Homeland Security

Statement before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Thank you for the opportunity to address the committee on this vital topic. Just as a preamble, my remarks do not reflect the views of the Council on Foreign Relations, which does not have a corporate position on these matters. My understanding of the Committee’s objectives in holding this hearing is that witnesses should focus on the future and address themselves to issues that might help both Congress and the Executive branch set homeland security priorities. The Committee it seems to me is doing the right thing. Our vulnerability at home to terrorist assault, as well as to natural disasters, is essentially infinite. The fact is that not everything can be protected. Judicious decisions about what to protect given our wholesale and inevitable exposure to attack by clever and disciplined terrorists are essential. What follows are my personal reflections on this vexing problem. Given the myriad threats to our infrastructure—critical and otherwise—and to the lives of our fellow citizens, other analysts will legitimately come to different conclusions about the best way to focus our collective efforts and especially those of the agencies under the jurisdiction of this committee, and of departments and agencies with which DHS must interact continuously and cooperatively in order to fulfill its daunting mandate. I will concentrate on three issues: first, the importance of cities as terrorist havens and terrorist targets; second, the continuing significance to many jihadists of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); and third, the need to preserve the good will and sense of belonging of America’s Muslim communities as a matter of national security, beyond the intrinsic virtues of a cohesive, considerate society in which citizens of all creeds can feel at home. Urban Warfare The jihad that has evolved since September 11th has become a war of cities. The transition from caves to condos, as one observer described this evolution, is impressive. Although the relatively remote, rural bases that incubated the jihad had strong advantages, especially given the centrality of social networks to the early jihad, municipalities have their own attractions. They offer anonymity, but also community, both of which can confer a kind of cover. Urban neighborhoods, with their numberless apartments, coffee-houses, mosques and Islamic centers, provide the setting for recruitment, clandestine meetings, preparation of weapons and other activities that form the terrorist enterprise. Moreover, the majority of urban areas in which jihadists have established a presence are not targets for air strikes, Hellfire missiles, or submarine-launched cruise missiles. Think of Muhammad Atta’s Hamburg, or the Leeds of Muhammad Siddique Khan, orchestrator of the 7/7 bombings of the London underground and bus systems. Post-bin Laden jihadists are not the first militants to avail themselves of these tactical conveniences. The radical campaign in Egypt that began in mid-1970s was spawned in Cairo, one of the world’s largest cities. And of course non-Muslim terrorist organizations, such as the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA), have long thrived in urban areas. It could be said that having adapted to city life, the jihad has really come into its own. Qualities that favor the jihadists’ defensive requirements do not tell the whole story. The other side is that cities are where their targets—both symbolic and of flesh-and-blood—are to be found in abundance and proximity. There are many aspects of Islamist militancy that are quintessentially modern. The transformation of cities into fields of jihad is a classic example of the movement’s modernity. It is part and parcel of the post-World War II process of urbanization that swept the Middle East, North Africa and Pakistan. Large-scale migration of Muslims to Europe represents perhaps the last phase of this urbanizing process. In these cities, Muslims radicalized by a potent combination of powerful imagery in the media, socio-economic exclusion, and a set of simple, but internally consistent religious and ideological concepts, have ample targets for their hunger for retribution and duty—from their perspective—of self-defense. One of the striking features of contemporary Muslim public opinion to emerge from recent Pew polls is the degree to which Muslims in far-flung, diverse places have come to see themselves as having “more in common nowadays.” This attitude can be seen at work in the United Kingdom, Spain, Germany, The Netherlands and Denmark. Events far removed geographically from these countries, especially developments in Iraq, have mobilized youth in each of their capitals. New York has already shown itself to be a crucial target for jihadists. This great city was construed by al-Qaeda to be the beating heart of America’s economy, which bin Laden believed he could cripple; the symbol of American arrogance as embodied by the “looming towers” of the World Trade Center; and the seat of Jewish power, which jihadists believe accounts for the global subordination of Muslim interests to America and Israel. It is also a teeming city, whose large and densely packed population promised the most efficient path to a successful mass attack that—from a jihadist viewpoint—might begin to even the score with the United States. There is no reason to think that this conviction has weakened. Furthermore, New York City proffers the same advantages to the attacker as do all large cities. The array of targeting opportunities in New York is wide. Although we can be perversely certain that the attack, when it comes, will be the one we least expected, some preliminary judgments are possible. Mass transportation, which the jihadists have attacked elsewhere with some success, the financial district or banks, symbols of authority, and perhaps schools, given al Qaeda’s insistence on the need to avenge the tens of thousands of Muslim children it believes were deliberately killed by the U.S., either directly or through Israeli action thought to be sponsored by Washington. Car or truck bombs—the icon of urban violence in Iraq and used effectively before then in Lebanon and Argentina by Hezbollah and elsewhere by others including the IRA, the Basque separatist group ETA and the Baader-Meinhof gang—should also be expected at some point. Similarly, we might expect Palestinian style backpack bombs carried into restaurants or other public places by solitary suicidal attackers. The implications of this analysis are, first, that community policing and extensive video surveillance probably need to be stepped up. In this kind of urban warfare, intelligence is acquired best by those who are most familiar with the terrain: police officers walking their beat. On the front line, they get to know their neighborhoods, the residents and the shopkeepers, form and cultivate relationships with local citizens, and develop a sense of the natural order of things and therefore of signs that something is out of the ordinary or warrants investigation. The pivotal role of local law enforcement is reinforced by the incapacity of federal authorities to gather information skillfully, discretely, effectively, and without alienating potential sources of intelligence. The FBI, in particular, presently lacks the numbers, skills, knowledge base and orientation to contribute. This does not mean however that local law enforcement can or should operate in a vacuum, especially in light of connections that have been disclosed between the self-starter groups in the U.K. and al-Qaeda figures in Pakistan. On the contrary, local police need an umbilical connection to national intelligence agencies in order to connect the dots they’re collecting on the ground. It is worth noting that the success of the UK counterterrorism effort in Northern Ireland was largely due the tight linkages between the local police, national police, and Britain’s domestic intelligence agency that were forged early in the conflict. Yet information sharing, which all parties claim to be essential, has not advanced significantly. In part this seems to be due to a lack of leadership, and in part to a slow pace of work that seems incommensurate with the urgency of the threat. Thus, issuance of U.S. government sponsored clearances for local police officers, the necessary first step toward sharing intelligence information, has lagged. Even the New York Police Department (NYPD), which has built a very aggressive intelligence collection program and uncommonly close ties to Washington intelligence agencies, has only about 350 cleared officers, or less than one per cent of the force. Many of these patrolmen and detectives have clearances via their status as military reservists rather than as police officers. Countrywide, cleared personnel are usually the handful of detailees to the local Joint Terrorism Task Force. The circle clearly needs to widen. The other dimension to this issue is the apparent substitution of quantity for quality as Washington’s criterion for information sharing with local law enforcement. This puts municipal authorities in the worst of both worlds. The information does not help them do their jobs better, while the sheer volume of unhelpful information can make it harder to manage their responsibilities. The bigger question, however, is where these police officers will come from, at a time when State, local and federal budgets are under severe pressure. In the upcoming federal budget cycle the COPS program is again under pressure to be cut. This program has put more than 100,000 new police officers on the street over the last decade. Instead of eliminating this program it should be revamped to create the local intelligence capacity cities need. WMD Amid growing concerns about the vulnerability of ground transportation, civil aviation, financial institutions and landmarks to large bombs, one should not lose sight of the chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats. As many experts have usefully pointed out, jihadists, like other terrorists, prefer tried-and-true methods and shy away from technical innovation. This is certainly true as a general proposition, despite important exceptions, from the first use of dynamite by anarchists early in the 20th century to the experimentation with stabilized liquid explosives by Ramzi Ahmed Yousef in 1995. Yet intramural jihadist tactical and strategic discussions frequently refer to the use of one or another form of weapon of mass destruction. Not every contributor to this debate defines the utility of these weapons in the same way. For some jihadists, WMDs are the golden key to a reversal of fortune, for which the Muslim world allegedly yearns. Others see these weapons in less apocalyptic terms and more as tools for “worldly war.” For these jihadists, unconventional weapons are the indispensable instruments of the weaker party in an asymmetric struggle. Whether such a weapon is used in the belief that it will decisively settle the argument between Muslims and their chief enemy, or in pursuit of tactical effects meant to deter the enemy or deny him specific options, a toxic or radiological release or detonation of a nuclear weapon would have dramatic consequences. The social and economic effects would obviously be proportional to the damage, but the baseline for these effects would be high. Thus, most experts believe that if such a weapon is used it is unlikely to cause mass casualties. Nevertheless, even an attack that took relatively few lives would have an emotional and psychological impact that could tear the fabric of our society and undermine the social contract between government and society. It would also have sizable, perhaps open-ended economic costs, especially if the attacks were repeated or authorities could not assure citizens that the attackers had all been captured or killed. The implication here is twofold. First, Washington must make consequence management a priority. This means not only allocating appropriated funds, but also establishing a high, federally defined performance standard that cities would have to meet reasonably swiftly. The reason for this emphasis on consequence management is simply that a well-planned attack will be difficult to prevent without an uncommon dose of good luck. This being the case, the surest way to stave off the worst emotional, political and economic damage is to show not only the victimized community, but also the American public that the effects of the attack are being handled with confidence and competence by local and federal authorities working quickly and smoothly—and in lockstep. Efforts to do this have been broached repeatedly, ever since the second Nunn-Lugar bill was signed into law in 1996. Some of these initiatives failed because the government was not structured in a way that yielded a lead agency that could or would be held responsible for this important job. Now that we have a Department of Homeland Security, this impediment has been swept away. It is now time to systematize consequence management where it matters most, which is in large American cities. The other implication is that Washington and local leaders must begin soon to educate the public about the kind of CBRN attacks that are likely to occur. The purpose is not to scare people. Rather, it is to ensure that Americans understand that for the foreseeable future, a CBRN attack will not necessarily equate to instant annihilation, that it is likely to kill or wound relatively small numbers, and that the federal government and local authorities are prepared for such an eventuality. This is easier said than done, owing to the non-trivial risk that terrorists acquire a weapon capable of a catastrophic nuclear yield. An educational initiative would have to acknowledge this possibility, even as it strove to counter the effect of the Katrina aftermath on public confidence in the competence of their government. As part of this effort, dedicated broadcasting channels should be set up so that authorities can communicate with the public throughout a crisis and so that the public knows exactly how to “tune-in” to this source of information and guidance. Given the plethora of electronic media and the scarcity of bandwidth, operationalizing this recommendation will not be easy. In a crisis, however, we will wish we had it available. It goes without saying that the trans-attack and post-attack message must be fully coordinated among federal state and local agencies. It will be just as vital for all these players to have decided beforehand who will be empowered to speak publicly and about what. In the absence of such discipline, the public will be awash in contradictory and inconsistent statements and quickly conclude that no one is in charge. This perception will fuel the panic and desperation latent in what will be a terrifying and unprecedented situation. Muslim-Americans The 9/11 disaster showed that skilled, self-possessed and highly determined attackers could do tremendous damage to the homeland without having to rely on a support network within the United States. Halting and uneven progress on border security, especially at airports, has reduced the probability of this sort of attack by injecting uncertainty into terrorist calculations of their chances of getting in. Deterrence at that level does seem to work. This type of attack, however, is not the adversary’s sole option. Other approaches do require infrastructure, in the shape of cells that may or may not be linked to outside networks. A glance toward Western Europe, where this phenomenon seems to be well established, raises questions about circumstances here at home. The conventional wisdom is that Europe’s Muslim’s discontent is a result of failed immigration policies that could not affect America’s prosperous, happy Muslims, who have benefited from the welcoming embrace of our “melting pot” nation. This view may not reflect reality, even if it once did. Recent research shows that “the real story of American Muslims is one of accelerating alienation,” which could produce a “rejectionist generation.” Muslims are increasingly choosing not to assimilate into American society, finding solace in their religious identity instead. Muslim students’ associations on college campuses are growing rapidly as havens for Muslims who prefer not to socialize with non-Muslims, and Muslims are building Islamic schools as alternatives to a public school system perceived as inhospitable. To thwart media bias, Muslims are developing their own radio programs and publications. These initiatives may resemble those taken by other religious and ethnic groups in the United States since the nineteenth century to promote acceptance and assimilation. But the Muslims’ situation differs in that many perceive their nation’s foreign and domestic policy agenda as a campaign against their faith. The domestic aftermath of the 9/11 attacks implied that a low religious profile was better for their health, that they couldn’t take their civil rights for granted, and that their interests depended on the absence of serious future attacks within the United States. Iraq further dimmed America’s promise to its Muslims. The U.S. Muslim community is deeply skeptical about U.S. democracy promotion, which many think are undercut by lack of due process at home and support for authoritarian rulers abroad. In particular, Muslims vocally decry what they see as the biased implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act and the absence of official American sympathy for the victimization of Muslims worldwide, especially Palestinians. The evolving attitudes of non-Muslim Americans towards their Muslim compatriots are likely to spur alienation. According to a 2006 Gallup poll, a third of Americans admire “nothing” about the Muslim world. Nearly half of all Americans believe the U.S. government should restrict the civil liberties of Muslim Americans. Since September 11, they have faced increasing racism, employment and housing discrimination, and vandalism. The Justice Department has undertaken high-profile prosecutions based on meager evidence, flawed procedure or misidentification. Media coverage dwelling on the violence associated with radical Islam, and ignoring the respectable lifestyles of most American Muslims, along with rhetoric of some on the Christian Right casting the war on terrorism as a clash of religions, contributes to the public’s misunderstanding of Islam. To be sure, Muslims in the United States have shown no sign of violent protest, and American Muslims’ relative prosperity may function as a brake on radicalization. Yet U.S. Muslims’ post-9/11 insularity suggests that some, like many European Muslims, may seek psychological sanctuary in the umma—that is, the notional global community of Muslims. And the umma is where Osama bin Laden’s brand of militancy has maximum traction. The U.S. government also has not manifested trust in the nation’s Muslims. While the pool of Muslims available for official duty may not be large, the federal government has made no serious efforts to recruit Muslims for confirmable policy positions. Meanwhile, mutual distrust has burgeoned. The U.S. administration should consult American Muslims directly and earnestly on foreign-policy issues, as is it has customarily done with other politically important minority constituencies—e.g., American Jews with respect to Israel, Irish-Americans on Northern Ireland, and Greek-Americans as to Turkey and Cyprus. The difference here is that the electoral leverage of American Muslims is relatively weak. But their potential vulnerability to an incendiary ideology of confrontation that is being disseminated transnationally should override the normal course of domestic politics. Fear of being punished at the polls should not be the only incentive to be more attentive to Muslim concerns and anxieties. Finally, the Madrid and London bombings only confirm that governments need to understand the campaign against transnational Islamist terrorism as an internal security problem to a much greater extent than they have so far. The current approach, however, has been simply to enforce a zero-tolerance immigration policy with respect to the Muslim community. This dispensation has the doubly perverse quality of being both ineffective in counter-terrorism terms and alienating with respect to Muslim Americans. Domestic law enforcement’s ranks should also include more Muslims, both to improve the FBI’s understanding of and links with Muslim communities and to give Muslims a sense of ownership of America’s security challenges. American Muslims do not remotely pose the domestic threat that European Muslims do. To ensure it stays that way, they need to be embraced—not spurned. I put this issue before the committee for lack of a better place. The challenge outlined here requires leadership and a program. Yet given the way our government is structured, there is no obvious lead agency, or special assistant to the President on the National Security Council or Homeland Security Council, to formulate a program or provide the leadership. We are not the first to face this conundrum. Several years ago, in the wake of a Whitehall study showing upwards of 10,000 al Qaeda supporters in Great Britain, Her Majesty’s government tasked the Security Service—MI5—both to dismantle jihadist networks and devise a plan to win the hearts and minds of Britain’s Muslim minority. Ultimately, the Security Services balked at a difficult job for which they had no experience or clear jurisdiction. We need to do better. Fortunately, unlike our sister democracies across the Atlantic, we have time. We must not squander it.

Chairman Kyl, Senator Feinstein, thank you for inviting me to speak with you about U.S. efforts to detect smuggled nuclear weapons. Current programs to enhance detection of smuggled nuclear weapons are, despite some important flaws, making valuable contributions to national security.They are not, and will never be, the most powerful means of defense—that role falls to programs that secure nuclear weapons and materials at the source. But assessed in the context of a much broader system aimed at reducing the likelihood of catastrophic nuclear attack, and judged against the full range of existing and potential adversaries, not only against worst-case scenarios, their value is undeniable. There remains much room for improvement. U.S. efforts to defeat nuclear terrorism are insufficiently integrated across the federal government, between federal, state, and local levels, with the private sector, and internationally. This reduces the value of those detection programs that are currently underway. The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) has taken important steps to promote integration, but it cannot, and should not, do the entire job itself. It would be best for DNDO to focus on developing and deploying technology and on integrating radiation detection efforts, as it largely does today. Congress should explore the utility of establishing a broader system integrator in the Executive Office of the President. An effective strategy to detect smuggled nuclear weapons would also benefit enormously from a far better understanding—a strategic intelligence assessment—of the covert nuclear threat. We are not fighting the movement of radioactive materials—we are fighting states or organizations with their own internal limits that must acquire, possibly build, transport, and detonate a weapon, all with some strategic, political, or religious goals in mind. Simply testing the sensitivity of our radiation detection instruments is thus insufficient alone for judging whether our investments are worthwhile. Without a better understanding of the enemy, we cannot adequately assess the value of our defensive investments. Congress should support a concerted effort to produce a detailed strategic intelligence assessment of the covert nuclear threat, and use this assessment as the basis for judging investments in defense against nuclear smuggling. This assessment should draw upon analysts with expertise in terrorism, rogue states, and nuclear technology, as well as on new intelligence operations as required. You have also asked me to comment on the potential of “transformational” technology. This is technology that could lead to “dramatic improvement in national capabilities in nuclear/radiological detection and verification.” Physics imposes basic limits that must be acknowledged, but there is room for technological advance. Congress should, in principle, support long-term transformational programs, which would benefit from increased funding and from better use of the national laboratories. Congress should, however, exercise oversight to ensure that resources are deployed in ways that complement broader defensive efforts. Outline The remainder of this testimony is divided into five parts: Describes the broad system for defending against covert nuclear attack, of which direct defense against nuclear smuggling is a part, and makes recommendations for better integrating the system. Makes the case for a new strategic intelligence assessment of the covert nuclear threat, as a basis for defensive planning and evaluation. Assesses the potential of transformational radiation detection technology. Describes the transformational potential for detection systems that integrate radiation detection with other detection tools. Explains why traditional detection efforts will be less effective against covert nuclear attack by states, and stresses the importance of attribution and deterrence in these cases. The Defensive System Were we able to secure all nuclear weapons and materials, there would be no need for a broader effort to prevent nuclear smuggling. Security at the source, including, most prominently, cooperative threat reduction, is the most powerful tool available, and would benefit from increased investment and attention. But it will never be sufficient alone. A system of defensive tools, including materials and weapons security, law enforcement, intelligence, border controls, consequence management, denial of sanctuary, targeting of terrorist financing, and disruption of terrorist recruitment, can work to significantly reduce the likelihood of a successful nuclear plot, and to dissuade terrorist groups from pursuing such plots in the first place. (Preventing covert state attack is very different from preventing terrorist attack. I discuss this challenge below under “Attributing Attacks”.) Even if no single defensive tool has a high probability of defeating a given terrorist attack, a combined defensive system can still be effective. If, for example, twenty independent defensive measures each have only a 10% chance of defeating a terrorist plot, they would, combined, have a 90% chance of defeating that plot. If each defensive element forces a terrorist group to alter its plot, the effect is even more powerful. Tools for detecting nuclear smuggling must be developed and assessed in this context. That a particular defensive tool cannot defeat all terrorist plots is not reason enough for rejecting it—so long as a defensive tool complicates terrorist plots, increases their probabilities of failure, and is pursued within a broad defense, it may deserve investment. This way of thinking about nuclear terrorism—refusing to assess defensive elements except as parts of a system—must be institutionalized. DNDO was in part an attempt to do that, but it falls short. Though DNDO includes interagency mechanisms for coordination, its efforts have been principally focused on coordinating radiation detection programs. This is useful but insufficient, as the wide range of tools relevant to defense against nuclear terrorism, outlined above, suggests. It is, however, natural, and perhaps inevitable, for an organization whose funds are spent primarily on radiation detection. Ultimately, DNDO should be one (major) piece within a broader effort to defeat nuclear terrorism, directed from within the Executive Office of the President. The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), which is responsible for strategic operational planning against terrorist threats, appears to be the right place for such coordination. Congress should consider directing the NCTC to produce a strategic operational plan that prescribes and delineates responsibilities for defense against nuclear terrorism across the U.S. government, and to periodically assess the effectiveness of that plan. Such a scheme would help efforts to detect nuclear smuggling, and provide context for evaluating them. Understanding the Enemy It is meaningless to talk about the effectiveness of a defense without understanding the enemy that it faces. Yet we do not have a strong understanding of that enemy. In assessing detection of nuclear smuggling, we thus fall back against two poor substitutes. Sometimes, we adopt a narrow technical focus, evaluating technologies against quantitative goals that are at best loosely connected with careful study of terrorist plots. Here, our tendency is often to adopt goals simply because they are achievable. At the other extreme, we focus on the worst-case threat, a terrorist group that is so resourceful, flexible, and lucky that it can evade essentially any defense. This is what many would call the “Ten-Foot Tall Terrorist”. In reality, many terrorist groups have far more limited, though still very threatening, capabilities. These are the “Five-Foot Tall Terrorists”. It is critical to understand these more limited threats, and to design defenses against them as well. As in military planning, defenses optimized against the worst-case threat are not necessarily the best possible defenses. Instead, defenses designed to contend with a range of enemy capabilities have the potential to be far more effective. What does this mean in practice? TheUnited Statesneeds a new strategic intelligence assessment of potential covert nuclear plots. That assessment should draw upon expertise in terrorism, rogue state behavior, and nuclear technology, and outline a range of terrorist capabilities, rather than simply estimate a worst-case or most-likely threat. Novel intelligence operations can help refine this estimate – for example, intelligence operatives posing as nuclear scientists could improve our understanding of how terrorist groups might recruit technically skilled assistance. As with the strategic operational plan, this intelligence assessment most likely should be led by the NCTC. This would provide an intimate connection between underlying intelligence and strategic operational planning. It would also help institutionalize the practice of assessing the value of U.S. programs against a realistic assessment of the threats they face. Radiation Detection: Techniques, Targets, and Transformational Potential Materials used in nuclear weapons—uranium and plutonium—emit radiation: neutrons and gamma rays. Detectors are designed to sense that radiation. To be useful, they must be able to distinguish radiation emitted by nuclear materials from naturally occurring radiation, which may come from the earth, from building materials, from space, and from other sources. In many cases, detectors must be able to do that in the presence of “shielding”, material placed around the nuclear material that absorbs gamma rays or neutrons before they can reach a radiation detector. Unfortunately, material used in nuclear weapons need not be highly radioactive, and hence may not emit many neutrons or gamma rays, making detection difficult. Much has been made of the difficulty of detecting highly-enriched uranium, a challenge to which I will return later. It is important, though, not to focus narrowly on this worst-case threat. Many materials that terrorists might transport as part of a nuclear plot emit considerably more radioactivity, providing greater opportunities for detection. (There is no reason to believe that terrorists can be selective, rather than opportunistic, in acquiring nuclear materials, at least without making themselves more vulnerable to defeat.) These materials include highly-enriched uranium that is below weapons-grade, that it not metallic, or that has been extracted from used nuclear fuel (as much Russian nuclear-weapons material has been). They also include plutonium, in both metallic and non-metallic forms. And stolen weapons may incorporate large masses of depleted uranium, which substantially increases radiation emissions. Detectors that can spot some but not all potential weapons or materials—an accurate description for many detectors—can be valuable. Many challenges still remain, both in detecting low-radioactivity materials (including weapons-grade uranium metal) and in detecting shielded materials. Here, at least four types of “transformational” technology make sense. It is too early to evaluate specific technologies, but it is useful to understand where the potential for advances exists, along with their limits. Combined radiation detection and radiography, analyzed using new software, has the potential to substantially increase detection capabilities. Used in close proximity to a suspect source such as a cargo container (within a few meters), radiography, like an x-ray, produces an image that may be able to identify shielding material. Thus, if a terrorist group uses shielding to hide material from radiation detectors, radiography may be able to identify it. Intelligent data analysis algorithms can increase the combined value of radiation detection and radiography by automatically synthesizing data from both sources, a process that is currently labor-intensive, prone to human error, and slow. Indeed, it is this software, rather than any of the hardware used, which has the potential to be transformational, and that should be the focus of investments. Active interrogation is also potentially transformational. Again, it must be used in fairly close proximity to a suspect source. Active interrogation bombards suspect objects with radiation. If those objects contain nuclear materials, they will, in turn, emit radiation that can be detected. In principle, such technology can be used to detect well-shielded material, so long as an intense enough radiation source is used. (Increasing the radiation source is, very crudely, like turning on a brighter light when searching for something.) However, such strong sources of radiation raise health concerns, since they can be dangerous to operators and to bystanders, among other problems. It is thus essential that development of active interrogation systems be accompanied by careful evaluation of what radiation exposure is socially acceptable, a process that has not received the same attention as the technology has. (This is a political process.) Current limits on radiation exposure may already be too low. Moreover, in a very high threat environment—for example, in the aftermath of a theft of nuclear material—society will likely be willing to accept much more hazardous means of inspecting cargo. Yet if we do not develop technologies in advance, we will not be able to exploit such situations. Ultimately, though, safety issues will place limits on the potential of active interrogation. Detectors that are more efficient and that have better energy resolution than current models might also be transformational. (Their potential, however, is more limited than that of active interrogation, though they do not carry the same dangers.) What does this mean? Radiation detectors only detect a fraction of the radiation emitted by nuclear materials. That fraction is called their “efficiency”. While we cannot change the fact that many nuclear materials emit little radiation—these are the “limits of physics” that many refer to—we can improve how much of that radiation we detect, allowing us to better find nuclear materials. Radiation detectors are also characterized by their “resolution”. Radiation varies in energy, and the energy of radiation can sometimes be used to distinguish nuclear material. If a detector can more effectively discriminate between different energies—if it has improved “resolution”—it will be better at identifying nuclear material. Think of energy as color, and the gamma rays emitted by a particular type of nuclear material as “red”. A detector with poor energy-resolution is color-blind—it cannot use color to spot the nuclear material. Improving detector resolution is like improving ability to see in color, and thus to identify nuclear material. A final potential for transformational radiation detection technology lies in integrating data from large numbers of detectors. This has both hardware and software components. It requires reduction in weight, cost, and power requirements for detection systems, so that large numbers can be deployed cost-effectively, and often in mobile configurations. It requires software to dynamically integrate data from a large number of detectors. One example of such a program might involve radiation detectors mounted on large numbers of police cars, transmitting data to a central location where it is continuously combined. Advances in computational power would also help advance these technologies. These technological innovations might also be combined. For example, higher efficiency radiation detectors might be combined with radiography using advanced data analysis. How should this affect American investments? In FY06, DNDO received $56.6 million for “Transformational Research and Development”. In contrast, only one major program area at DARPA, which supports transformational research through the Department of Defense, was funded at less than $100 million during FY06. As DAPRA understands, ambitious, high-risk research requires funding many failures in order to yield a single success. Transformational efforts would profit from expanded funding. Congress should consider earmarking such funds for the national laboratories, which are currently excluded from applying for several critical DNDO transformational R&D grants. (They may apply as subcontractors.) This occurs despite their having deep strength in relevant technologies. Moreover, if we are to direct efforts at detecting realistic nuclear weapons, rather than just generic samples of radioactive materials, we must exploit the understanding of weapons design that the laboratories have accumulated over more than half a century. DNDO has asserted that most of its transformational work will be unclassified; as a result, it will not be able to exploit this opportunity. The national laboratories will. In the long term, transformational detection efforts should be assessed against a new, nuanced strategic intelligence assessment, and within the context of a broad strategic operational plan. Integrating Radiation Detection into a Broader System for Detecting Nuclear Smuggling Radiation detection is not the only way to spot nuclear smuggling, especially if terrorists decide to smuggle an assembled bomb. In many cases, explosives detection may play an important role, as might detection of the weight and bulk of a weapon or of nuclear materials. Automated systems that integrate data from multiple detectors would be particularly valuable. Strategists should also explore automated means for integrating radiation detection with non-technical detection. For example, it would be useful to develop algorithms for airports and official border crossings that combine radiation data with passenger profile information to yield combined assessments of nuclear threats. A similar scheme could be useful for identifying suspect cargo containers, based on radiation detection and non-technical intelligence. In many cases, radiation detection will play a supporting, rather than a leading, role. This is particularly notable in defending against nuclear smuggling at non-official points of entry, such as land, sea, and air borders. Transformational schemes envisioning continuous and universal radiation monitoring of American borders are unrealistic. Instead, efforts aimed at identifying and interdicting terrorists attempting to enter theUnited States, regardless of whether they are involved in nuclear plots, will play the leading role, with radiation detection supporting them. Consider, for example, attempts to smuggle nuclear weapons or materials across the southern border. The probability of an illegal immigrant successfully crossing the border after one attempt is likely less than fifty percent; such low odds of success might well deter a would-be nuclear terrorist from attempting a crossing. What makes illegal immigration easier is the “catch-and-release” policy that affords would-be-immigrants multiple chances to attempt illegal entry. Portable radiation detection equipment can, however, be used to ensure that individuals caught at the border while carrying nuclear weapons or materials are not released. Here, radiation detection plays a critical but supporting role. Similar schemes might be applied to aircraft intercepted while illegally entering U.S. airspace. Applying this approach on the water presents greater challenges, as the United States currently has much weaker capabilities to detect illegal sea-based entry. Addressing this requires efforts to improve maritime domain awareness, and maritime interdiction capabilities, rather than to improve radiation detection. This emphasizes the need for a broad defensive plan, and cautions that technical detection investments must not outpace other complementary, non-technical, homeland security needs. Intelligence can also multiply the effectiveness of radiation detection. If we know or strongly suspect that terrorists have acquired nuclear weapons or significant amounts of nuclear materials, a surged response is possible. Such detection begins at the source of nuclear materials and weapons. For over a decade, the United States has been helping other countries install systems for protecting their nuclear weapons and materials (so-called MPC&A systems). If terrorists acquire materials or weapons, MPC&A systems will in many cases provide warning, allowing a surged response to any ensuing attempt at nuclear smuggling. The United States should attempt to secure agreements with facilities that receive MPC&A assistance, requiring that they promptly share warning information. DNDO is already tackling this challenge, and should be strongly supported by other parts of the U.S. government. It would be wise to go beyond this and develop protocols and agreements for sharing warnings of theft, including from facilities secured without U.S. assistance. Such warning may be the most powerful source of intelligence that can be leveraged by detection systems. Its value would be strengthened if the United States stockpiled equipment needed for a surged response, which could be deployed only when necessary. (Despite the high prices of many detection systems, the bulk of their costs come from the labor required to operate them.) Other sources of intelligence should also be pursued. For example, if terrorists are caught attempting to bribe radiation detector operators, intensified interdiction efforts might be mounted. Advance development and stockpiling of detection equipment would be essential. Attributing Attacks Against states, which generally have deeper resources and more extensive military and intelligence capabilities than terrorist groups, American efforts to directly defeat nuclear smuggling are far less likely to be successful. In particular, states will have greater abilities than terrorists will to evade radiation detection and border control efforts. Our best hope against these threats is to enhance deterrence by improving our ability to attribute covert attacks to their sponsors, thus allowing us to threaten retaliation. (This is a form of detection, albeit post-attack detection.) Attribution would work through a mixture of traditional forensics and technical tools that exploit nuclear-specific signatures. The latter would operate primarily by analyzing samples of material dispersed in a nuclear attack, and comparing them to a database of “fingerprints” for various nuclear states. Our greatest current deficiency on this front is in the fingerprint database. Theoretical analyses of material produced by suspect facilities, along with intelligence operations to obtain foreign material samples, would be valuable. So would better coordination: multiple government agencies with strong capabilities in this area, such as the CIA and the DOE, are not fully sharing what they know with each other. International cooperation, done with appropriate consideration for secrecy, would also help enhance deterrence. Summary Six points should be kept in mind when thinking about detecting smuggled weapons: Securing nuclear weapons and materials at the source will always be the most powerful defensive tool. Within the context of a broader defensive system, efforts to detect nuclear smuggling can be valuable. It is essential to assess these efforts against a wide range of realistic threats, not only against semi-arbitrary numerical targets or worst-case scenarios. Transformational technology has real potential but firm limits. It is as much about innovative software, concepts of operations, and leveraging intelligence, as it is about hardware. Technology will often play a supporting role to traditional tools for controlling land, sea, and air borders. Those traditional tools must receive strong support. Detection and interdiction are much weaker tools against covert state threats than against terrorist plots. Against state threats, enhancing attribution capabilities is critical.

Iran’s Nuclear Impasse: The Next Steps More than any other issue, the nuclear question has exposed the divisions within the clerical establishment’s over Iran’s international orientation. To be sure, Iran’s contending factions are united on the need to sustain a vibrant nuclear research program, but the prospect of actually crossing the nuclear threshold in defiance of the international community and in violation of Iran’s long-standing treaty commitments has generated a subtle yet robust debate. The War Generation Comes to Power After 27 years, the complexion of the Iranian regime is changing. An ascetic ”war generation” is assuming power with a determination to rekindle revolutionary fires long extinguished. For Ahmadinejad and his allies, the 1980-88 war with Iraq defined their experiences, and it conditions their political assumptions. The Iran-Iraq War was unusual in many respects, as it was not merely an interstate conflict designed to achieve specific territorial or even political objectives. This was a war waged for the triumph of ideas, with Ba’ath secular pan-Arabism contesting Iran’s Islamic fundamentalism. As such, for those who went to the front, the war came to embody their revolutionary identity. Themes of solidarity, sacrifice, self-reliance and commitment not only allowed the regime to consolidate its power, they also made the defeat of Saddam the ultimate test of theocratic legitimacy Suddenly, in August 1988, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini declared the conflict to be over. After eight years of brutal struggle and clerical exhortations of the inevitability of the triumph of the armies of God, the war ended without achieving any of its pledged objectives. For veterans like Ahmadinejad, there was a ready explanation for this turn of events. It was not the inadequacy of Iran’s military planning or the miscalculations of its commanders, but the West’s machinations and its tolerance of Saddam’s use of chemical weapons that had turned the tide of the battle. And although many Iranians wanted to forget the war, for people like Ahmadinejad the war, its struggles and its lessons are far from being a faded memory: They are constantly invoked. In his much-discussed speech in front of the UN General Assembly in September, Iran’s new president used the platform offered to him to pointedly admonish the gathered heads of state for their shortcomings: For eight years, Saddam’s regime imposed a massive war of aggression against my people. It employed the most heinous weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons, against Iranians and Iraqis alike. Who, in fact, armed Saddam with those weapons? What was the reaction of those who claim to fight against WMDs regarding the use of chemical weapons then? A pronounced suspicion of the United States and the international community would come to characterize Ahmadinejad’s perspective. After all, neither America’s human rights commitments nor the many treaties prohibiting the use of weapons of mass destruction saved Iran’s civilians and combatants from Saddam’s wrath. The lesson that the veterans drew from the war was that Iran’s independence and territorial integrity could only be safeguarded by its own initiatives and not by international legal compacts and Western benevolence. Ahmadinejad’s Foreign Devils As the face of Iran changes and the elders of the revolution recede from the scene, a new international orientation is gradually beginning to surface. A combustible mixture of Islamist ideology, strident nationalism and a deep suspicion of the international order comprise Ahmadinejad’s global perspective. As an uncompromising nationalist, Ahmadinejad is unusually sensitive of Iran’s national prerogatives and sovereign rights. As a committed Islamist, he continues to see the Middle East as a battleground between forces of sinister secularism and Islamic authenticity. As a suspicious ruler, he perceives Western conspiracies and imagined plots where none may in fact exist. Nowhere has this new ideological determinism been more evident than in perceptions of America. For the aging mullahs such as Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the more pragmatic head of the Expediency Council, Hashemi Rafsanjani, America remained the dominant actor in Iran’s melodrama. For the those hardliners, the United States was the source of all of Iran’s problems, while for the older generation of more pragmatist conservatives it was the solution to the theocracy’s mounting dilemmas. In either depiction, America was central to Iran’s affairs. Given that this cohort came into political maturity during the reign of the shah and his close alliance with the United States, was engaged in a revolutionary struggle that was defined by its opposition to America, and then led a state often in conflict with Washington, it was natural that they were obsessed with the United States. In terms of their international perspective, Ahmadinejad’s generation of conservatives does not share its elders’ preoccupation with America. Their insularity and their ideology-laden assumptions about America as a pernicious, imperial power lessen their enthusiasm for coming to terms with a country long depicted as the “Great Satan.” Even a cursory examination of the younger hardliners’ speeches reveals much about their view of international relations: that power in the international system is flowing eastward. As a stalwart of the new conservatives, the current mayor of Tehran, Muhammad Qalibaf, declared, “In the current international arena we see the emergence of South Asia. And if we do not take advantage of that, we will lose.” From the perspective of the new Right, globalization does not imply capitulating to the United States but cultivating relations with emerging power centers on the global landscape. It is hoped that such an “eastern orientation” might just obviate the need to come to terms with the United States. In a stark contrast to their elders, the war generation displays a unique degree of indifference and passivity toward America. Ahmadinejad emphasized this point, stressing, “Our nation is continuing in path of progress and on this path has no significant need for the United States.” The notion that Iran should offer concessions on important national priorities for the sake of American benevolence has a limited appeal to Iran’s new leaders. After a quarter of a century of hostility, war and sanctions, Iran’s emerging leadership class is looking east, where its human rights record and proliferation tendencies are not particularly disturbing to its commercial partners. A mixture of wariness and nationalism is driving the new regime’s approach to the nuclear issue. The bitter experience of the war has led to cries of “never again”, uniting the veterans-turned-politicians behind a desire to achieve not just a credible posture of deterrence but potentially a convincing retaliatory capability. After decades of tensions with America, Iran’s reactionaries perceive that conflict with the United States is inevitable and that the only manner by which America can be deterred is through possession of the strategic weapon. Although today the United States may seem entangled in an Iraqi quagmire that tempers its ambitions, for Iran’s rulers it is still an aggressive state whose power cannot be discounted and whose intentions must not be trusted. Given their suspicions and paranoia, the hardliners insist that American objections to Iran’s nuclear program do not stem from its concerns about proliferation, but its opposition to the character of the regime. They argue that should Iran acquiesce on the nuclear portfolio, the perfidious Americans would only search for another issue with which to coerce Iran. “The West opposes the nature of the Islamic rule. If this issue [the nuclear standoff] is resolved, then they will bring up human rights. If we solve that, they will bring up animal rights”, emphasized Ahmadinejad. Given such views, there appears no sufficient incentive to compromise on such critical national issues, since acquiescence will not measurably relieve American antagonism. As Iran plots its nuclear strategy, the American demands that it relinquish its fuel-cycle rights granted to it by the NPT have aroused an intense nationalistic uproar. As a country that has historically been the subject of foreign intervention and the imposition of various capitulation treaties, Iran is inordinately sensitive of its national prerogatives and sovereign rights. The new rulers of Iran believe they are being challenged not because of their provocations and previous treaty violations, but because of superpower bullying. In a peculiar manner, the nuclear program and Iran’s national identity have become fused in the imagination of the hardliners. To stand against an impudent America is to validate one’s revolutionary ardor and sense of nationalism. Thus, the notion of compromise and acquiescence has limited utility to Iran’s aggrieved nationalist. Iran’s Realists In the Islamic Republic’s informal governing structure, the national security decisions are subject to input by many figures, even those not necessarily with a portfolio. For instance, the former prime minister Mir Hussein Mussavi, who has been out of power for nearly two decades, is nevertheless consulted intimately about Iran’s nuclear course. It appears that despite Western perceptions that the nuclear issue is decided by a narrow band of conservatives, Ayatollah Khamenei has broaden the parameters of the debate and has included relevant elites from across the political spectrum in the nuclear deliberations. Thus, reformers out of power, moderate conservatives struggling against their reactionary brethren as well as professionals from key bureaucracies are allowed to stress their point of view. Given the provocative nature of the nuclear program, Khamenei seems to be hoping that the burden of any ensuing international confrontation would be assumed by all political factions, as opposed to being the responsibility only of the conservatives. Thus, the systematic consolidation of power by the conservatives over the state does not necessarily mean that voices of restraint have been excised from the decision-making process. In contrast to the hardliners, the pragmatic elements within the Islamic Republic insist thatIran’s integration into the international order and the global economy mandates accepting certain restrictions on its nuclear program. Although it is tempting to see this issue as divided between reactionaries and reformers, the coalition pressing for reticence features both conservatives, such as Rafsanjani, who is currently the head of the Expediency Council—officials within the ministries and important elements of Iran’s national security establishment that retain their status irrespective of who is the president. The proponents of this strategy do not call for the dismantling of Iran’s nuclear edifice, but for the development of an advanced capacity within the flexible guidelines of the NPT. GivenIran’s long-term commitment to the NPT and the prevailing international scrutiny, a provocative policy could invite multilateral sanctions and lead Iran’s valuable commercial partners, such as the European Union, to embrace the U.S.policy of isolating and pressuring Iran. Thus, for this constituency, a hedging strategy can sustainIran’s nuclear program while maintaining its international ties. By far the most intriguing voice on the emerging security issue is the new head of the Supreme National Security Council, Ali Larijani. For Larijani, the Islamic Republic is offered a rare opportunity to establish its sphere of influence in the Persian Gulf. For centuries, Iran’s monarchs and mullahs perceived that given their country’s history, civilizational achievements and geographic location, it should emerged as the preeminent state of the Gulf. However, those ambitions were unjustly thwarted by global empires and local hegemonic powers. Today, as Iran’s leaders gaze across the region, they see a crestfallen American imperium eager for an exit strategy out of its Arab predicament, an Iraq preoccupied with its simmering sectarian conflicts and a Gulf princely class eager to accommodate rather then confront Iranian power. A judicious and reasonableIran can go a long way toward achieving its long cherished aspiration of dominating the critical waterways of the Middle East. A careful examination of Larijani’s speeches reveals an insistence on India as a model for aspiring regional powers. India’s détente with Americahas allowed it to both maintain its nuclear arsenal and dominate its immediate neighborhood. In contrast, a Russian Federation that at times finds itself at odds with America has seen its ability to influence its “near abroad” checked by a skeptical Washington. Although theU.S. presence is bound to diminish in theMiddle East, for Iran’s realists, American power can still present a barrier toTehran’s resurgence. Although this faction does not seek normalization of ties with America, it does sense that a less contentious relationship with theUnited Statesmay ease America’s distrust, paving the way for the projection of Iran’s influence in the Gulf. For the realists, the nuclear program has to be viewed in the larger context of Iran’s international relations. Once more, Larijani points to the example of India, namely a country that improves relations with theUnited States may obtain American approbation of its nuclear ambitions. Although the realists are disinclined to dismantle the nuclear edifice, they do sense the need for restraint and the necessity of adhering to Iran’s long-standing NPT obligations. What is to be done? On May 2006, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice took an important step in revising America’s approach toward Iran. In a unique and momentous step, Secretary Rice proposed direct talks with Iran over its nuclear program. The administration judiciously insisted on the suspension of Iran’s ongoing enrichment efforts as a precondition for the commencement of the talks. Despite the fact that this is a bold reconceptualization of American policy, it tends to miscast the disagreement between Iran and the United Statesas a disarmament dispute. The only manner of resolving this issue is through comprehensive discussions that deal with the totality of US-Iranian concerns. The United States needs to move still one step further and propose discussions that include not just Iran’s nuclear ambitions, but Iraq as well as terrorism. In the meantime, Iranian concerns such asAmerica’s sanctions policy should also be on the table. As both parties become satisfied that the content of the negotiations encompass all their concerns, then perhaps an accord can be reached. This diplomatic format views the nuclear issue as a symptom of a larger US-Iranian malady and tries to address the root cause of the animosity. Only through a fundamental transformation of US-Iran relations can we arrive at a satisfactory solution to Iran’s nuclear imbroglio.