Nonproliferation, Arms Control, and Disarmament

Coauthored with Martin Willner, research associate in the International Institutions and Global Governance program. President Obama deserves praise for spearheading global efforts to address the threat of nuclear terrorism. As countries gathered for this week’s Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague, it was clear that countries had made real progress in securing the world’s most dangerous weapons. But nuclear security is only one of seven nuclear weapons priorities the president outlined in his famous Prague speech of April 2009, and most of the others have stalled, despite some surprising successes with Russia and Iran. Continue U.S.-Russian bilateral disarmament: Given the unfolding clashes between the United States and Russia, it’s surprising that one of the greatest success stories has been the bilateral reduction of U.S.-Russian nuclear stockpiles. In 2010, the two countries signed the New START treaty, limiting the United States and Russia to the deployment of 1,550 strategic nuclear warheads (a 30 percent reduction from the limits in the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty). According to an October 2013 report, Russia had actually reduced its arsenal beyond what the treaty stipulated. Though Russia had refused to participate in negotiations on a legally-binding agreement to supersede New START, cooperation is unlikely to halt. For, “even in the darkest days of the Cold War the United States and Russia” continued “to work together on reducing the nuclear threat” as Undersecretary for Arms Control and International Security Rose Gottemoeller recently remarked. Pragmatically, both countries understand that, with aging fleets and expensive modernization costs, it is in their best interest to continue on a path of disarmament. Reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy: In Prague, Obama called for an “end to Cold War thinking” whereby states relied heavily on nuclear weapons in their defense policies. Therefore, his administration outlined a new U.S. strategy in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review and the 2013 Nuclear Employment Strategy, which narrowed the scenarios that would trigger the United States to employ nuclear weapons ultimately enabling the United States to eventually reduce its arsenal by one-third. To be sure, some critics were disappointed that the administration retained a potential role for nuclear weapons in confronting non-nuclear adversaries. But, the president’s own Prague speech suggested a certain realism about reaching a “world without nuclear weapons.” He added, “I’m not naïve. This goal will not be reached quickly—perhaps not in my lifetime.” On balance, the president has done a good job leading the world toward this goal at a reasonable pace. Ratify a global ban on nuclear testing: A third Prague speech priority was finally ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which President Clinton signed in 1996 since the United States had already ceased nuclear tests and given the public health and environmental dangers that they pose. For the past eighteen years, the treaty has languished in the Senate, due to objections from a core of Republican Senators worried about its implications for U.S. freedom of action and the reliability of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Consequently, despite ratification by 160 states, the treaty cannot come into force because the United States (an Annex II state) has not joined. Although the Obama administration has actively engaged legislators to alleviate their concerns, GOP opponents have dug in their heels. In 2013, the Republican-controlled House Armed Service Committee approved amendments to a bill barring the use of U.S. contributions to the CTBT Organization for lobbying or advocacy activities related to the treaty within the United States. End production of fissile material: Despite Obama’s hopes, the world has failed to move toward a treaty to end the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. While many states have renounced such activities, Pakistan, India, and potentially China continue to increase their nuclear stockpiles. For over a decade, international efforts to create a so-called Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) have remained deadlocked and, in 2011, Pakistan strengthened its opposition to such a treaty. Though the United States continues to push the treaty on the sidelines of diplomatic meetings like the Conference on Disarmament, its prospects are dim. Strengthen the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty(NPT): As President Obama stated in Prague, “the basic bargain [of the NPT] is sound”: nuclear weapon states move toward disarmament, non-nuclear weapon states do not acquire nuclear weapons, and all states are guaranteed access to peaceful nuclear energy. The NPT, opened for signature in 1968, has 189 state parties and serves as the foundational legal text for nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. But as the president pointed out, the treaty must be strengthened. The IAEA, which serves as the treaty’s guardian, needs more resources and stronger authority to conduct inspections. The NPT should be updated to spell out consequences for violating its terms or withdrawing from the treaty. While the NPT review conference in 2010 reaffirmed countries’ previous commitments, no concrete efforts were taken to update the treaty. The United States should make a major push to do so at the 2015 review conference. Create a new framework for civilian nuclear cooperation: Among the trickiest nonproliferation dilemmas is facilitating state access to “peaceful” nuclear energy (as guaranteed by Article 6 of the NPT), while reducing the risk that civilian programs conceal nefarious enrichment activities. One way out, Obama noted in Prague, was to create an international fuel bank, supplied by countries with existing enrichment capabilities, from which other countries could draw fuel for their civilian nuclear reactors. In 2006, the Nuclear Threat Initiative, with the backing of the billionaire Warren Buffet, committed $50 million to the IAEA in 2006 to jumpstart such a bank. By 2009, total pledges had risen to $150 million. Two years later, Kazakhstan agreed to host such a site, and in 2013 the IAEA board of governors approved the plan for a low-enriched uranium fuel bank, which is expected to be established in 2014. Still, it remains to be seen whether its existence will persuade non-nuclear states to make use of the new multilateral body—and forego the pursuit of enrichment technologies. Check Iranian and North Korean nuclear ambitions. In Prague, President Obama stressed the need for international solidarity to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon and reverse North Korea’s nuclear buildup. Five years later, the progress is decidedly mixed. After years of failed negotiations, and tightened Western sanctions, Iran finally agreed on November 24, 2013 to a Joint Action Plan (JPA) with the P5+1 countries—the United States, Russia, France, Great Britain, China, and Germany. The JPA offers Iran limited sanctions relief in exchange for halting and rolling back parts of Tehran’s nuclear program. Although President Obama puts the JPA’s chances of securing a lasting solution at no more than 50-50, these are the best odds the world has seen in a decade. In contrast, crushing multilateral sanctions and increased isolation have done little to deter North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, which has defied the world by restarting its Yongbyon nuclear reactor and launching long-range missiles. The White House can take pride in its success, over three nuclear summits, in helping lock down the world’s nuclear weapons and fissile material. But as for the rest of the Prague agenda, it clearly remains a work in progress.  

Coauthored with Claire Schachter, research associate in the International Institutions and Global Governance program. Today, fifty-three countries and four international organizations are gathered in The Hague for the third Nuclear Security Summit. Russia’s annexation of Crimea has cast a shadow over the biannual meeting, threatening to distract delegates from the critical task at hand: following through on their commitments to lock down the world’s unsecured nuclear weapons, fissile material, and related technologies. The summit’s success will depend on whether the participating countries are willing to move beyond the harmonization of national pledges to construct a strong framework for nuclear security, undergirded by more powerful conventions and institutions. The NSS process originated five years ago, in President Obama’s Prague speech of April 2009. Describing nuclear weapons as the most pressing threat confronting humanity, he stressed the need to prevent terrorists from getting ahold of the world’s most dangerous weapons. The following year, his administration hosted the first Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, DC, where participants adopted an ambitious target: securing all vulnerable nuclear material by 2014. When the parties convened for a second summit in Seoul two years later, each country presented a list of national actions taken toward the collective effort. By 2012, 60-80 percent of national commitments to secure or eliminate stockpiles of fissile materials were achieved. According to experts, that percentage of commitments that have been implemented has risen to 90 percent today. Still, it’s clear that progress has been uneven. On the one hand, the NSS has served as a flexible format to catalyze concrete action. Participants arrive at each meeting with specific national pledges, as well as thematic “gift baskets”—voluntary initiatives that countries present and seek to acquire backers for, ideally as many as possible. (This year, for instance, South Korea, the Netherlands, and the United States are announcing a trinational initiative on “Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation.”) The process also imposes relative accountability, as participating countries must submit national progress reports that explain how they are fulfilling their obligations. Consequently, the number of countries and facilities in possession of HEU and plutonium is decreasing, and many countries have made progress in securing or eliminating vulnerable material. One noteworthy success story is Ukraine, which removed all the highly-enriched uranium (HEU) on its territory in order to fulfill its 2010 NSS  commitment. Observers have rightly noted how much higher the stakes in Crimea might be today had it not done so. There are other success stories. According to the 2014 Nuclear Threat Index, Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Mexico, Sweden, and Vietnam have also eliminated their stocks of weapons-useable nuclear materials. In addition, thirteen other countries have reduced their stockpiles. And today, Japan announced it will turn over a massive cache of weapons-grade plutonium and HEU to the United States—a coup for President Obama. Nevertheless, the risk remains. Terrorists would need only a small amount of diverted fissile material (some thirty-five pounds of HEU or nine pounds of plutonium) to fashion a crude nuclear weapon. Terrorists could also make use of loose radiological material to create a less destructive “dirty bomb.” Such a dispersal device would function as a weapon of “mass disruption,” sowing panic and economic chaos (if deployed, say, at the lower end of Manhattan under the right conditions, it could make that area uninhabitable for decades). It is thus worrisome to learn that in the past year alone approximately 140 cases of missing or unauthorized uses of nuclear and radioactive material were reported to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). More broadly, it is clear that NSS participants will fall short of their 2014 target goal of locking up all nuclear material. There are still twenty-five states with one kilogram or more of weapons-usable nuclear materials, and some states are still increasing their stockpiles, including Japan, the United Kingdom, India, and Pakistan. Existing institutions also fail to adequately address the threat. Approximately 85 percent of the global stockpile of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and separated plutonium (approximately 2000 metric tons scattered across hundreds of sites in twenty-five countries) remains outside of civilian programs and therefore not subject to IAEA guidelines or to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material [PDF] (CPPNM) and its 2005 Amendment [PDF]. Moreover, many nations have not translated the IAEA guidelines into domestic law, and they are thus not enforceable when it comes to material used by civilian programs. The United States has been pushing countries to commit to more stringent international guidelines and incorporate these into domestic legislation, but its own failure to ratify the 2005 amended version of the CPPNM undercuts these efforts. Perhaps most disturbing are gnawing doubts about the capacity or will of select countries to safeguard their nuclear arsenals, as well as to track, interdict, and prosecute nuclear smugglers. Pakistan is a particular concern, given that country’s growing arsenal of nuclear weapons (including small, portable battlefield devices) and its penetration by (and periodic sponsorship of) jihadist networks. North Korea is another concern, given its penchant for selling sensitive contraband, including weapons, to the highest bidder, and uncertainty about command and control of its nuclear arsenal during internal crisis. Given these continued—and in some cases growing—concerns, NSS delegates cannot afford to rest on their laurels.  Success will require that world leaders: Remove the Crimean elephant from the room: The United States and Russia should release a bilateral statement declaring that despite differences over Crimea and Ukraine, both remain committed to the NSS process and facilitating the fulfillment of the objectives of the Washington Workplan, their individual pledges, and those of all participants. The world needs Russia to play ball on securing civilian-use nuclear material as well as on non-proliferation generally, given the number of facilities and quantity of material still in its possession. It may be too late to prevent unhelpful issue linkage, but confronting the problem squarely could make it more difficult for any stakeholder to hold the process hostage going forward. Untether U.S. leadership: President Obama has allocated political capital to this issue. But the United States cannot lead by example with one hand tied behind its back. The president should declare his determination to work with lawmakers of both parties to push legislation through the Senate that will ensure U.S. compliance with the CPPNM and its 2005 amendment. Share the security burden: The summit communiqué should include a renewed commitment by NSS states to assist developing countries meet their commitments under UN Security Council resolution 1540 (as extended in resolution 1977), including through strengthening the 1540’s committee’s capacity to provide technical assistance to countries that require expertise to deal with proliferation threats. Support Pakistan’s progress: The communiqué should include a strong statement acknowledging the particular challenges facing Pakistan, and pledging multilateral and bilateral assistance from NSS parties, as well as from the IAEA, in assisting the securing of its nuclear arsenal. Such a collective announcement would be less inflammatory than unilateral U.S. efforts to elicit greater nuclear cooperation, given the often fraught relationship between Washington and Islamabad, and would be appropriate given the improvements Pakistan has made and its engagement with the NSS process. Realize the potential of the IAEA: Participants should settle on a near- and long-term strategy for empowering the IAEA to play a greater role in the field of nuclear security diplomacy, starting with transforming the IAEA guidelines into standards and pushing for their implementation, and increasing core funding to the IAEA Office of Nuclear Security. Secure the post-2016 agenda: As things currently stand, the final NSS summit will occur in 2016, the last year of the Obama presidency. To remove uncertainty, the entire NSS membership should endorse the indefinite extension of the biannual summit, which will continue to meet as long as the world faces a threat from unsecured nuclear weapons. Creating a standing summit mechanism should be the first step in formalizing—and ultimately institutionalizing—what has to date been an informal system of parallel national pledges. A concrete, forward-looking communiqué should be the first step in creating a robust multilateral framework for nuclear security, helping to ensure that this agenda moves ahead—even against the eerily familiar backdrop of escalating tensions between a set of nuclear powers.

Sarin, one of the world’s most lethal chemical weapons, has long been stockpiled but is rarely used by states or terrorists. Allegations of attacks on civilians in Syria, if substantiated, would represent a departure from long-standing international practice.