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    Why Israel Has Been Slow to Support Ukraine
    Israel’s government is grappling with a moral imperative to help Ukraine in a war that recalls its own struggle to maintain sovereignty while acknowledging that cooperation with Russia is vital to its security goals.
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    Religion and Conflict Resolution
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    Lisa Sharland, senior fellow and director of the Protecting Civilians in Conflict program at the Stimson Center, and Sukhsimranjit Singh, the Judge Danny Weinstein managing director of the Straus Institute for Dispute Resolution at Pepperdine University Caruso School of Law, discuss the United Nations’ role in peacemaking and how religion leaders contribute to conflict resolution around the world. Learn more about CFR's Religion and Foreign Policy Program. FASKIANOS: Thank you, and welcome to the Council on Foreign Relations Religion and Foreign Policy webinar series. I’m Irina Faskianos, vice president for the National Program and Outreach here at CFR. As a reminder, this webinar is on the record. And the audio, video, and transcript will be made available on our website, CFR.org, and on our iTunes podcast channel, Religion and Foreign Policy. As always, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy. So we’re delighted to have Lisa Sharland with us today to talk about “Religion and Conflict Resolution.” Unfortunately, Dr. Singh could not be with us. He might be able to join us later. We’re not exactly sure, so we will just roll with it. But we’re happy to have Lisa with us to talk about this important topic. Lisa Sharland is a senior fellow and director of the protecting civilians in conflict program at the Stimson Center. She was previously the deputy director of defense, strategy, and national security, and the head of the international program at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute. Her research has focused on UN peace operations reform, peacekeeping effectiveness, protection of civilians, preventing and countering violent extremism, and women, peace, and security. She served as the defense policy advisor at the Permanent Mission of Australia to the United Nations from 2009 to 2014; and represented Australia in multilateral negotiations in the UN Security Council and General Assembly bodies, including the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. So, Lisa, it’s great to have you with us to talk about this, given your experience, the research you’ve done, and the positions you’ve held. If you could give us an overview of the UN’s role in peacekeeping, especially the approaches that the UN has taken to deal with religious conflicts, and what you’ve seen over the trajectory of your career, and your prediction for or your thoughts on how we should be dealing with conflicts as we look out. SHARLAND: Thanks so much for the kind introduction, Irina. And it’s a pleasure to be here with the Council on Foreign Relations and those that are on the call today. As Irina has noted in my sort of biography, I’m by no means a religious scholar to comment on any of these topics. But what I’d really like to do in my introductory remarks is, I guess, offer a bit of some context in terms of the spectrum of different tools that the UN has available to it to engage in peacemaking and conflict resolution efforts, and then pivot a little bit to what this means for what we may term as religious conflicts. So what do we mean by peacekeeping—sorry, peacemaking in the context of the UN? So there’s a spectrum of different tools that are available to the international community through the UN when it comes to resolving conflict and addressing threats to international peace and security. Although, I think really at the outset of this conversation it’s really important to note that many of those tools may appear out of reach when we look at the context of what’s happening with the war in Ukraine at the moment, and the intractability of any action in the UN Security Council. So what are some of these tools? And I think I have no doubt we’ll come back to some of the challenges around utilizing them in the conversation. So we have at hand—and many of these tools have been around for seventy years; they came out and emerged from the UN Charter—conflict prevention, which is diplomatic measures that are focused on preventing tensions or disputes from escalating into conflicts. So, really, trying to target some of these tensions before they escalate into a context where civilians may be impacted by violence or those tensions maybe escalate into military conflict. We have peacekeeping, which is well-known around the world for those blue helmets that you see on personnel that are deployed to different mission contexts—at the moment across twelve in the globe, including contexts such as Mali and the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and many that have been in place for decades including within the Middle East. Further along that spectrum we have peace enforcement, which is really more direct intervention, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter in terms of military action. And then we also use this terminology around peacebuilding, this idea of preventing the relapse into conflict, and how do we ensure that efforts to build peace don’t fall apart when some of these tensions emerge. So these processes are not necessarily linear and may be required upon during the different stages of conflict for intervention. Now, one of those that I didn’t mention in that spectrum was peacemaking, and this is sort of a terminology that has been explored for decades. We can go back to 1992 and An Agenda for Peace by the then-UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. And that noted that peacemaking is action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as were seen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations. So, really, what we’re talking about here is diplomatic action to bring parties to an agreement, often while hostilities are underway. And it may be used in conjunction with other tools or facilitated by the actions of others, including peacekeeping missions, humanitarian assistance, and so on. In this context the UN secretary-general may exercise their good offices to facilitate the resolution of conflict, and a lot of that may involve consultation behind closed doors. And I have no doubt this is an ongoing conversation in terms of another conflict—a number of conflicts that we see around the world at the moment. It may involve the appointment of different envoys who act on behalf of the secretary-general, and it may indeed be undertaken by individuals who have no official affiliation with the UN in terms of supporting those conflict-resolution efforts. What I think is notable at the moment is there is discussion about A New Agenda for Peace currently being driven by the secretary-general as part of his common agenda, recognizing that the world faces a new range of challenges and evolving threats to peace and security—climate change, cyber, information warfare—and I think these are all important to highlight in the context of what they mean when the intersect with religion and conflict. So, very briefly, I wanted to go through how has the UN engaged on conflict and religion. And I think a really important question here to ask at the outset is: What are we talking about when we refer to religious conflicts? Religion itself can be both a driver of conflict and a mechanism for fostering peace. Some of the comments that I’ll make here will draw on some of the research that the Stimson Center and the Protecting Civilians in Conflict Program undertook back in 2020 looking at the issue of violence based on religion or belief, and this was spearheaded by colleagues of mine, Aditi Gorur and Julie Gregory. Some of the things that this research noted that—is, in terms of geography, the Middle East and North Africa region has the highest level of violations based on freedom of religion or belief, followed by the Asia-Pacific, and Europe. And this is drawing on research by the Pew Research Center. These include violations by state and non-state actors. And there remain, of course, ongoing concerns about religious-related terrorism and violent extremism. Religious-related atrocities have been highlighted and amplified of particular concern by the UN special rapporteur on this topic, in relations to violence targeting Muslims in the Central African Republic, for instance; the Muslim Rohingya communities in Myanmar; and Yazidi communities in Iraq. Other areas of concern that have been noted generally by researchers in the international community focused on the forced internment of predominantly Muslim Uighurs in China, and the targeting of Christians by Boko Haram. In this context, in terms of UN engagement there has been a range of different interactions and tools that have been utilized. However, I should note that they have not focused explicitly on the issue of the religious nature of this conflict, although they have been reflected, obviously, in a number of the debates and discussions. So, for instance, dependent on some of the countries that are being looked at, some of the countries that are on the agenda of the Security Council at the moment where there are different levels of religious-related violence include Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen. In the context of UN peacekeeping and peace operations, which I previously referred to, we see it in the Central African Republic, the DRC, and Mali. And we also see it in relation to efforts to prevent conflict and violence by and the work of violent extremist groups, and in discussions around sanctions that the UN may employ under that peace-enforcement mechanism in relation to different ISIS affiliates, or al-Qaida affiliates, and so on. The research that was undertaken by Stimson found that the issue of violence based on religion or belief was an underexamined issue in the Security Council. It was not an issue of thematic focus, unlike the discussions that have taken place in the broader membership within the UN in the General Assembly, and in the Human Rights Council. The Security Council has recently indicated that it may be willing to engage more actively on the issue of freedom of religion as a security matter. Indeed, back in August 2019 it hosted what they call an Arria-formula meeting, which is a more informal meeting of the Security Council, looking at the issue of advancing the safety and security of persons belonging to religious minorities in armed conflict. And I should note that a number of those country contexts that I outlined do indeed consider or refer to the issue of religious intolerance and violence and how it can drive conflict in the resolutions that have been adopted on some of these issues. But one of the key findings that emerged from Stimson’s research was the need for further analysis of some of these issues and to explore whether or not there is any further causality between the issues related to conflict. I want to refer to briefly some of the points that were mentioned in the research that looked at how perhaps religion may be related to the way that conflict develops, and I should note again this remains an underexplored area of research. But it may relate to, for instance, the identification of targets; to exclude individuals, making clear who is socially and politically included and who is not; to demarcate lines between those that may be perceived as the other and those that may not fall within that group. It may present risks that can trigger conflicts due to high levels of inequalities between different groups—that is, economic disparities, access to justice, access to different services that may exacerbate grievances. However, what I should note here is that it is likely a reflection of the overlap of different identity markers that are associated with religious belief or identity, and where politicization can enhance grievances and stoke conflict. So what I want to draw out here is a comment that was made by the special rapporteur in their recent report on this issue in the UN, and I quote: “A number of these crises and conflicts have a religious dimension, sometimes involving adherents of diverse faiths or adversaries within the same religious tradition. However, it is essential not to unduly overestimate the role of religion in either conflict or peacemaking to the exclusion of other factors and motivations involved. This approach is often reductive, concealing the complexities affecting the lives of peoples affected by conflict and crises, including members of religious or belief minorities.” So I think it’s important to note there that while religion may have a really important role in terms of, I guess, intersecting with some of these different issues of discrimination or marginalization, that there are, obviously, a range of different factors to consider. So what I want to conclude on before we have a chance to hear from our other panelist is, I guess when we’re looking at this role of the UN in peacemaking and engaging in some of these conflict scenarios and efforts to resolve conflict, what is the role of religious actors and faith-based organizations in these contexts? And again, I defer a little—a bit back to what the special rapporteur within the UN system has reflected on. And importantly, in looking at civil society engagement, they note the importance of promoting interfaith engagement, the importance of opposing narratives that may essentialize different parts of religious or belief communities, and the importance of faith-based leaders in terms of being influencers who can promote inclusive, peaceful, and just conflict resolutions. And I’m quoting directly there from that special rapporteur. So I think that’s a really important note to conclude on when we consider the role of the UN in this peacemaking space and the vast array of tools that are available, that there is a really important role for civil society and faith-based communities in those conversations depending on the nature of the conflict. And I’ll leave my comments there. Thanks, Irina. FASKIANOS: Thank you so much, Lisa. And thank you to Sukhsimranjit Singh for joining. We’re so happy you could be with us. As we have laid out in his bio, he’s the Judge Danny Weinstein Managing Director of the Straus Institute for Dispute Resolution at Pepperdine University Caruso School of Law, where he’s also an associate professor of law and practice, and directs the LL.M programs. His practice, teaching, and scholarship focuses on cross-cultural dispute resolution, faith-based mediation, and utilizing modern theories, science, and technology to devise creative solutions for global disputes. Dr. Singh has resolved disputes in countries throughout the world, including Canada, India, Japan, New Zealand, and U.S. states across the country. And he most recently published Best Practices for Mediating Religious Conflicts for the American Bar Association. So we’re really looking forward to your perspective, Dr. Singh, to talk about what religious leaders have historically contributed to conflict resolution, how they can continue to do so, and to talk about your Best Practices for Mediating Religious Conflicts as you have done and what you could offer to the group. So I’ll turn it over to you. SINGH: Absolutely. Thank you. Can you all hear me well? Good. All right. Thank you for inviting me. An honor to be here. And such a good pleasure to hear Ms. Lisa Sharland speak from her perspective. And, Ms. Irina, wonderful to be in your presence as well. Folks, let me tell you my specialty, or expertise, or experience, rather. Years of thinking has been on the idea of dispute resolution, so my lens will be more towards conflict resolution and how religion plays a role there. Besides religious leaders, I’m going to make some comments also on culture and cultural identity besides religion and religious identity, because I think both are intertwined in many ways. In fact, I’ll start with an example. In some countries, there’s a cultural practice of arranged marriage. People get arranged marriage. When it comes to—when it’s time to get married, their children, their grandchildren, people prefer to do arranged marriages. And I’ve been studying that for a few years. And I look—in those countries what is fascinating is the cultural trend of arranged marriages transcends across religious lines. So I’ve seen Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, Jews, Christians all doing arranged marriage in that part of the village that I’m talking about. This one is in India. My interest in this area of international diplomacy came most likely when I started studying for my master’s degree in 2005 and ’06. But I published a piece in Cardozo Journal of Dispute (sic; Conflict) Resolution on international nuclear negotiations and the impact of culture and religion on them. To me, it’s fascinating to see how sometimes we miss this beat that religion can play a big role in negotiations. And I’m fascinated by this. So again, I’m a practitioner as well as a scholar, so I’m going to give examples from both sides. Let me start quickly with my scholarship there and then I’ll give you example from a practical part of the world. My scholarship looked into India and how India chose not to sign CTBT—Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty—when U.S. was negotiating with India on the signage of the treaty and that moment in time. And what’s fascinating to me is the impact played by religion in it, which is very, to my knowledge—my limitedness; sorry if I’m wrong—understudied topic, at least in that part of the region. Two things. There is national identity involved whenever you involve international diplomatic negotiations involving at least two states. There is organizational identity involved, speaking from a cultural lens. And then there is the personal identity of the specific negotiators who are negotiating. So there are three things involved. Let’s quickly talk about all three. National identity. I think national identity in this sense is what’s the major religion of the nation. Let’s say India: It is Hinduism. Some negotiator ought to—should have asked what is a Hindu’s mind about conflict resolution. Where does nuclear negotiation fit with the majority faith in India? Now, these are interesting questions. Here is one data I found out that I’m going to read for you, all right? Let me read this—quote this for you: “Some displays in the annual Ganapati Festival in Maharashtra, India, celebrates India’s technological progress”—and I’m quoting it—“which is seen as a force for the betterment of people as a whole. The progress is equated with nuclear weapons. You could see vignettes of electricity, dams, satellite dishes, fighter planes, and Agni missiles sitting in temples right next to the gods.” What’s fascinating here is this idea, why should India not be fighting or not be as strong to enter into nuclear power that other countries were at that moment, and how religion is supporting that idea. I don’t plan to go too deep into it. I just wanted to touch the surface, a fascinating idea how missiles could be prayed, could be blessed upon in a temple, and how religion and international foreign policy can be connected. Here is my general statement on this. How much do we study the impact of national culture? My article was published on India-U.S. nuclear negotiation. You can find it. I’m not going to go too deep into it. But my question is, when we negotiate, let’s say, with Iran, how deeply are we looking into the impact of religion, impact of cultural identity, impact of saving face for those negotiators who are at the table but who are also representing a national identity? And that is what fascinates me. So when I travel abroad—and I’ve done work in New Zealand, and I’ve worked with Māori community—I have looked at how religion and culture is playing a role before I become successful in those mediations. That’s point number one. Point number two. You asked about religious leaders. I think that is such a fascinating question, and I totally agree with that. Religious leaders are revered in most of the world, if not all of the world. People look up to them because they can lead a group of people, right? That’s what a culture is. Culture is a pattern of thinking followed by a group of people over time based on some values. So religious leaders can actually lead a group of people. That means they can lead a culture. They can lead a culture of people, culture with capital C. Any times you see resistance in the world, the first resistance you see is culture because cultures have a unique way of functioning. They have a unique way of working because that’s what makes culture. Culture is a software of mind. So come back to practical point: Can religious leaders play a role? I think they already play a role. I think in many ways they already have underserved for many of us around the world. My institute, Straus Institute, for example, had a blessing, privilege to work with Archbishop Desmond Tutu many years ago, and we have—we have it on tape. We had a wonderful meeting with him. We interviewed him. And we—part of my question—our question to him was, looking at—Professor Tom Stipanowich, my colleague, asked the question—was looking into the intersection of faith and dispute resolution, how faith is playing a role. And Archbishop Mr. Tutu’s comment was very powerful. He said faith not only plays a role in peacemaking; it plays a role in the daily lives of people, in everyday choices we make, in how we live, how we decide, who we talk to, how much we talk to. And I’m expanding on that. He didn’t go that far, but I’m trying to fill in the words, if you may. So this is a fascinating concept, then. The question you are raising in this important webinar—thanks to the Council on Foreign Relations—is, are we not only using religious leaders, but are we underusing them? Do they have a role to play to do two things, influencing a culture of people within a country—because negotiation has to happen in two ways. One is external. One is internal, right? There’s always an internal audience. And externally, can they represent that faith or be a leader on a world stage? And my colleague mentioned UN and the negotiations at the UN level. I was just with Ambassador David Carden two days ago—(inaudible)—who served under President Obama for ASEAN—Association of Southeast Asian Nations—and we were discussing how Indonesia, Philippines, many countries in that region are heavily influenced by faith, by religion, and how negotiations change the phase, how negotiations are different diplomatically when you’re dealing with a group of people that are emotionally intertwined with faith. My last comment’s my third comment. So, one, let’s take a look at culture and religion, how culture is bigger sometimes than religion—not always—and how we can influence this idea of culture—involvement of culture in different nations, and why we should not ignore it, especially the idea of saving face, the idea of gender, the idea of minorities in culture, the idea of just involving people as to where they are. Because people can be way more impactful when they’re emotionally involved in a negotiation. The second thing I spoke about is this idea of not just utilizing world leaders, faith-based leaders, but I think we have underutilized them. Yes, we have—we have the Vatican, as we all know, playing an influential role internationally in diplomatic negotiations with many connections, with many missionaries around the world, and with a powerful presence. But can there be more representation of faith in a neutral setting, in a strategic setting, where leaders from a country like India and China? Of course, we have to manage how the diplomatic heads of those states feel about it, how they are including it, and how can they be in consensus that this is the right way to go. We cannot ignore the diplomatic heads. And then, moving on from there, my last comments—and I want to go to more into Q&A—is going back to my piece on nuclear negotiations between India and U.S. in Cardozo Law Journal. I want to talk briefly about this idea of awareness, and I want to go personal for a second. My religion is Sikhism. A day ago, I spoke at a symposium at my own university and we looked at how—what we have learned from the pandemic. What I have learned is, first of all, on a—on a light note, I love people, so what I learned is I don’t want to be away from people. It’s good to be back, good to be without masks, good to be with people. On a more serious note, I hope it made us all self-reflect—self-reflect as to how we define meaning to life. What is meaning to life? What is it that motivates me on a daily basis? So we’re sharing on this panel that what motivates me is this idea from Sikhism, which is sarbhat dah phalla, which is “may everyone be blessed”—not just one group of people, one idea of people. So there are two ways to look at religion. One is religion separates us. The other is religion combines us or brings us together because you are believing in a common major force in life. Whichever you believe in, one thing is clear: religion is here and it’s going to exist. It’s a powerful force. So the next question for us is: How do we utilize people’s emotions? Because everyone wants to have meaning to life. Everyone wants to live through providing meaning to life, which I think is powerful from a macro perspective to a micro perspective around the world. I just wanted to share those opening thoughts, but I’m happy to take any questions going to any one of those three topics further. But thank you for being—inviting me here. Please. FASKIANOS: Thank you very much to both of you. And now we’re going to go to all of you for your questions and comments. You can either raise your hands and when I call on you please say your affiliation; or you can type your question in the Q&A box, and also if you could add on your affiliation there that would be great. And I think the first question is—do you see that question from Adem Carroll? Question to Professor Singh: Since high caste or other political elites make policies and shape popular views through mass media, isn’t there a risk in generalizing about religious culture? Isn’t the media the main filter? In India, for example, one sees the diverse—sorry—divisive policies like the discriminatory Citizen Amendment Act, promoted by the BJP. Should we be blaming Hindu religious culture for this, or specific politicians? SINGH: Very good question. Wow. Thank you for asking a difficult question. I thought you will start with a softball, but no, this is not an easy crowd. I would—this is a very, very good question. What we have to be aware of is the following: Every nation, to my knowledge, has a major religion that dominates, right—if not one, two religions. You can’t just focus on India. You can look at around you and you’ll see religious politics being played around the world. The question is, can you—let me rephrase the question. Can you ignore that religion and be friends with those politicians, or with the religious leaders, or involve them in a way in which we can have a peaceful dispute resolution? Let me ask you this way, a different way: The way to change, I believe, is first through trust-building, connection, involvement, listening, understanding people, trying to build empathy, and then, once you have built that channel, then pushing them slightly, then challenging them, right? I mean, let me give you quickly, from being a devil’s advocate for a second, what will their response be if you challenge India’s idea of whatever the idea is, a nationalist Hindu movement that you are mentioning in your comment, which many people, especially minorities will agree with, right? And one of the things you will hear back from—you may hear back—is who are you again to tell us to reform? Oh, OK, so you just did this in this country and you’re telling us to stop doing it? OK, so you did 1,130 nuclear bomb tests and you’re a nuclear power, but you don’t want us to be nuclear power? Oh, I see. And I address that in my article as well, it’s amazing that some countries have conducted more than twelve hundred, more than two thousand nuclear tests but when one country does five, we have issues, we have problems, we have judgment. So you have to be very careful in not going in as an outsider and telling them, here is how you fix your country and these are three problems you have. I believe in the other side of diplomacy, which is, how can I work with you, how can I involve you, and leave the issues that are local to them to be fixed but I’ll start by building trust. Long answer. Sorry about this, but that’s just a diplomatic way of involvement of religion because, again, I missed your name, but you have to see one thing: You’re dealing with one billion people who probably belong to that faith. Let me repeat the number: one billion people. Will they be open to lecture, or will they be open to working with us if you involve them? So great question. Sorry for my indirect answer. FASKIANOS: Great. So we are—we have several hands raised now, so I’m going to Katherine Marshall. MARSHALL: Good afternoon, and thank you for the presentations. I’m at Georgetown University and the World Faiths Development Dialogue. I think there are two dimensions that you’ve highlighted; one is understanding the religious dimensions, and then the other is the active involvement of groups that are specifically with religious roots in the very complex controversies that we have in the world—I think of DRC, or South Sudan, or the Rohingya-Myanmar issue. So I’m interested in more comments on the formal or the visible roles that religious actors, ranging from the Vatican, or Sant’Egidio, or maybe the OIC might play in working through the UN channels but through others in moving forward on what seemed to be perpetual and intractable problems. SINGH: Do you want to take this first? SHARLAND: Happy to, Professor Singh. Look, thanks, Katherine. I think that is a really important question and one that goes to the crux of, I guess, where some of the gaps are in terms of addressing conflict resolution and peacemaking, about the inclusivity of those processes. As you say, a lot of this work is undertaken informally and there is quite a bit of engagement by different actors on the ground. If we take the example of peacekeeping missions, for instance, working with faith-based communities, working with different civil society organizations, recognizing that they have an important and influential role, I think, in garnering support for peace processes, for ensuring that different grievances are addressed. But I don’t think perhaps that those roles are as formalized as perhaps there is capacity for them to be. Now, some of this may be indeed due to misunderstanding or sensitivities around the role of religion in some of these conflict environments, and therefore, perhaps there is an assessment that a lot of that work being undertaken at the grassroots is really important, and pivotal, and beneficial when there isn’t a very strong watch shined on the work that is being undertaken. But there is no doubt that in some contexts, particularly as Professor Singh had noted there about the visibility at the national level of religion, and identity, and culture, that there may be a greater role for highly visible religious leaders to be engaged in these processes to bring different parts of the community into those processes. And I think this is particularly important when we consider concerns about relapse into conflict. There is a tendency for international actors, the UN and others, to depart, sometimes on a timetable or sometimes when the Security Council decides that its appetite for engagement in a conflict is no longer there, and then really, at the end of the day, it is the communities, and it is the different leaders of those communities who are involved in picking up the pieces and trying to identify how to resolve those grievances and concerns about conflict and identity that have not been resolved. So I think, to go to your question there, there is capacity and I think it’s an important consideration that at times is perhaps overlooked a little bit in terms of engagement in these processes. SINGH: I’ll make a quick comment. I 100 percent agree with the comment of my co-panelist. And I think, Ms. Marshall, Professor Marshall, that’s a very good point you raised is the question of active groups, right—active groups is the word you used—and how religion—but the point I’m going to say—I just want to include a new thing, thought here, if you may allow me. We have to be careful how some groups use religion and manipulate religion for popular votes, and for popularity in their local regions, and how international actors and religious leaders can just do a bigger role—play a bigger role through still coming back and saying, OK, hold on, don’t blame religion for this; religion is not the cause, but the politicization of religion, the abuse of religion, the use of religion, the strategic ways in which you have used religious votes to gain power, and to manipulate local society has to blame. I think sometimes that slight distinction can help raise more awareness, as my colleague mentioned—that’s the word—raise more awareness locally as to how one may have to distinguish oneself from a group or from what they may be calling a religious political party but it might be just a political party who’s using religion. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I’m going to go next to Mark Webb. WEBB: Hello. Thank you for your remarks and for including me in this discussion. I’m a philosophy professor at Texas Tech University and I was very interested to hear about the idea of trust-building. It’s something I last heard when I was talking to some people at the EastWest Institute, and their idea was that there are already people who trust each other across these lines and if they are not the leaders, then perhaps former military leaders, former politicians, businesspeople who trust one another and have contacts, that those kinds of lines of connection can be used to build trust, to sort of get you out of the prisoner’s dilemma of international problems. (Laughs.) And I wondered, is there any reason why religious leaders can’t be used across borders for that same kind of track to diplomacy track 1.5 diplomacy, whatever it is. Is that some—that strikes me as a very promising sort of avenue. SINGH: Can I quickly comment, Lisa? SHARLAND: Yes, absolutely. SINGH: Thank you. I think that’s a very good—thank you, Professor Cook, for that question—Professor Webb. I think what—you almost gave the answer within your question, right? I could hear the answer within your question, but—if I’m right. Absolutely yes. The simple answer is absolutely. The question is how, right? And the very first question that was asked today—let me see if I can get the name here and that was by Caroll, if I’m not wrong, P. Carroll. FASKIANOS: Adem Carroll with the Burma Task Force. SINGH: OK, wonderful, by Mr. Carroll. Now, the question is connected in some ways. What we have to be careful is, when you appoint a religious leader, does that religious leader represent the diversity of religions of a state? That’s the question, right? Because some people may feel marginalized because religion has a very powerful force, is OK, who appointed that leader? So just a simple theory there, or suggestion there is I really enjoy being on interfaith panels, on interfaith conversations, on interfaith dialogues, on interfaith—that’s one of my best days—if you put me and ask my students and my clients, my best day would be when I’ve just attended a one-hour, two-hour, three-hour interfaith discussion. The reason is it challenges me. The reason is that I end up learning more about myself and others by being with friends who are from a different faith than myself. I think there’s a power there in appointing multiple—what I’m going there are religious leaders within a culture, someone who can represent, let’s say, Christianity, Judaism, and Hinduism, and so forth and so on, just saying it quickly, from a religion, from a country to be on a panel, and that would be wonderful. In fact, let me give you an example, though it is interesting. Indian Supreme Court tried to come up with an interfaith panel for a very controversial case in Delhi. I’m not going to go into the case. I’m not going to talk about it or the panelists because I know a couple of panelists, but I will tell you that at least the approach, the idea that we can have this interfaith leadership was, I think, something we should remark about. Now, coming back to your other point, I think you made an amazing point about trust-building and there are people, you said, who already have trust. That’s an excellent, brilliant point, not only, I think—totally agree with you; I think that’s what you’re alluding to—not only they’re underused. We don’t ask, we don’t have awareness. Have we gone to Iran? I’m just saying it loudly—forgive me, I don’t want to be on record for this point. Have we gone to a people in Iran and asked, how do you get persuaded? Who is your leader? Can we work with your leader? How can I work—or a village in India, or a village in China. This idea of involving people who already have trust either from my side, or your side, or a global side, and utilizing them for peaceful negotiations, diplomatic negotiations is a brilliant idea. I think it’s truly underserved, and here’s a quick answer why. It takes time. It takes effort. And our international diplomacy, we all know, sometimes we do things, then we think about them, or we’re a little behind, or we don’t have time, as we say, or we have to be quick because we don’t have time because things change, especially now with social media, things change in an instant. Great question. I hope this was some help. (Laughs.) I don’t know if I was much but I’m going to stop here. SHARLAND: I might just jump in there briefly with a slight pivot to the point—(inaudible)—because I do not have the exceptional expertise of my current panelist on some of these issues, but the point about trust-building there and I refer back to my—(laughs)—native Australia in terms of the context, and the importance of building relationships that we saw around defense counterparts, for instance, between Australia and Indonesia when it came to the intervention in Timor-Leste, and the importance and fruition of those relationships twenty years later when it came to de-escalating hostilities in different contexts, purely because there had been that engagement, that trust, that building of relationships, so I think that is an incredibly important point when it comes to conflict resolution. And I think, on a related point to the inclusivity of different, I guess, groups, I really take the point there that Professor Singh made there around the representation of different religious groups in these processes, and ensuring that it’s not just one associated with identity or culture. And I think I would extend that to say that this applies obviously not just to religious leaders, but ensuring that different marginalized groups—traditionally, women we highlight in peace process is the fact that they are often not at the table, often not taking part in these conversations, and that that actually is to the detriment of being able to resolve the conflict and the sustainability of those efforts going forward. So I think there’s some related points to what you just made there, so thank you so much. FASKIANOS: Wonderful. And I’m going to go next to Tereska Lynam, who raised her hand and also wrote the question, but I would prefer you to tease it out, Tereska. There you go; you’re unmuted. LYNAM: OK, thank you. Sorry about that. Yeah, so I did write the question down, but, one, fantastic presentation. Thank you all so much; this is great. And I wanted to say, I just attended a Judeo-Christian meditation group before this call and we were talking about Adam and Eve and the tree of knowledge and how it brought about many negative feelings and estrangement. And then later in the call we were discussing how much of the information, as just regular people, as citizens of the world, how much information we receive today, especially by anything broadcast media, creates anxiety within us, and that there are so many media outlets and sources; it’s not like  in the ’70s, ’80s, and even the ’90s when people would watch one—there was a consensus about what we were all watching, so we were reading the same newspapers, we were watching the same news programs. That’s not happening anymore, even within, among closest friends and families. We’re just getting constantly different information. And so this unregulated, if you will, information gathering compounds our own anxiety and creates divisions within our tightest community because we’re asked to be outraged or we’re asked to do—I almost got sick reading about what’s going on in the Ukraine the other day. And if someone’s—when you have that and then you have someone who has a totally different perspective, it creates divisions, right? So what I’ve noticed, bringing it back to what religious leaders can do, is that if they create safe spaces within the congregation for information sharing and arriving at peaceful consensus, we come together and, possibly more importantly, are optimistic about the future and/or the ability to effect positive change. And then, I didn’t write this down, but all the wonderful conversations you’ve been having, I think that we can—what I have been trying to meditate on is how I can be a spiritual leader for those not involved in my own congregation, or not involved in things, to kind of help them create a safe space for information sharing and optimism. And to that end, Irina, I feel like this—what you’ve done here with this community is, for at least me, you’ve created a spiritual congregation for information sharing and arriving at, if not consensus, at peace and optimism. So thank you all so much for it and I’ve been—I look forward to hearing your comments. Thanks. SINGH: Can I comment quickly? Can I, please? Yeah. This is beautiful. Thank you for that comment. I think it’s deep. It’s deep. (Laughs.) We can go into logistics. I always say, as a lawyer, we can go into legal arguments all the time, but the question is seeing the bigger picture, and I think what you just saw, ma’am, is a bigger picture. I want to comment on two things. Imagine we are all—I know it’s not an amazing analogy; forgive me for this—but imagine we are about to die and you’re closing your eyes. Are you going to think about your loved ones or are you going to think about your enemies? What matters to you in life is more love, and compassion, and the memories we create around it, not people we fight with. We’re not going to take them to our deathbed. I hope not. The question that we all have something in common is we’re going to die, right? The question here is the following—that’s why I took the example; forgive me—love has always sustained. Peace has always sustained. Wars start, wars end, but this mutual cooperation—if this ends, we will end as a civilization and that’s exactly the comments like you, I believe, people who will lead us into remaining believers, that at the end of the day we believe there are more people who believe in peace than of people who believe in war. That’s my comment on that. Thank you. SHARLAND: Just a very quick reflection. I think it’s such an important point that you’ve raised there, Tereska, in terms of information that we consume, and information that we obtain, and it’s something that really drives consent in the work that we’re doing in our organization, because there is a lot of divisiveness created out of that, and it’s very easy to manipulate and to polarize different populations. And how do you break down those divides? And I think a really important part of that is being open to contested ideas and debate, and conversations around some of these issues, and ultimately, the shared goal of—as Professor Singh has noted there, about peacefulness and trying to bring these into the conversations, but unfortunately, I feel like so much of it—it is much easier to weaponize some of these ideas and to cut off information, which, I will say, is such an important precursor to different levels of conflict. We see this playing out at the moment in terms of the war in Ukraine and other things as well, unfortunately. So I think having that ability to have contested ideas and to have those conversations in spaces where people are open and receptive to collegial debate is so, so important. FASKIANOS: Thank you. And thank you, Tereska, for your shout-out there. We really appreciate it. I appreciate it. So I’m going to go next to Victoria Strang, who has written a comment. She is the first faith advocate at Human Rights Watch. “It is very rare for secular human rights organizations to have specialists who are skilled in engaging faith leaders and communities, which I think can be a detriment due to some of the examples that have been provided.” And she’s hoping that both of you can speak more to the importance of secular organizations in taking faith partnerships seriously and investing in that kind of work. SHARLAND: I’m happy to jump in here to start. Thank you for the question, Victoria. I think it’s a really important point, and I think one of the risks that emerged or was highlighted in the research that we were doing, particularly in the context of UN at Stimson, was around one of these tensions, and often you may see this in terms of different religious or faith organizations when it comes to efforts to advocate for different human rights within the UN system. And we do see a lot of the tensions that emerge there in terms of advocacy around whether it be women’s reproductive rights, or whether it be the rights of different marginalized groups. And again, some of this comes back, I think, to the conversation we were just having there about the polarization of different ideas and what’s—how these ideas may compete with one another. So I think part of that conversation in terms of the benefits that may exist to bring faith-based leaders or those, at least, with an understanding of it into some of the work of these organizations, is to have really frank and open conversations around what some of these different issues and tensions are, because we do see them playing out in a very polarized manner in the UN environment and, of course, in a number of other contexts. So I think that would really be a first step to that conversation, because there is a lot that different organizations and those with different backgrounds can learn from one another, and it may be that some of the tensions cannot be entirely resolved, but I think we need to draw on our strengths where we can in these conversations, particularly when it comes to conflict resolution. SINGH: I will quickly comment that sometimes we need alliances with different partners, strategic partners who can do more persuasion in their groups, so your point about partnering with secular organizations who take faith partnerships seriously. And the rest is absolutely spot-on because what you then do is you invite people who may or may not believe in faith or who may have a different take on faith, and if you believe in faith, you’ll accept them too, right, and everyone is the same. So the idea of how do we—the idea you’re going at is persuasion. How do we persuade more and more folks to come to belong to this peacemaking mission? And the idea of persuasion is to go through alliances, to go through connection, to go through the bridges that have already been built instead of starting a new bridge. And I think that’s exactly where your comment—again, you provide an answer to us within your question—is absolutely right and it’s needed, and needs to be more studied. And there is some really good work done on it already, as you can see, you can find, by terrific scholars, but still, we can do more implementation of that work in the practical field. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I’m going to take the next question from Thomas Walsh, who’s the Universal Peace Federation. He’s written the question: Today we heard from the Security Council special session on atrocities that are horrifying. I would like to hear your thoughts on how religions can contribute to conflict resolution in Ukraine—obviously not simple or easy—and how can we support the UN in its efforts? SHARLAND: Here’s my short answer to this very challenging question that you’ve raised there—(laughs)—and I’m certainly not going to do justice to it in the few minutes that are remaining. I think the one major point I would make here is the need to avoid having religion weaponized in a way to stoke the conflict further. And I—we have seen in terms of the misinformation around the rationale for Russia’s invasion and other things sort of on different precursors or different information around what was happening in Ukraine. But I think the key point I would make here, as a starting point is that this context is not manipulated to the advantage of different groups to stoke the conflict further, and indeed, I think we have seen some instances where that has occurred. I think, obviously, in terms of—we talked early on, and indeed, Professor Singh mentioned early on in his comments—one of the notes that I made here was the importance of, I don’t want to say saving face in this context, but a lot of people have talked about what’s the off-ramp, how do we de-escalate the conflict, how do we come to some political resolution? And I think core to that is trying to understand what the motivations, and the different identities are that are attached to different groups that in no way, in our line of work in the program that I work in at Stimson, we are very much focused on the atrocities and what sort of is coming out of this conflict, which is absolutely abhorrent. But I think that gives us more impetus to really focus on, well, how do we de-escalate this, how do we ensure there are justice and accountability mechanisms when it comes to the atrocities that have been committed, and how do we ensure that the civilians that are being impacted by the conflict right now have the protection that they require, and unfortunately, we are falling incredibly short in that right now and we need to continue looking at how we mitigate some of the impacts of this conflict going forward. FASKIANOS: Dr. Singh, I’ll let you conclude. SINGH: OK, totally agree with my esteemed colleague there, beautifully stated. So let me say, in addition now, after—in consensus with her comments. In addition, I would say, I think from a young age we should teach empathy and listening as two skills. Imagine some of the world leaders right now if they know what empathy is. That’s so totally missing. It’s bizarre how much some people have no idea what empathy is. Seeing children dying on the street—I mean, you just got to not have a heart, right? The connection is missing. The empathy is missing for—of course, the idea that who you are. And the other thing is you’re not being heard. You’re feeling—but you don’t know how to listen to other people but you’re also crying to be heard. So the idea, now, to come back to the role of UN: My quick idea there is we have faith communities. The word is community. What builds a community? What is a community? Can communities be powerful? I think every faith-based communities are very well connected. You can look at my community, look at other faith-based communities. We have a unique way of connecting, which also means we can use that as a power tool. We can use it as a tool to make good influence in the world. But we haven’t done that. We haven’t gone there. We haven’t used systemically faith-based communities to lobby whatever we need to lobby at the UN level, but also to give more prestige to UN, the work that UN has been doing. So two things. Last thing I’ll say is, I think we need more focus outside of UN—whatever it is, schools, colleges, everywhere else, in spaces like this one, so I’m so thankful you’re doing this—on peace. Why is peace important? Is peace a culture? When peace is missing, what are we losing? How can we teach peace and idea of peace from a young time, and what happens when humanity loses peace? If these concepts are explored from a young age, at a young mind, I think we’ll be able to create more sustainable—because our time is going, right? We’ve already seen the disaster in the last few weeks on earth. The question is, how do we not make it happen again, twenty, thirty, fifty, hundred years from today? FASKIANOS: Thank you. A very powerful way to end and we really appreciate you both being with us today to share your expertise, and insight, and analysis, and to all of you for your questions and comments. So I encourage you to follow Lisa Sharland’s work on Twitter at @LJSharland and Sukhsimranjit Singh’s work at @Sukhsimranjits, and his website, singhadr.com. So we will circulate resources as well as a link to this webinar so you can reference it, as well as the Stimson report that Lisa mentioned. And I hope you also follow us, CFR’s Religion and Foreign Policy program, on Twitter at @CFR_religion. And as always, we encourage you to reach out to us to send your suggestions, comments, questions to [email protected]. Thank you all again. Our next webinar will be on Thursday, April 14 at 12:00 p.m. for a Social Justice and Foreign Policy Webinar on Religion and Voting Rights. So thank you both again for being with us today, and to all of you, stay safe.
  • Technology and Innovation
    War in the Digital Age, With Audrey Kurth Cronin
    Podcast
    Audrey Kurth Cronin, distinguished professor at American University’s School of International Service and founding director of the Center for Security, Innovation and New Technology, sits down with James M. Lindsay to discuss how technology, innovation, and social media are shaping Russia’s war in Ukraine and what it might mean for the future.
  • Russia
    CFR Discussion: Geopolitical Implications of Russia's Invasion of Ukraine
    Podcast
    The conversation on Geopolitical Implications of Russias Invasion of Ukraine during the International Studies Association 2022 Annual Convention featured Audrey Kurth Cronin, distinguished professor in the School of International Service and director of the Center for Security, Innovation, and New Technology at American University; Charles A. Kupchan, CFR senior fellow and professor of international affairs in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and Department of Government at Georgetown University; and Kori Schake, senior fellow and director of foreign and defense policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute. James M. Lindsay, senior vice president, director of studies, and Maurice R. Greenberg chair at CFR, moderated the discussion. LINDSAY: Good afternoon everyone. I am Jim Lindsay, senior vice president at the Council on Foreign Relations. It is my great pleasure to welcome you to today’s on-the-record CFR luncheon discussion on the geopolitical implications of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It is also my great pleasure to introduce a stellar set of panelists: Audrey Cronin, Charles Kupchan, and Kori Schake. I am going to keep my introductory remarks short even though I could talk at great length about each of them and the wonderful work they have done. Immediately to my left—at least geographically; not necessarily politically—(laughter)—is Audrey Cronin. She is distinguished professor in the School of International Service and director of the Center for Security, Innovation and New Technology at American University. She is the author of How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns. Her most recent book, Power to the People: How Open Technological Innovation is Arming Tomorrow’s Terrorists was short-listed for the Lionel Gelber Prize and won the 2020 Airey Neave Prize. So congratulations on that, Audrey. CRONIN: Thanks, Jim. LINDSAY: In the center of the stage—not necessarily politically—(laughter)—is Charlie Kupchan. Charlie is a senior fellow at the Council, and a professor of international affairs at Georgetown University. From 2014 to 2017, Charlie served as special assistant to the president and senior director for European affairs on the staff of the National Security Council under President Barack Obama. Charlie’s most recent book is Isolationism: A History of America’s Efforts to Shield Itself from the World. Finally, to my far left—again, geographically; not necessarily politically—is Kori Schake. Kori is senior fellow and director of foreign and defense policy at the American Enterprise Institute. She has held policy positions across government including on the staff of the National Security Council, and at the U.S. State Department where she was deputy head of policy planning. Her most recent book is America vs. the West: Can the Liberal World Order be Preserved? So Audrey, Charlie, Kori, thank you very much for joining me. We have agreed that we will engage in a conversation for about twenty-five minutes. At that point we’re going to open it up to everyone else in the room. Given that the title of our session is Geopolitical Implications of Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine, I’d like to focus our conversation more on what the invasion means or doesn’t mean for global order rather than focus on why Russia invaded or why Putin didn’t get the quick victory that he anticipated. So where I’m going to start is a question for all of you. Vladimir Lenin once remarked that there are decades where nothing happens and weeks where decades happen. Now it certainly feels like we are in the latter situation right now, but is this really an inflection point in the global order, and if it is, is the best historical analogy for the current moment 1815? 1857? 1905? 1914? 1939? Pick whatever you want. Since I introduced you last, Kori, you get the first crack at the question. SCHAKE: No, I decline. I give Charlie the first crack at the question. (Laughs.) KUPCHAN: I was—you were going to buy time for me to think, so—(laughter). The era that most resembles—I’m going to— LINDSAY: I’m going to ask you the first question. Is this an inflection point? KUPCHAN: It’s definitely an inflection point, and I guess the decade that most immediately comes to mind would be the 1890s, and that’s because I think it’s in the 1890s that a series of developments took place that enabled us to actually see the changes in the global balance of power that were taking place slowly, but it brought them to the surface. And that’s because during that—it was during that decade the United States came online as a power with geopolitical ambition outside its neighborhood, picked a fight with the Spanish, turned into a colonizer of the Philippines and other places. Germany embarked on its High Seas Fleet in 1898. And so there was a kind of consolidation of a multi-polar setting that I think looked similar to today. And there was also a lot of domestic change and political fluidity that was the product of industrialization in Germany, in the United States. This was the progressive era dealing with large corporations, trusts, how do we tame them. This resonates with our age, both in terms of what’s happening in other places, but also in here. There’s a lot of economic or socio-economic dislocation that is taking place because of globalization. So that’s—I think I’d say 1890s. SCHAKE: So can I now confess that I was actually reading the ISA tribute to the Trail of Tears so I had to punt to Charlie because I actually didn’t know what question you were asking. I wasn’t listening, Jim—(laughter)—and now that I know it’s is this an inflection point—thank you, Charlie for stepping forward when I was unprepared—I don’t actually think it’s an inflection point. LINDSAY: Why not? SCHAKE: I think we are still litigating the end of the Cold War, that we assumed that the end was 1991 and 1992 with the unification of Germany, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the expansion of freedom, but in fact, Russia is more continuous with the Soviet Union than it is different from the Soviet Union under Vladimir Putin. And so, I think what we are seeing is a resurgent effort by the countries of the West to restrict Russian power when it is used for the suppression of the sovereignty and freedom of others. So I think we are still litigating the end of the Cold War. I hope it will be an inflection point because we succeed and we will end up with a Russia that either lives within the existing rules of the Western order or changes. LINDSAY: OK, Audrey, so we have a vote for an inflection point. We have a vote for no inflection point. Where do you weigh in? CRONIN: Well, I think that whenever we talk about historical analogies, I get really nervous because Ernest May’s book had a huge impact on me early in my career—Thinking in Time—and I think personally I’m going to split the difference, and we can choose from different analogies. So I think we do have a lot of what Charlie has talked about; certainly at the end of the nineteenth century you had globalization, you had inequality at tremendous levels. You had a huge monopolization of major companies that were controlling more and more. You had the maturation of fossil-fuel-based economies, which is quite similar to the maturation of digitally based economies, and also the equivalent to oil, I would say, is—many have said—the equivalent to oil and coal is data. The data economy is becoming quite mature. And so I think the broader context is more the way that Charlie laid it out. But I also agree with you, Kori, because I think that, you know, 1947 is a period where I would look back and say we were—I mean, I did write my first book on the negotiations over Austria, so I see that as being very comparable to what we’re thinking about in some ways with respect to Ukraine—or what the Ukrainians are thinking about. So I can certainly see the continuation with respect to the Soviet Union and Russia there, too. So I think we—you know, we have to pick and choose a little bit. LINDSAY: OK. Kori, I want to come back to you, and you can throw this question to Charlie or Audrey if you want— SCHAKE: (Laughs)—I’m listening now, I promise. LINDSAY: OK. You know, you have written a book asking about whether the liberal world order can be preserved, and you have mentioned that we have seen a remarkable show of unity and action in the West. I think the West as a term has sort of gotten a new lease on life. But the fact that there is unity at the start of the crisis doesn’t mean there will be unity at the end of the crisis. How do you assess the chances for Western cooperation to continue to be sustained? Do you think it’s temporary? Or is there an opportunity here for it to be long lasting? SCHAKE: That’s a really good question, and the honest answer is I don’t know. But I do see—and things are about to get a lot more painful for the countries of the West economically and possibly even politically to sustain the very hard line we have taken, and not just because it looks like Russia is going to turn off the gas pumps unless Western countries will pay in rubles to get Russia around some of the creative economic sanctions that the West has put forward, but also the inability to export wheat from Ukraine and natural resources from Russia. This is going to be a huge humanitarian crisis. We are going to have a food crisis, most particularly in the developing world. And that, too, will put pressure on Western governments. The good news is the amazing creativity of the treasury departments of the Western countries to come up new tools to try and impose economic costs on Russia. The bad news is it’s not yet clear what the second-order effects of those tools are going to be, and who they’re going to hurt, and who they’re going to help as they—as they sink their roots. So we have set sail in very choppy waters. We did it for very good reasons, and I think, though, that two things will help Western countries hold together. The first is Russia is so obviously in the wrong here, and in a way, that’s dangerous—not just to Ukraine; it’s dangerous to this system of rules that have made the West safe and prosperous; namely borders only changed by consent, and sovereignty is inherent in any state—large, small, weak, powerful. So having the German SPD chancellor almost triple German defense spending this year, to commit to the NATO 2 percent next year as opposed to 2035, which was Germany’s opening position, to start sending arms to Ukraine, and to agree to wean Germany off of Russian oil and gas by the end of this year—I don’t see how you walk that back. He planted his sword, and I think that will hold—since Germany is one of the weakest links in Western unity on the sanctions that have been taken against Russia, it will be very hard for others to walk back if Germany holds the line. And the second thing is the war in Ukraine is taking on the trappings of a moral crusade, right? There are good guys in this and there are bad guys in this. And it will be very hard for a country of the West to—after all they have already said, look in the face what Russia is doing—you know, kidnapping mayors from towns they have occupied, shelling apartment buildings, and it was easier for us to look away in Afghanistan, in Syria, and in other places. It will be harder for them to look away in a neighboring country as it takes on this overtly moralistic overtone. LINDSAY: Let me ask you, Audrey, since you have written about Austria, do you see the potential for a negotiated deal that could stick, particularly in light of the point that Kori just made that this is starting—at least in the United States—to turn into a moral crusade, and it’s very difficult to compromise when you are supposedly fighting over good versus evil? CRONIN: Yes, well, neutrality is not necessarily good versus evil. I mean, it’s a different plane altogether, right? So you’re talking geopolitics. You can have good or evil regimes that are neutral. So I don’t really see the question of whether Ukraine could be neutral in those kind of crusade terms. I think it’s all up to the Ukrainians and whether or not they can negotiate a deal that serves their interests. And there’s a bunch of key things that I’m really worried about. One of them is they are talking about not joining any kind of foreign alliances. So the details on that are very, very important. So if that’s part of an agreement, who decides what a foreign alliance is, is going to be very important. The second thing is that security guarantees—they want security guarantees, and they’re saying from the United States, France, and Britain, and that’s essentially an Article 5 commitment. That is quite potentially dangerous to NATO, so it could be quite destabilizing depending upon the details. What if the security guarantor were China, as well? What if Russia were insisting upon that as the agreement. So the devil is in the details in this agreement and to what degree are the Russians going to insist that there be demilitarization? I think that if the Ukrainians become neutral, it’s going to have to be very important that they maintain robust defenses. And then the last thing I’m really worried about is what’s it going to look like. What is the territory going to be? Because there is going to be partition, probably. They are going to have to give something up, and it would be the Donbas and Crimea probably—I’m guessing—and this is up to the Ukrainians, not us. But, where is that line going to be? Some people think that it could be along the Dnieper River. Some people think it could only be the Donbas region in Ukraine as I’ve just said. But exactly what it is that they’re neutralizing is crucial. We could have actually a divided Ukraine that begins to look a little bit like the divided Germany after the Second World War. LINDSAY: Charlie, you have written in the pages of Foreign Affairs just last year, that there is a need for a great power concert. But given what we’ve just talked about and Kori’s notion that we’re really sort of moralizing this conflict, what are the prospects for a concert of great powers, and what would they cooperate on in this current context? KUPCHAN: Let me tie that question back to Kori’s comment because you all—you clearly want us to disagree to get some friction here. LINDSAY: I want you to disagree nicely. (Laughter.) KUPCHAN: I will be very nice, but I—you know, I think there are some differences that should be delineated. Is this a moment of Western rejuvenation? Yes, on some level. But I also think it is a wake-up moment that will force us to confront the prospect of liberal overreach that we, at the end of the Cold War, thought that the order that we built was going to be universalized, and to some extent I think we are seeing blowback from that assumption, and may need to take a more conservative approach to the expansion of the liberal rules-based system that is more focused on us than it is on bringing others in. And I would point out that there is a big liberal democracy out there called India that has not decided to stand with the liberal democracies of the world in this conflict. Second point: I’m more worried than you are, Kori, that this kind of resurgence of moralism and Western strength will last, and that’s because all the problems that we were concerned about before February 24 are still there, and in fact, they’re getting worse. Gas prices are going up, egg prices are going up, grain and bread is going up. What—four million or close to four million refugees have arrived in Europe, and not too far off the Europeans are going to wake up and say, holy crap, most of these aren’t going to go home. Where are we going to put them? How are we going to deal with this? And immigration has been really one of the toughest issues for Europe. So I do worry that as this clock moves forward, as we head into the midterms here in the United States, this kind of burst of bipartisanship will be just a burst, and that the Republicans are going to get their knives out—I’ll defer to you on the Republican Party—but I don’t think the America First crowd is gone; it’s just quiet for now because it doesn’t play well. I expect it to come back vocally as we get closer to the midterms. Final comment: I think the impulse, Jim, is to say forget a global concert; it’s over. And to some extent I agree with that because Richard and I wrote a global concert depends upon the absence of an aggressor state. We have an aggressor state. It’s called Russia. It has invaded its neighbor. But I would also point out that we cannot afford to go back to a world that looks like the Cold War. We are in the boat together on pandemics, on climate change, on proliferation, on global economic interdependence. So I do think we need to talk about either a post-Putin Russia or even a Putin Russia, and what can be done after the dust settles in Ukraine to figure out how to make sure that the broader global agenda that we face doesn’t go by the wayside. LINDSAY: Kori, I want to get you to respond to Charlie’s point that India has not joined in the effort to sanction. And I should note it’s not just India; it’s Brazil, it’s South Africa. Indeed most of the countries of the global south have not rallied behind Western sanctions and in fact have criticized them. So what does that mean for the future of the rules-based order that you have spoken about? SCHAKE: I think it’s a fabulous challenge. So I have a couple of reactions to it. The first is I would be doing exactly what they are doing if I were a developing country, an emergent economy because Germans can have the luxury of paying double gas prices. It’s an incredibly wealthy country. The government can float bonds and pay for things in the future because there is a lot of confidence in the dynamism of the German economy. That’s not the case for most emergent economies, and they have more pressing problems than the problems we are worried about. And so I think the first thing is we need to not be so judgmental about the fact that they are solving other harder problems than what we are trying to recruit them to help us with. Second, I also think that’s good alliance management because allies very often disagree. They even disagree on really important things, so it’s reasonable that people who are not tied as tightly into the benefits of the liberal international order are questioned more what they’re going to offer for its continuation. So that’s the second thing. The third thing is I think there’s a difference between not wanting to be counted on something and opposing it. And India is an interesting case in this point—example in this case, sorry—because on the one hand they get a lot of their military equipment from Russia, and they have a budding, burgeoning relationship with the United States, Australia, and Japan; not because of Russia but because of China, and trying to figure out how to synchronize the gas pedal and the clutch on their series of concerns is actually genuinely difficult. And so, again, I don’t think we should be too judgmental about this. But we should work hard to win the argument and explain to them why it is in their interest that countries cannot change borders by force. That’s what Pakistan has attempted to do to India. That’s what China is attempting to do to India. And they have a stake in a system in which all of us work together to prevent that. LINDSAY: Do you want to jump in here, Audrey? CRONIN: Yes, I was—so jumping off of that point, actually, Kori, isn’t it interesting that China, the great defender of sovereignty, does not seem to be interested in defending Ukraine’s sovereignty, and is quite interested in supporting the aggressor in this case. But getting back to India, I think the fact that only within the last two years the Indians have been fighting the Chinese in the Himalayas. You know, they have a lot of other things to worry about. And the other thing I would say is that, what major power war can you think of where what is essentially the non-aligned movement in the world has ever aligned with those who are currently defending the global order. And then the last thing that I’ll say—to disagree a little bit since I think that’s what you want—disagree a little bit with Charlie is that I don’t think we could have a concert of Europe right now or a concert of great powers because we have a lot of new actors that are as powerful as great powers are in certain dimensions, including the major tech companies who are having a massive influence geopolitically on this crisis. So, we are not in 1815. We are in a different situation with a lot of new stakeholders and a different economic situation than the one that existed then. LINDSAY: Audrey, can I draw you out on that point about technology companies and the role they are playing? Can you just sort of spell it out for me—how you see them influencing or being influenced by the conflict? CRONIN: Yeah, so in some respects the tech companies have been—have sort of been bunged by reality because they have been very poor at dealing with situations of war. So you’ve got Meta that has been—you know, Facebook, and Instagram, and WhatsApp have all been shut down in Russia, and now Meta is being criminalized by the Putin administration—Putin regime—and so, because Meta claimed that they would go to an exception of their moderation rules and allow the Ukrainians to cry for blood against the Russians, this made them seem hypocritical and gave the Russians the excuse to criminalize them within Russia. So this whole concept of neutrality where—neutrality in terms of communications that they have sort of tied their whole identity to for many decades is proving to be extremely frayed. Meta is now being, you know, as I said, criminalized, and it’s giving the Russians a greater argument for why it is that, you know, they can clamp down within Russia. And so, as a result, the Russian people are getting less information. For the first time that I can remember, the New York Times has pulled its people from Moscow. All of the major bureaus have either closed down or pulled people. You’ve got a, you know, crackdown that started to occur before this crisis where Google and Apple representatives were being harassed and, you know, very, very severely. There is kind of a hostage-taking approach to making sure that there were people there that the Putin administration could control. So I don’t see Meta as having been very successful. However, then you’ve also got Elon Musk and Starlink. Look at the role that Starlink has played in Ukraine. I mean, he’s the one who in many respects are keeping the Ukrainians connected, and that’s not unrelated to how this crisis is going. Starlink, with its two thousand individual-sized satellites which are very difficult to shoot down—this has been a huge boon and a support for Ukraine. So I think that major tech companies are an important stakeholder in the international geopolitical realm that we don’t put enough emphasis upon. LINDSAY: Kori, did you have a two-finger? SCHAKE: Yeah, I wanted to tag along on Dr. Cronin’s very good—Dr. Cronin’s very good point and say that it’s not just— CRONIN: Kori, call me Audrey. We’ve known each other for decades. (Laughter.) SCHAKE: Thank you, my friend. It’s not just the big tech companies. What we are looking at is a war in which civil society—business, private charities—all these different dimensions are playing extraordinary roles, right? Chef José Andrés is not only buffeting Poland and other countries that are taking in enormous numbers of refugees, he is also running aid convoys to Odessa. We could be in a point before this war is over where you have private charities breaking sieges of Ukrainian cities and the Russians trying to hold the sieges. You see the hackers group, Anonymous, going after the Russians something fierce, and that’s where the values, the moral crusade part of this matters because civil society in free societies are taking it upon themselves—often beyond the control of the government and without the government’s blessing—to do things that they think will help the people they think are good guys in the war. LINDSAY: I see you’ve done a two-finger, Charlie. I’ll let you do that, but I’m going to ask one last question of you before we bring the rest of the room in. And it is what do you make of President Xi’s decision to back Russia rather than to stand up for the principle of sovereignty? Are Russia and China now joined at the hip? How should U.S. statecraft respond to that? But I know you wanted to get a two-finger first. KUPCHAN: Yes. One quick two-finger to Dr. Professor Cronin. CRONIN: Oh, please. (Laughter.) KUPCHAN: And that is that—and this will just be in defense of the concert system, and I just came from a roundtable—I see Chet Crocker and others who were there—on concerts, one of their assets being the flexibility to put at the table Google, and Meta, and International Rescue Committee, and other groups precisely because they are not formal U.N. Security Council bodies. But you seem skeptical— CRONIN: You are—you are redefining the terms. KUPCHAN: —so let’s not let you talk. (Laughter.) To your question, Jim, I think that the Chinese were a little bit uncertain at first, and they said some things that suggested that they were going to back Russia and some things that said they weren’t so comfortable with the disruption that’s being caused. My sense is that they have now coalesced around standing fairly firmly behind Putin. And I think that’s because this is a war that, on balance, is probably good for China. And that’s because it pushes Russia more fully into China’s embrace and turns Russia irretrievably into the junior partner. It distracts the United States and Europe from the Asia-Pacific. We’re going to be focused on the new central front for the foreseeable future, and I think the Chinese like that, just like they like the fact that we were spinning our wheels for twenty years in Afghanistan and Iraq. The big question mark in my mind is will they go the next step. Will they provide economic assistance and military assistance? Will they bail out a Russian economy that could be collapsing? And I don’t know the answer to that. My guess is they’re going to be careful not to see secondary sanctions get imposed. But one issue that I do worry about—and then I’ll throw this out for discussion—is, are the Chinese going to look at what’s happening here, and are we going to look at what’s happening here, and say globalization and interdependence has become too dangerous, and as a consequence, we’re moving into what could become an era of deglobalization? That’s scary in a world in which two-thirds of the countries in the world already trade more with China than with us. So deglobalization may be unstoppable, but it’s not necessarily good for the U.S. LINDSAY: OK, fair enough. On that note, I’m going to bring the rest of the room into our conversation. I want to remind everybody that this meeting is on the record. If you would like to ask a question, raise a hand, and please stand. Wait for the microphone to arrive, then state your name and affiliation before asking your question. And I do ask that you ask a question. Right here in the front—right here. CRONIN: (Laughs.) The race is on. Q: Thank you. Victoria Hui at University of Notre Dame. These days people talk about today it’s Ukraine, tomorrow it’s Taiwan. So do you think— LINDSAY: Can you hold it a little closer? Q: Oh. LINDSAY: Thank you. Q: People say today it’s Ukraine; tomorrow it’s Taiwan. So do you think that today it’s Ukraine means— tomorrow it’s Taiwan means that there is a bigger chance that there will be a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, or Ukraine—the experiences that we are seeing is actually going to make Taiwan safer? Thank you. LINDSAY: So have the chances of an invasion of Taiwan gone up or gone down? SCHAKE: So I honestly don’t know. Let me tell you the two arguments. The first argument would be what the Chinese could learn from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is it’s shocking that the Western world actually can pull together when it’s serious. Second, the diabolical creativity of Western financial institutions to develop new tools in market—to affect markets, again, should be scary to them. Third, the only way to tell whether a military is any good at what it’s doing is to fight it, and I—like a whole bunch of other people thought the Russian military was an awful lot better than it is. And China hasn’t fought in a long time, and so whether they would have the grit for this fight or the ability to do the orchestration of logistics and air power, getting across a hundred miles of choppy water in an amphibious operation on Taiwan—that’s a pretty sophisticated military task. So lots of reasons they should take caution from that. Not at all clear to me that Xi Jinping will take caution from that—that he may very well be arrogant enough to think, well, of course the Russians are terrible at this, but my military is great at this. And of course the Ukrainians feel Western. The Taiwanese are starting to feel Western; we’d better shut this down before it goes much further. Like I could see arguments where he would think the West would never have the stomach to impose on China the kind of economic restrictions they are imposing. So it’s touch and go I think. KUPCHAN: Two quick thoughts: the first is that I think on balance it makes a Chinese attack less likely, and that’s simply because the Chinese are watching what’s happening to Russia, and they’re probably going to calculate we don’t want to go down that rabbit hole; that does not look good to us. My second observation is that I think it probably makes sense for the United States to end strategic ambiguity—not to change the One China policy, but to say we’re going to defend Taiwan because I think part of what happened in Ukraine is we were ambiguous, and the Russians called our bluff. So if we intend to defend Taiwan, let’s say so. If we don’t intend to, let’s say so. But living with this ambiguity, it seems to me, invites trouble. We just learned that in Ukraine. LINDSAY: Charlie, how do you square that with your observation earlier that you worry that the America First movement is just sort of in abeyance right now and will come back with great force? Because that would seem to be the kind of commitment that they would oppose. KUPCHAN: You know, it is a huge and interesting question, and if Trump is reelected, I don’t know what the future of NATO and U.S. alliances in Asia will be. I do think, though, that the impetus for the America First movement came out of the forever wars, and that if you look at the Trump administration, they were actually pretty tough on China and supportive of Taiwan. LINDSAY: The administration was; the president wasn’t necessarily— KUPCHAN: President not so, but the Republicans are—you know, they’re pretty gung-ho on China, and so I think that this geopolitical realignment that we have been undertaking: out of wars of choice in the Middle East let’s focus on meat-and-potatoes issues in Eurasia is good because I think that’s the sweet spot in American politics. LINDSAY: Audrey, do you want to jump in here? CRONIN: Just two things on the Taiwan question and also the relationship between Russia and China—I think firstly that China is going to find that it has developed a kind of a vassal state now and, you know, the Russians are going to be depending upon China for weapons, for buying their oil, for technology, for evading sanctions, and I’m not sure that China, over time, is going to find that this is a good deal for them, so I think that may—in theory—change the desire that they might have had to take aggressive action against Taiwan. I think you can see it both ways, though. I agree with Kori. I’m not sure that it’s possible to say definitively that way. But the second thing I would say is that Taiwan has a lot to learn from what Ukraine has done. So, you know, urban warfare; using easily accessible and cheap technologies; engaging in, you know, skirmishes; fighting forward; not depending upon huge legacy systems—instead using the kinds of tactics that we associate with insurgents. I think that Taiwan would be extremely good at that, and they’re going to learn from Ukraine. LINDSAY: I think it’s a really important point that both sides can learn from the events in Ukraine. If you want to ask a question in the back of the room, you’re really going to have to stand up and wave because I’m not sure I can see that far back. But we have a question right here. Q: Hi. Jim Morrow, University of Michigan. LINDSAY: Go blue! Q: It’s clear that the Europeans are going to come close to meeting their commitments to increase their military spending. My question is do you also think that they’ll go further to create something like a really unified European military, and also to take the political changes to have a coherent European foreign policy? And then the other part of the question is should the United States encourage this because it seems to me there’s two sides to this. One is greater burden sharing—the Europeans can carry more, but at the same time, it will decrease U.S. influence on security and defense issues. SCHAKE: Those are great questions. So I think the result of Russia’s aggression is going to be Europeans clinging more tightly to the United States because when we are scared, we like to hold hands with each other. And even watching how awful the Russian military is at the profession of arms doesn’t appear to be making our European friends and allies any less desirous of having the United States in the mix of it. So I don’t anticipate that the increased spending is going to be external to NATO or to build European capabilities autonomous of the United States. I do think, however, we should be encouraging closer political and even military cooperation among the Europeans for exactly the reason you said, which is after watching the performance of this Russian military, the Poles could defeat the Russians pretty easily. And once you start mixing all the NATO countries in, our opposition to greater European autonomy has actually encouraged the Europeans to think of themselves as weak, and they are not. And we should want allies that feel their strength and are confident in their strength as a way of better balancing the risks all of us run together. KUPCHAN: I would just add, Jim, that I think what’s going on in Germany is an inflection point because if there were to be a development on the European side that changed, in a consequential way, Europe’s defense capability, it had to happen in Germany. And Germany was the laggard. I mean, its military has atrophied, deteriorated in a way that’s hard to overstate. And if there is to be a kind of European pillar, it has to start with Germany, and it looks like they are starting. But I agree with Kori that this is not the beginning of Macron’s strategic autonomy, and that’s because France is alone in having a view of Europe as standing apart from the United States and flexing its muscles on the global stage. Just about every other EU member state wants a stronger Europe that’s tethered to the United States; not that goes off on its own. That’s good for them, and I think it’s good for us. CRONIN: Yeah, the only thing I would add is let’s look at what the non-NATO members have done to get a sense of how important this shift is. I mean, if you look at the tremendous increase in spending—defense spending in Sweden, increase in defense spending in Finland; the fact that Switzerland, which is not a member of NATO or the EU is now abiding by the sanctions—you know, this is an inflection point if only from that perspective. The Europeans are drawing together in anger and frustration, and it is unprecedented. LINDSAY: We’ll go over here to the right side of the room. Q: Hi, deRaismes Combes from American University. Thank you so much for an interesting conversation. I’m still thinking about this notion of historical analogies that you started with, and I’m wondering if you think Ukraine is teaching us anything about 21st century geopolitics in the digital age that we just haven’t really grasped before in terms of where this is heading, both specifically with Ukraine, but also with Taiwan and with the broader geopolitical system and the liberal world order. So thank you. LINDSAY: Do you want to take first crack at that, Audrey? CRONIN: Yes, I mean, that’s a huge question, and the answer is yes—(laughs)—it’s teaching us a lot about geopolitics in the digital age. Some of this I’ve already talked about. I think that major digital actors need to be parts of this Concert of Europe that we’re talking about, the concert of the great powers, because I think they play an enormous role in affecting the future and how things are evolving. You know, I think that we see a lot with respect specifically to Ukraine, which is that the fact that Ukraine had a pretty advanced technology element to their economy; they are very advanced in aeronautics; they had their own drone industry, and their use of drones has come very naturally to Ukrainian citizens—you know, those who are volunteering. You know, this shows you that—again, getting back to the question on Taiwan—countries that are advanced in terms of their digital capabilities, and their populations are able to use digital technologies effectively, are going to be, I think, more successful as we move into the 21st century. LINDSAY: Kori, you want to jump in here? SCHAKE: Yeah, two quick, additional points. One is that one of the surprises of this war was that we all expected it was going to start with a cyber Armageddon, right, that power stations were—power systems were going to go down all over Ukraine, that the government wouldn’t be able to communicate. All of these fancy cyber things were supposed to happen, and they didn’t. And it looks like they didn’t happen for three reasons: first, is the Russians gave us so much lead time of what they were potentially doing that NSA and CYBERCOM were able to forward deploy to Ukraine and other places teams to assist in the defense of the architectures. Second, the Russians—for reasons I don’t understand—were evidently more restrained than anybody anticipated. Maybe it’s the nature of cyber tools that once you unleash them your adversaries can use them back against you. Maybe we are seeing an assured destruction leveling. And the third thing is it’s just easier to blow stuff up—(laughter)—and so the Russians blew stuff up. And so one big thing we expected was going to happen actually turns out not to be as significant in modern warfare. But Audrey’s point about the technological sophistication—I mean, the Ukrainian government dispensing an app so that people can identify Russian troops as they come. That gave them country-wide situational awareness. A couple hundred thousand people are actively using the app, so you get societal resilience and you also get better information. It is really extraordinary. LINDSAY: Did you want to— KUPCHAN: Just one quick sentence on the—how important the information space has been. You know, the Biden administration I think deserves credit for stealing the march from the Russians, right? The Russians have spent the last five, ten years cleaning our clocks in the information space. I think that the Biden people reversed it. They got out ahead. They released intel that they probably shouldn’t have released, but they did it anyway, and I really think it has made a difference. LINDSAY: Going to go all the way to the back of the room. Q: Thank you. I’m Chandler Rosenberger from Brandeis University. And I wanted to follow up on this point about resilience because I think we’ve talked a lot about tactics. We’ve talked a lot about specific things that the Ukrainians have done. But I think the most impressive thing about them is how resilient they have been militarily and as a society. And I wonder if that tells us something about the advantages of a kind of, you know, liberal, democratic, civic order in which people feel deeply invested and its ability to survive an assault from an authoritarian states where the soldiers seem not to know what they are fighting for, that there’s—maybe we can have more faith in that kind of democratic social resilience than we might have had otherwise. LINDSAY: Who wants to take first crack at the question? CRONIN: I will. LINDSAY: OK, Audrey, you’re closest, got your finger up first. CRONIN: All right, well, so yes, I think that we are going to learn a lot about societal resilience, but I think we have to wait. I think we have to wait and find out how this plays out because Kori’s point about it being a lot easier to just blow things up, that is also still true. So if all you want to do is crush a country and, you know, occupy that country by killing a lot of civilians and, you know, targeting corridors of humanitarian fleeing civilians, if all you want to do is kill a lot of people, I think the Russians are capable of doing that. And I don’t think we can yet come to full conclusions about how strong that resilience is going to be to stand up to that. We’re still pretty early in this fight. I hope from my heart that what you are saying is what we learn from this conflict. But we’re only, what, about a month and a half into it—five weeks into it, so I hope that resilience is what we get out of it. SCHAKE: So it clearly makes a difference in the willingness of soldiers to run risks in a fight, right? We see the comparative difference in Russia and Ukraine, and I do think that that’s partly about societal resilience. In better militaries than the Russians there’s also the professionalism that gives resilience, right? They’re not fighting for me; they are fighting for the guy standing next to them kind of resilience. Temperamentally I want so much to believe it’s true, and yet, I think there are a couple of factors that make Ukraine uniquely resilient against a Russian invasion. First, the terrors of Soviet occupation. There are still Ukrainians alive who experienced the Holodomor that Russia—the Soviet Union imposed on Ukraine. They feel like they are fighting for survival. They don’t feel like they are fighting for a particular kind of government—in addition to a particular kind of government. The second thing is that I think it matters that the World War II generation is still alive in our countries because I think they have a slightly different perspective. But let me add one hopeful note. When Jim Mattis and I did the surveys of American public attitudes about military issues for our book, Warriors and Citizens several years ago, the weirdest anomaly in the data was that the attitudes of people under twenty-five most closely approximated the attitudes of people who had lived through the Great Depression and World War II: that the world feels fundamentally uncertain and unsafe to them, and that does give a kind of resilience that I think the intervening generations might not have to the same extent. LINDSAY: Charlie? KUPCHAN: Yeah, what I’m sort of ruminating on, vis-à-vis this question, is how did Putin get it so wrong, right? Because we will look back at this crisis and say Putin made Ukraine great again. The Ukraine that he envisaged did exist, but it was—it was pre-2014 and probably all the way going back to the Orange Revolution. You know, you used to go to Mariupol, or Donetsk, or Lugansk, and it was full of Russians, and they felt like Russians, and they affiliated with Russia. That’s gone, right? They have come together around a strong Ukrainian national identity, including the president, who grew up speaking Russian, right? How did he get elected? He got elected by, you know, pro-Russian and Russian speakers in eastern and southern Ukraine. That’s gone, right? He’s now a rock star because he’s giving his middle finger to Putin. And so the country has really come together as a consequence of Russian aggression. It’s a kind of blowback that the Russians are going to have to live with forever. LINDSAY: This gentleman here with the dark jacket. Q: Fen Hampson from north of the border. The panel—I’ve forgotten who it was—raised the interesting question about Russia with Putin and Russia without Putin. And I’d like to ask you, if and when this crisis ends, what sort of relationship do we have with Russia if Putin is still around? Do we walk back sanctions? Do we take oligarchs off Magnitsky? Do we stop proceedings in the International Criminal Court? Do we welcome them back to the various organizations they’ve been thrown out of, and that includes the G-20? And if he leaves—for whatever reason—you know, is Russian going to be easier to deal with or more difficult to deal with? And I would say, you know, be careful what you wish for because he has provided stability—and I’m not defending him—but one can envisage a scenario where the security vacuum extends now to Russia as others see weakness in Moscow. LINDSAY: Charlie, do you want to take a first crack at that? KUPCHAN: A lot depends, Fen, on how this ends, and my best guess is that it will not end cleanly, and it will not end well. Audrey already mentioned some of the provisions that are tentatively on the table. I have a hard time imagining them seeing the light of day. Who is going to guarantee Ukraine’s security? Is Zelenskyy going to get the support of the Rada to change the constitution? Is he going to have the domestic support to recognize Crimea, Mariupol, and Donetsk, and Lugansk as Russian? So I’m guessing that what will end up here is another frozen conflict in which Russia takes a big bite out of eastern Ukraine, probably doesn’t go into Kyiv because it’s not going very well, and then we sort of have to say, well, the fighting is over. They did more, they took more; now what? And I guess I’m enough of a realist to say that, you know, we’re going to have to go back to something that looks more like the Cold War which mixes containment and engagement. And that’s because there is simply too much at stake to put Russia in the penalty box and throw the key away. And so I would say that even in a post-war Putin Russia as opposed to a post-Putin Russia, we’re going to have to find ways of getting some difficult hedging cooperation on arms control, on the question of energy issues—I mean, there’s a lot of stuff here that we can’t just throw away. LINDSAY: I want to get in one last question because we’re nearing the end of our time, so we’ll go to that young lady over there, if we can, and then I’ll have to ask the panelists to be short in the response. Q: Hi, I hope this won’t be too long. My name is Eve Clark-Benevides. I’m from SUNY Oswego. And I—there was an editorial in the New York Times yesterday that infuriated me, but it has been really coming up during this whole talk. Bret Stephens argues maybe we’re being a little bit too premature, kind of celebrating that Putin has miscalculated. Maybe actually Putin really only wanted eastern Ukraine all along. He never really thought—and that a lot of the goals that Putin has wanted over time—getting rid of the free press, getting the moderates to move out, and really having full power over the Russian society—is really coming to pass. So this is kind of a piggyback off the last question that, really, are we going to see sort of these steps to disengage economically and politically with Russia—you know, Britain realizing that maybe having Russian money completely floating their economy—we’re trying to divest. Do you think that maybe in this new Cold War—whatever occurs—that we’re going to continue to really try to get away from oligarch money in the political systems in the West? LINDSAY: OK, Audrey, you had your hand up first so— CRONIN: Yes, so when it comes to our analyses of Putin, I think it’s a mistake for us to personalize this as much as we are. You know, put aside this unfortunate comment about potentially regime change in the way that it was interpreted. I think that the Russians have always, throughout their history, gone back and forth between kind of a Slavophile approach and a Westernizer approach, and Putin is a Slavophile. So what we’re seeing right now is a reawakening of Russian nationalism, a move back exactly along the lines that you just suggested to having greater control over their domestic population, getting rid of some of the threats that Putin personally feels are quite dangerous; you know, domestic movements within Russia. I hate to see all of this happen, but yes, it does feel quite familiar. I mean, I spend my—some of my teenage years living in Moscow in the American embassy. I remember the Cold War; I’m old enough to remember all of that. And I think we are going to have to move back to that kind of relationship where sometimes we can deal on certain things and at other times we can’t deal on those things, we deal on other things. But the worst thing that we could do would be to make Russia a complete pariah because, if you understand European history, you also know that anytime you have a complete pariah that is aside from the whole system, you are more likely to end up in a major war. LINDSAY: Charlie or Kori? SCHAKE: So Putin—I don’t buy the argument that Putin is a grand strategic genius and invaded Ukraine in order to crackdown domestically for two reasons: first because he is already cracking down. It was just a slow strangulation—CREF, Nemtsov, and Navalny—and so he didn’t need the Ukraine invasion to be more repressive domestically. But the second thing is I think the failure of Russian force and arms in Ukraine is actually making his domestic position much more tenuous in ways that I think are unpredictable from the outside to understand. My answer to—just quickly, my answer to the what do we—how do we deal with Putin still in power, I think it would be a good thing for us to find ways for a strategically smaller, weaker, and humiliated Russia to have a U.S. counterparty on some things that are important to them and to us. It will make Ukraine’s longer-term future and Russia’s longer-term future easier to handle if we, who have had so little invested in this fight, step forward and help integrate Russia in ways that we can. KUPCHAN: To the question of was Putin a grand master and he intended this from the beginning, I don’t see it, and that’s because he could have done the eastern bit at any time, and he wouldn’t have needed to put almost two hundred thousand troops all around Ukraine, including in Belarus. He could have just gone into the separatist territories, turned south, gone to Mariupol and connected to Crimea, and called it a day. I think what’s happening here is he’s changing the goalposts because his original goal of regime change and the occupation of the country, it does not look feasible anymore, although I agree with my colleagues that he might just keep bombing for another few months. Who knows what will happen? But the key question in my mind is whatever that ultimate disposition is, can he portray it as a victory? Can he sell it—not just to the Russian people, but to the Russia elite system, which is showing more discontent than I think we’ve ever seen in modern Russia. I don’t think Putin is about to go, but I do think that this is a war that is going to loosen his grip on power, and anything could come of that. It could mean he goes and we get a worse outcome. After all, a lot of the people around him share his views. It could also be that we get a more benign outcome. We don’t know, and as a consequence, I think we just have to hedge our bets. LINDSAY: Well, that brings us to the end of our time here. I want to thank everyone in the room for joining us for this conversation on the geopolitical implications of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. I want to do a shout-out to Irina Faskianos and her team— AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yay, Irina! (Applause.) LINDSAY: —for arranging today’s thing. And I want to say thank you to our three guests: Kori Schake, Charlie Kupchan, and Audrey Cronin for their expertise. (Applause.) (END
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    Rose Gottemoeller, the Steven C. Házy lecturer at the Center for International Security and Cooperation in Stanford University's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and research fellow at the Hoover Institution, leads a conversation on international security and cooperation. FASKIANOS: Welcome to today’s session of the Winter/Spring 2022 CFR Academic Webinar Series. I’m Irina Faskianos, vice president of the National Program and Outreach at CFR. Today’s discussion is on the record, and the video and transcript will be available on our website at CFR.org/academic. As always, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy. We are delighted and honored to have Rose Gottemoeller with us today to talk about international security and cooperation. Rose Gottemoeller is the Steve C. Házy lecturer at Stanford University's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and its Center for International Security and Cooperation. She is also a fellow at the Hoover Institution. From 2016 to 2019, she served as the deputy secretary-general (DSG) of NATO, where she advanced NATO’s adaptation to the new security challenges in Europe and the fight against terrorism. And before that, she served as the undersecretary for arms control and international security at the State Department. In 2009 and 2010, she was the assistant secretary of state for arms control, verification, and compliance, during which time she served as chief U.S. negotiator of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with the Russian Federation. So, Rose Gottemoeller, thank you very much for being with us. I can’t think of anybody better to have this conversation with us than you. When we planned this webinar, we knew it was the sixtieth anniversary of the Cuban Missile Crisis, but what we did not know was Russia would invade Ukraine and that there would be a war going on. So perhaps you can put this in context, talk about the lessons learned from the Cuban Missile Crisis, and where we are now, given what’s going on in Ukraine. GOTTEMOELLER: Thank you so much, Irina. And it’s wonderful to be with you, and with everyone who was able to join us today from across the country. I know there are many impressive institutions who are dialing in, and I really appreciate the chance to have a conversation with you and look forward to talking with the students and hearing what your questions are as well. Let me indeed begin talking today about the Cuban Missile Crisis, which happened sixty years ago this coming October. It was a time—I was a fourth grader at the time. And I remember, I was going to a Catholic school in Dearborn, Michigan. And the nuns said to us: You really must get home quickly tonight, children, there might be a nuclear war. You need to be with your parents. None of us knew exactly what was going on, but we knew that nuclear war was a really bad thing. We’d been through many drills, hiding under our desks or out in the hallway with our head between our knees. I have to tell you, even as a third grader, during one of those drills I thought to myself: If we get hit by a nuclear weapon, putting my head between my knees is not going to help one bit. So even as a third grader, I knew that nuclear weapons were weapons of mass destruction. So, we did manage to solve that crisis, with a secret deal, as it turned out. President Kennedy agreed quietly to withdraw intermediate-range nuclear missiles from Turkey. Never made public, until much later. And Khrushchev agreed to withdraw what were equivalent missiles from Cuba. And we got back to the negotiating table. In fact, the Cuban Missile Crisis dealt not only the United States and the Soviet Union, but other countries around the world, what I call a short, sharp shock. We recognized how devastating would be the effect of nuclear war, and we decided we really did need to talk together about how we were going to control and limit those risks. So, it led to a blossoming of negotiations on all kinds of limitations and controls. First, the Limited Test Ban Treaty. It was a test ban on nuclear testing in the atmosphere that was very quickly agreed after the Cuban Missile Crisis. President Kennedy gave an important speech at American University in June of 1963, when he said we really must control this most dangerous of weapons. And he proposed at that time a test ban treaty limiting testing in the atmosphere. And that was agreed rather quickly. It’s amazing to me, as an arms control negotiator, that that treaty was then agreed by August of that very year. So record time. The U.K. also joined in those negotiations. But one thing that’s very interesting, the Limited Test Ban was the first, I would say also, environmental arms control treaty. It was inspired by the fact that countries around the world and publics around the world were recognizing that testing in the atmosphere was producing a lot of strontium-90 and other radioactive pollutants that were getting into the food supply. Again, I remember from that period my own mother saying, “We’ve got to be worried about the milk we’re drinking because it’s got strontium-90 in it from testing in the atmosphere.” So even then, there were some environmental pushes that led to, I think, in part the quick negotiation of the Limited Test Ban Treaty. After that, we went to the step of controlling tests also under the sea and underground, starting with the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, that did not enter into force until the early 1990s. It was a long negotiation, but it was negotiated through that period of the 1960s into the 1970s. We also negotiated what has been the foundational document of the nonproliferation regime: the [Nuclear] Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). That was negotiated through the late 1960s and entered into force in 1972. It did basically designate five nuclear weapon states. These days they are U.S., U.K., France, China, and Russia. But at that time, those nuclear weapon states were the only states that would be permitted to possess nuclear weapons. All other states around the world would give up their right to nuclear weapons. But there was a grand bargain there. The nuclear weapon states agreed to proceed with total nuclear disarmament, under Article 6 of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and in return for which the non-nuclear weapon states under the NPT would, again, not build their own weapons. They would prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons. And everyone would work to promote peaceful uses of the atom, whether in nuclear energy, or agriculture, manufacturing, mining industry, et cetera, promoting—or medical uses as well—promoting peaceful uses of the atom. So those are what are called the three pillars of the NPT: disarmament, nonproliferation, and peaceful uses. So that was agreed in 1972. And working in that multilateral way was important, but there was also an impetus given in this commitment to disarmament for the United States and the Soviet Union to get together and to begin to negotiate bilaterally the two together on limiting their nuclear weapons. We built up a tremendous nuclear arsenal during the Cold War years. At the time that we were beginning to talk to the Soviets about limiting nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon delivery systems, missiles and bombers, submarines—at that time, in the late 1960s, we had about 32,000 nuclear warheads, if you can imagine that. And the Soviets built up their stockpile to be about 40,000 nuclear warheads. So there were tremendous numbers of nuclear weapons being held in storage, but there were also tremendous numbers that were deployed. So we worked steadily from that period, the 1970s into the 1980s, to try to limit nuclear weapons. Didn’t work so well. There are various reasons why. Most specifically, I think, we were just driving harder and harder with more effective missiles to deploy more warheads on those missiles. And so, by the time we got into the 1980s, we had about 12,000 warheads deployed on missiles and deployed or designated for deployment on bombers. The Soviets the same, about 12,000. Now, remember those numbers I gave you, 32,000 total, 40,000 total in the USSR. We held a lot of weapons in storage, not on top of missiles, not on top of delivery vehicles, as we called them. They were just held in storage. But we also then had 12,000 deployed on missiles and pointed at each other in a very high-readiness state. So we had got through the 1970s and 1980s not blowing each other up, but we also didn’t have much success limiting those systems because there was this technological jump ahead, being able to put more warheads on individual missile systems. So, that’s when Reagan and Gorbachev entered the scene. In the mid-1980s they got together. Reagan had not been very easy on the USSR when he came into office. He declared the USSR the “evil empire.” And he drove hard military modernization that included some nuclear modernization as well. The sclerotic Soviet leadership at that time, they were dying off one by one. First it was Brezhnev, then it was Andropov, then there was a third fellow. They all went very, very quickly. And Gorbachev took over in the mid-1980s. And he and Reagan actually then got together and began to talk about how they might reduce—not try to limit, because limit wasn’t good enough. The technology was always pushing ahead. But how could we actually begin to reduce nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, and the missiles we put them on? So that was the negotiations that began in the 1980s for the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and also the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, which finally entered into force in 1994. And that treaty, once again, took the number of deployed warheads on both sides down from 12,000 deployed warheads on each side to 6,000 deployed warheads on each side. If you think about one of these warheads, a single warhead is enough to destroy a city. It’s nothing like what we’re seeing in Ukraine today. Sadly, such horrible destruction and the really barbaric attacks on civilian targets like this maternity hospital yesterday. I’m just heartbroken about this, as I’m sure many of you are. But that was a big bomb that was really directed at a single facility and was very destructive. But if you can imagine a nuclear weapon, that could really pulverize—pulverize—the center of a city. And that’s what happened in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, when the United States was the only country to use nuclear weapons in wartime. And that is what has led to this nuclear taboo that has been pretty clear, because it was recognized these are weapons of mass destruction. They completely pulverize, and many, many lives lost. And those who are left living, as it was said at the time of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, would envy the dead because of the severity of their injuries. So, people were recognizing that we had too many deployed warheads. We had 12,000 pointed at each other on a high state of alert. So getting them down to 6,000 on each side was important. That was the goal of the START treaty. Then in the early 2000s, in 2002, President Bush and President—believe it or not—Putin at that time decided in the Moscow Treaty on a further reduction. That took us down to 2,200 deployed warheads on both sides. And then the treaty that I worked on negotiating, the New START treaty in 2009 and 2010, took us down to 1,550 deployed warheads on both the U.S. and Russian sides. So 12,000 down to 1,550. That’s a pretty good disarmament record. And it all sprang from that short, sharp shock of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Now, sixty years later, it’s a tragedy, but we seem to be facing another crisis on par with the Cuban Missile Crisis. Vladimir Putin has been rattling the nuclear saber. We are very concerned, not necessarily about a big nuclear exchange between the United States and the Russian Federation, but about some smaller strike, perhaps use of a nuclear weapon on Ukrainian territory, perhaps a so-called demonstration strike, where Russia would launch a nuclear explosion over the Black Sea, for example, just to prove that they’re willing to do it. And so, at the moment, we are facing these nuclear threats out of the Kremlin with a lot of concern, but also very serious attitude about how we sustain and maintain nuclear deterrence at this moment of supreme crisis in Ukraine, and ensure that we continue to deter Russia from taking these disastrous actions with weapons of mass destruction. But also think about ways—how can we go forward from here to preserve what we have achieved in these sixty years since the Cuban Missile Crisis. This great foundation of big nuclear international regimes that we have been able to put in place—such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, that means the only country that has tested nuclear weapons in this century is North Korea. There is a taboo against nuclear testing that is strongly held, the taboo against nuclear use has held since Hiroshima and Nagasaki over seventy-five years ago. And now, we are looking at ensuring that we sustain and maintain the Nonproliferation Treaty regime so that we do not see a lot of new nuclear weapon states emerging across the globe. Just one thing I forgot to mention—President Kennedy spoke quite a bit about these things. I think the Cuban Missile Crisis really for him personally was a big shock, and really provoked his thinking quite a bit—but he said, “We need this Nonproliferation Treaty because otherwise we’re going to end up with twenty, twenty-five nuclear weapon states around the world. And that will be hugely destabilizing.” So the Nonproliferation Treaty regime, although we pay attention to the rogue states, the DPRKs [Democratic People’s Republic of Koreas], the Irans, of course. It looks like we may be now returning to the Iran nuclear deal. I certainly hope so. We also need Iranian oil at this moment, which is another matter. But we have a couple of nuclear rogues out there. But, in general, we have prevented the proliferation of nuclear weapons, thanks to the Nonproliferation Treaty regime. We need to do everything we can at this moment to preserve and protect these important big regimes. And that goes not only for nuclear, but also the so-called other weapons of mass destruction. The Chemical Weapons Convention bans the use of chemicals in wartime. Not only chemical weapons, that is chemical designed to be used as weapons, but also what we’ve been seeing in Syria, the use of chlorine gas in wartime. That is forbidden by the Chemical Weapons Convention as well. So we need these big regimes to continue—the Biological Weapons Convention, the same. So I really wanted to stress this point as we get to our discussion period, because it’s going to take a lot of attention and effort if Russia is now turning its back on playing a responsible role in the international community. If Russia is turning into a very big pariah state, as I argued yesterday in a piece in Foreign Affairs, we need to figure out what we are going to do, losing Russia as a partner. Because Russia has actually been a great player in negotiating all these treaties and agreements. But if Russia is turning its back on a responsible role in the international community, then the United States has to look for other partners. I would argue that we should be really approaching Beijing. They are, after all, a nuclear weapon state under the Nonproliferation Treaty. And historically they have been a rather responsible nuclear weapon state under the Nonproliferation Treaty, joining in efforts to advance the goals of nuclear disarmament. So it’s hard, because at the moment, as you know, Beijing and Washington have been at great odds over any number of issues—Taiwan, trade and investment, human rights with the Uyghurs. So many issues we’ve been at odds over. But I think the moment has come where we need to think about how we are going to preserve these weapons of mass destruction regimes, the nuclear regimes, the testing—the ban against nuclear testing. How are we going to preserve it in the face of Russia as a pariah state? And that means, I think, we must partner with China. So those are my remarks to begin with. I see we have a few questions already. And I’m really looking forward to our discussion. Irina, back over to you. FASKIANOS: Rose, thank you very much. So let’s start with a raised hand from Babak Salimitari. And please state your institution and unmute yourself. Q: Good morning. My name is Babak Salimitari. I’m a third-year economics major at University of California, Irvine. And my question really pertains with NATO as a force for international security. I was looking at the list of countries that were not paying the 2 percent of their necessary GDP for defense. And these are some rich countries, like Norway, and the Netherlands, and Germany. These aren’t poor, third-world countries. I don’t understand why they don’t pay their fair share. So when you were in NATO, what did you tell these people? GOTTEMOELLER: That’s a very good question, Babak. And, honestly, it’s been great for me to watch now with this otherwise terrible crisis in Ukraine—it’s been great for me to watch that countries who were very resistant of paying their 2 percent of GDP are now stepping forward and saying they are ready to do so. And Germany is the prime example. President Trump was very insistent on this matter, and very much threatening dire action by the United States, including that the United States would fail to honor its so-called Article 5 commitments to NATO, which that is—under the founding document of NATO, the so-called Washington Treaty of 1949, Article 5 states that if a single country in the NATO alliance is attacked, then all countries must—and it asks for help, there’s that important point too—if it asks for help then other NATO countries are obliged to come to its assistance in defending it. So President Trump was threatening that the United States would not fulfill its Article 5 commitments. He was very tough on this matter. I was the deputy secretary-general at NATO during the years of the Trump presidency. My boss and I, Jens Stoltenberg and I, always welcomed President Trump’s pressure on these matters, because every single U.S. president, again, since Jack Kennedy—I’ll go back to him. There’s a great—now in the public domain—a great report of a National Security Council meeting where John Kennedy says, “I am tired of these NATO European freeloaders. We spend all the money on defense; they take our defenses and don’t build up their own. And they’re freeloading, they’re freeriding on us.” So every single U.S. president has raised this issue with the allies. But it was Donald Trump who got them to really sit up and take notice in the first instance. So President—I’m sorry—Secretary-General Stoltenberg and I always supported his efforts, although we were not supportive of his drawing any question about U.S. obligations with regard to Article 5. But we supported his efforts to push the allies on paying 2 percent of GDP. A number of them did step up during the Trump years, and so more were paying 2 percent of GDP now with this crisis. Unfortunately, again, it’s taken a dire crisis in Ukraine. But we see even Germany stepping up. Just one final word on Germany. At the time, when I was DSG, they kept saying, well 2 percent of our GDP, we are the most enormous economy in Europe. And if we spend 2 percent of GDP, then other countries are going to start worrying about casting back to the past and remembering Nazi Germany, and thinking about the big military buildup in the 1930s. So we don’t want that to happen. So that was very deeply ingrained in the political elites in Berlin. But now, we’re seeing that 180-degree switch just in the last ten days. I think it’s remarkable. But I welcome it, for one, that they are now willing to spend 2 percent of GDP on defense. FASKIANOS: Great. I’m going to take the next question, a written question, from Caleb Kahila, undergraduate student at the University of Wisconsin-Whitewater. One issue that I don’t hear much about is the actions of individuals involved in nuclear weapons. An example is Abdul Qadeer Khan, who leads the Pakistani nuclear program but is also believed to have given nuclear information to Iran, North Korea, among others. With examples like Khan, should the international community take the issue of individual nuclear proliferation more seriously? GOTTEMOELLER: That is a great question. And indeed, certain individuals have had a profoundly malignant effect on nuclear nonproliferation. It is worthwhile to note that the Nonproliferation Treaty—the membership is very wide, but there are a few outliers. And India and Pakistan are both outliers. And I think for some weird reason, Khan felt justified in being an outlier to share nuclear weapons information with a number of countries, including also Libya, as I understand. So there was this notion I think that he had, almost an ideological notion—he’s dead now—but an ideological notion of producing an Islamic bomb to counter both the Indians, their mortal enemies, but also to ensure that the rest of the world did not mess with Pakistan, and also did not mess with the rest of the Muslim world, the Islamic world. So it was, I think, very clear that this one malignant individual had an enormous deleterious effect on the nonproliferation regime. We have been able to, I think, place constraints and dial back in many ways from some of his export activities, including when the Libyans were willing to give up their weapons of mass destruction programs. But you’re absolutely right that it necessary to pay attention to individuals—powerful individuals, they have to be—who have that kind of access. And luckily, they are fairly rare. But we have to pay attention to the individuals who could make a very big problem for the nonproliferation regime. I do worry nowadays about the North Koreans, about the DPRK. The trouble is, they are themselves bent on acquiring nuclear bombs. And if they give away their fissile material, for example. One of the big barriers to getting a bomb is you need a significant amount of either highly enriched uranium or plutonium. And it’s rather difficult to acquire. So if the DPRK were going to get into this business of giving away their expertise, the next question would be, well, how about some fissile material to back that up? And I dare say, they’d rather keep all their fissile material for themselves. But that’s a very good question, Caleb. Thank you for that. FASKIANOS: I’m going to go next Mojúbàolú Olúfúnké Okome at Brooklyn College. Q: Thank you very much. Mojúbàolú Olúfúnké Okome. And I teach political science at Brooklyn College. And I have two issues that are kind of bothering me. One is, what are the chances that Russia will turn its back on the NPT in totality, and on other weapons regimes in this war? And then, besides an alliance with China, what are the other options for the U.S.? The second thing is, would Russia have been so bold to invade Ukraine if Ukraine hadn’t destroyed its weapons—it’s nuclear weapons and joined the NPT? I remember a Mearsheimer article in Foreign Affairs, I think, where he was giving a very unpopular view at that time that nuclear—destroying nuclear weapons in the Ukraine was a bad idea, because there was a need to kind of have a defense against Russia’s potential invasion of the Ukraine. This was in the 1990s. And now it seems like he was right. So I’m just wondering what you think of these two issues. GOTTEMOELLER: Very good questions, Dr. Okome. And very difficult ones. But let me start on your first question. I argued yesterday in my Foreign Affairs article that I don’t think it’s so much that Russia would actually leave the regimes. I don’t believe that they would turn their backs on the regimes by leaving them. What I believe, though, is that they will just prove to be not the good partner they have been historically. Historically they have really been, as I put it in the article, a giant of the nonproliferation regime, always looking for solutions for problems. Helping to drive forward top priorities, not only in the Nonproliferation Treaty but in what I call the wider regime, which includes these other treaties and agreements, including our bilateral treaties, the New START treaty is currently still in force, thank God. So I do worry that now they would instead turn to a more negative role, perhaps a wrecker role, in trying to stymie decision making in the regime implementation bodies, and trying to be mischievous in the way they interact with the rest of the regime members. And for that reason, I think we will need to have strong leadership. And the United States will need allies. And so that is why I have been emphasizing looking to China as a possible ally in what will be a very difficult, very difficult time going forward. But I do feel very sure that we must have as a top objective, a top priority preserving these regimes and agreements. Your second question, let me say a few words about the so-called Budapest Memorandum. I was involved in negotiating it. I worked for President Clinton in the 1990s. I was convinced at the time, I remain convinced, that what the Budapest Memorandum bought Ukraine was thirty years of peace and stability to build itself up as an independent and sovereign nation. We, in the Clinton administration, argued to Ukraine at the time that if they tried to hang on to the nuclear weapons that were left on their territory after the breakup of the Soviet Union, that they would end up in an immediate conflict with Russia that would be destabilizing and would not allow their fragile, young democracy to take root. And I still believe that very strongly. For those of you who don’t remember those years, when the Soviet Union broke apart, over a thousand warheads were left on Ukrainian territory, over a thousand warheads were left on Kazakh territory, Kazakhstan, and approximately a hundred warheads were left in Belarus. So there—and there were strategic delivery vehicles. There were intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) deployed in all three countries, and there were bombers deployed in Ukraine. So there were weapon systems that needed to be destroyed and eliminated. And in this case, we got the Ukrainians to agree to join the Nonproliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapon state. Their warheads were returned to Russia for down-blending to low-enriched uranium, which was then used in—(laughs)—it’s ironic—but it was used for power plant fuel for the nuclear power plants in Ukraine. I do want to stress that at that time there was a very cooperative negotiation going on. And our assumption working—it was with the Russians and the Ukrainians and the Americans together. We were all working on this problem together in good faith. And it was a very, very positive effort overall. I still believe that Ukraine would have been caught immediately in the maelstrom of conflict with Russia if they had tried somehow to hang onto those weapons. And technically, it would not have been easy, because the command and control of all those missiles was in Moscow. It was not in Ukraine. They would have had to try to guillotine themselves from the command-and-control system in Moscow and build up a command-and-control system in Ukraine for these nuclear weapon systems. And it was our judgment, it remains my judgment, that it would have been very destructive for the young Ukrainian state, the young Ukrainian democracy to try to hang on to them. And I do think that they have taken shape as an independent power, not entirely healthy economically but, before this terrible crisis, their economy was growing. And so I do think that what we are seeing today, with the brave—very brave defense of Ukraine by the Ukrainian public, and its armed forces, and first and foremost its president—that was all born out of the thirty years that the Ukrainians got to build up their country as an independent and sovereign state. And, again, they would not have had that if they had insisted in the 1990s on holding onto nuclear weapons. FASKIANOS: Great. I’m going to take a written question from Michael Strmiska, who is associate professor of world history at Orange County Community College in New York State. I’m going to shorten it. In essence, the Biden administration has said they will not impose a no-fly zone, as have other nations. And then we recently saw the Polish fighter jets via the U.S. to Ukraine. They have declined on that. So at what point do you think—there’s been a lot of talk that either one of those will trigger a nuclear war. And in his question he says: Putin says “nuke” and we run and hide. If the death toll in Ukraine approaches the levels of the Holocaust, do you think the calculus will change? And do you think that this—that would trigger nuclear war? GOTTEMOELLER: Well, it’s a complex question, Dr. Strmiska. Let me—let me try to give you my point of view on it. I’ll just say, first of all, that I don’t think we’re running and hiding at all. We have sustained—and when I say “we” I’m still talking as if I’m NATO DSG. (Laughs.) But what I mean is the United States and its NATO allies have been providing a steady stream of military assistance to Ukraine, and a steady stream of humanitarian assistance to Ukraine, and also to the countries bordering Ukraine—Moldova, Hungary, Poland—that are—that are sheltering refugees from Ukraine. So we are really, I think, continuing to support them in, so far, pretty amazing ways. I have been talking to some military experts this morning, retired military officers here in the United States. And they think Putin and the Russians may be running out of ammo. We’ll see to it that the Ukrainians do not run out of ammo. And so we are doing a lot to help them. And in terms of the deterrence messaging that’s gone on, I’ve actually been rather admiring of the way that the administration has been clear about, and firm, about the dangers of rattling the nuclear saber, but also has been very clear that we are not taking steps ourselves to up the readiness of our nuclear forces, nor will we do so. They, the White House and the Department of Defense (DOD), basically postponed an ICBM test this week to ensure that there was no hint of a message that we, ourselves, are escalating. But we’ve been very firm and clear that nuclear use of any kind would be crossing, for us, a redline that is significant. So now let me get to your question about the no-fly zone, because I think this is—this is a complex question. It’s turned into this kind of cause célèbre in the media, the press. You’re watching the twenty-four-hour news cycle. All of us are, like, glued to our televisions right now, it’s so horrible what is unfolding before us in Ukraine. So everybody’s saying, no-fly zone, no-fly zone, no-fly zone. But when you look at it, the Russians aren’t actually flying aircraft very much in Ukraine. These missiles are being delivered from Russian territory, from Belarusian territory, from ships in the Black Sea, and some now from Ukrainian territory in Donetsk and Luhansk in the eastern part of the country. But the vast majority—yesterday, the count was over 670 missiles. The vast majority of them have come from Russia. The Ukrainians don’t need a no-fly zone right now. They need missile defenses. And so some of the actions that have been taken, for example, by the—by the U.K. government, for example, to get into their hands some handheld capability—now, these are not going to go after those big missiles, like the terrible explosion at the maternity hospital yesterday. That was caused by a very big missile. But some—they can be useful to defend their skies against some smaller—some smaller projectiles. And I think that’s going to be important, those kinds of steps. I wish there were a way to get the Ukrainians the Israeli Iron Dome system. That’s the best missile defense system around for short- to medium-range missiles. But I have my doubts that—(laughs)—the Israelis are going to want to get involved in this thing. But that’s the point. This is not an air superiority problem at the moment. It is a problem of missile attacks. And so we need to do, I think, what we can to, again, get some help to the—to the Ukrainians. But we’ve got to be clear in our own mind what kind of help they really need. We’ll see. This could change. And the Russians are upping their activity, so it may turn into more of an air battle than it has been up to this point. But I think it’s really good to think harder about what the actual threat to Ukraine is today, rather than just being so fixated on a no-fly zone. FASKIANOS: Thank you. That’s an important clarification. Let’s go now to Kazi Sazid, who has raised his hand. Q: Hello. So I’m a political science student at CUNY Hunter College, just right next to CFR, actually. So my question is, we’ve seen in the past in how geopolitics and geopolitical biases obscures if not manipulates the reality of certain threats to international security and cooperation. One example is Nixon destabilizing the Allende government because there’s a fear that socialism triumphed the narrative that socialism can only happen through dictatorships basically falls flat. So my question is, what avenues and mechanisms are available to ensure that security situations are not sensationalized to the point where people believe it is a bigger threat than it truly is? Sorry if that’s a loaded question. GOTTEMOELLER: Well, it’s a good question because it points to the information/misinformation space. And I think we’ve all been thinking about that a lot right now. And the United States and its NATO allies I think in the run up to the invasion actually were doing a pretty good job controlling the information space by, for example, undoing these false-flag operations that the Russians were trying to launch in the run-up to the invasion. They were actually apparently on the cusp of trying to replace the Zelenskyy government with their own puppet government. All of this was outed by some very astute use of intelligence by, again, the U.S. and the U.K., and getting it out into the information space. So in the run-up to the invasion, we were actually winning the misinformation war. Nowadays, I’m a little concerned about a couple of things. First, I’m concerned—well, there’s so much to talk about here, but let me—let me just give it a shot, Kazi. We have to be concerned about the fact that Vladimir Putin is closed up in his bubble with his small cohort and is not getting sources of information that may cause him to think twice about what he’s doing. And that is of concern when you’re trying to deter the man, when you’re trying to ensure that he knows that there will be a firm response. I don’t think he had any idea—and maybe even today doesn’t have any idea—at the strong pushback and the very capable pushback he’s getting from the Ukrainian armed forces. They are defending their country well. And the Ukrainian public is joining in on that effort. Putin, in his bubble, just did not realize that. And now I’m not sure he’s getting the information that would really help him to understand the situation that his armed forces are in right now. If, as my military experts conveyed this morning, they’re beginning to run low on missiles, they’re beginning to run low on ammunition, it’s going to be a problem. They’re going to start doing worse, rather than being able to pick up the pace, as we were talking about a moment ago, and as many people expect. So that’s number one problem, is how is that deterrence messaging thing working with the Kremlin right now? The second thing I’d point to, though, is how do we reach the Russian people? Everybody takes note of the fact that all the—the internet backbone is closing down now in Ukraine. Harder and harder for Russians who are interested to get independent news that is not the product of state TV and state radio, state propaganda outlets. So how to get that message across is one that is really, really important. But I note at the same time, there was a poll that came out yesterday that was so interesting to me. It said, 58 percent of Russians support the war. And they say, well, that’s pretty good. 58 percent of Russians support the war? But then when you think about it, there were a lot of “I don’t knows” in that—in that poll as well. And when people don’t want to say publicly what they really think they may say “I don’t know,” or “I don’t have an opinion on this matter.” Fifty-eight percent, when you juxtapose it against the support for the invasion of Crimea in 2014, is extraordinarily low. There was over 90 percent support for the invasion of Crimea in 2014. And now we’re looking at 58 percent against the war—no, I’m sorry—it’s 58 percent support the war. Sorry about that. And then a bunch of “I don’t knows” in there, or “I don’t want to comment” in there. So I think that there is an issue here about trying to talk directly to the Russian people. And the president has discussed that already in public. And I think we need to do better about figuring out how to reach the Russian people, especially now that social media’s being shut down, other, I would say, more open forms of internet communications are being—are being shut down. We need to figure out how to message the Russian people as well. And finally, I’m not sure I’m actually answering your question, but I think—I think it’s time that we start pivoting. We, the United States and NATO, to a more positive overall message of global leadership. That this is about our values and this is about what we want the world to be like in the years going forward. Let’s talk about what we would need to support an independent Ukraine, no matter what. And let’s talk about how we see the necessity of democratic principles and the rule of law being reenergized, restrengthened by this terrible crisis. I think we need to get a message out there about how we have a positive agenda, and we will push to pursue it, come what may. FASKIANOS: Thank you. Our next question is from Susie Risk, a first-year economics student at West Virginia University. Do you believe economic sanctions from the West on Russia is a viable way to slow Russia’s advance on Ukraine? From my understanding they are mostly affecting civilians in the country, not those attacking Ukraine. And what are the other ways states like the U.S. could affect Russia in a nonviolent way? GOTTEMOELLER: I actually think the coherence of these sanctions across the board have turned them into a powerful instrument to both convey to the Kremlin, to the Russian government, and to the Russian people that they are on the wrong course. The coherence of them—there aren’t any workarounds left. And in fact, even in the case of the Europeans, for example, saying that they can only cut back partially on their purchases of Russian oil because they cannot—they can’t do without Russian oil and gas at the moment, but they say they’re going to cut by 65 percent by the end of the year. OK, that’s great, but what I’m hearing is, again, this status of the Russian Federation now as being the invader, being the country that has taken these wrong steps and is so deserving of these coherent sanctions across the board, that it is leading—like, the insurance industry—to think twice about insuring tankers that are picking up Russian oil. And so it’s leading to ports messaging that they will not offload Russian oil. So despite the fact that they are still selling oil, the overall behavior of the Russian Federation and the way it is now wrapped in this coherent sanctions regime, is leading, I think, to a situation where, yeah, sure, they’re going to continue to put some oil through—gas and oil through the pipelines into Europe. And they, I think, may be more likely to continue pushing that, rather than trying to turn the tap on and off, as they’ve done historically to try to pressure the Europeans. I think they’ll be wanting to sell their gas and oil. But I think increasingly, on the stock market and in other settings, they are going to have a harder and harder time pushing oil sales, gas and oil sales. So you see this coherent sanctions regime as having knock-on effects that I think will have an even greater effect on the Russian economy, even on the Russian oil economy. FASKIANOS: It’s been pretty amazing to watch the sanctions both from governments and from private—as you said—private companies and social media companies pulling out. Starbucks, Coca-Cola, and all of that, to try to—and the ruble has devalued. I think it is pretty much devalued to the very bottom. GOTTEMOELLER: Well, that’s a great—that’s a great point too, Irina. And particularly mentioning the sanctions against the central bank have had a profound effect. Russian rating has gone to junk—it’s gone below junk bond status now, and so they’re not rated anymore by the big rating companies. So it’s had a profound effect on the Russian economy overall. And so, I’m wondering about—they’ve got very good technocrats running their banking system. That was always, I think, one of the things Putin was very proud about in coming out of the 2014 invasion of Crimea with a lot of sanctions slapped on him. He basically turned his country inward and said we are going to be more self-sufficient now and you, the bankers, you do what you can to ensure that we have lots of reserves, a rainy-day fund, that we are protected from shocks in future. Well, what happened in sanctioning the central bank is 70 percent of that rainy-day fund is held in Western financial institutions, and those now have placed blocks on the Russians getting their hands on their—on their financial reserves. So I think those steps have been coherent and very strong and have led to this really tanking of the Russian economy. FASKIANOS: Right. And with the sanctions now affecting the oligarchs and the well-to-do in Russia, that also could bring pressure on Putin—assuming they can get close enough to him—because, as you said, he is very much in a bubble that probably has been exacerbated by the two-year pandemic that we all have been living through. I’m going to go next to Nancy Gallagher, with a raised hand. Nancy, over to you. There we go. Q: I’d love to go back to the history that you started with briefly as a way of thinking about the future. And you’ve spent your entire career, basically, thinking about what mix of toughness and cooperation is appropriate for our relations with Russia or the Soviet Union at any given time. And even during the worst periods that you talked about, there was still some tacit cooperation that was going on to make sure—or to try to reduce the risks of a nuclear war that neither side really wanted. So it’s never been 100 percent confrontation. And I’m just wondering, as you think about our relationship with Russia now, whether you’ve essentially written Russia off for the indefinite future or if you think that we should be continuing to think about ways of simultaneously being as tough as we need to right now, but also not completely closing the door on cooperation either to keep the risks of escalation under control now or to improve the prospects for reengagement with Russia in the future. GOTTEMOELLER: Thank you for that question, Nancy, and thank you so much for joining this call. The other half of my Foreign Affairs piece yesterday talked about this and really stressed, as strongly as I could, that we need to do everything we can to keep Russia at the nuclear, both arms control and also nonproliferation regime tables, that we need to do everything—for one thing, Russia, as I mentioned, has been a giant of these regimes. They are really very good diplomats and negotiators who work these issues, and they can help to find solutions. They have helped to find solutions throughout the fifty years since we began seriously negotiating bilaterally in the Strategic Arms Limitation agreement of the 1970s, agreed in 1972. From that time forward to the present day, fifty years we’ve had this great relationship at the negotiating table. We haven’t agreed by any means at every step of the way, and sometimes we’ve been in negative territory, but we’ve always slowly and steadily driven forward on nuclear disarmament objectives. So I think we need to do everything we can to preserve that, and I am hopeful that we can do so. Even in the depths of this horrendous crisis, the Russians have been continuing—although with some issues coming up in recent days over sanctions—but they’ve been continuing to try to resuscitate the Iran nuclear deal. And I’ve got my fingers and toes crossed that, in fact, we will resuscitate the Iran nuclear deal. Now, the Russians maybe were reluctant at the moment because I think the United States is seeing the potential for Iranian oil to start to flow again, which would help with this cutoff that we’ve embraced of our purchases of Russian oil and gas. So there’s a whole bunch of issues there. But the point I wanted to make is, despite this severe disagreement and a really dire crisis over Ukraine, in this particular case we’ve been able to continue to work together more or less positively, and that has been the history of this. Nuclear weapons are an existential threat to our survival and to the survival of Russia, clearly, but also to humankind. If we suddenly have a massive nuclear exchange, the effect on humankind overall is going to be dire. So for that reason, that existential threat has continued to place us together at the negotiating table to try to find solutions here. So I do hope that we can work our way through this and find ourselves back at the table with the Russians before too long to negotiate a replacement for the New START Treaty, which goes out of force in 2026, and to work on other issues, such as a replacement for the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which we withdrew from after Russian violations in 2019. But I think there are actually some good proposals on the table about how we return to constraints on intermediate-range ground-launched missiles. The Russians initiated some of those. Again, they are good diplomats and they are good policymakers in this realm, so I would hate to do without them. But what spurred my concern in the first place and what led to the article was this message that Dmitry Medvedev put out two weeks ago when he said, well, maybe we ought to, just withdraw from the New START Treaty and maybe we ought to just kick the embassies out of Moscow and hang—kick all the diplomats out and hang big padlocks on the embassies. Maybe we don’t need the world was his message, and that’s what alarmed me, so that’s why I was talking about the worst case. But I do hope we can keep the Russians at the table. FASKIANOS: And just to pick up, Doru Tsaganea, an associate professor at the Metropolitan College of New York, has a question about China. And there have been reports that Xi asked Putin to hold off the invasion until after the Olympics in Beijing. There seems to be alliance between China and Russia, and now some—maybe China coming back can be—I mean, the way to bring—to give Putin an off ramp is via China. You just wrote this article in Foreign Affairs about—and you’ve mentioned how we can leverage—really get China in the mix to help give Putin an off ramp. Can you talk a little bit more about that dynamic? GOTTEMOELLER: Yes. Again, I started thinking about this—well, I was thinking about it during their appearance together at the Olympics—at the Olympics opening ceremony. Doesn’t that seem like twenty years ago now? February 4, it was. FASKIANOS: It does. (Laughs.) GOTTEMOELLER: But, clearly, they have a joint agenda. They’ll be working together on some things. But I was actually—at the time, I was actually quite positively impressed that what they did talk about—the one thing they talked about in the arms-control realm was beginning to put in place constraints on ground-launched intermediate-range missiles not only in Europe, but also in Asia. And I thought, wow, now that’s interesting. If there’s going to be, you know, generally Eurasian constraints on ground-launched intermediate range missiles, that’s a really interesting development. And so I came away from February 4, rather positively impressed that we might be able to do something with both Russia and China in that regard. But fast forward to the 24 of February and the invasion of Ukraine, and here in—just a few days after that terrible day, the foreign minister of Ukraine, Mr. Kuleba, phoned his counterpart in Beijing and asked for facilitation again of diplomacy with Russia. And at least from the readouts of that meeting, slightly less forward-leaning on the Chinese side but not contradicting anything Kuleba said, the Chinese seemed to indicate a willingness to facilitate diplomacy. It does—I don’t know what’s going on behind the scenes. In diplomacy, it’s always better if you don’t know what’s going on behind the scenes—(laughs)—if it is quiet diplomacy, if it’s not out in public, if it’s not this—one of the reasons why I was pretty—well, we all hoped against hope regarding no invasion. But, the Russians seemed to be in bad faith from December on because they kept playing at megaphone diplomacy—putting out their proposals to the public and the press, and even leaking U.S. answers in some cases. So they were clearly not playing a proper diplomatic game, which is quiet diplomacy behind the scenes trying to make quiet progress. So I hope that this Chinese facilitation has begun. I have no hint of it at the moment, but I certainly think that it could be—it could be a productive way to begin to develop some new off ramp. We’ve tried a lot off ramps with Putin and it hasn’t worked, but maybe the Chinese can help us develop another way of approaching this matter. Finally, I will just take note of the fact that there are other facilitators in the game. For example, President Erdoğan of Turkey has been very active, and today there is a meeting between the foreign ministers of—again, Kuleba, foreign minister of Ukraine, and Foreign Minister Lavrov of Russia in Turkey. I, for one, I haven’t seen any reports of it. You may have seen reports of the outcome, Irina, but I think that that—that kind of facilitation is important, and I hope it will continue. We all want to see diplomacy taking precedence over the bombing of innocent civilians in Ukraine. FASKIANOS: Right. There are a lot more questions, and I—we can’t get to them. I apologize. But I don’t want to—and we are at the end of our time, but I just want to give you an opportunity and give the students to hear your thoughts on public service. You’ve devoted your—mostly your entire career to it. You’re now teaching. You have a lecturer spot at Stanford, so you’re clearly working with students. And what you would say about public service. GOTTEMOELLER: I was so privileged to have the opportunity to serve both President Clinton and President Obama. I think if you can in your career do a stint of public service it will be absolutely a wonderful experience for you. Now, sometimes bureaucracies can be pretty frustrating, but it’s worth—it’s worth the price of admission, I would say, to begin to operate inside that system, to begin to figure out how to make progress, and it is the way you put ideas into action. You know, from the outside I can write all the op-eds I want to, and, yeah, some of them may get picked up by somebody inside the government. But when you’re working inside the government, you can really put ideas into action from the lowest levels, even if you have a chance to be an intern at the State Department or in one of the other agencies of government, you can begin to get a flavor for this. But you might be surprised that they’re asking for your opinion because you all at the, I would say, less-old—(laughs)—end of the spectrum have a lot of good new ideas about how the world should work going forward. And particularly I think this problem I talked about, how to communicate now directly with the Russian people, for example, you’ve got the skills and savvy to help people inside government to understand how to—how to do that effectively. So you’ve got some special skills, I think, that are much needed at the present time. So I would not shy away from some time in government. People often ask me, well, won’t I get trapped there? I think your generation will not get trapped there just because you already think about the world of work differently. You’re not going to be a lifer in any organization. You don’t want to start in the State Department and work there for forty years. You’ll be working, in—maybe in Silicon Valley; and then you go work for Capitol Hill, the Congress; then you may go into government for a little while, the executive branch; and then back to—back to the corporate world. So I know that you’ll be thinking quite differently about how to build your careers, but don’t shy away from public service. It’s a very good experience and it’s where you can make a difference. FASKIANOS: Well, with that, Rose Gottemoeller, thank you very much for being with us today and for sharing your expertise and analysis. We really appreciate it. And giving us a historical context, which is so valuable to understanding where we are today. You can follow Rose on Twitter at @gottemoeller. Our next Academic Webinar will be on Wednesday, March 23, at 1:00 p.m. Eastern Time. Jody Freeman at Harvard University will talk about global climate policy. We will send out the link to this discussion—the video, transcript—as well as the link to Rose’s Foreign Affairs article so you can read it if you didn’t have a chance. It was in yesterday’s background. And I encourage you to follow us on Twitter at @CFR_academic, and go to CFR.org, ForeignAffairs.com, and ThinkGlobalHealth.org for research and analysis on global issues. So thank you all again and thank you, Rose. GOTTEMOELLER: Thank you. Thanks for a great discussion. (END)
  • Russia
    Global Pressure Against Russia Grows, Two Years of COVID-19, and More
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    The destruction of Ukraine continues as countries ramp up pressure on Russia, the world marks two years since the COVID-19 pandemic was declared by the World Health Organization (WHO), and Colombians vote in parliamentary elections.