Nonproliferation, Arms Control, and Disarmament

Today, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)—the first treaty to ban an entire class of weapons—marks the 40th anniversary of its entry into force. Reflections on this milestone will examine the BWC’s successes and travails, such as its ratification by 173 countries, its lack of a verification mechanism, and what the future holds. Although not prominent in these discussions, the BWC relates to cybersecurity in two ways. First, the BWC is often seen as a model for regulating dual-use cyber technologies because the treaty attempts to advance scientific progress while preventing its exploitation for hostile purposes. Second, the biological sciences’ increasing dependence on information technologies makes cybersecurity a growing risk and, thus, a threat to BWC objectives. The BWC as a Model for Cybersecurity The BWC addresses a dual-use technology with many applications, including the potential to be weaponized. Similarly, cyber technologies have productive uses that could be imperiled with the development of cyber weapons. Those concerned about cyber weapons often turn to the BWC for guidance because of characteristics biology shares with cyber—the thin line between research and weaponization, the global dissemination of technologies and know-how, the tremendous benefits of peaceful research, and the need to adapt to new threats created by scientific and political change. The BWC supports actions to prevent weaponization and foster peaceful exploitation of the biological sciences, including: Prohibitions on weaponization and transferring the means of developing bioweapons; Requirements to implement domestic measures to prevent weaponization; Obligations to cooperate and provide assistance in addressing BWC violations; and Undertakings to facilitate exchange of information, materials, and technologies for peaceful research. However, the BWC maps poorly against cybersecurity problems. Cyber weapons, weaponization, and attacks by states and criminals have become ubiquitous. The BWC required destruction of stockpiles of bioweapons, but many countries accepted this obligation and the weaponization ban because they concluded bioweapons had little national security utility. The same cannot be said for cyber technologies. States find cyber exploits useful for multiple national security tasks, including law enforcement, counter-intelligence, espionage, sabotage, deterrence, and fighting armed conflicts. Tools used to prevent biological weaponization, such as imposing licensing and biosecurity requirements on biological research facilities, make little sense for cyber given the nature of cyber technologies and their global accessibility. Experts have called for a norm requiring countries to assist victims of cyberattacks, which echoes the BWC’s provision on assistance in cases of treaty violations. However, political calculations, not normative considerations, determine whether governments offer assistance to countries hit by cyberattacks—behavior consistent with other contexts where states provide discretionary assistance, such as after natural disasters. Nor have countries embraced export controls on cyber technologies in the manner seen with biological technologies. Countries harmonizing export controls on dual-use technologies through the Wassenaar Arrangement added "intrusion software" to this regime in December 2013. However, this decision reflected human rights concerns about authoritarian governments using such software, a reason having no counterpart in export controls supporting the non-proliferation of bioweapons. Perhaps led by the United States, the Wassenaar Arrangement might create more export controls for cyber technologies, but here the BWC offers a cautionary tale. Developing countries have long considered that export controls on biotechnologies imposed for non-proliferation reasons violate their BWC right to gain access to equipment, materials, and information for peaceful purposes. Whether a similar controversy emerges if Wassennaar participants agree to more export controls on cyber technologies remains to be seen, but this path is not one the BWC suggests would be easy or effective. The Cybersecurity Challenge in the Biological Sciences The more important aspect of the BWC-cyber relationship involves the biological sciences’ increasing exploitation of, and dependence on, information technologies (IT). In describing scientific developments for the BWC review conference in 2011, the BWC Implementation Support Unit noted that "[i]ncreasingly the life sciences are referred to as information sciences. Digital tools and platforms not only enable wetwork but are increasingly able to replace it." Cybersecurity problems increase as dependence on information technologies deepens. Biological research enabled by information technologies is vulnerable to cyber infiltration by foreign governments, criminals, or terrorists and theft of data or manipulation of facilities. The cybersecurity challenge has been recognized in some policies. In the United States, Executive Order 13546 (2010) identified the need for cybersecurity in facilities handling dangerous pathogens, which led to amended regulations. As the biological and information sciences converge, cybersecurity becomes increasingly important for responsible biological research. Despite awareness of this dependence, the BWC process has not focused on cybersecurity. Neither the 2011 review conference nor meetings in 2012-14 identified the security of information and the ubiquity of IT systems as issues arising from developments relevant to the BWC. As planning for the next BWC review conference in 2016 unfolds, cybersecurity should be included to ensure the BWC’s next chapter does not ignore a problem the biological sciences face now and in the future.

Below is a guest post by Naomi Egel, research associate in the International Institutions and Global Governance program. Nuclear weapons rarely appear on lists of pressing humanitarian concerns. Yet for a growing movement of both nonnuclear weapon states and civil society groups, the devastating humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons use has been a rallying cry for prompt disarmament. While the Obama administration has repeatedly declared its commitment to nuclear disarmament, momentum to put this commitment into action has waned as the glow of the New START treaty has faded. However, on November 7, the State Department announced that the United States will attend the Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons from December 8–9, 2014. Vienna will be the third such gathering organized by a coalition of nonnuclear weapon states (NNWS) and civil society groups. For the United States, which declined to attend the two previous conferences in Oslo, Norway (March 2013), and Nayarit, Mexico (December 2013), this marks a small but significant step forward for multilateral disarmament. On December 2, the United Kingdom announced that it too would attend. The United States and United Kingdom should demonstrate their commitment to disarmament by taking concrete steps toward this goal in a multilateral context, but nonnuclear weapon states and civil society groups will also need to ditch the quixotic assumption that a world without nuclear weapons will necessarily be more peaceful—and offer alternatives for maintaining international security. Talking past one another will not lead to a productive conference or to nuclear disarmament. The humanitarian disarmament initiative (HDI) emphasizes the indiscriminate humanitarian effects of nuclear weapons use to advocate for nuclear disarmament. It also frames disarmament as a responsibility for nonnuclear as well as nuclear weapon states (NWS). The widespread support for HDI—which has been endorsed by more than 155 governments—reflects frustration of many NNWS at the slow pace of disarmament by the nuclear powers. The NNWS also perceive themselves as excluded from disarmament negotiations, unable to influence a process in which they have a major stake. Meanwhile, many civil society participants seek to emulate the Mine Ban Treaty process, which civil society helped enact by generating initial momentum for a ban, encouraging states to support it, and even drafting parts of the treaty text. Many civil society members of the HDI advocate for a total ban on nuclear weapons, trying to shame states that possess nuclear weapons into giving them up. The humanitarian disarmament initiative has also gained strength from the inaction of the permanent five (P5) members of the UN Security Councilthe United States, China, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom—which are recognized as NWS under the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Although divided on other issues, the P5 have adopted a unified stance, advocating a ‘step-by-step’ approach to disarmament within the framework of existing multilateral mechanisms, including the NPT and the Conference on Disarmament. This consolidated, gradual approach has antagonized many NNWS and civil society organizations, which seek to move disarmament discussions and negotiations to less stale forums. What, then, to make of U.S. and UK attendance at the forthcoming Vienna conference? Neither country has altered its official position on disarmament. Indeed, the State Department has explicitly stated that the United States does not regard the meeting as an appropriate venue for disarmament negotiations (or even pre-negotiations) and that it will not engage in such discussions in Vienna. Still, participation has important symbolic value, suggesting a willingness to listen to opposing views about disarmament and a desire to rebuild battered trust between NWS and NNWS. It also implies recognition that disarmament involves a larger community of stakeholders, including civil society. As both Washington and London are well aware, the next NPT review conference will be held in May 2015, and will likely be highly contentious. Participation at the Vienna conference may help clear the air in advance of that gathering and facilitate a more productive outcome. More substantively, the United States and the United Kingdom will have an opportunity to shape the outcome of the meeting in Vienna. At the Nayarit meeting last December, the Mexican chair caused consternation when he produced a summary calling for a legally binding nuclear weapons convention—a goal many states did not fully support. While this document represented only the view of the chair, any consensus-based outcome document from the Vienna conference will need to strike a balance between diverse views, ranging from civil society groups such as the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) to states that continue to rely on nuclear weapons for deterrence. How the United States and the United Kingdom choose to engage the Vienna conference, however, may be even more important than their decision to attend. The United States could simply repeat its longstanding position that disarmament is the responsibility of NWS and should take place through existing channels and a step-by-step process, while highlighting its past accomplishments, including the New START treaty with Russia. This tired approach won’t achieve anything, though. It will likely further antagonize NNWS, many of which adamantly insist that nonproliferation efforts must be linked to tangible steps toward disarmament. The United States needs these partners to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons. U.S. officials, and their UK counterparts, therefore should adopt a more positive agenda in Vienna, engaging NNWS as essential partners and taking steps to demonstrate their commitment to disarmament. For example, the United States could take an active role in the joint UK-Norway Initiative [PDF], which seeks to develop a way for a nonnuclear weapon state to verify disarmament by a nuclear weapon state. The United States could also alleviate a potential sticking point in further disarmament negotiations by funding more research on how to verify nuclear disarmament at low numbers of warheads (which will require new verification methods). In this light, the December 4 announcement of a new U.S.-led international partnership for nuclear disarmament verification is welcome news. The two countries should both consider new forums for disarmament negotiations, particularly since the Conference on Disarmament—the sole multilateral forum for disarmament negotiations—has been deadlocked since 1996. The United States could also build on its 2013 Nuclear Employment Strategy—which reduced the situations in which the United States might potentially use nuclear weapons—and seek to further limit the role of nuclear weapons in national security. Similarly, the United Kingdom could update the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review [PDF], which outlined a plan for nuclear weapons reductions, and identify additional measures toward disarmament. Future progress in the step-by-step disarmament process, such as ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), would also demonstrate to NNWS that the United States is committed to reducing the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. The United Kingdom has already ratified the treaty. Admittedly, the outcome of the November 2014 midterm election has made U.S. CTBT ratification an even more distant prospect. For Vienna (and the HDI overall) to succeed, however, NNWS and civil society groups will need to show movement of their own. Perhaps the most important shift would be to understand and appreciate that not only NWS but also many NNWS (particularly those under the U.S. nuclear umbrella) regard nuclear weapons as a valuable deterrent. The HDI can only make progress if its members, both states and civil society groups, engage with the security concerns raised by those who rely on nuclear deterrence, rather than dismiss their arguments out of hand. The HDI should seek to answer how security would be maintained in a world without nuclear weapons rather than assuming that such a world would inherently be more peaceful. All states and civil society groups that will attend the conference share the goal of promoting global peace and security: the HDI should seek to find points of agreement between its diverse participants, and build from there. Nuclear disarmament cannot exist without the cooperation of states that possess nuclear weapons. To avoid mimicking the disarmament talk shops that have frustrated the HDI, participants at the Vienna conference will need to develop suggestions to lay the groundwork for multilateral disarmament discussions and negotiations. Both states and civil society groups should arrive in Vienna prepared to discuss what they themselves can do to create these conditions. The Vienna conference is not intended to result in a consensus-based road map to nuclear disarmament—nor should it aspire to, given the diversity of opinions on how nuclear disarmament should take place. What it can do is end the dialogue of the deaf that has too long characterized interaction between nuclear weapons states and those calling for prompt nuclear disarmament.

Coauthored by Stewart Patrick and Isabella Bennett, Assistant Director in the International Institutions and Global Governance program. The G7 is back. Today in Brussels, it meets for the first time since 1998. The group—which includes the United States, France, the UK, Japan, Germany, Italy, and Canada—replaces the G8, after suspending Russia for its annexation of Crimea. On one level, ejecting Russia was an obvious choice, on both ideological and geopolitical grounds. However, this reflects a dangerous trend. As geopolitical tensions intensify, international cooperation on global threats is faltering and U.S. leadership is absent. These are the headline findings of the latest Global Governance Report Card, released today by the Council on Foreign Relations, which assesses cooperation on nuclear nonproliferation, terrorism, armed conflict, global health, climate change, and global finance. The United States cannot afford to abandon international cooperation, especially with potential rivals in this era of interdependence. To solve any of today’s most pressing challenges, it must compartmentalize these rivalries from other forms of cooperation. It’s true that as a corrupt, authoritarian country, Russia never really belonged in this club of wealthy democracies. With Russia gone, optimists hope, the G7 can return to a tightknit community of Western nations united behind common interests and values. “Kicking Russia out” also sends a signal to other countries (see China) that territorial aggression will not be tolerated. But let’s not kid ourselves. The G7 may be useful for coordinating policies among like-minded countries. But the time is long gone when any of the world’s most critical problems could be resolved within a cozy Western boardroom. Even as the United States and its G7 partners resist unreasonable Russian and Chinese ambitions, they will still need to work with both countries—as well as other big players outside the G7 like India, Brazil, and Turkey—to cope with a slew of transnational challenges. Violent conflict rages from Syria to South Sudan, creating the worst global refugee crisis in two decades. Nuclear proliferation continues apace, as China, India, and Pakistan add to their arsenals. Al-Qaeda offshoots are multiplying and spreading throughout the Middle East and North Africa. Meanwhile, economic coordination remains crucial as advanced economies tentatively return to growth but major emerging markets confront new challenges. Climate change is beginning to wreak havoc on water supplies and agriculture, with other potentially cataclysmic results on the horizon. Finally, major health achievements like the near eradication of polio now appear threatened. After a frustrating year of contentious, even fruitless negotiations in larger multilateral forums like the UN or G20, the Obama administration may be tempted to focus diplomatic efforts on cooperation with like-minded G7 allies. But in our world of global interdependence, retreating from broader engagement would be perilously foolish. The reality is that breakthroughs in global governance require hammering out agreements not among the like-minded, but among the un-likeminded—including America’s geopolitical rivals. The only solution, therefore, is to compartmentalize. Consider global efforts to prevent rampant nuclear proliferation. These require a minimum level of trust among the nuclear powers, including between the United States and Russia—whose cooperation is essential in limiting Iran’s weapons capabilities. Any meaningful agreement to limit climate change, likewise, will require cooperation between China and the United States—the planet’s two largest emitters of carbon dioxide. Similarly, ensuring global financial stability and promoting economic growth demands coordination from China and the United States—the world’s two largest economies—as well as with other advanced and emerging market economies (including India and Brazil). And in today’s globalized world, containing public health threats necessitates worldwide cooperation with the World Health Organization and a host of other governments. Global institutions also remain critical in managing armed conflict. To be sure, Russia has obstructed UN efforts to halt mass atrocities in Syria. But it has, along with China, supported several important UN Security Council resolutions to combat violence in Mali, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the Central African Republic. Compartmentalizing can be done. Even in the past two months, as politicians and pundits proclaimed a return to the Cold War, the gears of cooperation continued to grind. The State Department confirmed in early May that Washington and Moscow were continuing to cooperate on chemical weapons disarmament in Syria, in negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program, and on cutting their arsenals at home. The rebirth of the G7 reflects understandable Western pique at Russian aggression in Crimea and obduracy over Syria, among other areas. But it would be a mistake to oversell its potential to solve global problems. The enduring lesson of the global financial crisis, which gave birth to the G20 in 2008, is that global stability today depends on coordination among all the world’s leading players—advanced and emerging, partners and rivals. To navigate this new world, the Obama administration must learn to play on multiple chess boards at once. It must be nimble enough to work together with Russia, China, and other emerging powers, even as it holds the line against threats to the sanctity of borders or regional balances of power. In short, Washington must learn to compartmentalize.