• United States
    Don’t Gut the Foreign Operations Budget
    This post was coauthored with my research associate, Amelia M. Wolf. In what is becoming an annual practice, congressional appropriators are once again trying to reduce America’s $16.7 trillion gross federal debt by slashing President Obama’s $52 billion foreign operations budget request. The budget includes everything from embassy security to protect diplomats, vaccination programs to prevent new incidents of polio and measles, humanitarian aid for victims of war and natural disasters, and United Nations (UN) peacekeepers. All of this, and more, for an amount that is roughly a mere 8% of the $615 billion that the White House has requested for the Pentagon. Though the foreign operations budget constitutes only one percent of the federal budget, House Republicans devote a disproportionate amount to time cutting it dollar by dollar each year. This does not makes a dent in reducing the federal deficit, and negatively impacts U.S. national security interests around the world. Last week, a House Appropriations Subcommittee voted to reduce Obama’s request by $11 billion to $40.1 billion. This would be a tremendous mistake as it would needlessly harm U.S. foreign policy and national security interests. The State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development must be fully funded as they have unparalleled capability for preventing conflicts, while protecting and promoting American interests and values in a sustainable manner. Rather than supporting programs vital to preventing political instability and armed conflict, the Subcommittee proposed to completely defund certain programs. These include the Complex Crisis Fund, which has facilitated rapid responses to situations in Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya, and Tunisia, Conflict Stabilization Operations programs, the United States Institute of Peace, the premier organization in research and teaching conflict prevention and peacebuilding, as well as the UN Population Fund, the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and other UN agencies. Back in 2011, former secretary of defense Robert Gates warned that everything the U.S. military had accomplished in Iraq was at risk if the State Department did not get funding to continue its work after the withdrawal of U.S. troops. That warning may become a reality, as violence in Iraq has skyrocketed in recent months, with 1,045 deaths recorded by the UN in May, the highest since June 2008. As troops continue to drawdown in Afghanistan, the trillion dollars spent on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past decade could go to waste. It wouldn’t be the first time. After spending “billions to drive the Soviets out of Afghanistan…we couldn’t get a million dollars to build schools in Afghanistan in 1989 and 1990,” and the Taliban soon gained control, Gates reminded the Senate in 2011. As President Obama stated plainly: “Foreign assistance is a tiny fraction of what we spend fighting wars that our assistance might ultimately prevent.” Indeed, just one soldier costs $531,427 per year on average when deployed to warzones overseas. Or, consider the role of foreign assistance over military interventions when combating terrorism. As Sen. Lindsey Graham recently stated: “Improving life [in Africa] is a real blow to radical Islamists. You know if you can provide schooling, a health clinic, clean drinking water, that really is a blow to their agenda.” It is revealing that the strongest proponents of funding diplomacy and foreign assistance are senior officials in uniform.  In 2010, chairman of the joint chiefs Admiral Michael Mullen, warned in a letter to Congress: "The more significant the [budget] cuts, the longer military operations will take, and the more and more lives are at risk!" In March, Admiral James M. Loy noted when speaking of the State Department and USAID: “The U.S. has underinvested in these very tools that are vital to our national security, to our economic prosperity, and to our moral leadership in the world.” Or, as Gen. James Mattis, Commander of U.S. Central Command, told the Senate bluntly in March, “If you don’t fund the State Department fully, then I need to buy more ammunition.” The latest attempts by House Republicans to slash the foreign aid budget will have drastic implications. Misallocating conflict prevention and development tasks to the Pentagon—a trend in recent years—is an expensive stop-gap measure, and one which cannot preventively address the underlying drivers of instability in conflict-prone countries. This is a task best suited to well-trained and adequately funded civilian agencies. If House Republicans succeed at slashing funding for diplomatic and foreign assistance programs, it might save fractions of pennies today, but it increases the likelihood for more costly and sustained military commitments in the future. Decreasing support is “literally a matter of life and death for some civilians in war-ravaged nations,” as Bryan Bender wrote in the Boston Globe. Although Bender spoke specifically about negative implications for U.S.-funded operations to remove leftover unexploded land mines and bombs, the consequences of budget cuts will span a breadth of initiatives that focus on protecting civilians and preventing conflict.
  • United States
    Report: U.S. Policies for Reducing Gun Violence in the Americas
    Julia Sweig is the Nelson and David Rockefeller senior fellow for Latin America Studies and director for Latin America Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. Joel Hernandez is a research associate at the Council on Foreign Relations. Sandy Hook, Aurora, Tucson, Virginia Tech, Columbine: massacres that punctuate the more than ten thousand gun homicides perpetrated every year in the United States. Yet what often goes missing from each subsequent debate in the United States about gun control is the international impact of lax American gun laws, especially in Latin America. For example, 74 percent of homicides in the Americas are carried out with a firearm. Brazil has the highest number of yearly gun homicides in the world, followed by Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela. The ten countries with the highest rates of gun homicide in the world, led by Honduras, are all Latin American or Caribbean states. A new CFR Policy Innovation Memorandum, “A Strategy to Reduce Gun Trafficking and Violence in the Americas,” lays out the effects of U.S. gun laws well beyond American borders. Between 2010 and 2012, gun traffickers attempted to smuggle about a quarter million firearms, worth about $127.7 million, from the United States into Mexico. While Mexican border authorities seized about 12.7 percent of illicit weapons flowing south, U.S. authorities intercepted only 2 percent, allowing as many as two hundred thousand weapons to pass the dragnet undisturbed.  The homicide rate in Mexico declined every year that the federal assault-weapons ban was in place, only to begin growing again in 2004, two years before President Felipe Calderón deployed armed forces against drug cartels, resulting in an eruption of violence. Indeed, in the two years since the assault-weapons ban was allowed to lapse, gun homicide rates spiked in Mexican towns along the borders of Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona, yet not in towns bordering California, where a state assault-weapons ban remained in place. The regional spillover effects of U.S. gun laws are one issue. As pernicious, and detrimental to American standing abroad, has been the National Rifle Association’s (NRA) international strategy. For example, the NRA took pride in obstructing the progress of the UN Arms Trade Treaty, and assisted the opponents of a 2005 referendum in Brazil that would have banned the sale of guns and ammunition to private citizens. Although many of the forty-five to eighty million guns currently in circulation in Latin America are holdovers from past civil wars and insurgencies, local efforts to reduce stocks of illicit weapons will founder if smugglers continue to replace Cold War-era decommissioned rifles with the most advanced assault weapons the U.S. market can provide. Containing the southbound flow of firearms in an essential task in the Obama administration’s efforts to promote stability and the rule of law, and combat transnational organized crime, in Latin America. The United States can’t eliminate gun violence or the inequality and weak institutions that perpetuate it. But by creating a bit of a firewall between the U.S. domestic firearms market and illicit weapons markets in Latin America, Washington can help governments in the region to reduce a massive security problem and perhaps even regain considerable lost standing in the region while we’re at it. Read the full report: “A Strategy to Reduce Gun Trafficking and Violence in the Americas.”
  • Syria
    The Role of Religion in Postconflict Syria
    Interreligious cooperation is central to facilitating transitional justice and reconciliation in Syria, says expert Daniel Philpott.
  • United States
    Illicit Networks, Political Instability, and Criminal Violence
    Two weeks ago, CFR’s Center for Preventive Action and International Institutions and Global Governance program convened a workshop on “Illicit Networks, Political Instability, and Criminal Violence.” The workshop intended to analyze trends in transnational criminal networks, examine the latest developments in the field, and identify gaps and challenges in U.S. and multilateral responses to criminal violence. In an off-the-record setting, we brought together government, academic, nonprofit, and private sector experts in the field of transnational crime from across the United States. Participants discussed the evolution of transnational criminal networks in recent years and revealed that the relationship between the state and criminal organizations is far more complex than previously understood. Criminal organizations are moving from the periphery of society to the core, where they play an active role in domestic politics and international relations. Currently, two models exist to explain the relationship between states and criminal organizations, and it is essential that policymakers differentiate between them. The first is a state penetrated by transnational criminal organizations that benefit from particular areas of government. The relationship has traditionally been viewed through this model. The second is a “criminalized state” in which criminal organizations become instruments of state policy, which is rapidly becoming more prevalent. Over time, illicit networks have evolved to incorporate characteristics once unique to the state and begun to comingle licit and illicit activities. To achieve this, criminal organizations sometimes seek sponsorship from a foreign government that will protect them from the local government; form their own sovereign principalities to gain control of a territory; or adopt a warlord strategy. Criminal organizations are gaining increased geopolitical importance and, at times, taking on sovereign characteristics and capabilities, including through land acquisition. Participants identified three major gaps in the U.S. strategies to combat transnational organized crime. First, inflated threats, such as terrorism, and misunderstood realities of transnational crime pose a barrier to deeper understanding of the relationship between criminal organizations and states, a necessary component to combating newly emerging trends in illicit networks. Second, there is (unsurprisingly) a lack of interagency collaboration and information sharing within government that inhibits effectiveness, efficacy, and the establishment of best practices. Finally, there is a failure to engage with external actors including the nonprofit community, media, and the private sector, as well as regional and multilateral organizations. To learn more about transnational organized crime and the workshop, read the full rapporteur note and the keynote address from Organization of American States Assistant Secretary General, Ambassador Albert Ramdin, and view a presentation from the office of the director of national intelligence.
  • Jordan
    Political Instability in Jordan
    In March 2016, the authors wrote an update to this memo to reflect recent developments in Jordan. Read the update. Introduction Jordan has so far weathered the political storm that has engulfed much of the Middle East since late 2010. However, several emerging challenges have the potential to develop into serious threats to the stability of the Hashemite Kingdom. While Jordan's moderate, nonideological, and revolution-adverse political culture is a strong mitigating factor, the risk of domestic instability is greater today than at any time since the country's bloody 1970–71 period. For the United States, systemic political change that is the product of instability—which, for example, would result in the abdication or removal of King Abdullah, a dramatically altered monarchical system, or the demise of the monarchy, replaced by an anti-Western form of government—could lead to Jordanian policies inimical to U.S. interests. Given Jordan's pro-West strategic orientation, commitment to peace with Israel, and cooperation on counterterrorism and security matters, the United States has a strong interest in helping Amman manage potentially destabilizing change. Instability in Jordan is by no means inevitable, and prudent steps taken now can prevent undesirable developments. The Contingencies Jordan's King Abdullah faces a combination of rising external and internal challenges. The main external sources of instability are the spillover effects of Syria's civil war, including possible military entanglement in the border zone, the spread of Salafist radicalization, the heavy cost of sustaining a large refugee population, and the potential interference inside Jordan of Islamist movements from other regional countries. Internal sources of instability include rising public anger resulting from economic austerity, insufficient political reform, and perceived government tolerance of corruption, as well as growing confidence in the country's Muslim Brotherhood and burgeoning Salafist movement. While external threats pose significant challenges, the most serious danger to the regime is when these threats catalyze or exacerbate domestic instability. Here, the three most plausible contingencies are the following: a "Tahrir Square"–like uprising in Amman, an Islamist squeeze play against the monarchy, and the defection of the regime's core base of support in the East Bank. "Tahrir Square" in Amman Frustration with slow, inadequate political reform snowballs into mass demonstrations that the regime cannot contain without resorting to unprecedented levels of force against a largely unarmed citizenry. Potential triggers include popular outrage at a glacially paced reform process, dissatisfaction with a government filled with corrupt ruling elites, or a particularly egregious public spectacle of royal corruption that goes unpunished. This scenario envisions growing demonstrations driven by a gradual but steady erosion of support for the king and possibly the monarchical system itself. Participants run the gamut of Jordan's activist population (itself a small segment of the overall population): underrepresented Palestinians, long-suffering Islamists, and potentially, East Banker Jordanians with tribal origins who have lost confidence in the king's ability to improve the economy, govern transparently, or deliver patronage at traditional levels. Under pressure not to use force, and sharing many similar grievances, the king's security apparatus breaks down. The result could be the king's acceptance of fundamental political change (e.g., a European-style constitutional monarchy), Abdullah's abdication, or the demise of the monarchy and establishment of a republic. The likelihood of this scenario is low because the lack of political reform is neither the leading grievance in Jordan nor one that unifies the opposition. Not only is popular discontent focused more on the weak economy and perception of widespread corruption, but political reform highlights deep antagonism between East Bankers and Palestinians. After all, real reform—in the sense of a fairer demographic representation in national voting—would dilute the privileged role of East Bankers, including the status of Jordan's tribal-heavy security services and the political empowerment of Jordanians of Palestinian origin. The absence of political reform alone is unlikely to trigger mass opposition to the regime. An Islamist Squeeze Play Against the Monarchy In a moderately likely scenario, after decades of an ambivalent relationship with the regime, Jordan's Islamist movement capitalizes on Islamist successes in Jordan's neighbors to directly challenge the Hashemite monarchy, with the goal of transforming Jordan into an Islamic state. Mass protests break out in Amman, Zarqa, Irbid, and other areas where there are significant concentrations of Palestinians, the primary support base of Jordan's Islamist movement. Clashes with security forces are difficult to suppress without substantial loss of life and attract foreign fighters into Jordan from Syria, Egypt and Iraq, leading to a contest over the survival of the regime. Islamists' ambitions in Jordan will largely be determined by events outside the country, particularly the extent to which they, and particularly the jihadists among them, assume prominent roles in post-Assad Syria; the potential for Hamas to overtake Fatah as the dominant player in Palestinian politics; and whether Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood leadership, with Qatari financing, looks to Jordan as an avenue for expanding its regional influence. It is unlikely that any one of these developments would trigger an Islamist contingency in Jordan, but two may be enough to convince local Islamists to flex their muscles and three—a "perfect storm"—could trigger an Islamist version of the Nasserist/Ba'athist effort to subvert Jordan in the 1950s and 1960s. If this were to happen, King Abdullah would likely respond by trying to burnish his Islamic credentials, especially the Hashemites' hereditary claim to the Prophet Mohammed. Ultimately, however, he would rely on his security apparatus while stoking fears of Jordan's takeover by Palestinians to secure the support of East Bankers. A concerted effort to undermine the king by Islamists in Cairo, Damascus, and Ramallah working with the local Muslim Brotherhood and more radical Salafists would pose a substantial threat; factors that militate against its success are the ideological divisions and ethnic splits (i.e., Palestinian versus Transjordanian) within the Brotherhood and the fact that Jordan's tribal-based security apparatus is likely up to the challenge, assuming it is confident of the political will of the king and his regime. The East Bank Core Defects For decades, analysts have focused on Jordan's large Palestinian population as the most likely source of regime instability. At least since the Jordanian army quashed a Syrian-supported Palestinian rebellion in 1970–71, Jordan's Palestinian population has generally been quiescent. Far more dangerous for the regime would be the development of a critical mass of disaffection among its traditional East Bank supporters—those who live in and near the spine of Transjordanian cities (e.g., Ma'an, Karak, Tafilah) and who supply the manpower for Jordan's armed forces and security services. Recently, such opposition has begun to emerge due to poor economic circumstances, alienation from Amman's nouveau riche, anger at the regime's apparent indifference to tribal grievances, and disgust at what is perceived as royally sanctioned corruption. Given the isolationist streak among many East Bankers, Jordan's deepening involvement in Syria—including reports that it is permitting Israeli drone flights over its territory and welcoming deployments of U.S. troops—could feed protests, too. The tribal-based opposition has coalesced around a political organization called Hirak ("Movement"), which has staged persistent street protests in East Bank cities as well as in the capital. In this scenario, East Bank disaffection metastasizes into full-blown opposition to the regime as a result of an event that both offends tribal sensibilities and feeds the idea that the regime has broken its covenant with its East Bank supporters. This could include the killing of Hirak members during street protests or their deaths while in detention, fueling a blood feud against the palace that attracts broader tribal support; a "man-made tragedy," such as the collapse of a bridge or tunnel that kills members of an East Bank family, attributed to shoddy construction linked to corruption; or the shuttering of public institutions, such as clinics, schools, or hospitals, that is viewed as unfair and disproportionate belt-tightening affecting poor East Bankers without similar sacrifices from the political leadership and better-off Ammanites. In each of these cases, demonstrations would spread quickly based on public sympathy and elements of the security services—themselves mostly East Bankers—would be supportive. Of the three scenarios for instability, disaffection among the regime's East Bank core is the most threatening and, since the emergence of the persistent and vocal Hirak in 2011, the most plausible as well. While its numbers are not yet huge, the organization has spread throughout the kingdom, and the regime might not be able to rely for long on East Bank security personnel suppressing East Bankers, whose concerns they may share. So far, the Hirak has no defined and unifying political agenda, but that could quickly change in the context of a wildfire-like spread of riots and demonstrations. Warning Indicators Warning signs of a "Tahrir Square"-in-Amman scenario include bold and direct criticism of the monarchy and the state in Jordan's growing online media, the appearance of leaflets and banners calling for national unity to combat a corrupt government, and a rise in the frequency and size of labor protests, university demonstrations, and sit-ins at government offices. This would all presage the emergence of mass protests. Likewise, increased participation by Palestinians—who have generally stayed out of recent demonstrations—might be another portent of instability. In the Islamist squeeze–play scenario, warning indicators would be less dramatic. One signal would be Islamist regimes or leaders in Egypt and Syria encouraging Jordan's Islamists to take bolder positions or use violent resistance. Increased activity in Jordan by foreign Islamist groups would complicate efforts by the regime to manage the challenge posed by local Islamists. Further growth of Jordan's indigenous Salafist movement, a regional trend already taking place in Jordan, would constitute another warning sign. For the last and most likely contingency, the East Bank core–defects scenario, warning signs might include increasing frequency, size, and coordination of Hirak protests; greater cooperation between the Hirak and Islamists, possibly to condemn the monarchy for "selling out" to foreign interests; increasingly heavy-handed suppression of the protests; defection to the Hirak by some of the "king's men" (i.e., older East Bankers of formerly unquestioned loyalty to the monarchy), and the explosion of "bread riots" in tribal areas, which attack the king and his family. It is important not to view these contingencies as discrete possibilities; rather, they have the potential to affect and even trigger one another. For example, a spread of Hirak protests that neutralizes the regime's security apparatus would make Jordan more vulnerable to subversion from radical Islamists, It is critical to keep a watchful eye on the potential contagion effects of any particular set of events. Implications for U.S. Interests Radical anti-Western change in Jordan coerced by popular opposition—for example, royal abdication or constitutional reforms compelled by street protests—would almost certainly trigger profound change in Jordan's strategic posture that would harm U.S. interests. The monarchy plays a critical role in maintaining Jordan's pro-West, pro-peace orientation; any coerced diminution of royal prerogative would harm Jordanian-American and Jordanian-Israeli relations. Radical change at home is sure to bring about radical change in Jordan's foreign policy. Potential setbacks for the United States include, but are not limited to, the severance of the Jordan-Israel peace treaty, Jordan's refusal to participate in U.S.-led counterterrorism and regional security efforts, and, by implication, heightened instability in Gulf monarchies, which view Jordan as a critical line of defense. At the same time, the United States has humanitarian and other political interests in Jordan: avoiding major bloodshed brought by popular unrest and furthering stable, if incremental, democratic change in line with its larger regional goals. Given these stakes, preventing radical and/or violent change in Jordan is a high U.S. priority. Preventive Options Most analysts emphasize political reform as the best way to insulate Jordan's monarchy from local Islamist and secular challenges alike. This is a mistake. First, as commonly understood in the West, reform is a divisive issue in Jordan; due to the population's demographic divide, its very definition is contested. Second, the most serious potential source of instability, East Bank disaffection, exists apart from reform or the lack thereof. Rather, the two most significant contributing factors to potential East Bank disaffection are perceptions of widespread corruption and insufficient and misallocated government spending. This is somewhat ironic, of course—many East Bankers are not angry about corruption per se, but rather, that they no longer receive what they consider to be an appropriate and equitable share of government largesse at a time when they see "business as usual" among the well-connected elites in Amman. The most effective way for the government to defuse the potential for a critical mass of disaffection is through a somewhat contradictory mixture of taking some high-profile measures against official—and, perhaps, royal—corruption while spending more money on local needs in crucial East Bank communities, thereby dividing the opposition. Unlike Islamists, a significant portion of East Bank opposition is not ideologically alienated from the regime; placating East Bankers should be a top priority. To be sure, the task of preventing instability in Jordan lies principally with the king. Nevertheless, Washington could take the following steps now to help avert a crisis. Provide Additional Financial Support Since its inception, Jordan has been a debtor state, dependent on foreign donors for critical recurrent and discretionary funding. Lately, however, the kingdom's financial struggles have been exacerbated by the cutoff of cheap natural gas from Egypt and the violence in neighboring Syria. Meanwhile, Amman has embarked on an austerity program, cutting food and energy subsidies—and engendering popular anger—to meet the terms of its International Monetary Fund (IMF) Stand-By Arrangement. To prevent the rise of domestic instability, the kingdom will need more financial backing. The United States has wisely supported Jordan's efforts to access the international bond market by providing the kingdom with loan guarantees. But refugees are flowing over the border in increasing numbers, placing an ever-expanding burden on Jordan's public services and fueling what is likely to be competition with the regime's most loyal supporters for scarce public funds. In this environment, additional support will be needed. Washington could take several steps, including providing Amman with more bilateral aid, organizing "friends of Jordan" to augment their own support to the kingdom, and using its influence to convince Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states to fulfill their pledges of financial support. Support Credible Anticorruption Measures Corruption has served as a potent rallying cry for the kingdom's disparate opposition groups. It has also proven highly corrosive to the stature of the monarchy, which—notwithstanding the establishment of an Anticorruption Commission in 2006—suffers from the perception that it is insufficiently committed to rooting out high-level corruption. While Jordan ranks among the least corrupt Arab states and the government has pursued some sensitive, high-profile cases, the perception of endemic public corruption prevails. To counter this perception, Washington could encourage the king to intensify his stated commitment to fighting corruption by pursuing high-profile trials, licensing organizations such as Transparency International to open offices in Jordan, and rescinding legislation restricting Internet publications, which have been outspoken in efforts to expose corruption in the kingdom. Promote Sound Leadership and Adequate Funding for Military and Security Services Holding government officials accountable is essential in the fight against corruption. However, viewed from a different perspective, Jordan's partners and allies should not take solace in the fact that two recent heads of Jordan's General Intelligence Directorate have been jailed for financial crimes. The public disgrace of these intelligence chiefs almost surely has had a demoralizing effect on the institution on which the king relies for internal security. In this regard, there is little Washington can do other than keep a close watch on disaffection within the security services and encourage the appointment of leaders focused solely on protecting the kingdom. Washington could also push Amman to take measures that strengthen its armed forces—the other pillar of regime security. Washington could encourage the government to shrink the procurement budget for the air force, which has long enjoyed special attention (and oversized budgets) despite its peripheral role in national security, in favor of the land forces, which provide the men and equipment that are vital in addressing threats facing the kingdom. Particularly during difficult economic times, it is important that Jordan retain traditional levels of funding for military hospitals and schools, a critical social service for poor East Banker families. Jordan should be counseled to not commit the "unforced error" of slighting military infrastructure that is essential for its internal stability. Enhance Quiet Cooperation on Syria Syria—both in its current state of civil war and in the post-Assad era—will pose a substantial threat to Jordanian security, one that rivals or even surpasses the heightened operational tempo of al-Qaeda in Jordan following the U.S. invasion of Iraq. The spread of radical ideologies from Islamist groups in Syria, an influx of violent jihadis, the threat of cross-border terrorism, and trade in sophisticated weapons will erode Jordan's internal stability. To help Jordan address this range of threats and insulate its internal politics from developments in Syria, the United States could increase its already strong intelligence sharing and cooperation with Jordan. But it should work with Jordan quietly. Whatever additional deterrence is created vis-à-vis Syria by advertising U.S.-Jordanian military and intelligence cooperation, including the deployment of U.S. forces to prepare for contingencies, is offset by inflaming local passions that could ignite if circumstances worsen. Promote a Natural Gas Deal with Israel Jordan's economic morass has much to do with energy. While Egypt was long a source of cheap gas, the absence of security in postrevolutionary Egypt made the pipeline to Jordan vulnerable to terrorist attacks, forcing Jordan to find alternative energy suppliers at exorbitant prices. Amman faced an unbudgeted expense of more than $1 billion in 2012, and Egypt will not return as a reliable supplier of cheap gas in the foreseeable future. In the short term, a concessionary arrangement with Iraq and, perhaps, discounted Gulf oil may fill the gap. But Jordan's strategic answer is Israel, soon to emerge as a major gas exporter, which is willing to provide Jordan's needs at concessionary prices well into the future. Anti-Israel sentiment pervades Jordanian public opinion and inhibits Jordan from pursuing a gas deal. The United States could play matchmaker, persuading the palace and the Jordanian people to accept a deal that is manifestly in Jordan's strategic, commercial, and security interests, all while strengthening the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty. Advocate for Credible, if Modest, Reform While political reform is not the main source of opposition to the monarchy, modest democratic changes would no doubt be welcome, both for their substantive benefits and for the improved image of the king they would provide. Shortly after the Arab revolts began in early 2011, the king initiated a process that resulted in constitutional reforms approved by 70 percent of Jordanians. While the United States should not endorse the transformational changes advocated by Islamists, Washington should support more moderate reforms, including the revision of media laws to provide for a less repressive press environment and the modification of the electoral law to modestly increase the number of representatives elected from a national list, which would give political parties greater representation in the lower house of parliament. Engaging with Israel and Saudi Arabia Two Middle Eastern states have deep interests in Jordan's stability—Israel and Saudi Arabia—and the United States could bolster Jordan by promoting ties with each. For Israel, whose peace with Jordan is a major strategic asset, finding ways to ensure stability in its eastern neighbor is a high priority. Saudi Arabia's interests are more complicated. Despite the Saudi ruling family's checkered relationship with the Hashemites, Jordan is a critical buffer against instability from the north. While Israeli and Saudi interests are not identical, they are complementary, and there is much that Washington can do to deepen political, security, and intelligence coordination vis-à-vis Amman with Jerusalem and Riyadh. Other actors—the United Arab Emirates, major European states, and pro-Western East Asian countries—have a supportive role to play, especially in terms of the provision of economic aid. Their role at a moment of crisis, however, will be minimal. Mitigating Options Should Jordan face a rapidly deteriorating situation, the United States should first take actions that ensure the safety of U.S. embassy personnel and American expatriates residing in the kingdom. Beyond that, there are important steps Washington could take on its own and in concert with other states to mitigate dangerous instability in Jordan. They include the following. Public Messaging of Support In the event of violence or large demonstrations in Jordan, Washington could privately encourage the palace to continue its longstanding policy of nonviolent crowd control while avoiding public criticism of King Abdullah II and high-profile contacts with opposition figures; both would be taken as signs of wavering U.S. support for the monarchy. Pressing the king to make drastic political changes such as allowing for full or near-full parliamentary representation by national list candidates may appear to mesh with democratic principles but is only likely to benefit Jordan's Islamist movement instead. Securing Immediate Infusions of Cash Money cannot ensure stability in Jordan, but it could buy the king time to ride out economic difficulties fueling popular unrest. A large cash infusion provided by Gulf states or Western donors in the midst of a crisis could prove a helpful stopgap measure, enabling the palace to temporarily resume subsidies, provide pay increases to government employees, or take other steps to defuse demonstrations. The king could then resume his program of managed reform once the situation stabilizes. Warning the Muslim Brotherhood's External Patrons Washington could consider more assertive measures to prevent outside actors from stoking instability, such as issuing stern warnings to Egypt (where the Muslim Brotherhood is strongest) and Qatar (the Brotherhood's main financier) not to interfere in Jordanian politics. In the event Amman finds itself embroiled in East Bank disaffection, Cairo and Doha could sense an opportunity to expand Islamist influence and contribute to a dangerous escalation by urging Jordanian Islamists into the streets in a tactical alliance with East Bankers. To dissuade them, the United States could communicate the substantial costs that Egypt and Qatar would pay for intruding in Jordan's domestic affairs. Recommendations The United States has important interests at stake in Jordan and should take steps now to lower the likelihood of major threats to Jordan's stability emerging in the near future. The most urgent factor contributing to instability in Jordan is financial; the IMF recently reported that Jordan's midterm fiscal situation appears positive, but to get to the "midterm," especially if the regional security situation worsens, Jordan needs help. At the same time, Jordan cannot be insulated from the deepening crisis in Syria but it can be protected from its most negative repercussions. In this regard, the Obama administration should take the following steps. Work with Congress to maintain military assistance to Jordan and organize "friends of Jordan" to provide additional financial support to offset the costs of sheltering Syrian refugees. The precise amount of additional support—which may be in the hundreds of millions of dollars—should include needs assessments conducted by the U.S. and Jordanian governments and relevant international institutions as well as a political premium designed to cushion the regime against shocks and prevent the rise of instability resulting from competition for limited public funds. In addition, the Obama administration should encourage Saudi Arabia and other donors to fulfill outstanding aid commitments. Together, these steps should ease Jordan's budget deficit and provide Amman with the means to address the demands of important constituencies. Lobby King Abdullah privately to implement more systemic anticorruption efforts while boosting open, transparent investments in East Banker–dominated areas. This message should be a consistent talking point high on the agenda of U.S.-Jordan consultations. The European Union's leadership should reinforce this message and provide technical assistance on anticorruption measures. Encourage Amman to prioritize its military expenditures on areas most essential for regime maintenance. Spending should be focused on land forces, intelligence agencies, and military support institutions (e.g., hospitals and schools), rather than air force procurement and other areas peripheral to maintaining stability. Urge the Jordanians to continue incremental political reform. This might include loosening media restrictions and increasing the number of national list parliamentarians. Any changes should strike the balance of maintaining forward movement without raising expectations of a rapid political transformation or providing regime opponents with opportunities to advance revolutionary change. Counter the spread of radical Islamist ideologies and jihadist terrorism to Jordan. This can be achieved by enhancing the already cooperative U.S.-Jordanian intelligence-sharing relationship, warning outside actors—especially Egypt and Qatar—against efforts to exploit Jordanian vulnerabilities to expand Islamist influence in the country, working to prevent a Hamas takeover in the West Bank, and bolstering Jordan's quiet cooperation with Israel and Saudi Arabia.
  • Conflict Prevention
    Ending Syria’s Agony: Lessons from Other Civil Wars
    Tuesday’s agreement between Moscow and Washington to convene an international conference on Syria raises some obvious questions. After a brutal conflict that has killed more than seventy thousand, is a negotiated peace between government and rebels forces plausible? And even if a settlement can be negotiated, is it likely to hold? Certainly, the apparent rapprochement between the United States and Russia is important. For the past two years frictions between the governments have paralyzed diplomacy at the UN Security Council, with Moscow (supported quietly by China) blocking Western efforts to place intense pressure on the regime of Bashar al-Assad. Moscow’s agreement to an international conference, secured during a meeting between Secretary of State John Kerry and President Vladimir Putin, would seem to signal greater diplomatic flexibility—an impression reinforced by Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s statement that Russia is not concerned about the fate of “certain” individuals (a clear reference to Assad’s future). The timing of the conference remains up in the air. Kerry, warning that Syria is heading “over the abyss and into chaos,” wants it “by the end of the month.” Whether the antagonists themselves will actually agree to substantive talks remains in doubt, however. Assad continues to dismiss the rebels as “terrorists,” while the Syrian National Coalition—the Western-backed umbrella group of rebel forces—has long made his departure a precondition for any talks on Syria’s future. Still, international pressure for the two sides to meet will be intense, and likely irresistible. Getting the combatants to the bargaining table is critical to ending a war that has generated tremendous human suffering and now risks a wider regional conflagration, possibly involving weapons of mass destruction. But it is only a first step. Presuming the two sides actually meet and are able to achieve a cease-fire—or even a more extensive peace agreement—what is the likelihood that that accord will endure?  It is not too early for policymakers in Washington—and Moscow—to begin asking these questions. With the caveat that each conflict has its own dynamic, the scholarly literature on how civil wars end may provide some clues, if no definitive answers, about Syria’s future. One of the biggest lessons is that negotiated settlements are notoriously difficult to maintain, for several reasons. To begin with, peace agreements rarely remove the underlying societal conflicts, such as political and economic inequities between different tribal or sectarian groups, that led to war in the first place. Second, negotiated settlements, compared to winner-take-all scenarios, are by definition second best, compromise solutions, and formerly warring parties are accordingly often reluctant to invest heavily in them. Third, peace agreements typically force parties to cede unitary control over their respective areas and ultimately disarm in settings of persistent insecurity. Finally, individuals and factions—known as “spoilers”—may have a vested interest in undercutting the peace process, particularly if it interferes with their access to illicit revenue streams that have sprung up during the conflict (say, from smuggling arms or other commodities). Beyond these generalities, what else can we say? Based on their study of sixteen civil wars (ranging from Bosnia to Sierra Leone) the political scientists Stephen John Stedman and George Downs distinguish between “permissive” and “demanding” environments for implementing peace agreements.  What separates these environments are two sets of critical contextual factors. The first set of factors are international: All things being equal, peace agreements are most likely to hold if major powers agree to serve as custodians of the peace process, if outsider actors invest major financial and other resources to help support the accord, and if the international community is willing to risk the lives (whether as part of an intervening coalition or UN peacekeeping force) to defend the terms of the agreement. How would these international factors apply in Syria’s case? First, the United States, Russia and other parties will need to form an enduring “contact group” that shepherds the peace process for years. Second, the international donor community, including major powers, the World Bank, and other entities, must be prepared for a multiyear financial commitment to reconstruct a devastated country. Third, preserving the peace will require international “boots” on the ground. These need not be American, but they will need robust terms of engagement. The second set of factors determining success and failure of peace agreements are internal and, alas, more numerous and daunting. The most important include: the number of warring parties and the extent of agreement among these groups prior to external intervention, the presence of potential “spoilers,”  the degree of state collapse, the overall number of combatants, the presence of exploitable natural resources, the involvement of neighboring states in the conflict, and whether secession is a motive for the conflict. Taking all of these factors together, chances for an enduring peace in Syria would appear to be dim. Let’s begin with the warring parties. Despite press coverage dividing combatants into government and rebel forces, the latter are extraordinarily heterogeneous. For example, there is little agreement on Syria’s future between those secular opponents of the Assad regime favored by the West and the al-Qaeda-linked al-Nusra Front, which is already establishing Islamist rule in cities under its control. Syria is also replete with potential spoilers to any eventual peace treaty. These include first and foremost the Alawite coterie around Assad himself, likely to fight tooth and nail against a diminution of its historic influence in Syrian politics. Shia militants, backed by Hezbollah, could also play a spoiler role, as could Syria’s Christian and Kurdish minorities, depending on the composition of any transitional government. The Syrian state, meanwhile, is close to collapse. The government has ceased to function in approximately 85 percent of the country and struggles to deliver services even in areas that it controls. Syria’s physical as well as administrative infrastructure has been decimated, contributing to a humanitarian catastrophe that now includes over 1.2 million registered refugees and 4.25 million internally displaced persons. Meanwhile, the country has become a battleground for regional rivalries between Shiite Iran and Sunni-dominated Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, and Turkey, with each funding their local proxies. Finally, at least some Alawites, fearing eventual collapse of the Assad regime, appear prepared to carve out a secessionist enclave of their own in western Syria, while Syria’s Kurds have their own secessionist ambitions. Only in the area of exploitable natural resources, it appears, does oil-poor Syria escape vulnerability. If history is any guide, these internal vulnerabilities may well trump even robust external support for any future peace settlement. Still, the fact that the belligerents in Syria appear locked in a “mutually hurting stalemate” make this a ripe time for the U.S.-Russian initiative.
  • Myanmar
    Myanmar’s Alarming Civil Unrest
    Myanmar’s emergence from military rule has also spawned some of the worst ethnic and religious violence in decades and fear of prolonged civil conflict, writes CFR’s Joshua Kurlantzick.
  • International Law
    “A Moment of Truth” for Syrian Refugees—and International Justice
    Yesterday Antonio Gutteres, the United Nation’s High Commissioner for Refugees, briefed the UN Security Council on the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Syria. Gutteres’ remarks, delivered in closed session but subsequently published on UNHCR’s website, provide a chilling summary of the human cost of this grinding conflict. The crisis, in his words, presents a “moment of truth” to the international community. That is true in at least two senses. The world needs to take bolder steps to alleviate human suffering in Syria. And it needs to hold the perpetrators of atrocities accountable. The humanitarian crisis in Syria is dire. In April 2012, UNHCR had registered 33,000 Syrian refugees in neighboring countries. Today, ten months later, this number has swelled thirty-fold, to 963,000—and it continues to climb. “Since early January, over 40,000 people have fled Syria every week,” Gutteres observed yesterday. The number of Syrian refugees in Lebanon now exceeds four hundred thousand—nearly ten percent of that country’s population of 4.3 million. A similar number have found shelter in Jordan (population 6.2 million). On Monday alone, 4,585 Syrians entered that country. Many tens of thousands of more have fled to Turkey and Iraq. As the conflict deepens, the risk is growing that Syria’s Palestinian refugees, numbering half a million, may once again be forced to flee. Syria’s refugees, Gutteres notes, have “lost everything they once owned—businesses, homes, livelihoods.” Most are living in austere conditions in crude camps, suffering through one of the harshest winters in years. An entire generation of children has been traumatized, their lives uprooted and shattered. Meanwhile, host countries (with the exception of prosperous Turkey) are straining to provide social services to refugee populations, who are taxing modest budgets and infrastructure. They are also struggling to manage the potentially explosive societal and political consequences of this massive influx—as well as the possible spillover of violence across their borders. It is the situation inside Syria, however, that is “most tragic”. While precise figures are impossible to come by, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center estimate that more than 3 million, or over fifteen percent, of Syria’s remaining population is internally displaced. More than four million [PDF] Syrians are in need of vital food and other assistance from UN agencies to survive. Particularly alarming are growing reports of mass atrocities committed by Assad’s military and, to a lesser degree, insurgents. On February 18, a special commission appointed by the Human Rights Council released a 131-page report documenting of widespread war crimes and crimes against humanity perpetrated by both government and opposition forces. Based on 445 individual interviews, the report details multiple instances of summary executions, massacres, targeting of civilians, abuse against children, and sexual violence. Yesterday, Zainab Hawa Bangura, a Sierra Leonean who serves as the UN’s special representative on sexual violence in conflict, provided the Security Council with what Britain’s UN ambassador termed a “disturbing” account of “the widespread use of sexual violence by the regime.” While both sides have committed atrocities, the Human Rights Council report is a scathing indictment of the regime’s strategy of punishing civilians perceived as sympathetic to the opposition: Indiscriminate and widespread shelling, the regular bombardment of cities, mass killing, indiscriminate firing on civilian targets, firing on civilian gatherings and a protracted campaign of shelling and sniping on civilian areas have characterized the conduct of the government. Based on this growing body of evidence, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, has repeatedly urged that the Syrian situation be referred to the International Criminal Court. But the UN Security Council, the one body that could authorize such a referral (since Syria is not party to the Rome Statute), has failed to do so, due to opposition from Russia and China. “It’s incredible the Security Council doesn’t take a decision, because crimes are continuing, and the number of victims is increasing day to day,” says Carla del Ponte, former chief prosecutor for the international criminal tribunals for Rwanda and Yugoslavia and a member of the special Human Rights Council commission on Syria. “Justice must be done.” Meeting in Rome with Syrian opposition leaders, Secretary of State John Kerry promised to expand “non-lethal” U.S. aid to those fighting Assad’s regime. While a welcome development, the Obama administration should take two additional steps to reduce human suffering in Syria and bring perpetrators of mass atrocities there to justice. First, the United States should increase its relief assistance both for refugees outside Syria’s borders and for those internally displaced within the country. Doing the former means directing more funds to UNHCR and other international agencies on the front lines. Doing the latter will require the United States (and other donors) to shift away from their current policy of directing relief assistance through the government of Damascus. As Kenneth Roth of Human Rights Watch notes, that approach guarantees that little aid gets to rebel-held areas. The new approach would entail expanding cross-border assistance with or without the consent of the Assad regime, so that it gets to the populations in most desperate need. Second, the United States should push the Security Council to refer the crisis in Syria to the ICC. By the beginning of the year, more than fifty UN member states had already called for this step, and several more EU leaders endorsed it last week. To be sure, Russia and China will likely cast vetoes against any such resolution. Nonetheless, there would be symbolic value in forcing a vote, likely to enjoy overwhelming support of the UNSC’s other members. The typical counterargument—that such a referral would be counterproductive, since it would only lead the Damascus regime to dig in its heels—seem untenable. When it comes to digging in, Assad is already up to his neck.
  • International Organizations
    Is the International Community Growing Apart?
    In this radio interview on From Washington Al Mundo of February 13, 2013, Dr. Stewart Patrick explains how and why the world is increasingly complicated as emerging democracies promote a diverse range of interests. Exploring issues of traditional power competition, cybersecurity, and the eurozone crisis, Patrick explains the current state of multilateral cooperation. He goes on to discuss the deadlock in the UN Security Council concerning the situation in Syria and explore governance issues in South America. [audio: http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/media/press/Stewart-Interview-FWAM-021313-part4.mp3]
  • Conflict Prevention
    A Conversation with Ambassador Frederick Barton
    Play
    As the United States prepares to withdraw forces from Afghanistan, and as the 10th anniversary of Operation Iraqi Freedom draws near, please join Rick Barton to discuss the future of U.S. civilian response.
  • Conflict Prevention
    A Conversation with Ambassador Frederick Barton
    Play
    Ambassador Fredrick Barton assesses challenges facing his bureau stemming from conflicts around the world.
  • Conflict Prevention
    Guest Post: Fighting Maritime Piracy: Mission Accomplished?
    Emma Welch is a research associate in the Center for Preventive Action and the International Institutions and Global Governance program at the Council on Foreign Relations. In early January, Mohamed Abdi Hassan—dubbed a “pirate kingpin” by the United Nations—announced his retirement from piracy. In his farewell press conference, Hassan explained: "After being in piracy for eight years, I have decided to renounce and quit, and from today on I will not be involved in this gang activity.” He added, "I have also been encouraging many of my colleagues to renounce piracy too.” Hassan may have an ulterior motive for quitting his career in piracy: business just isn’t what it used to be. In November 2008, pirates—reportedly led by Hassan—seized a Saudi tanker carrying over $100 million worth of oil. The tanker was released two months later, but only after the pirates negotiated a ransom of $3 million. Several months later, a Ukranian ship carrying weapons and ammunition was seized by the same group that ultimately claimed another handsome ransom. Oceans Beyond Piracy estimated that Somali piracy cost the global economy roughly $7 billion in 2011. The twin attacks catalyzed the UN Security Council to action in December 2008. Resolution 1846 called on states and regional organizations to use “all necessary means” to take preemptive act against piracy off the coast of Somalia. A few weeks later, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1851 to legitimize the use of force on land as well as sea. Ad hoc coalitions of states including the United States, United Kingdom, and the European Union began patrolling the Gulf of Aden as part of Combined Task Force 151, which was established to coordinate the various maritime operations in the region. Other countries ranging from China to Iran also deployed naval vessels to the Gulf of Aden. In May 2012, the European Union naval force took the unprecedented step of attacking a pirate base on the Somali coast, in the first land strike by external actors. Major shipping companies also worked with such coalitions to develop “best management practices” to prevent attacks by pirates, including traveling at full speed through high risk areas, installing physical barriers like razor wire, and removing ladders. In addition, private security teams have been hired to protect an estimated 40 percent of large commercial vessels in the Gulf of Aden and surrounding waters, at the cost of $45,000 for a four-man team. So far, these teams have a 100 percent success rate: no ship with armed guards aboard has been pirated. Thanks to increased international naval patrols in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, as well as the effective—albeit controversial—implementation of best practices and additional security, pirate attacks fell by over 30 percent from 439 in 2011 to 297 in 2012. The number of hostages also decreased markedly from 802 to 585 over the past year. The success in combating piracy in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean demonstrates that a relatively simple, coordinated policing regime is capable of delivering real results, particularly when it involves cooperation with the private sector. The bottom line for enterprising Somali pirates: risks are higher and rewards are lower. Despite these positive trends, it is premature to claim “mission accomplished” in the fight against piracy for several reasons. First, although attacks have dropped, they have only returned to levels witnessed in 2009, when the threat posed by piracy featured prominently on the international agenda. Second, criminal networks adapt and shift routes in response to enhanced policing and enforcement. In Somalia, pirates have pushed operations further offshore and beyond the Gulf of Aden. At the same time, the Gulf of Guinea off the coast of Nigeria has emerged as the new piracy hotspot. According to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), pirates in the Gulf of Guinea are considerably more violent than their counterparts in Somalia, and underreporting of attacks “continues to be a cause for concern.” Third, prosecution of apprehended pirates is weak. The special adviser to the UN secretary-general on piracy, Jack Lang, estimated that 90 percent of captured pirates are released because many governments have been reluctant to take on the prohibitive financial and logistical burdens of prosecution. (Case in point: Hassan, one of the most infamous pirates, is conducting high-profile press conferences with impunity, and some of his former “colleagues” have been offering their services as counterpiracy consultants.) For example, after Kenya signed bilateral agreements with the United States, United Kingdom, and Denmark, its courts and prison systems were quickly overwhelmed. Now, Kenya only accepts pirates for prosecution on a limited case-by-case basis. In 2010, the United States convicted five men of piracy for the first time since the Civil War, and Germany held its first piracy trial in over four centuries. Unfortunately, these success stories are few and far between. Although modern day piracy is dwarfed by its historical predecessors—when the nascent U.S. government paid nearly $1 million per year in ransom and tribute payments to the Barbary pirates—it still has profound implications for global commercial and security interests. Long-term and comprehensive solutions are needed to address the root causes of piracy. In the short term, however, states should work in partnership with the private sector to reduce the incentives of piracy by bolstering enforcement and improving prosecution mechanisms.
  • Conflict Prevention
    Can Egypt Survive Its Latest Crisis?
    Its economy is in terrible condition and state authority is apparently breaking down. It’s time to contemplate an intervention by Egypt’s military, says CFR’s Steven Cook.
  • International Organizations
    Collateral Damage: How Libyan Weapons Fueled Mali’s Violence
    Coauthored with Isabella Bennett, program coordinator in the International Institutions and Global Governance program. The violence that has plagued once-stable Mali since late 2011 should have come as no surprise to Western governments, for it is a direct function of NATO’s Libyan intervention. By adopting a “light footprint” approach in Libya, the alliance unwittingly contributed to a security vacuum that allowed countless weapons  to stream out of Libya and fuel insurgency, extremism, and crime in neighboring countries. One of these countries was Mali, where the flood of weapons from Libya helped a rebel coalition topple the democratically elected government in Bamako in May 2012 and—until the recent French intervention—allow a jihadist alliance to gain control over the country’s entire northeast. The relevant policy question is why neither the United States nor its international partners did anything to  staunch or mitigate the flow of Libyan weapons south. After all, Western policymakers were hardly ignorant of the danger. A surge in the illegal arms trade is common in postconflict scenarios, and policymakers were well-aware of the threat that Libyan weapons posed in a volatile region of fragile states unable (and a times unwilling) to police their frontiers. The U.S. intelligence community knew that Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi, the deposed Libyan leader, had filled “well over a thousand” arms depots. The collapse of his regime left behind “miles of unsecured warehouses filled with rockets, machine guns, ammunition, and antiaircraft systems.”  Time magazine reported that within hours after Qaddafi’s death on October 20, 2011, Tuareg fighters from Mali that had served as his mercenaries were speeding home with pickup trucks full of weapons from the dictator’s warehouses. By January 2012, a United Nations report warned that governments in the Sahel were struggling to address a “spike in weapons proliferation, organized crime, and terrorism.” Three months later, militants armed with the weapons flowing out of Libya orchestrated a coup in Mali. That was only the beginning of the turmoil, however. Taking advantage of the national political chaos, the weak reach of the central government, and their new access to arms, an alliance between jihadists—including the terrorist group al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Ansar Dine—with separatist Tuareg rebels, began to carve out a proto-state in the country’s northeast, imposing a draconian version of sharia law. By the end of 2012, these heavily armed elements were within striking distance of Bamako. Alarmed at the prospect of Mali becoming a permanent jihadist haven—and frustrated at delays in getting a UN-authorized force of African troops into the country–France launched an intervention on January 11, 2013. If observers were so conscious of the danger posed by Qaddafi’s weapons stockpiles, the question is: What could have been done to keep them out of the hands of militants and terrorists, and why wasn’t it done? From the outset, the Obama administration made it clear that the campaign in Libya would proceed with a “light footprint.” The international coalition would enforce a no-fly zone and conduct airstrikes to weaken Qaddafi’s forces, but let the Libyan rebels take responsibility for ground operations. As the air campaign wound down in August 2011, NATO issued a statement that the alliance would not deploy any troops to the country to help the Libyan National Transition Council (NTC) preserve law and order, stating that “It is a classic case for blue helmets.” Ian Martin, then the special representative of the UN secretary-general and head of the UN Support Mission in Libya, drafted a plan to help stabilize Libya in August 2011. It proposed “up to two hundred unarmed military observers plus an ‘interim protection force’ for the observers.” However, Martin soon informed the UN Security Council that the NTC had “rejected the idea of deploying any kind of international military force.” This resistance to a peacekeeping force was understandable: having come to power so recently, the victorious rebels were loathe to cede authority—and perceived sovereignty—to the United Nations. Unfortunately, the victorious Libyan rebels were also in no position, given their internal rivalries, to provide the basic security and rule of law that the country desperately needed. Implementing thorough security sector reform—including disarming militias, training new police and security forces, and establishing a functioning and accountable judiciary—would be the task of months and years. In such a context, controlling Libya’s arms depots and borders appears to have been an afterthought. To be sure, U.S. and NATO officials spoke with NTC leaders about securing Libya’s weapons stockpiles, and (according to an anonymous CNN interview with a NATO source) deployed intelligence officers to help the new authorities do so. But these discussions and operations appear to have focused overwhelmingly on securing Libya’s mustard gas and surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), rather than its massive stores of conventional arms. The Obama administration also provided a Swiss and a British nongovernmental organization with $1.5 million to prevent the proliferation of SAMs. (Both foundations had been working in the country to clear mines in Libya before the revolution.) Keeping chemical weapons and SAMs out of the hands of terrorists is of course crucial. But if there is a clear lesson of the Libyan experience for future military interventions, it is that such efforts cannot come at the expense of securing small arms and light weapons—which in this case undermined stability through the Middle East and North Africa. Moving forward, the United States should work with international partners and the United Nations to develop a new postconflict framework for securing weapons stockpiles—including but not limited to chemical weapons. It should also prioritize border control as a core task in reforming the security sectors of war-torn states. The United Nations should be in a position to offer such niche services and deploy trained personnel to accomplish these tasks, including where new authorities resist a fully-fledged outside peacekeeping force. More generally, the United States should work more assertively with international partners to control the illicit arms trade and associated criminal activities, that continue to destabilize states around the world. The French intervention in Mali may eliminate terrorist havens there, for example, but it is unlikely to eliminate the many regional pipelines, spanning West and North Africa, that transnational criminals have established to traffic in illicit weapons, as well as drugs and people. Clamping down on these established trafficking networks will require much better situational awareness, through a combination of remote sensing, investments in human intelligence, and information sharing among national governments. In one controversial proposal, U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) hopes to establish a drone base in the region to improve surveillance of illicit activities. But the United States should not ignore potential multilateral options, like having the the  UN Security Council direct the UN and its agencies (like the UN Office on Drugs and Crime) to monitor illicit arms flows in greater detail. According to Baffour Amoa, the president of the West African Action Network on Small Arms, third party assessments of legal weapons’ transfers in Niger could have identified stolen weapons from Libya and stopped them from falling into the hands of Malian rebels. Unfortunately, international proposals to tighten monitoring of the legal weapons trade—including through a new UN Arms Trade Treaty—have  failed in the face of ambivalence from China, Russia, and the United States. Finally, the spillover consequences of the Libyan intervention cast a pall over the “light footprint” model, suggesting that would-be intervenors should prepare themselves for regional blowback. Especially given the fiscal crises in NATO countries, leaders should invest in border control and control of weapons stockpiles to prevent the need for future, more costly interventions elsewhere. In the case of Mali, here’s hoping that the French mission includes attention to securing the country’s borders and its arms caches—and that the planned follow-on force of UN-mandated African peacekeepers, with U.S. and broader Western help, prioritizes the same tasks.
  • United States
    You Might Have Missed: Drones, Cyber, and Mythologies of Intervention
    Jill Lepore, “How Much Military is Enough?” New Yorker, January 28, 2013. Veit Medick, “Germany Plans to Deploy Armed Drones,” Spiegel Online International, January 25, 2013. Bowing to pressure from the German armed forces, the Bundeswehr, the federal government in Berlin is preparing to deploy armed, unmanned drones in foreign conflicts. In an answer to an official query made by the far-left Left Party, which has been obtained by SPIEGEL ONLINE, the German government wrote that its experience in foreign combat operations has made it clear that reconnaissance vehicles must be armed "in order to provide protection against sudden and serious changes in the situation." Rock Center, Interview with General Martin Dempsey, NBC, January 24, 2013. KOPPEL: We have capabilities today that make us sort of comfortable with the use of drones, but imagine if some other entity had the capability of using drones against the United States. Are we prepared for that? DEMPSEY: Yeah, I think we are prepared for that. I think it’s maybe an inevitability. KOPPEL: There’s another kind of warfare already being waged. Remember what Hurricane Sandy did to the power grid in lower Manhattan? A cyber attack would be even more devastating. There have been instances of our using cyber warfare; I’m going to say our using it, the United States, Israel, against Iran. There are also examples of the Iranians using it against us. DEMPSEY: There are reports that destructive cyber tools have been used against Iran. I’m not either confirming or denying any part in that. But what it should tell you is that capability exists. And if it exists, it doesn’t—you know—whoever is using those, can’t assume that they’re the only smart people in the world. KOPPEL: So if we, hypothetically speaking, are using it against the Iranians, we have to assume the Iranians would use it against us? DEMPSEY: That’s a valid assumption. Let me confirm that there is disruption—this was a phrase that may not be common knowledge, but disruptive denial of services, where you overwhelm a website in order to impede people who would normally use it from using it. It is literally disruption. That happens. “UN Counterterrorism Expert to Launch Inquiry into the Civilian Impact of Drones and Other Forms of Targeted Killing,” Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, January 24, 2013. Dan De Luce, “ How the United States Shapes the Military’s Big Screen Image,” AFP, January 22, 2013. Although the assistance offered to the "Zero Dark Thirty" crew sparked accusations that the White House used the movie as a propaganda tool, cooperation between Hollywood and the Pentagon or CIA is nothing new. The first film ever to win Best Picture at the Academy Awards, "Wings" in 1929, featured dogfight scenes with bi-planes thanks to help from the army. It was the beginning of a relationship that has grown over decades. The film industry covets access to hardware and expertise that only the armed forces can provide, while in return, defense officials want to burnish the military’s image on the big screen. The Pentagon’s criteria for justifying cooperation on any film or television project is loosely defined, but until recently has never been seriously questioned by Congress. "It just basically says: ’Is it something that might be of benefit for recruiting and retention? And/or is it something that might tell the American public more about the US military?" explained Philip Strub, who leads the Pentagon’s liaison unit with the entertainment industry. Paul Wolfowitz, “Hillary and ‘Leading from Behind,’” Wall Street Journal, January 22, 2013. It is perfectly understandable why the Obama administration wants to do nothing that would lead to a repetition of the invasion of Iraq. But no one is arguing for any such thing. The administration seems not to remember that the first Bush administration’s failure to protect Iraqi Shiites in 1991, when their uprising was crushed by Saddam Hussein, helped lead to a second war in Iraq 12 years later. Or that an international arms embargo kept the Bosnians defenseless for three years against the Serbs and led to American military intervention in 1995, including the stationing of tens of thousands of NATO peacekeepers in the Balkans. (3PA: On the day it was revealed that weapons from Libya were used in a terrorist attack that killed U.S. citizens in Algeria, former deputy secretary of defense Paul Wolfowitz criticized the Obama administration for refusing to arm Libyan and Syrian rebel groups. This paragraph contains two fundamental flaws. First, the George W. Bush administration never claimed that one of the (many) reasons for invading Iraq in March 2003 was the counterinsurgency campaign against the Shia uprising, which began in 1991 and lasted for several years. Second, the “international arms embargo” was widely and consistently violated by many countries—including by Iran and the United States, which was why the Bosnian Muslims were able to steamroll the Serbian armed forces on the ground—with the help of European artillery and an semi-enforced no-fly zone. For similar “mythologies” of intervention, read this.) David Wood, “Armed Drones Could Target President: Former U.S. Intelligence Chief,” Huffington Post, January 22, 2013. "I do fear that if al Qaeda can develop a drone, its first thought will be to use it to kill our president, and senior officials and senior officers," Blair said during a conference call with reporters. "It is possible without a great deal of intelligence to do something with a drone you cannot do with a high-powered rifle or driving a car full of explosives and other ways terrorists now use to try killing senior officials," he said. David E. Sanger, “Pursing Ambitious Global Goals, but Strategy is More,” New York Times, January 20, 2013. By comparison, Mr. Obama’s biggest accomplishments have been largely defensive: a full withdrawal from Iraq and devastating strikes against the core leadership of Al Qaeda. (When President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan visited the White House last week, he was presented a scorecard: of the “20 most wanted” Qaeda leaders when Mr. Obama was first inaugurated, 13 were dead, along with many of their successors.)