Military Operations

On Wednesday, the House Armed Services Committee held a hearing with senior Pentagon officials to review the Pentagon’s FY2015 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) budget request of $58.6 billion. Included in that request are $5 billion for the Counterterrorism Partnership Fund, of which $500 million would go to training and equipping Syrian rebels. By definition, OCO funding is outside of the normal budgeting process, and is intended to fund requirements that emerged after the federal budget was proposed on March 4. However, the hearing revealed that there is no publicly articulable plan for how the Pentagon will spend this money, only that it is being developed. Thus, given all of the existing security assistance budget authorities, many congressional members have legitimate concerns that this could become a slush fund. House Armed Services Committee Subject: "Fiscal Year 2015 OCO Budget Request," Witnesses: Michael McCord, Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller); Adm. James Winnefeld, Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Robert Work, Deputy Secretary of Defense, July 16, 2014. Rep. Adam Smith: Contained in one of those funds is an authorization for a Department of Defense effort to support friendly rebels in Syria. Now this is an effort that personally I support. I understand the limitations of it, but the bottom line is, when you look at ISIL and what’s going on in Syria and Iraq, regardless of the outcome we’re going to need friends in that region. …. Mr. Work: Well, sir, I think this is an interactive discussion that we are looking forward to. On one side is have a fully cooked plan that we can say this is exactly how we expect to spend the money and then debates the merits of the plan and the other one which is what we have tried to do is we see what’s happening in the greater Middle East and the Central Command area of responsibility and Europe. We know that we already have plenty of authorities which the Congress has given us, 1206, 1208, 1207, global sustain and lift. ….. Rep. Davis: Our regional stabilization initiative—I think it’s still an issue of why that requirement is part of the undefined transfer fund and not a direct request of Congress to provide assistance. Can you clarify that again? Mr. Work: As part of the broader counterterrorism partnership strategy that the president outlined, obviously everything that’s happening right now in Syria and Iraq has been the focus of intense discussion and debate inside the administration. And I think the president felt that we know we’re going to be doing something; we’re not certain what it is. And what we tried to do is peg to certain levels of efforts—so for example the 500 million (dollars) that we had for our partners, we just said, what would happen if we had to do something to assist one of the countries? And we just kind of built it out from there to give examples to the committee and Congress on this is the type of things that we’re anticipating. But it’s impossible for us to predict exactly right now what it might be. …. Adm. Winnefeld: And I’d just add as an example the 500 million (dollars) that we would anticipate for training and equipping Syrian opposition forces—that’s going to be subject to a very, very intense and rigorous interagency process to the deputies and the principals, ultimately the president. And then, of course, we would consult with Congress with the 15-day requirement. …. Adm. Winnefeld: Unfortunately, a lot of that is classified and I wouldn’t be able to talk about it in a hearing like this. But I would say that we are coming together on the construct of a plan that would train moderate oppositionists in the Syria. We would train them outside Syria, obviously. I can’t get into where we would do that. We would provide them with weapons, intelligence, logistic support, military advice, and they would conduct the insurgency struggle and also counter-ISIL, potentially, inside Syria. And I’d be happy to sit down with you privately and go into more detail, particularly as we get towards a decision on that. I want to make sure the president has his decisions based on this, to decide what it is—how he wants to configure this. But we do have a very good jelling together of a plan to do it. ….. Adm. Winnefeld:  There is a unanimous view inside all the decision-making apparatus I participate in that we’re not going to put boots on the ground. This is not going to be an Iraq or an Afghanistan war in Syria. It’s not even going to be a war. …. Adm. Winnefeld:  We do want to train and equip the moderate members of the opposition so they can go in there and do essentially three things. They can counter the more radical elements of the opposition who are targeting them. They can undertake to place the Assad regime under such pressure they are not under right now that would cause them to come to the negotiating table and at the same time they can defend themselves and their families. Rep. Smith: They can survive. Adm. Winnefeld: That’s the intent. The precise details of how we do that I just can’t share right now.

In May 2002, Gen. John Keane, commander of the 101st Airborne Division, vowed: “We have broken their will and they are trying to establish another safe haven now in Pakistan...when the time is right, we will deal with that one as well.” Indeed, two years later, his prediction came to pass on June 17, 2004, when a Hellfire missile killed Taliban commander Nek Mohammed, beginning the CIA campaign of drone strikes in Pakistan that continues to this day. One decade later, the United States has conducted a total of 371 drone strikes in Pakistan, killing an estimated 2,878, of which 376 were civilians. *Based on averages within the ranges provided by the New America Foundation (NAF), Long War Journal (LWJ), The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, as of June 12, 2014. Congressional overseers and former CIA officials describe the estimates listed above as being roughly accurate, although the categorization of victims remains contested, based upon how one includes the practices of signature strikes. Interestingly, these databases do not include all of the drone strikes that were revealed by the reporting of Jonathan Landry, including a May 22, 2007 strike conducted at the request of the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), Pakistan’s spy agency, to support Pakistani troops. The numbers that have been provided by different arms of the Pakistani government at different times also vary widely. After a six-month lull in early 2014, while it seemed drone strikes in Pakistan may be slowing, they began again on June 11. Bringing the first decade to a close on June 17, 2014, the United States will enter into its eleventh year of drone strikes in Pakistan. Never before in U.S. history has such a lengthy and lethal military campaign been so inadequately described or justified by the government, which retains the fiction that these strikes are “covert” and unworthy of public examination. The vast majority of congressional overseers and citizens concur.

Eric Schmitt and Brian Knowlton, “U.S. Officials Question Ability of Nigeria to Rescue Hostages,” New York Times, May 15, 2014. Even as terrorist groups throughout the world have engaged in more kidnappings for ransom to finance their operations, Pentagon officials have worried that the success in killing Osama bin Laden and a movie like “Captain Phillips,” which depicted the capture and killing of Somali pirates, have placed unrealistic expectations on the American authorities. “The United States of America doesn’t have the capacity, the capability to go rescue every kidnapped person around the world,” Gen. Mark A. Welsh III, the Air Force chief of staff, said in an interview this week. (3PA: One can already identify an emerging civilian-military disconnect about the proper use of military tools in response to the kidnappings in Nigeria. Civilians pushing for a greater commitment of personnel and capabilities to Nigeria, while the military, which certainly wants to avoid the direct intervention of ground forces, warns about the potential costs and downsides of doing this.) Doug Cameron, “Can the Pentagon Save Earth from Space Junk,” Wall Street Journal, May 15, 2014. The Pentagon later this month plans to award a contract for the first phase of its $6 billion project dubbed the Space Fence, a radar system that would track more of the fast-growing field of debris in space that threatens to disable or destroy satellites and manned spacecraft. Lockheed Martin Corp.  and Raytheon Co. are competing for a contract to build a powerful radar system intended to quintuple the amount of space junk the U.S. can monitor, and enable officials to warn satellite operators to move their spacecraft before possible collisions. (3PA: In my new memo, “Dangerous Space Incidents,” I discuss the threat of space debris and the specific need to upgrade the space fence.) “World Health Statistics 2014,” World Health Organization, May 15, 2014. WHO’s annual statistics report shows that low-income countries have made the greatest progress, with an average increase in life expectancy by 9 years from 1990 to 2012. Lesley Wroughton and Andrew Osborn, “Kerry says he’s seen raw data suggesting Syria used chlorine in attacks,” Reuters, May 15, 2014. “I have seen the raw data that suggests that there may have been, as France has suggested, a number of instances in which chlorine has been used in the conduct of war,” [John] Kerry told reporters in London. (3PA: One day before Kerry’s remarks, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, when asked about the U.S. government’s reaction to reports from France on the use of chlorine in Syria, responded: “I’m aware of the French foreign minister’s statement. We’ve not seen any evidence of the specifics of that statement.”) Naftali Bendavid, “Poll Says Anti-Semitism Is Global Matter,” Wall Street Journal, May 13, 2014. The only religious group with a higher unfavorability rating in the survey than Jews was Muslims. While 38% rated Jews favorably and 21% unfavorably, both numbers were higher for Muslims, with 47% rating them favorably and 24% unfavorably. In comparison, 62% rated Christians favorably and just 15% unfavorably, the survey found. Eric Tegler, “Duck Hunt: U.S. military plans defenses against growing UAV threat,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, March 12, 2014. The increasing number and sophistication of unmanned aircraft operators has forced into the open a discussion that was until recently behind the blinds: How can the U.S. counter adversaries’ UAVs? …Though no central counter-UAV organizing force exists in the U.S. military, discussion is centering on how to detect UAVs, whether to kill them and how to defeat them without breaking the bank. On April 30 and May 1, the Army held a technical exchange on counter-unmanned air systems (CUAS) technologies. The classified meeting drew 68 packets for review, 26 of which were presented in person. Detection, decision and defeat mechanisms at all echelons were discussed. Potential solutions ranged from kinetic and non-kinetic to electronic and cyberwarfare, according to the organizer of the exchange, Steve Bramlett, of the Army’s Aviation and Missile Research, Development and Engineering Center. Directed energy (lasers/high-power microwave) and cybernegation alternatives were of considerable interest. The most frequently offered systems, though, were ground-based and kinetic, he says. The relatively low cost of such systems and the speed with which they can be developed, acquired and deployed are likely factors in their popularity. However, all at the meeting agreed that a combined-arms approach will be essential. “All of our traditional kinetic air defense assets are big, expensive and set back at the brigade level,” Bramlett notes. “A small, inexpensive threat—commercially based, possibly a swarm—fielded by an enemy can run through our sophisticated, expensive kinetic assets quickly. That’s why we all realize we need combined arms and a cheaper kinetic solution at the tactical edge, battalion and below.” The need for such systems also implies detection and decision-making at lower levels, down to the platoon level. Defeating small UAS will not only require cost-effective negation systems but new chain-of-command mechanisms. “It’s a complicated, expensive problem,” Bramlett acknowledges. “The U.S. must negate the threat without fratricide, coalition or civilian casualty risks. The enemy doesn’t regard those problems. They’ll have cheap plentiful items and will not be concerned with positive I.D. CUAS is an asymmetric technical and financial battle.” Michael J. McNerney, Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Peter Mandaville, and Terry Hagen, “New Security and Justice Sector Partnership Models,” RAND Corporation, 2014. One might argue that U.S. leverage—and ability to push for SJS reform—would be greatest for those partners receiving high levels of FMF and spending little through FMS… However, these assumptions are not so clear, particularly in the MENA region. Table 2.1 shows that Israel, Egypt, Iraq, and Jordan dominate FMF assistance overall, as well as when accounting for population, gross domestic product (GDP), and FMF as a percentage of military expenditures. In addition to their purchases of FMF discussed above, each of these countries is critically important in advancing regional stability, counterterrorism, and other U.S. objectives, thus potentially limiting U.S. willingness to use FMF as leverage to pressure partners into SJS and political reform…In fact, no matter how FMF is considered, no country stands out as a “high FMF leverage” prospect, including those most affected by the Arab uprisings…High levels of FMF are not primarily provided to encourage reform, but rather to advance other U.S. interests in the region. (pp. 18-22) Lance Menthe, Myron Hura, and Carl Rhodes, “The Effectiveness of Remotely Piloted Aircraft in a Permissive Hunter-Killer Scenario,” RAND Corporation, 2014. We analyze the operational effectiveness of three RPA design concepts, plus the MQ-9 as a baseline, on a “hunter-killer” mission: to find and destroy a specific moving vehicle… First, there is no silver bullet for RPA performance in the hunter-killer mission. Even in this highly constrained example, no single RPA concept performed well on all measures under all environmental conditions. Second, numbers can compensate for capability. In this scenario, two or three smaller RPAs with less-capable sensor packages were often able to equal or exceed the performance of the larger RPAs employed singly. Third, the MQ-9 holds up well against the other RPA design concepts we modeled in this scenario. The MQ-9 was never dramatically outperformed and never fared worst on any measure. It compared favorably under most environmental conditions. Finally, improving MQ-9 sensor capabilities may be a cost-effective option. Although we did not perform a cost-effectiveness analysis, upgrading the sensors on existing MQ-9 platforms, in particular their FMV sensor capabilities, would permit greater operational flexibility and would offer enhanced operational effectiveness for this type of hunter-killer scenario. Furthermore, if the discrete levels of magnification currently available on the Multispectral Targeting System, Model B (MTS-B) could be replaced with a continuous zoom feature, MTS-B could be used more effectively to enable the RPA pilot and sensor operator to balance competing mission objectives. (p. xiii)

“The Secretary’s Analytical Staff Meeting on Non-Proliferation,” U.S. Department of State, August 2, 1974. SECRETARY KISSINGER: I just have a reluctance to have the United States go charging around the world, like Don Quixote, for every conceivable problem, including one of great importance, where there are other countries whose interest in it ought to be even greater, who affirm loudly that they are interested in it, and not make them share some of the responsibility. (page 41-42) Jeremy Page, “China Won’t Necessarily Observe New Conduct Code for Navies,” Wall Street Journal, April 23, 2014. Beijing won’t necessarily observe a new code of conduct for naval encounters when its ships meet foreign ones in disputed areas of the East and South China seas, according to a senior Chinese naval officer involved in negotiations on the subject. (3PA: Last month, I coauthored an article on “How to Avoid a Naval War With China,” noting that the United States and China have drastically different interpretations of current agreements that regulate interactions at sea.) “DARPA Officials Show Hagel Technologies Under Development,” U.S. Department of Defense, April 23, 2014. A defense official speaking on background told reporters that Hagel was brought up to date on the progress of three other DARPA programs: -- Plan X, a foundational cyberwarfare program to develop platforms for the Defense Department to plan for, conduct and assess cyberwarfare in a manner similar to kinetic warfare; -- Persistent close air support, a system to, among other things, link up joint tactical air controllers with close air support aircraft using commercially available tablets; and -- A long-range anti-ship missile, planned to reduce dependence on intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platforms, network links and GPS navigation in electronic warfare environments. Autonomous guidance algorithms should allow the LRASM to use less-precise target cueing data to pinpoint specific targets in the contested domain, the official said. The program also focuses on innovative terminal survivability approaches and precision lethality in the face of advanced countermeasures. “Meet the Press,” NBC News, April 20, 2014. SEN. BOB CORKER: We have relationships with 138 countries around the world where we help them with hardware and other kinds of things… SEN. BOB CORKER: I think we’re going to lose eastern Ukraine if we continue as we are. And I think it’s going to be a geopolitical disaster if that occurs. (3PA: Was Ukraine ever America’s to lose? European countries, that have more ties to Ukraine, are divided on whether they should intervene at all. Last week, a senior European official said, “Are the member states united on this? No. Are they willing to die for Ukraine? I don’t think so.” Meanwhile, John Kerry’s advisers said arming Ukraine forces is an option.) “Actions Needed to Strengthen Management of Unmanned Aerial System Pilots,” U.S. Government Accountability Office, April 10, 2014. In response to the increased demand, the Air Force has significantly increased the number of RPAs it uses for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and precision strike capabilities, according to Air Force documentation. Consequently, the Air Force has increased the number of its pilots flying RPAs from approximately 400 in 2008 to about 1,350 in 2013. As of December 2013, there were 1,366 RPA pilots, or around 85 percent of the total of 1,600 pilots determined by the Air Force as necessary to sustain RPA operations and training for 65 CAPs. In addition, the Air Force anticipates increasing the number of RPA pilot staff positions across the Air Force from 111 as of December 2013 to 300 by fiscal year 2023 to serve at various Air Force commands, including at Headquarters Air Force and Air Combat Command. Jason Lyall, “Bombing to Lose? Airpower and the Dynamics of Coercion in Counterinsurgency Wars,” Social Science Research Network, April 6, 2014. I take up the challenge of theorizing and testing the coercive effects of airpower in counterinsurgency wars… Four main findings emerge. First, airstrikes and, to a lesser extent, shows of force, are strongly associated with net increases in the mean number of post-event insurgent attacks in targeted villages relative to control villages. Second, these increases are fairly long-lived, lasting at least 90 days after an air operation, though the magnitude of the effect dissipates over time. Third, consistent with a reputation-based argument, these effects are largest in the immediate vicinity of the targeted location. Finally, and perhaps most counterintuitively, these effects are not associated with civilian casualties. Instead, battle field dynamics provide nearly all explanatory leverage when accounting for post-event patterns in insurgent attacks… (page 1-2) In our context, airpower as a coercive instrument comes in two forms. First, shows of force are non-lethal threats that signal to insurgents that punishment will be forthcoming if they do not cease their actions…Second, airstrikes represent the actual imposition of harm on insurgent organizations to compel them to abandon their political ambitions by imposing costs on rebels, their leadership, and supporters among the populace. (page 4)

Jeanne Whalen and Alan Cullison, “Ukraine Battles to Rebuild a Depleted Military,” Wall Street Journal, March 25, 2014. In recent weeks Mr. Yarema has turned to Washington and NATO for help, but with little luck so far. Ukraine’s military lacks much of an air force, and if fighting breaks out he expects that Russia would be able to pound Ukrainian ground troops with impunity. In meetings with U.S. senators and Western diplomats, he says he asked for help establishing a no-fly zone over Ukraine’s 15 nuclear reactors so that his troops could at least count on some zones of safety... (3PA: When a foreign government or opposition group wants low-risk U.S. military involvement, the no-fly zone has become the default request. Revisit my piece in the Atlantic for more on this trend.) “Concluding observations on the fourth report of the United States of America,” UN Human Rights Committee, March 2014. Targeted killings using unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) The Committee is concerned about the State party’s practice of targeted killings in extraterritorial counter-terrorism operations using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) also known as ‘drones’, the lack of transparency regarding the criteria for drone strikes, including the legal justification for specific attacks, and the lack of accountability for the loss of life resulting from such attacks. The Committee notes the State party’s position that drone strikes are conducted in the course of its armed conflict with Al- Qaida, the Taliban, and associated forces and in accordance with its inherent right of national self-defense and are governed by international humanitarian law, as well as by the Presidential Policy Guidance that sets out standards for the use of lethal force outside areas of active hostilities. Nevertheless, the Committee remains concerned about the State party’s very broad approach to the definition and the geographical scope of an armed conflict, including the end of hostilities, the unclear interpretation of what constitutes an “imminent threat” and who is a combatant or civilian taking a direct part in hostilities, the unclear position on the nexus that should exist between any particular use of lethal force and any specific theatre of hostilities, as well as the precautionary measures taken to avoid civilian casualties in practice (arts. 2, 6, and 14). The State party should revisit its position regarding legal justifications for the use of deadly force through drone attacks. It should: (a) ensure that any use of armed drones complies fully with its obligations under article 6 of the Covenant, including in particular with respect to the principles of precaution, distinction and proportionality in the context of an armed conflict; (b) subject to operational security, disclose the criteria for drone strikes, including the legal basis for specific attacks, the process of target identification and the circumstances in which drones are used; (c) provide for independent supervision and oversight over the specific implementation of regulations governing the use of drone strikes; (d) in armed conflict situations, take all feasible measures to ensure the protection of civilians in specific drone attacks and to track  5 and assess civilian casualties, as well as all necessary precautionary measures in order to avoid such casualties; (e) conduct independent, impartial, prompt and effective investigations of allegations of violations of the right to life and bring to justice those responsible; (f) provide victims or their families with an effective remedy where there has been a violation, including adequate compensation, and establish accountability mechanisms for victims of allegedly unlawful drone attacks who are not compensated by their home governments... “Death Sentences and Executions 2013,” Amnesty International, 2014. Executions were recorded in 22 countries during 2013, one more than in the previous year. As in 2012, it could not be confirmed if judicial executions took place in Egypt or Syria. The overall number of reported executions worldwide was 778, an increase of almost 15% compared with 2012. As in previous years, this figure does not include the thousands of people executed in China; with the death penalty treated as a state secret the lack of reliable data does not allow Amnesty International to publish credible minimum figures for China...   Rep. Michael Rogers, “A Special Message from Rep. Rogers,” March 27, 2014. What other job on earth could take you from sitting in the CIA Director’s office helping to plan the operation to kill Osama bin Laden one week, to traveling to the far reaches of the tribal areas of Pakistan where few Americans have ever been the next, to meeting with a protester in Ukraine who had his ear cut off standing up to Vladimir Putin’s goons the next?... (3PA: Why would the House Intelligence Committee Chair help to plan the operation that killed Bin Laden? And who oversaw his planning activities? A few more of Rogers’ notable statements include: “I think the Chinese got everything they needed they need out of Snowden. The Russians have now gotten everything they need out of Snowden. And the next I think — chapter in this book is somewhere in the Latin America one of these countries who is antagonistic to the United States, who is an adversary to the United States, using this as a public relations tool.” (CNN, July 7, 2013) “We did this in the 1930s. We turned it off–1929 the Secretary of State, at that time, where we were collecting information to protect America said you know we should do this. This is unseemly. Turned it off. So that led to a whole bunch of misunderstandings that led to World War II that killed millions and millions of people.” (CBS, November 3, 2013) “Everybody agrees that Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program.” (Business Week, March 17, 2013) “China is a rational actor…Iran is not a rational actor.” (New York Times, March 3, 2013).)

“U.S. Special Operations Command in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for FY2015 and the Future Years Defense Program,” Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, March 11, 2014. SENATOR JANET "KAY" HAGAN (D-NC): The ability of SOCOM to carry out the full range of missions it has been assigned does not solely rely on the size of its budget, but also on the authorities available to SOF [Special Operations Forces]. Last year the office of the ASD-SOLIC [Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict] completed a report which raised a number of concerns about the patchwork of authorities used by SOF to engage with partner-nation security forces… (3PA: Anyone interested in FOIAing this document?) MICHAEL LUMPKIN:  Since October 2001, 385 special operators have been killed in action, and another 2,160 have been wounded. I am committed to doing everything I can to ensure these warriors have the best training, equipment and support we can provide. Working closely with Congress, we will surely have the right strategies and policies in place to employ them effectively… ADM. MCRAVEN:  It is important for us to make sure we’re maintaining our readiness as we continue to project forces around the world. As was mentioned earlier, I think this week we are actually in 84 countries around the world and we’ve got approximately 7,000 people deployed globally right now and we think that, and possibly more, is going to be an enduring requirement… SENATOR BILL NELSON (D-FL): Following up on Senator Fischer’s comments, take for example the Air Force’s plan of 55 steady-state drone patrols. Is that going to be enough for you for your ISR needs? MR. LUMPKIN: If my understanding is correct, the SOCOM requirement is 44, what they call, caps. These are the orbits that the Air Force reduction is going to have an effect on support of USSOCOM. They can source 15 caps organically based on reprioritization of aircraft and movement, but that puts a significant burden on the Air Force, and their downsizing will have an impact. We’re still looking through what that will look like and the scope and regionally where it will be. One of the challenges we see, as the threat disperses globally and takes on farther reaches, it makes it harder to get places. So basing for those RPAs, those remote piloted aircraft, becomes more difficult as you spread them across the globe. Your orbits don’t always have the same impact as they do in a more concentrated area… SEN. NELSON: When we pull out of Afghanistan, do you feel confident that you can keep enough SOF forces in the area so that if, for example, something happened and we had to go back in we could do it on a quick turnaround and get back in? MR. LUMPKIN: From a policy perspective, as we look at the absence of a bilateral security agreement is what I’m understanding you’re asking the question about. The absence of one will make things significantly more difficult to conduct the counterterrorism operations that USSOCOM and USCENTCOM work in conjunction with the interagency. So options are being looked at on what that would look like, but it becomes significantly more problematic on how we would do business and meet the threats to this nation without a bilateral security agreement… ADM. MCRAVEN:  One of the areas where, again, it becomes a little bit of an unknown for us is the access that we may be granted by a particular nation. The great thing about special operations forces is we are a small footprint, we are low-cost, you can put a small special forces detachment or a SEAL platoon in there that I think gives you great return on your investment, and if the policymakers decide that they don’t like the direction we’re heading, it’s pretty easy to reverse the decision and pull them out. So that is kind of fungible across the globe… ADM. MCRAVEN: I would even go so far as to say our relationship with the CIA is fabulous. I’ve been on the ground with the agency continuously for the last 10 to 12 years. And I will tell you, they have magnificent intelligence officers. We are partnered not only at the chief of station level but at the chief of mission level in many of the nations we talked about. We have personal and professional relationships that were brought together under fire. I have never seen them this good, and I have a great personal and professional relationship with Director John Brennan. So it’s the best I’ve ever seen in my 37 years of doing this business, sir. SENATOR LINDSEY GRAHAM (R-SC): If we went to the zero option in Afghanistan for whatever reason, Admiral McRaven, what do you think would happen? ADM. MCRAVEN: …I’d be concerned that if we went to a zero option, as Secretary Lumpkin said, it would make that a lot more challenging. Does it mean that we couldn’t do it? No, sir. I think we would find a way to keep the pressure on, but it would make it significantly more challenging… SEN. GRAHAM:  Secretary Lumpkin, do we have the authority, legally under the AUMF or other authorities, to deal with al-Qaeda threats that are emerging throughout Africa and in Syria? MR. LUMPKIN: If it’s, again, one of those al-Qaeda affiliates, then the AUMF gives us the authority to act as necessary. SEN. GRAHAM: Are we locked in by their organizational structure? I mean, can the enemy use their organizational structure naming to deny us capabilities to protect the country? MR. LUMPKIN: I think that if there is an affiliate and an associate and it’s been recognized, regardless of what they call themselves and the relationship, I think that, of course we’d have to go to the (lawyer’s group?), but my sense is that we would probably be in a good place to use the AUMF. SEN. GRAHAM: Does the Congress need to do anything from your point of view to enhance your legal standing? MR. LUMPKIN: The AUMF has served us very well and gives the department the ability to do what’s necessary. Currently, however, I think we’re at a point where the AUMF—at some point we need to relook at it… SENATOR JACK REED (D-RI): Admiral McRaven, can you just give us—and I know this is an open session—sort of a response to how you’re adapting SOCOM to a battlefield that’s increasingly dominated by cyber, operationally in terms of interfering with equipment that you have huge superiority into a whole spectrum? Can you give us a sort of sense of that? ADM. MCRAVEN: Yes, sir. Our approach, really, has been to stay closely partnered with the National Security Agency and now Cyber Command as we look at our cyber requirements. So the National Security Agency and Cyber Command have done a great job for, again, the last 12 years that I have spent time kind of intimately with the cybersupport teams that come from Cyber Command, that come from NSA, in supporting us. So what we do is we provide our demands. If we’re looking for a particular individual, then we will make sure that we are linked with the NSA. They will, through their technical means, figure out how to identify that person. So instead of us at U.S. SOCOM building an additional capability to conduct cyber operations, we use the experts at Cyber Command and NSA to do that. What we do have is a small element at all of the combatant commands now that help us with the planning and the access to NSA and to CYBERCOM… SEN. KAINE: You know, just wrestling with what Congress should do, if the war is ending at the end of our 2014 activities in Afghanistan, should the authorization expire? MR. LUMPKIN: Again, as I mentioned to Senator Graham earlier, I think we’re at the point where, while the AUMF has supported the needs of the department in order to execute the missions at hand—in order to protect the homeland and American interests—I think we’re at an inflection point that may be a time to look at the AUMF to see if it does need adjustment to better serve this country. SEN. KAINE: Whether there might be a need to consider sort of a Chapter 2 version? MR. LUMPKIN: Potentially. And I look forward to working with the Congress as they consider and shape these issues… SEN. KAINE:  Has there been work done to the extent of either of your knowledge to determine, in the absence of the current AUMF, would the DOD, more broadly our defense establishment, have the tools necessary to wage the battle against terrorism that is needed circa 2014? MR. LUMPKIN: Well, clearly, the president does have constitutional authorities as the commander in chief. Previously, al-Qaida, prior to 9/11, has been engaged in the past. So it can be done. I think that we are at a natural inflection point. I think it’s a good time to sit back and look and see where we’re at, look at the threat in the future and make sure we clearly craft something that has left and right flanks, that has a program time to relook to make sure it serves our interests and gives us the ability to engage the threats that face us not only today but also tomorrow… SEN. HAGAN: In my opening remarks, I mentioned something about the remediation process. Do you have any recommendations for improving the vetting process or for a remediation process? And what do the other partnering nations actually do for a remediation? ADM. MCRAVEN: So the remediation process is an area where we have an interagency working group that’s going to see how we can improve the process. As Secretary Lumpkin said, I am fully supportive of the Leahy human rights vetting, always have been. My concern has always been the process and how expeditious the process is for us to get to a solution, whether or not a particular unit has in fact committed gross human rights violations or has not, and therefore we can either continue on with training or not. And that process, I think, needs improving between State Department and the Department of Defense. And actually Capitol Hill. We are working with all three of those in an effort to figure out how do we adhere to the letter of the law and the spirit of the law but do so in a manner that allows us to get back into a training venue as rapidly as possible if we can confirm that no gross human rights violations have occurred. So I think there’s a good-faith effort going on among the interagency to get to that point. SEN. HAGAN: And of the 170,000 do you have any idea of percent or number that people don’t make the vetting? And then you mentioned gross human rights violations. Is domestic violence included in any of these? MR. LUMPKIN: My understanding is that 2 percent don’t pass the vetting requirement… SEN. FISCHER: Admiral, you used the term "irreconcilable" to characterize the most extreme elements of our adversaries, the terrorists. How do you separate those who you believe are reconcilable with those who are irreconcilable? What’s the difference here? ADM. MCRAVEN: I think it requires thorough analysis. We don’t take any steps to go after anyone unless we know for a fact that they are kind of on the irreconcilable end on the counterterrorism part of direct action. And I’m not sure I can give you a great example of somebody—I mean, I know who we think is irreconcilable. Whether or not they are irreconcilable, I think, remains to be seen. But we do look at a body of people: some of the most virulent members of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, core al-Qaeda, al-Qaeda in the Islamic lands of the Maghreb. We know that the leadership there, I would contend, is irreconcilable. That no amount of negotiations, no amount of placation is going to put them in a position where they’re prepared to support universal values as we know them. And so as we look at all of the threats out there, I know a determination is made as we go through the process of determining whether or not an individual needs to have action against them. And that is, again, a very, very well-defined, thorough process to get to that point. But there are a lot of irreconcilables out there. (3PA: Note that on February 27, McRaven declared: “We need to be prepared to conduct direct action when those threats have a clear and present danger to the United States or to our interests.” This categorization, like the “irreconcilables” label, is different from the “continuing and imminent threat to the American people” standard presented by President Obama last May.)