Defense and Security

Military Operations

  • Afghanistan
    The False Promise of Peace in Afghanistan
    In a new report, Seth G. Jones details steps on how to prevent the peace process in Afghanistan from collapsing or stalling indefinitely
  • Nigeria
    ISWA’s Recent Attacks Could Signal a New, Deadlier Approach in Nigeria
    Bulama Bukarti is a sub-Saharan Africa analyst at the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, based in London, and a PhD candidate at SOAS, University of London. On June 9, a Boko Haram faction called a religious gathering in a village in Gubio, Borno state. It would become the group’s deadliest attack on civilians this year. Claiming to be on a preaching tour, armed militants entered the village of Foduma Koloram and asked residents to give up their arms and any other weapons. According to reports, once those villagers that had dane guns and bows and arrows surrendered them, the militants started shooting at close range and used vehicles to ram those attempting to flee. The group killed eighty-one people over a period of six hours, left many others injured, and abducted seven. They stole hundreds of cattle and set the village ablaze as they left. This was followed by news of twin attacks on the June 13 that “appalled” the United Nations. After killing thirty-eight in an assault on Goni Usmanti village, jihadis attacked Monguno with heavy weaponry and rocket launchers. A base for many international non-governmental organisations (INGOs), the attack on Manguno led to a clash with government forces in which twenty soldiers died while protecting aid workers. The Gubio and Monguno assaults were claimed by Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA), the faction of Boko Haram affiliated to the Islamic State. ISWA’s attack on Gubio, and presumably Goni Usmanti (which they did not expressly claim), represents a stark change in stance by the group. In a policy position long at odds with the Islamic State’s global stance, ISWA had not—until now, at least—attacked Muslim civilians, though they made exceptions for those who work for the Nigerian government or INGOs. This was also a key factor in the group’s split from the parent faction of Boko Haram in 2016. Since then, ISWA has distinguished itself by primarily targeting military, government, and INGO targets, while avoiding when possible killing Muslim civilians. This effort has been supported by a “winning hearts and minds” approach, with service provision in the areas they control. While the Monguno attack, with INGO and military targets, fits within ISWA’s bill, the ones in Gubio and Goni Usmanti, where the majority of fatalities were Muslim civilians, do not. While ISWA labelled its victims as vigilantes working with government forces, they were mostly unarmed cattle herders and residents, some of whom hold light weapons for self-defense in an utterly restive area. This signals a change in the group’s modus operandi of focusing attacks on state targets and Christians, but not Muslim civilians. It is not yet clear what is responsible for this change, but there are three possible explanations. The first is in reports that the attack was retaliation against villagers who pushed back against extortion by ISWA. The Gubio attack was against a herding village that had reportedly killed ISWA tax collectors. In pursuit of its proto-state objectives, ISWA has some territorial control in Borno and Yobe states and does tax residents. Reuters reported two years ago that ISWA provides safe grazing for about 2,500 naira ($7) a cow and 1,500 naira ($4) for smaller animals, presumably per annum. It also runs slaughterhouses, taking a cut for each animal. With cattle and other forms of livestock a key part of the economy in northeastern Nigeria, there are strong incentives for this behavior. The second explanation is the change in ISWA’s leadership in February 2020, following a successful coup within the group. Infighting in ISWA led to the execution of three of the group’s most senior leaders and their replacement with hard-line commanders who favor a more brutal approach. The revolt was triggered by an attempt to further “soften” the group’s approach to attacks. I concluded when this news first broke that this development may lead to a “further hardening of ISWAP’s policy of attacks.” This recent shift in who is a permissible target would be in line with this change in leadership and could signal an escalation in ISWA’s use of brutality against civilians, particularly noncompliant ones. The third is that these attacks might be a show of force to undermine government messaging on recent battlefield successes. Following an attack that led to the death of at least forty-seven soldiers last March, the Nigerian army announced a major offensive on both factions of Boko Haram. In April, Chad claimed to have killed 1,000 ISWA fighters in a counteroffensive that was the largest Chadian military action on record. Last week, the Nigerian army reported to have added a further 1,400 fighters to this toll. While government reports on the number of fighters killed in counter-offensives may be inflated or include misattributed civilian deaths, on-the-ground reports corroborate claims that recent efforts against the group have struck a heavy blow. With estimates from late 2019 putting ISWA’s fighting force at between 3,500 and 5,000, the loss of up to 2,400 fighters would be significant. These recent incidents could be the beginning of a new chapter in ISWA’s violence. If the faction sustains its attacks on civilians, unarmed Nigerians will become the target of both factions of Boko Haram. That ISWA has more fighters, reach, and sophistication means that the group could prove far deadlier than the original parent faction, Jama'atu Ahl al-Sunnah Liddawati wa Jihad (JAS). This could make a war that has killed an estimated 38,000 people and displaced millions even bloodier.
  • Mali
    French-Led Decapitation Strike on AQIM in Mali
    On June 5, France announced that its forces killed Abdelmalek Droukdel and many in his inner circle. Droukdel was the "emir" or leader of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The attack took place on June 3. France also announced the capture of Mohamed Mrabat, the group commander in Mali of the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, who was taken in May. France has said that the operations were carried out with the intelligence and surveillance support of Algeria the United States. The decapitation strike, killing many in the leadership of AQIM, is a major achievement of France and its partners, and is likely to reduce the terror group’s ability to conduct attacks for the immediate future. It may also reduce domestic criticism in France of the Macron administration about what seems to be an interminable war that resembles U.S. involvement in Afghanistan. But, "decapitation" does not mean defeat. The killing of Osama bin Laden in 2011 and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in 2019 has not led to the end of their respective organizations, but rather to new leadership. It should be anticipated that AQIM will similarly find new leadership, albeit after a likely bloody internal struggle, and the Islamic State will find a replacement for Mrabat.  Jihadi terrorism, whether of the Islamic State or al-Qaeda variety, has roots in a variation of the Salafist revival that seeks a purified Islam and the establishment of a polity based on Islamic law. Further, it reflects local ethnic rivalries and the popular resentment of exploitive post-colonial elites, fed partly by extreme poverty. The death of Droukdel does not mean that these drivers of terrorism are going away. Droukdel's career is emblematic of the Algerian dimension to terrorism in the western Sahel. Born in 1971, Droukdel was Algerian and well educated, with a degree in mathematics from an Algerian university. He is thought to have first fought in Afghanistan against the Soviets in the 1980s before returning to Algeria. He was an active participant in that country’s civil war, which lasted from 1991 to 2002. The war left between 150,000 and 200,000 people dead, and was noteworthy for its brutality. It resulted from an army coup following an Islamist victory in general elections. The army largely prevailed though there was a political settlement accepted by some—though not all—jihadists. Subsequent Algerian governments have pushed residual jihadi groups south into the Sahel, so that jihadi and criminal groups (they often overlap) operating in Mali, Burkina Faso, and elsewhere sometimes have Algerian roots.  Droukdel continued the fight after the civil war ended in 2002. Highly charismatic and a good speaker, he eventually merged his own group with al-Qaeda. He was sentenced to death in absentia by an Algerian court for three bomb attacks in Algiers in 2007. A munitions expert, he is likely to have introduced suicide bombing in Algeria, from whence it spread to elsewhere in West Africa. He led the 2015 assault on a hotel in Ouagadougou that left 30 dead and 150 injured. He credibly is associated with kidnapping operations in the Western Sahel. This post has been updated to add a source. 
  • South China Sea
    Rising Tensions in the South China Sea
    The risk of a military confrontation between the United States and China in the South China Sea is growing. In a new Center for Preventive Action report, Oriana Skylar Mastro details how the United States could prevent a clash, or take steps to de-escalate if one should occur.
  • Chad
    After Lake Chad Offensive, April One of Deadliest Months in Boko Haram Conflict
    Asch Harwood is a research associate with the Council on Foreign Relations and the creator of the Nigeria Security Tracker. Previously at UNICEF and Reboot, he is the founder of Red Hook Media Lab.  April is now one of the deadliest months in the Boko Haram conflict, according to data from the Nigeria Security Tracker (NST), which now features geographic data from Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1589298856898'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; if ( divElement.offsetWidth > 800 ) { vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='590px';} else if ( divElement.offsetWidth > 500 ) { vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='590px';} else { vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.height='727px';} var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   The NST has documented 1,491 deaths linked to the Boko Haram conflict in April. Casualties have only been higher in two previous months—March 2014 and February 2015—since the NST began in May 2011. These previously higher death tolls were reported during the height of the Boko Haram conflict.  So what accounts for such a dramatic spike in violence? The escalation culminating on April 8 is the result of a roughly two-week assault by Chadian forces on alleged Boko Haram operating around Lake Chad.  var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1589293529471'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; if ( divElement.offsetWidth > 800 ) { vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='587px';} else if ( divElement.offsetWidth > 500 ) { vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='587px';} else { vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.height='727px';} var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   Chad’s military claimed it killed one thousand “jihadists,” and lost fifty-two soldiers. It launched the assault, called Operation Bohoma Anger, in response to an attack on Chadian troops by Boko Haram near Lake Chad that left nearly one hundred dead over March 23 and 24. Chad’s military reportedly attacked positions all around Lake Chad, including in Nigeria and Niger. Borders in the region are largely nonexistent. var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1589293735896'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; if ( divElement.offsetWidth > 800 ) { vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='587px';} else if ( divElement.offsetWidth > 500 ) { vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='587px';} else { vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.height='727px';} var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   Despite these claims of “victory,” there remain unanswered questions. Jacob Zenn, a frequent contributor here, has pointed out that the effort was probably more of a public relations campaign than a military victory. He points to the presence of Chadian President Idriss Deby and his son in the region during the offensive. He also argues that the Chadian military is likely exaggerating how many alleged Boko Haram were killed while downplaying the number of military casualties. Zenn also notes that the operation largely targeted the ISWA sect of Boko Haram, even though it was its rival, Jama'tu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (JAS), that attacked the Chadian military over March 23 and 24. Then there are questions regarding human rights violations. For example, there have been credible allegations that suspected Boko Haram captured during Bohoma Anger were poisoned after being denied food and water while in prison.  The International Crisis Group points out in a recent report on the conflict, “Jihadist groups pose a very serious danger to civilians and soldiers in the four countries bordering Lake Chad.” Daniel Eizenga, writing for the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, goes a step further, arguing, “Boko Haram’s ability to accomplish such a devastating attack, along with the preceding increase in militant Islamist group activity in Chad’s Lac Province, however, raises the prospect that Boko Haram and ISWA have gained momentum and now pose a greater threat to Chad and stability in the wider region.” Still, for the moment, the spike in violence does not necessarily reflect a return to 2014–2015.  
  • Nigeria
    Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: April 4–10
    Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from April 4 to 10, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1586786037403'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='790px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   April 5: Two Boko Haram suicide bombers killed themselves and ten others in Amchide, Cameroon.  April 6: Nigerian troops killed nineteen Boko Haram militants in Kukawa, Borno.  April 6: Nigerian police killed six in a clash over the lockdown in Kaduna South, Kaduna.   April 7: Suspected herdsmen killed one in Oshimili North, Delta.  April 7: Nigerian troops killed two Boko Haram militants in Ngala, Borno.  April 7: Gunmen killed four in Bassa, Plateau.  April 7: Nigerien and Nigerian troops killed "scores" (estimated at forty) of Boko Haram militants in Kukawa, Borno.  April 7: A military officer and three kidnappers were killed during a shootout in Okene, Kogi.  April 7: Boko Haram killed three in Askira/Uba, Borno.  April 8: Sectarian violence led to nine deaths in Ukum, Benue.  April 8: Bandits killed one and kidnapped sixteen in Birnin-Gwari, Kaduna.  April 8: Gunmen abducted nine in Chikun, Kaduna.   April 8: The Chadian army said that military operations over the past month had resulted in the deaths of one thousand Boko Haram militants and fifty-two Chadian soldiers in the Lake Chad area.  April 10: Suspected herdsmen killed a pastor in Oshimili North, Delta. 
  • International Criminal Court
    The ICC’s Probe Into Atrocities in Afghanistan: What to Know
    The ICC appeals chamber’s decision to move ahead on an investigation of grave abuses by combatants in Afghanistan, including U.S. forces, marks an unprecedented move that is likely to arouse intensive pushback from Washington.
  • Mexico
    Women This Week: A Day Without Women in Mexico
    Welcome to “Women Around the World: This Week,” a series that highlights noteworthy news related to women and U.S. foreign policy. This week’s post, covering February 24 to March 6, was compiled by Maleeha Coleburn and Rebecca Turkington.
  • South Korea
    Advancing South Korean Capabilities for the Future: Procurement or Research and Development?
    South Korea can use indigenous capabilities to meet many of its goals, but will also need to procure some systems necessary for its self-defense into the future.
  • West Africa
    As Militaries Struggle in the Sahel, Jihadis Cooperate
    According to The Washington Post, jihadi groups with ties to al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS) are working together to gain control of a large part of the Sahel, the border region between the Sahara and the better-watered pasture and agricultural lands to the south. The story’s sources are identified as U.S. and local officials on the ground. “What we’ve seen is not just random acts of violence under a terrorist banner,” says Brigadier General Dagvin Anderson, head of U.S. Special Operations in Africa. “But a deliberate campaign that is trying to bring these various groups under a common cause. That larger effort then poses a threat to the United States.”  Perhaps. As the story acknowledges, al-Qaeda and IS are enemies in the Middle East. In Africa, allegiances are fluid, tactical rather than strategic, and often tribal ties and practical matters are more important than theology or ideology. There is also an important criminal dimension: the Sahel has long been a center of smuggling of everything from people to weapons to narcotics. Indeed, jihadi activity in the Sahel appears to be intensely local in its causes and its goals. If this conclusion is sound, it would mitigate against the success of a long-term unification strategy. The article notes that there seems to be distinct, “mutually agreed-upon areas of influence” allocated to the different jihadi groups.  The Sahel is huge, poor, and characterized by weak states whose authority exists primarily on islands in a sea of spaces governed without the state or not at all. Despite more than a decade of jihadi activity, remarkably little is actually known about the various groups’ internal workings or their links to each other and to the world outside the Sahel. Evidence is slight for meaningful material support from outside of Africa. Where exactly these groups are is also not always clear, and allegiances can shift. It does seem clear that there are thousands of jihadi fighters, but not tens of thousands, and that jihadi leaders are skilled at exploiting local grievances. It also appears that the jihadi groups enjoy some local support in a region where governments and the elites that they serve are detached from the vast majority of the population.   
  • South Korea
    Burden-Sharing in the U.S.-South Korea Alliance: Finding Balance
    The purpose, intent, and rationale of OPCON transition must be properly explained to the South Korean and American publics.
  • South Korea
    Don't Gut the U.S.-South Korea Alliance
    The OPCON transition plan should be put on the back burner or, better yet, scrapped altogether.