Terrorism and Counterterrorism

The spree of murders at several Atlanta-area spas demonstrates the unique threat posed by rampaging assailants. A new system that alerts the public during such attacks could help save lives.

On March 17, around one hundred assailants, traveling on motorcycles and pickup trucks, killed thirty-three soldiers and wounded an additional fourteen in an attack near Tessit in central Mali. Peacekeepers operating under the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) assisted the evacuation of the dead and wounded; the French-led counterinsurgency force stationed in West Africa, Operation Barkhane, helped the Malian military secure the area after the attack. About four days later, perpetrators killed 137 in coordinated attacks in the Tahoua region of southwest Niger. The attacks took place near the border with Mali and also not far from Tillabéri, another Nigerien border region, where at least fifty-eight people were killed recently by gunmen on motorcycles. The Islamic State’s “West Africa affiliate” has apparently claimed responsibility for the Tessit attack. This likely refers primarily to the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), which is known to operate in the tri-border region where the frontiers of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso meet; reporting on the attacks at Tillabéri and Tahoua suggests ISGS involvement. If so, there are additional reports that militants from the Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA)—a splinter group of Boko Haram—provided reinforcements to ISGS in the Tahoua attack. That would indicate a new expansion of ISWA’s geographic scope: the hotbed of ISGS activity is located well over one thousand kilometers from Boko Haram and ISWA’s main area of operations in northeastern Nigeria. Much closer to the tri-border area, however, is northwestern Nigeria, where criminal and jihadi activities are converging as the Nigerian region becomes more insecure. Banditry, particularly kidnapping for ransom, is prevalent; Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau claimed responsibility for a mass kidnapping in Nigeria’s Katsina State in December last year, though his claim is unverified. With regard to the latest atrocities in Mali and Niger, it remains possible that some level of coordination took place between jihadi groups and groups regarded as primarily criminal in nature. But, if so, why? Victims were killed, not kidnapped, and looting does not seem to have been the goal. However, outside observers lack the granular knowledge of the region to divine the motivation for the attacks. Revenge or rivalry over control of smuggling routes are plausible explanations, as is jihadi militancy. Or, perhaps, elements of all three are present.  With regard to the counterinsurgency effort against the jihadis, Barkhane is considered the most effective fighting force in West Africa. But the French deployment is not popular in France; public opinion perhaps fears Barkhane could become bogged down in West Africa like the United States in Afghanistan. Looking to the 2022 presidential elections, President Emmanuel Marcon raised the possibility of a whole or partial military withdrawal, but he has of late backed away from his earlier comments. MINUSMA was established in 2013 after the French Operation Serval and the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) failed to stabilize Mali in the face of Islamist rebellion. The deployment under MINUSMA is large, with more than 16,000 total personnel as of January 2021. So, too, have been its fatalities: some 235 since it was established. Its mandate is “stabilization,” not peacekeeping per se, as there is no peace to keep. The recent string of violent episodes, along with rumored cooperation between jihadi cells, shows that stability and security in the Sahel are far from achieved, and that a significant French withdrawal or a winding down of MINUSMA could lead to jihadi and criminal forces severely threatening the survival of Mali's military-led government.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from March 13 to March 19, 2021. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     March 13: Nigerian troops killed two bandits in Chikun, Kaduna. March 13: Gunmen killed six in Irewole, Osun. March 13: Nigerian troops killed "scores" (estimated at forty) of Boko Haram militants and lost four soldiers in Kukawa, Borno. March 14: Vigilantes killed nine bandits in Lapai, Niger State. March 14: Gunmen kidnapped ten in Suleja, Niger State. March 14: Bandits killed two and kidnapped one in Safana Local Government Area (LGA) and kidnapped four in Danmusa LGA in Katsina. March 14: Boko Haram killed twenty-two herdsmen in Monguno, Borno. March 15: Three teachers were kidnapped from a school in Birnin-Gwari, Kaduna. March 15: Nigerian troops killed forty-one Boko Haram militants in Ngala, Borno. March 15: Nigerian troops killed two bandits in Chikun, Kaduna. March 15: Nigerian troops killed six Boko Haram militants in Dikwa, Borno. March 15: Bandits killed two in Kauru, Kaduna. March 15: Herdsmen kidnapped five in Ayamelum, Anambra. March 15: Boko Haram killed "some" (estimated at five) Nigerian soldiers during an attack on a military base in Mobbar, Borno. March 16: Bandits killed three soldiers and five civilians in Gusau, Zamfara. March 17: Bandits killed one police officer and kidnapped three civilians in Chikun, Kaduna. March 17: Bandits killed one and kidnapped two in Bakori, Katsina. March 17: Gunmen killed one and kidnapped two in Birnin Kudu, Jigawa. March 17: Police officers killed two bandits in Lere, Kaduna. March 18: Gunmen killed four naval officers in Oyi LGA and three police officers in Anaocha LGA in Anambra. March 18: Nigerian soldiers killed "some" (estimated at five) Boko Haram militants in Mobbar, Borno. March 19: Gunmen killed two police officers and two prison warders in Aguata, Anambra. March 19: Bandits killed one in Zangon Kataf LGA, ten in Kauru LGA, and two in Chikun LGA in Kaduna.

Fola Aina is a doctoral fellow at King’s College London. He is an international security analyst with expertise on peace and security in the Lake Chad Basin and the Sahel. Nigeria’s northern regions continue to struggle with insecurity, claiming the lives of tens of thousands and displacing millions due to armed banditry and Boko Haram. Significant battlefield defeats led the military to resort to a strategy of establishing super camps to prevent terrorists and armed bandits from overrunning areas of relative peace. However, as that approach has largely failed, President Muhammadu Buhari decided to heed months of repeated calls for change among the military’s top brass when he appointed new service chiefs in late January. The new service chiefs should, as a matter of operational urgency, begin to work closely towards prioritizing the establishment of Nigeria’s first—and long overdue—Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). Countries located in or near the Lake Chad Basin and Sahel regions lack any JSOC-like structures, despite facing increasingly complex threats from violent extremist organizations. Nigeria, should it establish and successfully operationalize a JSOC, would be a trend-setter. As it is, the Nigerian military is overstretched across multiple fronts—onshore and offshore. Worsening matters, Kabir Adamu, a Nigeria-based security analyst, diagnoses Nigeria’s security architecture as lacking an “element of coordination” and any “mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation that would allow anyone to understand what they are doing.” A focused and dedicated command that draws on the expertise of elite Special Operations Forces (SOFs), such as the navy’s Special Boat Service, would improve execution of ongoing military operations against violent extremism while enabling better-coordinated strategic planning. Up to now, the government, rather than address the lack of coordination directly, has stuck mostly to replacing service chiefs and increasing manpower in regions blighted by insecurity—the number of which is growing. An advantage of creating a JSOC is that it would unify the chain of command; at present, Nigeria suffers from an overreliance of tactical direction from the command-and-control structure in Abuja. Bringing together the expertise of elite SOFs across the various arms of Nigeria’s military—including the army, air force, and navy—under a JSOC would encourage data-sharing, the lack of which has been a consequential shortcoming in the war against Boko Haram. A case in point is the 2011 attack on the UN office in Abuja, which the military failed to prevent despite receiving intelligence on the plot nine days before its execution. The appointment in late February of a new deputy chief of counter-insurgency command demonstrates a recognition of the need for greater synergy between Nigeria’s different chains of command, particularly the air force and the army. But the February appointment does not go far enough, as it does not formalize strategic cooperation between all branches of the armed forces in the way a JSOC would. A well-implemented JSOC would also enhance the Nigerian military’s ability to collect, share, and act upon various forms of intelligence—such as human intelligence (HUMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), and communications intelligence (COMINT)—thus enabling rapid response to asymmetric threats, as was the case when the army foiled an attempted abduction in Kaduna State earlier this month. National Security Adviser Babagana Monguno has said the government’s intelligence agencies are attuned to individuals involved in kidnappings, but the increasing frequency of mass abductions suggests that not enough is being done to act on available intelligence. Significant to note is that, for the JSOC to be fully effective, SOFs would need to be equipped with state-of-the-art technology, such as night vision goggles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The government could invest more in research and development through the Defence Industries Corporation of Nigeria to encourage domestic production. However, given that it would likely take a decade or more to produce high-grade military hardware, Nigeria in the meantime will continue to rely on foreign suppliers. The purchase of a dozen A-29 Super Tucanos, approved by the U.S. State Department in 2017 despite human rights concerns, will improve the air force’s ability to provide close air support. The aircraft’s state-of-the-art capabilities—the Super Tucano boasts advanced optics and secure radio systems with data links—also make it well-suited to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions. Similarly, the Chinese government has supplied the Nigerian military with VT-4 main battle tanks, SH-5 self-propelled howitzers, and eight new UAVs which can be armed with laser-guided bombs and missiles. Successfully curbing insecurity in Nigeria’s northern regions will require winning a military-focused “hard war” alongside a “soft war” of winning hearts and minds—which itself should be pursued with greater emphasis if there is to be progress in ending the Boko Haram-driven insurgency. Nevertheless, with respect to the “hard war,” Nigeria should establish a JSOC as part of a more effective military strategy. Additional troop deployments and reorganizations of service chiefs are not enough.

Nkasi Wodu, a New Voices Fellow at the Aspen Institute, is a lawyer, peacebuilding practitioner, and development expert based in Port Harcourt, Nigeria. In early March, over three hundred schoolgirls abducted by armed groups from a secondary school in Zamfara State in northern Nigeria were released by their abductors. Unfortunately, the global outrage this incident stoked has not deterred the armed groups operating in the north. Just last week, another set of students was kidnapped from a college in Kaduna State—the third mass kidnapping of students in Nigeria in 2021. An ugly video released by the kidnappers in Kaduna showed the students being brutalized by their abductors. Nigeria clearly needs to do more to protect its children. The country’s future depends on it. The recent abductions are part of a worrying trend that underscores students’ lack of safety in Nigeria. According to the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), over 13 million Nigerian children are not enrolled in school, more than anywhere else in the world. About 8 million of those children are located in Nigeria’s northern states, where violent conflicts spanning more than a decade have exacerbated the situation. Boko Haram, an Islamist insurgent group, is known for targeting schoolchildren and using them as leverage to negotiate with the Nigerian government for the release of prisoners. In 2014, the insurgent group attacked Chibok, a community in the northern state of Borno, abducting more than 250 schoolgirls. The Chibok incident sparked global outrage, but previous attacks occurred with little international attention. Earlier the same year, over fifty schoolboys from Buni Yadi, a town in Yobe State, were killed by suspected Boko Haram militants. Since February 2014, northern Nigeria has experienced at least seven high-profile attacks on secondary schools. More than one thousand schoolchildren have been victims of mass abductions by armed groups. While some of these students have been released, a significant number remain in captivity. Even beyond the most noteworthy kidnapping episodes, Boko Haram has continued to attack schools, abducting students and using them as suicide bombers or marrying off girls as brides to their soldiers. What is driving the recent spate of abductions? Several factors contribute: a proliferation of small arms and overstretched security forces make it difficult for the government to maintain control, while peace deals and huge ransom payments create perverse incentives that encourage more kidnappings. Blanket amnesties have recently gained even more traction through the support of Sheik Gumi, a leading Islamic cleric in northern Nigeria who appointed himself as a negotiator working to secure the release of victims of kidnapping. Attacks on students have many implications—for students themselves, along with their families and the country at large. Insecurity focused on centers of learning fuels parents’ unwillingness to send their children to school, thereby advancing Boko Haram’s goal of preventing Western education. A recent report revealed that over six hundred schools in six states in northern Nigeria have been shut down due to widespread insecurity. The attacks also provide armed groups with leverage to negotiate with the government, either for the release of prisoners or a request for a general amnesty. Compounding the situation, children without education can be especially vulnerable to recruitment by bandits and jihadis. The wave of insecurity in northern Nigeria is therefore creating a generation of children whose education has been permanently dented. The broad shortage of education could also lead to a skills gap in the workforce, reducing youths’ ability to catalyze sorely needed economic development. According to the World Bank, countries impacted by prolonged conflict are most likely to remain poor. This, in turn, leads to more violence. To improve the situation, Nigeria needs to intensify the Safe Schools Initiative established in 2014 in response to the Chibok abductions. Although armed groups have proliferated since its launch, the initiative can be tweaked to meet current realities. Better coordination between state and federal governments would also improve the response to banditry and general insecurity. Part of this strategy should involve the use of early warning and early response systems involving the federal government, state governments, local vigilantes, and community leaders. Without decisive action, abductions and the instability they cause will continue to plague Nigeria, holding back the futures of children and the country they will inherit.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from March 6 to March 12, 2021. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     (Last week, March 2: Bandits killed ten and kidnapped one hundred miners in Maru, Zamfara.) March 6: Bandits kidnapped twelve at Kaduna Airport in Igabi, Kaduna. March 6: Boko Haram killed three in Askira/Uba, Borno. March 6: Nigerian troops killed four bandits in Chikun Local Government Area (LGA) and one bandit in Birnin-Gwari LGA in Kaduna. March 7: Three soldiers and "some" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants were killed during a clash in Kaga, Borno. March 7: Bandits kidnapped twenty-five in Sabuwa, Katsina. March 8: Bandits kidnapped thirty in Sabuwa, Katsina. March 8: Gunmen killed four in Ibarapa, Oyo. March 8: Bandits kidnapped thirty in Rafi LGA and nineteen in Wushishi LGA in Niger State. March 8: Kidnappers abducted eight in Wukari, Taraba. March 8: Nigerian troops killed thirty-three Boko Haram militants and lost two soldiers in Marte, Borno. March 8: Kidnappers abducted five in Kosofe, Lagos. March 9: Kidnappers abducted three in Koton Karfe, Kogi. March 9: Vigilantes killed forty bandits in Lavun, Niger State. March 9: Communal violence resulted in seven deaths in Ohaukwu, Ebonyi. March 9: Bandits killed one and kidnapped eighteen in Munya, Niger State. March 10: Bandits killed thirteen in Maradun, Zamfara. March 10: Gangs killed seventeen in Toto, Nassarawa. March 10: Kidnappers abducted five in Koton Karfe, Kogi. March 10: Kidnappers abducted three from a college in Esan North-East, Edo. March 10: Nigerian troops killed ten Boko Haram militants in Marte, Borno. March 10: Bandits killed four in Igabi LGA, one in Giwa LGA, and two in Chikun LGA in Kaduna. March 11: Gunmen kidnapped thirty-nine students from a college in Igabi, Kaduna. March 11: Bank robbers killed five in Odo-Otin, Osun. March 11: Bandits kidnapped fifty on a Maulud journey in Faskari, Katsina. March 11: Bandits killed one police officer during an attack on a police station in Katsina-Ala, Benue. March 11: The Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) killed fifteen soldiers and four Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) members in Guzamala, Borno. March 11: Bandits killed "scores" (estimated at forty) in Maradun and Tsafe LGAs in Zamfara.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from February 27 to March 5, 2021. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     February 27: Bandits killed four and kidnapped twenty-six in Rafi, Niger State. February 27: Bandits killed four in Igabi Local Government Area (LGA) and three in Kajuru LGA in Kaduna. February 27: Bandits killed three in Sabon Birni, Sokoto. February 28: Police officers killed nine bandits in Safana, Katsina. February 28: Bandits kidnapped seven in Rafi LGA and three in Katcha LGA in Niger State. February 28: Gunmen killed five in Zangon Kataf LGA and five in Chikun LGA in Kaduna. February 28: Gunmen killed three in Tsafe, Zamfara. February 28: Nigerian troops killed "dozens" (estimated at twenty-four) in late February in Igabi, Kaduna. March 1: Bandits killed five in Igabi LGA and one in Kauru LGA while airstrikes killed "many" (estimated at twenty) bandits in the surrounding area in Kaduna. March 1: Bandits kidnapped one and killed twelve in Illela, Sokoto. March 1: Sectarian violence led to two deaths in Okobo, Akwa Ibom. March 1: Boko Haram abducted seven aid workers in Dikwa, Borno. March 2: Kidnappers abducted three students in Safana, Katsina. March 2: Bandits kidnapped fifty in Rafi, Niger State. March 2: Gunmen killed one and kidnapped "some" (estimated at five) in Obokun, Osun. March 3: Gunmen killed six police officers in Obubra, Cross River. March 3: Bandits kidnapped seventy in Maru, Zamfara. March 3: Nigerian troops killed "some" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Marte, Borno. March 4: Sectarian violence led to five deaths in Offa, Kwara. March 4: Bandits killed one and kidnapped two in Bodinga, Sokoto. March 4: Four bandits and one soldier were killed during a clash in Safana, Katsina. March 4: Nigerian troops killed one Boko Haram militant in Ngala LGA and five militants in Dikwa LGA in Borno. March 5: Bandits killed seventeen in Sabon Birni, Sokoto. March 5: Suspected herders killed two farmers in Ikole, Ekiti.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from February 20 to February 26, 2021. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     February 20: Bandits killed three and a suspected informant was lynched in Kajuru, Kaduna. February 20: Bandits killed nine and kidnapped seventeen in Shiroro, Niger State. February 20: Bandits killed two and kidnapped nine in Igabi, Kaduna. February 20: Gunmen killed one and kidnapped ten in Safana, Katsina. February 21: Kidnappers abducted five in Andoni, Rivers. February 21: Gunmen killed four at a market in Ibadan, Oyo. February 21: Boko Haram killed six internally displace persons (IDPs) in Damboa, Borno. February 21: "Scores" (estimated at forty) of militants were killed during a clash between Boko Haram and Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) factions (location estimated around Mobbar, Borno). February 22: Communal clashes led to twenty-five deaths in Ohaukwu, Ebonyi. February 22: Gunmen killed two police officers in Essien-Udim, Akwa Ibom. February 23: Gunmen killed three and kidnapped nine in Sabuwa, Katsina. February 23: A Boko Haram rocket attack killed sixteen in Maiduguri, Borno. February 23: Suspected herdsmen killed three in Ikpoba-Okha, Edo. February 23: Nigerian troops killed fourteen Boko Haram militants in Marte, Borno. February 23: Four gunmen and two police officers were killed during an attack on a police station in Osisioma Ngwa, Abia. February 23: Bandits killed seven while "several" (estimated at ten) bandits were killed by airstrikes in Igabi, Kaduna. February 23: Bandits killed eight and kidnapped "some" (estimated at five) in Chikun, Kaduna. February 24: Gunmen killed four police officers in Aguata, Anambra. February 24: Sectarian violence led to two deaths in Mbo, Akwa Ibom. February 25: Bandits killed nine in Maru, Zamfara. February 25: Gunmen killed four police officers in Calabar, Cross River. February 25: Boko Haram kidnapped "dozens" (estimated at twenty-four) in Konduga, Borno. February 25: Bandits killed three in Isa Local Government Area (LGA) and one in Sabon Birni LGA in Sokoto. February 26: Bandits kidnapped 317 students in Talata-Mafara, Zamfara.

Nkasi Wodu, a New Voices Fellow at the Aspen Institute, is a lawyer, peacebuilding practitioner, and development expert based in Port Harcourt, Nigeria. The Nigerian minister of defense recently enjoined Nigerians to take up arms to defend themselves against marauding bandits in their communities. The minister’s statement aligns with the grim reality that Nigeria has a serious internal security problem—and nobody knows exactly how to solve it. Nigeria has experienced devastating attacks from armed bandits for more than two years. While these attacks initially started in the North West region of Nigeria, they have since spread to other parts of the country. Armed bandits frequently kidnap unsuspecting members of the public before using their captives to secure huge ransoms in return for their release. Ransom frequently comes in the form of opaque government payments, a strategy that tends to undermine government authority. The level of coordination in the attacks seems to betray some type of paramilitary training or, at the very least, organization by leaders with military training. Making the problem worse, bandits have recently taken to targeting softer targets, such as schools, illustrated most recently by today’s mass kidnapping in Zamfara State, where gunmen took captive over three hundred schoolgirls. The kidnapping is the latest in a string of incidents. In December 2020, eighty students were kidnapped from an Islamic school in Katsina State, although they were later rescued or released. Last month, over forty-two people, including twenty-seven students, were kidnapped from a secondary school in Niger State—signaling a geographical expansion into the North Central region, part of the Middle Belt. The targeting of schools, worrying in itself, also further discourages students in a country with dismal rates of school attendance and completion. Banditry alone fails to explain the full scale of Nigeria’s internal security problem. For much of this decade, a murderous conflict between herders and farmers has plagued Nigeria, particularly in the Middle Belt. According to the Global Terrorism Index 2015 [PDF], Fulani militants—the most violent actor in the Middle Belt’s farmer-herder conflict—were adjudged the fourth-deadliest terror group in the world. In 2018, Fulani extremists were responsible for [PDF] 1,158 fatalities in Nigeria—a majority of terror-related deaths in the country that year. Intense violence perpetrated by militant herdsmen has since begun to expand further, towards the South West and South East regions, as herders search for grazing routes for their cattle. Unfortunately, a combination of drought occasioned by the rapid disappearance of Lake Chad, political instability driven by Boko Haram, and banditry made herders’ southward march an inevitability that will be difficult to reverse. A common feature of these attacks is the perceived lack of response—even complicity—from security agents. Recent rhetoric from the presidency against the response by some state governors to stem the tide of attacks from herdsmen further promotes this perception and impels communities to take up arms to protect themselves. This reality has already come to pass: southern Nigeria hosts armed, non-state actors such as the Eastern Security Network (ESN), the Western Nigeria Security Network—also known as Amotekun—in the South West, and several armed groups in the South South region. Proliferation of small arms and light weapons, a troubling feature of Nigeria’s security landscape, make the situation yet more combustible. Clashes between “self-defense” militias and herdsmen in the South East and the South West are on the rise, and they will continue to intensify as long as security agencies are beset by inaction and ineffectiveness. Layered on top of this conflagration is the ethnic dimension, with entire ethnic groups subsumed into conflicts and pitched against one another. In Oyo State, Hausa/Fulani communities have clashed with indigenes, while Nnamdi Kanu’s ESN continue to see attacks as a northern agenda against the Igbos. Nigeria’s troublesome security forces are, at present, ill-equipped to tackle frequent clashes between non-state actors. To address the worrying array of interlinked security threats, President Muhammadu Buhari needs to first shed his characteristic apathy and lack of empathy. In doing so, he should address the nation, pleading for national unity; his aides, meanwhile, should endeavor to appear neutral in their rhetoric rather than buttress perceptions of siding with particular groups. Below the state level, political actors from the various tribes would do well to see that their words and actions play an impactful role in either exacerbating or improving violent conditions. Consequently, they should eschew divisive action and instead pursue constructive solutions to the issues at hand.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from February 13 to February 19, 2021. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     February 13: Bandits killed two in Igabi, Kaduna. February 13: Two Nigerian Air Force personnel and "dozens" (estimated at twenty-four) of bandits were killed during a clash in Birnin-Gwari, Kaduna. February 13: Suspected herdsmen killed three in Egbado North, Ogun. February 13: Herdsmen killed three in Owo, Ondo. February 13: Bandits killed three in Chikun, Kaduna. February 13: Two police officers, two robbers, and one civilian were killed during a clash in Oshimili North, Delta. February 14: Gunmen killed one police officer at a church in Ughelli North, Delta. February 14: Kidnappers killed three and abducted thirty in Rafi, Niger State. February 14: Herdsmen killed four in Bassa, Plateau. February 14: Nigerian troops killed eighty-one Boko Haram militants and lost one soldier to a landmine in Gwoza, Borno. February 14: Herdsmen killed four in Egbado North, Ogun. February 15: Seven children were killed by a leftover explosive device in Maradun, Zamfara. February 15: Boko Haram killed ten Nigerian soldiers in Marte, Borno. February 16: Bandits killed eleven in Rafi, Niger State. February 16: Boko Haram killed five police officers and two civilians in Bursari, Yobe. February 16: Suspected Indigenous People of Biafra members killed six children in Idemili North, Anambra. February 16: Nigerian troops killed two Boko Haram militants in Bursari, Yobe. February 17: Gunmen killed one and kidnapped forty-two at a school in Rafi, Niger State. February 17: Nigerian troops killed "several" (estimated at ten) bandits who kidnapped four in Birnin-Gwari, Kaduna. February 17: Suspected herdsmen killed seven in Ovia North-East, Edo. February 17: Gunmen killed one and kidnapped thirty in Shiroro, Niger State. February 18: Kidnappers abducted seventeen in Faskari, Katsina. February 19: Boko Haram killed "many" (estimated at twenty) civilians in Dikwa, Borno. February 19: Gunmen killed one and kidnapped "several" (estimated at ten) in Rafi, Niger State. February 19: Three were killed during protests in Billiri, Gombe.

On February 17, a gang of "gunmen" kidnapped more than forty students, teachers, and administrators from a secondary school in Niger State. At least one student was killed. Niger State Governor Abubakar Sani Bello has appealed for assistance from President Muhammadu Buhari, who has ordered all four service chiefs to go to Niger State to coordinate rescue operations. In December, "bandits" kidnapped some three hundred schoolboys from a school in Kankara, located in Katsina State. There have been several other mass kidnappings, though none has acquired the international notoriety of the 2014 kidnapping of more than two hundred school girls from a school in Chibok. (More than one hundred are still missing, but some recently escaped.) Most—not all—of these mass kidnappings appear to be purely mercenary. These kidnappings are different from Boko Haram attacks in the past decade where the goal was to kill those who were benefitting from Western education. In these recent instances, kidnappers are after ransom, and appear to try to keep their victims alive. Nigerian federal and state authorities always deny paying ransom. Yet they often do so. Schoolboys and bandits involved in the Kankara abduction contradicted official denials that ransom was paid. Reports suggest the Katsina State government paid N30 million (about $76,000) to recover the schoolboys. Hence, the expectation should be that unless the Kagara victims are quickly recovered, which is unlikely, either the state or federal government will pay ransom to secure the release of those who have survived. Kidnapping in Nigeria and across the Sahel can be an extraordinarily lucrative enterprise in what is one of the poorest regions in the world. "Bandits" particularly prize citizens of the European Union. As rich countries with governments susceptible to emotional public opinion, EU member states can pay enormous ransoms while always denying that they are doing so. Jihadi and criminal networks overlap in the Sahel, so kidnapping can also provide both funding and manpower for jihadi groups. At Kankara, Boko Haram's Abubakar Shekau claimed his group was behind the kidnapping, though it appears to have been purely a criminal enterprise. The United States as a matter of policy never pays ransom. The U.S. government had previously threatened to prosecute private individuals who seek to do so. Refusing to pay ransom may provide some cover for American citizens that find themselves in the Sahel. However, Americans are few in number in those areas where kidnapping is rampant.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from February 6 to February 12, 2021. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     February 6: Bandits killed fourteen in Birnin-Gwari Local Government Area (LGA) and five in Kajuru LGA in Kaduna. February 6: Police officers killed two in Surulere, Lagos. February 6: A communal clash led to two deaths in Irepodun, Osun. February 6: Gunmen killed one police officer and one civilian in Warri South, Delta. February 7: A communal clash led to one death in Irepodun, Osun. February 7: Kidnappers abducted four in Gwagwala, Federal Capital Territory. February 7: Sectarian violence led to eleven deaths in Ajaokuta, Kogi. February 8: Herdsmen killed six in Bassa, Plateau. February 8: Bandits kidnapped seven in Oriade, Osun. February 8: Bandits killed ten in Birnin-Gwari LGA, one in Giwa LGA, seven in Chikun LGA, one in Igabi LGA, and five in Kauru LGA in Kaduna. February 8: Pirates abducted one in Brass, Bayelsa. February 9: Pirates abducted one in Brass LGA and four in Nembe LGA in Bayelsa. February 9: Kidnappers abducted seven in Ethiope East, Delta. February 9: Boko Haram kidnapped three customs officers in Geidam, Yobe. February 9: Nigerian troops killed nineteen Boko Haram militants in Kala/Balge, Borno. February 9: The Nigerian Air Force killed "several" bandits in both Birnin-Gwari LGA and Giwa LGA (estimated at twenty total) in Kaduna. February 10: Gunmen killed three at a town hall meeting in Idemli North, Anambra. February 10: Sectarian violence led to the deaths of two police officers in Takum, Taraba. February 10: Violence around a university student election led to the deaths of two students in Owo, Ondo. February 10: Nigerian troops killed thirty-one Boko Haram militants in Askira/Uba, Borno. February 11: Herdsmen killed two in Owo, Ondo. February 11: Herdsmen killed two in Egbado North, Ogun. February 11: Gunmen killed three in Oyigbo, Rivers. February 12: Herdsmen killed four in Egbado North, Ogun. February 12: Sectarian violence led to three deaths in Akinyele, Oyo. February 12: Boko Haram killed four in Biu, Borno. February 12: Nigerian troops killed two Boko Haram commanders in Gwoza, Borno. February 12: Boko Haram killed three Nigerian soldiers in Kukawa, Borno.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from January 30 to February 5, 2021. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     January 30: Suspected Fulani herdsmen killed one and kidnapped one in Akure North, Ondo. January 31: Boko Haram killed two police officers and one Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) member, and kidnapped two police officers in Magumeri, Borno. January 31: Bandits killed one in Zangon-Kataf, Kaduna. January 31: Bandits killed two and kidnapped two in Giwa, Kaduna. January 31: Bandits killed five in Sabon Birni, Sokoto. February 1: Airstrikes killed "several" (estimated at ten) bandits in Igabi Local Government Area (LGA), "several" (estimated at ten) bandits in Ikara LGA, and two bandits in Zaria LGA in Kaduna. February 1: Bandits killed two in Lere LGA and one in Birnin-Gwari LGA in Kaduna. February 1: Gunmen killed one police officer in Isiala Ngwa North, Abia. February 1: Bandits killed twenty-seven and kidnapped forty in Shiroro, Niger State. February 1: Gunmen killed one police officer and kidnapped three Chinese nationals in Atakumosa West, Osun. February 1: Gunmen killed four in Aba, Abia. February 1: Herdsmen killed three in Orhionmwon, Edo. February 2: Kidnappers abducted three in Bwari, Federal Capital Territory (FCT). February 2: Police officers killed three bandits in Dutsin-Ma, Katsina. February 2: Sectarian violence led to seven deaths in Bassa, Plateau. February 3: Kidnappers abducted one journalist and two others in Abuja, FCT. February 3: Bandits killed two in Bassa, Plateau. February 3: Bandits killed two in Igabi, Kaduna. February 3: Nigerian troops killed thirty-two bandits in Shinkafi, Zamfara. February 4: Gunmen killed three at a church in Ihiala, Anambra. February 4: Gunmen killed five in Khana, Rivers. February 4: Sectarian violence led to twelve deaths in Bassa, Plateau. February 4: Nigerian troops killed "a number" (estimated at ten) of Boko Haram militants in Ngala, Borno. February 5: Bandits killed six in Birnin-Gwari, Kaduna. February 5: Two police officers and one gunman were killed during an attack on a police station in Obowo, Imo. February 5: Bandits killed two and kidnapped five in Zaria, Kaduna. February 5: Police officers killed six cultists in Egbado North, Ogun. February 5: Nigerian troops killed twenty bandits in Shinkafi, Zamfara. January 13–February 5: Police officers killed eight kidnappers in Edo.

Security across Nigeria is challenged, with Islamist groups in the north far from defeated, a seeming resurgence of a low-level insurrection in the oil patch, ongoing conflict in the middle of the country over water and land use that sometimes acquires ethnic and religious dimensions, and a general wave of criminality around the country. President Muhammadu Buhari is facing criticism for his failure to address security issues and, at the same time, especially in the predominantly Christian south, for choosing his military chiefs from among his own northern Muslim Hausa-Fulani community. President Buhari's January 26 announcement that he has fired all four of his military service chiefs will be welcomed by his critics. His new appointments appear to be of high quality in terms of official announcements about their background. Buhari has also, apparently, balanced the appoints with respect to region of origin. This is congruent with the principle of "federal character," which holds that government positions should be equally distributed across the federation. The new chief of defense staff, Maj. Gen. Leo Irabor, is from Delta state in the south. The chief of army staff, Maj. Gen. Ibrahim Attahiru is from Kaduna in the north. The chief of navy staff is Rear Admiral Awwal Zubairu Gambo, from Kano in the north, and the new air force chief of staff is Air Vice Marshal Isiaka Oladayo Amao, from Osun state, near Lagos. (By population Lagos and Kano are the largest states in the federation.) Ethnic and religious identities predominate in Nigeria and national identity is weaker than in other African states. Nevertheless, within the military an effort has been made to downplay ethnic and religious identities. Accordingly, the official announcement of the new service chiefs makes no reference to their religion or ethnicity any more than the Pentagon does about senior American military appointments. However, speculation on social media identifies Leo Irabor as a Christian, with a lively dispute covered in conventional media over whether he is or is not an Igbo. Ibrahim Attahiru is identified as a "Hausa" Muslim; Awwal Gambo is identified as a "Fulani" Muslim; and Isiaka Amao is identified as a Yoruba Christian. Based on where they were born and their names, these designations from social media are plausible but by no means definitive. However, if the designations are accurate, two are from the north, and two are from the south. Two are Muslim and two are Christian. Two are Hausa and/or Fulani, while one is Yoruba while one is Igbo. Hence the three major ethnic groups in Nigeria appear to be represented: Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and Igbo. (Hausa is a language, Fulani is an ethnic group; northern Hausa-speaking Muslims are often designated as "Hausa-Fulani," though Hausa speakers may come from small ethnic groups and some are Christian.)  It remains to be seen whether the new team will be any more successful than the last. The military remains under-resourced. But the drivers of conflict, especially in the north and in the oil patch, are primarily (not exclusively) political. But no political initiatives are underway to address the widespread sense of grievance. Absent political initiatives, critics see replacement of the service chiefs as reminiscent of "rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic."