Military Operations | Council on Foreign Relations

Intelligence

You Might Have Missed: U.S.-China Relations, Olympics, and Intelligence Assessments

Rear Admiral John Kirby, “Department of Defense Press Briefing with Rear Admiral Kirby in the Pentagon Briefing Room,” Department of Defense, February 20, 2014. Q: I’d like to ask you about this Human Rights Watch report on the drone strike in Yemen from December 12th. They say that this JSOC [Joint Special Operations Command] operation with the drone targeted a convoy of 11 vehicles and that civilians were killed and injured, including a bride. How does that reconcile with the president’s guidance that civilians would not be targeted in drone strikes and that drones wouldn’t be authorized to target and kill someone, if there were civilians in the vicinity? REAR ADM. KIRBY: There’s a lot there, Jen. So, first of all, we just -- just like you, we just got this Human Rights Watch report, and so we’re working our way through it. I’m not going to talk about specific operations from the podium. What I can tell you is that, look, the guidelines are pretty clear about these type of operations and how we conduct them. If there are allegations or suspicions that civilians were hurt or injured in them, we investigate those thoroughly. And I can also tell you that nobody takes more care than we do to try to prevent unintended casualties when -- when any military operation is conducted, to include those kinds of missions. The president was very clear back in his May speech about transparency and due care and due process in conducting these missions. And believe you me, we take that guidance very, very seriously here. Q: So have you launched an investigation (OFF-MIKE) REAR ADM. KIRBY: Whenever there are allegations regarding the -- the potential loss of life of civilians, we investigate thoroughly, and that’s about as far as I’m going to go on this. Q: Right now, you’re saying that today was the first time that you realized that there may have been civilian casualties in this specific... REAR ADM. KIRBY: I didn’t say that. I said we just got the Human Rights Watch report, and we’re going through it. I’m also not talking about any specific operations here or that specific one that was written about. I would also point you to comments made by the Yemeni government itself with respect to that operation, that they believed very strongly and had reason to believe that -- that there were some pretty bad folks that were killed in that operation. Q: Yeah, but 11 vehicles in a convoy -- are you saying that there was no suspicion up until now that there were civilians in that convoy? REAR ADM. KIRBY: That’s not what I said, Jen. I’m not going to talk about the specific -- specifics of any operation. So I’m just not going to -- I’m not going to go there with respect to the operation that was written about in the Human Rights Watch report. I’d just reiterate what I said before. The Yemeni government itself said that -- that very dangerous individuals were targeted in an operation in December. And I’ll -- and then separately from that, whenever we have reason to believe that we -- that we may have unintentionally hurt or killed civilians, we investigate thoroughly. Q: Were you aware that the Yemenis paid blood money to the relatives of those who were killed? REAR ADM. KIRBY: I’m not going to speak to the actions of a foreign government. Again, we’re working our way through this Human Rights Watch report. (3PA: Note that the Pentagon spokesperson highlights alleged statements made by the Yemeni government that support the U.S. drone strikes, and seconds later says “I’m not going to speak to the actions of a foreign government.” An astonishingly fast contradiction in principles.) Geoff Dyer, “US v China: is this the new cold war?” Financial Times, February 20, 2014. One senior Pentagon official insisted to me, “This is not an anti-China battle plan.” But when the Pentagon starts to describe the threats it is facing – long-range, precision-strike missiles that can restrict the movements of its ships, advanced submarines and expertise in cyberwar – it becomes clear that AirSea Battle is primarily about China. The hypothetical threat that the Pentagon planners outline describes accurately the precise strategy that China has been developing to restrict US access to the western Pacific. No wonder US military officers sometimes refer to China as “Voldemort” – in the Pentagon’s new battle plan, China is the enemy whose name they dare not speak. Amid the military jargon there lies an idea that – if taken to its logical conclusion – is fraught with peril. In early 2012, the Pentagon released a document called “Joint Operational Access Concept” (known in the building as Joac). In the event of a conflict, the paper says, the US should “attack the enemy’s cyber and space” capabilities. At the same time, it should attack the enemy’s anti-access forces “in depth”. The clear implication of this advice is that, if war ever were to break out, the US should plan to launch extensive bombing raids across mainland China. China’s “anti-navy” of missile bases and surveillance equipment is based at facilities spread across the country, including in many built-up areas. The basic idea behind AirSea Battle leads to a fairly uncompromising conclusion that, in the early stages of a conflict with Beijing, the US should destroy dozens of military sites. It is the navy’s version of “shock and awe” for 21st-century Asia. Karen DeYoung, “U.S., allies agree on standards for which opposition groups in Syria will receive aid,” Washington Post, February 20, 2014. The senior administration official discounted reports this week of major changes in the administration’s Syria policy — spurred by recent statements from Secretary of State John F. Kerry and others — as “overstated. You would think we had a formal tasking” to come up with new options, the official said. “That is not the case.” Bruce Horowitz, “Olympic sponsors on edge before Winter Games,” USA Today, February 6, 2014. Major sponsors all have multimillion-dollar campaigns in place, many featuring Olympic athletes. Most also have, at least on paper, ads of compassion and support that could air following any incidents of terrorism. "Any delay in these communications would show you’re not as caring," notes Bernstein. Kathleen M. Vogel, “Expert Knowledge in Intelligence Assessments,” International Security, Vol. 38, No. 3, Winter 2013/14. Within a month of Fouchier’s announcement, a virologist at the University of Wisconsin, Yoshihiro Kawaoka, revealed that members of his laboratory had also created a different kind of mutated, air-transmissible H5N1 virus. Locked in a tight race for credit for their scientific discoveries, Fouchier and Kawaoka announced that they had submitted manuscripts to the journals Nature and Science for publication. Soon, government officials and the media were raising alarms about the wisdom of publishing such experimental methods and results in the open scientific literature. Their concerns sparked a large public controversy about these experiments and whether they should be published at all. As news of Fouchier’s and Kawaoka’s experiments spread, U.S. intelligence analysts began assessing the potential security implications of their pending publication. They wrestled with questions such as: How much of a threat do scientific publications such as these pose for bioterrorism? Could a terrorist, criminal, or state easily replicate these experiments and create mutated viruses for bioweapons use?... In contrast to most commentaries on the H5N1 publication controversy, the focus of this article is not on Fouchier or Kawaoka or on the U.S. policy officials and science advisers involved in the controversy. Instead, it examines how U.S. intelligence analysts, invisible in public accounts of the controversy, sought to assess the potential security threat posed by the publication of the H5N1 experiments. The study yields three important findings. First, U.S. intelligence analysts do not have adequate social and material resources to identify and evaluate the tacit knowledge, or know-how, that underpins dual-use experiments such as those in the H5N1 case. Second, they lack dedicated structures and methods to sort through the politics that characterize the use of technical expertise in such controversial biosecurity issues. Third, they require new types, structures, and assessments of expert knowledge to enable them to make more informed and balanced judgments of biosecurity threats.

Blog Post by Micah Zenko February 21, 2014 Politics, Power, and Preventive Action
Intelligence

You Might Have Missed: Israeli Drones, Benghazi, and the NSA

Jim Garamone, “Special Ops Forces in Transition, Pentagon Official Says,” U.S. Department of Defense, February 12, 2014. Network threats present new challenges and require new ways of planning, the assistant secretary told the audience, and cyber operations come to mind first. “As we continue to work our doctrine for response in the cyber realm,” he said, “it is entirely possible that SOF units, or even individuals, would be called upon to act online or offline to address these threats.” (3PA: Note that the NSA is already creating thirteen offensive cyber teams. Overlapping missions and redundancy is quickly defining the U.S. military’s approach to the cyber realm.) Ken Dilanian, “Sen. Levin’s bid to boost drone oversight falters in Congress,” Los Angeles Times, February 12, 2014. Sen. Carl Levin (D-Mich.), who chairs the Armed Services Committee, held a joint classified hearing Thursday with the Senate Intelligence Committee on CIA and military drone strikes against suspected terrorists…But the White House did not allow CIA officials to attend, so military counter-terrorism commanders testified on their own. Levin’s plan ran aground on the Washington shoals of secrecy and turf, according to congressional aides and other U.S. officials, none of whom would be quoted by name discussing classified oversight matters. Tamir Eshel, “IAI Designed its New Drone to be an MTCR Compliant Platform,” Defense Update, February 11, 2014. Israel Aerospace Industries’ (IAI) unveiled today at the Singapore Air Show an enhanced design of its Heron I unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) called ‘Super heron’. The new drone offers improved payload capacity and optional Heavy Fuel Engine configuration. Its weight/range characteristics position it below the MTCR export control threshold, thus improving its competitive advantage… The drone weighs 1,450 kg (3,197 lbs) and can carry a payload of 450 kg (992 lbs), positioning the platform 50 kg below the MTCR limits imposing export restrictions on guided platforms capable of delivering payloads (a.k.a warheads) of 500kg (1,102 lbs) weight over distances of more than 300km (162 nm). Jeremy Scahill and Glenn Greenwald, “The NSA’s Secret Role in the U.S. Assassination Program,” Intercept, February 10, 2014. According to a former drone operator for the military’s Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) who also worked with the NSA, the agency often identifies targets based on controversial metadata analysis and cell-phone tracking technologies. Rather than confirming a target’s identity with operatives or informants on the ground, the CIA or the U.S. military then orders a strike based on the activity and location of the mobile phone a person is believed to be using… In one tactic, the NSA “geolocates” the SIM card or handset of a suspected terrorist’s mobile phone, enabling the CIA and U.S. military to conduct night raids and drone strikes to kill or capture the individual in possession of the device… According to the former drone operator, the geolocation cells at the NSA that run the tracking program – known as Geo Cell –sometimes facilitate strikes without knowing whether the individual in possession of a tracked cell phone or SIM card is in fact the intended target of the strike… What’s more, he adds, the NSA often locates drone targets by analyzing the activity of a SIM card, rather than the actual content of the calls. Based on his experience, he has come to believe that the drone program amounts to little more than death by unreliable metadata. (3PA: For earlier reporting of how the NSA supported the first ever drone strike, see James Bamford’s groundbreaking 2006 article in the Atlantic.) Danielle Douglas and Craig Timberg, “Experts warn of coming wave of serious cybercrime,” Washington Post, February 9, 2014. Only 11 percent of businesses have adopted industry-standard security measures, said a recent report by Verizon Enterprise Solutions, and outside experts say even these “best practices” fall short of what’s needed to defeat aggressive hackers lured by the prospect of a multimillion-dollar heist. (3PA: On February 12, the White House launched the Cybersecurity Framework that presented voluntary guidelines for industry. During a background briefing on the framework, a senior administration official said: “Voluntary standards are a tradition in the United States because they work. When industries get together and determine for themselves what standards describe a quality of a product, these standards are much more likely to be adopted quickly and implemented fully.” Clearly 89 percent of firms do not believe this. Also, review the history of voluntary commercial airline security before 9/11.) Howard P. “Buck” McKeon, “Majority Interim Report: Benghazi Investigation Update,” U.S. House Armed Services Committee, February 2014. Immediately after the terrorist attack in Benghazi, Libya on September 11, 2012, the Committee on Armed Services began an ongoing extensive effort to evaluate the response of the Department of Defense (DOD). In addition to assessing how the Department reacted, the committee seeks to determine what preparations the U.S. military had made for the possibility of an attack in Libya, and what arrangements have subsequently been put into place to minimize the possibility of a similar recurrence. The U.S. military’s response to the Benghazi attack was severely degraded because of the location and readiness posture of U.S. forces, and because of lack of clarity about how the terrorist action was unfolding. However, given the uncertainty about the prospective length and scope of the attack, military commanders did not take all possible steps to prepare for a more extended operation. As the result of a specific request from the committee, DOD accounted for the location of each of its AC-130 aircraft in the military’s inventory. DOD reported to the committee that no AC-130s were in the region in the days before the Benghazi attack, including for maintenance, crew rest, or merely transiting through the area. (3PA: There is a great summary of potential military responses on pages 15 to 30.)

Blog Post by Micah Zenko February 14, 2014 Politics, Power, and Preventive Action
International Organizations

Tracking Civilian Deaths in Afghanistan

This blog post was coauthored with my research associate, Amelia M. Wolf. Since the Afghanistan war began twelve years and four months ago, the fate of innocent civilians has been a constant focus of Afghan and international audiences. Trying to understand and assign responsibility for harm to noncombatants in an insurgency/counterinsurgency conflict has been tremendously difficult, due to the obstacles faced by reporters and human rights investigators to obtain direct access to alleged victims, and the motivated biases of combatants to defend their targeting practices. Recently, the office of Afghan President Hamid Kharzai has taken to distributing demonstrably fake evidence to attempt to blame the United States for civilian deaths, and blamed the U.S. military for terrorist attacks overwhelmingly believed to have been committed by the Taliban. In an effort to better document the overall civilian deaths, assign responsibility, and identify the means of lethality, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) has produced 12 reports on the protection of civilians since 2007. The reports are prepared by UNAMA’s Human Rights Unit that is directed by the country representative for the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Georgette Gagnon. As the best independent and impartial source of information, we have summarized UNAMA’s grim data for the nearly 17,500 documented civilian deaths in the table below. Terminology Aerial attack or air strike: Firing ordnance from aircraft, including close air support (CAS) from fixed-wing aircraft, and close combat attack (CCA) from rotary-wing aircraft, and attacks using remotely piloted aircraft (RPA). Anti-Government Elements: ‘Anti-Government Elements’ encompass all individuals and armed groups involved in armed conflict with or armed opposition against the Government of Afghanistan and/or international military forces. They include those who identify as “Taliban” as well as individuals and non-State organized armed groups taking a direct part in hostilities and assuming a variety of labels including the Haqqani Network, Hezb-e-Islami, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Islamic Jihad Union, Lashkari Tayyiba, Jaysh Muhammed, and other militia and armed groups pursuing political, ideological or economic objectives including armed criminal groups directly engaged in hostile acts on behalf a party to the conflict. Civilian: For the purposes of the conduct of hostilities “civilians” are understood, under international humanitarian law, to mean all persons who are not members of military/paramilitary forces or members of organized armed groups who have a continuous combat function, of a party to a conflict. Civilians may lose their protection against attacks for such time as they take direct part in hostilities. A person who is a member of a military/paramilitary force or of an organized armed group and who is hors de combat (wounded, sick, shipwrecked, detained or surrendering) or who belongs to the medical or religious personnel of the armed forces must be protected from attack. ‘Complex attack’: a deliberate and coordinated attack which includes a suicide device (i.e body-borne improvised explosive device, vehicle-borne improvised explosive device), more than one attacker and more than one type of device (i.e. body-borne improvised explosive device and mortars). All three elements must be present for an attack to be considered complex. EOF Incidents: Escalation of Force incidents also referred to as “force protection” incidents: situations where civilians do not pay attention to warnings from military personnel when in the proximity of, approaching or overtaking military convoys or do not follow instructions at check points. ISAF defines EoFs as: “a defensive process which seeks to determine the presence of a threat, its eventual extent and when applicable to match the threat with an appropriate defensive response for Force protection.” IED: Improvised Explosive Device. A bomb constructed and deployed in ways other than in conventional military action. IEDs can take the form of suicide bombs, such as Personal-Borne IEDs (PB-IED), Radio-Controlled IEDs (RC-IEDs), Vehicle-Borne IEDs (VB-IEDs), Suicide Vehicle Borne IEDs (SV-IED), Command-Wire IEDs (CW-IEDs), Victim-Operated IEDs (VO-IEDs), and Pressure-Plate IEDs (PP-IEDs). IM Forces: “International Military Forces” includes all foreign soldiers forming part of ISAF and US Forces Afghanistan (including Operation Enduring Freedom) who are under the command of the Commander of ISAF (COMISAF), who is also Commander of US Forces in Afghanistan. The term also encompasses Special Operations Forces and other foreign intelligence and security forces. Pro-Government Forces: Afghan Government National Security Forces and other forces and groups that act in military or paramilitary counter-insurgency operations and are directly or indirectly under the control of the Government of Afghanistan. These forces include, but are not limited to, the ANA, ANP, ABP, NDS, ALP and other Pro-Government local defense forces. Afghanistan National Security Forces include: ANA, which reports to the Ministry of Defense and is formally incorporated into the armed forces of Afghanistan; Afghan Local Police, which are considered a de facto part of the armed forces because of their function and do not have the legal protection afforded to civilians; and ANP, AUP, and ANBP, which are law enforcement agencies not formally incorporated into the armed forces of Afghanistan that report to the Ministry of Interior. Members of law enforcement agencies lose their protection as civilians when they function as part of the armed forces or directly participate in hostilities. For members of police units which never have combat functions, use of force in self-defense does not result in loss of protection as a civilian. This term also includes international military forces and other foreign intelligence and security forces (see IM Forces). Targeted Killing: Intentional, premeditated and deliberate use of lethal force by States or their agents acting under color of law (or by an organized armed group in armed conflict) against a specific individual who is not in the perpetrator’s physical custody. Although in most circumstances targeted killings violate the right to life, in the exceptional circumstance of armed conflict, they may be legal. UAVs: also defined as Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA). There is no distinction between the terms RPA, UAV and drones. UNAMA may be under reporting the number of civilian casualties from UAVs because UNAMA is not always able to confirm which type of aerial platform was used during an operation (i.e. fixed-wing, rotary-wing or UAV) that resulted in civilian casualties. International military forces do not routinely make information about air operations available due to its classification.

Blog Post by Micah Zenko February 10, 2014 Politics, Power, and Preventive Action

Intelligence

You Might Have Missed: Global Threats Hearing, China’s ADZ, Drones in Pakistan

Hearing on Global Threats to the U.S., U.S. House Intelligence Committee, February 4, 2014. REPRESENTATIVE JAN SCHAKOWSKY (D-IL): Director Clapper, do you have any concrete intelligence of a relationship between Snowden and the Russian government in regard to the stolen documents? DIR. CLAPPER: That’s best discussed in a closed session, as we discussed last night. REP. SCHAKOWSKY: OK. I want to thank you, Director Clapper, for your robust defense of transparency, which has been characterized, actually, as a potential threat to our security or dismissed as politics. And I prefer to call it democracy. I believe that the national debate on domestic surveillance has been valuable, but unfortunately, it was an NSA contract leaker who initiated it and not the government. And the drone program is another example of a significant activity that the public is trying to discuss that has been thwarted by a lack of transparency. This year, both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have conducted serious research and raised very legitimate concerns about the consequences of the drone program on (your own?) security, that the government has not responded. Director Clapper, what steps can the intelligence community take to increase transparency into the drone program and foster a responsible national debate? DIR. CLAPPER: Well, we’re speaking of activities that are conducted covertly. So that’s one area where being transparent is one of a number of areas where we’re not going to be able to perhaps be as fully transparent as some might like. John, do you want to add to that? DIR. BRENNAN: When I was at the White House and I was assistant to the president of the counterterrorism, I spoke repeatedly, publicly about the so-called drones, or remotely piloted aircraft that had become an instrument of war. And I spoke about that to the extent that I could. But this is something that I think has been discussed quite broadly. REP. SCHAKOWSKY: Does the intelligence community weigh or consider how signature strikes against unnamed military-age males may increase the terrorist threat because it could generate hatred for Americans, and actually motivate you to join rather than reject terrorist groups? DIR. BRENNAN: From an intelligence community perspective, we’re always evaluating and analyzing developments overseas to include any counterterrorism activity that we might be involved in to see what the impact is. And I think the feeling is that the counterterrorism activities that we have engaged in with our partners -- we the U.S. government broadly, both from an intelligence perspective as well as from a military perspective, have greatly mitigated the threat to U.S. persons both overseas as well as in the homeland. REP. SCHAKOWSKY: And do you believe that the signature strike model, if adopted by other countries that are developing an armed drone program, can be a threat to the United States? DIR. CLAPPER : Well, it could be, but I would have to comment on the -- to the extent that we can talk about this here -- the great care that is exercised by the United States. And so I would hope -- and being very precise about which targets to strike. So I would hope, as other countries acquire similar capabilities, that they follow the model that we have for the care and precision that we exercise. REP. SCHAKOWSKY: One other question. As marked up by this committee, the FY 2014 Intelligence Authorization Bill includes an amendment that I sponsored requiring a written plan for each covert action program to prepare ahead of time for the potential leak of that program. It increases the threat to U.S. sources and methods of the intelligence community if caught flat-footed by a leak. And the reality is that any covert action can potentially be disclosed unexpectedly. Director Brennan, without disclosing classified details, does each covert action program have, or will it have a written plan, then, of action, to deal with leaks of significant activities in that program? DIR. BRENNAN: It’s one of the issues that we take into account whenever there is a covert action program that is approved and implemented. It takes into account what the implications would be in the event of leaks. Unfortunately, there are too many disclosures and leaks about a lot of things that the United States intelligence community is involved in. And so it becomes a normal part of our business to anticipate those… REPRESENTATIVE ADAM SCHIFF (D-CA): Director Brennan, you have spoken frequently about the unmanned air vehicles and program. The president at NDU in May gave one of the more detailed accounts of the criteria that’s used in those otherwise known as drone efforts. You’ve tried to increase transparency in the program. One way that I think would increase transparency and public accountability is if we could publish an annual report that identified how many combatants were killed through the use of unarmed -- or unmanned vehicles and how many noncombatants were killed. That seems to me of very limited value in terms of information to our adversaries, but in terms of public accountability and being able to correct the record at times when there are misleading claims of civilian casualties, it might be beneficial as well. Is that something that you could support? Would that be another effort of transparency that we can make, and would that, in your view, as in mine, be of fairly diminish value to our adversaries? DIR. BRENNAN: I think it would be a recommendation that would have to go to the administration, and then I would be a participant in the interagency process to discuss the advantages and potential disadvantages of it. But it’s certainly a worthwhile recommendation, if you would like to make that. REP. SCHIFF: Can you share any thoughts with us today on any of the costs of that? I mean, if it were done, say, at the end of the year, if we had categories so you could pinpoint any particular incident, is it your sense that the cost in terms of giving our adversaries any useful information would be fairly minimal? DIR. BRENNAN: Congressman, I think this would be something again for you to be able to discuss with the administration, with policymakers, and then what we would need to do is to take a look at it analytically and determine whether or not this is something that the U.S. government feels as though would be worthwhile to do. There is a lot of debate about, you know, what is the basis for those determinations and those numbers, and so it’s something, again, I would defer to the administration on. REP. SCHIFF: Well, thank you, Director. I’ll follow up with you on that. You know, the president in his speech in May also indicated that there is a wide disparity of view regarding those numbers, and I think more transparency and public accountability would be beneficial. Director Clapper, moving to the -- some of the privacy issues that have come up in the last six months, the tech companies are in a pretty impossible situation. They have a business model which includes a lot of international business, which has become increasingly difficult to come by. There’s a settlement recently with the Justice Department that allows some more transparency, which I think will be helpful to them. Can we go beyond that to let them assure their international customers that the number of times they’re asked to divulge information is very limited, compared to the overall number of transactions? And are there other ways that we can help them make the international business case, because it’s very much, I think, in our interest to do so? DIR. CLAPPER: Well, first, Congressman, thanks for citing the agreement that was recently struck with the providers on categories of disclosures that they can -- they can now make and they -- and they already have, which I think shows, A, that it’s part of the administration’s commitment to try to improve that situation. You know, I also think it shows in a -- in the -- (inaudible) -- population out there how infrequently these capabilities are called upon. One of the features of the -- which was in the speech and in the presidential policy directive was to see what we could do extend privacy protections to non-U.S. citizens. Now, this was, I think, unique in the world, so we’re looking at that. And again, just like in our own domestic context, we’ll have to weigh the risk versus gain and how much that impinges on the question of valid foreign intelligence. So we’re working through that, not in a position today to say how that will come out, but clearly, wherever we can enhance transparency to the benefit of the -- of our commercial partners, we certainly will. (3PA: Notice that Brennan does not really give an answer when asked about “signature strikes.”) “Al-Qaida’s Resurgence in Iraq: A Threat to U.S. Interests,” House Foreign Affairs Committee, February 5, 2014. REP. KINGZINGER: I’m obviously not very happy with what’s happening in Iraq, and I’ve been very clear that I thought the withdrawal from Iraq was one of the biggest mistakes, I think, historically that’ll be shown that the United States has made in modern foreign policy. (3PA: Any consequences of the drawdown in Iraq should not be minimized. But it was certainly the 2003 invasion that was the bigger mistake.) Demetri Sevastopulo, “US says China ‘acting professionally’ in air defence zone,” Financial Times, February 5, 2014. “We haven’t seen a significant change in those interactions since the reported establishment of the defence zone by the Chinese,” Adm Locklear said on Wednesday during a visit to Japan. “The good news is that military forces are acting professionally as we interact in these areas.” Adam Entous, Siobhan Gorman, and Saeed Shah, “U.S. to Curb Pakistan Drone Program,” Wall Street Journal, February 5, 2014. The Obama administration will narrow its controversial drone program in Pakistan to target a short list of high-level terrorists, and aim to end it during the prime minister’s current term, senior U.S. officials have told their Pakistani counterparts. The downsizing of the covert Central Intelligence Agency program reflects Pakistani objections to the strikes and logistical constraints on the spy agency at the end of this year, when U.S. troops are scheduled to pull out of neighboring Afghanistan, according to administration, intelligence and military officials. (3PA: Drone strikes in Pakistan were always primarily for force protection of U.S. troops in Afghanistan. Promising to end drone strikes in 2018, when troops are out of Afghanistan, is meaningless as the mission will no longer be needed. This isn’t a “new approach” and ignores the reality of signature strikes, implying that only people on a “kill list” are targeted with drones.) Michael Hirsh, “John Kerry Now Holds Obama’s Legacy in His Hands,” National Journal, January 30, 2014. "Anything labeled ’nonproliferation’ and ’counterterrorism’ gets the White House’s attention. The notion of Americans as peacemakers does not," says one senior official who works for the administration.

Blog Post by Micah Zenko February 7, 2014 Politics, Power, and Preventive Action
United States

You Might Have Missed: Afghanistan, Targeted Killings, and U.S. Policy Priorities

Alice K. Ross, “Leaked official document records 330 drone strikes in Pakistan,” Bureau of Investigative Journalism, January 29, 2014. The Bureau is today publishing a leaked official document that records details of over 300 drone strikes, including their locations and an assessment of how many people died in each incident… The Bureau estimates that at least 2,371 people died in the time covered by the document (excluding 2007, which is missing from the record), while it records 2,217 deaths in total… (3PA: In a recent blog post, I tracked the differences in reporting of all U.S. targeted killings and fatalities through 2013 by comparing estimates from three NGOs.) Brian Knowlton, “McCain Calls China a ‘Rising Threat’ in Baucus Confirmation Hearing,” New York Times, January 29, 2014. McCain went on: “This is a matter of a rising threat or challenge to peace and security in Asia because of the profound belief in the Chinese leadership that China must, and will, regain the dominant role that they had for a couple of thousand years in Asia.” Mark Hosenball, “Congress secretly approves U.S. weapons flow to ‘moderate’ Syrian rebels,” Reuters, January 27, 2014. Light arms supplied by the United States are flowing to "moderate" Syrian rebel factions in the south of the country and U.S. funding for months of further deliveries has been approved by Congress, according to U.S. and European security officials. The weapons, most of which are moving to non-Islamist Syrian rebels via Jordan, include a variety of small arms, as well as some more powerful weapons, such as anti-tank rockets. “Deficit Reduction Declines as Policy Priority,” Pew Research, January 27, 2014. The Pew Research Center’s annual survey of policy priorities, conducted Jan. 15-19 among 1,504 adults, finds that the public’s agenda continues to be dominated by the economy (80% top priority), jobs (74%) and terrorism (73%). As in past years, the lowest-rated priorities are dealing with global warming (29%) and dealing with global trade (28%). (3PA: You will note the bottom three priorities for Americans are often the top three demands for foreign policy columnists, such as Tom Friedman.) David S. Cloud, “Top general to ask Obama to keep more troops in Afghanistan,” Los Angeles Times, January 24, 2014. The U.S. commander in Afghanistan is planning to go to the White House on Monday to argue for keeping about 10,000 troops in the country after this year, a subject that has exposed a fissure between some of President Obama’s top advisors and the Pentagon. Marine Corps Gen. Joseph F. Dunford Jr., who commands all international forces in Afghanistan, is recommending that U.S. troops stay to help train Afghan forces and conduct counter-terrorism operations against Taliban insurgents and Al Qaeda-linked militants. All other U.S. troops will be withdrawn this year. To make the deployment more attractive to a skeptical White House, Dunford says the 10,000 should pull out by 2017, when Obama leaves office, according to two officials, who confirmed a Wall Street Journal report. The Pentagon previously had favored deploying the troops for a decade. But Vice President Joe Biden and other key White House aides favor leaving only 1,000 to 2,000 troops, said the officials, who spoke anonymously to discuss internal deliberations… “Contractor Support of U.S. Operations in the USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility to Include Iraq and Afghanistan,” U.S. Department of Defense, January 2014. In 1st quarter FY 2014, USCENTCOM reported approximately 99,057 contractor personnel working for the DoD in the USCENTCOM AOR. This total reflects a significant decrease from the previous quarter. The numbers of contractors in other USCENTCOM locations make up about 17.9% of the total contractor population in the USCENTCOM AOR. A breakdown of DoD contractor personnel is provided below: (3PA: This is the first decrease in the number of U.S. citizen contractors in Afghanistan since 2010, when there were 10,016. In 2011, there were 19,381. This rose to 25,287 in 2012, and reached a peak in 2013 at 33,444.)

Blog Post by Micah Zenko January 31, 2014 Politics, Power, and Preventive Action
Intelligence

You Might Have Missed: USS Cowpens, French Reapers, and the World Economic Forum

Samuel J. Locklear III, Commander of U.S. Pacific Command, “Department of Defense Press Briefing by Admiral Locklear in the Pentagon Briefing Room,” U.S. Department of Defense, January 23, 2014. Q: Admiral, I wonder if you could take us back to that incident between the Cowpens and the Chinese ship, you know -- I don’t know how long ago it was, weeks ago -- tell us exactly what happened there. You know, how dangerous was that situation? You know, we likely will be seeing more situations like that as tensions increase in the East China, South China Sea, between China and the U.S., and also Japan. ADM. LOCKLEAR: Well, the incident was widely reported. And I think that it was commented on by the leadership here in the Pentagon, as well as by me. And, in fact, there was a demarche that was sent -- that we sent formally to -- and the demarches are -- those are not -- those are fairly routine globally. I mean, we want to communicate to someone that we’ve been really concerned about something that has -- that has happened. So in this case, there was an interaction in international waters, in international airspace that we routinely operate in and that the Chinese were conducting what they claim to be carrier operations that they believe have been properly notified. Those notification procedures were a question. And the -- I don’t think that the people that were on the Cowpens -- in fact, I’m sure -- were not aware of any notification of that. At any point was the situation dangerous? I wasn’t on the bridge of the ship, so I can’t tell you how the CO felt about it. I would probably characterize it as more as unnecessary and probably more unprofessional. And that -- but we have to understand, I think, as we look at this part of the world, and we look at the growing number of navies that are operating and the growing number of security concerns that are in this region, we have to expect the militaries are going to have to encounter and operate around each other. And in this case, we have to expect that the U.S. and the Chinese navies are going to interact with each other. So this just highlights to both of us, to both the PLA and to the U.S. military, that we have to do better at being able to communicate with each other in a -- in a way that allows us to not lead to miscalculation that won’t be productive in the security environment… Q: You say unprofessional. Do you mean unprofessional on the part of that Chinese skipper? Or just a general sense of, you know, unprofessionalness on the part of the Chinese navy? ADM. LOCKLEAR: Well, I don’t know if it’s unprofessional or whether it was lack of experience. I mean, one of the things that our -- that I told my leadership and my sea captains is that, you know, when we’re operating in this area -- I mean, first, we talked to each other on bridge-to-bridge telephone, right, radio telephones to work this out. And we speak in English, and other countries don’t. They speak -- they’re speaking -- or they speak in English, but they’re not speaking in their native language. And so there’s an extra calculation you have to figure into what someone’s trying to tell you when they’re speaking the second or third language that they speak and you’re speaking in your primary language. And so we have to take this into consideration to make sure that we have -- that we have looked at all aspects of this. In the end, the U.S. military, my forces in the Pacific AOR, will operate freely in international waters, international airspace. That’s the bottom line. We will operate there. And we’ll operate professionally, and we’ll operate peacefully for the purpose of peace. And that’s the message to all the militaries that are operating in that region. (3PA: Are there no Mandarin Chinese language speakers on U.S. Navy ships that operate along the coast of China? And, if not, wouldn’t that investment be worth reducing the potential for miscommunication and misperception?) “Who’s on the Magic Mountain?” Economist, January 25, 2014. Of the 2,622 hobnobbers invited to this year’s World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, just 15% are women. (3PA: Ironically, one of the Davos sessions on January 22 was “Making Gains on Gender Goals.” The suggested hashtag was #gendergap.) Amy Butler, “Global Hawk, U-2 Duel Resumes in ’15 Budget Fight,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, January 20, 2014. In the Pacific, 55% of Global Hawk’s missions were canceled in fiscal 2013; 96% of the U-2’s missions were achieved. Bill and Melinda Gates, “Three Myths on the World’s Poor,” Wall Street Journal, January 17, 2014. A baby born in 1960 had an 18% chance of dying before her fifth birthday. For a child born today, it is less than 5%. In 2035, it will be 1.6%. Pierre Tran, “French AF Conducts First Reaper Flight,” C4ISR, January 16, 2014. The French Air Force Thursday flew a first flight, lasting 40 minutes, of a US-built Reaper surveillance drone based in Niger, an Air Force spokesman said. (3PA: With France now flying its own surveillance drones, it will no longer need targeting intelligence from the United States as it did since the 2013 intervention in Mali.) Efraim Benmelech and Carola Frydman, “Military CEOs,” National Bureau of Economic Research, January 2014. Whereas in 1980, 59% of the CEOs of large, publicly held corporations had served in the military, today only 6.2% of CEOs of these firms have a military background… When we do find statistically significant effects, our findings suggest that military CEOs pursue more conservative—rather than aggressive—financial and investment policies. Our estimates indicate that military service is associated with a 70% reduction in the likelihood of fraud compared to the unconditional mean. Our analysis shows that chief executives’ service in the military is related to executive decisions and corporate policies and outcomes. More precisely, we find that CEOs who have served in the military tend to have lower investments and R&D; they do not use excessive leverage; and their firms are less likely to be involved in fraud. Moreover, military CEOs seem to perform better in times of industry distress. “Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff: Possible Responses to North Korean Attack on the Republic of Korea,” U.S. Department of Defense, April 16, 1968. 2. CINCPAC OPLAN 27-yr – Defense of Korea – a. CINCPAC has recently submitted CINCPAC OPLAN 27-69, which is a complete revision and update of OPLAN 27-65. JCS review, under MOP 144 procedures, has been expedited and will be concluded on 20 May 1968. b. Very flexible plan – nuclear and/or conventional – with or without CHICOM and/or USSR intervention – defensive, offensive, withdrawal. c. Two phases – hold as far forward as possible – when forces and situation permit conduct offensive actions. d. Forced and Logistics – Force and logistic requirements (up to 12 1/3 US divisions and 40 Tactical Bomber Squadrons) would require disengagement from Southeast Asia, additional force withdrawals from NATO commitments, dissolution of the training base, mobilization, and/or early use of nuclear weapons. 3. As a result of the PUEBLO incident and the deployment of additional aircraft to PACOM to meet the threat of the North Korean air order of battle, CINCPAC was tasked to prepare plans for the neutralization of the North Korean AOB. a. CINCPAC forwarded his OPLAN FRESH STORM, which has been reviewed by the JCS. Approval will be forwarded to CINCPAC on or about 15 May 1968. (1) CINCPAC OPLAN FRESH STORM – Four preemptive options and one retaliatory option – conventional weapons – options differ as to forces and timing – round-the-clock operations until North Korean AOB is neutralized or the operation is terminated. (2) Option ALPHA – US Tactical AIR Option BRAVO – US Tactical Air, ROKAF Option CHARLIE – US Tactical Air, ROKAF, B-52s Option DELTA – US Tactical Air, ROKAF, B-52s Retaliatory – Option ECHO – US Tactical Air, ROKAF, B-52s 4. Nuclear contingency plan against North Korea – subsequent to the PUEBLO incident, CINCPAC forwarded a basic outline for planning of a nuclear contingency plan against North Korea. A CJCS message informed CINCPAC that has planning concept appeared appropriate and to forward his detailed plan for JCS review and approval. This plan he has termed FREEDOM DROP – a. Coordinated nuclear plan using US tactical aircraft and/or HONEST JOHN rockets and SERGEANT missiles. b. Three options varying from several military targets to all significant North Korean offensive and logistic support targets – 70KT maximum yield – flexible selection of options or sequential use of options. c. FREEDOM DROP has been reviewed under the procedures of MOP 144 and approved as submitted by CINCPAC. Message informing CINCPAC of the approval has been withheld by direction of the Chairman, JCS, for a propitious time of release… (3PA: Read more on the 1968 North Korean capture of the USS Pueblo and subsequent compromise of U.S. intelligence.)

Blog Post by Micah Zenko January 24, 2014 Politics, Power, and Preventive Action

Defense and Security

You Might Have Missed: NSA Reforms, CIA Drone Strikes, and Benghazi

“Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-28: Signals Intelligence Activities,” White House, January 17, 2014. When the United States collects nonpublicly available signals intelligence in bulk, it shall use that data only for the purposes of detecting and countering: (1) espionage and other threats and activities directed by foreign powers or their intelligence services against the United States and its interests; (2) threats to the United States and its interests from terrorism; (3) threats to the United States and its interests from the development, possession, proliferation, or use of weapons of mass destruction; (4) cybersecurity threats; (5) threats to U.S. or allied Armed Forces or other U.S. or allied personnel; and (6) transnational criminal threats, including illicit finance and sanctions evasion related to the other purposes named in this section. (page 4) (3PA: Does anyone really believe that the NSA will only gather nonpublic signals intelligence on behalf of six missions?) Loveday Morris, “Interview with Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki,” Washington Post, January 16, 2014. What support is Iraq receiving from the U.S. and what more would they like to see? To build the Iraqi army and protect Iraqi sovereignty we need heavy weapons, fighter jets, helicopters, air defenses, this is in the long term. But right now, to defeat al-Qaeda, we need medium weapons, and we need intelligence cooperation. We need drones to scan the desert, and right now that’s gradually happening with America. Can you give specific details? Has the U.S. pledged more support? We’ve received only Hellfire missiles, which are being used to fight al-Qaeda. We’ve received one wave and have been promised another. The other weapons we have requested we have not received yet. The surveillance drones we have used them once or twice in the desert. There is intelligence collaboration which is very important for us. What kind of intelligence is shared? It’s tapping al-Qaeda communications, finding their camps and places on the ground, observing their routes over the borders. We work together on that field but we need more cooperation. We have many agreements with other countries to share information, but on the U.S. side we have the Status of Forces Agreement, under that framework we are exchanging more information than with most countries. (3PA: What specific missions are U.S. drones being used to support?) Eric Schmitt, “Congress Restricts Drones Program Shift,” New York Times, January 16, 2014. In an unusual move, Congress is placing restrictions on the Obama administration’s plan to shift responsibility for armed drones more toward the military and away from the C.I.A., congressional and administration officials said Thursday. Lawmakers inserted wording into a classified annex to the $1.1 trillion federal budget approved by Congress this week that would make it more difficult to transfer control over the drone campaign or the authority to carry out strikes. But the measure, first reported on the Washington Post’s website on Wednesday night, is a rare move by Congress to dictate how covert operations like the drone program are carried out. It also reflects the simmering suspicion among many lawmakers on the Intelligence Committees that the military’s Joint Special Operations Command is not up to the task of killing terrorism suspects with Predator or Reaper drones, a notion the Pentagon rejects. (3PA: Last April I called for the Obama administration to transfer CIA drone strikes to the Pentagon, still a needed reform.) Darren Samuelsohn, “Public remains ‘all over the map’ on NSA tactics,” Politico, January 16, 2014. Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) said public opinion is off the mark because Americans are getting a skewed picture of the NSA programs. She slammed press coverage that “has been dramatically one way” against the surveillance activities, though she’s been writing op-eds and speaking out trying to correct the record. “I think there’s enormous misunderstanding out there about what exactly is done,” Feinstein said in an interview. “I think there is a misunderstanding because I think people believe we’re collecting content, that we’re collecting what people say to each other on the phone and that is not correct. It’s very difficult.” (3PA: Sen. Feinstein, during John Brennan’s February 2013 confirmation hearing, said that she was unaware of the United States’ policy of signature strikes. Yet, when it comes to the NSA’s surveillance program, Sen. Feinstein seems to think she is more well-versed than the American public and many other congressmen.) “Cisco Annual Security Report Documents Unprecedented Growth of Advanced Attacks and Malicious Traffic,” Cisco, January 16, 2014. Overall vulnerabilities and threats reached the highest level since initial tracking began in May 2000. As of Oct. 2013, cumulative annual alert totals increased 14 percent year-over-year from 2012. “Review of the Terrorist Attacks on U.S. Facilities in Benghazi, Libya, September 11-12, 2012,” U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, January 15, 2014. On June 6, 2012, Stevens recommended the creation of teams, made up of locally hired personnel, in Benghazi and Tripoli. The State Department attempted to create a team in Tripoli, but was unable to · difficult to find and clear appropriate personnel. (page 14) On July 9, 2012, Stevens sent a cable to State Department headquarters requesting a minimum of 13 "Temporary Duty" (TDY) U.S. security personnel for Libya, which he said could be made up of DS agents, DoD Site Security Team (SST) personnel, or some combination of the two. These TDY security personnel were needed to meet the requested security posture in Tripoli and Benghazi. The State Department never fulfilled this request and, according to Eric Nordstrom, State Department headquarters never responded to the request with a cable. (page 15) DoD confirmed to the Committee that Ambassador Stevens declined two specific offers from General Carter Ham, then the head of AFRICOM, to sustain the SST in the weeks before the terrorist attacks. (page 20) With respect to the role of DoD and AFRICOM in emergency evacuations and rescue operations in Benghazi, the Committee received conflicting information on the extent of the awareness within DoD of the Benghazi [CIA] Annex. According to U.S. AFRICOM, neither the command nor its Commander were aware of an annex in Benghazi, Libya. However, it is the Committee’s understanding that other DoD personnel were aware of the Benghazi Annex. (page 26) DoD moved aerial assets, teams of Marines, and special operations forces toward Libya as the attacks were ongoing, but in addition to the seven-man reinforcement team from Tripoli, the only additional resources that were able to arrive on scene were unmanned, unarmed aerial surveillance assets. (page 28) The Majority believes that the terrorist attacks against U.S. personnel at the Temporary Mission Facility and the Annex in Benghazi, Libya, on September 11 and 12, 2012, were likely preventable based on the known security shortfalls at the U.S. Mission and the significant strategic (although not tactical) warnings from the Intelligence Community (IC) about the deteriorating security situation in Libya. (Additional Majority News, page 1) Susan B. Epstein, Alex Tiersky, Marian L. Lawson, “State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: FY2014 Budget and Appropriations,” Congressional Research Service, January 3, 2014. (page 10) Craig Whitlock and Craig Timberg, “Border-patrol drones being borrowed by other agencies more often than previously known,” Washington Post, January 14, 2014. Customs and Border Protection, which has the largest U.S. drone fleet of its kind outside the Defense Department, flew nearly 700 such surveillance missions on behalf of other agencies from 2010 to 2012, according to flight logs released recently in response to a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit filed by the Electronic Frontier Foundation, a civil-liberties group…In 2010, for example, Customs and Border Protection conducted 76 drone missions for other agencies. The next year, that number quadrupled, and it remained at nearly the same level in 2012. Although the border agency has acknowledged that it flies drones for other law-enforcement departments, it has revealed little about the number and precise nature of the missions. Customs and Border Protection has a fleet of 10 unarmed Predator B drones. They are virtually identical to an Air Force drone known as the Reaper. Both are manufactured by General Atomics, a major drone producer based in Southern California…The FBI and other federal law enforcement agencies have their own drones, but they are more rudimentary than those operated by Customs and Border Protection. The Defense Department is prohibited from using its drones in the United States for law enforcement.

Blog Post by Micah Zenko January 17, 2014 Politics, Power, and Preventive Action
Military Operations

Tracking U.S. Targeted Killings

In January 2013, we released a report that called on President Obama to reform U.S. targeted killing policies in non-battlefield settings. Included in that report was a chart that estimated the number of strikes, total fatalities, and civilian fatalities through the end of 2012. The data was based on averages within the ranges provided by the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, Long War Journal, and New America Foundation. We have updated our chart to display all known U.S. targeted killings in non-battlefield settings from the first one on November 3, 2002, through the end of 2013.

Blog Post by Micah Zenko December 31, 2013 Politics, Power, and Preventive Action
Military Operations

You Might Have Missed: Drones, U.S. Arms in Iraq, and Civil-Military Relations

“Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap: FY2013-2038,” U.S. Department of Defense, 2013. Inventory of DoD UAS (page 5) (3PA: Like other Pentagon reports, the data contained in this chart should be treated with some skepticism. In May, the Pentagon provided its Annual Aviation Inventory and Funding Plan to Congress. That report listed the total Department of Defense aircraft fleet as being composed of 14,776 aircraft, but did appear to include some of the tactical surveillance drones listed above. This chart also presumably does not include the Central Intelligence Agency’s drone fleet, which according to Greg Miller consists of some 30-35 weapons systems.) 2.4.1 Autonomy (page 15-16) The potential for improving capability and reducing cost through the use of technology to decrease or eliminate specific human activities, otherwise known as automation, presents great promise for a variety of DoD improvements. However, it also raises challenging questions when applying automation to specific actions or functions. The question, “When will systems be fielded with capabilities that will enable them to operate without the man in the loop?” is often followed by questions that extend quickly beyond mere engineering challenges into legal, policy, or ethical issues. How will systems that autonomously perform tasks without direct human involvement be designed to ensure that they function within their intended parameters? More broadly, autonomous capabilities give rise to questions about what overarching guiding principles should be used to help discern where more oversight and direct human control should be retained. The relevant question is, “Which activities or functions are appropriate for what level of automation?” DoD carefully considers how systems that automatically perform tasks with limited direct human involvement are designed to ensure they function within their intended parameters. Most of the current inventory of DoD unmanned aircraft land themselves with very limited human interaction while still operating under the control of a human and perform this function with greater accuracy, fewer accidents, and less training than a human-intensive process; as a result, both a capability improvement and reduced costs are realized. This specific automatic process still retains human oversight to cancel the action or initial a go-around, but substantially reduces the direct human input to one of supervision. Human-systems engineering is being rigorously applied to decompose, identify, and implement effective interfaces to support responsive command and control (C2) for safe and effective operations. Systems are designed and tested so that they perform their tasks in a safe and reliable manner, and their automated operation must be seamless to human operators controlling the system. This automation does not mean operators are not monitoring the control of the system. Currently, automated functions in unmanned systems include critical flight operations, navigation, takeoff and landing of unmanned aircraft, and recognition of lost communications requiring implementation of return-to-base procedures. As technology matures and additional automated features are thoughtfully introduced, DoD will continue to carefully consider the implications of autonomy… Michael R. Gordon and Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Sends Arms to Aid Iraq Fight With Extremists,” New York Times, December 25, 2013. “We have not received a formal request for U.S.-operated armed drones operating over Iraq, nor are we planning to divert armed I.S.R. over Iraq,” said Bernadette Meehan, a spokeswoman for the National Security Council, referring to intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions. For now, the new lethal aid from the United States, which Iraq is buying, includes a shipment of 75 Hellfire missiles, delivered to Iraq last week. The weapons are strapped beneath the wings of small Cessna turboprop planes, and fired at militant camps with the C.I.A. secretly providing targeting assistance… (3PA: For more on Iraq’s unofficial requests for U.S. drone strikes, and for President Obama’s correct decision to refuse them.) Barton Gellman, “Edward Snowden, after months of NSA revelations, says his mission’s accomplished,” Washington Post, December 23, 2013. At the Aspen Security Forum in July, a four-star military officer known for his even keel seethed through one meeting alongside a reporter he knew to be in contact with Snowden. Before walking away, he turned and pointed a finger. “We didn’t have another 9/11,” he said angrily, because intelligence enabled warfighters to find the enemy first. “Until you’ve got to pull the trigger, until you’ve had to bury your people, you don’t have a clue.” (3PA: This is a disturbing conception of how civil-military relations are supposed to work in the United States, and one you rarely hear from senior military officials. The idea that only those in uniform—and in particular “trigger-pullers,” or those in mortuary affairs—are allowed to have opinions about sensitive military programs is preposterous, and an attack on the principle of a civilian-led military as established in Article II, Section II of the U.S. Constitution.) Mark Thompson, “The Navy’s Amazing Ocean-Powered Underwater Drone,” Time.com, December 22, 2013. The Navy has been seeking—pretty much under the surface—a way to do underwater what the Air Force has been doing in the sky: prowl stealthily for long periods of time, and gather the kind of data that could turn the tide in war. The Navy’s goal is to send an underwater drone, which it calls a “glider,” on a roller-coaster-like path for up to five years. A fleet of them could swarm an enemy coastline, helping the Navy hunt down minefields and target enemy submarines…

Blog Post by Micah Zenko December 27, 2013 Politics, Power, and Preventive Action
Military Operations

You Might Have Missed: Terrorist Attacks, Victory 206, and U.S. Armed Forces

“Despite Fewer Attacks in Western World, Global Terrorism Increasing,” National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, December 19, 2013. Although terrorism touched 85 countries in 2012, just three - Pakistan, Iraq and Afghanistan - suffered more than half of 2012’s attacks (54%) and fatalities (58%), according to new data released today by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) Global Terrorism Database (GTD), based at the University of Maryland. The next five most frequently targeted countries were India, Nigeria, Somalia, Yemen and Thailand. “Exclusive: How Diplomacy Helped Cause an F-18 Crash,” ForeignPolicy.com, December 19, 2013. VICTORY 206 inquired about diverting to Muscat, but was denied. Muscat, although 84 miles closer than Masirah (from the end of the Boulevard), is not the "diplomatically preferred" divert. CAG OPS stated that, per .the Defense Attac—to the US Embassy in Oman—there are significant sensitivities regarding diverting US military aircraft, even unarmed, into Muscat. Tactical aircraft diverts are almost always sent to Masirah, which is about twice as far away as Muscat, even though Muscat is briefed as an option. Thus, when it was thought that VICTORY 206 was "just a normal divert" and could make it to Masirah with at least 2,000 lbs of fuel, Muscat was not considered as an option. (3PA: The above passage comes from a letter to the commander of the carrier air wing seven on the subject of “Command Investigation Into The Facts And Circumstances Surrounding The Aviation Mishap That Occurred On 08 April 2013 In The Northern Arabian Sea,” which Foreign Policy reporter Dan Lamothe obtained through a FOIA request. It is an important internal account of how diplomatic sensitivities impact U.S. military operations ) H.R.3304 -- National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, 113th Congress. SEC. 1043. REPORT ON PROCESS FOR DETERMINING TARGETS OF LETHAL OR CAPTURE OPERATIONS. Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report containing an explanation of the legal and policy considerations and approval processes used in determining whether an individual or group of individuals could be the target of a lethal operation or capture operation conducted by the Armed Forces of the United States outside the United States and outside of Afghanistan. “Yemen’s Reeling Following Last Drone Blunder,” Yemen Post, December 15, 2013. Keen to defuse popular anger, military officials confirmed this Saturday that the coalition government had already paid the families an estimated $140,000 notwithstanding traditional gifts, such as guns as per tribal customs. “Message to the Congress—Report Consistent with War Powers Resolution,” White House, December 13, 2013. There are approximately 55,000 U.S. forces in Afghanistan, and the United States Armed Forces are on track to meet the Afghanistan Force Management Level of 34,000 by February 12, 2014… These forces joined U.S. forces already in Jordan for a total of approximately 1,500 U.S. military personnel… Approximately 715 military personnel are assigned to the U.S. contingent of the Multinational Force and Observers, which have been present in Egypt since 1981… Currently, 23 NATO Allies contribute to KFOR. Eight non-NATO countries also participate. The U.S. contribution to KFOR is approximately 670 U.S. military personnel out of the total strength of approximately 4,900 personnel… The total number of U.S. military personnel deployed to Niger is approximately 200… The number of U.S. military personnel deployed to the central Africa region, including advisors deployed for this mission and personnel providing logistical and support functions to this and other missions, is approximately 120. (3PA: Exact numbers were not provided for Libya or Yemen.) “10 Years Later, Many Think Cost Outweighed Benefit of Saddam Capture,” CBS, December 12, 2013. Most Republicans think toppling the Iraqi dictator was worth the loss of American life but majorities of both Democrats and independents disagree. CBS Poll (3PA: It was “worth” 180,000 Iraqi and 4,400 U.S. troop deaths, and $2.2 trillion in costs.)

Blog Post by Micah Zenko December 20, 2013 Politics, Power, and Preventive Action
Defense Technology

You Might Have Missed: Drone Strikes, Malaria, and Defense Contractors

Hakim Almasmari, “Yemen says U.S. drone struck a wedding convoy, killing 14,” CNN, December 13, 2013. A U.S. drone mistakenly targeted a wedding convoy in Yemen’s al-Baitha province after intelligence reports identified the vehicles as carrying al Qaeda militants, two Yemeni national security officials told CNN on Thursday. The officials said that 14 people were killed and 22 others injured, nine in critical condition. The vehicles were traveling near the town of Radda when they were attacked. "This was a tragic mistake and comes at a very critical time. None of the killed was a wanted suspect by the Yemeni government," said a top Yemeni national security official who asked not to be named because he is not authorized to talk to media. U.S. officials declined to comment on the report. (3PA: It should not matter whether an individual is wanted by the Yemeni government, but rather they are lawfully targeted under the White House guidelines for lethal targeting. If this is not the case, then the real question is—why is the United States using armed drones to enforce Yemeni arrest warrants?) “The Iran Nuclear Deal: Does it Further U.S. National Security?” House Committee on Foreign Affairs, December 10, 2013. Rep. Eliot Engel: Mr. Secretary, as you continue to engage with the Iranians, and I know you know this but I really need to mention it, I would urge you to remain cognizant of the fact that Iran remains the top state sponsor of terrorism in the world… (3PA: It is hard to make the case that the top ten terror groups (by number of attacks in 2012) are connected to Iran. In fact, if you look at the State Department’s own data, the top sponsors of terrorism in rough order would be Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Iran, Iraq, India, Somalia.) “Leon Panetta Revealed ‘Top Secret’ Information to Hollywood Filmmaker at bin Laden Assault Awards Ceremony,” Judicial Watch, December 10, 2013. Judicial Watch announced today that it has obtained more than 200 pages of documents from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), including a previously unreleased CIA internal report confirming that former CIA Director Leon Panetta revealed classified information at a June 24, 2011, bin Laden assault awards ceremony attended by “Zero Dark Thirty” filmmaker Mark Boal. (3PA: As expected, no one has been punished for this unauthorized release of the classified information.) “Contractor Support of U.S. Operations in the USCENTOM Area of Responsibility to Include Iraq and Afghanistan,” U.S. Department of Defense, October 2013. (3PA: In Afghanistan, there are 65,000 U.S. troops and 85,528 contractors (27,188 of which are Americans.) “World Malaria Report 2013,” World Health Organization, 2013. Modelling suggests that an estimated 3.3 million malaria deaths were averted between 2001 and 2012, and that 69% of these lives saved were in 10 countries with the highest malaria burden in 2000; thus progress is being made where it matters most.

Blog Post by Micah Zenko December 13, 2013 Politics, Power, and Preventive Action
Military Operations

Guest Post: The Humans Behind Remotely Piloted Aircraft

Priscilla Kim is an intern in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations. The U.S. Air Force trains more remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) pilots than traditional fighter and bomber pilots combined—350 RPA pilots compared to 250 fighter and bomber pilots in 2011. Additionally, one in every three planes is unmanned, and the Pentagon intends to double the number of unmanned aircraft systems from 340 to 650 by 2021. If RPA proliferation is not complemented with policy changes that effectively address the concerns of RPA pilots, there could be damaging overall effects for U.S. military forces. Philip Alson, former United Nations special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions, expressed concern in a May 2010 report that RPA pilots might have been developing a “PlayStation” mentality due to their remote location from the battlefield. In an adaption of his book, “The Way of the Knife: The C.I.A., a Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth,” Mark Mazzetti wrote, “Targeted killings were cheered by Republicans and Democrats alike, and using drones flown by pilots who were stationed thousands of miles away made the whole strategy seem risk-free.” However, more recent studies show that despite geographical separation of RPA pilots from the battlefield, the psychological effects remain remarkably similar to their manned aircraft (MA) counterparts who experience direct combat. RPA crews at ground control stations are comprised of pilots who maneuver the unmanned aircraft in flight and pull the missile trigger, and sensor operators who monitor camera visuals and guide the warhead to its target—both of whom are susceptible to mental health issues. Though there is growing attention to this concern, the U.S. military remains ill prepared for a future of sustained drone operations. Four particular points that are acknowledged in recent studies and interviews with RPA pilots are worth considering as the U.S. military moves forward with RPA operations. Same rates of mental health diagnoses between RPA and MA pilots. Studies conducted in recent years by the Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center (AFHSC) show no notable difference in rates of mental health issues between RPA and MA pilots, such as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), depressive disorders, anxiety disorders, substance abuse, and suicidal ideation. Despite an RPAs’ physical absence from the warzone, they often spend hours or weeks at a time surveilling a potential target or area. RPAs may covertly watch alleged al-Qaeda insurgents go about their daily lives. Airman First Class Brandon Bryant “watched the targets drink tea with friends, play with their children, have sex with their wives on rooftops, writhing under blankets.” When it’s time to release the Hellfire missile, pilots watch them die: “It took him a long time to die...I watched him [on the infrared camera] become the same color as the ground he was lying on.” In some instances the RPA crew’s mission may require them to linger at the scene for the funeral and watch as relatives mourn. Matthew Power of GQ Magazine calls this a “voyeuristic intimacy.” AFHSC reported approximately 8.2 percent of RPA pilots and 6 percent of MA pilots had a minimum of one out of twelve mental health illnesses. The incidence rate for RPA pilots with all mental health outcomes was 3.8, compared to 3.3 for MA pilots. Additionally, some of the other top contributing stressors identified in studies are unique to telewarfare, where the demarcation between combat and personal life is obscured, shifts are long and inflexible, and the working environment is isolated and often uncomfortable. RPAs experience “moral injury” PTSD. PTSD is the most difficult mental health concern for psychologists to diagnose in RPA pilots. While the traditional understanding of PTSD as a result of witnessing traumatic scenes or experiencing mortal terror can also be seen in RPA pilots, there are an increasing number of instances of “moral injury”—an idea accredited to Jonathan Shay in his book Achilles in Vietnam—which is caused by a sense of guilt about what one has either done or failed to do for others. Killing from a distance also weighs heavily on the human conscience and may cause an existential crisis. In the absence of preventive measures, the development of such psychological effects will make it increasingly difficult for the U.S. air force to retain its well-trained and effective RPA pilot force. High RPA pilot attrition rates. RPA students and pilots are burning out at nearly three times the attrition rate of MA pilots. Though attrition rates improved slightly over the last year, down from 33 percent to 25 percent (compared to the traditional pilot’s 10 percent attrition rate), concern remains regarding the quality of the candidate pool for RPA recruitment. Commanders have shown a tendency to select and send their least eligible captains for RPA pilot assignment—saving their best men for MA—which is contributing to high attrition rates. The bottom quarter of the class accounted for 54.3 percent and 63.3 percent of the 2011 and 2012 classes, respectively. The air force also allows cadets rejected from Undergraduate Pilot Training to volunteer for Undergraduate RPA Training. Assigning the less qualified to RPA pilot positions could create vulnerabilities in the sustainability and effectiveness of future operations. RPA pilot positions are undesirable. The shortage of airmen volunteering for the RPA community can be partially attributed to the lack of promotions. Due to the position’s relatively new status, the military has yet to establish a clear road for career advancements for RPA pilots. A Brookings Institution report by Col. Bradley T. Hoagland shows that over the last five years RPA pilots had a 13 percent lower rate of promotion to major rank when compared to MA or noncombatant airmen. Lower rates of promotion are partially indicative of insufficient recognition of the RPA community, and enduring skepticism within the military and the general public about the challenges of engaging in telewarfare. For example, former secretary of defense Leon Panetta approved the Distinguished Warfare Medal (DWM) in February 2013, claiming at a Pentagon news conference that it “provides distinct, department-wide recognition for the extraordinary achievements that directly impact on combat operations, but that do not involve acts of valor or physical risk that combat entails.” The creation of the DWM was later overturned by the Pentagon when it was marred by controversy and public outcry. Due in part to the aforementioned attrition rate, coupled with the fact that few airmen choose to fly unmanned aircraft over manned, the air force is facing a shortage of RPA pilots. According to the Air Education and Training Command (AETC), to compensate for the current shortage of RPA pilots, the air force will have to train 168 new pilots per year through 2016—and if that quota is met, 140 annually thereafter. Unfortunately, the air force was unable to meet their goal of 150 pilots in 2012 due to a lack of volunteers. The shortage of RPA pilots results in longer shifts for current operators, which means schedules that don’t allow them to take advantage of educational opportunities, and increased stressors that take both a physical and mental toll. As Gen. William Fraser, formerly of the Air Combat Command said, “We cannot operate on a continued surge pace indefinitely.” Policymakers should recognize that RPA pilots are at risk for many of the same mental health concerns as their combat counterparts and provide access to the same quality assistance in mental health care and well-being. Some initial measures should include an effort to institute robust periodic health assessments and improve working conditions. It has already been established that RPAs are here to stay. If the U.S. government intends to keep its RPA operations competitive, RPA pilots should not be consigned to a substandard status in the military—as a less desirable position delegated to purportedly less competent airmen. As other countries begin to acquire similar levels of technological sophistication, an investment must be made in the pilots who maneuver the aircraft that define the future of U.S. military operations.

Blog Post by Guest Blogger for Micah Zenko December 11, 2013 Politics, Power, and Preventive Action
Intelligence

You Might Have Missed: Snowden, Homeland Security, and Drone Strikes

Karen Parrish, “Hagel Arrives in Bahrain for Speech at Dialogue,” American Forces Press Service, December 5, 2013. Hagel noted during a press conference yesterday that even as it focuses more attention on the Asia-Pacific, the United States is fully engaged around the world. “Our interests, the United States of America’s interests, are the world’s interests,” he said. “Our interests are not defined by one region or one country or one area.” (3PA: This is a prime example of what is called “projection bias.”) Sean Gardiner, “New York’s New Police Chief Faces Fewer Crimes, More Counterterrorism,” Wall Street Journal, December 5, 2013. When Mr. Kelly handed the NYPD to Mr. Bratton at the start of 1994, the city had just finished a year with 1,946 homicides, or more than five each day. More than 600,000 major crimes were reported in 1993… Through Monday, there have been 307 murders in 2013. The city is also on pace to finish with fewer than 200,000 major crimes—about one-third of what Mr. Bratton faced at the start of his first tenure. “Department of Defense Press Briefing by Secretary Hagel and General Dempsey in Pentagon Briefing Room,” U.S. Department of Defense, December 4, 2013. One of the things that is coming out of the QDR that began to be illuminated by some strategic seminars that we ran about a year ago is that the homeland is no longer a sanctuary. If we’re engaged in a conflict virtually anywhere in the globe, there is likely to be some effect in the homeland. Whether it’s potentially ballistic missiles or cyber, something could potentially affect the homeland in a way that it hasn’t heretofore. So the homeland is actually achieving much greater prominence in our discussions of our future strategy than at any time in my 40 years, as it should. David Zucchino, “Afghans describe relatives’ deaths in recent drone strike,” Los Angeles Times, December 1, 2013. The sunburned 28-year-old farmer looked up and saw a gray, narrow-winged drone circling the village. A few minutes later, he said, it fired a missile that landed with a tremendous thud across a stony ridge line. He recognized the smoking remains of his brother, his brother’s wife and their 18-month-old son. Jan and other villagers say 14 people were killed in the attack; U.S. and Afghan officials place the toll at 11. Stefan Frei, “The Known Unknowns: Empirical Analysis of Publicly Unknown Security Vulnerabilities,” NSS Labs, December 2013. Given the NSA budget of USD $25 million for the purchase of exploits in 2013 and given that the documented price of an exploit ranges from USD $40,000 to USD $250,000, it can be assumed that this will result in at least another 100 to 625 exploits per year – or 86 to 541 known unknowns on any given day, provided the market can satisfy the demand. Anthony Faiola, “Britain targets Guardian newspaper over intelligence leaks related to Edward Snowden,” Washington Post, November 30, 2013. In the summer, a senior official at the British Embassy in Washington called Abramson at the New York Times to request the return of Snowden data — a request Abramson has said she denied. “We were made aware that the NYT might be in possession of a large number of stolen, highly classified documents,” said a British official who declined to be named. “Would it be unreasonable of us to ask for them back?” (3PA: Thankfully, American newspapers don’t allow foreign governments to prevent their investigative reporting.) “Ipsos Poll Conducted for Reuters,” Ipsos, November 26, 2013. Matt Spetalnick, “Americans back Iran deal by 2-to-1 margin: Reuters/Ipsos poll,” Reuters, November 26, 2013. Despite that, 65 percent of those polled agreed that the United States "should not become involved in any military action in the Middle East unless America is directly threatened." Only 21 percent disagreed with the statement. Amada Cordova, Lindsay D. Millard, Lance Menthe, Robert A. Guffey, and Carl Rhodes, “Motion Imagery Processing and Exploitation (MIPE),” RAND Corporation, 2013. This report discusses a set of technology enablers, which we call motion imagery processing and exploitation (MIPE), that can help military intelligence organizations more effectively manage and analyze the deluge of motion imagery in current and future conflicts. We define MIPE as the class of technologies, systems, and capabilities that have these purposes: — to aid in the detection, identification, and tracking of humans, vehicles, and other objects of interest (OOIs) in live and archival video, with or without associated metadata — to aid in the identification of human actions and activities of interest (AOIs) in live and archival video — to aid in the characterization of relationships between and among OOIs and AOIs — to facilitate any subsequent analysis, such as multi-intelligence (multi-INT) fusion, network analysis, and data visualization. To be useful to military intelligence operations, MIPE systems must be evaluated under conditions that mimic real-world application of the system, which may include very large target sets and diverse environments. The desired capabilities may also depend on the type of military operation; for example, evaluations of MIPE system performance in irregular warfare may not be relevant to major combat operations. It is also important to note that performance in one area may be heavily dependent on performance in another. For example, the ability of a system to exploit data may depend on previous processing.

Blog Post by Micah Zenko December 6, 2013 Politics, Power, and Preventive Action
Wars and Conflict

Balance of U.S. War Powers

There have long been disputes over the role of Congress and the president in waging military action.

Backgrounder December 1, 2013
Afghanistan

Afghanistan After the Drawdown

Overview Following the recent endorsement of the U.S.-Afghanistan bilateral security agreement by Afghanistan's Loya Jirga, a new CFR report from the Center for Preventive Action (CPA) outlines the composition, role, and rationale for the roughly ten thousand U.S. troops that will possibly remain in the country after the 2014 drawdown. RAND Corporation's Seth G. Jones and Keith Crane explain in a new Council Special Report how the United States should manage the complex political, security, and economic challenges that will accompany the reduction in U.S. and allied forces. They argue for a force of eight to twelve thousand troops to assist Afghan national security forces and prevent a resurgence of al-Qaeda. "The United States has made an enormous expenditure of blood and treasure in Afghanistan since 9/11. Though not readily apparent to an American public weary of more than a decade of fighting, important gains have nevertheless been achieved to make Afghanistan a better place." The authors warn, however, that "these gains are reversible" and cite risks such as the continued expansion of al-Qaeda and affiliates, regional instability, increased radicalization in Pakistan, and a perception by allies and enemies alike that the U.S. commitment is unreliable. The report specifies two main missions for the remaining U.S. troops and maintains that the commitment should not be open-ended. A majority should be assigned to train, advise, and assist Afghan national and local forces. Smaller numbers of troops should be tasked specifically with conducting strikes against terrorists by killing or capturing high-value targets, working with high-end Afghan forces in Taliban-controlled areas, and using unmanned aerial vehicles to conduct intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and occasional strike missions. The authors also assert that focusing on regional dynamics is essential to Afghan stability. The United States should rely less on Pakistan to help in accomplishing its goals in Afghanistan, while tying U.S. military assistance to Islamabad to its efforts to combat militant groups. Jones and Crane make additional recommendations to support the diminished U.S. military presence beginning in 2014: foster a realistic peace process that includes supporting Afghan government–led discussions with the Taliban over prisoner exchange, local cease-fires, and reintegration of combatants encourage multiethnic coalitions during the 2014 presidential elections work with international donors to sustain funding levels for Afghan education, health, and infrastructure support regional economic integration, including the transit of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline through Afghan territory, as well as détente between India and Pakistan Professors: To request an exam copy, contact [email protected]. Please include your university and course name. Bookstores: To order bulk copies, please contact Ingram. Visit https://ipage.ingrambook.com, call 800.234.6737, or email [email protected]. ISBN: 978-0-87609-574-4

Council Special Report by Seth G. Jones and Keith Crane November 26, 2013 Center for Preventive Action