Regional Organizations | Council on Foreign Relations

Asia

Does the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration Even Matter?

Elizabeth Leader is a Research Associate for Southeast Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations. The author’s views on ASEAN’s human rights progress do not necessarily reflect those of Joshua Kurlantzick. The Asia-Pacific remains the only UN-defined region that does not adhere to its own human rights treaty or possess a region-wide mechanism for the promotion and protection of human rights. Thus, there was seemingly a lot riding on the backs of the ten ASEAN foreign ministers who gathered in New York on Thursday —on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly— to review the second draft of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (AHRD). Concern over the controversial draft (drawn up by the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights) has, in the international media, far outweighed any sort of praise. Among the many aspects of the AHRD facing criticism are the possible inclusion of “public morality” as justification for suspending human rights, the opaque fashion in which the document was drafted, the limited participation of civil society organizations in its creation, and its failure to reference many of the marginalized populations who are in dire need of protection (including minorities, the LGBT community, and persons with disabilities). Regardless of the inclusion or exclusion of these aspects, the fact remains that without a corresponding mechanism for enforcement, the AHRD, no matter how forceful its language, will be largely damned to irrelevance. In his 2006 book Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community, former ASEAN secretary-general Rodolfo Severino rationalized ASEAN’s inability to formalize a unified, meaningful stance on human rights: “In the face of such wide divergences in the situations and conceptions of human rights among ASEAN countries, it is hardly feasible for ASEAN to construct a system for intervening in one another’s affair on the grounds of violations of human rights.” While citing the region’s diversity is arguably a ‘cop out’ for ASEAN’s failure to institutionalize respect for human rights, the international community must nonetheless recognize the reality that is ASEAN’s consensus-based decision-making process, and how this will fundamentally preclude progress on human rights promotion and protection for the foreseeable future. One is hard pressed to find any aspect of human rights for which shared norms or common experiences unite ASEAN’s ten member states. In terms of LGBT rights (a population whose exclusion from the current draft has received international condemnation and media attention), for example, Thailand is seen as one of the most tolerant countries in Asia, while in neighboring Myanmar homosexuality is illegal. No amount of ministerial meetings is likely to bridge such a cultural divide. Indonesia’s foreign minister Marty Natalegawa was candid in his recent admission that “state interests of each nation are also different from one another. Hence, a document that must be reached via consensus will never please all parties.” Above all, national self-interest will continue to dictate member states’ decision-making. Despite international concern for the treatment of Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine State, Myanmar, Muslim-majority countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia are unlikely to intervene for fear that other countries may in turn attempt to dictate citizenship standards within their own borders. Thailand, once seen as a beacon of democracy in the region, will not chastise Vietnam’s recent jailing of bloggers for fear that its own, draconian Lèse-Majesté law and the associated Computer Crimes Act will face censure from its neighbors. As long as ASEAN remains an intergovernmental body and not a people-powered institution, the “ASEAN way” will remain one of noninterference, and it is improbable that the protection of human rights will be paid little more than lip service. Instead, the resources and efforts of Western governments and international NGOs would be better spent focusing on grassroots movements, working bilaterally with the individual governments of member states, and working multilaterally with those networks that are not bound by the rigidities of ASEAN. The Southeast Asia National Human Rights Institution (SEANHRI), for example, unites the existing, independent human rights commissions of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand (as well as that of ASEAN non-member East Timor). Its website is funded by a European Commission project entitled "Enhancing the Role of National Human Rights Institutions in the Development of an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism." Contrary to the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights which lacks the ability to hear cases from individuals, organizations, or groups of people, a recent article in the Bangkok Post described the members of SEANHRI as the “most accessible” human rights mechanisms in the region. There is an opportunity for these commissions to set an example for their neighbors. In 2011, Myanmar established its own human rights commission (although the international community has yet to recognize it as independent, and it has thus far avoided investigation of human rights abuses in conflict-riddled ethnic minority areas). Earlier this month in Chiang Mai, Thailand, the Myanmar National Human Rights Commission was admitted to SEANHRI. Perhaps, in time, Myanmar’s commission will benefit from the exchange of best practices. The right of marginalized populations in Southeast Asia to be included in the AHRD is undeniable. Their inclusion in the declaration would send a powerful signal to not only ASEAN, but also the greater Asia-Pacific region and the entire international community. But, short of a miracle, a satisfactory AHRD is unlikely to come to fruition in the near future —and prospects for its enforcement are even dimmer. In the meantime, concerned governments and NGOs should continue to explore means of human rights promotion and protection that operate independently of ASEAN.

Blog Post by Guest Blogger for Asia Unbound September 28, 2012 Asia Unbound
Sub-Saharan Africa

Defining "Africa" Through Geography or Regional Cooperation

What is "Africa?" Nomenclature raises difficult issues. Maps in school rooms show “Africa" as a distinct continent, the second largest in the world. But the U.S. Department of State assigns North Africa –the states of the Mediterranean littoral (Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco), to its Near East bureau– not its Africa bureau. On the other hand, the Department of Defense’s African Command (AFRICOM) includes Africa’s Mediterranean littoral with most of the rest of the continent in its area of responsibility. The international consulting organization McKinsey & Co. included North Africa in its aggregated data on Africa in its well-known report Lions on the Move, the results of which would have been different absent the relative economic powerhouses of the Mediterranean littoral. The Libyan dictator Qaddafi famously tried to pose as an "African"—not Middle Eastern– leader, and he bankrolled the African Union. The Council on Foreign Relations follows the Department of State’s usage. I share the view that the Mediterranean littoral belongs to Africa only in the sense of its being the northern edge of a geographic continent. Incorporating it in discussions of sub-Saharan Africa can be misleading. Its history, language, culture, and politics tie it closely to the Middle East and, to a lesser extent, Europe. (North Africa was a part of the Roman Empire and its cultural unity with Europe was broken only in the seventh and eighth centuries during the Islamic conquest.) North Africa is also cut off from the rest of Africa by the Sahara desert. The Sahara is a barrier equivalent in many respects to an ocean. But, like an ocean, it can be crossed. And trans-Saharan trade has been the underpinning of brilliant civilizations along the southern edge of the desert, especially in what is now Mali and northern Nigeria. Where does the southern edge of the Sahara begin, especially as desertification proceeds? It seems to me that Mauritania and Mali, and perhaps Niger, can been seen as a borderland between North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa. As such, they share some cultural similarities, along with northern Nigeria, Chad, and Sudan. Why, in the era of globalization, does this matter? One recent example, is that NATO cited Arab League support for its intervention in Libya as a legitimizing factor, while largely ignoring the African Union –to the chagrin of many of the latter’s member states, especially South Africa. Also, Mali is a member of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). This is a sub-Saharan African regional organization that has played a positive role resolving certain regional conflicts. ECOWAS is deeply involved in the search for a political solution in Mali. But Mauritania and Algeria, on Mali’s western and northern borders, are not members of ECOWAS. Yet because of the porosity of boundaries and the cross-border movement of Tauregs (to say nothing of smuggling and other criminal or terrorist activities) these states are directly involved in the search for a solution in Mali, as well. And, as I blogged on September 13, 2012, neither Nouakchott nor Algiers is supportive of an ECOWAS troop presence in Mali. A solution might be for the African Union to involve itself more in Mali and for ECOWAS to draw back. Algeria and Mauritania are members of the African Union, as are all the states of ECOWAS. A September 14 meeting invovling Nigeria’s President Goodluck Jonathan, Ivorian President Alassane Ouattara, current chairman of ECOWAS and Benin President Boni Yavi, current chairman of the AU is a positive step in that direction. So, the important issue may be not how "Africa" is defined but rather how the the areas of cooperation of regional organizations are determined.

Blog Post by John Campbell September 17, 2012 Africa in Transition
Sub-Saharan Africa

UNHCR, Mali, and an "Arc of Instability"

Syria dominates the news cycle and is probably the principal preoccupation of foreign ministries, just as Libya previously was, and is once again following the murder of U.S. Ambassador Chris Stevens. Yet UN agencies, especially the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the World Food Program, have, with only limited success, repeatedly warned of the potential humanitarian catastrophe in the Sahel. On September 4, UN High Commissioner for Refugees Antonio Guterres published a thoughtful analysis of the crisis in Mali in the New York Times. It goes beyond a wake-up call. His central argument is that the current crisis in Mali and the Sahel is the result of an "intersection of trends," including food insecurity and desertification, "incomplete democratization…marked by social exclusion," and rampant youth unemployment. He also places the current radical Islamic groups who control northern Mali in the context of a century of Taureg rebellions and a smuggling trade that ranges from narcotics to weapons. He cites the attraction marginalized and disaffected youth in the region have of Malian radical Islamic groups . The bleak statistics he cites are not surprising, but dire nonetheless: eighteen million Sahelians affected by, or at risk of, food shortages; 266,000 Malian refugees–mostly in Mauritania, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Algeria; and 174,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Mali. Guterres warns that the Mali crisis could morph into an "arc of instability" from Mauritania in the West to the Gulf of Aden in the East, with weak state authorities and active transnational criminals. To forestall this, Guterres urges the international community to support those in the region working for a political settlement. The high commissioner’s warning is well placed. Once aroused –admittedly often a slow process that is influenced by the degree of media attention– the international community will write the necessary checks, the food will be delivered, and tent cities established. Assisting in achieving an internal political settlement in Mali will be much more difficult than meeting immediate humanitarian needs. For example, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has tried to play a leading role in Mali. But two of Mali’s closest neighbors, Mauritania and Algeria, are not ECOWAS members and are likely to be distinctly unenthusiastic about an ECOWAS military presence in territory adjacent to their borders.

Blog Post by John Campbell September 13, 2012 Africa in Transition

Asia

Next Steps on Clean Energy Trade

Earlier this week, at a meeting in Russia, the leaders of APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) agreed to reduce tariffs on fifty-four different types of environmentally friendly goods. The countries, which include the United States and China, agreed to specific maximum tariffs and to a deadline for the changes. This is great news. The World Bank has estimated that eliminating barriers to trade in clean energy technologies could boost that trade by fourteen percent. And as my colleagues and I argued in an in-depth study two years ago, cross-border trade and investment is essential to accelerating not only deployment but also innovation in clean energy. The big question now is what ought to come next. There are three directions – not mutually exclusive – that the United States and others ought to be looking at. Broaden the Scope The APEC countries make up roughly half of the global economy. That makes the announcement important. Extending it to the other half of the world would be a great next step. Bringing in India, Europe, and Brazil, all economic, energy, and (unfortunately) emissions powerhouses would be particularly valuable. This sort of effort could be pursued through the G-20, which includes many APEC members and many of those who were not part of the new announcement. It could also be pursued through the global climate negotiations, though I suspect that might become a technical mess. Other countries could also take the APEC lead and unilaterally reduce tariffs accordingly. The scope could also be broadened to a host of critical clean energy technologies that are not included. Fifty-four types of goods may sound like a lot, but the specifications are narrow, which means that the total is a bit less than one might expect. Liberalized trade in bamboo flooring may be progress but it isn’t going to do anything about climate change. Deepen the Measures The APEC agreement targets tariff barriers – explicit levies on imported products. Many of the biggest barriers to trade and investment, though, are so-called non-tariff barriers (NTBs). These include things like local content requirements that require projects to use local equipment. (Such requirements can effectively function like infinitely high tariffs.) They can also include complex regulations, particularly in the name of quality control, that effectively shut out foreign operators. Extending the APEC measures to appears to be on the agenda for future discussion. Negotiations will not be easy, but the payoff could be big. Stiffen the Rules The commitments made at APEC are important, but there are no penalities to those who do not follow through. For years, the World Trade Organization (WTO) has been engaged in negotiations aimed at lowering barriers to trade in environmental goods and services, all of which would be binding. With the Doha round stalled, the environmental agenda hasn’t gone anywhere, but if negotiations can be unblocked, there’s a big opportunity for gains on clean energy. Working through the WTO would also provide a big opportunity to broaden the scope of the APEC effort.

Blog Post by Michael Levi September 12, 2012 Energy, Security, and Climate
China

News Flash: Washington Source of All Beijing’s Problems

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s swing through Asia has been marked by a revelation in Beijing: the source of all China’s problems with its neighbors is the United States. A Xinhua editorial paints the United States as a “sneaky trouble maker sitting behind some nations in the region and pulling strings.” In the Global Times, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences scholar Ni Feng states that the U.S. pivot is “stirring up tensions between China and its neighbors”; while Renmin University scholar Jin Canrong argues that Washington aims to “dominate the region’s political agenda, and build a Trans-Pacific Partnership that excludes China, as well as further consolidate its military edge.” Fortunately, these same media and analysts have a relatively simple answer to the problem: the “U.S. owes China convincing explanation of true intentions of its Asia Pivot policy”; the United States needs to prove that it is “returning to Asia as a peacemaker, instead of a troublemaker”; and a real zinger from the Global Times, “We hope Clinton can reflect upon the deep harm she is bringing to the Sino-U.S. relationship in the last few months before she leaves office and try to make up for it.” If only it were that simple. Unfortunately, when the problem is misstated, the solution is likely to be as well. China’s problems in the region do not originate with the United States but with China’s own interactions with its neighbors. Some context might help: First, take the South China Sea, perhaps the source of Beijing’s greatest concern at the moment. Tensions in the region—particularly between China and Vietnam and China and the Philippines—have been heightened over the past year. However, conflict between China and its neighbors (as well as among the neighbors themselves) in the South China Sea has been a fact of life for almost forty years. The year-old U.S. pivot did not create the problem nor did it exacerbate it. U.S. policy has been consistent. In 1995, Washington explicitly supported the 1992 ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea, as well as any diplomatic effort to resolve competing claims peacefully. More than 15 years later, Secretary of State Clinton articulated U.S. policy as follows: “The United States does not take a position on competing territorial claims … but we believe the nations of the region should work collaboratively to resolve disputes without coercion, without intimidation and certainly without the use of force. That is why we encourage ASEAN and China to make meaningful progress toward finalizing a comprehensive code of conduct in order to establish rules of the road and clear procedures for peacefully addressing disagreements.” Second, the United States is not a puppet master, “sitting behind other countries” and “pulling strings.” Countries in Asia are replete with intelligent leaders and diplomats. They are fully capable of debating the issues surrounding the U.S. pivot and making their own decisions about how to interact with China and the United States. The Philippines kicked the United States out of Subic Bay two decades ago; if it now wants to allow some U.S. submarines to dock there, China should take a step back and ask itself what prompted the Philippines to shift its policy. Third, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is not a plot against China; negotiations for the agreement started in 2007, well before the current tensions and the pivot (the original negotiations did not even include the United States). The TPP is an effort by the United States to realize the economic benefits of deeper engagement with the most economically robust region in the world—much in the same way that China has done for decades. Moreover, China is welcome to join the TPP under precisely the same conditions as any other member, the United States included. People can disagree about the merits of the TPP, but it represents a recognition of past failings of U.S. trade and economic policy, not an effort to box out China. Fourth, security relationships in Asia are not exclusionary. China and the United States each have military-to-military relations with a wide range of countries throughout Asia (including with each other), and those countries have security ties among themselves that engage neither Washington nor Beijing. Moreover, China increasingly has military ties throughout the world. In the United States’ backyard, for example, China hosts military personnel from at least eighteen Latin American countries and sells arms to countries such as Venezuela, Argentina, Bolivia, and Ecuador. The United States clearly can’t define the terms of engagement for its neighbors, and China shouldn’t attempt to do so in its neighborhood. China spent more than thirty years earning the respect and admiration of its neighbors for its economic accomplishments, for its repeated emphasis on “win-win” solutions, and for serving as an important engine of growth in the region. What is causing consternation in the region now is not change in U.S. policy but more assertive Chinese rhetoric and military maneuverings. Once Beijing can acknowledge the real source of its problem, it has the opportunity to identify the correct solution. It is not about the United States assuaging Chinese concerns; it is about China assuaging the region’s concerns.

Blog Post by Elizabeth C. Economy September 5, 2012 Asia Unbound
Turkey

Weekend Reading: Syria’s Revolution, Egypt’s Crossroads, and Turkey’s EU Bid

Husam Dughman writes for Informed Comment on why Syria’s revolution is different than Libya’s. Shahira Amin says that in light of Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi’s recent military purge, it is up to him to show that authoritarianism is a thing of the past in the country. George Kyris Turkey’s reasons for inflexibility on Cyprus in its bid for accession to the European Union.

Blog Post by Steven A. Cook August 17, 2012 From the Potomac to the Euphrates

Sub-Saharan Africa

Mali Descends into Hell

Under the best of circumstances, life for Malians has been hard for millennia. The country faces recurrent drought and the Sahara encroaches. The social and economic statistics are poor. That in part was why the country’s stable governance for two decades was so remarkable, and its subsequent collapse such a tragedy. In the capital, Bamako, a political settlement between the military junta that overthrew the constitutional government and an interim civilian government supported by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is still elusive. The interim president has just returned after two months of hospitalization and recuperation in France following a beating by a mob in his own palace. Amnesty International has released a report documenting atrocities committed by junta forces in response to a failed counter coup. The Malian government – a state party to the International criminal Court (ICC) – has asked that body to investigate, prosecute and try perpetrators of crimes in the North because it lacks the capacity to do so. In the northern part of the country, the radical Islamist group Ansar Dine and other groups have destroyed West African Islamic monuments that are World Heritage Sites – because they were apparently not Islamic enough. And over the weekend, Ansar Dine stoned to death an unmarried couple in front of 300 witnesses, according to graphic and chilling reportage by the New York Times. Meanwhile, ECOWAS is trying to put together an intervention force of 3,000. Yet, as the president of Chad told the French foreign minister, only France (or NATO or even the U.S.) has the necessary capacity to make such a force effective. According to the press, however, there is little West African enthusiasm for French participation in an ECOWAS force and, presumably, even less for NATO or the U.S. Even with outside assistance, it is difficult to see how even a well supplied international force could impose order on the trackless deserts in the North. It could, however, retake Timbuktu, Gao and a few other population centers. But guerrilla fighting could continue indefinitely. Conventional wisdom among those outsiders who watch Mali is that a political settlement is needed first in Bamako before the Islamist tide can be rolled back in the North. However, while there may be little West African enthusiasm for a French role in an international military force, Ansar Dine atrocities may generate popular support in France for some form of intervention. Other than providing limited logistical support for an international force, I doubt there would be much political support in the U.S. for involvement in Mali, especially during election season. So, while ECOWAS may be able to broker a political settlement in Bamako, and the ICC acquires yet another African case, for the time being, it looks like there are no limits to the barbarism and atrocities in the North.

Blog Post by John Campbell July 31, 2012 Africa in Transition
China

China Moving Soldiers to Disputed South China Sea Islands

In today’s New York Times, a detailed article notes that China’s Central Military Commission has approved “the deployment of a garrison of soldiers from the People’s Liberation Army to guard disputed islands claimed by China and Vietnam in the South China Sea.” This development is only going to ratchet tensions up even higher from the already sky-high level in the wake of the failed ASEAN foreign ministers’ meeting earlier this month. In a new CFR Expert Brief, I analyze the current state of tensions in the South China Sea, examine where the dispute is headed in the near term, and discuss how all sides can cool the situation before it spirals completely out of control. Read it here.

Blog Post by Joshua Kurlantzick July 25, 2012 Asia Unbound
China

What Happens Now in the South China Sea?

Although the meltdown of the ASEAN foreign ministers’ meeting in Phnom Penh last week seemed like an unmitigated disaster, and already has resulted in a flurry of press coverage blasting the organization, the situation in the South China Sea is not necessarily headed for a steep descent into real conflict. To be sure, both sides seem likely to send more “fishing vessels” and other boats that straddle the line between civilian and military vessels into the disputed waters, raising the possibility of further skirmishes. Meanwhile, in the wake of the summit Philippine opinion leaders, and the Philippine media, are both livid at Cambodia for allegedly scuttling any joint position and increasingly aware of how vulnerable the Philippines is, having allowed their armed forces to deteriorate badly over the past two decades. I am hardly interested in absolving either China or ASEAN, an organization poorly prepared for dealing with 21st century challenges like a rising China, but in the near term, it is not unimaginable that all sides in the dispute will cool down. Indeed, there remains some room for compromise between all Sea claimants and the United States, in order to avoid any real shooting war in the Sea. While it is unlikely that Beijing will give up its claims to the entire Sea anytime soon, Chinese officials recognize that their forceful, increasingly vocal positions on the Sea have alienated many Southeast Asian nations and pushed countries like Vietnam and the Philippines closer to the United States, exactly what China, which has ambitions of denying the U.S. access to and control of Southeast Asian waterways, does not want. Already,China has lost much of the regional good will it fostered in the late 1990s and early 2000s by agreeing, in theory, to work for a code of conduct on the South China Sea, as well as by launching a “charm offensive” of aid, diplomacy, and cultural diplomacy inSoutheast Asia. At the same time, though some ASEAN nations like Cambodia are drawing nearer to China, while others such as the Philippines are moving closer to the United States, all ASEAN nations value the organization’s coherence, and realize that Southeast Asian states must generally provide a united front on issues if they are to be treated as a major power in East Asia, and if they hope to be the center of any future Asian regional security architecture. The savviest ASEAN officials realize this, which is why everyone from Indonesia’s foreign minister to the ASEAN Secretary-General has, in the wake of the summit, been engaged in back-and-forth diplomacy among ASEAN members to try to get them to agree to some kind of joint position on the Sea, even if that position is weaker than what the Philippines and Vietnam would have wanted.

Blog Post by Joshua Kurlantzick July 19, 2012 Asia Unbound
Sub-Saharan Africa

Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and South Africa’s HIV/AIDS Past

More people are living with HIV/AIDS in South Africa than in any other country, according to UNAIDS. It is about 11 percent of the total population, 17.18 percent of the population aged 15-49 years. There has been progress, but HIV/AIDS remains a salient feature of the South Africa landscape. Its effect on the most productive part of the population is devastating. The disease grew to epidemic proportions during the term of President Nelson Mandela and South Africa’s first “non-racial” government (1994-1999.) As was true in other countries, the response of Mandela and Mbeki’s administrations to the epidemic included denial and confusion, and was often non-scientific. In South Africa, the official response to HIV/AIDS was also colored by quarrels with foreign pharmaceutical companies. The Mbeki government sponsored virodene, essentially a quack remedy, for the treatment of HIV/AIDS, and did not distribute antiretrovirals through the public health system and for a time even blocked AZT trials. It took years for South Africa to join the scientific mainstream in HIV/AIDS treatment. The disease remains stigmatized despite Nelson Mandela’s public acknowledgement after he had left office that a son had died of the disease. Dlamini-Zuma was minister of health from 1994 to 1999 and was a close political ally of Thabo Mbeki. When Mbeki became president in 1999, he named her foreign minister. She became probably the most powerful woman in South Africa. She is the ex-wife of the current president Jacob Zuma, but there is a consensus that her political success is not related to her former husband. Following South Africa’s six-month diplomatic campaign, she has been elected as chairperson of the African Union Commission, the chief executive position in the organization. This is seen in the media as a significant diplomatic achievement by the Zuma administration and opens the way for increased South African influence on the continent. The media is also portraying it as an accomplishment for Africa’s women. Dlamini-Zuma, who is an ANC activist, is a medical doctor trained in South Africa and the U.K. As minister of health, her achievements were numerous: she instituted free medical care for children and achieved progress toward dismantling the apartheid dimensions of the healthcare system. But her association with and support for Mbeki’s anti-scientific approach to HIV/AIDS is a blot. How to account for it? Part of the answer, I speculate, comes from her close political alliance with Mbeki; part of it from the general predisposition among the ANC to search for “unorthodox” treatments; and partly from the confrontation with foreign pharmaceutical companies that made her particularly open to an “African” cure. (Virodene had been developed at the University of Pretoria.) Whatever the reason, her approach to HIV/AIDS associates her closely with what was Mbeki’s greatest domestic policy failure. And that tempers my enthusiasm for her election as chairperson of the African Union Commission.

Blog Post by John Campbell July 18, 2012 Africa in Transition
Asia

ASEAN’s Failures on the South China Sea

In the wake of the disastrous break-up of last week’s ASEAN foreign ministers meeting in Phnom Penh, at which ASEAN failed to agree to any statement summarizing their position on the South China Sea, even some of the most ardent backers of the Southeast Asian organization have begun to wonder whether ASEAN’s traditional consensus way is now totally defunct. This emphasis on consensus, of course, allows even one country, no matter how small, to block any joint position taken by ASEAN – in this case, probably Cambodia and Laos, which are increasingly close to China, blocking any joint statement that criticized Beijing. But this is hardly the first time the consensus approach has proven utterly counterproductive: ASEAN failed for years to strengthen their charter to include strong new clauses on human rights, almost surely because of the objections of more repressive ASEAN members like Myanmar. ASEAN failed, in the past, to take strong positions even on conflict within Southeast Asia, as occurred in East Timor in 1999, because of this adherence – some might say slavish devotion – to consensus and noninterference, a sharp contrast from some other regional organizations like the African Union. In recent years, there have always been some ASEAN members getting fed up with consensus. Wealthier states like Singapore have wanted to move faster on economic integration, and on some aspects of economic integration ASEAN has developed into a “two-track” organization similar to the EU, with poorer members going at one pace and wealthier members going at another pace. For the organization to continue to play a sizable role in regional security, as in trade and economics (ASEAN sees itself as the cornerstone of any future Asian regional security architecture), this type of new thinking is going to need to be applied to non-economic matters as well. ASEAN did indeed draft and sign a new charter in 2007, but it maintained most of the ideals of consensus and nonintervention of the original ASEAN Declaration, though it did commit to creating a “just, democratic, and harmonious environment in the region,” although it gave little clear definition of what ASEAN believed any of these terms meant. It did also announce that ASEAN had set a goal of forming a single market in Southeast Asia for goods, services, and investment. The proposals of Surin Pitsuwan and others could not overcome some ASEAN states’ reluctance to brook any criticism of their internal affairs, even though stronger, richer ASEAN members realized that, without ending this consensual style, ASEAN would never be strong enough to challenge China, and to deal with economic and political crises in Asia. Because of the obstacle of consensus, ASEAN thus far also has demonstrated little capability to handle either traditional or nontraditional regional security challenges, thus giving major Northeast Asian powers, or the U.S., little incentive to work through ASEAN to handle challenges rather than addressing them unilaterally or bilaterally. Beyond ASEAN’s weak handling of the perpetual smog crisis, the organization also has developed little capacity to combat drug trafficking, human trafficking, pandemic disease outbreaks, terrorism, or other high-priority nontraditional security threats in the Asia-Pacific. This aversion to intervening in any member-state’s affairs has meant that when ASEAN nations have had disputes with each other, let alone China, such as Indonesia and Malaysia’s dispute over the Sipadan and Ligitan islands, ASEAN states do not even trust ASEAN’s nascent institutions, such as the High Council of ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, to solve problems. Instead, Malaysia and Indonesia adjudicated their dispute at The Hague. Moving forward, ASEAN in the coming years will have to change significantly to remain a major force in Asia, and to avoid embarrassments like the recent foreign ministers’ meeting. In the next post I will explore some potential solutions to make ASEAN more relevant, and proactive, today.

Blog Post by Joshua Kurlantzick July 17, 2012 Asia Unbound
Sub-Saharan Africa

Guest Post: The Sack of Timbuktu

This is a guest post by Mohamed Jallow, a former interdepartmental associate at the Council on Foreign Relations, and now a program development specialist at IntraHealth International. Mohamed came to the United States as a refugee from Sierra Leone in 2003. As a history buff, I have always been fascinated with the mystics of the ancient African city of Timbuktu. The city is renowned for its historical significance as the crossroads of civilizations. It is among the few places on the continent that still conjures up nostalgic images of Africa’s intellectual history and achievements. The great African empires of Songhai, Macina, and Mali all had roots in the city. In fact, most of modern West Africa can draw on Timbuktu’s long history of education, religion, and diversity. So one would think Timbuktu is a city that all of Africa should be proud of. But not the al-Qaeda linked militants of Ansar Dine. Since taking control of the city following the military coup, and subsequent breakaway of northern Mali (Azawad), the militants have gone on the rampage, destroying musoleums, monuments, and shrines that date back hundreds of years. They claim that the sites are not only un-Islamic, but that they encourage idolatory. They have vowed to continue their campaign to rid the city of all its “ungodly treasures.” Though the focus of the militants for now had been on shrines and musoleums, fears are growing that they might expand their crackdown to libraries that contain rare manuscripts that chronicle the region’s rich history and religious tolerance. With Mali in disaray, the rest of the world watches in disgust and helplessness. UNESCO has called on the militants to stop the destruction of world heritage sites in what it called “repugnant acts,” and placed most of the city’s revered monuments and shrines on its most endangered list. The United Nations and the regional grouping ECOWAS continue to balk at military intervention after repeated attempts to resolve the political crisis. All the while, the senseless sacking continues. Since the coup d’état that ousted the democratically elected government of President Amadou Toumani Toure, Mali has been plunged into turmoil, and the country split in two. Tuareg militiamen have declared independence in the north, while Ansar Dine has capitalized on the turmoil to not only desecrate northern Mali’s historical sites, but also to declare a strict interpretation of Sharia law in the territories it controls. Until the coup d’état, Mali was considered a bastion of African democracy, and was hailed as one of the few countries that “got it right.” That adage is now history. Nevertheless, what continues to amaze me is the lack of outcry at Timbuktu’s desecration. I am not sure why the whole continent is not in uproar; after all, the city and its treasures are part of our collective African history and heritage, not just Mali’s. We in Africa are quick to dismiss western imperialism and the post-colonial plots to dilute Africa’s intellectual greatness, but muted in the desecration of a city that perhaps carries as much important historical significance than any other on the continent. What a shame.

Blog Post by Guest Blogger for John Campbell July 16, 2012 Africa in Transition
Sub-Saharan Africa

Malawi: Justice versus Impunity and the African Union

This is a guest post by Asch Harwood. Asch is the Council on Foreign Relations Africa program research associate. Malawi has decided not to host July’s African Union (AU) summit because of demands that Sudan’s al-Bashir be permitted to attend. It’s a heroic effort toward ending impunity on the continent. Despite explicit statements that Malawi’s new president, Joyce Banda, was concerned about offending international donors, her position in support of the ICC’s arrest warrant for al-Bashir is principled. Malawi is a signatory to the Rome statute and intends to fulfill its obligations. Of course, when your country’s budget is dependent on aid (40 percent before donors cut off support last year), international opinion is a real concern. But as Peter Fabricius writes, “(Banda) probably intended to mollify Malawians, who are very annoyed at losing the summit and the business opportunities that would have gone with it.” As any Africa watcher knows, one of the biggest holds on sub-Saharan economic and political development is impunity. So any champion, particularly one in a position to benefit from impunity, should be supported accordingly. The AU does face a conundrum though, which can easily be lost on ICC supporters. As Simon Allison writes, due to AU’s own internal governance, all heads of state must be invited. But Malawi, rightly, has chosen to value its commitments to justice over AU rules, even if it makes her unpopular in Africa. “By taking the opposite view, Banda - a relatively young, female leader in a group of old, grumpy men - is openly defying the African consensus, something sure to make her unpopular amongst her counterparts,” notes Allison. While it will certainly lead to some grumbling, I doubt Malawi’s decision will do any serious long-term diplomatic damage. And, in turn, perhaps other African countries will follow suit to help bring al-Bashir before the ICC.

Blog Post by Guest Blogger for John Campbell June 14, 2012 Africa in Transition
Regional Organizations

Weekend Reading: The EU and the Arab Spring, Iraq’s Constitution, and Syria’s Economy

Nathalie Tocci writes about the EU’s response to the Arab Spring after more than a year after its beginning. Reidar Visser discusses Maliki’s consolidation of power. Jihad Yazigi predicts the economy will play a crucial role in the Syrian aftermath.

Blog Post by Steven A. Cook June 1, 2012 From the Potomac to the Euphrates
Security Alliances

A Changing East Asia and U.S. Foreign Policy

The rise of China is precipitating a power transition in East Asia. China has become the top trading partner of almost every country in the region. Its military power is increasing to match that of the United States. Asymmetrical interdependence between China and other regional states across various dimensions continues to grow. East Asia has also been experiencing structural changes. Despite some progress in modernizing the U.S.-led alliance system, U.S. bilateral alliances have been relatively static, while minilateral or multilateral organizations and institutions are advancing. The East Asia Summit (EAS), China-Japan-South Korea (C-J-K) Summit, ASEAN+ 3 (Association of Southeast Asian Nations plus China, Japan, and South Korea), and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) have become active and are expected to expand their respective roles and areas of influence. The increasing dynamism resulting from integration and cooperation among the countries in the region has become visible and multidimensional. Still, other regional dynamics may impede this integration and serve as sources of conflict. Nationalism, territorial disputes, and unresolved historical issues have recently become more contentious. Furthermore, the uncertain outcome of ongoing political transformation and democratization in certain countries may create instability. Ultimately, the changing region is best characterized as "iAsia"—or an Asia of inequality, integration, innovation, investment, and instability. U.S. Policy Toward the Asia-Pacific Against this backdrop, President Barack Obama has indicated his administration's intention to refocus U.S. policy toward the Asia-Pacific region. This agenda reflects the rediscovery of the importance of the Transpacific axis in the twenty-first century in various dimensions from security to economics. Engagement and enlargement capture the basic direction of this Obama policy, which includes the following elements: strengthening traditional alliances strengthening partnerships with other regional countries managing and developing a cooperative relationship with China participating in and working with multilateral regional mechanisms developing and strengthening trade relations (through the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement and the Trans-Pacific Partnership) How the Obama administration will implement this policy remains to be seen. But the following concerns should be taken into account. First, the United States has been arguing that it is an Asia-Pacific country. Unfortunately, such rhetoric has not been substantiated through concrete policy or action. Despite the emergence of new challenges, such as the rise of China and intensified North Korean provocations, the United States has maintained nearly the same level of engagement and presence in the region since the end of the Cold War. It continues to appear preoccupied with the Middle East. Furthermore, throughout the Bush administration, rather than underscore the importance of U.S. forward deployment in East Asia, the United States highlighted the concept of strategic flexibility, which emphasizes the option of redeploying forces in the region elsewhere. Also, unlike China, the United States has been passive in various regional dialogue mechanisms. Its ties with the region have been overwhelmed by China's regional ties in security, economy, and trade. In turn, the overall credibility of U.S. policy toward the region is questioned by its allies and partners in the region. Second, U.S. policy has been relatively reactive to regional dynamics. The United States has not paid sufficient attention to the unfolding changes in the region, and its policies are selective and issue-based, rather than comprehensive. This aspect of U.S. foreign policy toward the region has inspired skepticism among East Asian countries about whether the United States has a clear vision for the Asia-Pacific. Third, the U.S. approach in this region has been driven by traditional concerns and concepts of security. Consequently, it has relied primarily on its bilateral alliances with the Republic of Korea (ROK), Japan, and Australia. Though Washington often stresses the parallel or complementary development of bilateral and multilateral cooperation mechanisms and institutions, it usually defers to (or prefers) the former. Countries in the region have other security concerns, however, and may prefer alternative mechanisms to address them. Future Concerns and Recommendations Most East Asian states welcome the Asia pivot as a stabilizing force in the face of China's rising influence. However, the United States should establish the reliability of its regional policy through sustainability and consistency. To achieve these objectives, the United States should strengthen its relationships with the region across various dimensions and issue areas, not only through verbal commitments but through concrete action. It should try to build a system for regional cooperation and integration so as to become a real "resident power" in the region. The United States should operationalize its stated commitment to the region. China may consider the U.S. approach toward East Asia a policy of encirclement and employ countermeasures. U.S. allies or partners may be forced to make a strategic choice between the United States and China. This will be a significant challenge, as China's relations with these countries are so complex and intertwined that the decision to side with the United States will be costly. It is imperative that the United States understand this. Ultimately, U.S. ability to strengthen cooperation with China will be a determining factor of the success of its policy toward the region. The United States should discuss with its allies and partners the form and conditions of the desired regional architecture. Though there is talk about peace, stability, and prosperity, there have been few, if any, meetings that have comprehensively assessed and forecasted the future regional strategic environment. Without a clear and common vision with guiding principles for the region, it will be impossible to overcome strategic distrust. Efforts must also be made to devise an action plan to attain the desired regional architecture and end-state. The United States should think of ways to make bilateral and multilateral mechanisms mutually complementary. This approach will require that Washington enhance its visibility in the existing multilateral forums and engage in issue-driven cooperation either in minilateral or multilateral form, especially in nontraditional security. Finally, in this time of financial constraint, careful management of burden sharing, budgets, roles, missions, and capabilities will be critical for maintaining and strengthening domestic support for U.S. alliances in the region. The United States should take into account the concerns of its allies and partners and enhance its understanding of regional dynamics in East Asia. For that purpose, strategic dialogue with regional countries should be strengthened and expanded. U.S. participation in and contribution to multilateral forums should also be encouraged. And parallel and mutually reinforcing development of bi- and multilateral cooperation will help the United States become a true resident power in East Asia.

Report by Choi Kang May 29, 2012