• Yemen
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  • Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
    American Military Leadership in the Middle East
    Play
    Former CENTCOM Commanders David Petraeus and Anthony Zinni discuss the military aspect of the Israel-Hamas war and lessons learned from U.S. involvement and operations in the Middle East.
  • International Law
    Three Challenging Policy Issues for the Prosecutor in the Israel-Hamas Situation
    The chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC),[1] Karim A. A. Khan,[2] faces several challenging policy issues in the months ahead regarding the Israel-Hamas situation.[3] In this comment I examine three of those issues. I. Role of the Prosecutor Prosecutor Khan made two particularly important public statements about the Israel-Hamas situation following October 7, 2023. The first was an address he delivered in Cairo on October 29, 2023, the text of which was published in The Guardian on November 10, 2023.[4] Khan’s address in Cairo immediately followed his visit to the Rafah crossing at the border between Gaza and Egypt. Khan was quite expansive in Cairo about the obligations of the contentious parties and how they can be held responsible under the Rome Statute. His remarks were aimed at both Israel and the State of Palestine (Palestine), including Hamas. Khan’s second statement occurred on November 17, 2023, in The Hague when he announced the referral by five ICC States Parties of the Israel-Hamas situation to the ICC.[5] These are the same countries (South Africa, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Comoros and Djibouti) that filed a case[6] under the Genocide Convention[7] before the International Court of Justice on December 29, 2023, seeking to hold Israel accountable under that Convention and requesting provisional measures against Israel. In his statement, Khan confirmed that he was extending his investigation (initially commenced on March 3, 2021 concerning “acts committed since June 13, 2014 in Gaza and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, which would constitute crimes under the Rome Statute.”) “to the escalation of hostilities and violence since the attacks of October 7, 2023. In accordance with the Rome Statute, my Office has jurisdiction over crimes committed on the territory of a State Party and by nationals of such a State.” He called “on all States Parties to the Rome Statute to provide us with the resources we need to enable us to effectively fulfill our mandate for all situations we examine.” In my view, Khan need not and should not say more publicly other than cryptic confirmations that his investigations continue. He needs to build trust among a wide range of governments, many of which are non-party States of the Rome Statute, such as Israel, the United States, Turkey, most Arab countries, and influential nations like China, Russia, India, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, and Indonesia. These countries need to understand that his office is investigating objectively, with no political agenda, and that those investigations will proceed under the auspices of a Court that they have not joined. That trust will be attained with communications in private and diplomatic channels. There will be more than enough to say publicly in the event the ICC issues arrest warrants in this situation. Further, Khan likely is reaching out to several non-party States, particularly the United States and Israel, for cooperation in the collection of evidence, including from intelligence sources. In his statement of November 17, 2023, he missed the opportunity to highlight the importance of cooperation from non-party States, particularly those with unique capabilities. He nonetheless should explore those opportunities quietly and diplomatically with such countries. Since the United States is cooperating with Khan on the provision of intelligence relating to the Russia-Ukraine war (fought between two non-party States of the Rome Statute), there will be protests of double standards unless Washington acts in a similar fashion regarding the Israel-Hamas war (fought between Hamas, part of one State Party, the State of Palestine, and one non-party State, Israel).[8] The best way for Khan to address that politically sensitive issue with the United States will be to do so discreetly and tactfully in the months ahead. II. Article 18 Notification Khan may have acted already in this respect, but just to check the box: Pursuant to Article 18 of the Rome Statute, the Prosecutor presumably has notified Israel, in particular, of the investigation now underway regarding the Israel-Hamas situation.[9] That is an important notification as it should incentivize Israel to demonstrate that it is investigating, for example, claims of war crimes allegedly committed by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and the Israeli political leadership as well as public statements by government and military officials allegedly inciting genocide. Khan should privately encourage Israeli officials to undertake a comprehensive domestic investigation of Israeli actions. Granted, this will be a difficult step for Israel whose population is traumatized by the October 7 intervention and atrocities by Hamas militants.[10] Most Israelis at this point will have little tolerance for self-reflection about the conduct of the IDF.[11] But everyone will need to recognize the important role for the rule of law being followed by all actors. While under Article 18(3) of the Rome Statute the Israeli investigation would be “open to review by the Prosecutor six months after the date of deferral,” if the Israeli investigation is being undertaken in good faith and diligently, then Khan should use his discretion under his own “review” to extend the period of time that Israel would continue to conduct its domestic investigation prior to continuing his own full-scale investigation. This would conform with principles of complementarity under the Rome Statute. Khan also presumably has delivered an Article 18 notification to the State of Palestine, whether that means to officials of the Palestinian Authority or the Palestine Liberation Organization. Such notification might prove pro forma as the judicial system in Palestine likely would struggle with any widescale investigation.[12] However implausible the procedure, nothing prevents officials of Palestine seeking foreign assistance, including even from Israel, to investigate the actions by Hamas on Israeli territory on October 7 and in the use of human shields during the combat in Gaza, the taking and holding of hostages in Gaza following the October 7 assault, and the commission of any other war crimes under the Rome Statute. All of these acts presumably will be under investigation by Khan, so Palestine has the choice whether or not to weigh in with its own investigations of Hamas’s conduct. Palestine should be as mindful of complementarity, and the risks of ignoring it, as any other State Party of the Rome Statute. III. Negotiated Settlement Khan and his staff should be strategizing how he will navigate any evolving diplomacy for a negotiated settlement among Israel and Palestinian representatives (however composed among the Palestinian Authority, Palestine Liberation Organization, and/or Hamas) and major foreign players such as the United States, key Arab states, the European Union, and the United Nations. Every party to those talks, other than probably Israel as long as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu remains in power,[13] will insist on the two-state solution[14] as a major objective. What will be the fate of international criminal justice in such talks? There might be strong pressures to keep justice issues completely separate from the diplomatic talks. Given the allegations and disinformation swirling around October 7 and the aftermath, it might prove very problematic how justice would even be discussed among the negotiators.[15] Isolating accountability for atrocity crimes from peace objectives would leave Khan free to pursue his investigation and uphold the prospect of ICC arrest warrants. Such segregation of justice from peace, however, may prove implausible, as the two goals of peace and justice seem destined to become intertwined given the way atrocity crimes presently dominate the situation both on the ground and in international courts, namely the ICC and the ICJ. But if the segregation of peace from justice is the chosen path, then Khan simply could plod his way through investigations and ultimately persuade the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC to approve arrest warrants, and then let the chips fall where they may. The more likely prospect is that justice will be factored into negotiations that center on permanently ending hostilities and forging a two-state solution. The victim populations of atrocity crimes will expect justice to be addressed in the talks and doubtless will protest strongly the absence of accountability in the settlement. But the negotiations will compel tough decisions on modifying perfect justice with imperfect justice (or none at all) in order to reach the two-state solution. Khan may choose to engage with the negotiators in order to preserve the ICC’s equities. It would not be surprising if one or more of the following options arise during the talks: First, Israel and Palestine could agree, upon normalization of relations, to enter into a non-surrender agreement described by Article 98(2) of the Rome Statute whereby neither country would surrender an individual under an ICC arrest warrant to the ICC without gaining the consent of the “sending State” of that individual.[16] Such an agreement would not be so different from probable realities. As a non-party State, Israel would not want to surrender anyone, and particularly not an Israeli citizen, to the ICC. Palestine would want to avoid the surrender of any individual (most likely from Hamas) within Palestine to the control of the ICC. While such an agreement would impair the ICC’s power to prosecute alleged perpetrators of atrocity crimes in the Israel-Hamas situation, the Article 98(2) non-surrender agreement could become a compelling means in the negotiations to essentially take the ICC off the table and focus on the two-state solution. Nothing would prevent ultimately bringing Hamas leaders to justice in Israel if captured and brought to Israel to stand trial in Israeli courts. Israel, almost certainly, would never immunize them from possible prosecution, particularly for the atrocity crimes perpetrated by Hamas on October 7. In a conditional reciprocal fashion, future Palestinian courts might try to prosecute Israeli citizens for actions taken prior to the peace agreement unless explicitly deprived of that power in the peace agreement as a pre-condition to Israeli recognition of the State of Palestine. These would be difficult trade-offs to negotiate, but they need not necessarily implicate Khan and the ICC as these issues focus on justice rendered by national courts (Israel or Palestine) and not the ICC. But Khan should factor in any such developments in his review of complementarity efforts, if any, by prosecutors and courts in Israel and Palestine. Finally, the negotiations for the end of hostilities and implementation of the two-state solution could raise the prospect of the UN Security Council acting in a manner consistent with the objective set forth in Article 16 of the Statute, namely that: No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this Statute for a period of twelve months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested the Court to that effect; that request may be renewed by the Council under the same conditions.[17] Israel and Palestine may find this option attractive during the negotiations so as to shelve the ICC for at least one year, perhaps more, if that would mean achieving a permanent end to hostilities and the co-existence of two nations—Israel and Palestine—engaged in normalized diplomatic relations. The prospect of constructive negotiations leading to promises of international financing to rebuild Gaza and to strengthen the economy of Palestine could be a tempting objective that negotiators would be willing to prioritize over speedily achieving criminal justice of leading individual perpetrators of atrocity crimes. In order to reach a final peace settlement enshrining the two-state solution, the five permanent members of the Security Council might find common cause in adopting a Chapter VII resolution (with sufficient non-permanent member votes) that prevents the ICC from continuing its investigation or prosecution of atrocity crimes in the Israel-Hamas situation under the terms of Article 16 of the Rome Statute. Russia and China might see political value in shielding Hamas officials from ICC scrutiny, and the United States, United Kingdom, and France might see equal political value in shielding Israeli officials from ICC investigation. Khan will need to keep a very keen eye on negotiations that may unfold in the coming months and weigh to what extent he should personally intervene at any point during those negotiations to respond to proposals pertaining to Article 16 or Article 98(2) or other provisions of the Rome Statute. This publication is part of the Diamonstein-Spielvogel Project on the Future of Democracy. Endnotes ^ “International Criminal Court,” International Criminal Court, accessed February 7, 2024, https://www.icc-cpi.int/.  ^ “Karim A. A. Khan KC,” International Criminal Court, accessed February 7, 2024, https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/otp/who-s-who/karim-khan.  ^ Vusi Madonsela, letter to International Criminal Court Prosecutor Karim A. A. Khan KC, November 17, 2023, https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/2023-11/ICC-Referral-Palestine-Final-17-November-2023.pdf.  ^ Karim A. A. Khan, “We Are Witnessing a Pandemic of Inhumanity: To Halt the Spread, We Must Cling To the Law,” The Guardian, November 10, 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/nov/10/law-israel-hamas-international-criminal-court-icc.  ^ “Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Karim A. A. Khan KC, on the Situation in the State of Palestine: Receipt of a Referral From Five States Parties,” International Criminal Court, November 17, 2023, https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/statement-prosecutor-international-criminal-court-karim-aa-khan-kc-situation-state-palestine.  ^ “The Republic of South Africa Institutes Proceedings Against the State of Israel and Requests the Court to Indicate Provisional Measures,” International Court of Justice, December 29, 2023, https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/192/192-20231229-pre-01-00-en.pdf. ^ “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,” conclusion date: December 9, 1948, United Nations Treaty Series, registration no. I-1021, https://iccforum.com/genocide-convention.  ^ “The Republic of South Africa Institutes Proceedings,” International Court of Justice. ^ “Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,” opened for signature July 17, 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9, Art. 18, https://iccforum.com/rome-statute. ^ Noa Limone, “‘A Multilayered Trauma Is Affecting Israelis in the Wake of October 7,’” Haaretz, December 2, 2023, https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2023-12-02/ty-article-magazine/.highlight/there-is-a-multilayered-trauma-taking-place-in-the-wake-of-october-7-its-infectious/0000018c-2774-d04a-af9f-f7f6ddf30000.  ^ “Widening Mideast Crisis: Blast That Killed About Twenty Soldiers Linked to Israeli Effort to Create Gaza Buffer Zone,” The New York Times, last updated January 24, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/01/23/world/israel-hamas-gaza-news.  ^ “Judicial Systems in Member States - Palestine,” Euro-Arab Judicial Training Network, accessed February 7, 2024, https://www.eajtn.com/judicial-systems/palestine/. ^ “Widening Mideast Crisis: U.S. Official Heads to Middle East for Talks on Hostages,” The New York Times, last updated February 6, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/01/21/world/israel-hamas-gaza-news-iraq#netanyahu-rebuffs-biden-again-on-the-idea-of-creating-a-palestinian-state. ^ “Israel-Palestinian Conflict: What Is the Two-State Solution and What Are the Obstacles?” Reuters, January 26, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/what-is-two-state-solution-israel-palestinian-conflict-2024-01-25/.  ^ Elizabeth Dwoskin, “Growing Oct. 7 ‘Truther’ Groups Say Hamas Massacre Was a False Flag,” The Washington Post, January 21, 2024, https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2024/01/21/hamas-attack-october-7-conspiracy-israel/.  ^ “Rome Statute,” Art. 98. ^ “Rome Statute,” Art. 16.
  • United States
    Why the Far-Right Terrorist Threat Is Often Misunderstood and Underestimated
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  • Technology and Innovation
    Cyber Week in Review: February 23, 2024
    Digital Services Act enters into effect; leaked data shows Chinese hacking; Google to launch pre-bunking campaign; U.S., EU, and UK take down ransomware gang; Russian disinformation campaign targets healthcare providers.
  • Ukraine
    Year Three of the Ukraine War, With Miriam Elder and Carla Anne Robbins
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    Miriam Elder, the Edward R. Murrow press fellow at CFR, and Carla Anne Robbins, a senior fellow at CFR and co-host of CFR’s The World Next Week podcast, sit down with James M. Lindsay to discuss where the war between Russia and Ukraine is headed as it enters its third year. 
  • Ukraine
    A Resilient Ukraine Faces Defeat if U.S. Aid Falters
    A failure by the United States to continue military aid to Ukraine would spell disaster for Ukraine and its Western allies while emboldening Russia and other potential aggressors.
  • Iran
    Open to Debate Collaboration: Unresolved—The Iran Threat
    Play
    In a collaboration between CFR and Open to Debate, panelists debate the threat of Iran to global security. Did Biden’s diplomacy fail? Can Israel live with a nuclear Iran? Does Iran pose a challenge to the global order? Open to Debate is the nation’s only nonpartisan, debate-driven media organization dedicated to bringing multiple viewpoints together for a constructive, balanced, respectful exchange of ideas. Open to Debate is a platform for intellectually curious and open-minded people to engage with others holding opposing views on complex issues.
  • United Kingdom
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  • Sudan
    United States Lacks Strategic Clarity on the Horn of Africa
    The recent flurry of congressional and executive attention on Sudan needs to be married to a long-term strategy toward the Horn of Africa. 
  • North Korea
    60th Munich Security Conference, African Union’s Conflict-Laden Agenda, Bellicose North Korea, and More
    Podcast
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  • South Korea
    The United States–South Korea Alliance: Why It May Fail and Why It Must Not
    Summary The U.S.-South Korea alliance has been the cornerstone of bilateral cooperation and the U.S. security presence in the Indo-Pacific region for over seven decades and continues to serve as a model of partnership amid a growing range of challenges. Nevertheless, the rise of exclusive nationalism guided by “America First” or “Korea first” leadership that places national self-interest above alliance-based cooperation on shared challenges represents a point of vulnerability for the relationship. Combined with deepening political polarization in both countries, the cohesion and resilience of the U.S.-South Korea alliance may come under threat. The United States–South Korea Alliance: Why It May Fail and Why It Must Not analyzes the internal and external threats to the alliance. It explores how a weakened U.S.-South Korea alliance could impact the security strategies of both countries and the broader security landscape in Northeast Asia. Additionally, it hypothesizes a future without the U.S.-South Korea alliance, shedding light on its potential impact and implications for U.S. and South Korean security strategies. Based on the analysis, the author concludes by offering valuable recommendations to the United States and South Korea for preserving and sustaining the alliance. This book is suitable for the following disciplines in undergraduate and graduate courses: International Relations East Asian Studies and History Contemporary East Asian Foreign Relations Asian Security   Discussion and Essay Questions Courses on international relations: How does the emergence of exclusive nationalism and domestic political polarization influence the commitments of states to cooperate on shared global challenges? What are the main differences in foreign policy approaches between South Korean conservative and progressive administrations toward the United States, Japan, and China? What historical and political factors account for these differences? How has intensifying U.S.-China competition impacted relations in East Asia? What are options that smaller countries may use to preserve national interests and mitigate risks in the context of rising major power rivalry? What are the implications of intensifying U.S.-China rivalry in both the security and technology realms on regional and global affairs? Courses on East Asian studies and history: What are the main differences in foreign policy approaches between South Korean conservative and progressive administrations toward the United States, Japan, and China? What historical and political factors account for these differences? How have South Korean efforts toward inter-Korean reconciliation generated both opportunities and frictions within the U.S.-South Korea alliance? How does polarization within South Korean politics regarding the legacies of Japanese colonial rule impact South Korea-Japan relations, the U.S.-South Korea alliance, and prospects for U.S.-South Korea-Japan trilateral cooperation? What strategies has North Korea historically employed to drive a wedge into the U.S.-South Korea alliance? How have North Korean efforts evolved alongside changes in inter-Korean relations and U.S.-North Korea relations? Courses on contemporary East Asian foreign relations: What are the different views on how South Korea should position itself in the context of U.S.-China competition? What are the limitations and implications of the different approaches? What contemporary factors have shaped relations in East Asia? In particular, what developments have most impacted South Korea’s relations with China and Japan, respectively? How does competition between the United States and China in technology and supply chain resiliency impact East Asia? What have been the opportunities and risks for South Korea? What role has the credibility of the U.S. alliance commitment in South Korea and Japan played in influencing the security environment of East Asian countries? Courses on Asian security: In what ways are U.S. and South Korean approaches toward peace and denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula aligned and in what ways are they different? What are the implications of the varying levels of U.S.-South Korea policy coordination toward North Korea on peninsular and regional security? How have external threats to the U.S.-South Korea security alliance changed in the era of U.S.-China competition? How do tensions between South Korea and Japan affect U.S. security strategy in East Asia? How would U.S. retrenchment from South Korea and/or Japan impact security in Northeast Asia? What alternative actions might the two countries pursue in the event of U.S. withdrawal?   Further Projects Op-Ed: Write a 700-word opinion piece on why a resilient and strong U.S.-South Korea alliance is important to both countries in the face of rising domestic challenges and political polarization within both the United States and South Korea. Write a 700-word opinion piece on how or whether the U.S. alliance approach toward South Korea should change given the political party in power in South Korea. Analytical essay: Write a 2,000-word essay on one of the following topics: What were South Korean concerns regarding U.S. alliance credibility and leadership during the Trump administration, and how did these concerns differ between South Korean conservatives and progressives? In what ways would the deterioration of the U.S.-South Korea alliance impact U.S. strategy in East Asia? How has South Korea’s response to rising U.S.-China rivalry and its foreign policy given China’s rise evolved? What factors or incidents have shaped South Korea’s strategy? Speechwriting: Step into the role of advisor and speechwriter for a presidential candidate in the 2024 U.S. presidential election. You have the opportunity to choose your candidate’s political affiliation, either Democrat or Republican. Based on recommendations provided by the book, draft a compelling campaign speech for the candidate that reflects their stance on U.S. foreign policy and approaches toward alliances, especially in East Asia. It is November 2024, and a new U.S. president has been elected. You are the speechwriter for the South Korean president, who is concerned about whether the U.S. president will maintain the U.S. alliance commitment toward South Korea. You are tasked with drafting a speech for the South Korean president that will provide security, political, and economic rationales in support of the U.S.-South Korea alliance with the goal of influencing the new U.S. president’s course of action. Based on the lessons and themes learned from the book, what would you highlight in your speech? Policy memo: As the U.S. national security advisor, you play a pivotal role in navigating the complex dynamics of East Asia. This includes addressing the ongoing rivalry between the United States and China, as well as U.S. relations with South Korea, Japan, North Korea, and Taiwan. You are tasked with drafting a policy memo for the U.S. president that outlines an alternative U.S. strategy for managing its alliances in the region amid intensifying tensions between the United States and China and growing concerns regarding a conflict involving Taiwan. The memo should also cover potential consequences should U.S. credibility and commitment deteriorate amidst escalating regional tensions. Negotiation: Imagine a hypothetical situation in which the United States is planning to reduce its military presence in South Korea and Japan. Participants will be divided into three groups, representing the United States, South Korea, and Japan. Ask students to discuss their perspectives on the U.S. plan and address the following topics: North Korea’s nuclear program, prospects for trilateral cooperation among the three countries, changes in the dynamics of U.S.-China competition, and the future of U.S. alliances with the two countries.   Supplementary Materials Victor Cha, The Impossible State: North Korea, Past and Future (New York: Harper Collins, 2013). ‌Victor Cha and Ellen Kim, “Between A Rock and a Hard Place: South Korea’s Strategic Dilemmas with China and the United States,” Asia Policy, no. 21 (2016): 101–22. Keyu Gong, “The Korea-US Alliance from a Chinese Perspective,” Asian Perspective 36, no.2, (April-June 2012): 309-330. Uk Heo and Terence Roehrig, The Evolution of the South Korea-United States Alliance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018). Gusang Kang, “Policy Implications of the Biden Administration’s Global Supply Chain Reorganization,” World Economy Brief 13, no. 30 (August 2023). Han-kwon Kim, Nari Pyo, and Jinbaek Choi, “Outlook for the Yoon Suk Yeol Administration’s China Policy and Policy Recommendations,” Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, June 2022. Chris Miller, Chip War: The Fight for the World's Most Critical Technology, (New York: Scribner, 2022). Terence Roehrig, Japan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella: Deterrence After the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017). Robert S. Ross, “China Looks at the Korean Peninsula: The ‘Two Transitions,’” Survival 63, no.6 (November 2021): 129-158. Gilbert Rozman, Sue Mi Terry, and Eun A Jo, South Korea’s Wild Ride: The Big Shifts in Foreign Policy From 2013 to 2022 (New York: Routledge, 2023). Scott A. Snyder and Kyung-Ae Park, North Korea’s Foreign Policy: The Kim Jong-un Regime in a Hostile World (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2022). Scott A. Snyder, South Korea at the Crossroads: Autonomy and Alliance in an Era of Rival Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018). Ouyang Wei, “Several Strategic Issues Concerning the Korean Peninsula,” East Asia Institute, September 2023. Andrew Yeo, “South Korean Foreign Policy in the Indo-Pacific Era,” Brookings Institution, November 2022. Download the Teaching Notes (PDF) Visit the Book Page