Conflict Prevention

Introduction Kenya is at risk of repeating the violence that marred its 2007 presidential election, during which 1,133 died and nearly 600,000 were displaced from their homes. Political order in Kenya nearly collapsed. Ending the crisis required two months of negotiations mediated by former UN secretary-general Kofi Annan and supported by the United States and its partners. The negotiations resulted in a power-sharing agreement between the two adversaries in the election, President Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga. Known as the National Accord, the deal elevated Odinga to the post of prime minister and provided for the writing of a new constitution to address the causes of the conflict. Kenya's next elections, to be held on March 4 and April 11, 2013, are arguably the most important and complex since the country's return to multiparty politics two decades ago. If the elections are largely peaceful and viewed as "free and fair," they will bring Kenya's new constitution, adopted in 2010, fully into force and advance the country's progress toward becoming a modern democratic state. Conversely, if the elections are marred by widespread violence and perceived as illegitimate by the Kenyan public, they are likely to plunge the country into a renewed period of political instability and set back Kenya's democratic advance. A breakdown in the electoral process will also do serious harm to Kenya's economy, which has been performing well in recent years. Since Kenya is the "anchor state" of East Africa, a prolonged political and economic crisis will also harm neighboring countries. In particular, two major U.S. foreign policy goals in the region—preventing Somalia from becoming a safe haven for terrorists and nurturing peace between Sudan and South Sudan—could be compromised. The United States, therefore, should work expeditiously with all parties concerned to ensure that the forthcoming elections are peaceful, free, and fair. The Contingencies Six factors make the prospects for electoral violence particularly high in the run-up to and in the immediate aftermath of the 2013 elections: As in prior elections, the leading presidential candidates are mobilizing voters along ethnic lines. This is resulting in a polarized electorate and outbreaks of violence between the members of rival ethnic groups. Kenyan politics have historically been contests in which the leaders of the country's largest ethnic groups form ethnic coalitions among themselves and with the leaders of smaller groups to dominate their rivals. Ethnic fault lines run deep because the country is divided into five large groups that constitute 68 percent of the population—the Kikuyu and related groups (21 percent), the Luhya (14 percent), the Kalenjin (13 percent), the Kamba (10 percent), and the Luo (10 percent). Interethnic violence between unemployed youth hired by rival politicians is already occurring in nearly a dozen areas. The race for the presidency is likely to be extremely close. Under its new constitution, Kenya has adopted a two-round runoff procedure to ensure that whoever is elected president will have received a majority of the vote. The current contest began with five major candidates campaigning for the post. Three have already dropped out after concluding that they would be eliminated in the first round scheduled for March 4. They have allied themselves with one of the present front-runners: Prime Minister Raila Odinga, a Luo and head of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), and Deputy Prime Minister Uhuru Kenyatta, a Kikuyu and the leader of the National Alliance party (TNA). Both seek victory in the first round, but the presence of a half-dozen minor candidates may force a runoff election. Kenya's forthcoming elections will be the most complex in its history, because of an expanded number of electoral positions. In addition to electing a president, Kenyans will directly elect 384 members of a new bicameral legislature, plus 47 governors and 47 county assemblies. The new county system of subnational government, which creates a quasi-federal governing process, could mitigate Kenya's long history of ethnic conflict by providing all groups, large and small, with a measure of power and resources. However, devolution also multiplies the arenas of electoral competition and the prospects for election-related violence in the near term, especially in counties with multiethnic populations. The Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) will be unable to prepare for the elections so that Kenyans can go to the polls with confidence. Due to delays in the procurement of required equipment and technical issues, the commission completed voter registration two months behind schedule. Moreover, the commission registered only 14.4 million, or 69 percent, of the more than 21 million Kenyans eligible to vote. The IEBC also faces major challenges with respect to the recruitment and training of up to 120,000 temporary workers to staff 29,000 to 40,000 polling stations, and the procurement and distribution of essential supplies such as ballots and ballot boxes. The IEBC is also responsible for educating voters on what will be a complex ballot, since Kenyans will be voting for six offices for the first time. Most important, the commission must address the principal failure of the 2007 elections by carrying out an accurate transmission and tabulation of the votes from thousands of polling stations to its results reporting center in Nairobi and by making a timely announcement of the results. Any further delays or missteps in meeting these challenges could force a postponement and/or undermine the legitimacy of the elections. Unfortunately, personal disagreements between the chair and the chief operating officer of the IEBC have also compounded its problems. Ongoing proceedings of the International Criminal Court (ICC) could complicate the presidential election and its outcome. One of the two leading candidates for president, Uhuru Kenyatta, and his running mate, William Ruto, the most prominent Kalenjin leader, have been indicted by the ICC for perpetrating interethnic violence between Kikuyus and Kalenjins following the 2007 elections. Their trials are scheduled to begin on April 10 and April 11, 2013, respectively, but neither is likely to travel to The Hague if they emerge victorious in the first round or are finalists in the second. Indeed, one major purpose of their alliance is to avoid trial. Their alliance also, ironically, raises the prospects for peace during this election cycle between their respective ethnic groups, the Kalenjins and the Kikuyus, who viciously attacked each other in 2007. The election of Kenyatta and Ruto, however, would most likely result in the United States, European Union states, and others that support the ICC process shunning them diplomatically. This could invoke a potentially hostile response from Kenyatta and Ruto and ultimately lead to Kenya's increased international isolation. Kenya lacks an adequate number of trained police. Kenya has approximately 70,000 police, or roughly 160 per 100,000 residents, which is less than three-quarters of the 220 per 100,000 recommended by the United Nations. Kenya's police are also widely regarded as corrupt and prone to human rights abuses. They were unable to contain the violence following the 2007 elections, and may not be sufficiently improved to deal with the challenges this time. Because there will be between 29,000 and 40,000 polling stations to which at least one officer must be deployed, the police will be stretched to the limit. This reality, coupled with the likelihood of violence in more areas than in the past, could create a situation in which the Kenya Defence Force is required to augment the police to maintain order. Such involvement would be the military's first deployment to maintain domestic order since independence. Three broad scenarios, each with its own variations, are presently conceivable for the 2013 elections: The IEBC conducts credible elections on March 4, and one of the presidential candidates, most likely Raila Odinga or Uhuru Kenyatta, wins or prevails in the runoff round scheduled for April 11. Outbreaks of violence are limited to rural areas and associated mainly with elections at the county level. Though this scenario was plausible a year ago, it is much less likely today. Raila Odinga remains the leading candidate, but he has lost popularity among ethnic groups other than his own. At the same time, Uhuru Kenyatta has gained popularity and could beat Odinga in a runoff, according to some recent public opinion polls. If the past is any guide, a close election is likely to be accompanied by violence between Kikuyus, who will mostly vote for Kenyatta, and Luos, who will mostly vote for Odinga. Violence by Kikuyu and Kalenjins against Luo breaks out after the Kenyan government arrests Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto to send them to the ICC. Because President Mwai Kibaki, a Kikuyu, firmly controls Kenya's security forces, such arrests are unlikely. Indeed, the arrests are only plausible if Kibaki and other senior Kikuyu political and business leaders conclude that their interests are best served by backing Musalia Mudavadi, a Luyha, whom they view as a benign, non-Kikuyu vehicle to defeat Odinga. These leaders face a difficult choice between maintaining their loyalty to a fellow Kikuyu by shielding Kenyatta from the ICC or forsaking him to avoid the international sanctions that will be levied on Kenya or selected members of its political class if Kenyatta is elected president or if the government of Kenya fails to honor its obligations under the Rome Statute. Senior Kikuyu leaders—who arguably control Kenya's economy—rightly worry that business and Kenya's international stature will suffer if the country elects a president the world shuns. Some also realize that it is not in the interests of the broader Kikuyu community to push for the election of a Kikuyu successor to Kibaki, as Kenyatta would be Kenya's third Kikuyu president out of four since independence. The IEBC continues to stumble in its preparations for the 2013 elections and fails to facilitate a credible process. Since more than 30 percent of the eligible electorate was not registered, civil society organizations protest their disenfranchisement and bring cases before the courts to force the continuation of registration. The IEBC also fails to meet its remaining challenges required for credible elections and thus is confronted with a painful choice between two unappealing alternatives. First, in mid-to-late February 2013, the IEBC panics, realizing that it cannot conduct competent elections without further preparation. It announces a ten-day-to-one-month postponement of the elections. Though the decision is sound from an operational standpoint, the political blowback is instantaneous as rival candidates accuse the IEBC of "rigging" the elections in favor of the other. The General Services Unit, Kenya's paramilitary police, puts down protests on Nairobi's streets, but not until after several protesters are killed. Second, due to fears of retribution if it postpones the elections, the IEBC decides to muddle through by proceeding with the elections on March 4 even though it knows it is not adequately prepared to conduct the process. Sporadic violence occurs in various areas as a result, and several returning officers are killed. The police are sent in to restore order but are unable to do so in many areas because of insufficient personnel. Order is restored after President Kibaki and the Kenya Defence Force's chief of staff reluctantly conclude that the army must be sent in to reinforce the police. Warning Indicators Indicators that the forthcoming elections will be marred by violence and regarded as illegitimate by most Kenyans are: Continued failure by the IEBC to meet critical deadlines to administer the elections. In addition to registering no more than 60 to 70 percent of the eligible electorate, the commission fails to complete one or more of the remaining critical tasks required for credible elections. Outbreaks of sporadic violence as election campaigns ramp up. Most election-related violence to date has been associated with county-level races (e.g., for governor and senator) rather than with presidential contests, as occurred in 1992, 1997, and 2007. Violence at these localized levels, though troubling, is more containable than violence arising from the presidential race. The likelihood that both types of violence will occur is difficult to estimate, but is arguably as high as 50 percent depending on which contingency scenario evolves between now and the elections. Formation of local militias supported by local political leaders. Armed militias are reportedly forming across Kenya, though the exact number and their political affiliations are unclear. Their formation is fueled by the influx of arms, including automatic assault rifles from Somalia and to a lesser extent Ethiopia. Renewal of hate speech, especially by politicians. Hate speech was a significant driver of the 2007 postelection violence. The caustic rhetoric was disseminated by mobile phones, especially via text messages, and encouraged by talk show hosts on ethnic-language radio stations—two dominant modes of communication for Kenyans. The new constitution and communications legislation now largely ban hate speech, and broadcasters are responsible for its propagation. All radio stations also have delayed broadcast devices so that hate speech can be blocked. Hate speech via text messages, however, is far more difficult to control, because it cannot be filtered out by network operators. Two political leaders have been indicted for hate speech, but neither has been convicted, with the result that the likelihood of hate speech continues to be a concern. Attempted acts of terrorism to disrupt the election. Kenya has had numerous, though isolated, terrorist attacks over the years, including the 1980 bombing of the famed Norfolk Hotel in Nairobi, the 1998 bombing of the U.S. embassy, and the 2002 bombing of an Israeli-owned hotel in Mombasa. The arrest of Somali terrorists in the Eastleigh area of Nairobi on September 17, 2012, which thwarted their alleged attempt to blow up the National Assembly, confirms the continuing threat of al-Shabab, the Somali affiliate of al-Qaeda, beyond the Indian Ocean coast. None of these attacks to date have threatened Kenya's stability, nor have they been explicitly directed at the elections, but this situation could change as the 2013 elections draw near. Heightened tensions between the Kenyan government and the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC). The MRC is a secessionist movement that argues that successive Kenyan governments have marginalized the peoples on the Indian Ocean coast. The MRC urges a boycott of the elections, and some of its members have attacked local offices of the IEBC. The government reimposed a ban on the MRC in October 2012 on the grounds that it was a threat to peace and security. However, the unbanning of the organization coupled with its participation in the forthcoming elections at the county level could diffuse the situation, because the elections hold out the possibility for more autonomy and resources from the center. Implications for U.S. Interests Although Kenya is not a major U.S. ally or trading partner, the United States nevertheless has significant strategic and foreign policy interests to protect. Because of Kenya's importance as a regional anchor state, the United States has long invested in its economic and political development. Washington has provided military assistance to Kenya for more than thirty years, while U.S. military aircraft and ships enjoy access to Kenya's international airports and seaport at Mombasa. The U.S. Mission in Nairobi is the largest in Africa, and it mounts a wide range of programs, including several that are regional in scope. These include diplomatic engagement with Somalia, the Regional Security Office, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Departments of Agriculture and Commerce, the Center for Disease Control, and the Library of Congress. Private U.S. investment is also growing in Kenya; several U.S. companies, including General Electric, IBM, and Google, have established or are in the process of establishing their African headquarters in Nairobi. Oil has recently been discovered near Lake Turkana in northern Kenya, and explorations are proceeding to determine the extent of offshore natural gas. These developments, coupled with the rapid expansion of Kenya's financial services industry and information technology sectors, provide a platform for further U.S. investment and other foreign direct investment if Kenya's stability is maintained. Any breakdown of the electoral process and political order in Kenya would also have major economic consequences in the region and jeopardize other U.S. objectives. Uganda, Rwanda, eastern Congo, and South Sudan are all landlocked areas that depend on Kenya for their external trade, especially for importing refined petroleum products and exporting goods through the Kenyan port of Mombasa. A stable Kenya is also essential for maintaining U.S. efforts to sustain the new but fragile governments in Somalia and South Sudan and continuing U.S. counterterrorism efforts against al-Shabaab along the Indian Ocean coast. Efforts by the African Union (AU) and other states to reestablish effective governance in Somalia seem to have finally gained traction and would be set back by Kenyan instability. Preventive Options The United States and other interested states have far less leverage over Kenyan domestic politics than they did two decades ago, when Western pressure forced Kenya's return to multiparty politics. The Kenyan government no longer depends as much on external aid to operate. Notwithstanding the flaws in the 2007 elections that brought it to power, the current coalition government is also democratically elected. Consequently, concerned states now need to rely more on their ability to persuade Kenya's political leaders that it is in their interests to ensure free, fair, and peaceful elections. In the lead-up to the election, six efforts appear most promising: The United States could lead a coalition of like-minded states to impress upon the Kenyan government that time is running out to make adequate preparations for a credible election, including enhancing the police's preparedness to prevent and contain violence. The ability of the United States and others to persuade Kenya's political leaders to take necessary actions has always been greatest when done multilaterally. Such multilateral messaging, however, has historically depended on the United States playing a leadership role. An informal contact group of donors, now known as the Democracy and Governance Donors Group, has existed since 1992, but its recent activities have been limited largely to discussions among technical experts on elections management, democracy assistance, and conflict prevention. These discussions need to be raised immediately to the chiefs of mission level to finalize and implement a coordinated action plan to develop a common strategy that aims to raise the prospects of a credible election. Kenya's international partners wield their greatest influence when they articulate concerns on a multilateral basis. The leading partners for coordinated action are the United Kingdom, Germany, Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, and especially the European Union. Strong messaging by other states in Nairobi should be buttressed by strong messaging from home. A joint or complementary statement or statements by U.S. president Barack Obama, UN secretary-general Ban Ki-moon, and other influential leaders would be particularly useful. Together with its partners, the United States could publicly announce its support for the continued diplomatic engagement in Kenya by Kofi Annan and the African Union Panel of Eminent African Personalities, which he chairs. Although Annan brokered the National Accord between President Mwai Kibaki and Prime Minister Raila Odinga that ended the 2007 postelection violence, his presence in Kenya has never been fully embraced by Kibaki's side of the coalition government, including presidential candidate and ICC indictee Uhuru Kenyatta. Annan's mandate and that of the panel could nevertheless be extended until after the elections. He and his colleagues constitute an African solution to a major African problem and provide a respected platform on which the United States and its partners can mount their own efforts. The United States can also work with its partners to provide whatever assistance the IEBC may still require for the elections, including the provision of outstanding equipment and supplies, and/or additional technical expertise to enable the commission to complete its outstanding tasks. The United States could continue funding programs via USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) to strengthen civil society organizations that focus on countering youth mobilization. Youth in conflict-prone areas—including Nairobi's slums, Eastleigh, the northwestern Rift Valley, Kericho, and the coast—are particularly vulnerable to being recruited by elites for the purpose of fomenting electoral violence. Strengthening civil society networks in these areas is arguably the most effective method to counter their mobilization. USAID should also continue its support of the Elections Observation Group (ELOG), a network of civil society organizations intending to provide domestic electoral observers. The United States could provide international assistance to strengthen Kenya's police to be better prepared for dealing with election-related violence as it unfolds. Put simply, Kenya needs to recruit, train, and deploy more cops. However, any assistance to build greater police capacity must be provided in a manner that does not perpetuate the poor record of the police with respect to human rights. The United States could encourage the United Kingdom to assist in this vital area since the UK has greater experience in providing this form of aid. Finally, the United States, along with like-minded partners, could mount an aggressive multilateral electoral observation mission consisting of two parts: long-term observation starting no later than January 15, 2013, to monitor preparations for the elections at all levels across Kenya and continuing through the end of the elections; and an exercise that would track outbreaks of violence before and after the elections. The Carter Center and/or the National Democratic Institute have the capacity to mount such observer missions, and the UN Electoral Assistance Division could be engaged to maximize coordination. Mitigating Options Given Kenya's electoral history, there will almost certainly be further incidents of violence in the run-up to the 2013 elections. Such violence will consist mainly of small-to-moderate outbreaks scattered across the country, which the Kenyan police—supplemented in extreme cases by the Kenya Defence Force—may still have the capacity to put down. Violence between the first and second rounds of the presidential election, or after the second round if the outcome is in doubt, is likely to erupt rapidly as it did in 2007. In such circumstances, the United States and others have few good options beyond applying diplomatic pressure and offering mediation assistance. Timely military intervention to prevent a major escalation of violence is not feasible. In contrast to West Africa, where the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has intervened in its region, there is no comparable organization in East Africa. The East African Community remains fragile and is unlikely to risk its future by moving into the military sphere. Authorizing and organizing an international coalition of the willing will be difficult and is unlikely to be consummated in time. To improve the ability of concerned states to respond promptly to a potentially rapidly deteriorating situation, one option would be to "pre-position" a multinational diplomatic mission in Nairobi on the eve of the presidential election. This could be headed by a special envoy of the UN secretary-general and contain representatives of the other leading external actors. It would be prepared and empowered to act quickly to bring a negotiated end to an emerging crisis and avoid the kind of drawn-out negotiations that occurred in 2007. Any pre-positioning of an international delegation from outside Africa should be preceded by the AU's reauthorization and perhaps enlargement of the Panel of Eminent African Personalities. The United States and its partners have few "sticks" to apply to encourage recalcitrant players to agree to a negotiated settlement. Two options, however, could be useful. The first is targeted sanctions against individual Kenyans, particularly members of the political class who incite violence, including visa bans and the freezing of their personal assets. To be effective, such measures would have to be extended to family members, especially children attending American and British universities. Visa bans might also be extended to prominent members of the business community known to support politicians involved in violence. Second, the United States could provide a clear warning that it will continue to support any investigations and ICC prosecutions if atrocities are committed again. Given other U.S. domestic and foreign challenges, there is likely to be little appetite in the Obama administration to take more extensive action. Recommendations The United States should impress upon Nairobi the importance of taking steps to prevent significant and widespread election violence. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's visit to Nairobi in August 2012 was a positive first step. It should now be complemented by the following initiatives: Bring together like-minded states to push the Kenyan government to make adequate preparations for credible elections. The message from Washington and its partners should be that further delays sow doubts about the grand coalition government's commitment to full implementation of the National Accord and 2010 constitution. These communications should include a joint or complementary message or messages from President Obama, Secretary-General Ban, and other influential world leaders who recognize the centrality of successful elections for Kenya's transition to democracy. Provide unequivocal support for the continued diplomatic efforts of the African Union's Panel of Eminent Personalities in Kenya by encouraging the AU to expand and reauthorize the panel through May 2013. Urge the panel to increase the frequency of its visits to Kenya in the run-up to the elections and pre-position the panel in Kenya on the eve of the first vote and through the runoff to more quickly address any breakdown in the process. Rapidly provide any assistance that the IEBC may require to administer credible elections. The assistance could include helping the IEBC with voter education initiatives and with recruiting and training the 120,000 temporary poll workers potentially needed. It could also come in the form of providing technical expertise or funding and logistical support for the commission's procurement and deployment of needed supplies, such as ballots and ballot boxes. The need and likely impact of such aid should be reviewed case by case. Extend the current program by USAID OTI to strengthen civil society efforts to prevent election-related violence in conflict-prone areas, and integrate the new programs by the Department of State's Bureau of Conflict Stabilization Operations with those of OTI so that the two agencies do not work at cross-purposes. Encourage the United Kingdom and other countries with greater police-training expertise and experience than the United States to assist the Kenya police to strengthen and perhaps expand its numbers so it is not overwhelmed by the forthcoming elections as it was in 2007. Authorize, fund, and initiate a robust and coordinated international electoral observation mission to monitor preparations for the elections, the conduct of the elections, and the reporting of the results. The mission, in coordination with efforts by domestic observers, should include parallel vote tabulation, or PVT, to increase the likelihood of an honest and timely reporting of results. It could also monitor those outbreaks of violence that occur before and after the elections. Join with like-minded governments, particularly the United Kingdom, to impose visa bans and asset freezes on members of Kenya's political class who incite violence and engage in demagogic behavior. The United States and others may have limited leverage over Kenya's domestic politics, but they are not without options that would significantly improve the prospects for acceptable elections and help avert a major crisis. However, with little more than two months before the elections, Washington must intensify its engagement or forsake its opportunity to make a difference.

In March 2015, the author wrote an update to this memo to reflect recent developments in Venezuela. Read the update. Introduction In the coming months, Venezuela could experience significant political unrest and violence that lead to the further curtailment of democracy in the country. Presidential elections are scheduled to take place on October 7, 2012. President Hugo Chavez is in the midst of a tough reelection campaign against Henrique Capriles Radonski—the young and energetic governor of the state of Miranda—who enjoys multiparty support and appears to have a better chance of defeating the incumbent than earlier challengers. Over the course of the past year, Chavez and several of his most senior associates have asserted that there will be instability and violence if he is not reelected. At the same time, Chavez is battling cancer, but he has shared little information with the public about the state of his health beyond the fact that he has twice been treated for the disease since spring 2011. Speculation about Chavez's health problems has generated considerable uncertainty among his supporters, especially since he has not anointed a successor. Should Chavez appear to be losing the election, die suddenly, or withdraw from public life for health reasons, tensions are likely to rise in Venezuela, especially if the public suspects that Chavez has used extra-constitutional means to preclude or invalidate an opposition victory in order to sustain his regime's hold on power. Protests over such actions, which could turn violent, may in turn lead to the imposition of martial law and the further curtailment of democratic rights in Venezuela. This would almost certainly trigger a major political crisis in the Western Hemisphere that pits countries seeking to restore democracy and the rule of law in Venezuela—including the United States—against those who support Chavez and the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other states. Longstanding U.S. efforts to promote good governance in Latin America as well as cooperation on a range of political, economic, and security challenges in the region would be threatened as a consequence. Accordingly, the United States should seek free and fair elections in Venezuela. If Chavez or a replacement candidate is defeated, it should offer to help promote an orderly, peaceful transition. If Chavez is reelected in a process judged acceptably free and fair, the United States should seek to reset the bilateral relationship with an eye toward the eventual renewal of high-level communication on areas of mutual interest. If the election results appear fraudulent or apparently legitimate results are nullified, the United States should encourage international pressure to restore democracy and suspend bilateral business as usual until a legitimate government is restored. The Contingency Political unrest leading to a suspension of democracy before or after the upcoming elections in Venezuela is not inevitable. If Chavez can participate in the campaign and win convincingly in what is accepted as a free and fair election, while seeming sufficiently healthy to govern, the opposition will likely concede and violence will be avoided. If Capriles wins convincingly, is recognized internationally as the victor, and can reassure Chavistas of his intention to work for the benefit of all, trouble also may be averted. Although Chavez has indicated he will respect the results of the election, most plausible scenarios for instability and conflict in Venezuela derive from the premise that the Chavistas will not willingly surrender power and would be willing to provoke violence, orchestrate civil unrest, or engage in various forms of armed resistance to avoid doing so. This is the real danger surrounding the current campaign and it extends beyond the election itself because of the questions concerning Chavez's health. There is nothing to indicate the opposition has the will, wherewithal, or weapons to challenge the Chavistas through violence. That said, student-led protests over the closing of the national television channel RCTV set the stage for the defeat of the Chavez-sponsored constitutional referendum of 2007. There is no evidence to suggest any opposition effort to arm or organize militarily. Chavez, on the other hand, has worked assiduously to inculcate supporters with the notion that a Capriles victory would be achievable only through deception, collusion with the remaining independent media, and covert U.S. support. The Chavez government also insists that an opposition victory would result in the termination of the popular Chavista social programs known as Misiones Bolivarianas (commonly known as misiones) and would return to power the elites who had earlier governed Venezuela. Chavez has added huge numbers of workers to the government payroll and extended direct government benefits to many other low-income Venezuelans. Further complicating matters, Chavez has announced an economic plan for his next term that would accelerate dismantling the private sector economy, putting those who defend democratic pluralism, free enterprise, and private property on notice of his intention to complete Venezuela's transformation into a socialist state. More than a year ago, his brother Adan Chavez, governor of the state of Barinas, publicly advised Chavez's supporters that they might need to defend the Bolivarian Revolution by force of arms. Given current circumstances in Venezuela, several plausible scenarios could trigger significant political unrest that degenerates into violence: Chavez's defeat on October 7 looks likely before the election. Street violence erupts either spontaneously or at the instigation of Chavez's allies in the government. The government declares a state of emergency and postpones the election. The suspension of civil liberties following such a declaration may last for ninety days and can be renewed. The state-controlled media would likely endorse the temporary imposition of martial law as necessary to preserve order and the revolution. Such actions, however, could precipitate widespread clashes with opposition supporters, particularly where there are military and National Guard deployments. Chavez wins the election—or plausibly claims to win—and almost immediately dies or withdraws from public life for health reasons. A state of emergency is declared. New elections are required but also new candidates. Since none of Chavez's chief lieutenants appears to enjoy sufficient public support to assure election, cracks begin to appear in the Chavista movement that prove difficult to reconcile. It is also possible that the opposition splinters. In many respects Chavez holds the opposition together much as he does his own coalition. The election is held and Capriles wins. Government workers and the beneficiaries of misiones riot before Capriles can be inaugurated. An apparently lame-duck Chavez declares a state of exception and postpones the inauguration. The perception that the government had manufactured a justification for setting aside a Capriles victory would lead to widespread demonstrations by Capriles supporters. An angry, resurgent opposition, convinced it was in danger of having its triumph stolen, would be vulnerable to Chavista provocation. Clashes between opposition supporters and the Chavista faithful would occur. Capriles wins and is inaugurated. Strikes by Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) oil workers paralyze oil production. Chavistas at all levels of government resist the new administration's efforts to implement its own programs and/or jettison moribund Chavista projects. Government workers are encouraged by Chavista media to see Capriles's efforts to cut the government's swollen payroll as a purge. This is particularly likely at PDVSA, the state oil company, which has doubled its workforce since the strike of 2003 even though oil production has stagnated at well below pre-strike levels. The military intervenes, and supporters of the new government take to the streets. The election is held and the results are too close to call or are unacceptable to the government. The Electoral Tribunal delays announcing the results. Both the opposition and Chavez's supporters take to the streets. The Chavista base fears a loss while the government seeks a way to avoid acknowledging a defeat. The opposition fears a manipulated outcome. The Council of State or the somewhat vaguely constituted Anti-Coup Command denounces efforts to subvert the election or destabilize the country while Chavez or an interim president declares a state of exception. Street violence erupts and is attributed to the opposition. Although the government has enjoyed extraordinary advantages in terms of both resources and media access, most observers expect the vote count on election day to be largely accurate given the experience of the legislative elections of 2010 and the referenda votes of 2007 and 2009. The great unanswered question is how the government will react if it appears Chavez has lost. Unrest and violence, should it occur, is likely to be concentrated in the cities and to take the form of a rise in street protests and a spike in violent criminal activity—Venezuela has one of the world's highest homicide rates—accompanied by political hooliganism and possibly sabotage of public services. The point of instigated violence would be the creation of circumstance sufficient to justify a suspension of civil liberties, postponement of the election, or, following a vote, invalidating the results of October 7. Spontaneous violence emanating from Chavez's supporters remains a real possibility if it appears that the Bolivarian movement has or is about to suffer a reverse at the polls. A preemptive move by the military cannot be categorically ruled out but seems unlikely unless the security situation in the major cities threatens to unravel. Another possible aim of any Chavista-choreographed instability, if recognition of defeat were unavoidable, would be to force a brokered transition to an opposition administration such as occurred in Nicaragua following the election of Violeta Chamorro. Warning Indicators A range of developments could indicate one of the aforementioned scenarios for violence. Chavez dies or an announcement is made that his death is imminent. The possibility of violence would be particularly high if Chavez died or announced his resignation for medical reasons after being reelected. Violent crime is allowed to surge in the major cities before the election. Irregular armed groups violently harass the opposition and/or seek to disrupt Capriles's political events. Weapons are distributed to the militia. Military units are repositioned. After the abortive coup of 2002 (though not immediately after), Chavez created a national militia, organized outside the formal military chain of command and drawn from the social and economic strata in which Chavez's support is strongest. Weapons for the militias, however, remain under the control of the regular military. Arming the militia would be tantamount to putting military weapons in the hands of the Chavista base. Basic food items disappear. Private businessmen are accused of hoarding and their businesses are expropriated. Stocks of staples are perpetually low at present in Venezuela because of Chavista penalties for hoarding in reaction to price controls. Remaining independent media are closed and/or prominent journalists are detained. The independent media have been under pressure by Chavez since 2006. Most that remain are critical of the government. Sharp divisions within Chavismo surface publicly, suggesting insiders know Chavez is failing. There are persistent rumors of tensions among prominent senior Chavistas, several of whom have been perceived as jockeying to position themselves as Chavez's logical successor. A senior political figure close to either Chavez or Capriles is assassinated. Though the homicide rate in Venezuela is high, political assassination is rare. Local supplies of gasoline are interrupted. Most Venezuelans, especially poorer Venezuelans, consider cheap (pennies per gallon) gasoline a birthright. Efforts to raise prices in 1989 caused violent riots in the capital. The government via PDVSA controls the supply of gasoline, and an interruption of supply would likely enrage segments of the population. Implications for U.S. Interests Political instability and violence in Venezuela would damage U.S. efforts to promote democracy, increase regional cooperation, combat narcotics, and protect its economic interests in the region. Democracy Promotion: The United States has worked for decades to promote democracy in the Western Hemisphere. In recent years, Chavez has become increasingly authoritarian, undermining important political institutions, giving more powers to the presidency, and weakening both civil society and the independent media. The United States should view a suspension or further deterioration in the quality of Venezuela's democracy as a setback for U.S. policy and for the hemisphere. The emergence of a military junta or a compromised Chavez regime would also likely increase Iranian and Cuban influence in Venezuela. It already has a close relationship with Iran from which it reportedly receives advanced weapon systems and other assistance. Cuba sends thousands of teachers and technical, medical, and security advisers in exchange for an estimated ninety to one hundred thousand barrels of oil per day. Regional Cooperation: The United States has an interest in nurturing regional cooperation particularly under the auspices of the Organization of American States (OAS), of which it is a core member. While often disappointing to both the United States and Latin America, the OAS provides the only regional forum in which all of the countries with democratically elected governments participate. A failure by the OAS to play an effective role in Venezuela if it appears democracy is at risk would further undermine support for the organization both in the region and in the United States. How the United States manages its relations with Venezuela if violence does break out would likely affect U.S. relations with others in the hemisphere, especially Brazil, which has cordial relations with Chavez and reacts badly to perceived U.S. efforts to dictate to Latin America. A repetition of the acrimony that characterized the hemisphere's efforts to resolve the Honduras crisis of 2009 would be corrosive to U.S. relations with the region. Counternarcotics: Venezuela does not cooperate with the United States on counternarcotics, except at the most minimal level. Drug trafficking has, consequently, surged. A number of Venezuelan military officers, including the current minister of defense, have been plausibly accused by the U.S. Treasury of cooperating with the Colombian insurgent group Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and facilitating drug shipments through Venezuela, especially from Apure State. Venezuelan recalcitrance in counternarcotics clearly undermines other regional efforts to combat the drug trade. Even low levels of violence would create new opportunities for the FARC and other drug traffickers to retrench and extend their reach. Economic Interests: A significant number of U.S. companies have operations in Venezuela; it remains an important market for U.S. goods and some services, especially oil services. Many of these companies could be at risk if violent internal conflict broke out. Venezuela is consistently among the five largest foreign suppliers of oil to the United States. The United States is Venezuela's largest market, buying up to nine hundred thousand barrels of oil daily, up to 45 percent of Venezuela's total oil exports. Around six hundred thousand barrels of Venezuelan crude per day are refined at CITGO facilities in the United States. Although a cut off of Venezuelan oil to the United States is theoretically possible, it is unlikely given Venezuela's dependence on the U.S. market. The United States is now less vulnerable to a cut off of supply from Venezuela as U.S. domestic production has risen and imports from elsewhere could relatively quickly replace Venezuelan oil. Venezuela's economy, on the other hand, has become more dependent on petroleum. Although production has stagnated since 2003, oil accounts for over 95 percent of Venezuela's export earnings, and export revenue pays for nearly 50 percent of the government's budget. Thus, although Venezuela is vulnerable to pressure via its dependence on its oil exports generally and the U.S. market and refineries specifically, global markets would likely react negatively to either an interruption of Venezuelan production or a crisis in U.S.-Venezuelan relations that threatens the bilateral trade in oil. Preventive Options Two factors seem most likely to dissuade leading Venezuelan actors from violence: scrutiny of the electoral process and a clear sense that the rest of the Western Hemisphere would not countenance an attempt to subvert or set aside the outcome of a legitimate vote. All Western Hemisphere international organizations make having a fully functioning democracy a necessary precondition to full participation. Chavez's influence (beyond oil revenue) has always rested in large part on the perception that he is legitimately elected and enjoys a popular mandate. The options to prevent instability in Venezuela include the following: Regional/Bilateral: The United States could urge Brazil, Colombia, and other countries in the region to press for transparency and compliance with the highest possible standard of election administration and to press Venezuela to permit exit polling, quick counts, and other mechanisms for independent validation of the electoral results. Brazil, in particular, has influence with the Chavez government and seeks to play more of a leadership role globally and in the hemisphere. Instability, violence, or an interruption of democracy in Venezuela would hurt Brazil's geopolitical ambitions as well as its extensive business interests. It would also be problematic for the Southern Common Market (Mercosur), which recently made Venezuela a full member. (Mercosur requires members to be fully functioning democracies and recently suspended Paraguay after the Senate there removed the sitting president under circumstances that other members considered questionable.) Extra-regional: The EU (and especially Spain), Japan, and China all have significant investments in Venezuela that would be at risk in the event of an internal conflict. Interested stakeholder countries could be encouraged to make clear that free and fair elections in Venezuela, and an orderly transition if Chavez loses, are important to the global community. (China, however, while having a growing stake in the Venezuelan economy, is unlikely to agree to pressure Caracas.) Electoral authorities in democratic capitals could be encouraged to review with the media the criteria for judging the quality of election administration. Multilateral: The Venezuelan government declined to invite substantial international observation and the deployment of a robust international mission is most likely impractical now except for the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). Nevertheless, the United States and other hemispheric partners could press the OAS to insist that the Venezuelan government permit the accreditation of interested diplomats and other volunteers as election observers and to permit international media–facilitated access to voting sites. In the event a new election was necessary for any reason, the OAS could push for early deployment of an international observer mission. (International observation and other steps to guarantee transparency were precisely the elements Chavez considered necessary for a free and fair election when he first ran for the presidency in 1998.) Mitigating Options In the event that the government either orchestrates or takes advantage of a violent popular reaction to Chavez's defeat, death, or incapacitation to suspend civil liberties and govern under a renewable state of exception, the United States could take or encourage several steps in order to accelerate a return to democracy. The likelihood of success for unilateral U.S. efforts is low; multilateral efforts that include other important regional players are far more likely to influence Venezuelan behavior. Diplomatic Options Together with like-minded nations, the United States could demand that the OAS declare Venezuela in breach of its obligations as a signatory of the Inter-American Democratic Charter and encourage a secretary-general–led mission to Caracas. (Note: It would be difficult to generate a consensus condemnation of Venezuela at the OAS but the secretary-general can undertake such a mission on his own authority. A secretary-general–led mission would still require Venezuelan acquiescence to enter the country.) Venezuela would understand that if regional and subregional organizations determine that the country is no longer a functioning democracy, it will be suspended, as has happened recently with both Honduras and Paraguay. The United States could bring the issue of Venezuelan democracy to the United Nations Security Council and urge the UN to endorse a fact-finding mission or to explicitly endorse regional efforts to restore democracy. With other international partners, including the European Union, the United States could support offers to mediate. If it proves difficult to get the OAS or UN involved in mitigation efforts, the United States could propose a delegation of foreign ministers to travel to Caracas to engage the Venezuelan authorities. The United States could suspend visas for all individuals (officials and nonofficials, government and opposition) perceived to be involved in precipitating violence or undermining democracy; or suspend normal visa adjudication services at the U.S. embassy pending a resolution of the crisis. Economic and Financial Options In the event of violence or an interruption of democracy, the United States could freeze individual bank accounts of key figures involved or responsible and seize assets in the United States. It could also arrange for the proceeds of Venezuelan government–owned corporate entities like CITGO to be held in escrow accounts until democracy is restored and encourage other important trading partners (i.e., Canada, Spain, France, Brazil) to do the same. If other forms of pressure fail to have an effect, the United States could block access to CITGO's refining facilities in the United States and consider prohibiting PDVSA oil sales to the United States while the government's status is uncertain. Military Options The United States could encourage other Latin American militaries, as well perhaps as the Spanish, to communicate to the Venezuelan military the importance of complying with constitutional mandates, respecting human rights, and preserving democracy. While Chavez loyalists dominate the Venezuelan high command, it is not clear to what extent they control the middle ranks. Nor is it clear to what extent the military's loyalty to Chavez's Bolivarian movement would trump other considerations. In the abortive coup of 2002 the military temporarily removed Chavez but also restored him to power. Direct military involvement appears inappropriate. The United States has never unilaterally intervened militarily in a South American internal conflict (criticisms of Plan Colombia notwithstanding) and to do so now would likely unite most of South America behind Chavez and/or his successor. Most Latin American countries are profoundly reluctant to intervene or even comment on the internal affairs of their hemispheric neighbors. Even multilateral military intervention in any but the direst circumstances (Haiti) is all but unthinkable. Recommendations As the election approaches, the United States needs to emphasize publicly as well as privately the importance for the hemisphere of free and fair elections in Venezuela. The United States should restate its interest in renewing cooperation in areas such as counternarcotics and emphasize the continuing complementarities of the U.S. and Venezuelan economies. While the United States should emphasize the U.S. view that only Venezuelans can solve Venezuela's political problems, it should also encourage democratic countries in the region to make clear the hemisphere's concern that democracy be preserved, basic political liberties be respected, including press freedom, and violence be avoided. The importance of transparency in administration of the elections and verification of results should be stressed. At the same time, U.S. policymakers should avoid feeding the Chavista narrative that the United States is plotting the overthrow of the Bolivarian Revolution. More specifically, the United States should take the following steps as soon as possible: Reach out to important regional and extra-regional partners now to gauge their likely response to instability, particularly those countries that would be most directly affected (i.e., Brazil, Colombia, and the EU), and convey a sense of the range of options the U.S. government would entertain in the event of an outbreak of violence and/or interruption of democracy. It will be particularly important to engage Brazil and its Mercosur partners early because of their close relations with Chavez to minimize the possibility of misunderstandings arising between them and the United States. This should include proactively sharing information that would signal Venezuelan preparations for violence or manipulation of the electoral outcome. Begin identifying important actors (military and civilian officials as well as opposition figures) now whose visas would be canceled and accounts frozen in the event that they are linked to political violence and/or an interruption of democracy. Work to build awareness at the UN, in Europe, and in Japan of what is happening in Venezuela and attempt to organize a coalition of partners to limit an illegitimate Venezuelan administration's access to government assets held abroad as well as to the international financial system. Continue to stress directly to the Venezuelan government as well as publicly that the United States will accept and be prepared to work with a legitimately elected government, including one headed by Hugo Chavez or a Chavista successor, provided the election is free, fair, and constitutional. Leverage defense department contacts in Latin American and Spanish armed forces to communicate to the Venezuelan military leadership that they are obliged to uphold their constitution, respect human rights, and protect their country's democratic tradition.