Conflict Prevention

Overview The greater Horn of Africa—including Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda—is a region of strategic importance. It is also a region in crisis. Avoiding Conflict in the Horn of Africa: U.S. Policy Toward Ethiopia and Eritrea, commissioned by the Council’s Center for Preventive Action and written by George Mason University’s Terrence Lyons, presents a comprehensive picture of this neglected part of the world and suggests what the United States can do to address the multiple challenges to stability and peace. Major change has taken place in Somalia since the release of this report in December 2006. The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia, backed by Ethiopian troops and air power, completely and swiftly dislodged the Islamic Courts movement from power in the capital, Mogadishu, and in Kismayo, the second major city. As a result, the dangers of a “proxy” war between Ethiopia and Eritrea in Somalia and that of a larger regional war, as discussed in the report, seem to have receded. The defeat of the Islamic Courts has focused attention on international efforts to stabilize Somalia, including increased economic support and development assistance for the country and the introduction of an African peacekeeping force to replace Ethiopian troops. The United States should vigorously support both increased aid and a regional military presence to promote order in Somalia, which has suffered nearly two decades of anarchy. The dramatic turn of events in Somalia creates opportunities to reduce the ongoing conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea and avoid renewed warfare between them. Equally important is the internal political dynamics in both countries. Their conflict has fed authoritarian tendencies in each country. Ethiopia continues to experience a tense stand-off between the government and leaders of the opposition, several of whom are in prison charged with treason. Eritrea has become increasingly despotic. The United States will need to move quickly to implement a new strategy for resolving, or at least reducing, the Ethiopia-Eritrea tensions.

Overview For four decades Papuans have struggled, sometimes violently, over their integration into Indonesia. Yet recent events in Indonesia have created an opportunity to make progress on resolving the conflict. Following up on the Center for Preventive Action’s 2003 report Peace and Progress in Papua, this Council Special Report, Peace in Papua: Widening a Window of Opportunity, urges the Indonesia Government to follow through with its commitments to achieve a comprehensive solution to the conflict in Papua by engaging with legitimate representatives of Papuan society, fully implementing special autonomy, improving local governance, and reforming security arrangements. The United States, the European Union, Japan, Australia, and ASEAN member states can encourage Jakarta with quiet diplomacy. They also should provide a technical and financial assistance package to provide professional training, natural resource management, public sector reform, and civil society development.

This Council-sponsored, independent Task Force points out that nation-building is not just a humanitarian concern, but a critical national security priority that should be on par with war-fighting and urges the United States to equalize the importance of the two. The report argues that the United States must acknowledge that “war-fighting has two important dimensions: winning the war and winning the peace.” The Task Force, cochaired by former national security advisers Samuel R. Berger and Brent Scowcroft and directed by retired Army Major General William L. Nash, finds that “to succeed, initial military combat operations require advance planning and a substantial commitment of money and manpower. The same is true for the subsequent phase of conflict, commonly called nation-building, and known inside the Pentagon as ‘stabilization and reconstruction.’ The failure to take this phase of conflict as seriously as initial combat operations has had serious consequences for the United States, not just in Iraq but, more broadly, for international efforts to stabilize and rebuild nations after conflict.” The U.S. government is currently poorly organized for the task of nation-building. “The higher priority now accorded to nation-building has yet to be matched by a comprehensive policy or institutional capacity within the U.S. government to engage successfully in stabilization and reconstruction missions,” the report says. The Task Force calls on the president to make it clear that building America’s capability to conduct stabilization and reconstruction operations will be a top foreign policy priority. The report recommends concrete ways for the Bush administration to reorganize to take on these challenges, including giving greater authority to the State Department.

Overview The price of U.S. and EU inaction in the western Balkans was amply illustrated in the 1990s, as opportunities for preventive action were squandered and the former Yugoslavia descended into brutal and devastating ethnic conflict, first in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and later on in Kosovo. As is always the case, military intervention and the need for post-conflict reconstruction consumed significant U.S. resources—far more than the cost of thoughtful and decisive preventive action. A decade and a half later, the United States has another opportunity for preventive action, this time to avert a renewed crisis in Kosovo and achieve progress in Bosnia and Serbia and Montenegro that will help stabilize the region. This report builds on the Center for Preventive Action's 2002 Task Force report, Balkans 2010. It identifies the principal steps that the United States can take to secure the investment it has made in the western Balkans and facilitate the region's progress toward its rightful destiny within the EU. In doing so, Forgotten Intervention? lays out a straightforward and doable strategy for the United States that will pay dividends. This publication was made possible in part by a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.