Defense and Security

Terrorism and Counterterrorism

  • Nigeria
    Case Not Quite Closed on the Assassination of Nigerian Salafi Scholar Shaikh Jaafar Adam
    Jacob Zenn is a fellow on African affairs at The Jamestown Foundation and an assistant adjunct professor at Georgetown University. His book, Unmasking Boko Haram: Exploring Global Jihad in Nigeria, is being published in April 2020.  While at prayer on April 13, 2007—thirteen years ago—the prominent Salafi scholar, Shaikh Jaafar Mahmud Adam, was assassinated at his mosque in Kano. At the time, the murder made a deep impression on mainstream Muslims, many of whom revered Adam. The murder took place in the final days before the 2007 presidential elections, and many observers, including those at the U.S. embassy, thought that the murder was somehow related. But it now seems more likely that Adam was assassinated by a vengeful former member of the Nigerian Taliban. His murder was an early manifestation of the deadly battles among Boko Haram’s competing factions that continue up to the present. When Adam was assassinated, there were three suspects: Sufis who resented his anti-Sufi preaching; Kano politicians who resented his condemning cronyism; and Boko Haram. Nigerian Sufis have virtually no precedent for engaging in such violence, let alone the ability to conduct targeted assassinations, and no evidence has since come to light that substantiates their involvement.  So that leaves either politicians or Boko Haram, or both. For Boko Haram, it has long been clear that the group has never been a monolithic entity; factions existed well before Abubakar Shekau announced the jihad in 2010. At the time of Adam’s assassination, “Boko Haram” was made up of the principal group, led by the charismatic preacher Muhammed Yusuf, whose deputy was then Shekau, and a subgroup comprising former members of the Nigerian Taliban, which was originally led by Muhammad Ali until his death in 2004. Other factions, like Ansaru and the Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA), did not materialize until 2012 and 2015, respectively.  In his 2018 book, Abu Musab al-Barnawi, Muhammed Yusuf’s son, asserted that it was not Yusuf, but the “Kanama Taliban,” another name for the Nigerian Taliban, that had assassinated Adam. Muhammed Ali, its original leader, was a Nigerian university campus leader who traveled to Sudan in the mid-1990s and returned to Nigeria to found and lead this now notorious group. Based in Kanama, Yobe State, in 2003, it counted among its members former students of Adam and especially then current students of Yusuf.   Further, in his capacity as Boko Haram’s official spokesman and liaison to the Islamic State, but before he deposed Shekau to become ISWA leader in 2016, al-Barnawi explicitly denied claims that his father was behind Adam’s murder. In communiques to an Islamic State media activist in 2014, for example, al-Barnawi (or his media team colleagues) wrote that Boko Haram under his father’s leadership denounced Adam’s “religion of democracy,” but said that it was a “lie” that Yusuf’s followers assassinated Adam.  But can al-Barnawi’s claims be trusted? Given Adam’s popularity and ISWA avoiding killing Islamic scholars after al-Barnawi became leader, it may be self-serving for al-Barnawi’s self-described "hearts and minds" approach to insurgency to deflect blame for the widely condemned assassination. Nevertheless, given that Yusuf was once considered Adam’s “likely heir” in the 1990s before breaking with Adam after the 1999 restoration of civilian rule in Nigeria, there was an element of ambiguity in their relationship. Yusuf believed Adam engaged in shirk, or polytheism, by accepting Nigerian democracy, but Yusuf still attended Adam’s funeral as a sign of respect. Although Adam’s followers castigated him and suspected he plotted Adam’s assassination, unless Yusuf was supremely duplicitous, he would not have gone so far as to pay condolences to Adam’s wives while having secretly ordered their husband’s assassination. Moreover, up to that point in 2007, Yusuf had no history of ordering attacks or assassinations, even though other factions in his following, especially late Muhammed Ali’s followers from the Nigerian Taliban, were prone to violence. The Nigerian Taliban had a much clearer reason than Yusuf for wanting Adam dead: he had supported the government crackdown on them in Kanama in December 2003. The effort ultimately led to Ali’s death at the hands of pro-government vigilantes in Borno State weeks later. Yusuf, who fled to Saudi Arabia shortly before the crackdown, had already been declared an infidel by Ali because Yusuf advocated a more patient approach to jihad than Ali. Ali’s followers even attempted to kill Yusuf, which, in addition to pilgrimage, prompted his flight to Saudi Arabia. According to an interview with a former companion of Ali in 2019, Ali’s students had also declared Adam a murtad (apostate) for condoning the crackdown and disavowing his former students in the group. Yusuf, meanwhile, returned to Nigeria from Saudi Arabia in 2004 and successfully reintegrated Ali’s supporters into his own following. One credible Boko Haram “insider,” who is known for releasing deceased commanders’ photos and revealing the group’s secrets, has gone so far as to proffer the alias of Adam’s assassin, Ibrahim Uquba al-Muhajir. After the crackdown in Kanama, which left the Nigerian Taliban in disarray, al-Muhajir was among several members who fled to join al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in the Sahel. According to the insider, al-Muhajir then returned to Nigeria to assassinate Adam on April 13, 2007. He benefited from confusion surrounding Nigeria’s April 14 elections and two surprise Nigerian Taliban attacks in Kano that same week, including one claimed retrospectively by ISWA in 2015. Al-Muhajir was killed years later in a Boko Haram attack in Bama and eulogized in a Boko Haram video in 2019. It featured an image of him that the Boko Haram insider already released one year earlier. There are still mysteries about Adam’s assassination. For example, what exactly did Adam imply in his final sermon before his assassination, when he mentioned that three years earlier Yusuf returned from Saudi Arabia to Nigeria without his bags checked at the airport? Was there, for example, some secret deal made between Yusuf’s contacts in Saudi Arabia, Nigerian officials, and Yusuf himself when several Nigerian officials visited him in Saudi Arabia and then facilitated his return? Adam further promised to “disclose those things…when their time will come.” Who or what would Adam have exposed will never be known, but it was likely related to Yusuf’s stint in Saudi Arabia in 2004, where Adam also met Yusuf and urged him to return to Nigeria. Yusuf did not trust Adam, however, and only returned after some form of safe passage back to Nigeria was guaranteed. In addition, what did another prominent Nigerian Salafi scholar, Muhammed Auwal “Albani,” mean when he once asserted Adam was killed because “a few international organizations to build mosques and schools [and] a few politicians…brought some problems for him” and noted that an “Algeria group” brought weapons into Nigeria and Yusuf’s followers were “prime suspects”? Could any Islamic organizations or politicians in Kano who were close to Nigerian Taliban members have collaborated with, or even ordered, al-Muhajir to assassinate Adam?  Albani can no longer expound on his theory because he, too, was assassinated by Boko Haram in 2014. Shekau bombastically lauded his death in a video and, according to the Boko Haram insider, Shekau later killed Albani’s assassin, who was Albani’s former student. Shekau must know the group’s secrets about Adam’s murder. Although Shekau has rarely alluded to the murder, in February 2020, he warned Salafi scholar and Nigerian minister of communications, Isa Ali Pantami, that he would suffer Adam’s same fate. The episode surrounding Adam’s assassination drives home the point that Boko Haram has never been a monolithic entity. Factions and internecine warfare existed well before the jihad began in 2010. Perhaps more importantly, it suggests that revenge has always been one of Boko Haram’s motives. Adam’s assassination not only caused great mourning in Nigeria, but, in killing a former Yusuf ally and relative Salafi moderate, it was also a harbinger of more violence to come, especially against Salafis whom Boko Haram viewed as betraying the pursuit of an Islamic state in Nigeria.
  • Nigeria
    Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: March 28–April 3
    Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from March 28 to April 3, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1586187432849'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='790px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   March 28: ISWA militants killed five in Konduga, Borno.  March 28: Nigerian troops killed nine bandits in Bungudu, Zamfara.  March 28: Gunmen killed one and abducted three in Suleja, Niger State.  March 28: Boko Haram killed six in Maiduguri, Borno.  March 29: Cultists killed a police inspector and two others in Sagamu, Ogun.  March 30: Nigerian troops killed "some" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Gwoza, Borno.  March 30: Gunmen killed six in Chikun, Kaduna.  March 31: The Nigerian Air Force killed "some" (estimated at ten) bandits in Rafi, Niger.  March 31: Suspected herdsmen killed thirteen in Bassa, Plateau.   March 31: Suspected herdsmen killed three in Ose, Ondo.  March 31: The Nigerian Air Force killed "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Gwoza, Borno.  March 31: Nigerian troops killed seven Boko Haram militants in Gwoza, Borno.   March 31: Bandits killed three in Igabi, Kaduna.  April 1: Prison guards killed eight inmates of Kaduna Prison in Kaduna, Kaduna. April 1: Bandits killed twenty-two in Sabon Birni, Sokoto. April 3: Nigerian troops killed "some" (estimated at ten) ISWA militants in Kukawa, Borno. 
  • COVID-19
    How Jihadi Groups in Africa Will Exploit COVID-19
    Bulama Bukarti is a sub-Saharan Africa analyst at the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, based in London, and a PhD candidate at SOAS, University of London. As the COVID-19 outbreak begins to spread in earnest in Africa, we can expect so-called jihadi groups on the continent to try to take advantage of the crisis to unleash violence and recruit members. We are already seeing indications that this has started happening. Governments, development workers, and aid agencies need to be made aware of this threat and take steps to deny these brutal militias more room to operate.    Over the past two weeks, Africa has seen a dramatic rise in the number of confirmed COVID-19 cases, with recorded cases climbing from 1,017 on March 20, to over 7,177 on April 3, with at least 293 deaths and reaching fifty African states. If the spread of COVID-19 across Africa reaches anywhere near the levels of China, Europe, or the United States, panic, chaos, and confusion will ensue. Already stretched resources currently earmarked for state security forces fighting violent extremists and the provision of healthcare and humanitarian supplies to communities in need may have to be diverted to deal with a widespread outbreak. Based on past experience, if this happens, we can expect jihadi groups to exploit the situation in both their narratives and operations. Jihadi groups everywhere are opportunistic, adept at exploiting confusion and chaos to further their ideological goals. In Africa this is no different. For instance, al-Shabaab’s emergence in East Africa came amidst a power vacuum and turmoil from years of civil war in Somalia. Similarly, Ansarul Dine, a group wreaking havoc in the Sahel under the banner of Jama’a Nasr al-Islam wa al-Muslimeen (Group to Aid Islam and Muslims), hijacked confusion caused by the 2012 coup to establish its version of an Islamic state in northern Mali.     Ideologically, there are two ways in which violent Islamist groups may seek to exploit the situation. If the pandemic spreads in Muslim-majority areas, they will peddle conspiracy theories about its origins, blaming the West, Jews, and Zionists, all of whom they lump together as the “enemies of Islam.” If the spread of the pandemic is controlled and does not reach Muslim-majority areas, particularly those controlled by jihadi groups, they will frame it as divine punishment against those areas. Either way, groups claiming to fight for Islam in Africa will use the virus outbreak to recruit and radicalize fighters and justify their narratives of hate, division, and enmity. We have already seen examples of this from ISIS and al-Qaeda affiliates in other parts of the world in their coronavirus messaging.  Operationally, violent groups will try to capitalize on the situation to wreak more havoc. Many African states are already vulnerable to jihadi violence and struggling to muster the military capacity to counter extremist efforts. On March 24, Islamist extremists suspected to be part of the Islamic State in Central Africa took over a strategic port in Mozambique and hoisted their flag in what may herald the establishment of a new outpost for the so-called caliphate. On the same day, the faction of Boko Haram led by Abubakar Shekau killed ninety-two Chadian soldiers in an ambush around the Lake Chad area, and at least forty-seven Nigerian soldiers died in northeastern Nigeria in an ambush by Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) fighters. Similarly, jihadists affiliated to al-Qaeda killed twenty-nine soldiers in Mali on March 19. As COVID-19 hits and governments re-task their military capacity to support the public health response, countries will be even more vulnerable to attacks.  To complicate matters further, this pandemic will delay the deployment of an additional 250 British troops scheduled to join the effort against violent extremists in the Sahel later this year. The British and U.S. militaries in Africa have already been reported as needing to retreat due to the health crisis. COVID-19 has pushed the effort to counter extremism down the list of priorities of Western countries, at least for the moment. This will certainly affect the war against extremist factions and allow them more space to operate. Strategically, jihadi groups could increase their efforts to exploit humanitarian vacuums likely created by a widespread outbreak. Credible studies have found that jihadi groups in Africa seek to deliver governance services such as health and infrastructure to recruit members and build credibility with sympathizers even in normal times. In the current climate, these groups might increase service provision, stepping in where the state is failing in medical, water, and food provisions, to build popular support for their cause and proto-states.  African governments already face a tall task in responding to COVID-19, but they should remain hyper vigilant of the now greater threat posed by Islamic extremist groups. 
  • Nigeria
    Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: March 21–27
    Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from March 21 to 27, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1585579143265'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='790px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   March 21: Kidnappers abducted fourteen in Anka, Zamfara.  March 21: Gunmen killed two soldiers and two others in Bassa, Plateau.  March 22: Suspected herdsmen killed one and kidnapped three in Kwande, Benue.  March 22: Suspected bandits killed twenty-nine security operatives in Shiroro, Niger State.  March 22: Gunmen abducted five in Akoko, Edo.  March 22: Boko Haram killed ninety-two Chadian soldiers in Boma, Chad.  March 23: Seventy Nigerian soldiers and one hundred fifty Boko Haram militants were killed during a clash in Askira-Uba, Borno.  March 24: Kidnappers abducted twenty-three in Jos, Plateau.  March 25: Gunmen killed three in Kajuru, Kaduna.  March 25: Nigerian soldiers killed two civilians in Southern Ijaw, Bayelsa.  March 25: Sectarian violence led to five deaths in Chikun, Kaduna.  March 25: Nigerian troops killed "scores" (estimated at forty) of ISWA militants in Ngala, Borno.  March 26: Sectarian violence led to fourteen deaths in Kajuru, Kaduna.  March 27: Kidnappers abducted six in Ibi, Taraba.  March 27: Nigerian troops killed "several" (estimated at ten) of Boko Haram militants in Gwoza, Borno. 
  • Nigeria
    Women, Boko Haram, and Suicide Bombings
    Since 2011, when Boko Haram (and its subsequent off-shoots) entered its current violent phase, kidnapping women and girls has been a defining characteristic. Boko Haram seeks women as wives for its fighters—who are often too poor to pay a bride price—as domestic or sexual slaves, and as suicide bombers. Boko Haram’s most notorious kidnapping, at least to those in the West, was the abduction of 276 school girls from Chibok in 2014, more than 100 of whom remain in captivity. The total number of Boko Haram kidnapping victims is unclear, but it is likely in the thousands.  As the military dislodged Boko Haram in 2015 from the territory it had captured and occupied earlier, victims of suicide bombers grew as a proportion of those the group killed through August 2018. Between June 2014, when Boko Haram reportedly deployed its first female suicide bomber, and February 2018, about 468 women and girls have been deployed or arrested in 240 suicide attacks, the most by any terrorist movement, killing roughly 1,200 and injuring some 3,000, according to a report [PDF] by the Counterterrorism Center. These numbers have no doubt climbed in the years since. The number of women and girls involved in suicide attacks, most likely through coercion but some voluntarily, is part of the reason why female victims that escape or are liberated are too often shunned by their communities. There is a popular fear that they remain Boko Haram at heart. Perhaps because of international compassion fatigue, perhaps because the horror is so great, women and girl kidnap victims have largely fallen off the Western media radar, all the more so in this time of coronavirus. Hence, the New York Times has done a service by telling the stories of some kidnap victims who escape and the challenges they have faced since, stories that are painful to read. 
  • Nigeria
    Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: March 14–20
    Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from March 14 to 20, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.    var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1584975857049'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='790px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   March 14: Bandits killed one and kidnapped four in Birnin-Gwari, Kaduna.  March 14: The Nigerian Air Force killed "some" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Kukawa, Borno.  March 15: Six Nigerian soldiers and three Boko Haram militants were killed during a clash in Bama, Borno.  March 15: Bandits killed three in Birnin-Gwari, Kaduna.  March 15: Police killed three kidnappers in Jada, Adamawa.  March 16: Kidnappers abducted two in Ibadan, Oyo.  March 17: The Nigerian Air Force killed seventeen bandits in Giwa, Kaduna.   March 17: Bandits killed sixteen in Maru, Zamfara.  March 17: Bandits killed two in Birnin-Magaji, Zamfara.  March 18: The Nigerian Air Force killed "some" (estimated at ten) ISWAP leaders in Abadam, Borno.  March 18: Sectarian violence led to five deaths in Chikun, Kaduna.  March 19: Police killed four kidnappers in Dutsinma, Katsina.  March 19: Kidnappers abducted seven in Wukari, Taraba.  March 19: The Nigerian military killed twenty-four bandits in Jibia, Katsina.  March 19: The Nigerian military killed two bandits in Maru, Zamfara.
  • Local and Traditional Leadership
    Nigeria Considers National DRR Agency Amid Boko Haram Setbacks
    Alvin Young is a Rangel Fellow and master's candidate at the Elliott School of International Affairs at the George Washington University. On February 19, 2020, Senator Ibrahim Gaidam, the former governor of Yobe State, introduced legislation to create the National Agency for Deradicalization, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration of Repentant Insurgents. Gaidam represents Yobe state, which borders Borno and has been affected by the insurgency. The bill’s purpose is to encourage and rehabilitate Boko Haram defectors and prevent violent extremism in Nigeria. Given the recent requests for additional military force to combat Boko Haram by Nigerian lawmakers, Senator Gaidam’s legislation is an important step toward incorporating deradicalization, rehabilitation, and reintegration (DRR) programs into the overall strategy designed to defeat Boko Haram.  Currently, Nigeria has three deradicalization programs that support Boko Haram defectors. The Prison Program works with militants convicted of violent extremist offenses or those on or awaiting trial. During the program, Imams teach classes on non-violent interpretations of Islam, and other program staff provide vocational training so that, when inmates fulfill their prison terms, they can reenter society with less risk of reverting to terrorism. Second, the Yellow Ribbon Initiative supports women and children associated with Boko Haram by providing psychosocial therapy and reintegration programs. Finally, Operation Safe Corridor, launched by the Nigerian military in 2015, works with Boko Haram defectors by addressing extremist ideology and providing them with trauma counseling. Two thousand members of Boko Haram and the Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) have defected through Operation Safe Corridor since its inception. Governor Babagana Zulum of Borno promised to complement security initiatives with programs that provide access to education and job opportunities. But, as military failures at the hands of Boko Haram’s have left much of Borno cut off from itself and the rest of the country, Governor Zulum has apparently—and understandably—prioritized military action by calling on the federal government to recruit 100,000 troops to counter the insurgency. Zulum promised an additional 50,000 "able-bodied" persons to combat the extremist group but did not request support for DRR programs. Instead, Babagana urged the Nigerian military to re-establish a military base in Borno. Other Northern leaders such as Yobe State governor, Malam Mai Mala Buni, are calling on the Nigerian military to expand their presence in the north. While an influx of troops may be important to addressing the immediate security situation caused by Boko Haram, the governors’ prioritization of security forces over investments into more DRR initiatives places their constituents in a revolving cycle of violence. Many Nigerians, including several lawmakers, oppose DRR programs. Some feel that their communities are not sufficiently consulted when these programs are developed and implemented. Perhaps more problematic, many communities, after enduring years of atrocities, remain skeptical of reconciliation with Boko Haram defectors. A senator from Ondo state said that there was “no justification” for the program proposed by senator Gaidam. “How can an enemy be rehabilitated? These are people who have done Nigeria so much harm." Current DRR efforts have had mixed results due to the Nigerian military’s limited expertise in deradicalization programs such as Operation Safe Corridor and reasonable fears that program participants will face violent retribution upon reintegration.  Vanda Felbab-Brown argues that community opposition to DRR efforts suggests that the Nigerian government “needs to invest more in open and comprehensive discussions with society about rehabilitation, reintegration, leniency, and victims’ rights.” To be effective, Nigerian lawmakers must ensure that DRR programs continue to work with those communities that will receive the rehabilitated fighters. A primarily military effort—still the current approach of the government—has not been successful; leaders owe it to their communities to explore the root causes of the insurgency and support non-military efforts, where possible, such as Senator Gaidam’s new legislation. 
  • Nigeria
    Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: March 7–13
    Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from March 7 to 13, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1584367334062'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='790px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   March 7: Boko Haram killed seven in Diffa, Niger.  March 8: Gunmen kidnapped three in Aniocha South, Delta.  March 8: Bandits killed eight in Bungudu, Zamfara.  March 8: The Nigerian Air Force killed "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Gwoza, Borno.  March 9: Kidnappers abducted six and killed one in Shagari, Sokoto. March 9: Kidnappers abducted four students in Funtua, Katsina. March 10: Gunmen killed one and kidnapped four in Kaduna North, Kaduna.  March 10: Sectarian violence led to nine deaths in Ohaukwu, Ebonyi.  March 10: Customs officers killed nine in Ibadan, Oyo.  March 11: Nigerian police killed six kidnappers in Faskari, Katsina.  March 11: Sectarian violence led to five deaths in Agatu, Benue.  March 12: The Nigerian Air Force killed "scores" (estimated at forty) of Boko Haram militants in Gwoza, Borno.  March 12: Bandits killed four in Gusau, Zamfara. March 12: Nigerian and Chadian soldiers killed "some" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram commanders in Kukawa, Borno.  March 13: Herdsmen killed seven in Guma, Benue.
  • Libya
    Prospects for Peace in Libya Are Bleak
    Despite recent UN efforts to coordinate talks, peace in Libya remains elusive.
  • Nigeria
    Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: February 29–March 6
    Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from February 29 to March 6, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1583780666942'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='790px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   February 29: Boko Haram killed ten in Aksira/Uba, Borno.  March 1: Bandits killed fifty-one in Igabi, Kaduna.  March 1: Kidnappers abducted five students and one teacher in Mariga, Niger. March 3: Herdsmen killed four in Kwande, Benue.  March 4: Gunmen killed two policemen and two civilians in Udu, Delta. March 4: A cult clash resulted in three deaths in Okigwe, Imo.  March 4: Three soldiers and nineteen Boko Haram militants were killed during an attack in Damboa, Borno.  March 4: Herdsmen killed three and kidnapped seven in Aniocha North, Delta.  March 4: The Nigerian Air Force killed "some" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Gwoza, Borno.  March 4: Boko Haram killed six police officers and two civilians in Bursari, Yobe.  March 4: Kidnappers abducted three local government councillors in Gummi, Zamfara.  March 5: The Nigerian Air Force killed "some" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Gwoza, Borno. 
  • Nigeria
    Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: February 22–28
    Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from February 22 to 28, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1583163551729'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='790px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   February 23: Cult clashes resulted in three deaths in Ikorodu, Lagos. February 23: Herdsmen killed one and kidnapped one in Aniocha North, Delta  February 23: Police killed five crime suspects in Kankara, Katsina.   February 24: Police killed three protestors in Sagamu, Ogun.  February 24: Cultists killed five in Okpokwu, Benue.  February 26: Kidnappers abducted a Civilian JTF official among "others" (estimated at five total) in Chibok, Borno.  February 26: A Nigerian army corporal killed four of his colleagues and then himself in Abadam, Borno.  February 27: Police killed seventeen bandits and bandits killed four civilians in Kankara, Katsina.  February 27: The Nigerian Air Force killed "some" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Gwoza, Borno. February 27: Over the last two months, a combination of military offenses and infighting between ISWA and Boko Haram has led to the deaths of twenty-five militants in and around Kukawa, Borno (LGA estimated). 
  • West Africa
    As Militaries Struggle in the Sahel, Jihadis Cooperate
    According to The Washington Post, jihadi groups with ties to al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS) are working together to gain control of a large part of the Sahel, the border region between the Sahara and the better-watered pasture and agricultural lands to the south. The story’s sources are identified as U.S. and local officials on the ground. “What we’ve seen is not just random acts of violence under a terrorist banner,” says Brigadier General Dagvin Anderson, head of U.S. Special Operations in Africa. “But a deliberate campaign that is trying to bring these various groups under a common cause. That larger effort then poses a threat to the United States.”  Perhaps. As the story acknowledges, al-Qaeda and IS are enemies in the Middle East. In Africa, allegiances are fluid, tactical rather than strategic, and often tribal ties and practical matters are more important than theology or ideology. There is also an important criminal dimension: the Sahel has long been a center of smuggling of everything from people to weapons to narcotics. Indeed, jihadi activity in the Sahel appears to be intensely local in its causes and its goals. If this conclusion is sound, it would mitigate against the success of a long-term unification strategy. The article notes that there seems to be distinct, “mutually agreed-upon areas of influence” allocated to the different jihadi groups.  The Sahel is huge, poor, and characterized by weak states whose authority exists primarily on islands in a sea of spaces governed without the state or not at all. Despite more than a decade of jihadi activity, remarkably little is actually known about the various groups’ internal workings or their links to each other and to the world outside the Sahel. Evidence is slight for meaningful material support from outside of Africa. Where exactly these groups are is also not always clear, and allegiances can shift. It does seem clear that there are thousands of jihadi fighters, but not tens of thousands, and that jihadi leaders are skilled at exploiting local grievances. It also appears that the jihadi groups enjoy some local support in a region where governments and the elites that they serve are detached from the vast majority of the population.   
  • Nigeria
    Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: February 15–21
    Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from February 15 to 21, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1582558147228'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='790px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   February 16: Gunmen kidnapped six in Lokoja, Kogi. February 16: The Nigerian Air Force killed "several" (estimated at ten) ISWA militants in Marte, Borno.  February 16: Gunmen killed four soldiers and two civilians in Ekeremor, Bayelsa.  February 16: Kidnappers abducted twelve in Ofu, Kogi.  February 16: Gunmen killed two soldiers in Barkin Ladi, Plateau.  February 17: A cult clash resulted in three deaths in Lokoja, Kogi.  February 17: Gunmen killed two policemen in Irele, Ondo.  February 17: One bandit and one vigilante member were killed during a clash in Kurfi, Katsina.  February 18: Gunmen killed two soldiers in Jos, Plateau.  February 18: Herdsmen killed two in Ovia North-East, Edo.  February 18: Four Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corps (NSCDC) officers were kidnapped in Ofu, Kogi.  February 19: Cultists killed six in Ikpoba-Okha, Edo.  February 19: The Nigerian Air Force killed "some" (estimated at ten) ISWA militants in Kukawa, Borno.  February 19: Bandits kidnapped "many" (estimated at ten) in Rafi, Niger.  February 20: Nigerian police killed two Hausa traders in Abeokuta, Ogun.  February 20: Airstrikes killed "some key" (estimated at five) ISWA leaders in Abadam, Borno.  February 20: Bandits killed two and kidnapped one in Chikun, Kaduna.  February 20: A cult clash resulted in ten deaths in Oredo, Edo.  February 10–20: Troops killed thirteen bandits in Katsina and Zamfara; estimated at identified location of Shinkafi, Zamfara.  February 21: Police killed two robbers in Abuja, FCT. February 21: Boko Haram killed "some" (estimated at five) vigilantes in Damaturu, Yobe.  February 21: Thirteen children were kidnapped in Ilorin West, Kwara. 
  • Terrorism and Counterterrorism
    U.S.-Taliban Peace Talks, Trump’s India Trip, and More
    Podcast
    The United States and the Taliban move closer to an agreement, U.S. President Donald J. Trump makes a state visit to India, and Iran holds parliamentary elections.
  • Nigeria
    Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: February 8–14
    Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from February 8 to 14, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1582044380307'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='790px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   February 8: Bandits killed three in Shiroro, Niger.  February 8: The Nigerian Air Force killed "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Gwoza, Borno.  February 8: Gunmen killed two in Dutse, Kaduna.  February 9: Herdsmen killed three in Riyom, Plateau.  February 9: Boko Haram killed thirty and abducted "many" (estimated at ten) in Konduga, Borno.  February 9: Nigerian troops killed "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Damboa, Borno.  February 10: Two soldiers and one Boko Haram militant were killed in a clash in Konduga, Borno.  February 10: Boko Haram killed one soldier in Magumeri, Borno.  February 10: Three CJTF and "several" (estimated at five) Boko Haram militants were killed in a clash in Kala/Balge, Borno.  February 11: Gunmen killed twenty-one in Giwa, Kaduna.  February 12: Gunmen killed seven in Kachia, Kaduna.  February 13: Herdsmen killed eight in Ughelli North, Delta.  February 13: Four people were killed during a riot in Orhionmwon, Edo.  February 14: Herdsmen killed one in Bokkos, Plateau.  February 14: Bandits killed thirty-three in Batsari, Katsina.