Military Operations

Prime Minister Suga will keep working to upgrade Japan’s military amid increasing pressures from China, North Korea, and Russia.

U.S. troops are supposed to leave by May 1, according to a U.S.-Taliban agreement. But a complete withdrawal could be disastrous.

Steven A. Cook is Eni Enrico Mattei senior fellow for Middle East and Africa studies and director of the International Affairs Fellowship for Tenured International Relations Scholars at the Council on Foreign Relations. It has been ten years since Syrians rose up in peaceful protest against Bashar al-Assad demanding political change. In that time, half a million people have died and roughly half the population has been displaced. The uprising turned into a civil war that became a regional proxy battle and a zone where great power competition continues to grind on. Although in recent years, observers have come to believe that the Assad regime—with both Russian and Iranian backing—will prevail, victory for Damascus remains elusive. The Assad regime controls most of Syria’s territory, but significant regions in the North, Northwest, and Northeast remain beyond its control. In addition, Syria’s sovereignty is compromised. Aside from Russian and Iranian/Iranian proxy forces that support the regime, the United States and Turkey have forces on the ground in Syria and Israel routinely violates Syrian airspace in its low-level war against Iran and its allies. The Syrian Defense Forces—a Kurdish dominated group—continues to fight the Islamic State and al-Qaeda affiliates for control of Idlib. In this dynamic environment there are several scenarios for increased conflict, including between Turkey and the Kurds, Turkey and regime forces, Turkey and Russia, as well as conflict between the United States and Iranian-backed militias. There is also the risk of miscalculation and accident in the field that could lead to blows between American and Russian forces. And there is ever-present risk of a recrudescence of the Islamic State and other extremist groups. The likelihood of these conflicts materializing vary, of course, but they are all plausible. The question of whether and to what extent the United States should be involved in Syria has vexed two administrations. The conflict’s complexities are also likely to take up time and resources of the new Biden administration. The United States cares about the humanitarian disaster in Syria, wants the end of Assad’s rule, seeks to blunt Iran’s efforts to reinforce its reach in the Levant, and counter Moscow’s growing influence in the region starting with Syria. Yet, American policymakers have neither the will nor the domestic political support to invest military and financial resources to meet Syria’s challenges. As a result, barring a direct escalation of fighting that targets Americans or a significant threat from extremist groups, the United States will likely remain in Syria with modest forces, continue to employ sanctions to deny the Assad regime financial relief or the benefits of reconstruction, and use both as a leverage for a potential political solution, though thus far this policy has not produced the desired results. The status quo may be the best the United States can do, however.

This article was authored by Jamille Bigio, senior fellow with the Women and Foreign Policy program, and Cailin Crockett Truman National Security Fellow and former policy advisor on violence against women in the Obama-Biden administration.   In April this year, Airman 1st Class Natasha Aposhian arrived at Grand Forks Air Force base in North Dakota. Around the same time, Army Specialist Vanessa Guillén disappeared from her Fort Hood base in Texas after experiencing sexual harassment that, according to her family and attorney, she was too afraid to report. Both were found dead in June: Aposhian was shot and killed in her dormitory by a fellow airman she had been dating, while Guillén’s mutilated remains were discovered just outside the base, where her murderer—an Army enlisted soldier—had hidden her. The next month, in a letter to the heads of the Air Force and Army (the military branches in which Aposhian and Guillén had served), State Senator Daniel Ivey-Soto, president of the National Hispanic Caucus of State Legislators, mourned the loss. “Enlisted women—especially enlisted women of color,” he lamented, “have more to fear from those with whom they serve than from this nation’s enemies.” That’s been the sad truth for much too long, and it became even worse under the Trump administration: take as one example sexual assault in the workplace (referred to as military sexual assault)—a 2018 Pentagon survey found a 44 percent increase in the number of women victims compared to 2016. Read the full piece at Foreign Policy >>

The prospect of a contested U.S. presidential election has spurred concerns about militias appearing at voting locations. State and federal laws have strict guidelines for any deployment of forces at polls or to quell election violence, but worries persist.

Alexander Noyes (@alexhnoyes) is a political scientist at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation. Ashley Bybee is a research staff member at the Institute for Defense Analyses. Paul Clarke is an adjunct research staff member at the Institute for Defense Analyses. In August, jihadists in Niger killed six French aid workers and two Nigeriens just outside of the capital, Niamey. Terrorist attacks have increased by 250 percent over the last two years in Africa's Sahel region, according to the State Department. To help counter the threat of terrorism and build the capacity of African militaries, the U.S. government spends over $1.5 billion a year on security assistance to the African continent. Does this support work?  Reliable security cooperation and assistance data are scarce. But the existing evidence suggests that the current U.S. focus on training and equipping African partners, without due attention to governance and institutional-level reforms, has been insufficient at best and counterproductive at worst.  Focusing solely on increasing the operational capabilities of security forces in Africa runs the risk of strengthening unaccountable, corrupt, and predatory security sectors, throwing away U.S. taxpayer dollars on equipment that will not be sustained, and undermining U.S. governance and human rights priorities.  The deficiencies of the traditional train and equip approach in Africa are well documented, including anecdotes of U.S.-supplied equipment rusting on runways due to neglect, investments swallowed by corruption, and U.S.-supported militaries being used for government repression or launching coups.  A 2018 RAND study found that prior to 1990, U.S. security assistance to Africa in fact did more harm than good and was associated with an increase in civil wars. The impact of more recent efforts has also been paltry, as U.S. security assistance since 1990 in Africa "appears to have had little or no net effect on political violence."  The study found, however, that a more holistic focus on governance and institution building showed more promise. Such assistance can be a more effective way to achieve both U.S. and partner country objectives, leading to "durable improvements" in the security environment. Our research in Niger – where we served as subject matter experts for U.S. defense-institution building initiatives – supports this finding. Niger is a key partner of the U.S. in West Africa. The United States provides a range of assistance to Niger, but the country stands out because strategic-level reforms have been taken seriously by both the United States and the partner country.  Niger continues to suffer from corruption, serious allegations of abuse, and often tumultuous civil-military relations. Yet our research found that the country has made strides over the past five years toward building better defense institutions and improving its defense management practices. Niger's political leadership – at the highest levels – appears to be genuinely interested in reforms aimed at improving the professionalism and performance of their defense and internal security forces.  Our experience in Niger points to four main lessons for how to build better military institutions in low-capacity countries facing a host of threats in Africa (and beyond).  Generate high-level political will. Local buy-in and senior level political will are crucial to all security sector reform efforts, but are particularly important for institution building. Identifying and cultivating change agents to take the lead in devising and implementing potentially disruptive reforms is key to ensuring gains are made and progress is sustained. In Niger, a full-time senior-level coordinator, with excellent high-level access and working relationships with senior leaders, was critical.  Codify shared commitments. Where U.S. and partner interests align, successful reforms are more likely. In Niger, an official Joint Country Action Plan – essentially a memorandum of understanding between senior leaders on both sides – helped establish and codify shared priorities and goals, and lay out tangible ways to achieve them.  Focus on the institutional as well as the operational. Niger conducts myriad military operations and hosts U.S. defense-institution building teams concurrently. Identifying opportunities to apply defense-institution building principles to current operations is a sweet spot where partners' operational effectiveness can be enhanced while simultaneously building more effective and accountable defense institutions.  Engage holistically – support military and police reforms equally. In many African countries, police forces are just as important to security – and in need of reform – as the military. With Nigeriens in the lead, U.S. teams helped create a unified interministerial structure that allowed the military and police to work more effectively and streamline joint reforms. Institution building and reform processes are long-term endeavors where progress should be measured in decades, not years. Even where clear progress is made, defense institution building is surely no panacea for fledgling democracies struggling with recent coup legacies and allegations of abuse.  While Niger still has a long way to go, the country's recent experience suggests useful ways to help build more effective, affordable, and accountable defense sectors in other low-capacity countries facing similar challenges and threats.

Opposition supporters, fed up with a corrupt political system, lack of economic opportunity, and continued violence, are demanding the president’s resignation.

Nkasi Wodu is a lawyer, peacebuilding practitioner, and development expert based in Port Harcourt, Nigeria.  For more than two years, northwestern Nigeria has faced devastating attacks from armed bandits, particularly in the states of Zamfara, Katsina, Kaduna, Niger, and Sokoto. Such attacks are driven by many overlapping factors, including cattle rustling, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, illicit artisanal mining, youth unemployment, poverty, and inequality. This is further compounded by the weakened, stretched, and demoralized security services, who are deployed in thirty-five of Nigeria’s thirty-six states and will soon enter the second-decade of their war against Boko Haram, one of Africa’s deadliest terror groups. It is estimated that many of the armed bandits are of Fulani origin, as are many of the victims. Banditry, which includes armed robbery, murder, rape, and cattle-rustling, is present in Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Cameroon, Senegal and Mali.  According to a report [PDF] from the West Africa Network of Peacebuilding (WANEP), from January to December 2019, armed bandits were responsible for more than 1,000 civilian deaths in the Northwest. According to the Nigeria Security Tracker, this is greater than civilians killed by Boko Haram over the same period (though not greater than all those killed, which includes soldiers and Boko Haram members). The impact of these deaths have ripple effects across communities that will last generations. A committee set up to investigate the menace of armed banditry, headed by Mohammed Abubakar, a former inspector general of police, reported that in Zamfara state between June 2011 and May 2019, 4,983 women were widowed; 25,050 children were orphaned; and more than 190,000 people were displaced as a result of armed banditry.  The Nigerian security forces initially responded to this issue by increasing the deployment of the military and police to the troubled zones. These deployments were under several code names such as "Operation Puff Adder," "Diran Mikiya," "Sharan Daji," "Hadarin Daji," "Thunder Strike," and "Exercise Harbin Kunama III."  But these operations have produced mixed results. While the security forces have successfully pushed back bandit attacks, destroyed several hideouts, and killed or arrested hundreds of bandits, attacks have continued. Against this backdrop, the governors of Katsina, Sokoto, and Zamfara, agreed on a peace deal with the armed bandits in 2019. According to Governor Aminu Bello Masari of Katsina, negotiation was the best way to achieve lasting peace. The agreement involved disarmament, the release of kidnapped victims, and an amnesty for the bandits. But the agreements did not last. While there was a lull in attacks toward the end of 2019, attacks have picked up again in 2020. One state governor recently admitted that the bandits had reneged on the terms of their agreement. Following the apparent failure of the governors’ peace deal, Nigeria’s chief of army staff, Lieutenant General Tukur Buratai said recently that dialogue is “not a good military option for tackling banditry, kidnapping, and other heinous crimes currently bedeviling the North-West.” General Buratai’s admonition is telling. Whether it is dispersing protests, responding to separatist agitations or, as in one particularly brutal case, responding to the obstruction of General Buratai’s convoy, the penchant that violent problems require violent solutions is ingrained in the psyche of the Nigerian security forces. The resort to shallow and poorly conceived peace deals is an age-old failure of the Nigerian security and political establishment. To truly achieve peace, the government must start by building trust with local communities vulnerable to attacks by bandits. They should set up early warning and response systems, working with vigilantes and community leaders on the ground. And they should begin to address the structural inequalities that drive people to violence, like poverty, a lack of education and opportunity, and government mistreatment. The military in particular should redirect its attention to controlling the trafficking in small arms and light weapons, specifically by patrolling porous national borders. Banditry is not a problem that will be solved through the barrel of a gun.

Nigerian army spokesmen have announced a series of successes against Boko Haram and that terrorism had been significantly weakened in the Lake Chad Basin. But such announcements lack credibility.    According to the Nigeria Security Tracker, the last two years have been deadlier than any other period for Nigerian soldiers since the Boko Haram insurgency began in 2011. On Tuesday, Boko Haram killed thirty-seven soldiers in a deadly ambush, though military spokesmen claimed only two soldiers were killed. Soon after, videos circulated showing ostensible survivors cursing the Army and Chief of Army Staff Tukur Buratai. Last Month, Boko Haram released a video showing the execution of a Nigerian soldier and a policeman. Another video showed five kidnap victims pleading for their freedom, and a third extended fraternal greetings to Boko Haram fighters in the nearby states of Zamfara and Niger. The media in the northeast is restricted and military spokesmen lack credibility. They often undercount casualties and inflate the number of terrorists killed. The government in Abuja frequently states that victory is at hand. Hence, accurate information is hard to come by. The reality appears to be that the Nigerian army is able to secure Maiduguri and the larger towns. It has consolidated its forces into fortified bases in these population centers in part to reduce military casualties. It can even clear episodically certain rural districts. But it is not able to retain the territory it clears nor the territory around cities and towns. In this way, insurgents have at times effectively cut off ground travel to these cities and towns from the rest of the country. Buratai appears to recognize this reality. In an interview with Nigerian media, he commented that Boko Haram was hard to defeat because its operatives were blended into the population. He suggested that defeat of the jihadi insurrection could require many years. But, the frequent disconnect between official statements and the reality on the ground continues to undermine confidence in the military.