority, but oil perhaps belongs on the back burner. The reality is that Russia has made a policy of offering its assistance to national oil sectors under siege, including those who become targeted by U.S. sanctions. That policy has subjected Russian oil companies to all kinds of negative consequences that will hinder their balance sheets and make it more difficult for Russia to play a balancer role in the global oil market down the road. The United States needs to weigh any pledge of oil “cooperation” with America against Russia’s active involvement in troubled oil sectors as diverse as Venezuela and Iran. In the run up to the Helsinki summit, Iran’s senior advisor for international affairs Ali Akbar Velayati met with Putin last week and agreed to $50 billion in oil and gas sector investments. Russian giants Rosneft and Gazprom are in talks with the Iranian oil ministry about upstream investments. Earlier this year, Russia’s Zarubezhneft signed an oil field development deal with the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) to refurbish the Aban and West Paydar oil fields. Iran could believe that turning to Moscow will shield its oil and gas sector not only from attack by Arab separatists but also even (perhaps a little more far-fetched, but probably not in the minds of Iranian hardliners) Israel and the United States. The opposite could come to happen. If proxy wars escalate, Russian companies could get caught accidentally in the cross fire. In fact, both Tehran and Moscow alike could lose from deepening their collaborations in Iran’s domestic oil and gas sector. Iran may want to consider what happened to Turkmenistan, whose energy exports were forced into Russia at cheap domestic Russian prices to allow Russian companies to export more of their own gas at higher levels to European buyers. That is one reason many Central Asian countries eventually turned to China for assistance with energy and electricity as the conflict of interest and strings attached were less onerous. For its part, Russia could find that Russian oil workers will be in a vulnerable position to spontaneous local protests and attacks, both inside Iran and Iraq, regardless of the overall tone of high level, government to government interactions. The latest example is Iraq, where angry local protesters lashed out this week at a number of targets but notably gathered to threaten an oil field operated by Russian firm Lukoil. The event, which so far hasn’t resulted in major oil supply cutoff, is a reminder that Iran has the means to punish Moscow on the ground, not only via its proxies on the ground in Syria but also in Iraq, should Moscow cross a redline on any of Tehran’s regional interests.  Iran has threatened that the United States would be mistaken if it thinks Iran would be the “only” country unable to export its oil. Most analysts took that threat to be alluding to Saudi Arabia, which is involved in proxy wars with Iran in multiple locations and whose oil industry has been subject to cyber, drone, and sabotage attacks. But Iran may also want to make sure that Putin knows Iranian proxies can make trouble for Russia (in addition to Saudi Arabia) if Tehran feels double crossed. Moscow could be finding that its “partnership” with Iran is double-edged, constraining its freedom of movement on a host of critical issues ranging from its ongoing operations in Syria to its desire to remain the senior partner in oil market management with Saudi Arabia. From the U.S. point of view, this is highly material to U.S. and Israeli hopes that Russia can be an effective partner. Any Russian promises to help with Syria’s border areas or oil markets could become subject to Iranian backlash and therefore not reliable. In other words, U.S. policy makers could overestimate the value of collaboration with Moscow on Middle East conflict resolution. For Russian oil companies, operations in special assignment regions like Iraq, Venezuela, Libya, and Iran come with extremely difficult operating environments. Local conflicts are disrupting oil production, limiting payments in kind (e.g. oil exports) that were expected to reimburse Russian firms like Lukoil and Rosneft for its massive capital outlays and manpower. Money spent in oil and gas fields in these far-flung places is capital not available to make steady and possibly more reliable profits in Russia’s own domestic oil and gas fields, and it remains to be seen if Russian firms would be able to hold onto the barter style deals, should the governments change in any of the troubled locales. When all is said and done, it remains to be seen whether in the hindsight of history, Vladimir Putin’s deal making in oil over the past year or so will be viewed as triumphantly as it now might appear. In the glare of Europe’s response, the sudden cutoff of Russian natural gas supplies to Ukraine back in 2006 proved a misstep by giving impetus to not only the installation of several major liquefied natural gas receiving terminals in southern Europe and Poland but also giving added stimulus towards a major push towards renewable energy on the continent. Russia’s current moves into troubled states could similarly come back to bite its oil and gas industry, which was already struggling from high indebtedness, limited access to future financing, and the threat of additional U.S. sanctions.
  • Russia
    The Trump-Putin Summit: Issues at Stake
    Presidents Trump and Putin have little to show for their rapport so far. Their summit will not be seen as a success without fresh approaches to issues from arms control to election tampering.
  • Donald Trump
    Trump Meets With Putin and Trade Talks Commence Between EU and China
    Podcast
    U.S. President Donald J. Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin hold a summit in Helsinki, and China and the EU consider closer trade relations.
  • NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)
    A “Value”-less Summit: What to Expect from Trump’s NATO Summit
    The following is a guest post from Christopher M. Vassallo, an intern at Foreign Affairs at the Council on Foreign Relations. If you want to know how this week’s North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit will likely play out, look no further than June’s European Union (EU) summit. The events of the earlier summit will still be fresh in the minds of European heads of state when President Donald J. Trump arrives in Brussels this week. Trump will likely assume the role of the skeptical populist, intent on dominating the agenda of an alliance he once dismissed as “obsolete.” To German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron, the EU’s liberal stalwarts who profess that Europe is stronger together, this spectacle will seem like déjà vu. Two weeks ago, at the EU summit a mere twelve minutes down the road, five Euroskeptic heads of statethe leaders of Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, and Romaniaderailed constructive policymaking by haggling over language. Among other tactics, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban insisted on dubbing migration an “invasion,” and Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte threatened to veto the entire slate of conclusions unless they included concrete plans to reduce refugee numbers. Trump shares the views of these two hardliners and has been working behind the scenes to support them. In April, he congratulated Orban, a fellow anti-migration crusader with whom presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama frequently tussled, after his electoral victory. He also promised a White House visit to Conte, who backed Trump’s plan to reinstate Russia to the Group of Eight (G8). Trump might also find common ground with the leaders of Poland, Romania, and the Czech Republic, who comprise the rest of NATO’s anti-migration wing. For the Euroskeptics, the EU summit provided a welcome showdown between their energized forcesadherents of a populist, nationalist platform, hostile to migration and centralized European authorityand the EU’s traditionally dominant liberal core, led by Western European nations like France, Germany, and Belgium. Trump is familiar with this conflict, which is manifest throughout U.S. politics. His presence along with the Euroskeptic leaders will reveal a similar rift within NATO. While the EU summit was convened to address a host of issuesincluding Brexit, American tariffs, and EU expansion in the Balkansmigration monopolized discussions. Even though the flow of migrants into the EU has fallen 95 percent from its 2015 peak, division over the issue in recent weeks nearly toppled Angela Merkel’s chancellorship in Germany and helped forge an unnatural governing alliance between Italy’s radical left and right. During the EU summit, dissension between nationalists and liberals forced an all-night session that produced only a non-binding set of conclusions on migration. The EU summit made it clear that the union is a fragile entity, vulnerable to surging populism. The union is premised not on shared nationality, language, or religion, but instead bound together by a more nebulous faith in the common market, open borders, and the supremacy of democratic institutions. By agreeing to restrict open borders within the EU, Merkel and Macron indicated that a premise of the union was subject to negotiation. Like the EU gathering, this week’s NATO summit presents another occasion to discuss shared values—and for populist leaders to force similar compromises on long-established principles. It is possible, of course, that Trump will reaffirm Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which he conspicuously omitted from last year’s speech. He could also reassure allies ahead of his one-on-one meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, by declaring that neither the U.S. troop presence in Poland nor NATO war games in the east are up for negotiation. But he will almost certainly pass on this opportunity. Instead, Trump will likely antagonize his already battle-weary audience. He will lecture Europeans on defense spending, repeating his recent letters to each NATO nation not yet spending at least 2 percent of GDP on defense. He will likely touch on tariffs, repeating his particular disgust for German luxury car imports, as he did at last month’s Group of Seven (G7) summit. What is certain is that Trump, like his Italian and Hungarian counterparts, will sit down with NATO’s weakened liberal core, which has suddenly shown a willingness to compromise on principles that were once off limits. They are increasingly negotiating by his rules, on his terms. Trump is unlikely to repeat his G7 performance, in which he stormed off, revoked support for the group’s conclusions, and condemned one leader to “a special place in hell.” Why should he, when several NATO allies share his outlook? What the summit will reveal is the degree to which Trump has transformed the alliance, by simultaneously cultivating illiberal European backers and exploiting the liberal leaders’ willingness to compromise. What is less clear is whether Trump will offer any positive vision for NATO, one that clarifies the alliance’s enduring purpose in the twenty-first century. To the deal-obsessed U.S. president, it might seem heretical to speak to NATO allies about values, rather than simply make demands. But as the imminent Soviet threat of nuclear annihilation has receded, replaced by a more diffuse threat environment, the foundations of the NATO alliance (like the EU) are fragile, resting on the more vague principle of cooperative self-defense. To survive, NATO requires steady affirmation of why it exists in the first place. If Trump refuses to invoke shared values, only then will NATO truly be obsolete.
  • Europe
    Trump’s Misguided Attack on European Unity
    Trump's antipathy toward the EU overlooks America’s enduring interest in a united Europe that can serve as one pillar of an open, rule-bound international system.
  • Europe
    Trump Goes to Europe
    President Trump goes to Europe this week. Its leaders are bracing for the impact.
  • North Korea
    The Aftermath of the Trump-Kim Summit With Victor Cha
    Podcast
    Victor Cha, senior advisor and Korea chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, joins James M. Lindsay to discuss North Korea and the aftermath of the Trump-Kim summit.
  • Mexico
    Is Political Change Coming to Mexico?
    Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador will likely become Mexico’s next president at a time of mounting concern over corruption and violence, but his reform plans are hazy.
  • North Korea
    The Art of the Summit
    President Trump prides himself on being a "dealmaker." In one of his biggest deals yet, he brokered a joint statement between the United States and North Korea. To what extent did he use his eleven-step method from The Art of the Deal?
  • Donald Trump
    On Trade, Should Allies Treat the United States as a Rogue Nation?
    The idea of targeting President Trump's personal assets may be tempting, but it is the wrong approach.
  • United States
    America First Policies Leave America Alone and Disadvantaged
    Trump's rebellion against the rules-based order may give the United States more freedom of action, but it undermines the ability of the United States to influence its own future in a global era.
  • Taiwan
    Is Washington Boosting Ties With Taiwan?
    The opening of a new U.S. diplomatic compound in Taipei doesn’t mark a major change in ties, but the Trump administration has taken new approaches to dealing with China over Taiwan.
  • Europe
    Transatlantic Tension With Célia Belin and Alina Polyakova
    Podcast
    The Brookings Institution's Célia Belin, an expert on transatlantic relations and U.S. foreign policy toward Europe, and Alina Polyakova, an expert on European politics and far-right populism and nationalism, join James M. Lindsay to discuss U.S.-European relations. 
  • North Korea
    The Singapore Summit’s Uncertain Legacy
    The Singapore summit lessened the chances of conflict in the short term, but the ultimate legacy of the summit could still be a march toward war.