Defense and Security

Terrorism and Counterterrorism

  • Nigeria
    Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: June 26–July 2
    Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from June 26 to July 2, 2021. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     June 26: Herders killed one and kidnapped one in Offa, Kwara. June 26: The Joint Task Force killed two kidnappers in Koton-Karfe, Kogi. June 27: Two soldiers and thirty-seven Boko Haram militants were killed during a clash in Abadam, Borno. June 27: A masquerade group killed one at a mosque in Osogbo, Osun. June 27: Gunmen killed three in Bassa, Plateau. June 28: Police killed three in Ogo-Oluwa, Oyo. June 28: Police killed one student during a protest in Jema'a, Kaduna. June 29: Bandits killed a Zamfara lawmaker and kidnapped two others in Faskari, Katsina. June 29: Hunters and police officers killed two kidnapers in Okehi, Kogi. June 30: Kidnappers abducted eight ceramic workers in Ajaokuta, Kogi. June 30: Vigilantes killed three kidnappers in Lokoja, Kogi. June 30: A communal clash resulted in three deaths in Lavun, Niger State. June 18–June 30: Nigerian troops killed seventy-three Boko Haram militants (estimated at seven unaccounted for by reported incidents) in Borno. July 1: Security forces killed five at Sunday Igboho's residence in Ibadan, Oyo and kidnapped his wife along with others (estimated at five kidnapped total). July 1: Robbers killed one police officer at a bank in Moba, Ekiti. July 1: Gunmen killed seven herdsmen in Jos South, Plateau. July 2: Bandits kidnapped thirteen in Chikun, Kaduna. July 2: Three police officers and twenty-eight Boko Haram militants were killed during a clash in Kaga, Borno.
  • Nigeria
    Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: June 19–25
    Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from June 19 to June 25, 2021. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     June 19: Gunmen killed a radio presenter in Ibadan, Oyo. June 19: Fifteen bandits and one military personnel were killed during a clash in Kontagora, Niger State. June 19: Bandits killed an All Progressives Congress (APC) chieftain in Osei, Ondo. June 20: Police killed fourteen bandits in Katsina-Ala, Benue. June 20: Nigerian troops killed six Boko Haram militants in Bama, Borno. June 20: A police inspector killed five civilians in Enugu, Enugu. June 20: Nigerian troops killed twenty Boko Haram militants in Kaga, Borno. June 20: Kidnappers killed one and abducted three in Obi, Nassarawa. June 20: Gunmen killed three in Ibadan South-East, Ondo. June 20: Thirty vigilantes and "several" (estimated at ten) bandits were killed during a clash in Magama, Niger State. June 21: Police foiled a kidnapping, killing one bandit in Igabi, Kaduna. June 22: Kidnappers abducted two in Ido, Oyo. June 22: Police killed one kidnapper in Uhunmwonde, Edo. June 22: Boko Haram killed two in Tillaberi, Niger while Nigerien troops killed three Boko Haram militants in Bosso, Niger. June 23: Bandits killed one and kidnapped thirty-three in Kachia, Kaduna. June 23: Kidnappers abducted nine in Gwagwalada, Federal Capital Territory (FCT). June 23: Suspected herdsmen killed three in Gassol, Taraba. June 23: Suspected herdsmen killed one in Egbeda, Oyo. June 24: A special taskforce killed five bandits in Rafi, Niger State. June 24: Kidnappers killed two in Jos East, Plateau. June 25: Kidnappers abducted "many" (estimated at twenty) in Kajuru, Kaduna. June 25: Nigerian troops killed "scores" (estimated at forty) of bandits in Talata-Mafara, Zamfara. June 25: Police killed "several" (estimated at thirty total) bandits in Ikeduru Local Government Area (LGA), Oguta LGA, and Ideato North LGA in Imo. June 25: Boko Haram kidnapped "many" (estimated at twenty) in Kaga, Borno.
  • Nigeria
    Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: June 12–18
    Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from June 12 to June 18, 2021. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     June 12: Herdsmen killed one and kidnapped six in Nkanu East, Enugu. June 12: Seven soldiers and an "unkown number" (estimated at seven as well) of gunmen were killed during a clash in Ohafia, Abia. June 12: Kidnappers abducted twelve in Zaria, Kaduna. June 12: Nigerian Air Force airstrikes killed "scores" of bandits (estimated at forty) and two civilians in Rijau, Niger State. June 13: Gunmen killed twelve in Josh South Local Government Area (LGA) and five in Bassa LGA in Plateau. June 13: Kidnappers abducted one in Owerri West LGA and one in Nwangele LGA in Imo. June 13: Bandits killed six police officers and two others while police killed "several" (estimated at ten) bandits in Bakura, Zamfara. June 13: Communal violence led to eleven deaths in Agatu, Benue. June 14: Gunmen killed one and kidnapped two Chinese expatriates in Wukari, Taraba. June 14: Bandits killed five and kidnapped ten in Rafi, Niger State. June 14: Vigilantes killed six in Awka, Anambra. June 15: Three soldiers and seven Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) militants were killed during a clash in Damboa, Borno. June 15: Gunmen killed five security personnel in Maradun, Zamfara. June 15: Bandits kidnapped fifteen in Chikun, Kaduna. June 16: Attackers beheaded two in Orsu, Imo. June 16: Kidnappers abducted four Chinese expatriates and killed one police inspector in Odeda, Ogun. June 16: Kidnappers killed two and abducted two in Akoko North-West, Ondo. June 16: Suspected herdsmen killed one and kidnapped six in Isi-Uzo, Enugu. June 17: Bandits killed one police officer and abducted 102 from a school in Yauri, Kebbi; troops then killed "scores" (estimated at forty) of the fleeing bandits. June 17: A gang war resulted in eleven deaths in Ibadan, Oyo. June 17: Bandits killed two and kidnapped fourteen in Chikun, Kaduna. June 18: Communal violence led to ten deaths in Ohaukwu, Ebonyi. June 18: Bandits killed twenty-nine in Gusau, Zamfara. June 18: Three of the kidnapped students were killed during a clash between bandits and vigilantes in Sakaba, Kebbi. June 18: Bandits killed two and kidnapped twenty in Chikun, Kaduna.
  • Nigeria
    Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: June 5–11
    Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from June 5 to June 11, 2021. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     June 5: Gunmen killed six in Danmusa, Katsina. June 5: Bandits killed one police officer and forty farmers in Bungudu, Zamfara. June 6: Police officers killed five attackers during an assault on a police station in Owerri, Imo. June 6: Suspected herdsmen killed twenty in Ibarapa North, Oyo. June 6: Bandits killed thirty in Zurmi, Zamfara. June 6: Bandits killed thirty in Agatu, Benue. June 7: Suspected herdsmen killed three in Imeko-Afon, Ogun. June 7: Bandits killed three in Igabi, Kaduna. June 8: Suspected herdsmen killed four in Asa, Kwara. June 8: Police officers killed two kidnappers in Ajaokuta, Kogi. June 8: Nigerian troops killed six Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) militants in Dikwa, Borno. June 9: Kidnappers abducted a University of Jos lecturer in Jos North, Plateau. June 9: Herdsmen killed three in Asa, Kwara. June 9: Suspected herdsmen killed six in Katsina-Ala, Benue. June 10: Suspected herdsmen killed five in Makurdi, Benue. June 10: Gunmen killed one police inspector during an attack on a police station in Idemili South, Anambra. June 10: Kidnappers killed one and abducted ten from a school in Zaria, Kaduna. June 10: Kidnappers abducted four in Ibadan, Oyo. June 10: Bandits killed ninety-three in Zurmi, Zamfara. June 10: Suspected herdsmen kidnapped fifteen in Okigwe, Imo. June 11: Herdsmen kidnapped a farmer in Ikole, Ekiti. June 11: Bandits killed one in Yola South, Adamawa. June 11: Suspected herdsmen killed six in Keana, Nassarawa.
  • Nigeria
    Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: May 29–June 4
    Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from May 29 to June 4, 2021. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     May 29: Police repelled an assault on a police station, killing four attackers in Oguta, Imo. May 29: A former advisor to ex-President Goodluck Jonathan was killed in Owerri, Imo. May 29: Two police officers and eight Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) members were killed during an attack on a police station in Umuahia North, Abia. May 29: Electoral violence resulted in five deaths in Surulere, Lagos. May 30: Police officers killed ten gang members in Enugu, Enugu. May 30: Bandits kidnapped 208 and killed two at a school in Rafi, Niger State. May 30: Sectarian violence led to fifty deaths in Ebonyi, Ebonyi. May 30: Pirates killed two in Asari Toru, Rivers. May 30: Herdsmen killed nine in Isi-Uzo, Enugu. May 31: Bandits killed one police officer and fifteen civilians while five bandits were killed by vigilantes in Mariga, Niger State. May 31: One police officer, three civilians, and three bandits were killed during an attack in Jibia, Katsina. May 31: Gunmen killed three in Oru East, Imo. May 31: Boko Haram killed seven soldiers in Maiduguri, Borno. May 31: Three police officers were killed by unknown attackers in Enugu, Enugu. June 1: Bandits killed four in Jema'a Local Government Area (LGA), one in Giwa LGA, and one in Birnin-Gwari LGA in Kaduna. June 1: Police officers killed three gunrunners in Sabon Birni, Sokoto. June 2: Nigerian troops killed fifty Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) militants in Damboa, Borno. June 2: Robbers killed four police officers and three civilians in Isokan and Irewole LGAs in Osun. June 2: Police killed five bandits in Kurfi, Katsina. June 3: One police officer, four attackers, and two civilians were killed during a clash in Owerri, Imo. June 3: Bandits killed twelve in Gusau LGA and ten in Anka LGA in Zamfara. June 3: Pirates killed two in Degema, Rivers. June 3: Bandits killed eight in Danko Wasagu, Kebbi. June 4: Bandits killed two in Chikun LGA and three in Igabi LGA in Kaduna. June 4: Soldiers killed a Department of State Services (DSS) operative in Ado-Ekiti, Ekiti. June 4: Police killed five robbers in Logo, Benue. June 4: Herdsmen killed one in Ibarapa North, Oyo. June 4: Herdsmen killed two and kidnapped one in Logo, Benue.
  • Nigeria
    Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: May 22–28
    Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from May 22 to May 28, 2021. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     May 22: Two police officers and "several" (estimated at ten) bandits were killed in a shootout in Gusau, Zamfara. May 22: Bandits killed eight in Maradun Local Government Area (LGA), nine in Zurmi LGA, and ten in Kaura-Namode LGA in Zamfara. May 22: Sectarian violence led to one hundred deaths in Katsina-Ala, Benue. May 23: One police officer and one attacker were killed during an attack on a police station in Ebonyi, Ebonyi. May 23: Police killed four attackers during an assault on an Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) office in Awka, Anambra. May 23: Gunmen killed eight in Jos South LGA, eight in Riyom LGA, and six in Wase LGA in Plateau. May 23: Herdsmen killed five in Takum, Taraba. May 23: Bandits killed twenty-one vigilantes in Rabah, Sokoto. May 24: Bandits killed ten while police officers repelled the attack, killing ten bandits in Bungudu, Zamfara. May 24: Bandits kidnapped fifteen in Tafa, Niger State. May 25: Gunmen killed five police officers during an attack on a police station in Ezeagu, Enugu. May 25: Police killed two bandits in Ohaji/Egbema, Imo. May 25: Bandits killed one and kidnapped one in Sabon Birni, Sokoto. May 26: Gunmen killed one police officer in Oshimili North, Delta. May 26: Boko Haram kidnapped "some" (estimated at ten) in Kaga, Borno. May 26: Police officers killed five bandits in Batsari, Katsina. May 26: Land grabbers killed two in Ado-Odo/Ota, Ogun. May 27: Herdsmen killed thirty-six in Katsina-Ala LGA and seven in Gwer West LGA in Benue. May 27: Herdsmen killed twelve in Gassol LGA and two in Bali LGA in Taraba. May 27: Security operatives killed seven Eastern Security Network (ESN) members in Eleme, Rivers. May 27: Bandits killed three while two bandits were also killed in Giwa LGA, bandits killed four in Igabi LGA, and bandits killed one in Chikun LGA in Kaduna. May 28: Bandits killed twenty across the Wushishi and Lavun LGAs in Niger State. May 28: Three police officers and two attackers were killed during an assault on a police station in Ukwuani, Delta. May 28: Nigerian troops killed ten Boko Haram militants in Kala/Balge, Borno. May 28: Gunmen killed five soldiers in Ihiala, Anambra. May 28: A Boko Haram attack in Diffa, Niger resulted in the deaths of three militants, four Nigerien soldiers, and four civilians. May 28: Kidnappers abducted "many" (estimated at ten) around Kachia LGA, Kaduna.
  • Nigeria
    Islamic State in West Africa Now Dominates in Northeast Nigeria
    The Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) has announced that it has replaced Abubakar Shekau with Abu Musab al-Barnawi. Abu Musab "takes over all territories that were under Shekau. The immediate replacement of Shekau was a major revenge against the former Boko Haram leader that exhibited ‘highhandedness and ruthlessness’ against humanity in the Northeast." The announcement also included that ISWA had arrested thirty top commanders that were loyal to Shekau. It appears that ISWA has absorbed Shekau's faction. A credible hypothesis is that the thirty commanders "arrested" will either switch allegiance to Abu Musab or be killed, with the former alternative the more likely. ISWA is already the larger fighting force: in February 2019 it was estimated to boast around two to three times more fighters (3,500-5,000) than Shekau’s faction (1,500-2,000). It should be noted that there is still no definitive evidence that Shekau is dead. The Nigerian government has been careful to say that it is still investigating; no corpse, or even a picture of a corpse that might serve as proof of death, has been found. That said, there has been no statement by Shekau's supporters that he is still alive. It remains to be seen whether this apparent consolidation of Boko Haram factions will make the movement more lethal and dangerous to the Nigerian state. Shekau's displacement or demise raises the question of what group now hold the more than one hundred Chibok schoolgirls that remain in captivity. It is to be hoped that there might be some movement toward their release.
  • United States
    Why a Commission Should Investigate the U.S. Capitol Attack
    Far too little is known about how the January 6, 2021, attack on the U.S. Capitol happened. A bipartisan investigation should address this, to dispel falsehoods and to help prevent such an assault from happening again.
  • Nigeria
    Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: May 15–21
    Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from May 15 to May 21, 2021. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     May 15: Herdsmen killed three and a police officer killed one in Guma, Benue. May 15: Gunmen killed four in Khana, Rivers. May 15: Herdsmen killed three in Keana, Nassarawa. May 15: Police officers killed four gunmen and one nurse in Oyigbo, Rivers. May 16: Gunmen killed three police officers during an attack on a police station in Aniocha South, Delta. May 16: Communal violence resulted in three deaths in Ayamelum, Anambra. May 16: Herdsmen killed four in Gwer West, Benue. May 16: Sectarian violence resulted in sixteen deaths in Bali, Taraba. May 16: Police officers killed four robbers in Ethiope East, Delta. May 16: Nigerian troops killed forty Boko Haram militants in Konduga, Borno. May 17: Gunmen killed two police officers during an attack on a police station in Umuahia South, Abia. May 17: Bandits killed three soldiers and kidnapped two expatriates while two bandits were also killed in Magama, Niger State. May 17: Bandits killed eight and kidnapped eleven in Kachia, Kaduna. May 17: Sectarian violence resulted in two deaths in Edu, Kwara. May 18: Kidnappers abducted a Shariah Court judge in Safana, Katsina. May 18: Bandits killed one and kidnapped twenty-one in Batsari, Katsina. May 18: "Hoodlums" set two Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) officers on fire in Ebonyi and Ezza North Local Government Areas (LGAs) in Ebonyi. May 18: Bandits killed nine and kidnapped eighteen in Maru, Zamfara. May 19: Bandits killed eight while troops killed three bandits in Chikun, Kaduna. May 19: Herdsmen kill three in Igabi, Kaduna. May 19: Gunmen killed one police officer in Owerri North, Imo. May 19: Communal violence led to three deaths in Odukpani, Cross River. May 19: During an attack by the Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) on a Boko Haram base, there was a gunfight that led to a number of deaths followed by Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau allegedly blowing himself up along with high-ranking members of ISWA (estimated at twenty total) in Gwoza, Borno. May 19: Bandits killed three and kidnapped twenty in Suleja, Niger State. May 19: Bandits killed eight while troops killed three bandits in Chikun, Kaduna. May 20: Bandits killed five in Kontagora, Niger State. May 20: Gunmen killed one Catholic priest and kidnapped another in Malumfashi, Katsina. May 20: Gunmen killed two in Igabi LGA, one in Giwa LGA, and one in Jema'a LGA in Kaduna. May 21: Robbers killed one police officer and one other in Umuahia North, Abia. May 21: Gunmen killed nine in Makurdi, Benue. May 21: Gunmen killed two Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corps (NSCDC) officers in Anambra East, Anambra. May 21: A cult clash led to eight deaths in Esit Eket, Akwa Ibom.
  • Nigeria
    Nigerian Terrorist Abubakar Shekau: Dead or Alive—and Does it Matter?
    Multiple Nigerian media outlets reported last week that Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau has died or been mortally wounded in a confrontation with fighters from the Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA), a group that separated from Shekau’s Boko Haram in 2016. The Nigerian government has not confirmed the reports and is investigating. The caution is well-placed: Shekau has been reported dead at least four times since he became the leader of Boko Haram in 2009 following the police killing of founder Mohammed Yusuf. This time, however, the reports have more credibility. The story is that ISWA fighters tracked down Shekau, killed his fighters, and then demanded that he swear allegiance to Abu Musab al-Barnawi, the head of ISWA. After a fruitless parley, so the story goes, Shekau tried to kill himself—and some within ISWA leadership—using a suicide vest. Another version has it that he shot himself in the chest, and a few of his followers escaped with the badly wounded Shekau, living to fight another day. The split [PDF] between ISWA and Shekau's faction in 2016 was over Shekau's brutality against other Muslims and his use of child suicide bombers. Otherwise, the goals of the two were the same: destruction of the secular state, creation of a polity based on Islamic law, and the end of Western influence. Since the split, relations between the two factions have varied. Shekau was the recognized successor to Yusuf, while al-Barnawi was the latter's son. Sometimes, they appear to have cooperated tactically. Of late, however, relations have been murderous. That ISWA tracked down Shekau and sought to compel him to accept al-Barnawi's leadership is credible, as is that the erratic Shekau chose suicide instead. Assuming Shekau is, indeed, dead, what difference will it make? ISWA has become the much stronger and better organized of the two factions. It trumpets its ties to the Islamic State (IS) group and cooperates with other jihadi groups under the IS umbrella active in the Sahel. ISWA could well absorb Shekau's jihadi fighters. Shekau's faction appeared focused on Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin while ISWA has looked further beyond its borders. If ISWA is able to establish dominance over the various jihadi factions across the Sahel, it will become more formidable than Shekau's faction was and a greater threat to the fragile states in the neighborhood. Shekau was a monster, known for his brutal executions that he publicized, his use of women and children as suicide bombers, and his wholesale kidnapping: he orchestrated the kidnapping of the Chibok schoolgirls, more than a hundred of whom remain in captivity. He mastered the politics of terror. He was charismatic and erratic with some education: he deliberately misquoted Abraham Lincoln. He was also a religious leader and drew on the well of Islamic grievance in northern Nigeria to produce a belief system largely regarded as a perversion of Salafist-inflected Islam but one which has spread in the Sahel.
  • Nigeria
    Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: May 8–14
    Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from May 8 to May 14, 2021. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     (March 23–April 2 and April 19–May 3: Nigerian troops reported that they killed fifty-three bandits in and around Maradun, Zamfara.) May 8: Gunmen killed six police officers during an attack on a police station in Ini, Akwa Ibom. May 8: Bandits killed three in Jema'a, Kaduna. May 8: Bandits killed eleven in Safana, Katsina. May 9: Gunmen killed two police officers during an attack on a police station in Essien-Udium, Akwa Ibom. May 9: Gunmen killed five in Ekwusigo, Anambra. May 9: A Nigerian soldier killed one civilian in Gusau, Zamfara. May 10: Bandits kidnapped forty from a mosque in Jibia, Katsina; thirty were rescued immediately. May 10: Police killed three kidnappers in Oredo, Edo. May 10: Kidnappers abducted a pastor from his church in Akure, Ondo. May 10: Herdsmen killed one in Iwajowa, Oyo. May 10: A cult clash resulted in ten deaths in Bakassi, Cross River. May 11: Bandits killed one police officer in Sokoto, Sokoto. May 11: Nigerian troops repelled a Boko Haram attack, killing nine militants in Maiduguri, Borno. May 11: Kidnappers abducted two in Akoko North-West, Ondo. May 11: Gunmen killed two in Ife North, Osun. May 12: Gunmen killed one police officer during an attack on a police station in Etim Ekpo, Akwa Ibom. May 12: Pirates killed two in Mbo, Akwa Ibom. May 12: Security operatives killed two gunmen in Obowo, Imo. May 13: Customs officers killed five civilians in Iseyin, Oyo. May 13: Herdsmen killed eleven in Bali, Taraba. May 13: The Nigerian Air Force killed "several" (estimated at twenty total) in Chikun and Birnin-Gwari Local Government Areas in Kaduna. May 13: A cult clash resulted in eight deaths in Esit Eket, Akwa Ibom. May 14: Gunmen killed one in Port Harcourt, Rivers.
  • State and Local Governments (U.S.)
    Confronting Extremism at the Municipal Level
    Play
    Andy Berke, former mayor of Chattanooga, Tennessee, and Sasha Havlicek, cofounder and chief executive officer of the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD), discussed how organizations like ISD’s Strong Cities Network are equipping local leaders with the data, tools and capacities needed to combat extremism. Learn more about CFR’s State and Local Officials Initiative.   TRANSCRIPT   FASKIANOS:  Thank you. Welcome to the Council on Foreign Relations State and Local Officials Webinar. I’m Irina Faskianos, vice president of the National Program and Outreach at CFR. We’re delighted to have participants from forty-eight U.S. states and territories with us today for this conversation. Thank you for taking the time to join us. This discussion is on the record. As you know, CFR is an independent and nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher focusing on US foreign policy. CFR is also the publisher of Foreign Affairs magazine. Through our State and Local Officials Initiative, we serve as a resource on international issues affecting the priorities and agendas of state local governments by providing analysis on a wide range of policy topics. So we’re pleased to have with us today, Andy Berke and Sasha Havlicek. We previously shared their bios, so I’ll just give you a few highlights. Andy Berke served as mayor of Chattanooga, Tennessee from 2013 to April 2021. In 2015, Mayor Berke was named municipal leader of the year by American City and County magazine for his leadership following a domestic terror attack in the city. From 2007 to 2012, he served as state senator for Tennessee’s tenth district in the Tennessee Senate. So thank you, Mayor Berke for being with us. Sasha Havlicek is a cofounder and CEO of the Institute for Strategic Dialogue. She specializes in conflict resolution, extremism and digital information operations, she serves as the advisor to the UK Counter Extremism Commission, and the mayor of London’s counter extremism campaign. In 2015, the Institute for Strategic Dialogue established the Strong Cities Network to mount a city-led response to hate, polarization, and extremism. So thank you both for being with us. Sasha, I’m going to first start with you. I think it would be helpful if you could define what we or what you or what we mean by extremism, and really give that some a definition. And then we can go from there to talk about how Strong Cities Network help cities cope with extremism ideology. And Sasha, you’re muted. HAVLICEK: Of course. Every one of these webinars has to start with somebody speaking on mute. Apologies. Irina, I want to say thank you, for us, to you and to CFR. It’s a wonderful opportunity to speak to all of you today, I’m very, very grateful. I’m thrilled to see Andy Berke, who’s a great leader and has been an important pillar of the Strong Cities Network. You’ve asked me to start by giving you my definition of extremism, I say mine, I mean, it’s the Institute’s definition of extremism, these definitions vary. But I think that the core elements of this definition hold, and that is, extremism is a belief. It is a worldview, if you like, that posits the supremacy, the superiority of one in-group over all outgroups, and advocates, the dehumanization of that outgroup and ultimately advocates for political and social change, in line with that worldview. And I think that those components are very important to understand, it isn’t just a prejudice that you hold privately. It really is the advocacy of political and social change to reflect this supremacist worldview. As such, it is antithetical to human rights to universal human rights, it is antithetical to cohesion, and indeed, to democratic civic culture. It is therefor problem. It is not to be to be muddled with radical behavior or views, or, or just the idea of somehow—be that you know, things on the fringe. You can have extremism, of course, take hold across an entire society. And we’ve seen that, of course, in terrible parts of history around the world. I don’t know if you’d like me to say a couple of words about the trends that we’ve seen in extremism through our research in the U.S., and perhaps internationally over the recent period. With the incidents around the sixth of January, of course, very fresh in people’s minds. I think it’s important to say, you know, we’ve been we’ve been researching, analyzing, and innovating both policy and operational responses to extremism now since 2006, at the Institute. And what we’ve seen is really a wholesale transformation of the extremist ecosystem and threat since that time. What were once a disparate parochial, primarily small scale, often violent, set of street groups of Trump’s transformed into a fully transnational, tech-savvy, large-scale online subculture. A set of subcultures able to translate, quite effectively, their online mobilization into real-world action, offline action and successfully coordinate around key political objectives. And we see this sort of sharing increasingly of a common worldview, not only representing local struggles and issues, but a sort of existential battle for survival and supremacy. And I think it is important to say, you know, that a broad church emerged, what we saw come out on the day—on the sixth was, was evidence of a set of trends. We see this broad church emerging a coalition building, across a fairly broad ideological spectrum. And we’ve seen that coalition building happened, for instance, in Charlottesville, in Kenosha, then at the Capitol. And, you know, coalescing with with very specific political goals in mind. COVID, I should say, was a terrible crucible in a way for the expansion of the audience for disinformation and hate. It became a vector for a mass of disinformation online related to COVID itself, vaccination, and we’ve seen that full spectrum. But of course, QAnon that—we’ve been watching QAnon since 2017—that QAnon burst onto the scene at scale, in March of last year, really coinciding with the onset of COVID. And you see, the growth of the QAnon networks and related conspiracy networks really become a vector for the expansion of the sort of outreach, if you like, by extremist actors into much more mainstream constituencies. And QAnon was very effective with pastel Q, and various campaigns like “save the children”, and getting to much, much broader audiences, if you’d like, to reach well beyond the hardcore of the extremist ecosystem. Their communications have shifted. It’s important to understand this courses for courses they’ve consciously brand cleansed when speaking to the normies when trying to reach out to constituencies that aren’t necessarily bought into a fully extremist worldview. And they’ve adapted their language around broader grievances and political issues: political correctness, free speech, and so on. So they’re very consciously looking at ways in which to communicate to wider, wider audiences. And then I think it’s important to understand that what we’ve seen is really a hybridized threat landscape, it is no longer coherent to talk just about extremist actors, without understanding the interplay of conspiracy networks, as I’ve just mentioned, but also disinformation networks, including state actors. Where we’ve seen, increasingly, the online, through information operations, the online boosting, if you like, of, of extremism, of hate, in a way as to as to cause division essentially designed to stoke aggression and division, among constituencies. And we’ve seen some of this happen, of course, with the Kremlin playbook. What we see other state actors also come into this into this space. And then of course, that grab bag of tactics we came to associate with the Kremlin. All of the online grab bag of those tactics, that the tactics that the false accounts, the false networks, amplifying this type of content, in a massive way to millions of people. That grab bag is now in everybody’s hands, we see extremist actors use disinformation, to get their messages out again to wider audiences and distort the playing field, the information playing field online. And of course, that brings me finally just to the role of the internet and social media platforms, which I hope we can come to and speak to. But here we see, you know, not only extremists being able to deploy and reach further and faster than ever before, and commercialize hate and fund for hate. We did a big piece of research on how seventy-three hate groups across the U.S. were using online fundraising platforms, commercialization, to fund their activities. But it’s also that the technology on these social media platforms essentially amplifies, algorithmically amplifies extreme messaging, as you see this big, big amplification. And in the end, what we see is a set of trends around, obviously, a rise in violence. I mean, this is very clear, we’ve seen not just a rise terrorism and globally speaking, there’s been a 250% rise in religiously and ethnically motivated terrorism internationally over the last five years. You see that reflected, of course in a U.S. context where law enforcement and the DHS have identified that type of extremism as a number one threat. But you also see hate crime in like 2019, I think was the peak in recorded hate crimes across the United States. And of course, we’ve seen now this recent bout, which is really, really terrible of hate crimes of violence, of course, massively on the rise. But it’s important to know that that violence is coming from across the ideological spectrum that I just talked about. It isn’t just ostensibly violent groups. And it isn’t just from groups, there is a kind of post-organizational terrorism appearing, where you see people inspired to terrorism inspired to acts of violence that aren’t necessarily card carrying members of groups. And so prescription—purely prescription based group based responses are going to be challenged in that sense. And then, of course, I think it’s important to remember that the real impact here, beyond violence, has been a social impact: polarization. Polarization has really been, you know, in a way, the major fallout from this massive transformation of the operational and communications tactics of these extremist groups today. FASKIANOS:  Thank you so much, Sasha. That was really very rich. Let’s go now. Mayor Berke, can you talk about the spectrum of policies and programming, and acted as mayor to confront extremism in Chattanooga? And maybe you could also give your definition of extremism as you saw it through the prism of a mayor. BERKE:  Sure, thanks, Irina, and appreciate the Council on Foreign Relations allowing me to say a few words on this and really have learned a lot from Sasha and the Institute over these last several years. So I think it’s, you know, listen, I’m American, patriotic, and, you know, we do have this rich history of people talking about extremism in our country. Barry Goldwater, of course, famously said extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice. We understand that there are people who are always going to be pushing for change, and to make sure that our country improves, that’s part of the, the natural course of the United States. But there is a different type of dialogue that is out there now. That is extremism that seeks to alienate people from society that seeks to tear apart the social fabric that people, like me and mayors across the country and council people who are on this call, are trying to build. That frequently tries, as well as pulling apart our society to polarize it, can also lead to violent acts. And that is the kind of extremism that at least for me, I have spent these last several years thinking a lot about and trying to combat. And I think it’s worthwhile to say a few minutes about why this has reached the mayor of Chattanooga. And I remember back in June of 2015, watching one of my idols Joe Riley as a guy named Dylann Roof had had walked into Mother Emanuel church in Charleston and shot nine people and killed nine people and think to myself: how can he even be up there going through this. And then roughly a month later, we had our own terrorism attack in Chattanooga that was inspired by hate. Just as Sasha was talking about, this was a person who had been inspired by ISIS, was not a quote card carrying member of it, but had been led down this extremist path, watching videos online, killed four marines and a sailor at a naval operations support center in our community. As a result of that, you know, we started thinking more proactively, not just about how we combat extremism, but also how we network across communities. Because then Orlando happened and El Paso and we can keep the list going on, there’s been on shootings, there’s been more than one mass shooting average per day in the United States this year. And then we know what’s happening with Asian-American crime and hate crimes right now, you know. We needed to take action, and the Strong Cities Network was the platform that I saw that provided us the best opportunity to learn from others, and then to do things ourselves. So one of the one of the lessons that I learned was that we needed to we had had a number of things that were going right to try to promote inclusion, and to have a society that was cohesive, but we also needed a platform, for example, to, to really speak out against the hate that I saw forming in our, in our society, and particularly after Charlottesville. My family, I come from a family that were refugees, just two generations ago, saw, you know, came to this country to be part of a better society. And then I saw in Charlottesville, people walking down the street with tiki torches, and really felt moved to act, not just with this international group, but to act locally, as well. So we started a Council Against Hate, it was to examine policies, to educate, to make sure that we could, that we could help those who were working in these areas, for example, in the education system. So we’d have speakers come in, we change policies, we gave toolkits out to those who wanted to act and to speak out against hate. And just to give you like a small example of the kinds of things that that we would do. We would change small policies like anytime that there was a hate incident reported, we would always do a follow up from the police department, with a detective-level person coming out there to show that this was an elevated type of occurrence in our city. And also to make sure that the target of that knew how seriously that we took it, we provided opportunities when there was an incident of, of a public official in our community, who was espousing hate, the leaders of the Council Against Hate spoke out and said, here, here’s why this is wrong in our community. So there are lots of different things that we can do as local officials. But I think it goes back actually, to that really important first question that that we were trying to establish is, what is extremism? And how are we going to combat it? And I think there actually is a positive and a negative side of this, the negative side being we have to speak out and say why hate is wrong. And then we also need that piece that is how do we build a cohesive society that is inclusive and welcomes everybody, because right now, we are talking about a lot in our country about right-wing extremism, it’s obviously a huge issue. But we have all kinds of extremism, and we need to make sure that people are not alienated in our communities and feel part of the fabric that that we’re building. FASKIANOS:  Right. And I think that is, you know, how can we talk about, and leaders, local leaders and you know, talk about extremism without appearing partisan or alienating the other side? Because as you pointed out, you know, we are, the focus right now is really due to, you know, January sixth, and this this talk, it seems to be alienating one side. So how do we move beyond that and talk about it. It’s all of our problems, and it’s not pitting people against each other? BERKE:  Well, the first thing to acknowledge is that that is actually more challenging than then it should be. I started Council Against Hate now, what could be less controversial than a Council Against Hate? That just sounds like something that people should be in favor of. And yet there was a relatively mainstream group that was operational in our in our community that took nonstop pot shots at talking about how terrible it was that we had a Council Against Hate. And that was entirely, in my opinion generated by a partisan type of view that actually being against hate was—I’m a Democrat let’s go on and say what it is that I was a Democrat—that my view of trying to combat hate was a partisan issue to go after the Republican Party, which is, of course, nonsense, it’s nonsense. I got plenty of other issues that I can, you know, disagree with people about hate is something that tears at the fabric of our community, and makes it harder for all of us, Democrats, Republicans, independents, to live in a place that we enjoy. So, um, you know, for me, you know, we mobilize religious leaders. We mobilize community leaders. We ensure that, that people across the religious spectrum, were able to speak out and, and by the way, never made it a partisan issue to say that everyone in our community has the right to, to be free from hate, and to be feel included in in our society. And we did everything that we could. Now the truth is that it is that there are still some people who are going to listen to those forces, but I know of no other way to, to work on this, than just to do the things that we need to do, and to be genuine and sincere, and then hope in the long run, that helps us get past this partisan divide. FASKIANOS:  And Sasha, can you talk about the lessons that Strong Cities Network learned, has learned, you know, at the global level, and then the work that you’ve been doing with cities in the U.S.? And how you are helping local leaders to track polarization and extremist extremism, discourses in their communities? HAVLICEK: Absolutely. And and I should say, actually putting this into the context of a global network, you very quickly see, of course, that you’re dealing with many different forms of extremism. And what we try to do is provide support to local leadership, local authorities, and communities. Both to understand what those dynamics are of polarization or indeed, of extremist mobilization in whichever ideological context they emerge. And, and to provide them with toolkits to help prevent, and then mitigate those problems once they see once they see extremism take hold in some way. Ultimately, this is about building a kind of public health perspective on violence prevention, so I don’t think it’s too late. We mustn’t exceptionalize this work too much. I mean, this is when you bring it down to the nuts and bolts of what you do locally, you’re creating a framework for local prevention of violence. And that is across the spectrum, just to your point about not politicizing this too much. And maybe I say just a couple of words about the Strong Cities Network and how it’s emerged and what it what it’s done. And then maybe some of the resources that are available for, for U.S. partners, as we now think about rolling this out in a U.S. context. And we’d love to get feedback and thoughts from your guests here. I had, as I said, you know, we’ve been working on understanding and responding to extremism for many, many years. But what we realized quickly was that, you know, beyond the national conversation, policy conversation, cities and their communities were really at the coalface of this challenge, and needed to be supported better, and enabled to lead the charge on turning the tide on these threats. Not least because actually, they were able to de-politicize some of this work in a more effective way. And we had started to work with local authorities across Europe. I had the privilege of then working with Eric Rosand now now the interim director of the SCN, who was then at the State Department, which spearheaded we launched together at the UN General Assembly in 2015 with twenty-five global mayors, the Strong Cities Network. Wow this is the first global network of its kind dedicated really to powering solutions at a local level to these rising tides of extremism and polarization. It’s now a network of over 145 cities in more than forty-five countries spanning every major global region. And it’s delivering tools, the training, the resources, and on-the-ground programming and support to cities and their communities to build response. Now we’ve engaged and trained over five thousand professionals and community leaders, 750 city officials, we’ve worked with over one hundred mayors. So it’s been a very interesting learning journey. But I can just say, a couple of things that I think one of my colleagues might be able to post a little bit of information about, there’s a five year anniversary video that says a little bit about the achievements of the network and a brochure that maybe she can post in the chat. But number one, its data—data for cities. So we combine digital state of the art digital analysis with on-the-ground research to really provide local leaders and practitioners with evidence, you know, evidence-based recommendations for how to go about doing their local planning work. And this gives you really an insight into both on and offline how, how these problems might be mobilizing. This has been particularly important in the context of, for instance, COVID, where you’ve seen this, you know, expansion of, of those threats. The second thing is local infrastructure for prevention. And this is a kind of whole of society response, a model for facilitating partnerships between the local authority, the community frontline services, and it is that sort of local prevention framework and network that we now have a model for building that I think it’s so vital for work in the U.S. on this. This is multi—sort of team building at a local level, multi-sectoral engagement of the sort that Andy’s just been talking about. That gives you then an opportunity to respond to whatever threat you might be seeing. And that is the entity then through which you can do so much programming, whether it’s prevention or interventions at the sharp tip of the problem. And we offer expert services and training and on all sorts of, you know, key topics from rehabilitation and reintegration of those that have already radicalized, psycho-social support, youth engagement, digital resilience, strategic communications, monitoring, evaluation. I think it’s important, we built some tools for cities that really work from the real world, you know, on building the how to. So for instance, a post-incident response toolkit, building from the experiences of our mayors of our cities, in dealing with, for instance, terrorist attacks or hate crimes. How the step-by-step how to respond to that in a way that de-escalates the problem,  that enables cohesion to be established, and that protects the victims. And so again, there’s some really interesting resources there. There’s an online hub, where you can find those resources. And, again, the evolving resources, a COVID-19 resource center for cities. So really looking at the threats now. And the challenges these are augmented threats that cities are facing. And finally, it’s this sort of interconnection of local leadership. That exchange piece is so important, we’ve seen so much happen because of exchanges, really international exchanges, but also domestic exchanges. Partnerships between Montreal in Canada and Dakar in Senegal, which saw exchanges between police, youth leaders, and city officials. Seen as a model adapted for frontline prevention training that was developed in Canada, but adapted to this vibrant youth volunteer network in Senegal. You’ve seen these kinds of exchanges inspire models in in various different places. And as we look forward, really, I think the aim is to look at how across the U.S. all the amazing good practice that’s being done at a local level, gets a spotlight on it gets shared, gets distilled and shared in a in an effective way across the U.S.. And there’s a number of things I think that can happen now, to bring this whole of society approach, especially in the aftermath now of January the sixth and the new administration’s drive to support this whole of society approach and to address this threat. There is, I think, a unique opportunity in the U.S.. And I think especially now with Secretary Mayorkas’s announcement in February that the DHS will provide at least $77 million to city and other sub-national jurisdictions across the country to protect against domestic violence, extremism, there will be real means by which to do some of this work at a local level. FASKIANOS:  Thank you. Mayor Berke, the U.S. Conference of Mayors—is such an important group and really mobilized to take on the challenge of climate—was extremism, while you were there, was that sort of coming into onto the agenda? And what other mayors were you cooperating, you know, what other cities were the cities that you were cooperating with, to sort of build exchange best practices and, you know, come together? BERKE:  So the U.S. Conference of Mayors is absolutely leading out there on the these issues. And, you know, the sad fact is that that it has to, we don’t have a lot of choices. I remember maybe it was two years ago, two or three years ago, I was on a panel at the U.S. Conference of Mayors about mass shootings. And I think there were there were nine of us. And just to look down colleagues, people whose phone numbers I had in my phone, you know, and to know that it didn’t go very far, because he had Pittsburgh and Chattanooga and Orlando, and San Jose, and again, El Paso, you keep going, many of these motivated by hate and extremism. And so the U.S. Conference is responding well, to the, to the needs of the of the members. And I would guess, although, you know, I became mayor in 2013, I can’t say for sure. But, you know, you have these kind of twin problems of both mass shootings, and then hate violence, which sometimes, but not always overlap. And the U.S. Conference has had to take that on as one of its issues, because the members are having to deal with it every day. So Sasha is talking about how the federal government is now responding. One of the—I mean, it is absolutely terrific that the federal government is having is leading on this issue, but it’s also responding to the needs that it sees from local leaders like those who are on this call, who are saying: we need more tools, we need more knowledge, we need more data about what’s actually going on. And the city to city interactions are really important. And so Sasha was talking about this, and and I know, at least I worked with a guy at the State Department named Mike Duffina lot. He connected as well as Sasha, they connected us with, with some of the Arhaus model of what they were doing in Denmark. Or some of the interventions that police were doing in The Netherlands, when they found people who had been radicalized or some of the interventions that a nonprofit was doing in Australia to deal with mostly, or purely, young men, who had been alienated from society had been radicalized. And they were trying to, basically, do heavy duty social work, to pull them back into to the mainstream of society. Listen, not all those things are directly transferable to the U.S., but I can see the principles and thought a lot about the principles underlying them. And how do I take that and make something that can work in my own city? And so dealing with you know, yeah, Bill Peduto in Pittsburgh, and Buddy Dyer in Orlando, and Greg Fischer in Louisville, and Nan Whaley in Dayton, Ohio. Those are the kinds of conversations that we have, you know, both formally and also informally, when we’re at a conference together to say, kind of what are the things that you’re doing? How do we do this? And I think the important part about trying to do more of this in the U.S. is we need to, we need to formalize those so that they’re, they’re occurring more regularly with purpose and direction. HAVLICEK: Just to add to that, I find my I mean, the, you know, Strong Cities Network has done some work and interacted with with over a dozen cities. We have members in the U.S. and it’s been wonderful to work, you know, as Andy said, with Orlando, with San Diego, with Louisville, with Chattanooga, with Pittsburgh, with L.A.. And we keep getting requests for assistance from across the U.S. from cities that are facing some of these challenges. And we have actually been privileged to have a very strong working relationship with U.S. Conference of Mayors and set up a working group on hate and hate, responses to hate at a local level with a number of the mayor’s from the Strong Cities Network and the U.S. Conference of Mayors and that’s been extremely helpful. I think this is the moment to really formalize and build a network. So that the practices that are now going to be put in place don’t get lost. That we’re not reinventing the wheel. That there is an opportunity to really learn from across the U.S., but also from international practices, some of which, as I said, in terms of the principles in terms of the approaches can be quite informative. And I think that there is really an opportunity now, in a U.S. context to do that at scale. FASKIANOS:  Right, I’m going to go to questions and from all of you. So if you want to raise your hand, you can raise your hand clicking on the icon, or you can type your question in the Q&A box. And just be sure to unmute yourself. Sasha’s colleague put a lot of resources in the Q&A box, we’re going to copy those over to the chat. And we will also share them out after this. So you don’t have to worry. We will, we will circulate them so that you can dig into them at your convenience and share them with your colleagues. That is the point of this. Alright, so there are a few written questions. I’m going to ask from Gail Patterson Gladney, and she asked do counties or cities, townships that have diversity, inclusion and equity programs/departments have less problems with extremism? BERKE: Sasha may add, but let me let me let me say, first, that that’s a great question and an empirical one, that I don’t I don’t know the answer to. I think, for me, I’m not sure we seen some of those, especially some of the DEI work over the last few years, we probably need to give it some more time to be effective. But I do think that what I have seen, again, then Sasha can say if she has some data on this. Is that the cities who are proactively thinking about how to be inclusive, and how to ensure that they build this social cohesion piece are more successful in combating hate around the around the globe and in the U.S. And, and that’s why I think these conversations are important it is it may be DEI, there may be other things that that you’re doing. But as long as you are thinking about and looking for ways to promote the inclusion of more people into the broader society that has that has got to be helpful for you in the long run. The real the real question is always—and this comes back, Irina, to the question you asked earlier is—how do you ensure that that work doesn’t get politicized? That you it’s, it’s seen as genuine and sincere and about everybody. So that, that you can make sure you could do this. I’ll tell you, when we had our terrorism attack in the U.S., in Chattanooga. One of the things I wrote on the board within a few minutes of that happening for the entire staff was no one will be radicalized as a result of what happened in Chattanooga today. No one. Not, not another young Muslim kid, because we reacted harshly to the Muslim community and not any body in, in our in the rest of our community because they thought that we didn’t care about what was going on or that something. We were going to include everybody in the response and that that kind of overall attitude or worldview of the goal here is to ensure that everybody in our community feels part of the recovery of this and that everybody feels safe. We would say this, everybody in our Muslim community is going to feel safe, like they do not suffer any retribution or do not ever feel any kind of worry about walking down the street. But also we’re going to genuinely ensure that people know that this is important to all of us, and that our entire community is going to recover together from this. You know, there was a lot of we had a great New York Times article about our response. There was a lot of work, but I think that overall attitude always helps us city. FASKIANOS:  Sasha? HAVLICEK: Yes, I mean, it’s hard to add to that because it’s it’s absolutely right. And I completely agree. But I would say—firstly, it’s such an interesting question, I don’t have any empirical data on it. And I think it would be really interesting thing to, to research properly. What we do know is that cities, communities in which diversity and inclusion programming, if it is done in a way that enables the building out of relationships across the community—and it shouldn’t just be in one part of the community, it really needs to be across the community. Those relationships work in a number of ways. And they work both to be able to give insights into any changes into any developments that may ultimately lead to extremist mobilization. If you have your ear on the ground, and you’re talking to community members, whether it’s whether it’s schools, whether it’s parents associations, whether it’s religious leaders in in whichever shape or form, you’re more able to know what may be emerging as a set of threats and challenges. Now, we tend to complement that work that on-the-ground outreach and engagement research work as a baseline for any community with online work now, because so much of this mobilization to extremism happens, of course, in these in these subcultures online. And it’s important to understand what they look like, and whether they in fact, are targeting your community in any specific way. And there are ways to track, you know, localized engagements online, as well as the sort of more generalized engagements and the overlaying of that data, I think, can be very important. Those communities that have good infrastructure, built out with the communities are also in a much better position, as Andy has said, to respond, if there is an attack, whether it’s a hate crime or anything of that kind. They’re able to mitigate what can be an escalating event in a much more in a much more effective way. And to those questions that I see about, you know, whether then culture and art and all of these things can be used? Absolutely. I think, you know, creating a positive environment for a community, a community where people do feel a sense of belonging and other things. Those things are absolutely critical in, in every part of extremist research, you see that belonging, a sense of disenfranchisement, a sense of a lack of belonging, these sorts of things, play a part in as one of many, many influential aspects to that radicalization process. So, yes, that broader space, I think, is absolutely critical. But of course, then there is, you know, if you do find that people are progressing down a pathway to radicalization, there are very specific things that a community can do in terms of early interventions to prevent somebody going from radicalization to violence. And the community infrastructure that I talked about, those prevention frameworks are essentially set up as multi-sector networks in order to be able to both spot that potential transition that somebody may be going through, and then to essentially enable case management in a way that brings the relevant services to the table, whether it’s education, social services, or indeed police, in a way that can prevent that stemming into an attack of some kind or violence. Psychosocial support is really, really important here. And bringing the community to the table in some inclusive way around that is also really important here. So there are indeed, models for how to go about doing that prevention work at a local. FASKIANOS:  Fantastic. Um, so I was gonna call on Danielle Brazell, but she did put her hand down. And I don’t know if you want to ask the first part of your question, Danielle, if you want to unmute yourself. Q:  Sure, sure. And I really appreciate the question—answering the question around the role that arts culture can play as part of a belonging strategy because I run the cultural department for the City of Los Angeles. So my, my appreciation to you for that. But I think the first part of my question, and forgive me, but I did miss the first few minutes of the of the session, but what would you identify as the top three to four primary drivers of extremism? And of course, I put some examples in there. You know, is it our algorithms? Is it our biased media? Or and how do these factors kind of contribute to that rise in and maybe it’s also, you know, we’re seeing an unprecedented population shift in this country and mass migration as a result of some pretty intense causes for mass migration. So I just, I thought I’d throw that out there. And again, thanks for lifting up the role that culture and creativity can play in creating human to human contact and belonging for any local community. And Mayor Berke, I’d love to hear what you’ve done in Chattanooga on that front. HAVLICEK:I think just in terms of the drivers there, you know, this is very complex, and there’s always multiple drivers. And they’re not all the same for each individual, obviously. But there are, I’d say, push factors and pull factors, broadly speaking. Push factors can be a set of both personal and social grievances. And we do see people turn to turn to violence, ultimately, disproportionately affected by some kind of incident of personal grief. Or, you know, issues that may have a mental health ramifications. So there are interventions that happen, of course, across the across the public health space that I think can be quite important early on. But it isn’t just that. There are social grievances, often. A lack of feeling of lack of belonging, a feeling of a community no longer having the standing that it might have once had a feeling threatened by others, by outsiders, by changes that may have been happening locally, internationally, and narratives that are built around that. But I think all of that doesn’t translate into the kind of the kind of mass extremism that we’ve seen on the rise, without social mobilization without the pull factor. And that pull factor is a combination of, as I said, the transformation of organizational and communications tactics, to reach wider audiences, to engage, to radicalize and so on, and the means by which that’s being done, which absolutely is, of course, partly the changes that we’ve seen in our information ecosystem. I mentioned the internet, the algorithmic amplification of extreme messaging and polarization. We know that the content that comes closest to the red line in terms of acceptability on the platforms is most likely to be viral. And so you’re starting to reach much, much broader audiences with with a barrage of this kind of, of communication and content, which grabs on to and leverages local grievance, national grievance, wider grievances, turns that into narratives that really, that really mobilize people over time. I hope, I hope that that sort of answers that but there’s a lot more to be said on that. I’d be happy to take that offline. BERKE:  Thanks. And let me let me just add a little bit because I think it gets the two questions are related in a strange way. Listen, we have a toxic stew going of things right now in the U.S., that is causing this extreme polarization, everything from social media and the algorithms that you’re talking about, to the media culture that is that is making money off of division. To leaders who think that it’s in their best interest to get elected to stoke division. And you put those things alongside the personal grievances, which are, which are inherent in every society, and you have a huge toxic stew, that that can lead to extremism and violence. And this is something that really worries me, really worries me for our country. And so, I’ve been thinking a lot, also, to the point about what are the things that bind us together. It’s not just about what tears us apart. And I think that if you think about what binds us together as Americans, there might be fewer of those things as well. We don’t share facts, areas are more different from each other than they ever were in terms of if you live in a place like Los Angeles or you live in rural Tennessee. You know, languages are different. And then you combine that with how we segment every other part on top of income and wealth inequality. So, so what binds us together is weaker and what tears us apart is more active. That is a problem for us. And so I think, you know, things like art and culture are actually one of the things that brings us together. It’s one factor that we can celebrate and listen and enjoy each other’s company in a non-political setting that is often a place where we can learn about other cultures and show empathy for one another. And, and that’s one of the reasons that I believe in in arts and education. And we, you know, we in Chattanooga had a huge public art department. But I, you know, in the long run, we had to continue to have a conversation about how we strengthen those ties on top of, you know, fighting against those pulls that Sasha is talking about that tear us apart. FASKIANOS:  So there are a few questions, comments in the chat, there are a lot. So I’m just going to group a couple there two mayor’s from Tennessee, and from Hillsboro, North Carolina, that are talking about being in small towns, and have very limited capacity and resources. So given that, how you prepare for extremist attacks, if you have limited resources? And then there is another question about talking about counties, counties represent huge swaths of the rural U.S.. These areas are not often talked about, and it’s where extremism and hate is growing. People are being left out left behind not included. So how do we how do you connect with those communities? HAVLICEK:  Irina, may I bring my colleague, Eric Rosand, into the conversation. Eric is the director for the SCN, interim director and has been a leading official at the State Department in the counterterrorism department for many years and knows this very well, and is looking at exactly these questions of how this might roll out in the U.S. Over perhaps to you, Eric. ROSAND: Sure, thank you, for including me. I think that’s the other questions from this small town mayors and people representing county governments, is really important one. And it’s one that I think of when we think about rolling out the Strong Cities Network, the United States, it’s exactly the kind of issue we’re trying to get at. In part, because we’ve seen so many of the bigger cities, we’re able to and quickly mobilize to apply for DHS funding or other federal government funding to initiate programs in this area. But a lot of the smaller communities get left out for various reasons. And that’s actually where more and more of the issues lie. And so our hope is that, by connecting more of these localities and counties to our network, they’ll have access to tools and resources and support that they currently have trouble accessing. And they’ll be able to learn much more from other others around the country facing similar challenges, but also from our network overseas, that many of them representing small towns, many of them representing large sort of rural communities as well. So again, I think it’s just another avenue for this work to grow. And I would just—sort of a little plug here is—would encourage all those mayors and county officials on this call who want to get engaged at a very early stage in what we’re trying to do to somehow get in touch with us, or we’ll get in touch with you to try to get you involved because again, we think that’s sort of a missing piece of the of the problem solution set right now that we’re hoping to try to make a dent in here. HAVLICEK:I just listed, your contact details, Eric and mine in the chat in case any body does want to follow up with us about this. And Andy has done the same. FASKIANOS:  Yes. And thank you for doing that. We will also just so we will circulate and make it really easy for people to contact you. We will circulate your emails after this to everybody on the call because I think it is important. I mean part of this is to connect people and to have access to resources and obviously you you’re bringing so much. Alright, so I’m going to go next to a raised hand. And I’m going to go to that goes. Sorry, keep toggling back and forth is not good. Everybody put down their hands. No, I’m looking. Sorry, all the hands were lowered. Okay, that’s why I can’t find any. So I’m going to go back to, we had like three raised hands, and they’ve all gone down. So there is a question from Stephanie Gandsey. What does an intervention look like when someone is identified as extremist? Who identifies and has the conversation on a local level? I don’t know who wants to take that? BERKE:  Well, I can, I can say, and Eric can get there. There are a lot of different models of how you use this. But often, it is some kind of, hopefully, you have people in your community who are trained and understand how to do this, which is the first step and often difficult is how do you use some kind of case management to deal with people? And what are the what are the types of issues that they face? And how do you help them? But I know, I know, we’re running out of time and just say, think that proactively, kind of think about who that could be. And what are the models that they can use? And how can you train them? Those are the--I put my information in the chat. And I think these are the kinds of things we need to figure out together. And how do you how do you adapt that kind of model to your own community, because obviously, that case management might look a little different in in rural North Carolina than it does and in Chicago. HAVLICEK:And there are absolutely models that can be adapted to different contexts that we would use in terms of those referral systems, case management, the concepts for how to set them up, but also the training for those for those constituencies. And sorry, Eric. ROSAND: I will just add that I think the challenge here is the probably this individual isn’t right for being brought to the police because they haven’t necessarily committed a crime. But the people who might ordinarily be best placed to help this individual might be a little bit nervous. A social worker, or a teacher or community member who is a little concerned about getting too close to quote unquote, an extremist. And so how do you sort of build that trust within the community and understandings in the community on how to actually engage with someone who is on the path towards radicalization of violence without having to refer them to law enforcement. And I think that is the heart of the nub of the of the issue here. And a lot of communities just need sort of the team building, collaboration approach that is often missing, when we’re talking about violent extremism. FASKIANOS:  Right, I’m gonna go next to Jonathan Lewis, who has raised his hand. Q:  First, forgive me, I’m one of the people who raised and lowered and now has raised again. Thank you for you forbearance. So, I’m a trustee of the village of Scarsdale in Westchester County. You’ve raised some really great issues in this presentation. I’ve really appreciated learning about the opportunities for engagement. I think there’s a unique set of challenges for local government, a) due to resource limitations b) the challenge of overcoming the inertia that’s inevitable when you need to collaborate with state, county, and local entities. Right? There’s a lot of budgets to collaborate with, and a lot of different silos to be broken down. And so one, if you could sort of help me think that through a little bit and, and how that may work? And the degree to which the police reform issue in the U.S., either is creating new opportunities for dialogue, or is maybe making people less eager to dialogue because of the political heat around these subjects? Thank you. BERKE: Let me let me start with that. And I think you’re 100% right with with all those pieces. So I think one of the ways that I think about this is that any approach has to be multi-sectoral. And so it’s not just government. It’s also how do you get private industry involved? How do you get nonprofits involved? How do you get the civic sector as part of that? And, and one of the reasons that, that I formed the Council Against Hate was to build a table where lots of people could sit and contribute, and they would be different kinds of people. Well, I will tell you, that that we always struggle with multi-governmental levels, on all kinds of things, not just this. But oftentimes when it comes to public safety, we can try to identify those people who might have the, the best attitude or most in line with what we’re trying to achieve. But if we kind of build a table that has not just us at it, but lots of other types of entities, religious leaders, private sector leaders, and, and civic leaders, then that often helps us to also get other governmental entities involved, as opposed to the other way around. So it doesn’t look like it’s just the mayor’s thing, the city mayor’s thing, the state doesn’t want to do it. You know, whatever we have to we have to broaden that responsibility a little bit to create an opening for people. ROSAND: If I can just add to that, I think it’s a fantastic question, because it just highlights how important a network is because I’m sure there are other local leaders around the country grappling with the same issue, and how to understand and how to work in the space. And because the ability to connect with each other is it would be so important to learn from each other. But also, I would just make one point here is, since 9/11, you’ve seen the concept of joint terrorism task force emerge, obviously, across the United States, where you have federal, state and local officials working together in a task force to counter terrorism. But there hasn’t been the same kind of federal state local collaboration around prevention. And I think what you highlight, Jonathan is a critical gap here. And I think something on your network could help advocate for and promote in this country. This sort of layered prevention task forcing. FASKIANOS:  Fantastic. So, Sasha, you had referenced at the very beginning in your remarks on social platforms. And there are a few questions in the chat, or in the Q&A boxes about how do you handle social media interactions when there are extremist sentiments churning within your community? You know, Jess Kramer says there’s a widely viewed Facebook group in his community or in their community where local government issues are addressed. But also extremist ideologies, and conspiracy theories are pushed by the group’s moderator. As an elected official I had stopped posting information in this group out of fear of legitimizing it. But I also worry about isolating/disenfranchising citizens. They’re coupled. So if you could just sort of talk about that. And yeah, and Mayor Berke, maybe. HAVLICEK:I do think that there’s a real challenge here, because engagement and open conversation is an absolutely critical part of how to deal with some of these challenges. And you know, we do that both in in a one-to-one context. So the types of engagements that have worked in terms of interventions across that radicalization spectrum, with those with extremists have been interventions that aren’t combative. They are human outreach. They seek to understand where these people come from. They look at some of the underlying potential causes. And they seek to have a genuine conversation. Establishing a form of relationship, a mentoring relationship is probably the best way in which to prevent somebody tipping over the edge in terms of violence. And so in many contexts, we have set up that kind of direct human intervention. Sometimes we have worked with former extremists to establish those relationships, and counselors to do that work offline. And we’ve actually transferred some of that work online. And we’ve attempted scaled programs and direct interventions carefully with extremists online with people who repeat post dehumanizing and sometimes violent rhetoric online, to try to engage them in a conversation. And I think that those conversations are important to have. But I think there’s a balance to be struck here. The social media platforms do in fact have rules about violent extremism. And if people are posting or running groups that contain violent extremist content and material that should be reported to the platform. And that should, in fact, come down. If there is a way to use that data, however to do then further outreach, we do direct messaging outreach to those individuals. I think it is important, but it also is important to be honest and clear about your own perspective in those interventions. And while they can be human, I don’t think I think it’s also very important not to legitimize those views. So it’s a delicate balance. Again, there are I think ways in which to train up social services, community groups to do this work in a safe in sort of within the context of sort of risk assessments that get undertaken and to do this in a safe way. And I think that they can have a great deal of impact. So I agree that stopping the conversation entirely is not a good thing. It is important to continue to have human outreach and conversation across those boundaries. BERKE:  Let me just add, that I think misinformation is an incredible threat to our democracy. And something that I’m worried about. I, I have teenage daughters, I tell them that I think that’s one of their generation’s greatest threats that they’re going to have to figure out how to deal with is how do you combat misinformation? And so I, I saw in another question, talking about the First Amendment. And of course, we do have this tradition of free speech constitutionally enshrined. That is part of, of what makes us our country so great. I’ll go back to this idea that to some extent, when you’re talking about people posting misinformation in these groups, and that is that there has to be some shared burden to respond. It can’t just be that government, the elected official, or the city manager, whoever, goes into the group and says, “No, you don’t understand here’s the here’s the deal.” There actually has to be some shared burden between people in the community who say on behalf of the community, we don’t believe that this is the, you know, this is not accurate and this type of information can be harmful to us as we try to build, whatever that language is that’s right for y’all. I would be always be careful of, especially as elected or as government officials, trying to tell people this is the information because typically that that can spur more misinformation and disinformation. But there obviously there can be some of that, but you have to create ways to share that burden across again, religious leaders and private sector leaders and nonprofits and community activists so that they can come in and say, listen, we live in a community where we want to tell the truth, and we want to be respectful. And this is this conversation is isn’t getting us there. FASKIANOS:  Thank you. I’m going to take the last question from Lenard Diggins from Arlington, Mass. Q:  Well, thank you. FASKIANOS:  You’re welcome. Q:  And actually, I thought I, I thought I put my hand down here. But I will go ahead and ask anyways, because I think this might be a little bit out of out of scope. So that’s okay. But in terms of how to make the conversations more inclusive, when one side just inherently doesn’t trust the other and or is afraid of, or afraid of the other. And this isn’t so much an extreme example. But when, for instance, if you have folks who are supporting Black Lives Matter, meaning you want to include the police, but then you get complaints that they we’re afraid of the police representing us, how do you how do you get how do you get the inclusiveness that you need, in order to really create an effective dialogue? HAVLICEK:It’s interesting, because we’ve worked in places as challenging as municipalities in Lebanon, which faced terrible division, you know, sectarian division and conflict. And it is interesting to see how nothing happens overnight. But over a three-year process, we’ve been in a position to establish working relationships across the community with the various services required but across the community and community representation across the across the different communities there. In a way that I think has gone further in establishing local trust than anything that’s happened at a national level. And their ability to flag when things when things are heating up and the effectiveness of that approach, I think has been built further trust. And having spent a decade working in conflict environments, it is I have to say, painstaking work, but absolutely possible. In particular, when there is a more conducive political, national, political, geopolitical environment in which to do that. And I say that just because in certain conflict contexts, you can build very, very strong local relationships that then get knocked by a wider conflict happening. But if that isn’t happening, I think that is doable, but it takes a long time. And it means making sure that you do in fact, have representation from all parts of the community at the table. And then you have them working together on problems. And that joint problem solving, I think makes makes a very big difference over time, but it doesn’t happen immediately. BERKE:  I would just echo what Sasha said. Sorry, Irina, just wrote real quick and say that, you know, that trust building, we have to work hard at it. In the in the police and BLM context, for example, every cadet since 2014, or 15, somewhere around there, has done a marginalized community report as part of their as part of their time in the police academy. So every cadet has to go with has to spend time in a marginalized community and then report back to, in Chattanooga, report back to the larger community about—actually out loud, verbally at a big event—here’s what I learned about people of color, about people with disabilities, whatever it is. To try to build that trust, that we’re talking about. That doesn’t mean that it happens overnight. And, you know, we we think about that every day when the when we had protests every night last summer. You know, I made sure that the police chief called leaders of the of the protest to make sure they understood kind of what was going on and what we were going to do and make sure that those lines of communication. That doesn’t mean those things instantly vanish. But it allows us to try it again, build that table with more people at it, and at least over time, have a community that that people know and trust each other, even if they don’t always agree with with the perspectives. FASKIANOS:  Well, thank you all this was a really terrific conversation. There’s so many unanswered questions. But again, as I said, we will circulate email addresses resources from the Strong Cities Network, so that you can follow up and talk specifically about cases or what’s happening in your community. So Mayor Berke and Sasha, thank you very much for doing this. And Eric, for joining us. We really appreciate it. You can follow Mayor Berke twitter @AndyBerke and the work of Strong Cities Network @Strong_Cities. And of course, you can follow us @CFR_local, you know, email us please, [email protected] with topics that you want to cover on other ways we can support you all. So again, thank you to Mayor Berke, Sasha Havlicek, and Eric Rosand for doing this. We really appreciate it. BERKE: Thank you. HAVLICEK:Thank you so much for having us. (END)