Intelligence

Department of Defense Press Briefing by Rear Adm. Kirby in the Pentagon Briefing Room, U.S. Department of Defense, February 18, 2015. Rear Adm. Kirby: These are actually proscriptions in place that we will follow and we will expect anybody that receives these systems to follow…It’s in our best interest to be able to have this kind of control, supervision, and scrutiny over the potential delivery of these systems because it’s a ubiquitous, now, capability. Not every nation has the same sophistication at it as we do, but this is a technology that’s not going away. So, it suits our interests, and I think it should suit the American people’s interests to know that we’re going to be involved, from soup to nuts, on how these systems are eventually transferred. (3PA: Kirby’s comments were in reference to a policy released by the State Department this week, which is the topic of my new column on ForeignPolicy.com.) Askold Krushelnycky, “ Ukrainian Forces Recover Downed Russian Drone,” The Intercept, February 17, 2015. A Russian drone was shot down over the weekend during heavy fighting against separatist forces near the government-held port city of Mariupol in southeastern Ukraine, according to Ukrainian forces.The drone was quickly identified as a Russian-designed and manufactured drone designated E08 by its manufacturer, the Enics company, whose logo and name appear in Cyrillic on its fuselage… Members of Ukraine’s 37th Mechanized Battalion, who brought down the drone, saw it crash into the Azov Sea, fringing the conflict zone. (3PA: In a recent Brookings Institution report on policies to preserve Ukrainian independence and prevent Rusian aggression, the authors noted that Ukrainian military officers claimed they have “no capabilities to jam or down Russian UAVs.” Of course, they do; drones are easy to shoot down.) Aisha Ahmad, “The Security Bazaar, Business Interests and Islamist Power in Civil War Somalia,” International Security, 39(3), Winter 2014/15, pp. 89-117. Since the collapse of its government in 1991, Somalia has suffered more than two decades of civil war along clan lines. For fiffteen years, these fierce tribal divisions were the main fault line of conflict. In 2006, however, a new Islamist movement emerged in the capital city of Mogadishu and quickly ousted the heavily entrenched clan warlords. Within the short span of six months, these newcomers accomplished what more than a dozen internationally sponsored peace processes could not: they centralized political control over the majority of the Somali countryside…(p. 90) The estimation results indicate that the price of security was significant in driving the Somali business community’s support for the Islamists over the warlords, and that both clan and Islamic identity may be overstated…(p. 105) This research suggests, however, that both ethnic and Islamic identity politics may actually be overstated in the existing literature, and that more work needs to focus on the pragmatic cost calculations of the business elite. By modeling civil war as a market for the provision of security, this article offers a practical, economic explanation for why Islamists may prove more competitive than groups defined by narrower identities. I argue that because certain Islamist groups have the ability to sell security to prospective buyers across ethnic or tribal divisions, they are able to charge the business elite lower rates than protection rackets that rely on a more limited ethnic or tribal base. By courting the valuable support of the business class, Islamists are thus able to monopolize the market for providing security. (pp. 114-115) Robert L. Grenier, 88 Days to Kandahar: A CIA Diary (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2015) pp. 413-414. In the midst of these maneuvers, for years the United States could not induce Pakistan to invade and occupy the militant safehaven in North Waziristan, which provided a base for groups whose primary targets were in Afghanistan. The Pakistanis lived in fear that to do so might drive those groups to join forces with others primarily focused on Pakistan, with potentially disastrous consequences to themselves. They had their own challenges, and were not about to take risks to defend foreigners, who—the Pakistanis reasoned—could take care of themselves. Over time, the efforts of Pakistan’s ISI [intelligence agency] to maintain links and to try to manipulate all these groups in defense of its own interests looked progressively to U.S. observers more and more like active Pakistani collusion with those who were killing Americans. In response, the employment of armed drones in the Pakistani Tribal Areas, which had once largely been limited to pinpoint strikes against foreign militants with operational ties to al-Qa’ida, was expanded, if press accounts and those of organizations dedicated to the subject are to be believed, to include attacks against groups of armed men apparently engaged in cross-border insurgency. Out of frustration with Pakistan’s unwillingness or inability to police its own territory, what once had been primarily a counterterrorism tool became a broad-based counterinsurgency tool. As the number of cross-border attacks increased, so did the number of drone strikes. The fact that such “signature strikes” were aimed at local, as opposed to foreign militants, and had a much greater propensity to generate collateral casualties among non-combatants, had the effect of greatly increasingly public outrage in Pakistan, and encouraging yet more militancy. (3PA: I first pointed this out six years ago, and am glad to see a senior CIA official responsible for overseeing these strikes acknowledge this now.) Arthur Schlesinger, A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin Harcour, 2002) p. 258. “If someone comes in to tell me this or that about the minimum wage bill,” [President] Kennedy said to me later, “I have no hesitation in overruling them. But you always assume that the military and intelligence people have some secret skill not available to ordinary mortals.”

Press Briefing by the Press Secretary Josh Earnest, White House, December 11, 2014. Q: And finally, has the President ever sought a formal assessment from the intelligence community about whether the drone program is a net asset, either because of our moral authority, or in terms of creating more enemies than it takes off the battlefield? MR. EARNEST:  Well, I’m not aware of any intelligence assessment like this.  You can certainly check with the office of the Director of National Intelligence to see if they’re aware of anything like this that they could talk to you about. CIA Director John O. Brennan Holds a News Conference On the CIA’s Former Detention and Interrogation Program, Central Intelligence Agency, December 11, 2014. QUESTION:  Your agency is involved in overseeing the drone program in which we know, from the government’s own statements, you know, that there have been some civilians, innocent civilians, killed alongside terrorists. I’m wondering if you feel that there’s enough control over those programs and that we’re not going to be here in a few years with another director having to answer these same questions about the loss of trust from the public, from policymakers. BRENNAN: I’m not going to talk about any type of operational activity that this agency is involved in currently. I’m just not going to do it. I will tell you, though, that during my tenure at the White House, as the president’s assistant for counterterrorism, that the use of these unmanned aerial vehicles that you refer to as drones in the counterterrorism effort has done tremendous work to keep this country safe. The ability to use these platforms and advanced technologies, it has advanced the counterterrorism mission and the U.S. military has done some wonderful things with these platforms. And in terms of precision of effort, accuracy and making sure that this country, this country’s military does everything possible to minimize to the great extent possible the loss of life of noncombatants, I think there’s a lot for this country and this White House and the military to be proud of. Interview with Maine Senator Angus King, CNN’s “The Situation Room,” December 11, 2014. BLITZER: As a member of the Intelligence Committee, the CIA. And so without revealing any classified information, the drone program is obviously very well-known. Do you have a problem, without going into specifics, and I don’t want you to break any of the classification rules, do you as a United States senator, who oversees this program, have problem with it? KING: I believe that the CIA is acting within the law and the intentions right now. That’s as far as I want to go. You’re trying to get me to say something I’m not... BLITZER: No, I don’t want you to break any rules. I don’t want you to violate sources and methods or anything like that. KING: And I’m not ducking the question. I’m just trying to follow the rules. BLITZER: Because, as you know, the critics of President Obama, they say, yes, he didn’t like the torture, he didn’t like the excessive interrogation, but these people, except for one that we know of in Afghanistan, they lived to talk about it, they’re still alive to this very day. When you send out a drone with a Hellfire missile and you go into Pakistan or Afghanistan or Yemen or someplace and you just kill them, in the process, you might kill relatives or family members. They’re not going to be interrogated. They’re just going to die. KING: Again, Wolf, I can’t confirm any information about the program. I’m sorry. Press Briefing by the Press Secretary Josh Earnest, White House, December 10, 2014. Q: You have repeatedly talked about moral authority.  So can you explain how the President believes that it’s un-American to use these techniques but it was okay to ramp up the drone policy and basically thousands of people around the world, innocent civilians were killed.  What’s the moral equivalency there?  How do you have moral authority when innocent civilians are killed by drones? MR. EARNEST:  Well, I think that the difference here, Ed—and this is a stark difference in the way that the United States conducts our policy and the way that terrorists around the world conduct their policy—that there is significant care taken and there are significant checks and balances that are included in the system to ensure that any counterterrorism action that’s taken by the United States of America does not put at risk innocent lives. Q: But they do in the end.  I understand there are safeguards, but in the end, we’ve seen many cases around the world where U.S. drones have killed innocent civilians, despite those safeguards.  So how do you have moral authority? MR. EARNEST:  What I’m saying is that is a stark difference from the tactics that are employed by our enemies, who seek to use car bombs to actually target innocent civilians. Q: Yet you still kill civilians.  No one is defending the terrorists’ tactics, but by your tactics— MR. EARNEST:  But you’re asking about our moral authority, and I think there is a very clear difference…There is a very clear difference between the tactics that are used by terrorists and the counterterrorism tactics that are employed by the United States of America that go to great lengths to protect the lives of innocent civilians.  In fact, many of these terrorists that we’re talking about—and, again, many of these counterterrorism activities that are used against terrorists are targeting terrorists that themselves have targeted local populations—that have targeted fellow Muslims in some situations.  So the efforts that are taken by this administration to limit or to prevent innocent civilian casualties are consistent with our values and are consistent with our broader strategy for protecting the American people. “FBI: Torture Report May Spark Terror Threat,” CNN’s “The Situation Room,” December 9, 2014. SEN JAMES RISCH (R-ID): That’s true. And the more that’s reported and now affirmed by this report, it is going to damage our ability to go to our partners—and some of them are not necessarily allies—but also to allies and say, "Look, you’ve got this information. We’ve got this. Let’s work together on this." They’re going to be very reluctant to do that. A good example of that is the drone program today. You know, they talk about interrogation here. We don’t do that anymore. There’s no interrogation— WOLF BLITZER: There is interrogation, but not through these enhanced interrogation techniques. They question these terrorists. RISCH: They aren’t picking up prisoners anymore. What they do is when they identify a high-value target, the target is droned. There’s no terrorist left to interrogate. BLITZER: They’re not questioned, they just kill them, is that what you said? RISCH: That’s right. That’s what the administration— BLITZER: They don’t question anymore. I want to be specific here. So what you’re saying is President Obama has ruled out torturing prisoners, but he supports just killing them? Is that what you’re saying? RISCH: You’re saying that more directly than I would. Certainly, he has ruled out the torture, as has everybody. There’s nobody thinks that this is—this is a good thing to do. Having said that, when and if we get these people—and that is very, very rarely—they are interrogated. But more importantly, when we do identify these people, instead of trying to get our hands on them, they are subject to our covert drone program that’s out there. BLITZER: Which is targeted assassinations, killing of these suspects? RISCH: I wouldn’t call them assassinations. These are people in the fight against America. It is only people who we are engaged in conflict with, in war with that are identified and listed as possible targets for the drone program. Press Briefing by the Press Secretary Josh Earnest, White House, December 8, 2014. QUESTION: So what’s the difference between (inaudible) interrogation techniques and drones that kill civilians? EARNEST: Well, Nadia, the president gave a pretty detailed speech on this topic about a year and a half or so ago, where he talked about the desire to try to bring more transparency to some of the counterterrorism programs that are implemented by the United States. Despite that commitment to transparency, there are still some limits about what I can say from here, but I can tell you that the president does want to be sure, that as we execute the counterterrorism strategy that he has outlined, that we are mindful of the impact that those strategies have on our ability to win hearts and minds. Brian Bennett, “Dianne Feinstein Leaving Intelligence Job Amid Clash on Tactics Report,” Los Angeles Times, December 7, 2014. Feinstein also defended the CIA against efforts by the Pentagon to eclipse the agency’s covert drone program. She believes the CIA has a better track record than the military and more experience with the strikes. "They have the patience and they wait until the situation is right," Feinstein said. "There are not hot heads" making the decision on when to fire, she said. She has sent committee staff members into the CIA "more than 50 times" to make unannounced visits to watch the operation of the drone program, she said. The number of civilians killed in CIA strikes has declined in the last few years, she said. "Collateral damage is low," Feinstein said, which was one of her goals when she increased oversight of the targeting-killing program after she took control of the committee.

As I have highlighted previously, the United States’ recent increased security cooperation with the government of Iraq to confront the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has been characterized by an astounding lack of clarity. Yesterday, there was another troubling example of contradictory statements about the missions and objectives of U.S. forces in Iraq. Pentagon spokesperson Adm. John Kirby was asked if the United States was supporting airstrikes from Iraq against ISIS in support of the Kurds. Kirby replied unequivocally: “We’re not coordinating air attacks in Iraq. We’re not.” This claim is at odds with prior articulations of U.S. policy in Iraq. During a House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing on July 23, Brett McGurk, deputy assistant secretary for Iraq and Iran, defended the Obama administration’s responsiveness to August 2013 Iraqi requests for U.S. targeting intelligence and precision-guided-capable missiles: “We responded immediately. We set up intelligence fusion chairing centers, we helped them with the Hellfire missiles precision strikes.”  McGurk later added, “The sequence was the helping the Iraqis with their Hellfire strikes, with the information, and the fusion cells we set up.” During a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on the following day, McGurk again emphasized the level of direct assistance that has been provided by the United States: “When this crisis started, the Iraqis had zero Hellfire missiles in their arsenal. We have delivered them, since this crisis began in June, hundreds of Hellfire missiles. And with our new intelligence, with the joint operations center, the Iraqis have deployed those missiles with precision and accuracy. It has made a difference.” The apparent missions, as detailed by the Obama administration’s lead official for Iraq, are that the United States is providing both the firepower and targeting intelligence for Iraqi airstrikes against suspected ISIS militants. There might be some debate about whether this amount of support counts as “coordinating air attacks in Iraq,” or not. However, where the United States provides the weaponry and intelligence, without which an airstrike would not have occurred, then that essential and enabling role makes the United States, in large part, responsible for the outcome.  This does not make them direct U.S. airstrikes, but officials and policymakers should demand that the government of Iraq be held accountable for how it uses U.S.-supplied missiles and intelligence. On the one hand, this provides leverage and influence that the United States can attempt to use to promote more responsible and precise uses of force, a meaningful objective given that some airstrikes conducted by the government of Iraq have been both indiscriminate and against targets of doubtful military utility. On the other hand, this also makes the United States a direct party in yet another Iraqi civil war, which ties America’s credibility to defending a deeply unpopular ruling regime, or a newly-formed government should Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki step aside. It is uncertain if this will happen, as the Maliki government is already demanding even more aid and security cooperation before any domestic political changes occur. In keeping with the tradition of thankless partners and allies who want ever more U.S. assistance before they implement domestic changes sought by Washington, leverage and influence works both ways.

U.S.-Germany relations have plunged to new lows, but the alliance is far greater than the recent controversy over espionage, says expert Karen Donfried.

Jeanne Whalen and Alan Cullison, “Ukraine Battles to Rebuild a Depleted Military,” Wall Street Journal, March 25, 2014. In recent weeks Mr. Yarema has turned to Washington and NATO for help, but with little luck so far. Ukraine’s military lacks much of an air force, and if fighting breaks out he expects that Russia would be able to pound Ukrainian ground troops with impunity. In meetings with U.S. senators and Western diplomats, he says he asked for help establishing a no-fly zone over Ukraine’s 15 nuclear reactors so that his troops could at least count on some zones of safety... (3PA: When a foreign government or opposition group wants low-risk U.S. military involvement, the no-fly zone has become the default request. Revisit my piece in the Atlantic for more on this trend.) “Concluding observations on the fourth report of the United States of America,” UN Human Rights Committee, March 2014. Targeted killings using unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) The Committee is concerned about the State party’s practice of targeted killings in extraterritorial counter-terrorism operations using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) also known as ‘drones’, the lack of transparency regarding the criteria for drone strikes, including the legal justification for specific attacks, and the lack of accountability for the loss of life resulting from such attacks. The Committee notes the State party’s position that drone strikes are conducted in the course of its armed conflict with Al- Qaida, the Taliban, and associated forces and in accordance with its inherent right of national self-defense and are governed by international humanitarian law, as well as by the Presidential Policy Guidance that sets out standards for the use of lethal force outside areas of active hostilities. Nevertheless, the Committee remains concerned about the State party’s very broad approach to the definition and the geographical scope of an armed conflict, including the end of hostilities, the unclear interpretation of what constitutes an “imminent threat” and who is a combatant or civilian taking a direct part in hostilities, the unclear position on the nexus that should exist between any particular use of lethal force and any specific theatre of hostilities, as well as the precautionary measures taken to avoid civilian casualties in practice (arts. 2, 6, and 14). The State party should revisit its position regarding legal justifications for the use of deadly force through drone attacks. It should: (a) ensure that any use of armed drones complies fully with its obligations under article 6 of the Covenant, including in particular with respect to the principles of precaution, distinction and proportionality in the context of an armed conflict; (b) subject to operational security, disclose the criteria for drone strikes, including the legal basis for specific attacks, the process of target identification and the circumstances in which drones are used; (c) provide for independent supervision and oversight over the specific implementation of regulations governing the use of drone strikes; (d) in armed conflict situations, take all feasible measures to ensure the protection of civilians in specific drone attacks and to track  5 and assess civilian casualties, as well as all necessary precautionary measures in order to avoid such casualties; (e) conduct independent, impartial, prompt and effective investigations of allegations of violations of the right to life and bring to justice those responsible; (f) provide victims or their families with an effective remedy where there has been a violation, including adequate compensation, and establish accountability mechanisms for victims of allegedly unlawful drone attacks who are not compensated by their home governments... “Death Sentences and Executions 2013,” Amnesty International, 2014. Executions were recorded in 22 countries during 2013, one more than in the previous year. As in 2012, it could not be confirmed if judicial executions took place in Egypt or Syria. The overall number of reported executions worldwide was 778, an increase of almost 15% compared with 2012. As in previous years, this figure does not include the thousands of people executed in China; with the death penalty treated as a state secret the lack of reliable data does not allow Amnesty International to publish credible minimum figures for China...   Rep. Michael Rogers, “A Special Message from Rep. Rogers,” March 27, 2014. What other job on earth could take you from sitting in the CIA Director’s office helping to plan the operation to kill Osama bin Laden one week, to traveling to the far reaches of the tribal areas of Pakistan where few Americans have ever been the next, to meeting with a protester in Ukraine who had his ear cut off standing up to Vladimir Putin’s goons the next?... (3PA: Why would the House Intelligence Committee Chair help to plan the operation that killed Bin Laden? And who oversaw his planning activities? A few more of Rogers’ notable statements include: “I think the Chinese got everything they needed they need out of Snowden. The Russians have now gotten everything they need out of Snowden. And the next I think — chapter in this book is somewhere in the Latin America one of these countries who is antagonistic to the United States, who is an adversary to the United States, using this as a public relations tool.” (CNN, July 7, 2013) “We did this in the 1930s. We turned it off–1929 the Secretary of State, at that time, where we were collecting information to protect America said you know we should do this. This is unseemly. Turned it off. So that led to a whole bunch of misunderstandings that led to World War II that killed millions and millions of people.” (CBS, November 3, 2013) “Everybody agrees that Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program.” (Business Week, March 17, 2013) “China is a rational actor…Iran is not a rational actor.” (New York Times, March 3, 2013).)