Intelligence

Leon Panetta had unique and unprecedented access into U.S. targeted killing programs as the director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (February 2009–June 2011) and secretary of defense (June 2011–February 2013). As Daniel Klaidman revealed last year, one procedural change implemented early in the Obama administration was that “the CIA director would no longer be allowed to have his deputy or the head of the counterterrorism division act as his proxy in signing off on strikes. Only the DCI would have sign-off authority.” While he was the director of the CIA, Panetta personally approved roughly two hundred drone strikes in Pakistan. Before leaving the secretary’s suite in the E-Ring of the Pentagon, Panetta made a series of statements that were either confused or misleading about the scope of U.S. targeted killings. (See especially Marcy Wheeler for more on this.) Panetta was recently interviewed by Fareed Zakaria for a CNN special—“Beyond the Manhunts: How to Stop Terror”—in which he made the following statement: ZAKARIA: “How do you make sure you only kill soldiers on the battlefield? Leon Panetta, the CIA director from 2009 to 2011, says that after an Al Qaeda target list had been vetted, the decision was ultimately his to take the shot. PANETTA: At the time that I was director of the CIA, we made very clear that if there were any women and children in the shot, we were not to take it and that we were to only go after those that we knew were identified as targets and, therefore, enemies of the United States.  Was there some collateral when you’re hitting a particular target and you’re not sure of all--you know, the situation, especially when you’re going after compounds? Sure. There may have been some collateral. But it was minimal.” This statement is puzzling on several fronts. First, the “women and children” line is false, as a U.S. official acknowledged to NPR when Panetta first made this claim in February of this year. Second, this description defies the widely-known—though never acknowledged—practice of signature strikes, which do not require the positive identification of suspected militants before they can be killed. As Mark Mazzetti wrote regarding the CIA’s classification: “If a group of young ‘military-aged males’ were observed moving in and out of a suspected militant training camp and were thought to be carrying weapons, they could be considered legitimate targets.” It was only after Panetta left the CIA that the Obama administration reportedly tightened the rules somewhat for those who could be killed with drones in Pakistan. Finally, Panetta offers the disturbing reversal of causality, in which everyone killed by CIA missiles are “therefore, enemies of the United States.” It is one thing to claim that all military-age males were legitimate targets under the international humanitarian law criteria of distinction, but another to contend that upon their death they then met the principle of military necessity. Remarkably, many policymakers and analysts are demanding that the White House declassify the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence’s report on the CIA’s relatively minor enhanced interrogation program, yet remain silent about the glaring need for a similar study into the CIA’s vastly more expansive targeted killing program. CIA accountability, which many demand for allegations of torture, must also be expanded to include drone strikes. Such a study could begin with asking Panetta: “Who exactly did you authorize to be killed? And why?”

Olga Khazan, “Interview: NATO Supreme Allied Commander on Syria and Soft Power,” The Atlantic, May 9, 2013. But one strike is a very different proposition than launching a big campaign. The benefit of surprise and stealth and a single-point strike may or may not tell us a good deal about Syrian air defense, broadly conceived. Syria has about 10 times the air defense capability that Libya had, and it’s compressed into about one-fifth the space of Libya. It would be a challenging air defense environment. (3PA: On April 30, Gen. Martin Dempsey chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that compared to Libya: “In Syria you’ve got five times more air defense systems, some of which are high-end systems, which means higher altitude, longer range. More importantly, they’re all collapsed into the western one-third of the country. So it’s a much denser and more sophisticated system.”  Which is it? Stravidis: 10 times and one-fifth, or Mullen: five times and one-third?) Julian E. Barnes, “Shrinking Budget Forces Army Into New Battlefield,” Wall Street Journal, May 10, 2013. "It is almost like the Army needs a therapist," said a senior Army official. "Go lie down in a dark room and think about what does the nation expect of me and how am I going to do that." “The Use of Armed Drones Must Comply With Laws,” International Committee of the Red Cross, May 10, 2013. “How to Generate Distrust on Drones,” New York Times, May 9, 2013. President Obama says he wants greater transparency for the clandestine killing of terrorists overseas, largely using missiles fired by drones. There has been little public action on this pledge, but if he is serious, he should consider many of the recommendations made this week by a former legal adviser to the State Department, Harold Koh. Speaking at Oxford University on Tuesday, Mr. Koh said the legal standards and procedures of the killing program are far too secret, even to Congress and American allies. That has fostered a growing sense that the program is “illegal, unnecessary and out of control,” he said. (3PA: For my thoughts on Koh’s remarks, see “Talking in Circles.”) Dexter Filkins, “The Thin Red Line,” The New Yorker, May 13, 2013. Still, Obama has said that he is worried that arming the rebels will have unintended consequences: a genocide against the Alawites; weapons falling into the hands of Islamist extremists, as happened when the U.S. armed Afghan jihadis in the nineteen-eighties; or a rapid political collapse that demolishes the state’s institutions. “If we’re not careful about who gets weapons, we’ll be cleaning that up for years,’’ the senior White House official told me. “We saw that movie in Afghanistan.” Ernesto Londono, “Special Ops Halted From Responding to Benghazi Attacks, U.S. Diplomat,” Washington Post, May 6, 2013. As the weakly protected U.S. diplomatic compound in eastern Libya came under attack the night of Sept. 11, 2012, the deputy head of the embassy in Tripoli 600 miles away sought in vain to get the Pentagon to scramble fighter jets over Benghazi in a show of force that he said might have averted a second attack on a nearby CIA complex. Hours later, according to excerpts of the account by the U.S. diplomat, Gregory Hicks, American officials in the Libyan capital sought permission to deploy four U.S. Special Operations troops to Benghazi aboard a Libyan military aircraft early the next morning. The troops were told to stand down. Robert Burns, “AP Exclusive: Air Force Sidelines 17 ICBM Officers,” Associated Press, May 8, 2013. The Air Force stripped an unprecedented 17 officers of their authority to control — and, if necessary, launch — nuclear missiles after a string of unpublicized failings, including a remarkably dim review of their unit’s launch skills. The group’s deputy commander said it is suffering "rot" within its ranks. "We are, in fact, in a crisis right now," the commander, Lt. Col. Jay Folds, wrote in an internal email obtained by The Associated Press and confirmed by the Air Force. Craig Whitlock, “Lawmaker Wants Military to Promptly Alert Congress About Drone Strikes,” Washington Post, May 8, 2013. A leading House Republican said Wednesday that he wants to require the U.S. military to “promptly” inform Congress about every drone strike it conducts outside Afghanistan as well as other military operations to kill or capture suspected terrorists outside declared war zones. Rep. Mac Thornberry (Tex.), the chairman of a House Armed Services subcommittee, said his panel already receives regular reports on counterterrorism operations from the Defense Department. But he said he will introduce a bill Thursday that would codify the practice into law to reassure the public that Congress is providing adequate oversight of drone strikes and other sensitive military operations… Thornberry’s bill would require the administration to produce a report describing its legal justification and decision-making processes for military drone strikes and other capture-or-kill operations outside Afghanistan. Although the administration has recently shared some of its legal rationale with lawmakers, it has done so reluctantly and behind closed doors. (3PA: Much of what Thornberry proposes is already being done with joint special operations command reporting to the armed services committees. However, this was the first time an armed services committee chair acknowledged its oversight role in targeted killings, unlike Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) and Rep. Mike Rogers (R-MI) chairs of the intelligence committees who routinely tout their oversight of CIA operations. The text of Thornberry’s bill is not yet available on thomas.gov)

Donna Cassata, “Report: US Footing Greater Bill for Overseas Bases,” Associated Press, April 17, 2013. The United States is footing more of the bill for overseas bases in Germany, Japan and South Korea even as the military reduces the number of American troops in Europe and strategically repositions forces in Asia, a congressional report says. The exhaustive, yearlong investigation by the Senate Armed Services Committee focused on costs and burden-sharing as the United States spends more than $10 billion a year to back up the U.S. military presence overseas, with 70 percent of the amount expended in the three nations. The figure does not include military personnel costs. (3PA: The full 75-page SASC report can be found here.)  Jacob Koebler, “Industry: Drones Could Have Helped Boston Marathon Bombing Responders,” US News, April 16, 2013. Monday’s bombing killed three people and injured dozens more. On the police scanner in the aftermath of the attack, first responders discussed grounding a helicopter because it needed to refuel. Multiple drones would theoretically solve that problem. "Our industry is working to develop technologies to provide first responders with the best tools possible to do their jobs safely as they work to protect our communities," [AUVSI President & CEO Michael] Toscano says. (3PA: The AUVSI is the industry association and primary lobbyists for domestic drone manufacturers.) Jay Solomon, “Kerry Focuses on Deciphering Duo in Iran, North Korea,” Wall Street Journal, April 15, 2013. In recent months, Iran has begun installing at nuclear sites hundreds of more-advanced centrifuge machines capable of producing fuel at three times the current rate, according to U.S. and U.N. officials.  Iran has also completed the development of an uranium enrichment facility in a fortified military structure near the holy city of Qom, which is seen as largely immune from an American or Israel attack. "In Khameni’s eyes, he probably thinks he’s winning" his conflict with the U.S., said a senior Israeli official. (3PA: There is a long tradition of naively believing non-Iranian policymakers can step into the shoes of the seventy-three-year-old Shiite theocrat and accurately comprehend what he sees and believes is lunacy.)  Jennifer McDermott, “Admiral: Many Unaware Sub Service Keeps Enemies From Our Shores,” The Day, April 15, 2013. "We operate forward inside their 20-yard line, inside their red zone, so that they rarely come out into midfield and very, very rarely operate off the East or West Coast of the United States of America," he said. "I think the fact that we enjoy that advantage, where we don’t have to go to bed at night wondering if there’s going to be a land attack from sea, is something Americans have grown accustomed to and don’t realize that it hasn’t happened because we’re out there." (3PA: For a second, imagine if a Chinese admiral made a similar statement about operating near U.S. coastal waters in order to contain the U.S. Navy.) House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Subject: Worldwide Threats, April 11, 2013. REP. Terro Sewell: If each of you could just talk a little bit about the greatest cyberthreats from your perspectives -- is it foreign governments? Is it terrorists? Is it criminals? I mean, where is the biggest threat? DIR. James Clapper [director of national intelligence]:  Any time you’re assessing a threat, there are obviously two dimensions. One is the capability, and the other dimension is intent. And certainly from a capability standpoint, in terms of the ability to wreak damage to the country, we’re more concerned with the potential of a nation-state. And obviously -- and we’ve called this out publicly before -- Russia and China are probably the most capable from a nation-state perspective, have a capability to attack. This is separate, of course, from espionage, electronic or cyberespionage, and as we all know, that’s gone on quite voluminously, particularly by the Chinese. Other threats, though, from other countries who don’t have that capability but might have a more malevolent intent, are also of concern to us, which we do watch. And then it tails off to hackers, criminals, organized crime, which probably represent a lesser capability but a more aggressive intent…   REP. Michele Bachmann:  When the White House conducted their armed drone strikes in North Africa, particularly in eastern Libya, prior to the attack on our mission in Benghazi on 9/11 last year, did the White House notify the State Department of the armed drone strikes before they were made? DIR. John Brennan (director of central intelligence): Armed drone strikes in Libya? I’m unknowing of such, and I would defer to the White House to address your question. REP. Bachmann: Were there any armed drone strikes in Northern Africa that were made by the White House? DIR. Brennan: White House doesn’t have a drone capability, responsibility, whatever. So I -- REP. Bachmann: Did they have any directives toward having armed drone strikes in North Africa? DIR. Brennan: Again, I don’t know what it is specifically you’re referring to, but again, I would defer to the White House on whatever happened at that time. DIR. CLAPPER: (Referring to ?) the capability, the UAVs that were over -- flying over Libya were military and were unarmed. REP. Bachmann: And so were there any armed drone strikes that were made in North Africa prior to 9/11? DIR. Clapper: In Libya? REP. Bachmann: I’m asking in North Africa. I’m asking the -- I’m asking Director Brennan. Were there any armed drone strikes that were made by the United States in North Africa prior to 9/11? DIR. Brennan: Well, we usually don’t talk about any type of specific actions, but again, I don’t know what you could be referencing. REP. Bachmann: I’m just wondering if the State Department was aware or if the military was aware or if the CIA was aware. And if we aren’t going to talk about that, we aren’t going to talk about that, but that’s a question I’d like to know. (3PA: Classic congressional oversight.) Audrey McAvoy, “Air Force General: Actions Aim To Deter North Korea,” Associated Press, April 10, 2013.  B-2 stealth bombers, F-22 stealth fighters and B-52 bombers have recently all flown to South Korea for exercises or short deployments in what amounted to a dramatic display of U.S. air power. The stealth planes are capable of sneaking past radar undetected. B-2 and B-52 bombers are capable of delivering nuclear weapons. "Every morning that a potential adversary gets up and goes, `You know what, I’m not going to mess with America today’ - that’s a good morning," Gen. Herbert Carlisle said Tuesday in an interview at his headquarters in Hawaii. "We need all those mornings to keep coming."

Yesterday, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) held its annual open hearing on “National Security Threats to the United States.” First started in 1994, the hearing is the rare instance where the leaders of the Intelligence Community (IC) provide a public overview of the trends in U.S. national security threats and answer senators’ questions. Since the question and answer section is unscripted—unlike the prepared statements for the record—there are often new or interesting wrinkles in how the IC perceives the world. I have heard from intelligence staffers and officials who warily watch this hearing, cringing whenever their bosses answer questions that verge on the realm of classified information. I actually had the opportunity to attend part of this hearing, and witnessed staffers furiously scribbling notes during discussions of highly sensitive issues like Iran’s suspected nuclear weapons program. Representing the IC was James Clapper, director of national intelligence; John Brennan, director of the CIA; Robert Mueller, director of the FBI; Lieutenant General Michael Flynn, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency; Matthew Olsen, director of the National Counterterrorism Center; and Philip Goldberg, assistant secretary of state for intelligence and research. Compared to prior years, there were fewer revelations and direct questioning from the committee. Nevertheless, here are some of the highlights: FEINSTEIN: Since last year’s threat hearing, our staff has been keeping a tally of terrorism-related arrests in the United States. With the arrest on March 5th of Riyadh Khan for conspiring to provide materiel support to terrorists in connection with the suicide bombing of ISI headquarters in Pakistan, there have now been 105 terrorism-related arrests in the United States in the past 4 years...Another indicator of the success of our criminal justice system in prosecuting terrorists is that in 2011 the Department of Justice released a list of terrorism trials conducted since 2001 and reported a total of 438 convictions from September 11, 2001 to December 31st, 2010. So in those 9 years, 438 convictions in federal courts…. CLAPPER: I have serious reservations about conducting open hearings on the worldwide threat, especially the question and answer sessions. While I believe it’s important to keep the American public informed about the threats our nation faces, I believe that can be done through unclassified opening statements, and statements for the record. As you also know, we’re ready to answer any and all of your questions in closed session. But an open hearing on intelligence matters is something of a contradiction in terms…. CLAPPER: Threats are growing more interconnected and viral. Events that had first seemed local and irrelevant can quickly set off transnational disruptions that affect U.S. national interests. It’s a world in which our definition of war now includes a soft version. We can add cyber and financial to the list of weapons being used against us. And such attacks can be deniable and non-attributable. So when it comes to distinct threat areas, our statement this year leads with cyber, and it’s hard to overemphasize its significance. Increasingly state and non-state actors are gaining and using cyber expertise…. This year we include natural resources as a factor affecting national security, because shifts in human geography, climate, disease, and competition for natural resources have national security implications. Many countries that are extremely important to U.S. interests that sit in already volatile areas of the world are living with extreme water and food stress that can destabilize governments…. Water challenges include not only problems with quality and quantity, but with flooding. Some countries will almost certainly exert leverage for their own water interests and water infrastructure can be considered a viable target for terrorists. In the United States, Germany and Japan less than 15 percent of household expenditures are for food. In India and China that figure climbs to more than 20 percent. In Egypt, Vietnam and Nigeria it rises to greater than 35 percent. And in Algeria, Pakistan, and Azerbaijan more than 45 percent of household expenses are just for food…. On the issue of terrorism, the threat from core Al Qaida and the potential for a massive coordinated attack on the United States is diminished, but the global Jihadist movement is a more diversified, decentralized and persistent threat. Lone wolves, domestic extremists and Jihadist inspired groups remain determined to attack western interests as they’ve done most recently in Libya and Algeria. The turmoil in the Arab world has brought a spike in threats to U.S. interests. The rise of new governments in Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen and Libya, along with ongoing unrest in Syria and Mali provide openings for opportunistic individuals and groups. In these and other regions of the world, extremists can take advantage of diminished counter-terrorism capabilities, porous borders, and internal stresses, most especially a high proportion of unemployed young males. Weapons of mass destruction development and proliferation is another major threat to U.S. interest. North Korea demonstrated capabilities that threaten the United States and the security environment in east Asia. It announced last month that it concluded its third nuclear test, and last April it displayed what appears to be a road mobile intercontinental ballistic missile. We believe North Korea has taken initial steps towards fielding a system although it remains untested. It also used its Taepo Dong-2 launch vehicle to put a satellite in orbit in December, thus demonstrating its long range missile technology. These developments have been accompanied with extremely aggressive public rhetoric towards the United States and the Republic of Korea. Iran continues to develop technical expertise in a number of areas including Uranium enrichment, nuclear reactors, and ballistic missiles from which it could draw it if decided to build missile deliverable weapons. These technical advancements strengthen our assessment that Tehran has the scientific, technical, and industrial capacity to produce nuclear weapons. This makes the central issue its political will to do so. Such a decision will reside with the supreme leader, and at this point we don’t know if he’ll eventually decide to build nuclear weapons. ROCKEFELLER: I think you’re absolutely superb, absolutely superb. I’ve been through every -- for the last almost 30 years, I’ve been through every CIA director. I think you’re the best. The -- and I mean that…. We have to find a way for us to trust each other. And I don’t think that we’ve -- maybe mutually. But in any event, we haven’t figured it out. Things after the confirmation went directly back to the way they were from 2001, ’02, to 2007. We had a classified briefing. All of our staff was kicked out. All of our staff was kicked out, with one exception -- two exceptions. I was outraged… But we cannot be told that things which could be in our purview to look at, which in fact have nothing in them which is a threat to anybody -- is a threat to anybody at all, that we can’t have that, or that our staff cannot be in attendance. What would happen if we had you here and all the folks behind you had to stay out of the room, all of you? That’s the comparable situation. I’m not a lawyer. I’m not an intelligence analyst or specialist. I need advice. I need counsel. I need staff. I have a superb one, as we all do. BRENNAN: Senator, like most hostages, I was excluded from the ransom negotiations during my confirmation process…. CLAPPER: Clearly, the sanctions [on Iran] have had profound impact on Iran’s economy, by any measure. Whether it’s inflation, unemployment, the availability of commodities et cetera. And that situation is getting worse. At the same time, at least publicly, overtly, that has not prompted a change in the Iranian leadership, specifically the supreme leader’s approach. We can go into perhaps more detail discussion in a classified, in a closed setting about some indications that I think would be of interest to you, and I probably better let it go at that…. BRENNAN: Senator, the only thing I would add is that on your first point related to cyber, the seriousness and diversity of the threats this country faces in the cyber domain are increasing on a daily basis. And from my perspective I think this is one of the real significant national security challenges we face. And the threat is going to continue and it’s going to grow. What we need to do, as a country, is to reduce the vulnerabilities and take the mitigation steps…. WYDEN: Director Brennan, first of all, congratulations. I appreciated a chance to talk about a number of issues with you previously. And I’m going to be asking you additional questions about drones and targeted killings in the days ahead [in closed hearings]…. GOLDBERG: What I can tell you, Senator Collins, is that the overall amount of Iranian oil that is being exported is down considerably, that there were workarounds within the exemptions made for those who reduced over time. And that’s a constant evaluation and consideration. But the actual amount of Iranian oil being exported is down. And it’s probably -- well, I think maybe I’d reserve on the exact quantity for a closed session…. HEINRICH: Director Clapper, this committee spent an awful lot of time examining the process that resulted in the unclassified Benghazi talking points. And you’ve touched on that a little bit this morning. I just have one simple question around that that I want to ask you. In your professional view of that process, was it in any way unduly politicized? CLAPPER: Absolutely not. HEINRICH: I want to move on to Syria for a few minutes. And just to sort of set the table, I wanted to ask how you would describe the current state of the opposition in Syria. CLAPPER: Well, the opposition is gaining in strength. It is increasingly gaining territory. At the same time, the regime is -- as I indicated in my statement -- is experiencing shortages in manpower and logistics. That said, the opposition is still fragmented. There are literally hundreds of these opposition battalions of varying strengths and cuts, and there are attempts being made by the opposition to bring some overarching command and control to that. The bad news in all this I believe, with respect to the opposition of course, is the increasing prevalence of al-Nusra Front, which is the al-Qaeda in Iraq offshoot that has gained strength both numerically and otherwise in Syria. And they’ve been pretty astute about this, and that they are, where they can, providing more and more municipal services in what is a very terrible situation from a humanitarian standpoint. As well, there have been a growing infusion of foreign fighters that have been attracted to the conflict in Syria who have joined the opposition. And so the opposition in my view, and the al-Nusra Front specifically, has been very -- very astute about that. The question of course comes up, how long will Assad last? And our standard answer is his days are numbered. We just don’t know the number. I think our assessment is he is very committed to hanging in there and sustaining his control of -- of the regime…. KING: My question on Iran is there a sufficient middle class which has the political power to have any influence on the regime’s decisions based upon the squeeze applied by the sanctions? In other words, does the supreme ayatollah care that his economy is going down? CLAPPER: Excellent question, sir. And yes, he does. He does care. And I think it does concern them about the deterioration in the economy because of the prospect for promoting unrest among the citizenry of Iran. And we are seeing more signs of that. At the same time though, I think the supreme leader’s standard is a level of privation that Iran suffered during the Iran-Iraq War. And I don’t believe -- he doesn’t believe they’ve reached that -- that point yet. And of course, as the supreme leader looks westward or looks at us, he can argue that, you know, we’re on the decline. Our influence is declining, particularly in that part of the world. And so, you know, his view of the world may not be necessarily fact based, particularly when it comes to internal conditions in his country…. KING: Turning again to another longstanding part of U.S. policy, which is nuclear deterrence, which has been our policy since the late ’40s, does deterrence work with a country like North Korea or Iran? And sort of the same question, do they care? Mutually assured destruction, are they responsive to that kind of rational thinking that has guided U.S. policy for 50 years? Are these countries, like the Soviet Union, that we can have some confidence that they’re going to make a rational decision, knowing that if they do something crazy, that they’re going to be wiped out? CLAPPER: Well, I do think they both understand that. I’m not sure that -- to speak to North Korea -- where they would expect us to use a nuclear weapon. But they do -- they certainly respect the capability of our military. They’ve gone to school on what we’ve done starting with Desert Storm. I know that for a fact. So I think deterrence in this broadest context does work and does have impact on the decision-making calculus of these two countries... CHAMBLISS: Tell the American public what keeps Matt Olsen awake at night? OLSEN. From an overseas perspective it is the decentralized nature of the threat from al-Qaida. As we’ve talked about this morning, the threat from core al-Qaida is greatly diminished. It is nowhere near where it was 10 years ago. But we have seen that threat become geographically dispersed as affiliated groups and groups sympathetic to al-Qaida and al-Qaida’s message have grown in areas, for example, in North Africa. So probably the most significant of those affiliated groups, from our perspective, is al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula. We’ve seen AQAP seek to carry out attacks against aviation targets three times over the last several years. So I would put AQAP at the top of the list from an overseas perspective. Looking closer to home and the homeland, the number one concern for an attack, albeit small scale or unsophisticated attack, likely comes from home grown extremists who may well be inspired or radicalized by the message al-Qaida sends. But would be more likely a person more likely to act alone or in a very small group to carry out an unsophisticated attack, and that’s very difficult for us from an intelligence perspective to see in advance, and therefore to be able to disrupt…. CHAMBLISS: Now, let me address that to you also, Director Mueller, since the FBI has jurisdiction over domestic criminal and terrorist activity. And I’d like your comments on what you see taking place from the standpoint of home grown terrorists. MUELLER: Let me start by saying that the threat from AQAP, particularly with airliners, has not dissipated over the years. There’s still that threat out there. The individuals who were responsible for the previous attempts are still there. So I join him with identifying that as a principle concern overseas. More directly at home, it is the radicalization of individuals on the Internet who develop the desire and the will to undertake attacks. They’re finding it very difficult to find co-conspirators, others that would join in. But then again, the Internet can facilitate that kind of a meeting coming together for an attack. And it is the lone wolves that we are principally concerned about….

Although Rand Paul will deservedly receive all the attention, yesterday’s marathon filibuster was catalyzed by the Obama administration’s general refusal to engage with Congress on the issue of targeted killings. Like any White House desiring maximum authority with minimal oversight, the Obama administration maintained that it is only required to report covert actions by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and counterterrorism operations by Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) to the requisite intelligence and armed services committees. While Congress is almost never satisfied with the responsiveness and openness of the executive branch, members who do not serve on the aforementioned committees are particularly upset about the lack of clarifying information on drones. In part, this is because the issue is so widely debated, but also because this administration’s practice echoes the even less responsive nature of the George W. Bush administration. For over two years, members have requested at least twenty times the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) memos that provide a legal justification into all targeted killings. Yesterday, Attorney General Eric Holder was asked again when he testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee, and he promised to ’look into it." It is remarkable that Congress and the American public now have a declassified narrative of the OLC memos regarding the CIA’s use of enhanced interrogation techniques, some of which Holder also declassified, but not the legal basis for when or why someone can be targeted and killed. Furthermore, it is important to note that the only reason we know anything about the White House detailed legal rationale is because someone leaked the Department of Justice white paper to NBC News. Members and staffers on the Senate Armed Services and House Foreign Affairs committees (who have proper clearances) have asked repeatedly to receive closed-door briefings on aspects of targeted killings occurring in the geographic areas where they exercise oversight. They have been refused on several occasions, as have other requests by elected representatives from both chambers. In at least one instance, the members threatened to withhold funding (a la Vietnam) in support of lethal strikes unless additional briefings were provided. The White House called their bluff, and the threat was never carried out. For an activity that has become the defining tactic of U.S. foreign policy, it is notable how little congressional members and staff members on both sides of the aisle know about targeted killings. They raise many concerns that go far beyond the statutorily limited oversight conducted by the intelligence and armed services committees. Yesterday, several members of the Senate intelligence committee also stood with Paul to highlight their own issues, which fall outside the purviews of their committee. There is also the enduring concern that—as under most administrations—Congress is not properly notified of other lethal covert activities. For example, in July 2009 the Wall Street Journal revealed that CIA had established kill or capture teams after 9/11 to go after suspected a-Qaeda members living in populated areas where drone strikes would not be appropriate. After this went public, "congressional Democrats were furious that the program had not been shared with the committees," and CIA director Leon Panetta shut down the teams. The attention of U.S. policymakers and public on targeted killings has always been focused on today’s headlines, and projecting what might happen in five or ten years. Once a new “revelation” fades from the headlines, so does the interest. More important than the theater of Rand Paul’s filibuster would be its impact (if any) on rallying the sustained interest of his colleagues to examine the full scope of America’s ten years and four months-practice of targeted killings. This will only be possible if the White House—as it has promised to do for many months—decides to more comprehensively engage with Congress, the American people, and the world about this unending Third War.

Several pundits have called for the confirmation hearing on John Brennan’s nomination to become the director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to be used as the opportunity to debate the vast expansion of targeted killings under President Obama. From his position as the senior White House advisor to the president on all counterterrorism and intelligence issues, Brennan could clarify and answer many of the moral, legal, and operational questions regarding U.S. drone strikes. Do not hold your breath. The hearings will be run by Senator Diane Feinstein, who will remain chair of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Despite leaking information regarding supposedly covert drone strikes in Pakistan, she strongly endorses targeted killings and, more generally, executive branch secrecy. She will assuredly place strict limits on what is asked and answered about drones in open session. Although drones and targeted killings were never raised in the confirmation hearings for previous CIA directors Michael Hayden or Leon Panetta, they did when David Petraeus testified in June 2011. See below for the brief exchange between Senator Roy Blunt and Petraeus (where you read “(CROSSTALK)” that is Feinstein trying to interrupt the discussion.) Do not expect much more from John Brennan’s confirmation hearing. BLUNT: I want to talk a little bit about drones for a minute and the use of -- use of drones. As I told you in my office a couple of days ago, I’m very supportive of the decisions the president made regarding Abbottabad. And one of the -- one of the results of that decision was the -- well, I -- I think we can talk about what I want to talk about here. PETRAEUS: I think generically... BLUNT: No, that’s... (CROSSTALK) PETRAEUS: And I think we had the conversation... (CROSSTALK) BLUNT: Yeah, yeah, the only thing I was going to say about that was, we were able to leave with information in addition to the principal goal, which was justice for Osama bin Laden. And what I was going to ask you in a general context was, what kind of evaluation should go into that decision of how much information might be there, whether you use a drone or not, or whether you make the decision to try to capture the information, as well as eliminate the individual? PETRAEUS: Well, thanks, Senator. As we discussed, in fact, our preference in many of our targeted operations -- again, speaking now for the military, but it has applications more broadly -- is to capture individuals so that you can, indeed, interrogate them, so that you can develop knowledge about the organizations they’re a part of, so that you can build, if you will, the link diagrams, the architectural chart of these organizations, understand the hierarchy, and generally continue to pull the string in, as you develop an evermore granular and nuanced understanding of these organizations that we are seeking to combat. There are, however, occasions where we cannot, for a variety of different reasons, carry out that kind of operation. And in such cases, then, obviously, kinetic activity is a course of action, whether by drones or other platforms, for that matter, or other kinetic elements. And so that does provide an option to us, other than, again, where you cannot carry out a capture operation. I would note that the experience of the military with unmanned aerial vehicles is that the precision is quite impressive, that there is a very low incidence of civilian casualties in the course of such operations. The warheads, actually, tend -- in many cases, they’re as small as a Hellfire, of course, so these are not large munitions. And as a result, I think, again, the precision is really quite impressive. And it is constantly growing with the proliferation of various platforms that enable us to have the kind of observation and understanding of the targets before they’re attacked.

Maria Abi-Habib, “Troops Shot After Taliban Leader’s Call,” Wall Street Journal, October 26, 2012. Anti-American feelings are rife in the Afghan army and police, the two forces that are supposed to take over once the coalition’s military mandate ends in 2014. "We call the Americans troops infidels. They may be our allies in military terms, but under our religion they are our enemies," said an Afghan army sergeant serving in Khost province. "The Quran says that Christians and Jews can never be friends of the Muslims." Colum Lynch, “UN to Probe Drone Attacks by United States, Others Resulting in Civilian Deaths,” Washington Post, October 25, 2012. Emmerson said that his decision to investigate drone attacks and other targeted killings reflects frustration with the Obama administration’s unwillingness to provide public information on such covert strikes. “The Obama administration continues to formally adopt the position that it will neither confirm nor deny the existence of the drone program…In reality, the administration is holding its finger in the dam of public accountability,” he said according to a prepared copy of the speech. “I will be launching an investigation unit within the special procedures of the [UN] Human Rights Council to inquire into individual drone attacks, and other forms of targeted killings conducted in counterterrorism operations, in which it has been alleged that civilian casualties have been inflicted,” he added. (3PA: Earlier that week at the UN, Harold Koh responded to questions: “‘The point is, all killing is regrettable [but] not all killing is illegal.’ He said that killings by drone ‘in the course of armed conflict or in self defense is consistent with international law.’” It would be unprecedented for such an investigation into U.S. targeted killings. The first such inquiry was released on January 13, 2003 (see E/CN.4/2003/3, page 16).) Peter W. Singer, “Tell Us the One About the Robots, Mr. President,” Foreign Policy, October 24, 2012. Robotics is akin to gunpowder, the steam engine, or the computer. It’s a game-changing technology not merely because of its power, but because of its impact both on and off the battlefield. While modern unmanned systems are still in the first generation of use—the Model T Ford stage, so to speak—operators for these systems are already the fastest-growing group in the U.S. Air Force, potentially reshaping its long-term identity as more and more pilots never leave the ground. Government Accountability Office, “Future Aerostat and Airship Investment Decisions Drive Oversight and Coordinations Needs,” October 23, 2012. Victoria Nuland, Department of State Daily Press Briefing, October 19, 2012. QUESTION: You talk about intelligence issues when you want to talk about them and when it’s in your interest to do so. NULAND: That’s fair. Jeffrey S. Thurner, “No One at the Controls: Legal Implications of Fully Autonomous Targeting,” National Defense University, October 2012. The United States will likely face asymmetric threats in military campaigns of the future. Whether the threat is the substantial jamming and cyber-attack capabilities of the People’s Republic of China or the legions of swarming Iranian patrol boats, LARs [lethal autonomous robots] may provide the best way to counter it. LARs have the unique potential to operate at a tempo faster than humans can possibly achieve and to lethally strike even when communications links have been severed. Autonomous targeting technology will likely proliferate to nations and groups around the world. To prevent being surpassed by rivals, the United States should fully commit itself to harnessing the potential of fully autonomous targeting. The feared legal concerns do not appear to be an impediment to the development or deployment of LARs. Thus, operational commanders should take the lead in making this emerging technology a true force multiplier for the joint force. Operational commanders who establish appropriate control measures over these unmanned systems will ensure their LARs are effective, safe, and legal weapons on the battlefield. “Who’s Counting Casualties?” Oxford Research Group, October 2012. Greg Miller, “Plan for Hunting Terrorists Signals U.S. Intends to Keep Adding Names to Kill Lists,” Washington Post, October 23, 2012. Karen DeYoung, “A CIA Veteran Transforms U.S. Counterterrorism Policy,” Washington Post, October 24, 2012. (3PA: For my thoughts on John Brennan’s role in shaping U.S. targeted killing policies, see here and here.) Craig Whitlock, “Remote U.S. Base at Core of Secret Operations,” Washington Post, October 25, 2012.

In today’s Washington Post, Greg Miller delivers a comprehensive, forward-looking, must-read report on the Obama administration’s vast and expanding targeted killing program. In the piece, Miller provides three significant details that were previously unreported. First, among senior Obama administration officials, “there is broad consensus [targeted killings] are likely to be extended at least another decade.” As a senior official is flippantly quoted: “We’re not going to wind up in 10 years in a world of everybody holding hands and saying, ‘We love America.’” Second, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) maintains a “disposition matrix” that attempts to harmonize the CIA and JSOC kill lists, presents strategies to kill or capture individuals who appear on those lists, and describes what is required by U.S. government agencies and foreign partners should targeting information become available. Although the role played by the NCTC was previously unknown, it is consistent with the six primary missions (see page 37) established in its mandate by the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. Third, the process of vetting and selecting individuals for targeted killings has been further narrowed and concentrated within the office of John Brennan—whose role as the "priest whose blessing has become indispensable" to Obama and misleading statements I have written about extensively. According to Miller’s article, Brennan ended the video conferences run by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that discussed revisions to the kill lists because “Brennan thought the process shouldn’t be run by those who pull the trigger on strikes.” This is savvy power-grab by Brennan, although—in my experience—trigger-pullers possess considerably less enthusiasm for killing people than civilians sitting in the basement of the White House. After following this program closely for the past half-dozen years, I have stopped being surprised by how far and how quickly the United States has moved from the international norm against assassinations or “extrajudicial killings.” As I wrote in my book on discrete military operations, opposition to assassination was widely held and endured throughout the Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations through 1999 for the following reasons: Assassinations ran counter to well-established international norms, and were prohibited under both treaty and customary international law. Third, weakening the international norm against assassinations could result in retaliatory killings of American leaders, who are more vulnerable as a consequence of living in a relatively open society. Fourth, the targeted killing of suspected terrorists or political leaders was generally considered an ineffective foreign policy tool. An assassination attempt that failed could be counterproductive, in that it would create more legal and diplomatic problems than it was worth. An attempt that succeeded, meanwhile, would likely do little to diminish the long-term threat from an enemy state or group. Finally, the secretive and treacherous aspect of targeted killings was considered antithetical to the moral and ethical precepts of the United States. Miller’s report underscores the cementing of the mindset and apparent group-think among national security policymakers that the routine and indefinite killing of suspected terrorists and nearby military-age males is ethical, moral, legal, and effective (for now). Moreover, it demonstrates the increasing institutionalization—“codifying and streamlining the process” as Miller describes it—of executive branch power to use lethal force without any meaningful checks and balances. Recent history demonstrates that the executive branch does not willingly provide transparency and a plausible defense of its national security decisions, or cede any of its incrementally accrued powers, unless Congress, courts, or the American people care. Indeed, it is notable that Miller does not find officials worried about the legality, congressional oversight, transparency, or precedent setting for future state and nonstate powers wielding armed drones. Having spoken with dozens of officials across both administrations, I am convinced that those serving under President Bush were actually much more conscious and thoughtful about the long-term implications of targeted killings than those serving under Obama. In part, this is because more Bush administration officials were affected by the U.S. Senate Select Committee investigation, led by Senator Frank Church, that implicated the United States in assassination plots against foreign leaders—including at least eight separate plans to kill Cuban president Fidel Castro—and President Ford’s Executive Order 11905: “No employee of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, political assassination.” Recently, I spoke to a military official with extensive and wide-ranging experience in the special operations world, and who has had direct exposure to the targeted killing program. To emphasize how easy targeted killings by special operations forces or drones has become, this official flicked his hand back over and over, stating: "It really is like swatting flies. We can do it forever easily and you feel nothing. But how often do you really think about killing a fly?"

Although likely U.S. voters are evenly split between President Barack Obama and Governor Mitt Romney, nearly all Americans agree that foreign policy issues are not important in this election. The latest poll found that only 6 percent think “foreign policy and the Middle East” is the most important issue. However, last night’s vice presidential debate devoted a significant amount of time on foreign policy questions, perhaps because moderator Martha Raddatz (who actually moderated) previously covered the Pentagon and the State Department, and is now a senior foreign affairs correspondent for ABC News. Since Raddatz asked the questions and demanded specific answers, several hot-button foreign policy issues were raised, such as the attacks on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi, the suspected nuclear weapons program in Iran, the protracted conflict in Syria, and the near-forgotten war in Afghanistan. In response, both vice presidential candidates gave statements that are misleading or wishful thinking. Ryan: “If we had the status of forces agreement [in Iraq]…we probably would have been able to prevent [Iranian flights suspected of carrying weapons to Syria].” Here, Ryan echoes what the Wall Street Journal military planning staff determined last month: “The Iranian overflights…would not happen if the U.S. still had an airbase in Iraq to secure the country’s airspace.” Would Ryan have supported maintaining U.S. troops in Iraq without Baghdad providing immunity protections? The United States currently has 225 troops, 530 security assistance team members, and over 4,000 contractors to equip and train Iraqi security forces via the Office of Security Cooperation Iraq. Would Ryan support these troops and personnel attempting to intercept Iranian flights?  Does Ryan believe that the government of Iraq would allow the United States to intercept aircraft over its sovereign territory? Ryan: “When Barack Obama was elected, they had enough fissile material—nuclear material to make one bomb. Now they have enough for five.” Ryan should have added: “If the material was further enriched at Iran’s declared nuclear sites where the IAEA does routine physical inventory verifications, which would quickly detect such activity.” Biden: “There is no weapon that the Iranians have at this point. Both the Israelis and we know if they start the process of building a weapon.” Biden added, “They’re closer to being able to get enough fissile material to put in a weapon if they had a weapon.” What Biden fails to mention is that the creation of a workable HEU-fueled nuclear device isn’t the biggest hurdle for Iran. One of the items that Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan shopped around on the nuclear black market was the blueprint for a Chinese-designed twelve kiloton warhead, which was successfully tested in 1966. Furthermore, even if Iran did not receive Chinese nuclear blueprints, Biden knows that it would not be overly difficult for Iranian engineers to manufacture a crude nuclear device. As he told an arms control conference in 2004: When I was chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee…I gathered the heads of all the national laboratories and some of their subordinates in [the Capitol]. I asked them a simple question. I said I would like you to go back to your laboratory and try to assume for a moment you are a relatively informed terrorist group with access to some nuclear scientists. Could you build, off-the-shelf, a nuclear device? Not a dirty bomb, but something that would start a nuclear reaction—an atomic bomb. Could you build one? They came back several months later and said, “We built one.”… I literally asked the laboratories to physically take this device into the Senate…it was bigger than a breadbox and smaller than a dump truck but they were able to get it in. They literally put it in a room and showed and explained how—literally off-the-shelf, without doing anything illegal—they actually constructed this device. Biden: “We are leaving [Afghanistan]. We are leaving in 2014, period.” The full withdrawal of all U.S. troops out of Afghanistan is not the current position of the Obama administration. On October 3, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced the appointment of Ambassador James Warlick, deputy special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, to lead the negotiations for an agreement that would keep U.S. troops in Afghanistan for an undefined period of time. Reportedly, “Western officials have mentioned the residual American force as ranging from a few thousand to some 20,000.” In addition, some U.S. policymakers assume that Afghanistan will serve as hub for special operations raids and drone strikes into Pakistan. Does Biden support the scheduled pull out of U.S. forces from Afghanistan by the end of 2014 or not?  Would the government of Afghanistan agree? At the same time, Ryan and Biden did agree on one point. They both think that they have total clairvoyance into the mind of the Iranian supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Ryan: “Let’s look at this from the view of the ayatollahs. What do they see?” In response, Biden declared, “Let me tell you what the ayatollah sees.” Understanding the mindset of Ayatollah Khamenei is essential for efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. In January, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper told the Senate: “Iran’s technical advances, particularly in uranium enrichment, strengthen our assessment that Iran is well-capable of producing enough highly-enriched uranium for a weapon if its political leaders, specifically the supreme leader himself, choose to do so.” This notion that U.S. policymakers—in a redux of the movie Being John Malkovich—can step into the shoes of a seventy-three-year-old Shiite theocrat and accurately comprehend what he sees and believes is lunacy. More accurately, it is what psychologists call the illusion of transparency, where “people overestimate others’ ability to know them, and they also overestimate their ability to know others.” The self-assuredness is also particularly dangerous for assessing the motives of repressive leaders. The recently declassified CIA review of how the intelligence community misunderstood Saddam Hussein’s motivations to refuse to fully reveal Iraq’s WMD programs should temper Ryan and Biden’s faith in their ability to think like the ayatollah: “Analysts tend to focus on what was most important to us—the hunt for WMD—and less on what would be most important for a paranoid dictatorship to protect…Deceptions were perpetrated and detected, but the reasons for those deceptions were misread.”

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu: "I believe that, faced with a clear red line, Iran will back down.” (September 27, 2012) Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon, “I think that this whole matter of red lines should be made, but not publicly.” (September 27, 2012) Deputy Prime Minister Dan Meridor, “I don’t want to set red lines or deadlines for myself.” (September 14, 2012) “Rockets Galore,” The Economist, September 29, 2012. (3PA: A Hellfire drone missile costs $115,000 and weighs 50 kilograms. The new Spike missile costs $5,000 and weighs less than 3 kilograms.) Peter W. Singer, “After-Action Report; It’d Be Stupid But Not Disastrous,” TIME, September 28, 2012. (3PA: This five-part series on the effects of defense sequestration is a solid and balanced analysis.) Department of Defense, Press Briefing with George Little, September 25, 2012. Q:  You said the secretary sees the mission moving forward in Afghanistan.  Just kind of been a tumultuous couple weeks here.  What are the metrics of success that you guys are most impressed with?  What are the things that tell you that that’s the case? LITTLE:  Well, partnered operations continue.  Overall levels of violence are down.  We see Afghans more and more in the lead for their own operations and for their own governance.  That is the goal here.  That is what we’re trending toward.  At the end of the day, that’s how success is going to be defined.  It’s whether Afghans can provide for their own security and govern themselves. If anyone thinks that the metric of success is a surrender ceremony on the deck of a ship, they’re wrong.  The metric of success in Afghanistan is enabling the Afghans, Afghan political institutions, and the Afghan national security forces, to create a brighter future for Afghanistan.  That is the point and that is the goal of our strategy. (3PA: How would the Pentagon define “a brighter future for Afghanistan,” or know when they’ve achieved that objective?) Q:  Iran says it has built and deployed a reconnaissance drone, the Shahed 129 they’re calling it.  It says it doubles the range of previous drones, and they say it’s like the RQ Sentinel drone that went down in Iranian territory in 2011.  Are you aware of this drone, of this -- of this deployment?  Can you verify it in any way?  And are you concerned about it in any way? LITTLE:  I’m not in a position to verify that claim one way or the other.  I think that we have the most sophisticated, elaborate remotely-piloted vehicles in the world. General Richard B. Myers, “How Junk Food in Schools Affects the Military,” Politico, September 24, 2012. Being overweight or obese has now become the leading medical reason why young adults cannot enlist in the military. The Defense Department estimates that 1 in 4 young adults is too overweight to enlist. When weight problems are combined with other disqualifying factors, like failing to finish high school or being convicted of a serious crime, an estimated 75 percent of Americans age 17 to 24 are not able to join the military. Casey L. Coombs, “Yemen to Get UAVs from the United States,” Aviation Week, September 26, 2012. An anonymous Yemeni defense official, who was not authorized to speak with the press, tells Aviation Week that Yemen is receiving four AeroVironment RQ-11 Raven UAVs. The 1.9-kg Raven is equipped with sensors for target acquisition, and infrared cameras capable of displaying persons carrying weapons. “This type of technology would be very appropriate for Yemen’s frontline military units because it provides real-time intelligence from the battlefield to launch strikes while minimizing troops’ exposure to surprise attacks,” according to Aysh Awas, director of security and strategic studies at Sheba, a think tank here in the Yemeni capital. Living Under Drones: Death, Injury, and Trauma to Civilians From U.S. Drone Practices in Pakistan, Stanford Law School and NYU School of Law, September 2012.  

The Iranian government is reportedly supplying military equipment via Iraqi airspace to Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria. Although Iraq temporarily halted the flights in mid-March at the request of the Obama administration, they resumed in July. Last week, Reuters quoted from an intelligence report from an unnamed country: "Planes are flying from Iran to Syria via Iraq on an almost daily basis, carrying IRGC (Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps) personnel and tens of tons of weapons to arm the Syrian security forces and militias fighting against the rebels." Yet again, the Obama administration has asked Iraq to ban the flights outright, or force them to land and undergo inspections. This would be a relatively simple process, as Iraq requires advance notice of eight business days for flights in its airspace, and mandates that such flights occur within twenty-four hours. Despite such demands, Iraq lacks the political will and the capability—specifically an integrated air defense radar system and robust air force—to establish complete control over its airspace. Yesterday, Lt. Gen Robert Caslen, chief of the Office of Security Cooperation at the U.S. embassy in Iraq, told the New York Times: “Iraq recognizes they don’t control their airspace, and they are very sensitive to that,” General Caslen said. Each time Turkish fighter jets enter Iraq’s airspace to bomb Kurdish targets, he said, Iraqi officials “see it, they know it and they resent it.” This is an interesting statement from the most senior U.S. military official in Iraq. As the countries’ occupying power, the United States controlled Iraqi airspace from April 2003 until the last sector was transferred in October 2011 to Iraq. As part of that role, the United States leveraged access to Iraqi airbases to launch surveillance drone missions over Iran. At the same time, several of Iran’s more capable spy drones like the Ababil III were easily tracked and shot down by U.S. fighter jets over Iraq. Prior to the U.S. invasion in March 2003, the United States played the predominant role in enforcing the Iraqi southern and northern no-fly zones (NFZs)—encompassing sixty percent of Iraq—for twelve years. Altogether, the United States has had excellent situational awareness of Iraqi airspace for nearly twenty years, until handing over control to Baghdad in October 2011. What makes Caslen’s comments disturbing is that between April 2003 and October 2011, Turkish F-16s routinely entered Iraqi airspace to attack Kurdish targets—suspected members of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).  These attacks were not only permitted by the United States, but U.S. manned and unmanned systems provided targeting information about suspected PKK camps to Turkey. This arrangement was cemented in November 2007 when the United States and Turkey established a joint combined intelligence fusion cell in Ankara to process all incoming intelligence on the PKK. On occasion, such Turkish attacks have been devastating to Kurdish civilians living in northern Iraq. Every single State Department Human Rights report—2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010—since the U.S.-Turkey cell opened warned of civilians casualties in counterterrorism operations where the PKK was the intended target. On December 28, 2011, a U.S. Predator drone provided video imagery of a caravan of suspected PKK militants near the Turkish border. After Turkish officers directed the drone to fly elsewhere, Turkish aircraft attacked the caravan with four sorties and killed thirty-four civilians. To this day, the United States provides targeting intelligence to the Turkish Air Force. If, as Caslen claims, Iraqis are aware of and resent the ongoing Turkish incursions into Iraq, they assuredly resented U.S. control of Iraqi airspace. Given the U.S. criticisms of Iraqi unwillingness to curtail Iranian arms and personnel flights headed to the Assad regime in Syria, it is also worth highlighting who else violates Iraqi airspace, and who supports those intrusions.