Terrorism and Counterterrorism

In April, Olivier Dubois, an experienced French journalist, was kidnapped in Gao, a Malian city on the Niger River. Though his disappearance was soon known by the Malian and French authorities, and by the non-governmental organization Reporters Without Borders, nobody went public with the crime, ostensibly to facilitate the victim's quick release. Those efforts appear to have failed, and in early May a jihadi group with alleged ties al-Qaeda released a video. In it, the victims pleads with his family and the French authorities to secure his release. The French authorities are seeking to authenticate the video. This kidnapping follows a familiar pattern. A professional from a rich European country is a high-value target. (French citizens are particularly prized.) A video plea from the victim builds pressure in his or her home country "to do something." Secretive negotiations then lead almost inevitably to ransom being paid by the European government, a professional organization, or the victim's family—perhaps all three. Sometimes, the negotiations fail, and the victim is killed. This becomes more likely if authorities attempt to rescue the victim. The perpetrators often are unclear. Many claim to be part of a jihadi group, but others appear to be criminal gangs. At times, a criminal gang carries out the kidnapping and then auctions [PDF] the victim or victims. Who will pay them the most? A government entity or a jihadi group? The bottom line is that the kidnapping of Europeans or others that are well connected can be hugely profitable. How profitable is the stuff of rumor, because the amounts paid are almost never revealed. (In many European and African countries the payment of ransom is illegal.) Kidnapping is an important source of funding for terrorist and criminal groups. Compared to other parts of the world, terrorism in the Sahel is inexpensive. Profits from kidnapping could therefore cover most of the costs. As of May 11, the French journalist has not been released.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from May 1 to May 7, 2021. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     May 1: Gunmen killed one police officer during an attack on a police station in Onicha, Ebonyi. May 1: Gunmen killed two police officers during an attack on a police station in Ikono, Akwa Ibom. May 1: Gunmen killed a commissioner and kidnapped the local government chairman in Yagba West, Kogi. May 1: One civilian died during a battle between Nigerian troops and Boko Haram in Kala/Balge, Borno. May 2: Boko Haram killed two soldiers and six civilians in Mafa, Borno. May 2: Herdsmen killed nineteen in Gwer West, Benue. May 2: A task force killed two kidnappers in Dekina, Kogi. May 2: Kidnappers abducted three in Ibarapa North, Oyo. May 3: The Nigerian Air Force killed bandits (no number given; estimated at ten) in Birnin-Gwari, Kaduna. May 3: Bandits killed one journalist and kidnapped "many" (estimated at ten) in Jibia, Katsina. May 3: Boko Haram killed fifteen Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) members, five soldiers, and ten civilians in Mafa, Borno. May 3: Communal violence led to four deaths in Akoko North-East, Ondo. May 3: Bandits killed one in Chikun Local Government Area (LGA) and one in Kajuru LGA in Kaduna. May 3: Communal violence led to six deaths in Agatu, Benue. May 4: Kidnappers abducted four in Abeokuta North, Ogun. May 4: Kidnappers abducted two in Jos North, Plateau. May 5: Gunmen abducted university students (no number given; estimated at ten) in Isuikwua, Abia. May 5: Gunmen killed two police officers during an attack on a police station in Idemili North, Anambra. May 5: Bandits killed two and kidnapped thirteen in Chikun, Kaduna; the kidnapped victims were later rescued after a gunfight with police. May 5: Kidnappers killed one police officer and kidnapped another police officer and three others in Abeokuta North, Ogun. May 6: Eleven Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB)/Eastern Security Network (ESN) militants and one Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corps (NSCDC) officer were killed during a clash in Orlu, Imo. May 6: Gunmen killed one police officer during an attack on a police station in Ohaozara, Ebonyi. May 6: Robbers killed two during an attack on a bullion van in Ondo, Ondo. May 6: Bandits killed seven in Magama, Niger State. May 7: Protestors killed a police officer in Abuja, Federal Capital Territory (FCT). May 7: Communal violence led to the deaths of one police officer and two others in Iwo, Osun. May 7: Gunmen killed five police officers in Port Harcourt LGA and two police officers in Emuoha LGA while losing two of their own during attacks on police stations in Rivers.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from April 24 to April 30, 2021. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     April 24: Gunmen killed eight security personnel in Ikwerre, Rivers. April 24: Gunmen killed nine farmers in Doma, Nassarawa. April 24: Security forces killed seven Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) members in Oru East, Imo. April 24: Gunmen killed eight in Oru East, Imo. April 24: Bandits kidnapped five in Dandume, Katsina. April 24: Kidnappers abducted ten in Ogo-Oluwa, Osun. April 24: Kidnappers abducted three in Atakumosa West, Osun. April 24: Bandits kidnapped thirty-five in Shiroro, Niger State. April 25: Bandits killed one and kidnapped four at a church in Chikun, Kaduna. April 25: Kidnappers abducted three students in Makurdi, Benue. April 25: Bandits killed nine police officers and two vigilantes in Sakaba, Kebbi. April 25: Bandits kidnapped two in Zaria Local Government Area (LGA), killed six in Birnin-Gwari LGA, and killed one in Kachia LGA in Kaduna. April 25: Boko Haram killed thirty-three Nigerian soldiers in Kaga, Borno. April 25: The Nigerian Air Force accidentally killed twenty soldiers during an airstrike meant to target Boko Haram militants in Konduga, Borno. April 26: Sectarian violence led to nineteen deaths in Oyi, Anambra. April 26: Gunmen killed six police officers and kidnapped one police officer during an attack on a police station in Ehime-Mbano, Imo. April 26: Bandits killed two Kaduna private varsity students in Chikun, Kaduna. April 26: Bandits killed six in Sabuwa, Katsina. April 26: Six were killed during a clash between okada (motorcycle taxi) riders and transport union members in Ojo, Lagos. April 26: Gunmen killed five soldiers in Abua/Odu, Rivers. April 26: Gunmen killed two soldiers and one civilian in Afikpo, Ebonyi. April 26: Boko Haram attacked Gwoza, Borno; no casualty figures were given. April 27: Herdsmen killed seven at a camp for internally displaced people (IDPs) in Makurdi, Benue. April 27: Gunmen killed two police officers in Ika, Akwa Ibom. April 27: Gunmen killed two soldiers in Onitsha, Anambra. April 27: Herdsmen killed two in Guma, Benue. April 27: Kidnappers abducted seven in Toto, Nassarawa. April 28: Kidnappers abducted four students but three escaped from a school in Barkin Ladi, Plateau. April 28: Police officers killed three bandits in Katsina-Ala, Benue. April 29: Boko Haram attacked Yunusari, Yobe; no casualty figures were given. April 30: Bandits killed one and kidnapped four in Musawa, Katsina. April 30: Herdsmen killed five in Gwer West, Benue. April 30: Bandits killed ten and kidnapped four in Chikun, Kaduna.

On April 27, Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari, in a virtual meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, requested that the United States move the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) headquarters from Stuttgart, Germany to Africa. The request marks a reversal of official Nigerian opposition—first made public twelve years ago—to AFRICOM plans to move to the continent. The shift likely reflects the conclusion that the security situation in West Africa and Nigeria is out of control, spurring a willingness to consider options hitherto unacceptable. Buhari argued that AFRICOM's headquarters should be closer to the theater of operations. He also seemed to imply greater U.S. involvement in West African security, including a kinetic dimension in the context of greater Western support for West Africa's response to its security threats. The statement released by President Buhari’s office following the meeting did not indicate whether the president offered Nigeria to host the AFRICOM headquarters. When President George W. Bush established AFRICOM in 2007, a military-civilian hybrid command in support of Africa, African official reaction was largely hostile, seeing the effort as "neo-colonialist." The Nigerian government took the lead in persuading or strong-arming other African states against accepting the AFRICOM headquarters, which was thereupon established at Stuttgart, Germany, already the headquarters of the European Command. However, AFRICOM's effective response to humanitarian crises, such as quickly establishing field hospitals in Ebola-affected areas in 2014, has ameliorated—at least somewhat—African hostility. More immediately, West Africa especially is facing security challenges beyond the ability of African states to control on their own. France has been the most important outside force against jihadi terrorism, but French involvement in seemingly never-ending military operations is unpopular at home, and President Emmanuel Macron has raised the specter of a drawdown or withdrawal in West Africa as he prepares for potentially strong opposition in the 2022 French presidential election. Up to the death of dictator Idriss Déby on April 27, Chad fielded the most effective West African fighting force against various jihadi groups and worked closely with France, the United States, and other partners. However, post-Déby, Chad is becoming a security unknown, with indigenous insurrections far from quelled and opposition demonstrations to the succession in the capital, N'Djamena. In Nigeria, in some quarters at least, panic has emerged over the erosion of security, and calls on the Buhari administration to seek outside help have been growing. In addition to opposing AFRICOM in the first place, the Nigerian military authorities have been largely uncooperative with the U.S. military. Hence, U.S. military involvement in Nigeria beyond limited training operations is minimal, and the country does not host any American defense installations. Successive Nigerian governments have wanted to purchase sophisticated American military equipment but have rejected U.S. oversight. In fact, Nigerian purchases of U.S. military material have been rare, despite their high-profile, ultimately successful purchase of twelve A-29 Super Tucanos—sophisticated aircraft. If opposition to AFRICOM is now muted, it has not gone away. Former Nigerian Senator Shehu Sani, an outspoken critic of the United States, characterized Buhari's volte-face as "an open invitation for recolonisation of Africa." In his view, Nigeria should seek only "technical assistance." Buhari is promising much better multilateral cooperation; it remains to be seen whether he can deliver. From an American perspective, moving AFRICOM's headquarters after fourteen years in Stuttgart would be a major undertaking. The defense review, now underway, will likely include the AFRICOM headquarters location issue. However, should the AFRICOM headquarters move, it is unlikely—if not impossible—that it would be to Africa, with its logistical challenges. Some in the U.S. Congress support moving AFRICOM's headquarters to the United States as a cost-effective alternative. For example, South Carolina's senators, both Republican, have advocated moving it to Charleston, the site of large U.S. military installations.

Confirmed by the Spanish prime minister, Western media reports that two Spanish filmmakers and the Irish president of a conservation non-governmental organization (NGO) were murdered in Burkina Faso near the border with Benin on April 26. Roberto Fraile and David Beriain were in Burkina Faso working on a documentary about poaching. They were accompanied by Rory Young, a Zambia-born Irish citizen who headed Chengeta Wildlife, an NGO devoted to training local residents to counter wildlife poaching; Chengeta reports it trained ninety rangers and other personnel in Africa last year. Though details are unclear, it appears that the victims were part of a convoy of forty that was attacked. Six others were injured and a Burkinabe soldier is missing. The fate of the rest is unreported, making it likely that they survived at least the initial attack, though contact with the group was lost. Media reports are situating the murders in the context of the upsurge of jihadi activity across the country. Perhaps. But the eastern region where the attack took place, situated on the border with Niger and Benin—rather than the “Three Borders” region shared with Niger and Mali, a more longstanding jihadi hotspot—is also characterized by criminal gangs often involved in poaching, robbery, and kidnapping. That the attack was motivated by criminals protecting poaching cannot be dismissed. Jihadi groups and criminal gangs would often appear to overlap; both make use of kidnapping. That the three Europeans were murdered rather than held for ransom is curious. In the Sahel, Europeans from rich democracies are prime targets. Public pressure to secure the release of kidnapping victims encourages European governments (or other entities) to pay enormous ransoms. Whoever the perpetrators, the three tragic murders are emblematic of the accelerating breakdown of security in the Sahel.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from April 17 to April 23, 2021. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     April 17: Nigerian troops killed five bandits who had killed seven in Makurdi, Benue. April 17: Sectarian violence led to eleven deaths in Gwer West, Benue. April 17: Police officers killed six bandits in Shiroro, Niger State. April 18: Kidnappers abducted seven in Ogba/Egbema/Ndoni, Rivers. April 18: Nigerian troops repelled a Boko Haram attack, resulting in "heavy casualties" for the militants (estimated at twenty) in Dikwa, Borno. April 18: Bandits killed one in Kajuru Local Government Area (LGA) and two in Igabi LGA in Kaduna. April 19: Police officers killed three bandits in Kankara, Katsina. April 19: Two police officers and three gunmen were killed during a clash in Dunukofia, Anambra. April 19: Bandits killed two in Zurmi, Zamfara. April 19: Bandits killed ten as police officers repelled the attack and killed thirty bandits in Maradun, Zamfara. April 19: Kidnappers abducted five in Ibarapa, Oyo. April 20: Kidnappers abducted three in Akoko North-West, Ondo. April 20: Bandits killed an Amotekun operative in Afijio, Oyo. April 20: Sectarian violence led to two deaths in Ohaukwu, Ebonyi. April 20: Kidnappers killed one and abducted twenty-three from a university in Chikun, Kaduna; three of the kidnapped students were later found dead. April 21: Gunmen killed two police officers during an attack on a police station in Uzo-Uwani, Enugu. April 21: Sectarian violence led to two deaths in Makrudi LGA, two in Agatu LGA, and two in Guma LGA in Benue. April 21: Bandits killed sixty in Gusau LGA, fifteen in Maradun LGA, and fifteen in Bakura LGA in Zamfara. April 21: Bandits kidnapped seventy-seven in Kajuru, Kaduna. April 22: Kidnappers abducted two nurses from a hospital in Kajuru, Kaduna. April 22: Kidnappers abducted eighteen in Ibarapa, Oyo. April 23: Bandits kidnapped twenty in Dandume, Katsina. April 23: Nigerian troops killed twenty-one Boko Haram militants who killed eleven civilians during an attack on Geidam, Yobe. April 23: Sectarian violence led to seventeen deaths in Guma, Benue.

According to Nigerian media, the Federal Ministry of Aviation has directed the Federal Airports Authority of Nigeria (FAAN) to increase airport security. Specific reference is made to the airports at Lagos, Abuja, Kaduna, Sokoto, Kano, and Maiduguri, with reports of an increased presence of Nigerian military personnel. (The Nigerian army has already assumed responsibility for security at the airports in northern Nigeria.) Of the airports cited, all but Lagos and Abuja, the two with by far the largest international and domestic traffic, are in the north in areas where jihadis or bandits—sometimes both—have been active. Nigeria has twenty-six airports under the authority of FAAN. In an April 9 memo, FAAN ordered all airports to operate a “heightened threat level,” though whether enhanced security is also being implemented at all of them is unclear. Travelers have taken to the skies in Nigeria. In 2019—pre-COVID-19—there were 8.5 million air passengers between January and June, an increase of 5.4 percent over the corresponding period in the previous year. Insecurity is a driver of air travel. Abuja and Kaduna are only about 116 miles apart, with train and bus service available for travel between the two. Yet airlines have launched a shuttle service, at least in part because of the increase in banditry on the road between the two cities and alleged attempts to attack the train appear to be growing. The air shuttle fare is $250 to $320, while rail is $7 to $16. The elites can insulate themselves at least somewhat from the banditry that curses the Abuja-Kaduna road, but not most people.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from April 10 to April 16, 2021. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     April 10: Gunmen killed four in Faskari, Katsina. April 10: Three soldiers, six civilians, and "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants were killed during an attack on UN facilities in Mobbar, Borno. April 10: Boko Haram killed three soldiers in Maiduguri, Borno. April 11: Civilians killed three bandits in Jibia, Katsina. April 11: Kidnappers abducted fifteen people in Safana, Katsina. April 12: Bandits killed four in Zangon Kataf Local Government Area (LGA) and one in Giwa LGA while one bandit was killed in Kajuru LGA in Kaduna. April 12: Bandits killed five vigilantes in Shiroro, Niger State. April 12: Communal violence led to fifteen deaths in Ohaukwu, Ebonyi. April 12: Bandits kidnapped three in Ibadan North, Oyo. April 12: Communal violence led to nineteen deaths in Balanga, Gombe. April 12: Bandits killed three while residents and vigilantes killed thirty bandits in Kankara, Katsina. April 13: Bandits killed four in Igabi LGA and one in Zangon Kataf LGA in Kaduna. April 13: Kidnappers killed one police officer and kidnapped four who were later released in Gwagwala, Federal Capital Territory. April 13: Fifteen beheaded bodies were found in Calabar, Cross River. April 13: Boko Haram killed seventeen civilians and lost one militant in Mobbar, Borno. April 13: Police officers killed four pirates in Oron, Akwa Ibom. April 14: Gunmen killed three police officers in Izzi, Ebonyi. April 14: Communal violence led to thirteen deaths in Guyuk, Adamawa. April 15: Gunmen killed three in Wukari, Taraba. April 15: Gunmen killed six at a beer parlor in Riyom, Plateau. April 15: Gunmen invaded the palace in Oye, Ekiti and kidnapped the monarch. April 15: Bandits killed nine in Rabah, Sokoto. April 15: Nigerian troops killed thirteen Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) fighters in Mobbar, Borno. April 15: Communal violence led to eleven deaths in Fika, Yobe. April 16: Clashes between bandits and vigilantes led to the deaths of twenty civilians in Maru, Zamfara. April 16: Boko Haram killed five soldiers in Gujba, Yobe. April 16: Gunmen killed seven traders in Orlu, Imo.

The Voice of America now has a presence in Maiduguri, providing welcome firsthand reporting on the Boko Haram insurgency. A recent report describes the gradual resumption of cross-border economic activity with Cameroon in the far northeastern sliver of Nigeria that borders on Cameroon and Chad. Specifically, the cattle market in Kolofata has reopened, with ranchers coming from across Africa. In another border town, Amchide, purveyors of small consumer goods crossing into Cameroon from Nigeria have reappeared. Local people are saying that security has improved because of the large number of soldiers that are now present. (It is not clear whether the soldiers are Nigerian, Cameroonian, or both.) However, a local employee of Human Rights Watch, a highly credible non-governmental organization, is also warning that the security in the region is too uncertain for those internally displaced to return to their homes. Boko Haram activity continues—the group conducted an attack in Kolofata only a few days after the reopening of the cattle market. Generalization is always risky. For now, however, the experience in Kolofata and Amchide indicates that once a modicum of security is achieved, economic activity bounces back. But security appears to be achieved only by large troop deployments. And, even if the area is more secure now than in the past, Boko Haram continues to be able to operate.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from April 3 to April 9, 2021. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     April 3: Herdsmen kidnapped five in Anambra East, Anambra. April 3 Gunmen killed two civilians and two police officers in Uvwie, Delta. April 3: Gunmen killed seven in Orlu, Imo. April 3: Kidnappers killed two in Sapele, Delta. April 4: Bandits killed five soldiers in Shiroro, Niger State. April 4: Kidnappers abducted five in Akoko North-West, Ondo. April 4: Nigerian soldiers killed eleven Boko Haram militants in Gwoza, Borno. April 5: Kidnappers abducted two Chinese mineworkers in Atakumosa West, Osun. April 5: Kidnappers abducted eight in Damnusa, Katsina. April 5: Gunmen killed two police officers in Takum, Taraba. April 5: Bandits killed two soldiers in Konshisha, Benue. April 5: Gunmen killed three and released 1,844 prisoners from a prison in Owerri, Imo. April 6: Bandits killed two in Kachia Local Government Area (LGA), two in Chikun LGA, and killed nine and kidnapped twenty-five in Kajuru, Kaduna. April 6: One assailant was killed when police officers repelled an attack on a police station in Ebonyi, Ebonyi. April 6: A military operation killed "several" (estimated at ten) criminals in Essien-Udim, Akwa Ibom. April 7: Gunmen killed two police officers and one other in Ukum, Benue. April 7: A cult clash resulted in three deaths in Awka South, Anambra. April 7: A cult clash resulted in three deaths in Port Harcourt, Rivers. April 7: Kidnappers abducted three quarry workers in Oluyole, Oyo. April 7: Kidnappers abducted a monarch and seven chiefs in Ihitte Uboma, Imo. April 7: Kidnappers abducted three in Ibarapa, Oyo. April 7: Kidnappers abducted two in Imeko-Afon, Ogun. April 7: Nigerian troops killed twenty-four bandits in Birnin-Gwari, Kaduna. April 7: Gunmen killed three farmers in Wuarki, Taraba. April 7: Nigerian troops killed twelve bandits in Konshisha, Benue. April 8: Gunmen kidnapped one police officer during an attack on a police station in Mbaitolli, Imo. April 8: Nigerian soldiers allegedly killed seventy civilians in Konshisha, Benue. The military disputed these claims. April 8: Gunmen killed one officer and ten soldiers in Konshisha, Benue. April 9: Bandits killed one and kidnapped ten in Shiroro, Niger State. April 9: Boko Haram killed five and kidnapped thirty in Hong, Adamawa. April 9: Gunmen killed eight at a mining site in Jos South, Plateau.

Violence attributed to Islamist groups has dramatically increased in sub-Saharan Africa over the past decade, and continues to infect new venues where it has been absent. In the recent attacks on Palma in northern Mozambique, the self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS) is claiming responsibility. In other instances, say, in the Sahel and the Horn, al-Qaeda and its affiliated groups make the claim. Some analysts see a Faustian bargain between IS or al-Qaeda and insurgencies that are driven by local grievances associated with corrupt governments that have marginalized those far from the national capital. The essence of the bargain is that IS and al-Qaeda are able to demonstrate their prowess despite reverses in the Middle East—valuable for recruitment and fundraising. For locally based insurgencies, ties, no matter how tenuous, enhance their prestige and win international publicity. The extent to which these bargains translate into tactical, strategic, or financial partnerships with IS or al-Qaeda varies from one insurrection to another. However, for both sides of the bargain, incentives are to exaggerate its importance. Insofar as Western policy makers associate IS and al-Qaeda with the insurrection, the prestige and therefore the power of both grows. However, perceiving local insurgencies as primarily an aspect of international terrorism, rather than as a response to local grievances, can lead to policy mistakes recalling some made in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq. After all, IS and al-Qaeda are core Western security concerns, while local African insurgencies are not.

Jihadi attacks in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province are accelerating, with heavy fighting breaking out around the town of Palma. In response, South Africa’s President Cyril Ramaphosa sent South African troops to evacuate South African nationals. The French oil and gas company Total has evacuated its employees from its Afungi gas facility and suspended construction on a $20 billion project. The Maputo government has, for much of the insurgency, routinely declined international help. But with the jihadi group Ansar al Sunna (ASWJ) increasing in strength, international assistance is now being accepted with greater regularity. Thus far, the Biden administration has sent a special forces detachment to provide counterinsurgency training to Mozambican forces. Portugal and the European Union are offering assistance as well. Maputo has requested military assistance from South Africa, but Ramaphosa declined on the basis that the insurgency is too big for a bilateral response. Meanwhile, the contract with South African private military contractor Dyck Advisory Group will not be renewed. The relevant multilateral security pact in the region is the Southern African Development Community (SADC), which will meet on Thursday to discuss the situation in northern Mozambique but apparently lacks the necessary funding to provide significant assistance. Further potential outside financial assistance from the European Union, South Africa, or the United States should not be ruled out, though it is unclear at present what the method of providing such assistance would be. SADC has not been particularly successful at conflict resolution and donors may well seek a different vehicle for providing their assistance.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from March 27 to April 2, 2021. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     March 27-28: A cult war resulted in four deaths in Awka North, Anambra. March 28: Gunmen killed a Peoples Democratic Party chieftain and kidnapped his wife in Tafa, Niger State. March 28: A cult war resulted in three deaths in Ogbadibo, Benue. March 28: Sectarian violence resulted in eight deaths in Uzu-Uwani, Enugu. March 28: A cult war resulted in three deaths in Osogbo, Osun. March 29: Herdsmen killed twenty in Ishielu, Ebonyi. March 29: Gunmen killed three in Ezza South, Ebonyi. March 29: Kidnappers abducted three in Oluyole, Oyo. March 29: Kidnappers abducted a Catholic priest and three others in Kagarko, Kaduna. March 29: Sectarian violence resulted in three deaths in Bassa, Plateau. March 29: Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) killed four police officers in Essien-Udim, Akwa Ibom. March 30: Gunmen killed a Catholic priest and three others in Katsina-Ala, Benue. March 30: A bank robbery resulted in the deaths of one police officer, one robber, and four civilians in Aniocha North, Delta. March 30: Kidnappers abducted two Chinese farmers in Obafemi-Owode, Ogun. March 30: Bandits killed six in Chikun Local Government Area (LGA), one in Giwa LGA, and one in Kajuru LGA in Kaduna. March 30: Communal violence led to seven deaths in Ibiono Ibom, Akwa Ibom. March 30: Communal violence led to three deaths in Owan West, Edo. March 31: Gunmen killed three police officers and kidnapped a commissioner at a rally in Aguata, Anambra. March 31: Boko Haram claimed responsibility for gunning down a Nigerian Air Force jet with two pilots around Gwoza, Borno; the air force rejected this claim. April 1: Bandits killed five soldiers and nine civilians and kidnapped twenty in Shiroro, Niger State. April 1: Kidnappers abducted five in Ohaukwu, Ebonyi. April 1: Sectarian violence led to four deaths in Ekeremor, Bayelsa. April 2: Nigerian soldiers killed eight Boko Haram militants in Monguno, Borno. April 2: Nigerian soldiers killed five youths in Ardo-Kola, Taraba. April 2: Bandits killed two in Kokona, Nassarawa.

In the early hours of March 29, an estimated sixty gunmen attacked two small military installations in Kafolo and Kolobougou, both located in Ivory Coast on the border with Burkina Faso. The assailants killed at least three soldiers and wounded others. While no group has claimed responsibility for the attack, the media is speculating credibly that the perpetrators were jihadis based in nearby Burkina Faso, where Islamist groups have been increasingly active. There have been attacks before in the same area. In 2020, "jihadis" killed fourteen soldiers and gendarmes, also near Kafolo. Nevertheless, concerns are growing that the latest attack is a sign that jihadi insurgents are expanding their reach, as they have in neighboring Mali and Burkina Faso. In some ways Ivory Coast is the largest and most important country in francophone West Africa. In the decades after independence in 1960, Ivory Coast was an economic powerhouse with wealth mostly based on agriculture, especially cocoa. It hosted the largest French expatriate community in West Africa. However, political instability after the death of long-time statesman/big man Félix Houphouët-Boigny resulted in coups and civil war, the latest round of which ended in 2011 and left the economy in shambles. Since then, under the technocratic President Alassane Ouattara, the country has largely recovered economically. (Ouattara was elected to a controversial third term in 2020.) Ivory Coast, linked by roads and railways with interior francophone countries, plays an outsized regional economic role. The country has long been an immigration magnet from the other West African francophone countries, which are much poorer. Nevertheless, even with renewed prosperity, remaining internal divisions provide an opening for jihadi groups. As elsewhere in West Africa, the south, centered on Abidjan, is predominantly Christian and much more prosperous than the north. In effect, the south dominates the country. The north is predominantly Islamic and many northern residents feel marginalized by a southern francophone elite that is predominantly Christian. Overlaying north-south differences are those between "indigenes" and immigrants from elsewhere in francophone West Africa, especially Burkina Faso. The indigenes are mostly Christian, the immigrants mostly Muslim. Hence, Ivory Coast in some ways resembles other African hotspots—such as Mali, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, northern Nigeria, Mozambique, Central African Republic, and Niger—where a marginalized Islamic population provides an opening for radical jihadism. However, Ivory Coast is far larger and economically more important that the others, with the exception of Nigeria. If jihadi radicalism acquires a foothold, the consequences will be dire for the West African region beyond just Ivory Coast.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from March 20 to March 26, 2021. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     March 20: Three were killed in election-related violence in Ekiti East, Ekiti. March 20: Gunmen killed a police inspector during an attack on a police station in Isiala Mbano, Imo. March 20: Boko Haram killed two Cameroonian soldiers and lost "several" (estimated at ten) militants in Ngala, Borno. March 21: Herdsmen killed three in Ukwuani, Edo. March 21: Cultists killed four in Ibeju/Lekki, Lagos. March 22: Gunmen killed three police officers in Ohafia, Abia. March 22: Bandits killed one in Jema'a Local Government Area (LGA) and three in Igabi LGA in Kaduna. March 23: Nigerian troops and police officers killed sixteen members of the Indigenous People of Biafra's Eastern Security Network in Aba, Abia. March 23: Gunmen killed twelve in Takum, Taraba. March 24: Nigerian troops killed two bandits in Chikun, Kaduna. March 24: Kidnappers abducted four in Kuje, Federal Capital Territory. March 24: Bandits killed three in Illela, Sokoto. March 24: Bandits killed two civilians and troops retaliated, killing two bandits in Katsina-Ala, Benue. March 24: Bandits killed one soldier and twenty vigilantes in Mariga, Niger State. March 24: Bandits killed two in Kaura-Namode, Zamfara. March 25: Bandits killed eight in Birnin-Gwari LGA and one in Giwa LGA in Kaduna. March 25: Kidnappers abducted three from airport quarters in Barkin Ladi, Plateau. March 25: Communal violence led to fifteen deaths in Ohaukwu, Ebonyi. March 26: Kidnappers abducted eight in Kachia, Kaduna. March 26: Nigerian troops killed forty-eight Boko Haram militants in Chibok, Borno.