Regional Organizations

On May 21, demonstrators in Mali’s capital of Bamako stormed the office of interim president Dioncounda Traore, seventy, and beat him unconscious.  He was hospitalized and has subsequently been released, according to press reports.  The mob, numbering several hundred, traversed the city with no interference from the army—or anybody else. The mob attack appears to reflect popular opposition to a deal brokered by the relevant regional organization, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), whereby Gen. Amadou Sanogo, thirty-nine—the  leader of the coup that overthrew the ostensibly democratic government of President Amadou Toure—would step aside and Traore would serve as interim president for a year rather than for just forty days as prescribed by the constitution.  That would give him sufficient time to organize new elections, while forty days is too short. Sanogo would receive the trappings – and the pension – of a former head of state. The mob beat Traore, who has been acting president since the coup, apparently because he supported the deal. The mob, the army, and much of the local population appear to want Sanogo to become interim president when Traore’s forty-day term expires.  This is unacceptable to ECOWAS, which has threatened sanctions.  The United States is supportive of the ECOWAS position. Meanwhile, the northern half of Mali is controlled by fundamentalist Islamic Tuareg rebels and the country as a whole faces a potential catastrophe because of drought. In a May 17, 2012, guest post on this site, Jim Sanders raised the question of the extent to which the military could be a vehicle for popular discontent against the old elites in Africa—and elsewhere.  Traore, a former president of parliament,   is certainly a member of the traditional elites, while Sanogo is not. Mali had the forms of democracy for twenty-one years, including regular, credible elections. The mob attack on May 21, and the apparent army support in Bamako, raise the question of how meaningful democratic forms were to a population increasingly in crisis outside the elite circle. That could be what is happening in Mali.

This is a guest post by Jim Sanders, a career, now retired, West Africa watcher for various federal agencies. The views expressed below are his personal views and do not reflect those of his former employers. In Jim’s post, he discusses recent events in Mali, and how they may point towards a possible democratic renewal. Last Friday, AFP reported that while Bamako’s political class and ECOWAS want Dioncounda Traore to continue as interim president, the group of low-ranking soldiers led by Amadou Sanogo, who carried out the March 22 coup against President Amadou Toumani Toure, don’t. Nor does the international community want soldiers leading a transition back to civilian rule in the country.  But Sanogo, reportedly, "wants to take back power once Traore’s 40-day mandate is up." Having served as an analyst of West African militaries for many years, I cannot say that Sanogo’s desire to hang on to power is unusual.  However, the extent to which the military has become, or could become, a vehicle for the expression of popular dissatisfaction with old elites--a form of grassroots assertion--must also be considered.  As John Voll observed in his February 13 Wilson Center lecture, we have moved into a new era in which the modes of protest have changed. We now live in a time of grassroots ascendancy, a fact which is being recognized across a spectrum of informed opinion. In her April 16th article in USA Today titled "When Spirituality and Religion Collide," Diana Butler Bass discusses the phenomenon in the religious realm, but observes that the "shift to the grassroots" is a problem for a broad range of organizations and is discernible in many contexts.  Not the least of these contexts, of course, is Europe.  Financial Times editorialized in its weekend edition about Europe’s "painful democratic renewal," saying that, "Voters in Greece, Italy and, to a lesser extent, France, are understandably turning away from a disconnected political class and looking for those offering new ideas and solutions." The expression of discontent with an old, entrenched, and non-performing political class via a coup from below should not be surprising in states where institutions are weak and such discontent cannot be expressed through conventional political channels.  In this connection, Nigeria bears watching, since Major General Sarkin Yaki Bello, coordinator of the Counter Terrorism Center in Nigeria’s presidency, last month told the press that the "army is the greatest employer of labor now in the country," which would mean it includes a large number of young men, an element of society often prone to express discontent. Policymakers see recent events in Mali as a threat to democracy, but democratic roots there were very shallow to begin with.  Given that in a system where, despite elections viewed internationally as positive, those at the grassroots (including the lower ranks of the military) feel their voice in the government is inadequate, could Mali’s coup be regarded as an effort at democratic renewal?  Just like Sheriff Bell in the Coen brothers’ popular film "No Country for Old Men," policymakers may sense that a new form of disorder is on the loose, and they are unsure how to handle it.  

President Amadou Toure agreed to step down as president, clearing the way for the vice president to become chief of state. The military in turn agreed to the restoration of constitutional government. Accordingly, Dioncounda Traore was sworn in as president last week. The military has what it wanted in the first place: the removal of Toure from office. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has what it wanted: the reversal of a military coup. But, the central issues remain the Tuareg insurrection in the north and the upcoming elections. The original justification for the military coup against Toure was that he was ineffectual against the rebels. Rebellions in the Sahel are difficult for governments to repress; Algeria and Chad are but two examples. And, this time, the Tuaregs are exceptionally well armed, presumably with surplus weaponry from Libya. ECOWAS leaders met last Thursday and effectively recommended the deployment of a regional force against the rebels should the negotiations led by Burkinabe president and mediator Blaise Compaore fail. Nevertheless, given the history of the Sahel, it is hard to envision a military solution to the Tuareg rebellion. In addition to dealing with the North’s political troubles and looming humanitarian disaster caused by drought and food insecurity, new president Traore has been tasked with holding elections within forty days. Alex Thurston bleakly notes at Sahel Blog that this deadline has two outcomes, both undesirable: “either the interim government holds a severely flawed election that fails to include a number of areas in the country (potentially including, given the short timeline, some rural areas in southern Mali) or the government fails to meet the deadline.” Junta leader Captain Sanogo has made it clear that after forty days the transition will end, which many read as a threat to return to power. There is also wide speculation that President Traore is not a natural leader and that he is not fit to oversee the reunification of Mali. In the meantime, he will be appointing cabinet members this week, including a new defense minister, whose appointment will prove critical for the future of Mali. So, Mali is likely to continue to churn.

The African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are opposed to the overthrow of legitimately constituted governments, especially by military coup. According to the press, ECOWAS army chiefs have been meeting in Abidjan to discuss possible intervention in Mali by a regional force. The AU and ECOWAS in principle are also unsympathetic to the breakup of countries, not least because once started, it is hard to see where it might end in a region with many ethnic and other divisions. Accordingly, the AU has denounced the "secession" of the Tuareg-dominated northern part of the country as proclaimed by a Tuareg spokesman in France in a "declaration of independence." Both the French Minister of Defense and the AU have said that Tuareg protestations have no validity because they are recognized by no one. ECOWAS failed to dislodge military governments in Guinea (2008) and in Niger (2010), and it is likely to be challenged in Mali. Sanctions such as closing borders and imposing trade restrictions are usually part of the international armory against a coup and played a positive role in dislodging Gbagbo in Cote d’Ivoire. But the Sahel as a whole faces drought, and there were UN warnings of possible famine even before the Mali coup occurred. Now, a spokesman for Oxfam observes that closing borders or restricting trade could have a devastating impact on the people of Mali, making emergency food deliveries to starving populations even more difficult. The AU and ECOWAS really have two Mali problems -- they are related, but different. The first is how to restore the legitimate government of Toure and return the military to the barracks. Here, diplomatic pressure could play an important role, and the press is already reporting that the Malian military head of state may in fact step aside. But the second problem is how to respond to the Tuareg insurgency, with its calls (by some) for a separate state. Regional organizations may find they have less leverage in such circumstances. And, as Oxfam reminds us, famine could become the context.

There is something pathetic about the new sanctions adopted by the EU today against Syria. Here is what was done, as explained by the Telegraph of London: The four women closest to President Assad were added to the European Union’s sanctions list at a meeting of Europe’s foreign ministers today. The Syrian leader’s wife, mother, sister and sister-in-law will be added to the travel ban and asset freeze blacklist as the EU steps pressure on Assad’s inner circle and family. The inclusion of Asma al-Assad follows the leak of emails detailing her shopping sprees. William Hague, the Foreign Secretary said: "Their behaviour continues to be murdering and totally unacceptable in the eyes of the world." Hague is right that the regime continues to murder, as artillery and tanks are used indiscriminately against cities. Today the AP reported this: “International condemnation of Assad’s regime and high-level diplomacy have failed to ease the year-old Syria conflict, which the U.N. says has killed more than 8,000 people.” That’s quite right; diplomacy has failed to “ease” the conflict. So will stopping Asma’s shopping in London and Paris. Such actions are symbolic, one might say, but appear to be symbols not of Western and international determination but of the lack of it. For such moves do not deter or prevent more murders today and tomorrow, nor do they help Syria’s people defend themselves. Sooner or later—and one must hope that it’s sooner—we will move beyond speeches and resolutions, and give genuinely useful aid to Syrians who are fighting the regime. “Syrian Rebels Running Out Of Ammunition," today’s Washington Post reports.  Stopping the shopping won’t remedy that.

In January, the South African government of Jacob Zuma threw down a gauntlet. Taking advantage of the rotating presidency of the UN Security Council (UNSC), South Africa introduced a resolution to tighten the relationship between the UNSC and regional organizations—and the African Union in particular—charging that “Africa must not be a playground for furthering the interests of other regions ever again.” The Security Council subsequently adopted Resolution 2033 (2012), which pledges to enhance cooperation with regional organizations, though its clauses remain extremely vague. It’s now well accepted, as Francis Fukuyama observes, that we live in a world of “multi-multilateralism,” but U.S. and foreign policymakers, are struggling to keep up. Increasingly, nations exploit collective frameworks beyond the United Nations to manage conflict —from ad hoc arrangements like the Six-Party Talks for North Korea to regional organizations like the African Union. The UN retains unmatched authority and legitimacy—thanks to its universal charter and legally binding Security Council decisions—but it’s hardly the only game in town. Elsewhere I’ve explored the trade-offs between relying on the prix fixe menu of universal institutions (like the UN) and exploiting a la carte “coalitions of the willing.” The challenge is to ensure that reliance on ad hoc and regional arrangements complement and reinforce, rather than undermine, the UN’s legitimacy and capacity. This conundrum has become more pointed in the wake of African opposition to the Libyan intervention, as many African governments perceived the United States, France, and the United Kingdom contorting UNSC Resolution 1973 into a license for regime change. This spectacle stiffened the determination of the AU—long wedded to the principle of “African solutions to African problems”—to become the gatekeeper of military intervention on the continent. Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, of course, recognizes an important role for regional organizations, including in advancing peace and security. But it explicitly subordinates this function to the authority of the UN Security Council. The South African initiative would represent a radical shift, toward codetermination between, in effect, equal partners. Predictably, the permanent members of the Security Council reacted coolly to Zuma’s gambit. Debates over whether the world should adopt universal or regional approaches to manage conflict are nothing new, of course. Indeed, American and British planners fiercely debated the point during World War II, as the two nations sought to define a postwar structure of peace. But by 1945, as I point out in my book The Best Laid Plans: The Origins of American Multilateralism and the Dawn of the Cold War, UN universalism had definitively won. Still, the perceived need for buy-in from regional organizations to legitimize UN enforcement action and peacekeeping is likely to persist. Indeed, it may well grow, if—as seems likely—there is no movement on enlarging the Security Council to include permanent members from the developing world. This is a particularly sensitive issue in Africa, which is after all the setting for most UN peace operations. By what right, many Africans ask, should the Security Council be permitted to authorize Chapter VII actions on the continent, without so much as an AU by-your-leave? As a practical matter, of course, the UN and regional organizations are already deeply intertwined in peace enforcement and peace operations. Alongside classic UN operations, one finds a variety of “hybrid” models, in which the Security Council authorizes a mission that is implemented by either an ad hoc coalition (such as the NATO-led Libyan intervention) or a regional organization (as in the AU’s AMISOM mission in Somalia), or some combination of the two. The growing role of regional organizations poses a conundrum for the United States. Many of these implications are spelled out in a terrific new book, Rewiring Regional Security in a Fragmented World, edited by Chet Crocker, Fen Hampson, and Pamela Aall. One, already discussed, is the question of how to operationalize Chapter VIII of the Charter—and whether regional organizations should be allowed to serve as gatekeepers to UN-mandated enforcement action. In addition, at least four other insights of the book warrant mentioning. Regional organizations are a diverse lot. The aspirations, mandates and activities of regional organizations vary enormously. One can contrast the growing activism of the AU, for example, with the hyper-cautious ASEAN. While the former’s Constitutive Act has shifted the organization from a position of “nonintervention” to one of “non-indifference” of its members’ internal affairs, the latter’s “ASEAN way” continues to discourage overt challenges to member state sovereignty. Regional approaches are no panacea. At first glance, regional organizations provide an attractive alternative, or complement, to an overstretched and sometimes dysfunctional United Nations. They are presumably more familiar with the sources of the relevant conflict and more invested in its solution. On the other hand, regional bodies are also vulnerable to domination by local hegemons, who may seek to hijack collective action for their own purposes. Moreover, regional organizations can suffer from the same debilitating collective action problems that bedevil the UN—including a tendency to take refuge in bland consensus reflecting the lowest common denominator, as well as a temptation for free-riding. Capacity building must be a priority. In addition, the aspirations of regional organizations often outstrip their ability to deliver. The AU is a case in point. Despite the creation of its own Peace and Security Council, the organization suffers from troubling institutional, professional, technical, logistical and material gaps. Consequently, burden sharing can easily devolve into “burden shifting”—as the international community places unrealistic expectations on unprepared regional bodies. These organizations will only fulfill their potential if outside players—including the United States—seek to nurture their capacities. The United States must adapt its diplomacy to rising regionalism. The State Department tends to approach conflict management through the lens of bilateral relationships, while giving short shrift to relevant regional organizations. (Indeed, it was only in 2009 and 2011, respectively that the United States sent its first resident ambassadors to the AU and ASEAN). Meanwhile, State’s Bureau of International Organization Affairs, continues to focus overwhelmingly on the United Nations, though it is beginning to reach out to some regional entities. More effective U.S. engagement will also require changing the professional incentives of foreign service officers, to reward expertise in and diplomatic postings to regional organizations.

A fine overview in The Economist this week outlines the challenges facing Timor-Leste this month, on the tenth anniversary of it becoming an independent state. On the surface, Dili and other parts of Timor seem to have made solid, hopeful progress; they are relatively quiet, and commerce is flourishing again. This looks like positive change compared to even five years ago, when on a visit I found much of Dili still deserted, the streets totally unsafe at night, and the ruins of not only the 1999 fighting but also battles between different militia groups contesting Dili. Many people I met in Timor then feared that the country, so small, and with so few capable administrators and other educated people, would not even survive, and would remain a ward of the international community indefinitely.The fear that Timor is not viable looks overblown now, although Timor is still a fair ways from being able to join the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) — I think Singaporean officials’ point that Timor is not yet equipped to send enough capable staff to all the ASAEAN meetings, and to participate in ASEAN’s economic integration, is valid. But Timor has managed its new oil wealth relatively capably, setting up a fund designed to ensure that the money goes toward social welfare uses, or is saved for the future, and it would be a welcome advocate for democracy in ASEAN. By the standards of previous oil gushers, like Nigeria, Timor is not blowing its resources money. The Economist also notes that the UN and Australian forces still keeping peace in Timor are hoping to soon go home and be replaced by local security forces. “The country is markedly more peaceful than when general elections were last conducted in 2007,” notes the International Crisis Group. Still, though Timor may not remain a ward of the international community, different fears have arisen. Back in 1999, there was so much unity in the Timorese desire for independence from Indonesia, and so much respect and love for former guerilla leader Xanana Gusmao, that discussion of possible splits within Timor after independence were papered over. But though the development from oil, and the fear of civil strife, has generally kept Timor’s leaders from attacking each other in recent years, the threat of militia violence, and politics disintegrating into warring factions, remains very high. And in such a small country only one or two attacks —like those that previously occurred against Jose Ramos Horta— can destabilize the entire place, which is not very resilient. Though The Economist notes that so far campaign season for the presidential election has been quiet, the deep cleavages between politicians, developed in exile and in the guerilla movement, have not been healed, which bodes poorly for the future.

Kofi Annan, the newly appointed United Nations and Arab League envoy to Syria, travels to the Middle East today to kick off his diplomatic efforts. He will stop first in Cairo, where he will meet Arab League representatives. On Saturday, Annan visits Damascus to see President Bashar al-Assad as part of a mission “to seek an urgent end to all violence and human rights violations, and to initiate the effort to promote a peaceful solution to the Syrian crisis.” Traveling to Egypt and Syria are surely necessary, but will soon prove to be insufficient.   The key to ending the bloodshed rests more in Moscow than in Damascus as I suggested in early February. Russia provides Assad the critical support that allows the Syrian dictator to survive. Russia has protected Assad diplomatically twice so far, vetoing UN Security Council resolutions critical of Assad. More importantly, Russia provides the Assad regime the arms that it uses to kill Syrians and destroy their towns. According to the Moscow defense think tank CAST, Russia sold Syria nearly $1 billion worth of weapons in 2011, with some $4 billion remaining in outstanding contracts. The former chief auditor for Syria’s defense ministry, who defected in January, claims that Russia has stepped up its arms supplies to Damascus since the unrest in Syria broke out. Russian arms manufacturers have reportedly increased production to meet the Syrian demand. Yet the Russians appear increasingly uncomfortable with how their support for the brutal Syrian regime is positioning them internationally and isolating them from the Arab world. Last month, Saudi king Abdullah publicly chastised Russia for exercising its veto at the Security Council and for failing to coordinate with the Arabs. Russo-American ties have strained over Syria as well, with Secretary of State Clinton calling Moscow’s UN votes "just despicable." Russia has indicated that it wishes to repair its relations with Washington as well as the Arab world perhaps at the expense of Assad. It supported a March 1 Security Council statement chastising Damascus for preventing humanitarian workers access in Syria. And just as Annan touches down in Syria on Saturday, Russian foreign minister Lavrov will arrive in Cairo for talks to repair Moscow’s relations with an Arab League leery of Assad’s most influential backer. And Russia signaled yesterday that now that Vladamir Putin has successfully put his presidential election bid behind him, Moscow seeks an improved relationship with Washington.  There are also hints that the Russians may be willing to be open to a Syria deal. They repeatedly state that they are open to further Security Council efforts to end the violence in Syria. And five days ago, Putin told interviewers that Syrians should decide who should rule their country: "We don’t have a special relationship with Syria. We only have interests in the conflict being resolved." The Russians will not agree to depose Assad as the first step. Moscow, like China, is suspicious of Western meddling in other countries’ internal affairs in general, and in regime change in particular. Russia still believes that the West "baited and switched" by taking Security Council backing for a humanitarian intervention in Libya and using it as the basis to oust Qaddafi. But Putin may be open to a deal that eases Assad out as part of a larger process that begins a political dialogue and protects Moscow’s interests such as retaining its naval base at Tartus and Syria as a major Russian arms purchaser. Participating in such a deal would also help Moscow repair its relations with the rest of the Arab world, and end the embarrassment of standing behind a brutal and vicious regime.  But bringing Russia on board requires that Moscow also believe that it could lose everything if it does not help solve the crisis. A post-Assad Syria is one that well may be hostile to a Russia that stood by while Bashar slaughtered his countrymen. Moscow could salvage its position in Syria and hedge against a complete loss by helping to solve the crisis there. But it will do so only if it is convinced that the alternative is Assad’s departure.  This is yet another reason that the West must, at a bare minimum, not take the use of force off the table. International resolve is required to convince the Russians that the Arabs and the United Nations are committed to pursuing a peaceful resolution in Syria, but that if such an option is not possible shortly, then the use of force--through some combination of outside military support and Syrian rebel fighting--will have to be employed.   That is where Kofi Annan comes in. His job is to convince a reluctant Putin that he stands much to gain both in Syria and internationally by working for an end to the violence and a political process that will perforce require the departure of Assad, whose bloodshed has simply robbed him of the legitimacy to continue ruling in Syria. As the International Crisis Group has suggested with a study just released, "if Annan can persuade Russia to back a transitional plan, the regime would be confronted with the choice of either agreeing to negotiate in good faith or facing near-total isolation through loss of a key ally." In the wake of Russia’s election and Annan’s launching of his diplomatic efforts, now is the time to engage Moscow and present it a way out of the diplomatic cul-de-sac in which it finds itself. Having isolated itself in the Arab world and in the international community by siding with the butcher of Homs, now is the time to see if Russia will take a lifeline out and become part of the solution, rather than the problem. Moscow should be forced to choose between preserving its interests in Syria while staving off greater conflict and possible military intervention there, or taking its chances by sticking with a ruthless dictator whose departure will also end Russia’s special relationship with Syria. Can a deal be reached that makes Russia a handmaiden to resolving the Syrian bloodshed? Or is Russia willing to risk everything by remaining implacably opposed to any compromise? There is only one way to find out—by putting that proposition before the Russians.

Preliminary reports from Senegal are that Sunday’s polling and subsequent ballot counting has gone well, though Western media concentrates on Dakar and other large cities. Nevertheless, an important, domestic NGO, RESOCIT, deployed more than two thousand local observers and concluded that there was an "astonishingly" low number of incidents of violence and fraud. The general consensus is that neither candidate will have an outright majority of votes as required by the constitution, and therefore there will be a runoff. Final results from the first round are likely by Friday For the international community and media, the chief issue was President Wade’s desire for a third term, which violates the spirit and maybe the letter of a new constitution, which he put in place. Among others, representatives of the African Union have urged him to step down. But, Wade -- like any other incumbent African chief of state -- has reservoirs of support, and it remains to be seen how he he will fare in the runoff. Senegal rightfully prides itself on the depth of its democratic culture. The Ibrahim Index of African Governance (including North Africa as well as sub-Saharan Africa) ranks Senegal as fifteenth out of fifty-three states. Freedom House downgraded Senegal to "partly free" because of its perception that executive power was increasingly centralized under Wade. But, there have been no coups or civil wars since independence from France in 1960. Senegal is one of the few African states in which a presidential challenger has defeated an incumbent in a credible election and gone on to govern the country. The experience of Ivory Coast should temper unbounded optimism about the elections, however. The Ivorian 2010 polling -- the first in a decade -- went well. There was a subsequent runoff between the incumbent president, Laurent Gbagbo and Alassane Ouattara. But, the runoff was marred by irregularities with both candidates declaring victory, setting up parallel administrations, and there was a low level civil war resolved in the end by the UN and the French. The country now appears superficially calm, but divisions persist. I am hopeful, even optimistic, that there will be no replay of the Ivory Coast scenario in Senegal. The former was characterized by "big man" rule under Houphouet Boigny that in effect stunted the development of a democratic culture. There was a recent history of civil war and the continued existence of parallel armed forces. There are ethnic and religious divisions often bundled together under the rubrics of "settlers" versus indigenes. Valuable commodities -- cocoa, oil -- distort politics. Senegal has numerous ethnic groups, but more than ninety percent of the population adheres to a highly tolerant form of Islam. (Leopold Senghor, popularly regarded as the father of his country and its first president, was a Roman Catholic.) Senegal has no significant quantities of oil or diamonds or other high-value commodities to distort politics. Senegal’s comparative advantage is its history of peace, its democratic reputation, tourism, and its geographical location. (Dakar is only five hours by air from New York). As Reuters quoted an election observer and member of the political opposition saying, "we don’t have minerals or resources here, what we have is peace and sunshine. We have to keep it. If that disappears, it could take us 50 years to get it back."

Significant Middle East Developments Hamas. Hamas officials announced today a break with long-time ally Syrian president Assad. Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh told a crowd of thousands at Cairo’s al-Azhar Mosque: “I salute all the nations of the Arab Spring and I salute the heroic people of Syria who are striving for freedom, democracy, and reform.” The announcement indicates a dramatic shift in alignment for the organization that until recently had been headquartered in Damascus. Worshipers responded to Haniyeh’s remarks by chanting, “No Hizballah and no Iran. The Syrian revolution is an Arab revolution.” Hamas’ policy shift was simultaneously announced at a rally in the Gaza Strip and further isolates Assad in the region, leaving Iran and Hizballah as the Syrian leader’s only Middle East allies. Syria. The “Friends of Syria” group  met today in Tunis at the end of yet another violent week in Syria that witnessed the continued siege of Homs and the killing of hundreds, including two Western journalists (my pre-meeting analysis available here). More than sixty Western and Arab countries sent high level envoys to the meeting. Russia, China, and Lebanon all declined to attend. The group demanded that President Assad end government violence and open humanitarian corridors within 48 hours. Al Arabiya TV reported that the Saudi delegation walked out of the meeting as an act of protest, saying that giving humanitarian aid is not enough. Saudi foreign minister Saud al-Faisal bin Abdel Aziz called for arming the Syrian opposition and said: “Humanitarian aid is not enough and the only solution is a consensual or forced transition of power.” Today’s meeting follows the appointment yesterday of former UN secretary general Kofi Annan to serve as the joint UN and Arab League special envoy to Syria. Annan has been tasked to find an “inclusive political solution” to the deadly crisis in Syria. My broader take on how the United States should handle Syria is available here. Yemen. For the first time in thirty-three years, Yemenis went to polling booths and did not find Ali Abdullah Saleh’s name on the ballot. Instead they found only one name--Abed Rabu Mansour Hadi--Saleh’s long-time vice president who will assume the presidency as part of a GCC-brokered deal to usher Saleh out of power. After Hadi is sworn in as president, ruling and opposition parties will begin to draw up a new constitution. Saleh’s exit does not mean the end of Yemen’s unrest, however; Houthi rebels in the north and separatists in the south continue to present serious challenges to government authority. Noteworthy U.S. Foreign Policy Developments The Obama administration stepped up its Syria rhetoric this week in the lead-up to the first meeting of the “Friends of Syria” on Friday. On Tuesday, both White House and State Department spokespeople hinted at possible support for lethal force, noted publicly that the United States could not rule out “additional measures” if the violence did not abate without specifying what those steps might be. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton moved closer to recognition of the Syrian opposition on Thursday saying that there is an international consensus that the Syrian National Council is a credible representative and an alternative to Bashar al-Assad. Quotes of the Week "Our strategy now is that if we feel our enemies want to endanger Iran’s national interests, and want to decide to do that, we will act without waiting for their actions." – Mohammad Hejazi, the deputy head of Iran’s armed forced, to the Fars news agency on Tuesday “What Qaddafi left for us in Libya after forty years is a very, very heavy heritage… It is very heavy and will be hard to get over it in one or two years or even five years.” – Mustafa Abdul Jalil, chairman of the National Trasition Council in an interview with the Associated Press on Tuesday "The attempt to topple the Syrian government will not become reality and the front line of confrontation with the Zionist regime [Israel] will not disappear.” – Ali Akbar Velayati, the top foreign policy adviser to Iranian supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei,  on Thursday While We Were Looking Elsewhere Libya. A Libyan military court that was about to try some fifty Qaddafi loyalists announced on Wednesday that most of the defendents should instead be tried in a civilian court; "We feel this court is under pressure and... does not have the necessary judicial independence," said Saleh Omran, a defense lawyer for seventeen of the accused. Human rights activists have been worried that the lack of central authority in Libya may prevent former loyalists from receiving a fair trial. Some of these Qaddafi supporters have reportedly received abusive and sometimes lethal treatment at the hands of former rebels. Bahrain. Over twenty thousand Sunni Bahrainis rallied in Manama on Tuesday night to warn the government against opening a dialogue with the Shiite opposition. A representative of a Sunni youth group read a statement that asked “How can there be a dialogue at this time? The majority of citizens ask, is this the time for dialogue and a political solution? Security is the priority!" The previous day, Bahraini security forces had used water cannons and tear gas to break up an anti-government march following the funeral of a protester. Saudi Arabia. Riyadh named its first ambassador to Iraq since Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990. Saudi Arabia does not intend to reopen its embassy in Baghdad, however.  Instead, it plans to appoint Fahd al-Zaid, the Saudi ambassador to Jordan, to serve as the new “nonresident” ambassador to Iraq. An announcement that a delegation of senior Iraqi officials had visited Saudi Arabia followed, pointing toward signs of warming ties between the two states. Meanwhile, tensions continued in Saudi Arabia’s oil-rich Eastern Province. On Monday, Saudi’s interior ministry defended its tactics against unrest and vowed to crack down further with an “iron fist.” A statement released on Wednesday and signed by forty-one Shiite dignitaries in the province denounced Saudi Arabia’s use of violence and called for a “serious investigation.” Palestinians. Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas and Hamas leader Khaled Meshal met again in Cairo to finalize the line-up of a new unity Palestinian government as agreed to in Doha  earlier this month. Instead, the two leaders failed to reach agreement and announced that their talks have been postponed. No new date for further Fatah-Hamas talks has been announced. This Week in History Tuesday marked the fifty-fourth anniversary of the founding of the United Arab Republic. On February 21, 1958, simultaneous referendums in Syria and Egypt overwhelmingly approved the formation of  the United Arab Republic--a political union between Syria and Egypt. The union was largely catalyzed by a strong sense of Arab nationalism and the desire to overcome the “artificial” borders created by the European colonial powers. The union collapsed after a mere three years, however, due to the widely-held view in Syria that it was being used as a tool to further Egyptian hegemony under President Gamal Abdel Nasser. Statistic of the Week  Russian officials announced on Tuesday that two-way trade between Syria and Russia jumped 58 percent last year—bringing the total up to $1.97 billion, with the balance heavily in favor of Moscow.

Former South African president Thabo Mbeki, in a February 16 lecture (PDF), reflects on the threat of Western re-colonization of Africa in the context of enduring racism as a way to encourage greater African unity. The speech is vintage Mbeki--thoughtful, sometimes outrageous (from an American perspective), and with extensive and appropriate quotations from Chinua Achebe and W.B. Yeats. It also provides insight into how this statesman sees South Africa’s role in Africa and the world. It is tightly argued, requires close reading, and does not lend itself to bumper-sticker summaries, including this one. Mbeki focuses on Libya while acknowledging that intervention in Ivory Coast also carries many of the same lessons. He recalls the adoption by the African Union Peace and Security Council of a roadmap for the resolution of the Libyan conflict, which secured Qaddafi’s agreement. The AU then forwarded its decision to the UN and the Arab league. However, the UN Security Council ignored the African Union and took as the justification for its actions the positions taken by the Arab League. It adopted Resolution 1973, which provided the justification for NATO “to intervene in Libya to impose a violent resolution to this conflict, centered on regime change—which was not the intention of Resolution 1973.” Mbeki charges President Obama, Prime Minister Cameron, President Sarkozy, and the UN with imposing their own solution on an African state. (He denies that Qaddafi was intent on making war on his own people.) It particularly sticks in his craw that the UN gave greater weight to the Arab League than to the African Union; in effect, he accuses the UN of detaching Libya from Africa. However, he blames the shortcomings of African governments for this state of affairs: “the Libyan tragedy and debacle occurred because things fell apart…we had learnt the ways of cheating and allowed those who have the means to abuse state power to control us, our institutions and our minds.” He calls for African states to reinforce democracy and respect for human rights, develop an African capacity to resolve conflict in the context of a commitment to find African solutions to African problems, and to strengthen the AU “to give practical meaning to the objective to achieve genuine African unity and solidarity…” Otherwise, he argues, Ivory Coast and Libya show that the West remains determined “to attach Africa to themselves as their appendage, at all costs…” The pervasiveness of racism in the West’s relationship with Africa is a theme throughout his speech. Near the conclusion he cites WEB du Bois’s call for black solidarity and refers to Pew data that the median wealth of white American households is twenty times that of blacks and eighteen times that of Hispanics as evidence of the persistence of “the problem of the color line.” Nowhere, however, does he acknowledge President Obama’s African-American origins. Mbeki has been out of power for a long time and is assuming the role of an elder statesman. (He has been outspoken on African homophobia, for example.) Hence, his speech should not be seen as a guide to the foreign policy of South Africa’s Jacob Zuma government. However, it does provide a window into the thinking of South African intellectuals who are wrestling with South Africa’s role in the world.

A new chapter in the struggle for Syria opens on Friday with the meeting of some seventy foreign ministers and senior officials in Tunis. Having dabbled episodically with President Bashar al-Assad’s ruthless bloodshed against the Syrian people, the first meeting of the “Friends of Syria” signifies the solid placement of this issue at the top of the international agenda. Until now, efforts to forge a united approach toward Syria have been sporadic and largely reliant on Middle East parties. Early on, Turkey attempted to broker a diplomatic solution without success. The Arab League took up the issue several times, suspending Damascus from the organization, imposing sanctions, and deploying monitors to Syria last November; when this effort failed to stop Assad’s killing, the Arab League proposed a presidential transfer of power, a comprehensive dialogue between Damascus and the opposition, and an end to the violence. But these efforts were rejected by Syria, and proposals to provide international backing for regional initiatives at the United Nations Security Council were thwarted by Russia and China. Given cover by these two world powers along with Iran, the Assad regime has felt sufficiently insulated internationally from having to change course, despite the pain that sanctions have inflicted upon the country. And there has been pain: the EU has imposed an oil and arms embargo while the United States, Canada, and many other individual countries have banned transactions with Damascus and frozen government assets. The Syrian government is burning through its foreign currency reserves and will likely deplete them entirely in the next three to five months. But it is not clear that within Syria it is the regime that is feeling the pain most acutely from these punitive measures. The “Friends of Syria” group now provides a new and critical forum for forging a consensus by an overwhelming majority of the international community on what needs to be done next in Syria. But the group is a forum, not a singular panacea. The problems bedeviling Syria cannot be resolved in one high-level meeting in Tunis. To be sure, there will doubtlessly be countless condemnations of Assad in Tunisia. But the meeting should be judged by two other important criteria: First, what will the Friends agree to do immediately to address Syrian suffering? Will the assembled leaders initiate or agree to forge an action plan? Will mechanisms to provide humanitarian assistance, with follow-up procedures, be established?  Second, and perhaps more importantly, will the “Friends of Syria” agree to maintain a regularized, intensive, high-level engagement with the goal of ending the killing in Syria and promulgating a political process that will perforce require Bashar al-Assad to depart? These efforts will require careful orchestration, sustained efforts, an effective division of labor, and high-level leadership. Key international actors, such as the United States and the European powers will need to ramp up their diplomacy with an eye toward bringing Russia off its heretofore rigid support for Assad. At the same time, the Western powers will need to start preparing the groundwork for backing their diplomatic carrots with increased sticks. This means that the policy, reiterated yet again last week by NATO secretary general Anders Rasmussen, rejecting force or assistance with UN-mandated humanitarian assistance, must be reversed. The region’s powers also have a key role to play, maintaining Assad’s isolation while working with Syria’s opposition to forge a positive vision for a peaceful and inclusive post-Assad Syria. The Tunis meeting will serve as a hortatory expression of friendship toward the Syrian people. But only a commitment to a sustained, coordinated, high-level international effort will provide the kind of friendship that the people of Syria require to bring about an end to the horrors currently being inflicted upon them by Bashar al-Assad and his regime.