Intelligence

Hearing on Global Threats to the U.S., U.S. House Intelligence Committee, February 4, 2014. REPRESENTATIVE JAN SCHAKOWSKY (D-IL): Director Clapper, do you have any concrete intelligence of a relationship between Snowden and the Russian government in regard to the stolen documents? DIR. CLAPPER: That’s best discussed in a closed session, as we discussed last night. REP. SCHAKOWSKY: OK. I want to thank you, Director Clapper, for your robust defense of transparency, which has been characterized, actually, as a potential threat to our security or dismissed as politics. And I prefer to call it democracy. I believe that the national debate on domestic surveillance has been valuable, but unfortunately, it was an NSA contract leaker who initiated it and not the government. And the drone program is another example of a significant activity that the public is trying to discuss that has been thwarted by a lack of transparency. This year, both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have conducted serious research and raised very legitimate concerns about the consequences of the drone program on (your own?) security, that the government has not responded. Director Clapper, what steps can the intelligence community take to increase transparency into the drone program and foster a responsible national debate? DIR. CLAPPER: Well, we’re speaking of activities that are conducted covertly. So that’s one area where being transparent is one of a number of areas where we’re not going to be able to perhaps be as fully transparent as some might like. John, do you want to add to that? DIR. BRENNAN: When I was at the White House and I was assistant to the president of the counterterrorism, I spoke repeatedly, publicly about the so-called drones, or remotely piloted aircraft that had become an instrument of war. And I spoke about that to the extent that I could. But this is something that I think has been discussed quite broadly. REP. SCHAKOWSKY: Does the intelligence community weigh or consider how signature strikes against unnamed military-age males may increase the terrorist threat because it could generate hatred for Americans, and actually motivate you to join rather than reject terrorist groups? DIR. BRENNAN: From an intelligence community perspective, we’re always evaluating and analyzing developments overseas to include any counterterrorism activity that we might be involved in to see what the impact is. And I think the feeling is that the counterterrorism activities that we have engaged in with our partners -- we the U.S. government broadly, both from an intelligence perspective as well as from a military perspective, have greatly mitigated the threat to U.S. persons both overseas as well as in the homeland. REP. SCHAKOWSKY: And do you believe that the signature strike model, if adopted by other countries that are developing an armed drone program, can be a threat to the United States? DIR. CLAPPER : Well, it could be, but I would have to comment on the -- to the extent that we can talk about this here -- the great care that is exercised by the United States. And so I would hope -- and being very precise about which targets to strike. So I would hope, as other countries acquire similar capabilities, that they follow the model that we have for the care and precision that we exercise. REP. SCHAKOWSKY: One other question. As marked up by this committee, the FY 2014 Intelligence Authorization Bill includes an amendment that I sponsored requiring a written plan for each covert action program to prepare ahead of time for the potential leak of that program. It increases the threat to U.S. sources and methods of the intelligence community if caught flat-footed by a leak. And the reality is that any covert action can potentially be disclosed unexpectedly. Director Brennan, without disclosing classified details, does each covert action program have, or will it have a written plan, then, of action, to deal with leaks of significant activities in that program? DIR. BRENNAN: It’s one of the issues that we take into account whenever there is a covert action program that is approved and implemented. It takes into account what the implications would be in the event of leaks. Unfortunately, there are too many disclosures and leaks about a lot of things that the United States intelligence community is involved in. And so it becomes a normal part of our business to anticipate those… REPRESENTATIVE ADAM SCHIFF (D-CA): Director Brennan, you have spoken frequently about the unmanned air vehicles and program. The president at NDU in May gave one of the more detailed accounts of the criteria that’s used in those otherwise known as drone efforts. You’ve tried to increase transparency in the program. One way that I think would increase transparency and public accountability is if we could publish an annual report that identified how many combatants were killed through the use of unarmed -- or unmanned vehicles and how many noncombatants were killed. That seems to me of very limited value in terms of information to our adversaries, but in terms of public accountability and being able to correct the record at times when there are misleading claims of civilian casualties, it might be beneficial as well. Is that something that you could support? Would that be another effort of transparency that we can make, and would that, in your view, as in mine, be of fairly diminish value to our adversaries? DIR. BRENNAN: I think it would be a recommendation that would have to go to the administration, and then I would be a participant in the interagency process to discuss the advantages and potential disadvantages of it. But it’s certainly a worthwhile recommendation, if you would like to make that. REP. SCHIFF: Can you share any thoughts with us today on any of the costs of that? I mean, if it were done, say, at the end of the year, if we had categories so you could pinpoint any particular incident, is it your sense that the cost in terms of giving our adversaries any useful information would be fairly minimal? DIR. BRENNAN: Congressman, I think this would be something again for you to be able to discuss with the administration, with policymakers, and then what we would need to do is to take a look at it analytically and determine whether or not this is something that the U.S. government feels as though would be worthwhile to do. There is a lot of debate about, you know, what is the basis for those determinations and those numbers, and so it’s something, again, I would defer to the administration on. REP. SCHIFF: Well, thank you, Director. I’ll follow up with you on that. You know, the president in his speech in May also indicated that there is a wide disparity of view regarding those numbers, and I think more transparency and public accountability would be beneficial. Director Clapper, moving to the -- some of the privacy issues that have come up in the last six months, the tech companies are in a pretty impossible situation. They have a business model which includes a lot of international business, which has become increasingly difficult to come by. There’s a settlement recently with the Justice Department that allows some more transparency, which I think will be helpful to them. Can we go beyond that to let them assure their international customers that the number of times they’re asked to divulge information is very limited, compared to the overall number of transactions? And are there other ways that we can help them make the international business case, because it’s very much, I think, in our interest to do so? DIR. CLAPPER: Well, first, Congressman, thanks for citing the agreement that was recently struck with the providers on categories of disclosures that they can -- they can now make and they -- and they already have, which I think shows, A, that it’s part of the administration’s commitment to try to improve that situation. You know, I also think it shows in a -- in the -- (inaudible) -- population out there how infrequently these capabilities are called upon. One of the features of the -- which was in the speech and in the presidential policy directive was to see what we could do extend privacy protections to non-U.S. citizens. Now, this was, I think, unique in the world, so we’re looking at that. And again, just like in our own domestic context, we’ll have to weigh the risk versus gain and how much that impinges on the question of valid foreign intelligence. So we’re working through that, not in a position today to say how that will come out, but clearly, wherever we can enhance transparency to the benefit of the -- of our commercial partners, we certainly will. (3PA: Notice that Brennan does not really give an answer when asked about “signature strikes.”) “Al-Qaida’s Resurgence in Iraq: A Threat to U.S. Interests,” House Foreign Affairs Committee, February 5, 2014. REP. KINGZINGER: I’m obviously not very happy with what’s happening in Iraq, and I’ve been very clear that I thought the withdrawal from Iraq was one of the biggest mistakes, I think, historically that’ll be shown that the United States has made in modern foreign policy. (3PA: Any consequences of the drawdown in Iraq should not be minimized.  But it was certainly the 2003 invasion that was the bigger mistake.) Demetri Sevastopulo, “US says China ‘acting professionally’ in air defence zone,” Financial Times, February 5, 2014. “We haven’t seen a significant change in those interactions since the reported establishment of the defence zone by the Chinese,” Adm Locklear said on Wednesday during a visit to Japan. “The good news is that military forces are acting professionally as we interact in these areas.” Adam Entous, Siobhan Gorman, and Saeed Shah, “U.S. to Curb Pakistan Drone Program,” Wall Street Journal, February 5, 2014. The Obama administration will narrow its controversial drone program in Pakistan to target a short list of high-level terrorists, and aim to end it during the prime minister’s current term, senior U.S. officials have told their Pakistani counterparts. The downsizing of the covert Central Intelligence Agency program reflects Pakistani objections to the strikes and logistical constraints on the spy agency at the end of this year, when U.S. troops are scheduled to pull out of neighboring Afghanistan, according to administration, intelligence and military officials. (3PA: Drone strikes in Pakistan were always primarily for force protection of U.S. troops in Afghanistan. Promising to end drone strikes in 2018, when troops are out of Afghanistan, is meaningless as the mission will no longer be needed. This isn’t a “new approach” and ignores the reality of signature strikes, implying that only people on a “kill list” are targeted with drones.) Michael Hirsh, “John Kerry Now Holds Obama’s Legacy in His Hands,” National Journal, January 30, 2014. "Anything labeled ’nonproliferation’ and ’counterterrorism’ gets the White House’s attention. The notion of Americans as peacemakers does not," says one senior official who works for the administration.

Successive U.S. administrations have sought to justify controversial domestic surveillance programs amid criticism from Congress and rights activists, explains this Backgrounder.

Karen Parrish, “Hagel Arrives in Bahrain for Speech at Dialogue,” American Forces Press Service, December 5, 2013. Hagel noted during a press conference yesterday that even as it focuses more attention on the Asia-Pacific, the United States is fully engaged around the world. “Our interests, the United States of America’s interests, are the world’s interests,” he said. “Our interests are not defined by one region or one country or one area.” (3PA: This is a prime example of what is called “projection bias.”) Sean Gardiner, “New York’s New Police Chief Faces Fewer Crimes, More Counterterrorism,” Wall Street Journal, December 5, 2013. When Mr. Kelly handed the NYPD to Mr. Bratton at the start of 1994, the city had just finished a year with 1,946 homicides, or more than five each day. More than 600,000 major crimes were reported in 1993… Through Monday, there have been 307 murders in 2013. The city is also on pace to finish with fewer than 200,000 major crimes—about one-third of what Mr. Bratton faced at the start of his first tenure. “Department of Defense Press Briefing by Secretary Hagel and General Dempsey in Pentagon Briefing Room,” U.S. Department of Defense, December 4, 2013. One of the things that is coming out of the QDR that began to be illuminated by some strategic seminars that we ran about a year ago is that the homeland is no longer a sanctuary. If we’re engaged in a conflict virtually anywhere in the globe, there is likely to be some effect in the homeland. Whether it’s potentially ballistic missiles or cyber, something could potentially affect the homeland in a way that it hasn’t heretofore. So the homeland is actually achieving much greater prominence in our discussions of our future strategy than at any time in my 40 years, as it should. David Zucchino, “Afghans describe relatives’ deaths in recent drone strike,” Los Angeles Times, December 1, 2013. The sunburned 28-year-old farmer looked up and saw a gray, narrow-winged drone circling the village. A few minutes later, he said, it fired a missile that landed with a tremendous thud across a stony ridge line. He recognized the smoking remains of his brother, his brother’s wife and their 18-month-old son. Jan and other villagers say 14 people were killed in the attack; U.S. and Afghan officials place the toll at 11. Stefan Frei, “The Known Unknowns: Empirical Analysis of Publicly Unknown Security Vulnerabilities,” NSS Labs, December 2013. Given the NSA budget of USD $25 million for the purchase of exploits in 2013 and given that the documented price of an exploit ranges from USD $40,000 to USD $250,000, it can be assumed that this will result in at least another 100 to 625 exploits per year – or 86 to 541 known unknowns on any given day, provided the market can satisfy the demand. Anthony Faiola, “Britain targets Guardian newspaper over intelligence leaks related to Edward Snowden,” Washington Post, November 30, 2013. In the summer, a senior official at the British Embassy in Washington called Abramson at the New York Times to request the return of Snowden data — a request Abramson has said she denied. “We were made aware that the NYT might be in possession of a large number of stolen, highly classified documents,” said a British official who declined to be named. “Would it be unreasonable of us to ask for them back?” (3PA: Thankfully, American newspapers don’t allow foreign governments to prevent their investigative reporting.) “Ipsos Poll Conducted for Reuters,” Ipsos, November 26, 2013. Matt Spetalnick, “Americans back Iran deal by 2-to-1 margin: Reuters/Ipsos poll,” Reuters, November 26, 2013. Despite that, 65 percent of those polled agreed that the United States "should not become involved in any military action in the Middle East unless America is directly threatened." Only 21 percent disagreed with the statement. Amada Cordova, Lindsay D. Millard, Lance Menthe, Robert A. Guffey, and Carl Rhodes, “Motion Imagery Processing and Exploitation (MIPE),” RAND Corporation, 2013. This report discusses a set of technology enablers, which we call motion imagery processing and exploitation (MIPE), that can help military intelligence organizations more effectively manage and analyze the deluge of motion imagery in current and future conflicts. We define MIPE as the class of technologies, systems, and capabilities that have these purposes: — to aid in the detection, identification, and tracking of humans, vehicles, and other objects of interest (OOIs) in live and archival video, with or without associated metadata — to aid in the identification of human actions and activities of interest (AOIs) in live and archival video — to aid in the characterization of relationships between and among OOIs and AOIs — to facilitate any subsequent analysis, such as multi-intelligence (multi-INT) fusion, network analysis, and data visualization. To be useful to military intelligence operations, MIPE systems must be evaluated under conditions that mimic real-world application of the system, which may include very large target sets and diverse environments. The desired capabilities may also depend on the type of military operation; for example, evaluations of MIPE system performance in irregular warfare may not be relevant to major combat operations. It is also important to note that performance in one area may be heavily dependent on performance in another. For example, the ability of a system to exploit data may depend on previous processing.

“Despite Challenges, Africans Are Optimistic about the Future,” Pew Research, November 8, 2013. The world’s two leading powers, the U.S. and China, enjoy mostly positive images in Africa. Both nations receive higher favorability ratings in Africa than in the other regions included in the 2013 survey. Across the eight African nations, a median of 73% express a positive opinion of the U.S., while 65% hold this view about China. Globally, the U.S. generally gets higher marks than China on this question. Pew China v US Favorability “Press Release – FAA Releases Unmanned Aircraft Systems Integration Roadmap,” Federal Aviation Administration, November 7, 2013. The Roadmap outlines the FAA’s approach to ensuring that widespread UAS use is safe, from the perspective of accommodation, integration, and evolution.  The FAA’s main goal for integration is to establish requirements that UAS operators will have to meet in order to increase access to airspace over the next five to 10 years. The Roadmap discusses items such as new or revised regulations, policies, procedures, guidance material, training and understanding of systems and operations to support routine UAS operations. The FAA plans to select six UAS test sites to begin work on safely integrating UAS into the airspace.  These congressionally-mandated test sites will conduct critical research into how best to safely integrate UAS systems into the national airspace over the next several years and what certification and navigation requirements will need to be established. (3PA: Read the full UAS Roadmap and the UAS Comprehensive Plan.) Ida A. Brudnick, “Salaries of Members of Congress: Recent Reactions and Historical Tables,” Congressional Research Service, November 4, 2013. Table 1 provides a history of the salaries of Members of Congress since 1789…The salaries shown are the payable salaries, indicating the rate actually paid to Members of Congress. “Rogers: NSA Intelligence Collection Stops Threats,” CBS News Face the Nation, November 3, 2013. We did this in the 1930s. We turned it off--1929 the Secretary of State, at that time, where we were collecting information to protect America said you know we should do this. This is unseemly. Turned it off. So that led to a whole bunch of misunderstandings that led to World War II that killed millions and millions of people. Scott Shane, “No Morsel Too Miniscule for All-Consuming N.S.A.,” New York Times, November 2, 2013. One N.S.A. officer on the Lashkar-e-Taiba beat let slip that some of his eavesdropping turned out to be largely pointless, perhaps because of the agency’s chronic shortage of skilled linguists. He “ran some queries” to read intercepted communications of certain Lashkar-e-Taiba members, he wrote in the wiki, but added: “Most of it is in Arabic or Farsi, so I can’t make much of it.” Nasser Mehsud, “Tribesmen Target U.S. Drone After TTP Chief’s Killing,” Newsweek Pakistan, November 2, 2013. Tribesmen opened fire on a U.S. drone over Pakistan’s tribal belt Saturday where Pakistani Taliban commander Hakimullah Mehsud was killed by a drone strike a day earlier, residents and officials said. (3PA: This is the first well documented exmple of local villagers directly sustained fire at a U.S. drone.) Peter Hamby, “Review: ‘Double Down,’ on the 2012 election, by Mark Halperin and John Heilemann,” November 1, 2013. But there’s still click-bait aplenty: Obama meditating on drone strikes and telling his aides that he’s “really good at killing people… Scott Fitzsimmons, “Wheeled Warriors: Explaining Variations in the Use of Violence by Private Security Companies in Iraq,” Security Studies 22:4, 2013. This article engages one of the most widely discussed but poorly understood aspects of the Iraq War: the use of violence by private security companies. It explains why, despite sharing several important characteristics…the personnel who worked for Blackwater, the chief protector of US State Department employees in Iraq, killed and seriously injured far more people than their counterparts in DynCorp. The article argues that Blackwater’s personnel killed and seriously injured far more people in Iraq than their DynCorp counterparts because Blackwater maintained a relatively bellicose military culture that placed strong emphasis on norms encouraging its security teams to exercise personal initiative, proactive use of force, and an exclusive approach to security, which together motivated its personnel to use violence quite freely against anyone suspected of posing a threat. If the trends established during the Iraq and Afghan Wars continue, then private security companies will see extensive employment in future conflicts. These findings, consequently, have implications that extend beyond the Iraq War and the particular firms under study. Indeed, they indicate that governments and other future clients should analyze the military cultures of the firms vying for their business and use the results as a basis for deciding which firms to hire and, to a great extent, represent them in unstable conflict zones. “Dracunculiasis (guinea-worm disease): Situation and Trends,” World Health Organization. In 1986, 3.5 million new cases were estimated to occur annually. Based on active village-based searches, 892,055 cases were reported to have occurred in 1989. By 2010, as a result of the intensive efforts to eradicate dracunculiasis, the annual incidence was brought down to 1,797 cases, a reduction of more than 99% since 1989…Dracunculiasis is on the verge of eradication. WHO has now certified 187 countries and territories as free of dracunculiasis or as having interrupted transmission or being an area where transmission never occurred. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, U.S. Senate, 2013. Subtitle B—Targeted Lethal Force Oversight SEC. 312. UNCLASSIFIED ANNUAL REPORT ON THE USE OF TARGETED LETHAL FORCE OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES. (a) REQUIREMENT FOR ANNUAL REPORT.—For each year, the President shall prepare and make public an annual report that sets forth the following: (1) The total number of combatants killed or injured during the preceding year by the use of targeted lethal force outside the United States by remotely piloted aircraft. (2) The total number of noncombatant civilians killed or injured during the preceding year by such use of targeted lethal force outside the United States. (b) TARGETED LETHAL FORCE DEFINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘targeted lethal force’’ means the act of directing lethal force at a particular person or group with the specific intent of killing those persons. (c) EXCEPTION.—A report required by subsection (a) shall not include— (1) any use of targeted lethal force in Afghanistan prior to the end of combat operations by the United States; or (2) any use of targeted lethal force in a foreign country described by a future declaration of war or authorization for the use of military force.  

Michael R. Gordon and Eric Schmitt, “As Security Deteriorates at Home, Iraqi Leader Arrived in U.S. Seeking Aid,” New York Times, October 31, 2013. Until now, Mr. Maliki was reluctant to openly ask for United States support. A former American official said that in 2012 Mr. Maliki was on the verge of asking the United States to fly reconnaissance drones over Iraq to help pinpoint the growing terrorist threat but backed off at the last moment when the request became public. (3PA: For why the United States should refrain from conducting drone strikes on behalf of Iraq’s embattled leader read here.) Claudette Roulo, “Carter Praises U.S. Soldiers’ ‘Ferocious Ingenuity,” American Forces Press Service, October 29, 2013. The current political squabbles in the nation’s capital are disruptive to the U.S. military, he said. “Having just flown [-in] from Washington … there’s nothing good I can say about it,” [deputy secretary of defense Ashton] Carter said. “It’s inexcusable. It’s leading to real disruption in how we manage our armed forces. Allison Nielsen, “Americans Highly Opposed to Use of Drones for U.S. Police Work,” Sunshine State News, October 28, 2013. According to a new Rasmussen Reports poll, 69 percent of likely U.S. voters favor the use of unmanned drone aircraft to kill al-Qaida and Taliban terrorists overseas while 20 percent oppose the use of drones to kill terrorists overseas. Sixty-four percent believe it’s at least somewhat likely that drone strikes overseas have killed more innocent civilians than the U.S. government is officially reporting, but just 21 percent consider that unlikely. Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Kony 2013: U.S. Quietly Intensifies Effort to Help African Troops Capture Infamous Warlord,” Washington Post, October 28, 2013. Several senior military commanders voiced skepticism in the early strategy sessions, questioning whether deploying forces to kill or capture Kony met core U.S. national security interests. Civilians in the Pentagon, State Department officials and staffers at the National Security Council, some of whom had worked closely with Invisible Children and Resolve, were far more supportive of a military deployment, viewing it as the quickest, most effective way to resolve the problem. (3PA: This article provided further confirming evidence about the differing civilian-military perceptions about using military force. You will not find many combatant command or joint staff planners who work closely with NGO advocacy groups.) Erik Gartzke, “The Myth of Cyberwar: Bringing War in Cyberspace Back Down to Earth,” International Security, Vol. 38, No. 2, Fall 2013. There is significant fault, however, in the theme of impending cyber apocalypse: it is far from clear that conflict over the internet can actually function as war…This article assesses the salience of the internet for carrying out functions commonly identified with terrestrial political violence. "U.S. Navy Employment Options for Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs)," Rand Corporation, 2013. The Current USV Market We identified 63 USVs in the current market. We obtained publicly available data on size, speed, endurance, level of autonomy, payload mass, and power provided to payloads. Where exact values were not available, we estimated based on vehicle and concept descriptions, comparisons with similar vehicles, and rough-order-of-magnitude technology-based assessments. The Current USV Marketplace Focuses on Relatively Few Categories of Applications While current USVs perform a range of missions and functions, the majority of activity in the USV marketplace tends to coalesce around a relatively small set of mission categories. Collectively, the 63 USVs in the current market perform 16 distinct types of missions, listed on the vertical axis of Figure 2.1. As most of these USVs are designed to perform more than one type of application and many are modular (allowing a range of missions through tailored payloads), the set of 63 USVs collectively demonstrates 148 individual missions. Nearly 80 percent of the applications fall into just five categories. The “observation and collection” application category is the most common; this partly reflects the fact that most USVs need to have some ability to observe their environment, enabling a remote operator or algorithm to respond to that environment, enabling a remote operator or algorithm to respond to that environment. The large number of USV applications under the “characterizing the physical environment” category is accounted for by the large number of civilian-sector USVs that perform environmental survey work, while the number of USV applications under the MCM category reflects both a large number of legacy European drones conducting influence sweeping, as well as a few modern systems. (pp. 8-10)    

John Hudson, “U.S. Rules Out a New Drone War in Iraq,” Foreign Policy Magazine, October 3, 2013. In 2013 alone, Iraq is averaging 68 car bombings a month. The United Nations reports that 5,740 civilians were killed since January, which is almost two times more deaths than recorded in all of 2010. Despite the staggering numbers, the U.S. isn’t about to open up a new drone war in Iraq. An administration official tells The Cable the use of lethal drones has not been discussed nor is it even under consideration for Iraq. "The administration got us out of Iraq, which is seen as an accomplishment for the administration. So any ramping up of activity back in Iraq would go against that success," Joseph Quinn, an instructor at West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center, told The Cable. "They might also be weary of what in the military we call ‘mission creep.’ It starts with drones, but where does it end?" [Iraqi ambassador to the U.S. Iraq Lukman] Faily, speaking with The Cable today, declined to say if the Iraqis ever made a request for drones in the first place, but he did say they would continue asking for more assistance from the United States.] (3PA: It is a positive sign that President Obama has decided not to authorize drone strikes in Iraq because it would be a terrible idea.) Greg Miller, “CIA Ramping Up Covert Training Program for Moderate Syrian Rebels,” Washington Post, October 2, 2013. The CIA is “ramping up and expanding its effort,” said a U.S. official familiar with operations in Syria, because “it was clear that the opposition was losing, and not only losing tactically but on a more strategic level.” The CIA’s mission, officials said, has been defined by the White House’s desire to seek a political settlement, a scenario that relies on an eventual stalemate among the warring factions rather than a clear victor. As a result, officials said, limits on the agency’s authorities enable it to provide enough support to help ensure that politically moderate, U.S.-supported militias don’t lose but not enough for them to win. Islamist factions have taken advantage, luring fighters away with offers of better pay, equipment and results. A spokesman for the ISIS said the group had added 2,000 Syrian recruits and 1,500 foreign fighters over the past two months. “What happens when some of the people we trained torture a prisoner?” said a former senior U.S. intelligence official familiar with agency operations in the Middle East. Even if the CIA can produce records to defend its training program, “we’re going to face congressional hearings,” the former official said. “There is no win here.” (3PA: This is a predictable outcome. America’s unwillingness to attack Syria is reflected in the level of military force officials and policymakers are willing to employ.) “Defense Ministry Working on Protocol to Shoot Down Encroaching Drones,” Asahi Shimbun, October 2, 2013. The Defense Ministry is planning a new protocol to deal with foreign unmanned aircraft that approach Japan’s airspace, like the Chinese military drone that ventured near the disputed Senkaku Islands last month. The protocol will include provisions for “necessary measures,” or shooting down a drone, if it continues to violate Japan’s airspace and poses a serious and immediate danger to the lives and property of the Japanese public, sources said. Officials will work out measures to deal with drone-specific issues and incorporate them into the “rules of engagement,” which set specific protocols on the use of arms. Michael Peck, “Global Cybersecurity Spending to Reach $94B,” Defense News, October 1, 2013. Global cybersecurity spending will reach $94 billion between 2013 and 2023, according to a new study by market research firm ASDReports. This makes the U.S. the largest market for cybersecurity firms, followed by Europe at $25 billion, Asia-Pacific at $23 billion, the Middle East at $22.8 billion and Latin America at $1.6 billion, according to an ASDReports announcement. Michael D. Shear, “On Day 1, Parks Close, Workers Stay Home and ‘Panda Cam’ Goes Dark,” New York Times, October 1, 2013. Officials informed lawmakers that about 72 percent of the intelligence community’s civilian work force were furloughed. Senator Dianne Feinstein, Democrat of California, angrily denounced the shutdown as “the biggest gift that we could possibly give our enemies.” Charles Clover, “Russia: A Return to Arms,” Financial Times, October 1, 2013. But now Russian arms dealers are prioritising a new client: the Russian state itself. Last year Russia’s defence spending soared 25 per cent and this year Moscow’s expenditure is set to overtake that of the UK and Japan, according to analysis by IHS. That would make Russia the third largest arms buyer in the world, spending $68.8bn in 2013, trailing only China ($131.7bn), and the US, which spends more on defence ($637.8bn) than the next 10 countries combined. As a percentage of economic output, Russia’s defence expenditures are scheduled to rise from 3.2 per cent in 2013 to 3.8 per cent by 2016. This is much higher than in other big emerging markets such as India (2.6 per cent), Turkey (2.3 per cent) and China (1.9 per cent), according to research by Renaissance Capital, the Moscow-based investment bank. Sam Fellman, “How Doing More with Less is Hurting Sailors—and the Navy,” Navy Times, September 30, 2013. “Listen, if we went to war with China today — and you can print this — I think it would take us 10 days to destroy their Navy," said retired Cmdr. Bryan McGrath, a former destroyer commanding officer who has worked as a consultant with Cropsey. Steven Aftergood, “To Fix U.S. Intelligence, Shrink It?” Secrecy News, September 30, 2013. “Something that’s worth considering,” another CIA analyst said, “is completely counterintuitive, which is to make the CT [counterterrorism] community smaller, not larger. I think there are far more people at CIA HQ now than when we defeated the Soviet Union in the Cold War. What the hell?”

Recent revelations about U.S. surveillance activities in Latin America have provoked a range of negative responses from regional leaders, but the practical consequences will be marginal, says expert Christopher Sabatini.

While the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court has granted U.S. agencies broad legal authority to collect sensitive information, it is hardly a "rubber stamp" for government surveillance requests, says CFR’s Matt Waxman.