Military Operations

Col. Stephen Liszewski, U.S. Marine Corps, is a Military Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He most recently commanded the 11th Marine Regiment based at Camp Pendleton, California. Victory over the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is not only a matter of military success; President Obama recently made this point to coalition military leaders. The fight against ISIS is part of a larger struggle with violent extremist ideology. To achieve victory, the United States and its coalition partners must craft and employ an effective narrative. The narrative will provide a framework for action and should concisely outline the threat, the outcomes they want to achieve, and the measures they will take to reach these goals. In order to be effective, the narrative must simultaneously address multiple audiences—the American people, U.S. coalition partners and their domestic populations, and the members of ISIS and their potential recruits around the world.  Most importantly, the narrative must reach out to the moderate Sunni populations in Iraq and Syria. Make no mistake, the military component is essential to this fight. But it is becoming increasingly clear that the central struggle is between opposing ideologies, and an effective narrative will be a powerful weapon to counter ISIS propaganda. It will build trust with Sunni populations in Iraq and Syria while negating ISIS’s claim to be the defenders of Islam. If properly developed, the narrative will unify the international coalition for what is shaping up to be an extended fight. Strategists and planners can draw on lessons the U.S. military learned while building a campaign narrative in Helmand Province in Afghanistan in 2012. While operating in Regional Command Southwest there, I helped develop the campaign narrative used to explain the our purpose and intent to several audiences. We set several goals. First, the narrative had to speak to American and British forces in Afghanistan and to the families of these marines, sailors, and soldiers. They had to understand the threat we faced, and the importance of our mission. Second, our narrative also had to speak to and mobilize Afghan security forces. The Afghans knew that coalition forces were beginning to leave Helmand, and ignoring this fact would have destroyed the credibility of the U.S. narrative.  It was important that our Afghan partners knew that, after many years of American and British forces leading the fight, it was now time for the Afghans to take the lead because they were better trained and larger than the enemy. And third, because of the nature of counterinsurgency—a competition with the enemy for the will of the local population—it was important that the narrative inform the people of Helmand of our intent to help them move forward after many dark years under the Taliban.  The enemy’s narrative characterized U.S. troops as foreign invaders; this message needed an effective counter.  Our narrative had to address the enemy and make them aware of our unwavering commitment to victory while offering the opportunity to reconcile if they would lay down their arms. So, too, the strategic narrative for the fight against ISIS must coherently explain the challenge the coalition faces, the need for action, and the coalition’s goals and how it intends to achieve them. This must be done in plain English based on fact, not driven by emotion. As we learned in Afghanistan, the United States must simultaneously address several audiences—coalition forces and their domestic populations, Iraqi security forces, moderate opposition forces in Syria, the innocent people of Iraq and Syria, the members of ISIS and, perhaps most importantly, Muslims across the world. Another lesson we learned in Helmand province in 2012 was the need to manage expectations in developing goals. This was a challenge for us; we had been given a tough mission and 2012 was a year of transition in Helmand Province. We knew we would not have unlimited resources to accomplish our mission.  We had to fight the temptation to establish lofty goals that sounded appealing but were not feasible with the resources on the ground. Similarly, the coalition faces a resource-constrained environment in its current struggle with ISIS. It must ensure that its message does not promise too much given the resources at its disposal. The most important lesson we learned while developing and deploying a campaign narrative in Helmand Province was the requirement to align our words with our actions.  We took great care to ensure that the narrative we propagated was not rendered hollow by our actions, but instead helped to provide the framework and boundaries for our actions. An imprecise narrative would have tied our hands or established goals we could not achieve. When faced with difficult choices about future operations, we asked if the actions we were considering aligned with the narrative. If this was not the case, we would reconsider our plans. When actions are not aligned with the narrative, credibility and effectiveness are lost; the enemy can use this inconsistency to strengthen their competing narrative in the war of ideas. This lesson also must be applied against ISIS. Winning the loyalty of moderate Sunnis in Iraq and Syria demands a high degree of credibility with the local population and security forces, who must believe the coalition can help deliver a better future than ISIS. Credibility will also be an important tool when the United States take on the larger challenge of countering ISIS efforts to radicalize and recruit personnel needed to grow their organization. If the United States’ actions do not align with its words, ISIS will use this to undermine the credibility of the United States and its coalition, and strengthen their recruiting efforts. Crafting a narrative for the fight against ISIS that effectively and simultaneously communicates the coalition’s message to several different audiences will be difficult. But a narrative marshals the coalition’s thoughts and will enable an effective campaign by ensuring the desired outcome is achievable with the resources available. Once developed, a strong strategic narrative can be used to help stave off mission creep, provide clarity for the expected time needed to achieve victory, and build the credibility needed to win the larger fight against violent extremism.

Leon Panetta, Worthy Fights (New York, NY: Penguin Press, 2014), pp. 388-391. But the singular preoccupation with drones distracts from the larger context of the struggle we are waging. Yes, the United States possesses and uses drones to target senior Al Qaeda leaders who are otherwise beyond our reach to capture. (3PA: Actually, the United States rarely uses drones to target senior al-Qaeda leaders. As I have pointed out, only between 2.2 percent and 5 percent of all victims of U.S. targeted killings were “leaders.” A recent study by the Bureau of Investigative Journalism determined that less than 4 percent of the 2,379 drone victims in Pakistan were members of al-Qaeda. Moreover, most of those killed by drones were not “beyond our reach to capture.”  Again, as has been pointed out, there is no actual preference to capture suspected terrorists over killing them. Since this was first declared a policy preference in September 2011, the Obama administration has conducted over two-hundred targeted killings and only five capture operations.) And yes, I appreciate the fascination with technology. Advances in weapon design often are captivating—witness the crowds at the annual Rose Parade as they gasp when the Stealth bombers pass overhead. But to call our campaign against Al Qaeda a “drone program” is a little like calling World War I a “machine gun program.” Technology has always been as aspect of war: The North developed repeating rifles to use against the South in the Civil War; machine guns and tanks debuted in World War I; the Allies used radar, code-breaking, and nuclear weapons to defeat Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan during World War II. Those breakthroughs saved American lives and secured historic victories, though sometimes at great cost. (3PA: The myth that drones are merely another weapons platform is one often repeated by U.S. officials, and is a myth that we have dismantled in successive reports. The inherent advantages that armed drones provide have significantly lowered the threshold for when civilian officials will authorize the use of lethal force to kill people. There is a reason that, of the estimated 385 targeted killings in Pakistan, for example, 99 percent of them were conducted by drones and not by manned aircraft, rockets, or special operations forces raids.) Today, as with those historical examples, what is most crucial is not the size of the missile or the ability to deploy it from thousands of miles away; what matters far more are the rules of law and engagement. (3PA: Panetta makes an excellent point, but what matters even more is that the rules of law and engagement are publicly known and comprehensible, and have been demonstrably implemented. If not, then there will never be much public trust or understanding of the targeted killing program and U.S. policies will have no normative influence in shaping how other countries employ their own armed drones.) Again, those rules reflect painstaking consideration across the government; they require presidential authorization, specific policies approved by the National Security Council, intelligence collection, and analysis by a number of agencies, legal opinions, and reviews and congressional oversight. Those legal standards in turn reflect the basic values that guide this work, and those who are involved in debating and constructing those rules work zealously to protect the values—notably the minimization of risk to American lives and those of noncombatants—that they express. (3PA: These statements of process and values are admirable, but are based upon the foundational principle of U.S. targeted killings: “trust us.” Given how often the words of administration officials—including Panetta—have not matched actual drone strike practices, this is a tenuous argument to make. Panetta later writes, “I recognize that the public was not privy to those conversations, but the checks and balances of our government ensures that these operations were subjected to appropriate scrutiny while still keeping details out of the hands of our enemies;” Another assertion without factual support. While properly classified details should, of course, be kept out of enemies’ hands, unclassified details should not be hidden from American citizens, as they have been.) Some of my colleagues in the Obama administration argued that these operations were far too secretive and that they should be conducted with full public explanation of each operation. One official even suggested that we send out press releases with each strike. I certainly agree with President Obama that we need to be far more transparent in the way we explain our drone policy. However, I also believe that certain operational details need to remain secret. The president, as commander in chief, needs a range of tools to defend the nation, and secrecy is one of those tools. (3PA: This is another universal statement that U.S. officials make safely after they retire: “We should have been far more transparent.” What would be more useful is actual transparency and accountability by those same officials when they were serving in government. Moreover, it would be helpful if Panetta suggested even one way that America’s use of drones could be made more transparent. It is easy to aspire to transparency in the abstract, but retired officials are rarely specific.) …And yet, as the president recognized that day and has since publicly acknowledged, this is an area admittedly fraught with complexity: When an American missile snuffs out an avowed enemy of this country, lives are both lost and saved. A terrorist who is committed to blowing up an airplane or destroying a skyscraper is eliminated, and those he would have killed are spared his brutality. At the same time, a young person who loses a father or a brother, who digs out the embers of a relative from the smoking wreckage of a Hellfire missile may be radicalized, may turn his anger against those who killed his loved one. It is a hard business of agonizing choices. In the world of theory, it is easy to be certain. In the world as it is, many brave men and women risk their lives to protect others from danger, and every decision is subject to dispute. (3PA: Note how Panetta characterizes all drone victims as “an avowed enemy of this country” or “a terrorist who is committed to blowing up an airplane or destroying a skyscraper.” This is a scary and vivid characterization, though inconsistent with those individuals who the United States has primarily targeted with drones. Namely, low-level militants who pose a threat to the security forces and populations in the countries where they reside, or, in the case of the Haqqani Network, those who facilitate attacks against U.S. servicemembers deployed in Afghanistan. Furthermore, Panetta mentions “many brave men and women risk their lives to protect others,” but the point of armed drones is that Americans never risk their lives–unless they are those intentionally or unintentionally targeted and killed.) As with enhanced interrogation, the use of drones provokes strong feelings and strenuous debate in our nation. It should. But as with the interrogation discussion, it’s important to recognize that neither side has a monopoly on reason. Relying too heavily for too long on technology that spies down from above and can unleash deadly force from half a world away surely reinforces a worrisome image of malevolent American omniscience. Moreover, this technology is rapidly spreading across the world. Americans would undoubtedly recoil if China, for instance, were to spot a dissident in Mexico and eliminate him with a missile. (3PA: These are all critical dilemmas posed by Panetta and ones that would have benefited from him expressing his own opinion. For a long-time-policymaker purportedly unafraid of “straight talk,” Panetta refuses even in retirement to address these dilemmas head-on. It is also worth mentioning how he hypothesizes a Chinese drone strike on a “dissident,” as opposed to how Beijing would assuredly describe the target, as a “terrorist.” Using such disparaging terms to characterize victims is assuredly one of the many precedents that China will adapt from U.S. precedents regarding drone strikes.)

Public Law 113-164, 113th Congress, September 19, 2014. SEC. 149. (a) The Secretary of Defense is authorized, in coordination with the Secretary of State, to provide assistance, including training, equipment, supplies, and sustainment, to appropriately vetted elements of the Syrian opposition and other appropriately vetted Syrian groups and individuals for the following purposes: (1) Defending the Syrian people from attacks by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and securing territory controlled by the Syrian opposition. (2) Protecting the United States, its friends and allies, and the Syrian people from the threats posed by terrorists in Syria. (3) Promoting the conditions for a negotiated settlement to end the conflict in Syria. (3PA: Note that the funds dedicated for training and equipping the “appropriately vetted” rebels cannot be used to attack Assad regime forces. So, if they are used against Syrian security forces, does the funding end and are the weapons taken away?) “Kissinger Considered Attack on Cuba Following Angola Incursion,” National Security Archive, released October 1, 2014. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger ordered a series of secret contingency plans that included airstrikes and mining of Cuban harbors in the aftermath of Fidel Castro’s decision to send Cuban forces into Angola in late 1975, according to declassified documents made public today for the first time…"I think we are going to have to smash Castro," Kissinger told President Ford. "We probably can’t do it before the [1976 presidential] elections." Drafted secretly by the Washington Special Actions Group in April 1976, the contingency plans outlined punitive options that ranged from economic and political sanctions to acts of war such as mining Cuba’s harbors, a naval quarantine, and strategic airstrikes "to destroy selected Cuban military and military-related targets." The contingency planners warned Kissinger, however, that any act of aggression could trigger a superpower confrontation. Unlike the 1962 missile crisis, stated one planning paper, "a new Cuban crisis would not necessarily lead to a Soviet retreat." Indeed, "a Cuban/Soviet response could escalate in areas that would maximize US casualties and thus provoke stronger response," Kissinger’s national security advisers warned. "The circumstances that could lead the United States to select a military option against Cuba should be serious enough to warrant further action in preparation for general war." “A Conversation with Robert O. Work,” Council on Foreign Relations, September 30, 2014. JAMES E. SCIUTTO, CHIEF NATIONAL SECURITY CORRESPONDENT, CNN:  Will the U.S. go to war to protect the Senkakus? Because it gets back to the first question I asked you. When it’s not an overt invasion, when the tanks aren’t driving across the border, but it’s a subtle, you know, step-by-step move that at the end of the day gets you to the same place... ROBERT O. WORK, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE: Well, the United States has said over and over that we take no position as to who has the long-term control of islands either in the East China Sea or in the Senkakus. But while the Senkakus are under Japanese control, Article 5 applies, and we would respond if there was an attempt to take the Senkakus, and we would support our Japanese allies. (3PA: Note that this applies to any disputed territory that Japan “controls,” regardless of whether the United States or the world thinks it is Japan’s sovereign territory.) Josh Rogin, “Exclusive: America’s Allies Almost Bombed in Syrian Airstrikes,” Daily Beast, September 30, 2014. Last week, an airstrike from the American-led coalition nearly hit a command-and-control facility affiliated with the Free Syrian Army, the moderate rebels the Obama administration says are America’s “boots on the ground,” according to two opposition leaders. They are asking the Obama administration to please coordinate with them in the future before America bombs its only allies in Syria. Since U.S. airstrikes against ISIS in Syria began on Sept. 22, there has been no coordination between the U.S. military and its alleged partners on the ground, according to FSA leaders, civilian opposition leaders, and intelligence sources who have been briefed on the U.S. and allied military operation… “Obama: U.S. Underestimated Rise of ISIS in Iraq and Syria,” CBS "60 Minutes," September 28, 2014. PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA: "What we also have to do is we have to come up with political solutions in Iraq and Syria, in particular, but in the Middle East generally that arrive in the combination between Sunni and Shia populations that right now are the biggest cause of conflict, not just in the Middle East, but in the world." “Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 6 July – 10 September 2014,” United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, September 2014. As of August 2014, an estimated 1.8 million Iraqis had been displaced due to the ongoing violence. Some 1,000,000 are displaced in areas under the control of ISIL and associated armed groups or in areas under Government control, while 800,000 were displaced in the Kurdistan Region. Ensuring the protection and basic humanitarian needs of all civilians remains of critical importance. (i) Overall, at least of 24,015 civilians have been killed or injured in Iraq during the first eight months of 2014. Of this total, at least 8,493 were killed and 15,782 were wounded. From the spread of the conflict from Anbar to other areas of Iraq, UNAMI/OHCHR recorded at least 11,159 civilian casualties between 1 June and 31 August. This number includes at least 4,692 killed, and 6,467 wounded. The actual numbers could be much higher. (page 1)

Hearing on U.S. Policy Towards Iraq and Syria, U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, September 16, 2014. SEN. JOHN MCCAIN (R-AZ): I take it from your answer that we are now recruiting these young men to go and fight in Syria against ISIL, but if they’re attacked by Bashar Assad, we’re not gonna help them? SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CHUCK HAGEL: They will defend themselves, Senator. MCCAIN: Will we help them against Assad’s air... HAGEL: We will help them and we will support them, as we have trained them. MCCAIN: How will we help them—will we repel Bashar Assad’s air assets that will be attacking them? HAGEL: Any attack on those that we have trained and who are supporting us, we will help ‘em. MCCAIN: I guess I’m not gonna get an answer, but it seems to me that you have to neutralize Bashar Assad’s air assets if you are going to protect these people that we are arming and training and sending in to fight. Is that inaccurate, General Dempsey? DEMPSEY: The coalition we’re forming, Senator, won’t form unless—if we were to take Assad off the table, we’d have a much more difficult time forming a coalition. But I think what you’re hearing us express is an ISIL first strategy. I don’t think we’ll find ourselves in that situation, given what we intend to do with the... (3PA: The Pentagon spokesperson, Rear Adm. John Kirby further confirmed this statement during a September 25 press briefing, when he said, “The secretary was clear in his testimony that, once we have trained opposition forces, should they come under attack, we would defend them.” This is a tremendously consequential decision.) Press Briefing by Rear Adm. Kirby in the Pentagon Briefing Room, U.S. Department of Defense, September 25, 2014. REAR ADM. KIRBY: I haven’t seen any movement by Assad regime forces to move into facilities or infrastructure that we’ve hit. We’ve also not seen a lot of, to be quite honest, haven’t seen much in terms of reaction by ISIL inside Syria as a result of these attacks. In other words, were not seeing a lot of movement or major muscle movement changes by them in just the last couple of days. Siobhan Gorman and Julian E. Barnes, “U.S. Feared Al Qaeda Group Targeted in Syria Was Plotting Terror,” Wall Street Journal, September 23, 2014. U.S. defense officials acknowledged that they were seeking to kill top leadership of Khorasan and the Islamic State militant group. However, the attacks weren’t targeted at specific people because the U.S. didn’t have definitive intelligence that any of the leaders were in buildings that were struck. (3PA: When the Pentagon spokesperson was asked about the effect of the attack on the Khorasan group sites, he replied, “Well, we know we’ve had an effect—again, we’re still assessing the attacks in Syria, so we know we hit what we were aiming at.” Andrew Edgeclifee-Johnson, “The invasion of corporate news,” Financial Times, September 19, 2014. But as journalists bemoan such PR obstacles, they rarely admit an important fact: the PRs are winning. Employment in US newsrooms has fallen by a third since 2006, according to the American Society of News Editors, but PR is growing. Global PR revenues increased 11 per cent last year to almost $12.5bn, according to an industry study entitled The Holmes Report. For every working journalist in America, there are now 4.6 PR people, according to the US Bureau of Labor Statistics, up from 3.2 a decade ago. And those journalists earn on average 65 per cent of what their PR peers are paid… As trust in business has fallen, the appeal of telling stories that humanise companies has grown. The history of advertorials shows that brands have long wanted their advertisements to look like news, but as the subjects of news increasingly want to decide what counts as news, and as they get ever more skilled at doing so, they are posing a challenge to journalism’s traditional storytellers. Barbara Salazar Torreon, “Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1979-2014,” Congressional Research Service, September 15, 2014. The following list reviews hundreds of instances in which the United States has used military forces abroad in situations of military conflict or potential conflict to protect U.S. citizens or promote U.S. interests… In 11 separate cases (listed in bold-face type) the United States formally declared war against foreign nations. For most of the instances listed, however, the status of the action under domestic or international law has not been addressed. Most instances listed since 1980 are summaries of U.S. military deployments reported to Congress by the President as a result of the War Powers Resolution… Mary Beth Altier, Christian N. Thoroughgood, and John G. Horgan, “Turning away from terrorism: Lessons from psychology, sociology, and criminology,” Journal of Peace Research 51(5), 2014, pp. 647-661. Consistent with Ebaugh, criminal desistance is conceptualized as a process by which individuals arrive at a state of criminal cessation, rather than a static event… Research overwhelmingly suggests desistance from crime depends, in large part, on the development of pro-social bonds; that is, meaningful attachments and behavioral investments in conventional others who encourage criminals to conform to social norms and provide them with incentives not to deviate…(p. 653) Indeed, disaffiliation from NRMs [new religious movements], like desistance, is conceptualized as a process that may occur over an extended periods of time…In the disaffection stage, one is confronted with dissatisfaction, which is managed for a period of time through various means, including repression, avoidance, rationalization, and redefinition…(p. 654)

On the eve of the Iraq War in 2003, while commanding the 101st Airborne Division, then-Maj. Gen. David Petraeus repeatedly asked Rick Atkinson the rhetorical question: “Tell me how this ends.” What began as a private joke between a military commander and an embedded journalist has become a warning for the need to define clear objectives and be cognizant of unexpected outcomes before going to war.  Last week, President Barack Obama attempted to provide clear strategic guidance for the U.S.-led war against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS or ISIL), declaring: “Our objective is clear: We will degrade, and ultimately destroy, ISIL.” I published a column in Foreign Policy today that highlights two troubling elements about Obama’s declared end state. First, other Obama administration officials have offered their own end states that confuse or contradict what the president stated just eight days ago. White House Chief of Staff Denis McDonough stated on Sunday: “Success looks like an ISIL that no longer threatens our friends in the region, no longer threatens the United States. An ISIL that can’t accumulate followers, or threaten Muslims in Syria, Iran, Iraq, or otherwise.” Yesterday, Secretary of State John Kerry declared before the the Senate Foreign Relations Committee something else: “The military action ends when we have ended the capacity of ISIL to engage in broad-based terrorist activity that threatens the state of Iraq, threatens the United States, threatens the region. That’s our goal.” Today, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel told the House Armed Services Committee that “success” included “stability in the Middle East.” Second, the United States—and any combination of partners or allies—will never “destroy” ISIS. The evidence supporting this assertion is simple: Both Presidents George W. Bush and Obama declared that the Taliban and al-Qaeda and its affiliates would be “defeated” and “destroyed.” Meanwhile, the size and lethality of these groups has increased almost everywhere that they exist. The reason that presidents make such absolutist and totally unachievable pronouncements says more about American political culture than providing realist military campaign objectives. As I wrote in my column, a courageous president would tell the American people the truth, which is: “The United States will attempt to diminish the threat that [ISIL] poses to U.S. personnel in the region to the greatest extent possible based upon the political will and resources that the United States and countries in the region are willing to commit.” That is a strategy of mitigating ISIS’ threats and containing its influence within Iraq and the surrounding region. Yet, while mitigation and containment will drive the U.S. counterterrorism strategy regarding ISIS as a reality, the Obama administration (and Congress and the media) will pretend that the strategic end state is to defeat and destroy them. So when you hear the White House promise to destroy ISIS, don’t believe them, but consider why it is politically mandatory that they make such an outrageous and impossible claim.

“Report of the Defense Science Board: Task Force on Contractor Logistics in Support of Contingency Operations,” U.S. Department of Defense, June 2014, p. 10. Department of Defense Press Briefing by Secretary Hagel and General Dempsey in the Pentagon Briefing Room, U.S. Department of Defense, August 21, 2014. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel: They [ISIS] are an imminent threat to every interest we have, whether it’s in Iraq or anywhere else…This is beyond anything that we’ve seen. So we must prepare for everything. And the only way you do that is that you take a cold, steely, hard look at it and get ready. “Report of the independent international commission on inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,” United Nations General Assembly, August 13, 2014. The findings presented in the present report, based on 480 interviews and evidence collected between 20 January and 15 July 2014, establish that the conduct of the warring parties in the Syrian Arab Republic has caused civilians immeasurable suffering. Government forces continued to perpetrate massacres and conduct widespread attacks on civilians, systematically committing murder, torture, rape and enforced disappearance amounting to crimes against humanity. Government forces have committed gross violations of human rights and the war crimes of murder, hostage-taking, torture, rape and sexual violence, recruiting and using children in hostilities and targeting civilians. Government forces disregarded the special protection accorded to hospitals and medical and humanitarian personnel. Indiscriminate and disproportionate aerial bombardment and shelling led to mass civilian casualties and spread terror. Government forces used chlorine gas, an illegal weapon. Non-State armed groups, named in the report, committed massacres and war crimes, including murder, execution without due process, torture, hostage-taking, violations of international humanitarian law tantamount to enforced disappearance, rape and sexual violence, recruiting and using children in hostilities and attacking protected objects. Medical and religious personnel and journalists were targeted. Armed groups besieged and indiscriminately shelled civilian neighbourhoods, in some instances spreading terror among civilians through the use of car bombings in civilian areas. Members of the Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham (ISIS) committed torture, murder, acts tantamount to enforced disappearance, and forcible displacement as part of an attack on the civilian population in Aleppo and Ar Raqqah governorates, amounting to crimes against humanity. (3PA: At a mere twenty-three pages, this is the single best and most-balanced summary of the conflict dynamics and war crimes in Syria that you can read.) Remarks by Secretary Hagel at a Troop Event, San Diego, California, U.S. Department of Defense, August 12, 2014. Great powers can’t pick and choose which challenges and threats they’re going to deal with. There is no power on Earth like the United States of America. And not only do the people of this country have confidence and must have confidence and rely on you, me, all of us for their security, and security is not just making sure nobody attacks exactly the homeland every day. It’s making sure that nobody gets close to threatening our country, but also continuing to work with partners and help our partners. No country is great enough, powerful enough to deal with all these threats and challenges alone in the world today. They’re too big, too complex. The world is too complicated. Whether they’re cyber threats, which are relatively new, but are just as real and deadly and lethal as anything we’ve ever dealt with. (3PA: In 2013, 37,992 people died in armed conflicts. Once again, zero died from cyber attacks.) Lotta Themner and Peter Wallensteen, “Armed conflicts, 1946-2013,” Journal of Peace Research 51(4), 2014, pp. 541-554. All conflicts active in 2013 were fought within states, but nine of them – or 27% – were internationalized in the sense that one or more states contributed troops to one or both sides. These conflicts were Afghanistan, Central African Republic, DR Congo, Mali, Nigeria, Sudan, Uganda, USA (the conflict between the government and Al-Qaeda) and Yemen.

Col. Clint Hinote, U.S. Air Force, is a Military Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He holds a PhD in military strategy, and he recently returned from Korea where he commanded a U.S. air base.  The conclusions and opinions expressed are his own and do not reflect the official position of the U.S. government. I just finished watching the uncut video from the Islamic State (IS) titled “A Message to America.”  Judging from the President’s reaction today, it is an important development.  Here are some initial thoughts: First, this is a group that is skilled at strategic messaging.  The video quality is professional with slick transitions and special effects designed to deliver the core message.  IS demands that President Obama stop the airstrikes against IS forces or more Americans will be killed, beginning with a second hostage shown at the end of the video.  The video stays on message and each image is chosen to build upon those that go before.  The penultimate image, where Foley’s severed head is perched upon his lifeless body and carefully placed to look into the camera, is designed to leave a lasting impression upon the viewer.  It does. Second, a particular line spoken by the militant in the video caught my attention: “You [President Obama] are no longer fighting an insurgency; we are an Islamic Army and a state that has been accepted by a large number of Muslims worldwide.”  When combined with IS actions to take and hold territory across Syria and Iraq, I think we can be confident that IS leaders have made a key transition in their minds.  Similar to Mao’s writings about the phases of protracted war, IS leaders appear to believe that their organization is ready to make the transition from insurgency to conventional warfare, where they are strong enough to conquer territory and engage their enemies directly.  IS actions this summer show their commitment to this transition, but a counteroffensive of Kurdish and Iraqi forces combined with U.S. airpower has rolled back some of the IS gains in Iraq. This brings us to a final observation; It is obvious that the bombing is having a significant and deleterious effect on the IS.  Otherwise, why would it go to such lengths to make this video and risk the backlash that is likely to result?  The video does not mention the other ways in which the United States is attacking the militants. It focuses on bombing by U.S. air forces, and it even shows in-cockpit video from a U.S. airstrike.  In my mind, this represents a positive measure of effectiveness for the recent air attacks on IS. While this video is probably a tactical success that will play well to core constituencies within IS, I cannot help but wonder if it is another sign of strategic overreach on the part of IS leadership.  Just a few weeks ago, IS forces appeared to be the class of the region.  IS was making sizable gains in Syria and Iraq before they went too far into Kurdish-held territory and threatened to commit genocide against religious minorities in the region.  With U.S. citizens in danger and a humanitarian disaster appearing imminent, the President had little choice but to act forcefully with the best tool he had—U.S. airpower.  Now, it appears that the attacks against IS forces are working, and it is likely that the murder of James Foley will only serve to unite U.S. policymakers in opposition to this jihadist group.   I have to agree with Max Boot, who writes in Commentary: “Such desperate measures instead telegraph, well, desperation–and far from cowing anyone they are only likely to redouble the resolve of the civilized world to smash this group of genocidal jihadists.” In this blog and elsewhere, Micah Zenko has written extensively about the tendency for limited interventions to grow over time.  In this case, he will be proven prescient.

Sarah Kreps is a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, and an associate professor of government at Cornell University.  She is the author of Coalitions of Convenience: Military Interventions after the Cold War and the co-author of Drone Warfare. Additionally, I was fortunate to coauthor a recent CFR report, Limiting Armed Drone Proliferation, with Sarah. 1. What is the most interesting project you are currently working on? I have been looking at how the United States finances its wars. In the past, Congress levied war taxes.  This not only generated revenue, but created accountability linkages among the populace, which was loath to part with its money, and with leaders’ conduct of the war.  In the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, legislators other than the anti-war left shunned proposals for a war tax.  The result is that we have financed the recent wars through debt.  Based on my research, the populace has no idea how much the wars have cost.  When queried, people hazard estimates ranging anywhere between $10 million and $50 trillion.  The real answer is somewhere around $1 trillion.  The point is that these costs are less concrete because of how the wars have been funded, and the shift to borrowing erodes one of the basic features thought to characterize democracies:  the populace bears the burden of war and therefore puts pressure on leaders to keep wars short and low cost.  It may be no coincidence that two of the longest wars in U.S. history were the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. 2. What got you started in your career? I grew up in the Washington, DC area so I was surrounded by politics from a very young age but thought of it as more of an avocation, thinking that my vocation would be medicine: flight medicine or the “medicins sans frontiers” kind of medicine, but something that involved travel.  I was a physics/pre-med major at Harvard, but the classes that I enjoyed the most—and perhaps not coincidentally, did the best in—were the ones involving political science.  After college and earning my master’s at Oxford, I spent four years on active duty in the U.S. Air Force, which completed my evolution from the hard sciences to the social sciences.  I was on active duty on 9/11 and for the start of the Iraq War, and knew that I wanted a vocation where I could try to be part of the solution to major issues of international security. 3. What person, book, or article has been most influential to your thinking? Thomas Schelling’s Arms and Influence. It has so many gems, ranging from deterrence theory to the principles of bargaining.  He also illustrates all of the principles with accessible examples that have stayed with me more than a decade after first reading it. 4. What kind of advice would you give to young people in your field? First, do what you like and you will do it well.  If you do something out of a sense of inertia or obligation, it is likely to show in your performance. Second, seek out and accept mentorship.  People starting out do not have all the answers, so consider the advice of more seasoned people in your field.  Third, write.  Get your ideas out there.  I am amazed at the democratization of media, where clever ideas by relative unknowns can get traction. 5. What was the last book you finished reading? I’m guilty of reading more articles than books, but recently read Fred Kaplan’s The Wizards of Armageddon.  Well researched, well written, and still extremely relevant. 6. What is the most overlooked threat to U.S. national interests? We hear a lot about how the United States lags in terms of education, but I think there is a more specific problem, which is investment in science, technology, engineering and math (STEM).  The United States is ranked forty-eighth in the world for the quality of its science and math education.  This does not befit a global power, and I think it hinders our ability to innovate and thrive in a service-based economy.  There are also important national security implications, given that investment in STEM education puts talent into the defense industry pipeline. 7. What do you believe is the most inflated threat to U.S. national interests? I am still not persuaded by the cybersecurity threat. That it is one of the most lethal threats, as individuals as high ranking as the secretary of defense have suggested, does not seem commensurate with the risk.  There is no doubt that there is a considerable threat to our economy and, indeed, security and defense systems are vulnerable given our reliance on networks and satellites.  However, this is not the same as saying that a terrorist can do as much damage with a keyboard as a bomb, which some groups have suggested. 8. What is the most significant emerging global challenge? The United States finding its appropriate global leadership role is an important challenge.  For several years there was too much American international involvement, which left the country overextended.  But then the pendulum seemed to swing back too far the other way, with major global challenges leaving the United States seeming reactive and flat footed.  The Goldilocks strategy seems both elusive but crucial. 9. What would you research given two years and unlimited resources? I would like to study why countries consistently underestimate the costs of war.  Time after time, countries have gone to war expecting quick victories only to be mired in protracted conflict.  This is not just the United States, although we have had our share of those experiences, whether the Civil War, which both sides expected would be resolved quickly, or the Korean War, which President Truman expected to be over by Christmas.  It also includes World War I, which all sides thought would be short and low cost.  I want to understand whether this tendency to underestimate the costs of war is systematic and find an explanation for the pattern.  The answer has important implications for why countries go to war—if they think it will be easy and low cost they will be less inclined to resolve differences diplomatically. 10. Why should someone who is not a security specialist read your book? This book deals with big questions about democratic checks and balances and the rule of law.  Yes, it deals with a fundamental question of American foreign policy, which is the use of armed drones for targeting suspected terrorists, but the implications are far more consequential.  They speak to the ways that Congress exercises oversight (or does not) in terms of military force issues; how international legal constraints affect (or again, don’t) American behavior; and the precedent that the United States’ uses of force has set for other countries in the future. Citizens thinking about what their government does and how they so it should read this book (as a bonus, they will also better understand the mainstream media’s preoccupation with drones).

David Cenciotti, “Armed U.S. Predator Drone Appears Over Iraq,” Aviationist, July 25, 2014. Allegedly filmed in the skies over Anbar, south of Mosul, in Iraq, the video below shows what clearly seems to be an MQ-1 Predator. As some analysts noticed the aircraft appears to be armed with Hellfire missiles, even if the first images are a bit too blurry to say it with certainty. (3PA: Earlier this month, a Pentagon spokesperson claimed that Predators and Reapers were not being flown over Iraq, which was puzzling because an anonymous Pentagon official had confirmed they were just days prior. Unless this was a Title 50 covert drone, the Pentagon should clarify what strike capabilities are orbiting over Iraq.) Karen DeYoung, “United States could do more to intercept militants, Pakistan says,” Washington Post, July 24, 2014. “How can you carry out a military operation that is costing the lives of hundreds of soldiers and officers, and costing us hundreds of millions of dollars, and for us to let any one particular group…escape?” [the Pakistani official said]. “Everyone has to be taken out.” “If there are any militants that are found fleeing into Afghanistan, we would love to see them taken out by the U.S., ISAF [the U.S.-led international force] and Afghan forces,” said the official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss diplomatic conversations with the United States. “The drone strikes should take place on the other side” of the border, he said. “We want to make it very clear. We are never informed as to when they are taking place, where they are taking place, and who is the target for the simple reason that we have made it clear both privately as well as publicly our opposition.” (3PA: “Everyone has to be taken out.”) “Iraq At A Crossroads: Options for U.S. Policy,” U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, July 24, 2014. Sen. John McCain (R-AZ): “[Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy] Miss [Elissa] Slotkin, we learn more from the Wall Street Journal and New York Times than any briefing from you." Jeremy Page, “China Pushes Limits to Closer Ties With U.S. Military,” Wall Street Journal, July 21, 2014. Adm. Greenert said he tried to build on eight proposals for cooperation made by Adm. Wu last September. One was China’s attending the naval drills off Hawaii. Another was implementing a code for unplanned encounters at sea, or CUES, signed by 21 Pacific naval powers in April. Some Chinese officials have suggested the code didn’t apply in disputed waters around China’s coast, but Adm. Greenert said Adm. Wu had committed last week to observing CUES throughout the South China Sea. Adm. Greenert said he had seen no reports of harassment or unprofessional behavior in encounters between U.S. and Chinese ships since April. “We’re talking more. They’re speaking English,” he said. “It’s a civil tone—it’s good.” He also said he met for the first time last week with China’s State Oceanic Administration, which oversees the coast guard, and discussed whether they, too, could observe elements of CUES. “They were open to the concept and saw the value in pursuing it,” he said of the officials overseeing the coast guard, which has often been used to enforce China’s maritime claims. Lev Grossman, “World War Zero: How Hackers Fight to Steal Your Secrets,” Time, July 10, 2014. Given their offensive potential, you’d think the government would want to control the trade in vulnerabilities the way it does, say, the trade in fighter jets and land mines. But regulators are just now catching up with it. The Wassenaar Arrangement, which is the international agreement that governs arms sales among the U.S. and 40 other participating nations, was modified in December to include “intrusion software” in its list of restricted dual-use technologies, but so far that change hasn’t been enforced. “It’s not a market that right now the government has really looked at regulating,” a senior Administration official told TIME. “We’ve been much more in the voluntary best-practices-and-standards space. And I think that you’ll see us continue to focus on that.”