• Fossil Fuels
    To Tackle Climate Change, Keep Fossil Fuels in the Ground
    As oil rigs and coal plants churn on, national emissions targets grow increasingly disingenuous and infeasible. To prevent the worst implications of the climate crisis, it is time to target the supply side of the world's dirty fuel addiction. 
  • International Law
    A Negotiator's Reliance on the Nuremberg Legacy
    This year we commemorate the 75th anniversary of the verdict of the Nuremberg Tribunal: on 30 September and 1 October 1946, the International Military Tribunal (IMT) delivered its Judgement in the trial against the most high-ranking political and military leaders of the German Nazi regime. On this occasion, the Leuven Transitional Justice Blog commissioned a special series to examine the lasting legacy of the Nuremberg Trials. In this seventh instalment, David J. Scheffer looks back on the influence of the Nuremberg precedent on the subsequent drafting processes of the statutes of international courts. The influence of the London Charter and Nuremberg principles on international criminal tribunal-building since 1993 has been profound and lasting. As I wrote in my memoir, All the Missing Souls: A Personal History of the War Crimes Tribunals: “The charters of the Nuremberg and Tokyo international military tribunals were the templates for the drafting endeavours of the modern tribunals. They confirmed the core definitions of crimes against humanity and war crimes and set the stage for the Geneva Conventions in 1949. The military tribunals deprived leaders of any immunity from prosecution and soldiers of the defence of superior orders. Their charters insisted on due process protections for the defendants, regardless of how repulsive or guilty they appeared.” As a statute-drafter and negotiator on behalf of the United States Government during the 1990’s in the creation of five tribunals (the International Criminal Tribunals for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR), the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, and the International Criminal Court (ICC)), I relied upon the London Charter and Nuremberg principles as the opening template for fundamental principles of law and due process. The endeavour, of course, evolved with successive tribunal statutes that were negotiated and drafted, as each one built upon the experience of immediately preceding statutes.  But the London Charter and Nuremberg principles stood guard, essentially, as the gold standard that I relied upon as a reminder of the origins of international criminal law that must be engraved for the ages. During the initial weeks of the Clinton Administration in early 1993, I happened to be reading The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials: A Personal Memoir, by Telford Taylor, a senior U.S. prosecutor at Nuremberg. The book had just been published and I devoured it as I began my work as Senior Adviser and Counsel to the new U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Dr. Madeleine Albright. We were thrust immediately into dealing with the atrocities of the Balkans War, which I have written about in The Sit Room: In the Theater of War and Peace.  Ambassador Albright led in the U.N. Security Council to create an international criminal tribunal quickly to bring perpetrators of atrocity crimes (genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes) in the Balkans to justice. The precedents of the London Charter and Nuremberg principles loomed foremost in our minds as we sought, and obtained, Security Council approval and then as the statute of the ICTY was negotiated and drafted. Indeed, on 22 February 1993, which was the day Resolution 808 authorising the establishment of the ICTY was approved, Ambassador Albright told her Security Council colleagues: “There is an echo in this chamber today. The Nuremberg principles have been reaffirmed. We have preserved the long-neglected compact made by the community of civilised nations 48 years ago in San Francisco to create the United Nations and enforce the Nuremberg principles. The lesson that we are all accountable to international law may have finally taken hold in our collective memory. The debates over the state of international law that so encumbered the Nuremberg Trials will not burden this tribunal.”  I drafted those words for her with Taylor’s book on my desk, reminding me of the powerful precedent of almost a half century earlier and upon which the ICTY would be built. On 13 May 1993, Ambassador Albright convened a working session at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations in New York of academic and practitioner experts to review various draft statutes of the ICTY, as a final draft would soon be put to a vote in the Security Council. I invited Telford Taylor, who was teaching at Columbia University, to join the session. He would be the voice of Nuremberg. Taylor stressed the criticality of the documentary record that underpinned the prosecution of the Nuremberg cases. He foresaw, correctly, a more difficult task in the Balkans, where the ICTY would need to rely much more on witness testimony. One can draw a straight line between many of the London Charter provisions and what appeared in the ICTY statute. The London Charter had become well established as the plausible template for an international criminal tribunal (despite the Nuremberg court being a military tribunal) that had avoided attracting much academic or political objections over the decades since the Nuremberg Trials. That point was critical to ICTY drafters, including the U.N. lawyers who produced the final draft. To garner a unanimous Security Council vote on 25 May 1993, for Resolution 827, the argument had to prevail that the ICTY statute essentially reflected customary international law principles emerging from the London Charter. Since the major legal debate would be about whether the Security Council had the legal authority under the U.N. Charter to create an international criminal tribunal as a subsidiary organ, we wanted any concerns about the substantive character of the ICTY statute to be minimal and successfully rebuttable. So, to ground the ICTY statute in the London Charter and the legacy of Nuremberg was essential. In the drafting of the ICTR statute, one Nuremberg issue that served as a precedent for what to avoid reared its head: collective culpability. As I wrote in All the Missing Souls: “The Rwandans also wanted to cover groups as well as individuals in the tribunal statute. This would have meant that mere membership in a Hutu group, such as the National Police, Coalition for the Defence of the Republic, Democratic Republican Movement, or murderous Interahamwe, would have subjected an individual to criminal liability. The same tactic was employed in 1945 with the London Charter, which empowered the Nuremberg Tribunal to define as criminal any group or organisation to which any defendant appearing in Nuremberg belonged. In the end, the Nuremberg Tribunal declared three of six organisations named in the indictment as criminal in character. But no one else at the table wanted to go down that path in Rwanda, as it pointed toward collective culpability—precisely what we argued must not be the future of justice in the Balkans or Rwanda. The Rwandan negotiators backed down.” During the long years of negotiations leading to the Rome Statute of the ICC, the Nuremberg precedent was a persistent touchstone of reference and reliance. As the U.S. Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues during the second term of the Clinton Administration, I led the U.S. delegation to the U.N. talks. I vividly recall the many times that the German delegation would invoke the Nuremberg precedent to emphasise the imperative of creating the ICC, particularly with respect to the crime of aggression. The Japanese delegation, on the other hand, invoked both the Nuremberg and the Tokyo Tribunals’ precedents to emphasise the due process protections that all defendants before the ICC must be accorded. The early objection to and longstanding criticism of the Nuremberg Trials as “victor’s justice” reverberated throughout the years of negotiation of the Rome Statute and to the present day regarding the ICC. While the ICC is a broadly subscribed treaty-based institution of presumptively objective application to all individuals and nations falling within its jurisdiction, the fact that some major powers and populous nations remain outside of its reach for all intents and purposes points to the argument of impunity for the “victors”. The People’s Republic of China, United States, Russia, India, Pakistan, Turkey, Myanmar, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Iran, South Sudan, Eritrea, or Ethiopia, for example, can play victor in their internal repression or foreign military adventures without necessarily attracting accountability before the ICC. Thus, the claim of “victor’s justice” has persisted, albeit differently conceived, with the precedent of Nuremberg its stepfather. Remarkably, one of the American prosecutors, Ben Ferencz, at Nuremberg survived long enough to have relentless influence on the creation and operation of the ICC and, in particular, the Rome Statute’s long journey to codify the crime of aggression. The aim to prosecute aggression dominated Justice Robert H. Jackson’s approach to the initial Nuremberg Trials and Ferencz carried forth that mandate as he lobbied for its inclusion in the Rome Statute. I first met Ferencz when the ICC negotiations commenced at the United Nations in 1995. He skilfully lobbied me in my role as the U.S. negotiator for years thereafter. The memory of Nuremberg shaped all that he said, including long into the 21st century as the definition of and procedural requirements to prosecute the crime of aggression finally were agreed to and codified at the Review Conference of the Rome Statute convened in Kampala, Uganda, in 2010. Nuremberg is a “forever legacy” that will continue to shape the growth of international criminal law. I have no doubt that a century from now judges will cite the London Charter, the Nuremberg principles, and the jurisprudence of the Nuremberg Trials as they render justice in the wake, tragically, of further atrocity crimes.
  • Genocide and Mass Atrocities
    Why Religious Persecution Justifies U.S. Legislation on Crimes Against Humanity
    (This article is part of a series on a proposed Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Humanity, due to be considered in discussions now scheduled to resume on Oct. 13 in the Sixth Committee, the U.N. General Assembly’s primary forum for discussion of legal questions.) The enactment of U.S. legislation on crimes against humanity would strengthen the prospect of the United States one day seriously considering ratification of the proposed Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Humanity. In testimony before the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom on Sept. 30, I sought to explain the importance of the legislation currently being crafted on Capitol Hill. I was joined at the hearing by Professor Leila Sadat, who focused on the convention’s many attributes. The following narrative is drawn from my testimony. At the Nuremberg Trials following World War II, the Holocaust was first and foremost prosecuted by U.S. prosecutors as a crime against humanity with deeply embedded religious origins. If one surveys the atrocity crimes committed in recent decades and currently (namely genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes), religious violence stands out as a core element of many of these prejudicial assaults against multitudes of victims. Recall the persecution of the Muslim Cham community by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia in the late 1970s, Bosnia in the early 1990s, Sudan for decades, ISIS and its rampage through the Middle East several years ago, including against the Yazidis, and today the Uyghurs in China, the Rohingya in Myanmar, and continuing religious turmoil in Nigeria, Kashmir, Yemen, Armenia-Azerbaijan, Ethiopia, the Holy Land, and Northern Ireland. Not everything that has transpired in these religion-stoked situations constitutes crimes against humanity, but this atrocity crime has left and continues to inflict far more scars on humankind than other international crimes. The World Economic Forum reported in 2019 that religious violence across the globe is rising. That trend continues to this day. So this is reality knocking on our door. Many of the criminal acts in the category of crimes against humanity have been employed in religious conflicts: widespread or systematic commission of murder, extermination, forcible transfer of population, torture, and mass rape or other forms of sexual violence, not to mention persecution that can underpin ethnic cleansing on religious grounds and unspecified “inhumane acts” that are confirmed by courts. Indeed, the London Charter that created the International Military Tribunal for the Nuremberg Trials and the Rome Statute that established the International Criminal Court (ICC) explicitly codified religious persecution as a crime against humanity. Gap in U.S. Criminal Law Regrettably, not only is there no convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against humanity, there is a gap in U.S. federal criminal law regarding such violations, which do not exist in the U.S. Code, even though federal courts often have invoked crimes against humanity as enforceable customary international law in civil law matters. As recently as Sept. 15, the U.S. District Court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted summary judgment in a civil lawsuit brought in February 2018 by survivor victims against a former Liberian warlord, Moses W. Thomas, for torture under the Torture Victim Protection Act and for both war crimes and crimes against humanity under the Alien Tort Statute. The plaintiffs survived a July 1990 massacre at a Lutheran Church in Monrovia, Liberia, during that country’s civil war. Thomas, accused of supervising the slaughter, returned from the United States to Liberia two years ago. If there had been a crimes against humanity statute in federal criminal law in 2018, Thomas could have been detained awaiting trial. Further, were the United States to codify such criminal penalties, it would be well-placed to participate in the future in the proposed Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Humanity as having already achieved its domestic requirements. The United States thus could serve as a leader to encourage prosecution of this body of atrocity crimes in national courts globally. One can no longer logically argue that crimes against humanity, committed on such a large scale, should be absent from the federal criminal code, as if they merit the imprint of impunity. Frankly, this is an antiquated omission that could be viewed by others as an ever- shining green light to commit crimes against humanity without fear of U.S. criminal justice. For many years, I and others have pointed to this glaring gap in federal criminal law. Senator Dick Durbin, chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, has long labored on legislation to codify and criminalize crimes against humanity, which is the draft bill that merits getting across the finish line for filing in this Congress. The American Bar Association Working Group on Crimes Against Humanity, which I chair and of which Professor Sadat and Professor Beth Van Schaack (a Just Security executive editor) are members, has been working to advance a crimes against humanity bill since 2015. The draft legislation also would correct a couple of other gaps in federal law to ensure criminal liability under U.S. law of non-American perpetrators of war crimes waged against anyone anywhere in the world if such alien perpetrators are present in the United States, and to bar from admission to the United States any alien who engaged in the commission of war crimes or crimes against humanity. The United States should not be a safe haven for perpetrators of crimes against humanity during religious conflicts overseas or, for that matter, to advance any cause anywhere. A government cannot speak of religious freedom abroad – much less of seeking to defend it — if the same government is providing shelter to the very individuals who deny such religious freedom by committing crimes against humanity against those whose religious persuasion is different from their own. The interests of victims of crimes against humanity remain paramount. Provided jurisdictional requirements are met, the U.S. legal system should be structured to enable the Department of Justice to meet victims’ yearning for accountability. Impunity for American Citizens? Nor would it be plausible to permit an American citizen to commit crimes against humanity at home or abroad without being subject to criminal punishment under U.S. law. We have not accepted any such impunity for the commission of genocide, torture, or war crimes (including recruiting, enlisting, or conscripting children in an armed force or group or using children to participate actively in hostilities), and there is no rational argument why we should exclude crimes against humanity from the list of crimes that Americans must not commit or tolerate. We should be setting the example, particularly in the face of authoritarian regimes across the globe. Further, just as federal criminal statutes pertaining to genocide, war crimes, and torture do not carve out the U.S. military from their reach, neither should the crimes against humanity bill. While crimes against humanity (and their tough contextual requirements) are not explicitly designated as such in the “punitive articles” of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, there are a number of violations in such punitive articles that can be found (or interpreted to fall) within the corpus of crimes against humanity. A federal criminal law would ensure — as with genocide, war crimes, and torture — that there is no loophole in federal law permitting the commission of crimes against humanity. If there were to be an intentional command decision to commit crimes against humanity and to do so as part of a known widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population — a scenario I would find shockingly un-American — then there must be an unambiguous means of accountability under U.S. law. Even if one remains concerned about the exposure of American nationals to compliance with such international law, I would emphasize this point: Although the United States is not a State Party to the Rome Statute, the nation would be foolish not to have a crimes against humanity law to enforce on its own will. The principle of complementarity under the Rome Statute applies to both States Parties and non-party States to the treaty. Where a country has the capacity in its criminal law to investigate and prosecute crimes against humanity — as crimes against humanity and not lesser crimes — then that country can avoid ICC scrutiny for any such crimes allegedly committed by its nationals, provided the government proceeds in good faith to investigate and, if merited, prosecute any such individuals. U.S. Needlessly Exposed to Scrutiny by ICC This principle serves the interests of a non-party State, such as the United States, because the ICC may seek to investigate U.S. nationals if there are allegations that those individuals committed crimes against humanity on the territory of a State Party to the Rome Statute. The Court must respect the United States when it responds in good faith that it will investigate alleged crimes against humanity, just as it can currently do with respect to alleged genocide and war crimes if suspected by the Court, provided there is federal law enabling its law enforcement authorities to investigate and prosecute crimes against humanity. If there is no such law, then the ICC can ignore American protestations and claim that the United States lacks the legal capacity to undertake the task, which the Court then may proceed to undertake on its own. There are 104 countries, including all but one of the United States’ 27 NATO allies, that have codified crimes against humanity in their criminal codes. A large majority of these 104 countries are States Parties to the Rome Statute. National laws empower such countries to exercise their full complementarity rights under the Rome Statute, essentially requiring the Court to “back off.”  The United States oddly remains, because of this gap in federal law, needlessly exposed to scrutiny by the ICC. All that being said, the legislation is primarily aimed at the more prominent objective of ensuring that alien perpetrators of crimes against humanity find no sanctuary in the United States. Finally, David Miliband, president and chief executive officer of the International Rescue Committee, recently wrote and was interviewed about a new “age of impunity.”  The absence of  a crimes against humanity law in the U.S. federal criminal code certainly exemplifies that description of our times. It is almost a clarion call to those who commit such atrocities that the United States remains available for refuge, or even a quick visit to Disney World, without fear of prosecution. One might describe the United States as “Impunity World” for such world-class criminals. A crimes against humanity bill should not be a heavy lift on Capitol Hill. It should be viewed as a bipartisan, non-partisan imperative for the sake of humankind. The modest part that the United States can play in this global challenge is to criminalize commission of crimes against humanity — in the same spirit as our lawmakers already have done for individual acts of genocide, torture, and war crimes — and thus provide a path to justice for the victims in particular.
  • Genocide and Mass Atrocities
    What Does Mladic’s Conviction Mean for Genocide Law?
    An international court has upheld the guilt of former Bosnian Serb military leader Ratko Mladic, but its narrower view of what constitutes genocide could make future cases harder to prosecute.
  • Global Governance
    Bringing the High Seas Biodiversity Treaty Into Port
    The high seas are poorly governed. Ratifying the proposed high seas pact would plug this gaping hole and help preserve the future of life on nearly half of the planet.
  • International Law
    Illegal Fishing Is a Global Threat. Here’s How to Combat It.
    Fishing provides a critical source of food and income for many countries, but much of it occurs unlawfully, harming vulnerable populations and eroding maritime governance.  
  • Global Governance
    When Assessing Geopolitical Risks of Geoengineering, Don’t Assume the Future Will Look Like the Past
    Attempting to shut down discussion of the potential weaponization of geoengineering is unwise. We can only see a short way into the future.
  • International Law
    Renewing justice for atrocities
    President Biden’s recognition of the Armenian genocide, inflicted over a century ago with an estimated 1.5 million deaths, acknowledges historical facts and rejects Turkey’s long campaign of denialism. The president deserves praise for delivering such a clear statement and, in doing so, underscoring the United States’ commitment to confront genocide. As former diplomats committed to justice for mass atrocities, we have worked collectively for the better part of the last three decades on behalf of the American people to build, support and staff numerous tribunals to prosecute perpetrators of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes against thousands, sometimes millions, of innocent people. America has led before and we must continue to champion the pursuit of international justice for such atrocity crimes. The American Society of International Law just issued a Task Force report, U.S. Options for Engagement with the ICC, describing this country’s far-reaching support to international justice over the last 75 years and advocating tangible and constructive options for U.S. policy towards the permanent International Criminal Court (ICC). It should be noted that one of us, Todd Buchwald, helped author the report. Despite aberrant episodes of withdrawal, Washington has repeatedly projected — through diplomacy, legislation, presidential directives, military manuals, strategic messaging and targeted appropriations — America’s strong national interests in promoting human rights, the rule of law and accountability for those responsible for mass atrocities. Bipartisan support for these underlying values has deep roots, including in the United States’ instrumental role in establishing the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals to try major war criminals after World War II and its critical support for tribunals prosecuting perpetrators of atrocity crimes in Rwanda, former Yugoslavia, Sierra Leone, Timor-Leste and Cambodia.  American efforts to buttress international criminal justice must include engagement with the ICC. The United States negotiated the creation of this institution and signed the court’s treaty in 2000 but never ratified it. Washington has not joined the more than 120 states, including almost all our allies and friends, as a member of the court. Nonetheless, save in the court’s very early years, the United States embraced a pragmatic approach in which Washington worked with the court and its supporters on issues of common interest, recognizing that there would be issues on which our interests would diverge.   The court’s investigations of the situations in Afghanistan (including some torture allegations against U.S. personnel) and Palestine (based on the court’s finding that Palestine need not qualify as a state under international law before the court exercises jurisdiction) present such issues and undoubtedly will remain contentious. But such disagreements must not translate into reflexive rejectionism of everything the court touches, as in the Trump administration. Far too much of the court’s work serves U.S. interests to make such an approach viable or productive. The United States learned this lesson as it confronted genocide in Darfur. A policy course correction generated a constructive relationship that enabled the Security Council to refer genocidal atrocities in Darfur to the court. The Obama administration facilitated the surrender of long-time fugitives from justice to the court — efforts that served American interests by incapacitating individuals accused of committing the worst crimes known to humankind. The United States doubtless will need to turn to the court again to enforce the proposition that atrocity crimes must be prosecuted.  This was an underlying message when Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken recently announced the lifting of Trump-era sanctions against the court that were widely seen as counterproductive and anathema to the rule of law and American values. The Biden administration should keep turning the page and return to a pragmatic approach to the court that is consistent with American interests and with our long-standing support for global rule of law and accountability.  The United States, its allies, and friends need the court in our collective toolbox for responding to crises where widespread atrocity crimes are being perpetrated and other options do not exist. We should work with our allies to improve the court’s effectiveness and the focus on its core mission, as proposed in a recent independent expert review. Current realities beckon. As the U.S. government surveys the world, Russian troops intimidate Ukraine, Venezuelans endure life-threatening government policies, Syrians and Yazidis cry out for justice, Rohingya flee Myanmar’s military, Uyghurs are cruelly interned in Chinese camps and atrocities rage in Ethiopia’s Tigray region. The ICC needs reform, but a turbulent future demands that we recognize the court for what it is: a critical pillar in the framework of international accountability and atrocity prevention. We would be foolish to pretend otherwise. The authors served respectively as U.S. ambassadors for global criminal justice in the Clinton, George W. Bush and Obama administrations. The views expressed are solely their own and do not necessarily reflect any institution with which they are associated.
  • Global Governance
    Can Solar Geoengineering Be Used as a Weapon?
    The premise that solar geoengineering is weaponizable is either false or grossly overstated. It is time to leave such distractions behind and focus more squarely on the real dilemmas of this otherwise promising technology.
  • International Law
    Save the Olympics, Again
    In May 1984, I published an op-ed in The New York Times entitled, “To Save Olympics.” It called for the depoliticization of the Olympics through an international treaty that would establish permanent locations for the games. During the intervening years nothing has changed to alter the political and economic risks of holding the Olympic Games in different cities, now every two years. This includes notably Beijing, which will host the Winter Olympics in 2022. In his own recent op-ed in the Times, Senator Mitt Romney (R-UT) rightly argued for an economic and diplomatic boycott of the Beijing Olympics but not a government-imposed athlete boycott. China’s genocidal treatment of its Uyghur minority population, anti-democratic governance of Hong Kong, and aggressive threats against Taiwan are reasons enough to publicly delegitimize its hosting the Olympics and its reaping any profit or political hype from the Games. Still, at this late date the Olympic athletes of 2022 must be prioritized and allowed to compete, even if Beijing remains the host city. Now is an opportune moment to consider more fundamental changes to the Olympics, so that we do not find ourselves in this kind of situation again. I spelled out my view almost four decades ago, writing: “[I]t is now clear that the Games must be depoliticized if they are to be preserved. Just as significant, the rights of qualified athletes to compete must be protected.  An ‘International Olympics Treaty,’ negotiated under the auspices of the United Nations, could prevent world leaders from routinely sacrificing athletes’ rights on the altar of nationalism.  Athletes who have devoted their lives to the goal of competing in the Olympic Games should have a guarantee that their achievement will not be snatched from them at the eleventh hour.” In the modern history of the Olympic Games, which resumed in Athens in 1896, there have been at least 11 instances where the site of the Games has given rise to political boycotts, disruptive controversies, nationalist propaganda, or human tragedy. These cities include Berlin (1936), London (1948), Mexico City (1968), Munich (1972), Moscow (1980), Los Angeles (1984), Seoul (1988), Atlanta (1996), Beijing (2008), Sochi (2014), and soon Beijing again. The economic burden imposed upon cities vying for the Olympics has increased astronomically in recent decades and burdened national economies. For example, the Greek government invested the equivalent of $11 billion at current exchange rates in the 2004 Summer Olympics, double its initial budget, and never offset the cost of the stadiums, which fell into disuse and sapped the national budget. That year, Greece’s national debt surged to 110.6 percent of gross domestic product, the highest in the European Union. As the country’s deficit ballooned, the European Commission subsequently imposed fiscal monitoring on Greece in 2005, an unprecedented step. Similarly, to host the Summer Olympics in 1976, Montreal overspent billions beyond its initial projected figure of $124 million. The spiraling cost overruns incurred during construction dumped upon the city’s taxpayers a debt of approximately $1.5 billion that took three decades to repay. In 1988, South Korean officials forcibly relocated roughly 720,000 people and demolished 48,000 buildings to prepare the city for foreign visitors ahead of the Seoul Summer Olympics. Likewise, the Chinese Government bulldozed vast tracts of poor communities, displacing more than 1.5 million citizens in order to build Beijing’s 2008 Summer Olympics infrastructure. Accounting for the city’s large-scale investments, the cost of Beijing’s exhibition surged to an estimated $45 billion. A similar scenario unfolded in London, where the government bulldozed an entire low-income housing development in preparation for the 2012 Summer Olympics. In 2014, the Russian resort city of Sochi hosted the costliest Olympic Games in history, totaling an estimated $50 billion. For years after hosting the Summer Olympics in 2016, Rio de Janeiro struggled with debt, colossal maintenance costs for empty facilities, and inadequate public services, with total costs reaching an estimated $13.1 billion. In 2017, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) refused to assist organizers to pay millions of dollars in outstanding debt. In the aftermath of the Games, the city struggled to find use for vacant sporting venues and to garner renters for the 3,600 units in the Athletes Village. In January 2020, a Brazilian judge ordered the closure of the Olympic Park due to safety concerns, describing the venue as “progressively battered by the lack of care” and “ready for tragedies.” As the world’s best athletes prepare for the Tokyo Olympics, it promises to be one of the most expensive Summer Games in history. The expected hit on Japan’s national budget to build the requisite sites is $15.4 billion. The cost overrun had already exceeded 200 percent without accounting for the additional billions in expenses resulting from the COVID-19 delay. Though in its original proposal in 2013 to host the Games, Tokyo estimated it would spend roughly $7 billion, early estimates in 2019 projected the cost would surge to more than $26 billion. Further, given the appropriate decision not to permit spectators to witness the delayed Games of “2020,” Japan will incur further financial loss. The intense competition among cities to burnish their image by hosting the Olympic Games is understandable but rarely makes economic sense. The process also is often marred by the tendency of the IOC to choose the city that submits the highest costing proposals, creating a “winner’s curse” for the country and its taxpayers. In the past, at least, it has also led on several occasions to serious allegations of impropriety or corruption involving, among others, members of the International Olympic Committee. There is a better way. The International Olympics Treaty that I have proposed could be negotiated to establish two permanent sites, one for the Summer Olympics and one for the Winter Olympics. Each of these locations would establish an “Olympic-free zone” where the designated national government agrees by treaty to govern such territory as permanently dedicated to an apolitical Olympic purpose and to comply with the operational requirements set forth in the treaty. In return, the budget of the Olympic Games every two years would be raised by the parties to the treaty and administered by a committee of auditors and financial experts set up by the agreement. This would include management of the commercial media coverage, sponsorships, endorsements, and spectator ticket sales that are major components of the revenue stream. The initial investments required to build modern facilities could be financed with bonds guaranteed by the major treaty parties (with high sovereign debt ratings) and repaid with revenue raised in connection with the Games. Those facilities need not be rebuilt elsewhere every two years and that alone would save billions of dollars in construction costs in perpetuity. The nations that initially refuse to enter the treaty regime, as I earlier wrote, “could participate in the Games under restricted conditions, including the payment of surcharges. Enough incentives and penalties could be built into the treaty to induce all nations to sign and ratify it.” The countries meriting serious scrutiny should not include any major global power or politically-stressed nation so as to avoid the vicissitudes of global politics and boycott fever.  Candidates for the permanent Winter Olympics site might include Norway, Sweden, Finland, Austria, and Switzerland. For the Summer Olympics, Greece, the birthplace of the Olympic Games, might uniquely qualify as could Jamaica and Singapore. (This assumes that seasons defined by the Northern Hemisphere calendar are selected.) Any of these nations should be able and obligated to facilitate the sports-centric Games with no political or nationalist agenda. The designated city would benefit significantly from spectators flocking to the host country every four years, the employment arising with permanent facilities built and maintained for each Olympic Games, and their well-planned use during off-years. To further avoid the enormous costs and political risks of the Games, a city that weather-wise can convene both the Summer and Winter Olympics in a politically “safe” country could be an attractive option with the bonus of Olympic events held every two years. While Canada, China, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and the United States have garnered both sets of Games and some of these nations are on deck through 2028, none of these mega-powers  likely would pass the political litmus test for the permanent Olympic site. The year 2030, for which no city is yet selected for the Winter Olympics, might be a good target date for transition to permanent Olympic status for one or two suitable cities under a freshly drawn international treaty. The practical difficulties of persuading countries to forfeit any future bid for an Olympic site, including those currently in the queue as bidders, cannot be underestimated.  But the current illogical system is far too costly on political and economic grounds, invites corruption, and burdens average taxpayers of the host nation.  Athletes should compete for the sake of sports excellence in an essentially neutral and financially-secure arena. They should know that every two years a city of ever-lasting commitment to the Games will host them for only one reason: to realize their individual Olympic spirit from which the whole world benefits. The author thanks Madeline Babin of the Council on Foreign Relations for her research assistance.
  • International Law
    Reforming the War Powers Resolution for the 21st Century
    John B. Bellinger III, CFR adjunct senior fellow for international and national security law, testified before the House Committee on Rules, on congressional and presidential war powers. The written testimony can be accessed here and a video of the hearing can be accessed here.
  • Trade
    Europe and the Prospects for WTO Reform
    The United States should recognize, and attempt to seize, the opportunity on WTO Appellate Body reform being offered by the European Union.