Terrorism and Counterterrorism

The security situation around Borno’s capital, Maiduguri, appears to be going from bad to worse. On February 9, The Boko Haram faction Islamic State in West African (ISWA) shot or burned alive some thirty people sleeping in their cars and trucks that night outside the town of Auno, some ten miles from Maiduguri. They also kidnapped others. The victims had arrived in Auno after curfew, the gates to the town were closed, and the military had departed, presumably for their supercamp in Maiduguri, according to media.  The Nigerian army is following its own version of the “fortified hamlets” strategy, employed by the United States and its allies in the wars in Vietnam and Afghanistan and generally regarded as a failure by counterterrorism experts. By consolidating their forces in highly fortified “super camps,” the Nigerian army reduces their own casualties, but in the evening, when soldiers withdraw back to these camps, ISWA appears to have close to free rein in the countryside and smaller towns. On February 12, ISWA killed five security personnel in three separate attacks near Maiduguri. That city, the capital of Borno state, has essentially been cut off from the rest of the country by ISWA and Boko Haram. The one remaining highway, to Damaturu, is subject to frequent attacks. The airport, however, remains open. The governor of Borno state is accusing the military of failing to protect civilians.  Military and security service failure is an old song. Though about 20 percent of the national budget goes for security, accountability for how the funds are spent is weak. Security service morale is widely reported to be low. Coordination among the agencies is bad. Trust of the security services among local people is low, and ISWA operatives appear to have better knowledge of the countryside than the security services. Though documentation is hard to find, security may be increasingly devolving from the central government to states and local communities. Local vigilante groups are active, in Yorubaland, for example, local governors have joined forces to organize a force to “assist” the security services.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from February 1 to 7, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1581350858423'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='790px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   February 1: ISWA (Boko Haram) killed three soldiers in Askira/Uba, Borno.  February 1: Bandits killed one and abducted twenty in Borgu, Niger.  February 2: Cult clashes led to seven deaths in Etche, Rivers. February 3: Three were killed during a clash between the police and protesters in Apapa, Lagos.  February 3: Bandits killed six vigilantes in Birnin-Gwari, Kaduna.  February 3: Bandits killed five in Talata-Mafara, Zamfara. February 3: Gunmen killed four in Etche, Rivers.  February 4: Herdsmen killed three policemen in Oshimili North, Delta.  February 4: Boko Haram killed two in Extreme-Nord, Cameroon. February 4: Sectarian violence led to two deaths in Arochukwu, Abia.  February 4: The Nigerian Air Force killed "some" (estimated at five) Boko Haram militants in Ngala, Borno.  February 4: Gunmen killed four in Eleme, Rivers.  February 5: Gunmen killed three in Kaura, Kaduna.  February 5: Nigerian police killed 250 members of the Ansaru terrorist group (Boko Haram faction) in Birnin-Gwari, Kaduna and lost two officers.  February 5: Bank robbers killed four in Ile Oluji/Okeigbo, Ondo.  February 5: The Nigerian Air Force killed "some" (estimated at five) ISWA (Boko Haram) militants in Ngala, Borno.  February 6: Sectarian violence led to two deaths in Ibi, Taraba.  February 6: Nigerian police killed two more Ansaru (Boko Haram faction) commanders in Birnin-Gwari, Kaduna and lost one police inspector.  February 7: Boko Haram killed six in Bosso, Diffa, Niger.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from January 25 to 31, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1580746166255'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='790px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   January 25: Bandits killed eleven and kidnapped four in Shiroro, Niger. January 25: Two Boko Haram suicide bombers killed themselves and three others in Gwoza, Borno.  January 25: Nigerian troops killed "many" (estimated at twenty) ISWA militants in Mobbar, Borno. January 25: Four herdsmen were killed in Nsukka, Enugu.  January 26: Sectarian violence led to three deaths in Bali, Taraba.  January 26: Gunmen kidnapped three in Abaji, FCT. January 26: Herdsmen killed seventeen in Bokkos, Plateau.  January 27: Boko Haram killed six Chadian soldiers on Tetewa Island in Lake Chad.  January 28: Herdsmen killed one farmer and one policeman in Ovia North East, Edo.  January 28: Boko Haram killed three in Konduga, Borno.  January 29: Boko Haram killed five in Blangoua, Chad.  January 29: Sectarian violence led to three deaths in Ankpa, Kogi.  January 30: A Boko Haram suicide bomber killed herself and three boys in Maiduguri, Borno.  January 30: Bandits killed two farmers in Wukari, Taraba.  January 30: Twenty-one Boko Haram militants, three soldiers, and one civilian were killed during an attack in Lake Chad. 

On January 29, the Nigerian House of Representatives passed a resolution calling on all of the military service chiefs to resign. If they do not, the resolution called on President Muhammadu Buhari to fire them. Earlier, the Senate had also expressed the view that the service chiefs had to go. The House motion appears to be more formal than the Senate’s action. However, both reflect frustration at the resurgence of Boko Haram in the northeast. The road to Damaturu is the only remaining operable road connecting the capital of Borno state, Maiduguri, to the rest of Nigeria. Maiduguri has an international airport, and air travel to other Nigerian cities continue. The service chiefs were appointed by President Buhari in 2015 after he was elected to his first presidential term. Under military regulations, their terms of service expired in 2017, but the President has kept them on. They are Defense Chief Abayomi Olonisakin, Army Chief Tukur Buratai, Navy Chief Ibok-Ete Ekwe Ibas, and Air Chief Sadique Abubakar. It is unlikely that President Buhari will move against the service chiefs because of the National Assembly. He might, indeed, replace some or all. But, should he do so, it would be for his own reasons. All are personally loyal to the President.  The inability of the security services to defeat Boko Haram is the result of complex factors, not the personal limitations of the service chiefs, whatever they might be. The House of Representatives resolution makes specific reference to Boko Haram and the northeast. However, the breakdown of security is nationwide, and it is becoming a major political issue. Earlier in January, the governors of the states of Yorubaland in the southwest moved to establish a security force to supplement and assist the national police force in the face of a kidnapping epidemic that the Federal government appears powerless to stop. In fact, according to one report, twenty-three states across the country have stood up local security organizations, ranging from neighborhood watches to armed police. 

Since the last National Defense Strategy [PDF] more than a year ago, there has been a shift in U.S. defense priorities from countering terrorism to great power competition. Since then, the Department of Defense has been considering a drawdown of U.S. military assets in Africa, especially West Africa, presumably for redeployment to arenas of great power competition. That would be a mistake. Also included in the strategy is to "support relationships to address significant terrorist threats in Africa." Terrorist episodes in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad have been expanding exponentially. Extremist violence has doubled every year since 2015. Mauritania is concerned, with good reason, that it will be next. Further east, in the Lake Chad basin, factions of Boko Haram have revived, with almost daily assaults in Chad, Nigeria, and Cameroon. The capital city of Borno State, Maiduguri, is almost cut off from the rest of the country due to the destruction of bridges and frequent attacks on travelers. Many governments in the Sahel and West Africa are weak and fragile, and, with the exception of in Nigeria, France plays an outsized role in countering terrorism there. Operation Barkhane is France’s largest overseas operation, with 4,500 soldiers and an expenditure of some 600 million Euros per year. There have been French casualties, small in number but nevertheless threatening French popular support for the effort. Further, the French presence in West Africa has recently elicited anti-colonial riots in Bamako, with the burning of the French flag. French President Emmanuel Macron has made it clear that France will stay only at the request of the governments in the region. Early in January, he convened a summit of the five francophone heads of state in the southwestern French city of Pau. There, the Africans reaffirmed their desire for the French to stay. Compared to the French, the American role is small. There are perhaps 800 Americans stationed in West Africa, mostly at a base in Niger. (For context, altogether there are about 200,000 U.S. military stationed abroad.) The Americans in Niger provide logistical support, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assistance to the French and their partner governments in the Sahel. The Americans also facilitate air-to-air refueling. The American role is small, but the French regard it as essential. A French presidency official characterized the American role as “irreplaceable.” “If the Americans decided to pull out of Africa, it would be very bad news for us, absolutely,” said President Macron. “I hope that I can convince President Trump that the fight against terrorism, a fight that he is fully committed to, is at stake out in this region.” At Pau, the five francophone heads of state also expressed their gratitude to the United States. French General Francois Lecointre, head of the French armed forces, has said that without Barkhane, the affected countries would collapse. The general is probably right. It is true that a long term solution to the problems of the region require the local elites to find political and social solutions, as French political scientist Marc-Antoine Perouse de Montclose told the American media. But that takes time. The risk is that if the United States withdraws its support for Barkhane, the French will draw down or even leave. Without the presence of the French military, a huge geographical area becomes more than an ungoverned space; it becomes a playground for jihadis and militants of all stripes.  This has dangerous consequences for U.S. interests, including uncontrolled terrorism, increased migration to Europe—already rattled by the Syrian refugee crisis—and an increased likelihood of further humanitarian crises. A Franco-American drawdown or departure also hands a victory to the jihadists, whose goals include expelling the West from Africa. American support for the modest French military presence in West Africa is a small, albeit still insufficient, price to pay. It is hard to know how exactly things will change if the U.S. follows through, but it is likely to be contrary to U.S. interests.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from January 18 to 24, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1580150322071'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='790px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   (Last week, January 17: Thirteen soldiers and four Boko Haram militants were killed during a battle in Bama, Borno.) January 18: Bandits kidnapped thirty-two people in Shiroro, Niger.  January 18: Bandits kidnapped five in Bukkuyum, Zamfara.  January 18: One soldier and four Boko Haram militants were killed during an attack on an aid facility in Ngala, Borno.  January 18: Sectarian violence led to four deaths in Igalamela-Odolu, Kogi.  January 18: Boko Haram killed four soldiers and kidnapped "scores" (estimated at forty) in Bama, Borno. January 19: A suspected Boko Haram suicide bomber killed herself and nine others in Kaiga-Kindjiria, Chad. January 19: Vandals tampered with a pipeline, leading to an explosion that killed five in Alimosho, Lagos. January 21: Gunmen killed four in Keana, Nassarawa. January 21: Police killed one during a Shiite protest in Abuja, FCT. January 21: 8 soldiers and "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants were killed during a battle in Kaga, Borno.  January 21: Gunmen killed one and kidnapped fourteen in Batsari, Katsina.  January 22: "Several" (estimated at ten) were killed during a clash between Boko Haram and ISWA militants in Abadam, Borno.  January 23: Boko Haram killed ten loggers in Dikwa, Borno.  January 23: Sectarian violence led to two deaths in Ughelli North, Delta.   

Amid a spate of drug cartel attacks, Mexico is considering whether to increase security cooperation with the United States.

Over the last couple of weeks, Boko Haram has increased attacks on the road from Maiduguri to Kano, the only remaining safe highway of the six major roads that connect Maiduguri with the rest of the state and country, according to Nigeria media. A major report on the increasing isolation of Maiduguri closely follows Boko Haram attacks on transmission lines supplying the city with electricity. Destroyed bridges and frequent attacks on travelers have cut off not only Maiduguri residents, but many other residents of Borno state from accessing or travelling to Borno’s neighboring states. In response, the Nigerian army has evacuated many villages along the highway, causing hardship and anger among the residents and friction between the governor of Borno state and the army.  Borno state and its capital, Maiduguri, have been ground zero for Boko Haram. Mohammed Yussuf founded the movement in Maiduguri, the police murdered him there in 2009, and Boko Haram emerged there in 2011 as a deadly terrorist movement. By 2015, Boko Haram controlled a territory as large as Belgium in Borno and adjacent Yobe and Adamawa states. The Nigerian army, assisted by Chadian forces and South African mercenaries, pushed Boko Haram back. But, there has been a Boko Haram resurgence. Though it is unclear the extent to which either Boko Haram faction actually governs territory, it is now able to operate in three states, especially Borno, and in some places it even provides a modicum of governance. It has seemingly pushed the security services back into fortified super camps, particularly Maiduguri. Local resident fear that Boko Haram will, with the closing of the Maiduguri-Kano highway, completely cut off Maiduguri and Borno state from the rest of Nigeria. The faction that is most active appears to be the Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA), though Abubakar Shekau’s faction has also been active. Nominally, Borno has a population of more than four million, and Maiduguri has a population of more than two million. However, because of the flow of internally displaced persons, it is hard to know how many people are now living there. Traditionally the state has been a center of trade, agriculture, and fishing. Borno was a center of the cattle industry, and a transit point for fish caught in Lake Chad. These activities are all dependent on the roads. The security services have so far been able to repel frequent Boko Haram attempts to destroy the bridge along the Kano-Maiduguri highway. If that bridge is destroyed, or attacks on travelers renders the road inaccessible, as a practical matter the only way to get to Maiduguri will be by air. Maiduguri has an international airport which remains open, and the city remains the headquarters of the Nigerian army operating against Boko Haram. It remains to be seen whether the isolation of Borno is part of a larger Boko Haram strategy and whether is presages a return to occupying and governing territory. 

On January 20, the electric company serving Maiduguri, capital of Borno state, publicly stated that Boko Haram attacks on transmission lines and infrastructure had cut electricity service to the city on January 17, removing Maiduguri from the national grid. The electric company had promised to restore power soon.  Maiduguri nominally has a population of about two million, but it is likely now much greater because of the influx of persons displaced by fighting between Nigerian security forces and Boko Haram factions. In addition to being the capital of Borno state, the city is the residence of the Shehu of Borno, one of Nigeria’s most important Islamic traditional rulers. The city is on the main Hajj pilgrimage route stretching from Senegal on the Atlantic coast to Mecca. There is a modern university, an international airport, and it is on the national railway network, now being restored by Chinese companies. The city is a major trading center, especially for cattle. However, the poverty of the city’s residents is legendary in the region, where Maiduguri is sometimes called “the beggar maker.”  The city’s population is mostly Muslim in religion and Kanuri in ethnicity, and it has long been a center of radical Islamic thinking. There is a small Christian minority, mostly made up of ethnicities from elsewhere in Nigeria. Mohammed Yusuf founded Boko Harm in Maiduguri, and he was killed there by the police in 2009. Since its resurgence starting in 2011, Boko Haram has come close on occasion to occupying the city. More frequently, it has dominated certain neighborhoods, with Boko Haram’s black flag flying over certain buildings. However, the Nigerian army now has its northern command headquarters there. Many international relief agencies also have offices in Maiduguri. Even in the best of times (which these are not), many or most residents of Maiduguri would have little or no access to electricity. The well-to-do would have their own electric generators. So, it is difficult to know what the impact actually is of the detachment of Maiduguri from the national grid for most residents. That said, however, Boko Haram would appear to have scored some sort of victory. Boko Haram has split into factions, of which the two best known are one that has been led by Abubakar Shekau since the resumption of hostilities in 2011, and one called the Islamic State in West African (ISWA), associated with the Islamic State. Relations among the factions are murky; at times they cooperate, at other times they fight each other. Nigerian media is carrying reports of a recent gun battle between the two factions that left “several” fighters dead. At present, it is not known which faction carried out the attack on Maiduguri’s electricity infrastructure.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from January 11 to 17, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker, featured below.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1579619989117'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='790px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   January 11: Boko Haram killed four and kidnapped four in Alom, Chad.  January 11: The MNJTF and Nigerian Air Force killed four ISWA (Boko Haram) commanders along with "several" other Boko Haram militants (estimated total of fifteen) in Kukawa, Borno.  January 12: Sectarian violence led to two deaths in Owan West, Edo.  January 13: Kidnappers abducted two teachers in Owan West, Edo.  January 13: Kidnappers abducted two in Ola-Oluwa, Osun.  January 14: Gunmen killed thirty and kidnapped one hundred in Kaduna, Kaduna.  January 14: Gunmen kidnapped two health workers in Zurmi, Zamfara.  January 14: Bandits killed twenty-nine in Gummi, Zamfara.  January 15: Bandits killed fourteen in Gummi, Zamfara.  January 17: Kidnappers killed one and abducted twenty-two in Shiroro, Niger.  January 17: Gunmen killed two in Zangon Kataf, Kaduna.   

This year, a mass-casualty terrorist attack on the United States or a treaty ally directed or inspired by a foreign terrorist organization was included as a top tier priority in the Center for Preventive Action’s annual Preventive Priorities Survey.

President Emmanuel Macron of France hosted a summit in Pau, southwestern France, with the heads of state of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauretania, and Niger. The purpose of the summit was to improve military coordination against insurgents with a particular focus on the Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) and al-Qaeda affiliate Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM). Macron also sought, and received from the African chiefs of state, an endorsement of France’s continued presence in the region. He, in turn, pledged a small increase in the number of French soldiers to be deployed there.  The summit was at least partly prompted by demonstrations in Sahelian capitals, most recently in Mali’s capital Bamako, calling the French role “neo-colonial.” Accordng to the New York Times, many of these protests were inspired by Islamist preachers. That has not gone down well with the French; as President Macron said in advance of the summit, “I know who is dying for the citizens of Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso. It’s French soldiers.” From an American perspective, the most interesting development was the summit’s expression of unease about a possible drawdown of the American military presence in the region. It would occur at a time when insurgent activity is increasing. The heads of state explicitly stated their “gratitude for the crucial support provided by the United States and expressed the wish for its continuity.” From its bases in Niger, the United States provides intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance to France and its African partners in the Sahel. It also provides air-to-air refueling services. A French presidency source characterized to the French media the U.S. role as “irreplaceable.”  Anxiety about an American withdrawal dates from the 2018 U.S. national defense review [PDF] that signaled a shift in U.S. priorities from the war on terrorism to great power competition. The U.S. military's presence in Africa received closer scrutiny after the deaths of four servicemen in an ambush in Tongo Tongo, Niger. In the aftermath, there has been discussion of a redeployment out of West Africa of U.S. resources devoted to the fight against terrorism. However, there have been mixed messages from U.S. sources and it is not clear if any drawdown has actually taken place yet. President Macron at Pau said, “If the Americans decided to pull out of Africa, it would be very bad news for us, absolutely. I hope that I can convince President Trump that the fight against terrorism, a fight that he is fully committed to, is at stake out in this region.” According to the chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of Defense Mark Esper has not yet made a decision. 

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from January 4 to 10, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker, featured below.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1578933098309'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='790px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   December 2019–January 2020: The Nigerian army killed one hundred bandits in Zamfara. January 4: Four Nigerian soldiers and six Boko Haram militants were killed during a clash in Konduga, Borno.  January 4: Gunmen killed four and kidnapped ten in Wukari, Taraba. January 5: The Nigerian Air Force killed "several" (estimated at ten) ISWA (Boko Haram) militants in Kukawa, Borno.  January 5: Bandits killed one and kidnapped forty in Kurfi, Katsina. January 5: Bandits kidnapped thirty in Batsari, Katsina.  January 6: Kidnappers abducted seven in Ogba/Egbema/Ndoni, Rivers. January 6: A bomb planted by Boko Haram killed thirty-two in Ngala, Borno.  January 6: Nigerian troops killed "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Kaga, Borno.  January 6: Boko Haram killed three Nigerian soldiers in Konduga, Borno.  January 7: Nigerian troops killed "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Jibia, Katsina.  January 7: Boko Haram killed twenty soldiers and three civilians in Monguno, Borno.  January 8: Nigerian troops killed "many" (estimated at ten) bandits in Jibia, Katsina.  January 8: Bandits abducted four seminarians in Ikara, Kaduna.  January 8: Bandits killed four and kidnapped twenty-one in Paikoro, Niger. January 9: Sectarian violence led to thirteen deaths in Mangu, Plateau.  January 10: Four Air Force officers and "several" (estimated at five) bandits were killed during a gunfight in Birnin-Gwari, Kaduna. January 10: Boko Haram killed three and kidnapped seven in Konduga, Borno.    var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1528827552157'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='900px';vizElement.style.height='1027px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement); var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1528476877380'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='900px';vizElement.style.height='1027px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1550185218651'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='900px';vizElement.style.height='1127px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);  

In a follow up to his remarks in December, Mohamed Ibn Chambas, the UN special representative and head of the UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) sounded the alarm on growing militant and jihadi violence. In his January 8 briefing to the UN Security Council, he said the “devastating surge” in terrorism has “shaken public confidence.” He focused on Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, where casualties from terrorism have increased fivefold since 2016, with 4,000 deaths in 2019 compared to 770 in 2016. He estimated those displaced in their own countries number half a million with an additional twenty-five thousand who have fled across national borders. He also noted that terrorist activity, broadly speaking, is moving from west to east. As though it were underscoring Dr. Chambas’s presentation, a rocket attack on a joint Malian, French, and UN base in northern Mali on January 9 wounded twenty, of whom eighteen were UN peacekeepers. Likely unconnected to the upsurge in violence further west, Boko Haram activity in the Lake Chad basin (Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Cameroon) continues, seemingly unabated. Militants, claiming to be the Boko Haram offshoot Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA), killed some twenty Nigerian soldiers around January 8. Civilian casualties are a fraction of what they once were at the height of the Boko Haram conflict from mid-2013 to the end of 2015. But, according to the Nigeria Security Tracker, military casualties reached their highest levels over the past year. The military has resorted to a “super camp” strategy, retreating to fortified towns and cities, ostensibly from which to launch attacks. This effectively cedes control of rural areas to ISWA and Boko Haram. Such attacks in Nigeria and West Africa are usually labeled as “jihadi terrorism.” The often unstated assumption is that they are somehow related to international terrorist organizations, such as al-Qaeda or the Islamic State. In some cases, this may be true. However, as Chambas noted in his briefing, terrorism, criminal behavior, and intercommunal conflict are often interrelated and local, especially in those large areas in the Sahel where government authority is weak. Chambas said, where the state is weak, “extremists provide safety and protection to populations, as well as social services in exchange for loyalty.” As Chambas went on to say, a key to countering terrorism is winning “the trust and support of local populations.” This is a tall order where governments are corrupt, unresponsive, and captured by an elite cabal.

Members of the Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA), a faction of Boko Haram, recently executed eleven hostages on camera. The video, released to a Nigerian Journalist on December 26, alleged that all the hostages executed were Christians, and that their murders were in retaliation for the killing of Abubakar al-Baghdadi, the leader of the Islamic State, by U.S. forces in October. The Islamic State-affiliated faction of Boko Haram has long posed a dilemma for policymakers. Is ISWA indeed an arm of the Islamic State (IS)? If so, does that mean it is therefore part of international jihadi terrorism and therefore has its sights set on Western targets? Or, despite its name, is it fundamentally a local insurrection against the secular Nigerian state? ISWA is certainly affiliated with IS. But what does that affiliation actually mean? They appear to share the same theological basis and much of the same rhetoric. IS leader Abubakar al-Baghdadi either orchestrated or approved an ISWA leadership change. But, evidence of strategic or tactical cooperation is limited. IS in Iraq and Syria sought to destroy Western secularism and was an avowed enemy of the United States. But ISWA in Nigeria has attacked no American installations, which, however, are few in the organization’s area of operation. It is implacably hostile to the secular Nigeria state, which it characterizes as evil.  ISWA has killed Christian hostages before. Most recently, it claimed to have murdered four aid workers it had kidnapped. In 2019 it murdered two midwives it had also kidnapped. It continues to hold captive an unknown number of hostages, estimated to be in the dozens and mostly aid workers and others somehow associated with the Nigerian government. In March 2018, it released the 104 schoolgirls it had kidnapped at Dapchi the month prior (five were apparently killed in the abduction), but it kept in its custody the lone Christian, Leah Sharibu. A number of things made this episode of particular significance. The eleven executions are the most numerous to date at one time. Further, ISWA videotaped the executions, made reference to the religion of the hostages, released the video the day after Christmas, and made it clear that their deaths were revenge for the U.S. killing of al-Baghdadi. By linking the murders to revenge for the killing of al-Baghdadi, ISWA is involving the United States, while publicity of the gruesome murders may have also been intended to further alienate Nigeria’s Christians and Muslims. In a Twitter thread, President Muhammadu Buhari rightly and unequivocally denounced the murders: “We should under no circumstances let the terrorists divide us by turning Christians against Muslims, because these barbaric killers don’t represent Islam and millions of other law-abiding Muslims around the world.”  Thus far, U.S. media reaction has been restrained. U.S.-based advocacy groups for Christians in West Africa have also been quiet, likely because of the Christmas holidays. But, even if the ISWA murders of Christians becomes a political issue in the United States in the coming days, U.S. capacity in the region, always small, is likely to become even smaller. A 2019 troop deployment review has signaled a U.S. draw-down of military and intelligence assets in West Africa. Should a consensus emerge that ISWA is, indeed, a part of IS, the U.S. capacity to shape events in northern Nigeria is likely to remain limited.