The Costs of President Yoon Suk Yeol’s Defiance

Jinwan Park is a nonresident James A. Kelly Korea Fellow at Pacific Forum. His works have been published in the Council on Foreign Relations, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Nikkei Asia, The Korea Times, Korea Economic Institute, and the National Interest.

South Korea continues to reel from President Yoon Suk Yeol’s martial law declaration on December 3. Although the National Assembly overwhelmingly nullified the declaration in a few hours, political tensions remain unresolved. Citizens are growing increasingly anxious and frustrated with the current leadership. Rapid and decisive action is crucial to stabilize the economy and diplomatic relations, with bipartisan cooperation essential to addressing the crisis.

President Yoon Denies Culpability Amid Mounting Pushbacks

On December 12, South Korea’s President Yoon Suk Yeol delivered a national speech amid the ongoing political crisis, proclaiming his intention to remain in office and challenge ongoing impeachment attempts and investigations. He characterized the declaration of martial law as a “sophisticated political decision,” attempting to legitimize his actions by citing the alleged paralysis of national governance and constitutional subversion by opposition parties.

The address appears to be a direct challenge to the ongoing treason investigation, particularly regarding accusations that Yoon planned to undermine the constitution by dismantling the National Assembly and arresting key legislators—claims that are reportedly supported by statements from the National Intelligence Office and ROK Army Special Forces. He further defended the deployment of special forces and police, portraying these actions as necessary to minimize public confusion while alleging that the opposition parties’ attempt to accelerate the impeachment process is merely a strategy to protect their leadership under legal scrutiny.

The aftermath has been swift and dramatic. The ruling party, which had previously shielded Yoon from impeachment during the first voting on December 7, quickly pivoted and mobilized its ethics committee to publicly repudiate the president’s address. The ruling party leader, Han Dong-hoon, expressed surprise at the president’s approach, arguing that the People Power Party (PPP) must now establish a consensus on impeachment. Han emphasized that Yoon had breached his earlier commitment to defer to the party’s judgment regarding his political future. This unexpected turn of events has prompted several PPP legislators to formally endorse impeachment, with the critical second vote scheduled for December 14. The main opposition Democratic Party (DP) quickly criticized Yoon, characterizing the speech as a delusional attempt to galvanize support among far-right supporters by highlighting the legal intricacies of his defense.

This development came mere days after the joint national address by Prime Minister Han Duck-soo and ruling party leader Han Dong-hoon, in which they announced plans to remove President Yoon from state affairs, with the Prime Minister set to assume leadership during the administration’s anticipated early termination. While the ruling party appeared to be strategically maneuvering toward Yoon’s early departure rather than impeachment—seemingly attempting to preempt the opposition from gaining significant political advantage—this approach is now dramatically challenged by Yoon’s new national address and the emerging internal disagreements among ruling party members regarding his potential impeachment.

Amid the rapidly evolving political landscape, the National Assembly passed a bill to launch a permanent special counsel investigating President Yoon and his key officials, including the Prime Minister, Defense Minister, and Martial Law Commander. The investigation encompassed fourteen distinct charges, ranging from treason to the unlawful arrest of legislators. Notably, twenty-three members of the ruling party voted in favor of the bill, a significant development that underscored the deep internal divisions within the party regarding President Yoon’s future and potential culpability. Concurrently, the police and prosecutors initiated their own investigations into Yoon’s treason charges, arrested Defense Minister Kim Yong-hyun—who had played a pivotal advisory role for Yoon—and attempted unsuccessfully to raid the Presidential office.

Public Outrage Continues

The initial shock of the incident rapidly transformed into widespread public outrage against a government that had wielded presidential authority to curtail political and personal freedoms. The anger largely stemmed from the perceived lack of legitimacy in the President’s declaration, which cited vague threats from pro-North Korea anti-state forces, continued impeachment proceedings against key government personnel, nomination obstructions, and accusations of legislative dictatorship—seemingly tied to recent significant budget cuts by opposition parties.

To the public, these justifications appeared more reflective of the President’s personal frustration with an opposition-controlled legislature than any genuine, identifiable national security threats warranting martial law. A Hankuk Gallup survey conducted immediately after the declaration revealed a dramatic erosion of public trust: President Yoon’s approval rating plummeted to a mere 13 percent, with his party’s support hovering at 27 percent—numbers that unequivocally signal a profound legitimacy crisis. The latest RealMeter survey concurred with the approval ratings for Yoon (17.3 percent) and the ruling party (26.2 percent) reaching the lowest levels. In the same survey, an overwhelming majority, 74.3 percent of respondents, indicated that President Yoon should immediately vacate his office, either through impeachment or resignation, while a mere 16.2 percent believed he should resign in an orderly manner over a specified period.

The societal response was deeply intertwined with South Korea’s historical memory. Generations of South Koreans, bearing generational experiences of military dictatorships, now instinctively draw parallels between Yoon and the authoritarian leaders of the past. The last martial law declaration in 1979, following President Park Chung-hee’s death, lasted 440 days and was characterized by egregious human rights violations, ultimately culminating in a military coup by Chun Doo-hwan. For those who lived through or inherited stories of that era, Yoon’s declaration reopens historical wounds and triggers visceral opposition. This moment represents a stark revelation for younger generations: democratic threats can emerge from within governmental institutions, not solely from external sources.

Reflecting the mounting public indignation, over a million protesters assembled before the National Assembly on December 7 and continued demonstrating in key political locations, including the Yongsan Presidential Office. Beyond demanding Yoon’s impeachment, demonstrators are calling for special investigations into multiple allegations: the president’s involvement with political brokers, the First Lady’s suspected stock price manipulation, and potential leakage of classified information—scandals that had already eroded Yoon’s approval ratings prior to the martial law declaration.

Economic and Diplomatic Pitfalls

The declaration’s ramifications extended far beyond the political arena, delivering substantial blows to South Korea’s economic and diplomatic standing. The Korean won experienced a precipitous decline, reaching its highest exchange rate against the dollar in two years—a movement that signified more than routine market fluctuation. South Korea related exchange-traded funds plummeted by up to 5 percent, while the KOSPI index tumbled, signaling a comprehensive erosion of investor confidence in domestic market stability.

The geopolitical risks surrounding Korean leadership have dramatically intensified the “Korea Discount,” a persistent phenomenon in which South Korean corporate valuations are systematically underestimated due to perceived national risks. Corporations must now endure this challenging environment as the political situation continues to evolve, with President Yoon retaining his presidential position.

Internationally, the crisis has delivered a devastating blow to South Korea’s meticulously cultivated image as a paragon of democracy and a “global pivotal state.” Neighboring countries have issued statements expressing deep concerns and calling for a peaceful resolution while simultaneously criticizing Seoul’s actions as contrary to public sentiment. The U.S. Deputy Secretary Kurt Campbell publicly denounced Yoon’s move as “illegitimate” and “badly misjudged,” further damaging the nation’s international credibility. U.S. Ambassador Phillip Goldberg also met with National Assembly Speaker Woo Won-shik, notably avoiding a direct meeting with the president, to discuss the stability of the U.S.-ROK alliance, underscoring the eroding credibility of Seoul’s leadership.

Summit diplomacy has ground to a virtual halt since the declaration, with multiple international leaders postponing or outright canceling planned visits to Korea. Most notably, Japanese Prime Minister Ishiba reportedly abandoned his scheduled January visit. The prospect of normalizing summit-level diplomatic interactions appears challenging, particularly with Prime Minister Han Duck-soo serving as a functionally acting president for the foreseeable months.

Furthermore, the martial law declaration starkly contradicted South Korea’s aspirations for value-based diplomacy—a vision prominently articulated through recent global engagements, including hosting the 2024 Summit for Democracy. This misstep has consequently strained relationships in Washington and other critical global capitals, potentially undermining years of careful diplomatic positioning.

Constitutional Court as the Ultimate Arbiter

Should the National Assembly proceed with impeachment, the Constitutional Court will serve as the final arbiter of the case—a unique judicial body in South Korea’s legal system. Unlike the Supreme Court, this independent institution holds specific jurisdictional power over the constitutionality, including reviewing the constitutionality of laws, potentially dissolving political parties, and adjudicating impeachment proceedings.

The primary challenge lies in normalizing the Constitutional Court’s composition, which currently lacks a full quorum. While technically operational with six justices out of nine, following the temporary suspension of the quorum requirement of seven members in October to minimize judicial paralysis, the court may still hesitate to hear the case, preferring to avoid rendering a historical decision with only two-thirds of its nine-member panel to avoid criticisms of legitimacy. The Democratic Party has recommended two justices, leaving the critical appointment process in President Yoon’s hands—a necessary procedural step for Constitutional Court justice appointments. The cabinet, led by the Prime Minister, will have to eventually approve these recommendations, as maintaining the status quo under mounting public pressure would prove the least favorable option for both the government and the ruling party.

Critical Months for South Korea’s Democracy

Even after the case reaches the Constitutional Court, resolving it will require significant time. Historical precedents suggest lengthy proceedings: President Roh Moo-hyun’s impeachment in 2004 took sixty-three days, while President Park Geun-hye’s case in 2017 lasted ninety-one days. Although the Prime Minister assumes the role of acting president during an impeachment, the ongoing police investigation and the newly launched special congressional investigation into President Yoon, Prime Minister Han, and key ministers for their involvement further complicate the situation. This will likely prolong the paralysis of national governance, at least in the short term.

The approaching months represent a critical juncture for Seoul, given the escalating economic and diplomatic repercussions stemming from the martial law declaration. The government must swiftly reorganize its structure amid ongoing ministerial resignations and resume ordinary governance to mitigate institutional instability. The Ministry of Economy and Finance, alongside the Bank of Korea, whose role remains unaffected by ongoing investigations, should rapidly implement policies to normalize the economic landscape. Simultaneously, the foreign ministry must work to rebuild international credibility by demonstrating resilience in the face of democratic challenges.

Critically, legislators must transcend partisan divisions and address citizens’ urgent needs. The twenty-second National Assembly, which commenced in April, has faced persistent criticism for political acrimony, partisan bickering, and unprecedented legislative inefficiency. Resuming substantive legislative activities—beyond the impeachment effort—remains the paramount priority and the sole viable path to national reconstruction, potentially alleviating public confusion and anger surrounding the current political crisis.