Military Operations

The security situation around Borno’s capital, Maiduguri, appears to be going from bad to worse. On February 9, The Boko Haram faction Islamic State in West African (ISWA) shot or burned alive some thirty people sleeping in their cars and trucks that night outside the town of Auno, some ten miles from Maiduguri. They also kidnapped others. The victims had arrived in Auno after curfew, the gates to the town were closed, and the military had departed, presumably for their supercamp in Maiduguri, according to media.  The Nigerian army is following its own version of the “fortified hamlets” strategy, employed by the United States and its allies in the wars in Vietnam and Afghanistan and generally regarded as a failure by counterterrorism experts. By consolidating their forces in highly fortified “super camps,” the Nigerian army reduces their own casualties, but in the evening, when soldiers withdraw back to these camps, ISWA appears to have close to free rein in the countryside and smaller towns. On February 12, ISWA killed five security personnel in three separate attacks near Maiduguri. That city, the capital of Borno state, has essentially been cut off from the rest of the country by ISWA and Boko Haram. The one remaining highway, to Damaturu, is subject to frequent attacks. The airport, however, remains open. The governor of Borno state is accusing the military of failing to protect civilians.  Military and security service failure is an old song. Though about 20 percent of the national budget goes for security, accountability for how the funds are spent is weak. Security service morale is widely reported to be low. Coordination among the agencies is bad. Trust of the security services among local people is low, and ISWA operatives appear to have better knowledge of the countryside than the security services. Though documentation is hard to find, security may be increasingly devolving from the central government to states and local communities. Local vigilante groups are active, in Yorubaland, for example, local governors have joined forces to organize a force to “assist” the security services.

The People’s Liberation Army is aiming to become the dominant force in the Asia-Pacific, strengthening China’s hand toward Taiwan and international disputes in the South China Sea.

On January 29, the Nigerian House of Representatives passed a resolution calling on all of the military service chiefs to resign. If they do not, the resolution called on President Muhammadu Buhari to fire them. Earlier, the Senate had also expressed the view that the service chiefs had to go. The House motion appears to be more formal than the Senate’s action. However, both reflect frustration at the resurgence of Boko Haram in the northeast. The road to Damaturu is the only remaining operable road connecting the capital of Borno state, Maiduguri, to the rest of Nigeria. Maiduguri has an international airport, and air travel to other Nigerian cities continue. The service chiefs were appointed by President Buhari in 2015 after he was elected to his first presidential term. Under military regulations, their terms of service expired in 2017, but the President has kept them on. They are Defense Chief Abayomi Olonisakin, Army Chief Tukur Buratai, Navy Chief Ibok-Ete Ekwe Ibas, and Air Chief Sadique Abubakar. It is unlikely that President Buhari will move against the service chiefs because of the National Assembly. He might, indeed, replace some or all. But, should he do so, it would be for his own reasons. All are personally loyal to the President.  The inability of the security services to defeat Boko Haram is the result of complex factors, not the personal limitations of the service chiefs, whatever they might be. The House of Representatives resolution makes specific reference to Boko Haram and the northeast. However, the breakdown of security is nationwide, and it is becoming a major political issue. Earlier in January, the governors of the states of Yorubaland in the southwest moved to establish a security force to supplement and assist the national police force in the face of a kidnapping epidemic that the Federal government appears powerless to stop. In fact, according to one report, twenty-three states across the country have stood up local security organizations, ranging from neighborhood watches to armed police. 

Since the last National Defense Strategy [PDF] more than a year ago, there has been a shift in U.S. defense priorities from countering terrorism to great power competition. Since then, the Department of Defense has been considering a drawdown of U.S. military assets in Africa, especially West Africa, presumably for redeployment to arenas of great power competition. That would be a mistake. Also included in the strategy is to "support relationships to address significant terrorist threats in Africa." Terrorist episodes in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad have been expanding exponentially. Extremist violence has doubled every year since 2015. Mauritania is concerned, with good reason, that it will be next. Further east, in the Lake Chad basin, factions of Boko Haram have revived, with almost daily assaults in Chad, Nigeria, and Cameroon. The capital city of Borno State, Maiduguri, is almost cut off from the rest of the country due to the destruction of bridges and frequent attacks on travelers. Many governments in the Sahel and West Africa are weak and fragile, and, with the exception of in Nigeria, France plays an outsized role in countering terrorism there. Operation Barkhane is France’s largest overseas operation, with 4,500 soldiers and an expenditure of some 600 million Euros per year. There have been French casualties, small in number but nevertheless threatening French popular support for the effort. Further, the French presence in West Africa has recently elicited anti-colonial riots in Bamako, with the burning of the French flag. French President Emmanuel Macron has made it clear that France will stay only at the request of the governments in the region. Early in January, he convened a summit of the five francophone heads of state in the southwestern French city of Pau. There, the Africans reaffirmed their desire for the French to stay. Compared to the French, the American role is small. There are perhaps 800 Americans stationed in West Africa, mostly at a base in Niger. (For context, altogether there are about 200,000 U.S. military stationed abroad.) The Americans in Niger provide logistical support, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assistance to the French and their partner governments in the Sahel. The Americans also facilitate air-to-air refueling. The American role is small, but the French regard it as essential. A French presidency official characterized the American role as “irreplaceable.” “If the Americans decided to pull out of Africa, it would be very bad news for us, absolutely,” said President Macron. “I hope that I can convince President Trump that the fight against terrorism, a fight that he is fully committed to, is at stake out in this region.” At Pau, the five francophone heads of state also expressed their gratitude to the United States. French General Francois Lecointre, head of the French armed forces, has said that without Barkhane, the affected countries would collapse. The general is probably right. It is true that a long term solution to the problems of the region require the local elites to find political and social solutions, as French political scientist Marc-Antoine Perouse de Montclose told the American media. But that takes time. The risk is that if the United States withdraws its support for Barkhane, the French will draw down or even leave. Without the presence of the French military, a huge geographical area becomes more than an ungoverned space; it becomes a playground for jihadis and militants of all stripes.  This has dangerous consequences for U.S. interests, including uncontrolled terrorism, increased migration to Europe—already rattled by the Syrian refugee crisis—and an increased likelihood of further humanitarian crises. A Franco-American drawdown or departure also hands a victory to the jihadists, whose goals include expelling the West from Africa. American support for the modest French military presence in West Africa is a small, albeit still insufficient, price to pay. It is hard to know how exactly things will change if the U.S. follows through, but it is likely to be contrary to U.S. interests.

President Emmanuel Macron of France hosted a summit in Pau, southwestern France, with the heads of state of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauretania, and Niger. The purpose of the summit was to improve military coordination against insurgents with a particular focus on the Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) and al-Qaeda affiliate Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM). Macron also sought, and received from the African chiefs of state, an endorsement of France’s continued presence in the region. He, in turn, pledged a small increase in the number of French soldiers to be deployed there.  The summit was at least partly prompted by demonstrations in Sahelian capitals, most recently in Mali’s capital Bamako, calling the French role “neo-colonial.” Accordng to the New York Times, many of these protests were inspired by Islamist preachers. That has not gone down well with the French; as President Macron said in advance of the summit, “I know who is dying for the citizens of Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso. It’s French soldiers.” From an American perspective, the most interesting development was the summit’s expression of unease about a possible drawdown of the American military presence in the region. It would occur at a time when insurgent activity is increasing. The heads of state explicitly stated their “gratitude for the crucial support provided by the United States and expressed the wish for its continuity.” From its bases in Niger, the United States provides intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance to France and its African partners in the Sahel. It also provides air-to-air refueling services. A French presidency source characterized to the French media the U.S. role as “irreplaceable.”  Anxiety about an American withdrawal dates from the 2018 U.S. national defense review [PDF] that signaled a shift in U.S. priorities from the war on terrorism to great power competition. The U.S. military's presence in Africa received closer scrutiny after the deaths of four servicemen in an ambush in Tongo Tongo, Niger. In the aftermath, there has been discussion of a redeployment out of West Africa of U.S. resources devoted to the fight against terrorism. However, there have been mixed messages from U.S. sources and it is not clear if any drawdown has actually taken place yet. President Macron at Pau said, “If the Americans decided to pull out of Africa, it would be very bad news for us, absolutely. I hope that I can convince President Trump that the fight against terrorism, a fight that he is fully committed to, is at stake out in this region.” According to the chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of Defense Mark Esper has not yet made a decision. 

This year, an armed confrontation over disputed maritime areas in the South China Sea was included as a top tier priority in the Center for Preventive Action’s annual Preventive Priorities Survey.

America’s longest war continues not because of government deception but because successive presidents have judged the risks of withdrawal to be higher than the costs of commitment.

In response to the proliferation of ostensibly jihadist groups in the Sahel, governments have deployed more than 20,000 international and local troops, comprising 4,500 French soldieries, 13,000 UN peacekeepers, and about 5,000 troops connected to the G5 Sahel—an initiative godfathered by France and including Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. But terror groups have grown more deadly.   Earlier this month, the Islamic State claimed responsibility for an attack that killed fifty-three soldiers and a civilian at a military base near the Malian-Nigerien border. Operating in the Sahel through its affiliate, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), it has accelerated its operations in Mali, Burkina Faso, and now in Niger, despite a significant military presence. By the end of 2019, it is predicted that ISGS will have been responsible for six hundred killings.  The relationship between the Islamic State and its affiliates (and between affiliates) in the region, principally ISGS and the Islamic State in West Africa, are unclear. Fighters can have a variety of motivations, such as disillusionment with their government, poverty, or a lack of economic opportunity, and their focus appears to be drive principally by local factors, as opposed to international jihad.  According to French media, there is growing indigenous resentment of these foreign troops, and much of it seems specifically directed at those from France. They are seen as closely tied to local country governments, which are often perceived as exploitative and out of touch with the people they ostensibly govern. For example, Ibrahim Kebe, host of a Malian anti-government radio station, characterized the African governments involved as “national lackeys under the orders of Paris,” and that “in the name of the French people, the multinationals are pillaging our resources.”  The Sahel is among the poorest regions in the world. The natural environment is delicate but harsh. It is true that there are great mineral and other riches, but their exploitation has not benefitted the people who live there. Political realities are intensely local and complicated; they are often misunderstood in national capitals, much less in Paris or Washington. A foreign military presence is bound to be disruptive, but that political granularity means that it is difficult for outsiders to judge how widespread resentment of outside forces is, or what the political impact is.

Voices from the Field features contributions from scholars and practitioners highlighting new research, thinking, and approaches to development, diplomacy and security challenges. This post is authored by Jeannette Gaudry Haynie, PhD, a Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, a combat veteran, and the founder and executive director of the Athena Leadership Project.

A U.S. military operation that eliminated Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is welcome but fails to allay worries about the security vacuum caused by the removal of U.S. troops from northern Syria.

Now a decade old, Boko Haram continues to wreak havoc in northern Nigeria, especially in Borno state. The Nigerian federal government’s strategy has so far largely been based on the use of conventional military force. Recently the army announced it was moving to a strategy of “super camps,” which are heavily fortified military bases near population centers, partly recalling an unsuccessful strategy used by U.S. forces in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Such a policy, in effect, cedes control of the countryside to the insurgents. Far from defeated, Boko Haram has intensified its activity over recent months, and the level of military casualties has surpassed that of the height of the conflict in 2014 and 2015.  Faced with a resurgent Boko Haram and an ineffectual federal government, Governor Babagana Zulum of Borno state appears to be readying a multi-pronged strategy of his own. According to press reports, he is recruiting ten thousand hunters that have “voodoo powers and hunting skills” to fight Boko Haram. With distinctive dress and amulets that purportedly protect them against bullets, they are now a visible presence in Maiduguri, the state’s capital with a population of between one and two million.  The hunters reportedly come from all over northern Nigeria and the Sahel, hence, they should be familiar with the terrain and local culture. That hunters and vigilantes are aiding in the fight against Boko Haram is not new—some state government turned to them at the height of the insurgency in 2014—but this appears to be one of the largest, most well-organized, and most well-resourced efforts. The leader of one hunting contingent said that the state government is feeding and supplying the hunters, while the governor’s spokesperson said that the Borno state government had also increased the resources available to other non-state fighting groups. The project is ambitious and apparently involves a whole-of-government approach. To complement the security initiatives, the governor also promised to enhance “access to education, job opportunities” and to provide “other means of livelihoods through social protection initiatives.” At another level, the governor has recruited thirty ulamas in Mecca to offer daily prayers for peace in Borno and Nigeria and the defeat of Boko Haram. It looks like Governor Zulum is assembling a fighting force separate and apart from the federal army and the police, though the hunters and the state government emphasize that they plan to cooperate closely with the Nigerian military. Chief of Army Staff Tukur Buratai, who led the government’s efforts against Boko Haram in 2014 and 2015, reportedly gave his blessing to the initiative in a phone call. The governor’s approach may yield success. Hunters and vigilantes, with their knowledge of the environment and culture, could prove to be more successful than the army. In intensely Islamic Borno, prayers from Mecca may undercut the Islamic claims of Boko Haram. Nevertheless, the emergence of what amounts to an army under the control of a state governor is bound to give the Federal government pause. For the moment, however, state and Federal authorities are cooperating.