Unpacking China’s “Four Red Lines” and Its Warning to Trump

Following Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s final meeting with President Joe Biden, which took place in November on the margins of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in Peru, Beijing released a summary of the conversation that delineated “four red lines” for U.S.-China relations. The statement asserted, “The Taiwan question, democracy and human rights, China’s path and system, and China’s development right are four red lines for China. They must not be challenged.” 

The intended audience for this message was not the current president of the United States but rather his successor. With these “four red lines,” China is seeking to set the terms for the U.S.-China bilateral relationship for the next four years and warn President-Elect Donald Trump and his national security team not to pursue certain policies. In addition, while China likely understands that the United States will not abide by these “red lines,” publicly putting them forward gives Beijing the opportunity to put the onus on Washington for heightened tensions by arguing that its warnings went unheeded and thus has no choice but to respond with countermeasures. 

While the “four red lines” may at first blush seem vague or odd, upon closer inspection their meaning is clear and they are worth unpacking to discern China’s priorities and the areas to which it attaches greatest importance. 

It's All About Taiwan 

Unsurprisingly, Taiwan, which Beijing often describes as the “core of China’s core interests,” is mentioned first, underscoring that it will remain the most sensitive issue in the bilateral relationship.  

During the first Trump administration, U.S.-Taiwan relations deepened. Among other steps, the Trump administration advanced security cooperation with and increased arms sales to Taiwan, sent high-level officials to Taipei (including Health and Human Services Secretary Alex Azar), declassified the Six Assurances, adjusted the formulation of the U.S. one-China policy to put the Taiwan Relations Act ahead of the three U.S.-China joint communiques, and lifted “self-imposed restrictions” that regulated contact between U.S. and Taiwanese officials. 

The Biden administration continued on this path, launching the U.S.-Taiwan Initiative on 21st Century Trade, further enhancing security cooperation by extending presidential drawdown authority and foreign military financing to Taiwan, and inviting Taiwan to participate in the administration’s Summit for Democracy. In addition, President Biden on four occasions stated that the United States would defend Taiwan against Chinese aggression, although members of his administration attempted to walk back these comments. 

China wants to put a halt to all of this, out of a conviction that if Taiwan is isolated and unsure about U.S. support it will be more likely to negotiate. At the very least, it wants to ensure that the United States does not extend diplomatic recognition to Taiwan or support its membership in the United Nations, steps that Mike Pompeo, who served as Trump’s Secretary of State during his first term, and Nikki Haley, who served as his Ambassador the UN, have advocated. China also wants the United States to use its influence to pressure Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te to adopt a more accommodating stance on cross-strait issues.  

Who Defines Democracy? 

China’s second red line, covering democracy and human rights, might strike the casual observer as an odd issue for the leader of a one-party dictatorship to single out. Its inclusion, however, serves to underscore how China is seeking to redefine these terms to make them compatible with the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) authoritarian rule. It is an example of the CCP pursuing “discourse power,” or the ability to frame issues and set narratives, which it believes the United States and the West have monopolized to its detriment. 

China’s leaders argue that the country is not only a democracy but is in fact more democratic than the United States. According to this narrative, Western democracies give citizens the right to elect their leaders, but after the election is over the voters do not have the ability to make their voices heard, while politicians are captured by and work for special interests. China, by contrast, is a “whole-process people’s democracy,” a concept that Xi introduced and that describes a system in which people do not vote but somehow exercise more oversight over the country’s leaders. Xi has argued that this is democracy “in its broadest, most genuine, and most effective form.” 

In another attempt to redefine terms, human rights for Beijing do not refer to universal values such as freedom of expression or the right to life and liberty. Instead, states determine rights and China’s government should be benchmarked against whether it delivers economic development. As a paper published by the Information Office of China’s State Council stated, “The right to subsistence and development are the primary basic human rights. Poverty is the biggest obstacle to the realization of human rights.” According to this logic, the CCP is a champion of human rights because it has lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty. 

Xi’s spotlight on democracy and human rights simultaneously conveys confidence that his efforts to redefine these terms have borne fruit and a concern that the United States will continue to press China on human rights violations in Xinjiang, Tibet, and Hong Kong.  

Don’t Question the Path That Has Been Chosen 

The CCP defines China’s path and system as “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” pursued under the party’s unchallenged leadership. This red line centers around the question of regime legitimacy and security and is an attempt to warn the incoming Trump administration not to attempt to split the CCP from the Chinese people, criticize or question China’s political system, or seek regime change. 

There are numerous examples that would give Xi ample reason for concern. In 2020, for instance, then Secretary of State Pompeo delivered a high-profile speech at the Nixon Library where he argued, “We must also engage and empower the Chinese people – a dynamic, freedom-loving people who are completely distinct from the Chinese Communist Party.” He continued, “Communists almost always lie. The biggest lie that they tell is to think that they speak for 1.4 billion people who are surveilled, oppressed, and scared to speak out.”  

Trump’s former Deputy National Security Advisor, Matt Pottinger, and former congressman and Chairman of the House Select Committee on Strategic Competition between the United States and the CCP Mike Gallagher, more recently penned an influential essay calling for the United States to embrace a strategy that seeks to “win” the competition with China by demonstrating to the Chinese people that they can “explore new models of development and governance that don’t rely on repression at home and compulsive hostility abroad.” The authors continued, “Washington should not fear the end state desired by a growing number of Chinese: a China that is able to chart its own course free from communist dictatorship.” 

Trump’s incoming National Security Advisor, Mike Waltz, has stated, “What we’re dealing with, to be clear, is the Chinese Communist Party, not the Chinese people.”  

Beijing is attempting to signal the incoming Trump administration that it should refrain from repeating such lines.   

When the Chips Are Down 

The fourth and final red line, the “right to development,” likely centers on China’s demand that the United States reverse its export controls and tariffs and stop pursuing a strategy of “de-risking.” China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi elaborated on this point to U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken in April 2024, explaining, “the Chinese people’s right to development is inalienable…The United States should implement its statement that it does not seek to contain China’s economic development, does not seek to ‘decouple’ from China, and is not intended to halt China’s scientific and technological progress…It should stop hyping up the false narrative of ‘overcapacity’ in China, revoke illegal sanctions on Chinese companies, and stop imposing 301 tariffs that violate WTO rules.” 

China’s primary concern is likely U.S. technology-related export controls, particularly those targeting semiconductors and equipment needed to make the most advanced chips. In October 2022, the Biden administration expanded the Trump administration’s export controls, and it has since tightened these controls, most recently in December 2024.  

China has struggled to overcome these restrictions, which puts it at a disadvantage in developing artificial intelligence capabilities. China is also concerned about Trump’s threatened 60 percent tariffs on Chinese exports and the potential that the United States and its allies will coordinate a response to Chinese overcapacity in sectors such as electric vehicles. 

Red Lines for What Purpose? 

The Trump administration is unlikely to respect any of these “four red lines.” Instead, it is far more likely that U.S. security cooperation with Taiwan will continue apace, export controls will be tightened, additional tariffs will be introduced, and U.S. officials will continue to spotlight China’s human rights abuses. China knows all of this, which raises the question of what it is attempting to accomplish by introducing red lines that are all but sure to be violated. Beijing is likely attempting to signal that U.S. pressure on these fronts will elicit a sharp response, while also establishing a written record that it can use to blame Washington for increased tensions. Finally, while these red lines may not be either respected or enforced, they provide a window into Beijing’s priorities, concerns, and sensitivities.