“Total Peace” is Dead. For Petro, Partial Peace is the Best Remaining Option

Two years in, Colombian President Gustavo Petro’s “Total Peace” initiative has lost momentum. Several of the policy’s first-year achievements—like a bilateral ceasefire with the National Liberation Army (ELN)—have unraveled, and the government and armed groups have been unable to advance past partial agreements that often break down. Public support for the policy is low. 66 percent of Colombians say that progress on Petro’s “Total Peace” strategy is moving in the wrong direction and 85 percent think Colombia’s security situation is worsening, according to a June poll.

The government’s approach to date—attempting to negotiate ceasefires with all of Colombia’s major armed groups, all at once, and at the national level—hasn’t led to the pacification Petro promised. Regional dialogues in two departments, Nariño and Guaviare, however, are promising, and could form the basis of a new approach allowing Petro to achieve at least some peace before the end of his term. Such a regionalized approach would involve tailoring policy to fit different departments’ unique security challenges, increasing investment in these territories’ development, and negotiating only with those armed groups that prove their seriousness. Time is running out, both for Petro (who leaves office in two years) and for Colombia’s security forces, whose operational capacity and morale are diminishing. Petro has no time to lose. 

A Year of Setbacks 

Two of the government’s major negotiation efforts have broken down since the start of the year. In March, Petro suspended the bilateral ceasefire with the Central General Staff (EMC), a dissident faction of the now-demobilized Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), in Cauca, Valle del Cauca, and Nariño, in response to the killing of an indigenous leader. While the government is continuing talks with several EMC factions, Colombian security forces are waging a full-blown offensive operation against the remaining 60 percent, resulting in an intensification of violence and forced displacement and confinements in the departments of Cauca, Nariño, and Valle del Cauca.

In August, negotiations with the National Liberation Army (ELN)—the Petro government’s longest-lasting and most successful peace talks, at that point—also ground to a halt after the group rejected the renewal of a bilateral ceasefire. Since then, the ELN and Colombian security forces have clashed in Chocó and Arauca. The ELN’s leadership accuses the Petro government of failing to offer financial incentives, violating the ceasefire agreement, and engaging in regional peace talks with an ELN dissident faction without the ELN leadership’s consent. Meanwhile, the Petro government criticizes the ELN for resuming ransom kidnapping and taxing citizens in areas the group controlled. Resumption of the ceasefire already looked uncertain, but an attack on September 17 by the ELN in Arauca is likely the death knell—both for national-level talks between the Petro government and “Total Peace” as originally envisaged. If talks with the ELN—one of Colombia’s biggest armed groups—are finished, there will be nothing “total” about whatever peace gains Petro manages to achieve in the remainder of his term.

Four in five Colombians live in cities, so urban violence is as much or more of a concern for the population. But there, Petro is confronting challenges too. His “Urban Peace” initiatives mean to reduce violence in cities, but after scoring some early wins, they too are also facing setbacks. In September, three criminal organizations in Quibdó ended a ceasefire. The government, by choosing to focus on negotiating with national-level groups, has often put talks like these on the back burner, raising questions around who would fund these local-level initiatives. And because Colombian law defines urban bands like these as “criminal groups,” not insurgencies like the FARC dissidents and ELN, there is no legal framework under which they might demobilize. Petro would have to create one and pass it through Colombia’s opposition-controlled Congress. 

Surprisingly, Colombia’s national homicide rate declined slightly last year, which is likely partly the result of ceasefires Petro signed with armed groups and urban gangs. But other insecurity indicators are troubling. Historically violent areas—including parts of Antioquia, Valle del Cauca, and Cauca—still have homicide rates northwards of 90 per 100,000, making them among the most violent places in Latin America. In Petro’s first two years, assassins have killed more than 350 social leaders and human rights defenders, at least 75 signatories of the 2016 peace deal have been murdered, and over 165 massacres have occurred. Extorsion and threats by armed groups are also up nationwide, while kidnappings in 2023 reached their highest level in eight years, increasing sharply since Petro took office. 

Armed groups have also expanded their territorial control with the EMC, the Second Marquetalia, and the Gaitanist Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AGC or Gulf Clan) expanding the most. In Petro’s first two years, armed groups have committed 11 percent more human rights violations than in the first two years of his predecessor. 68 percent of the provisions in the 2016 Peace Accord with the FARC remain unfulfilled—virtually the same as when Petro took office—another barrier to security gains.

Petro’s Last Chance 

Petro’s peace efforts are not destined for total failure, but now is likely the last chance to avoid that outcome. The government recently began negotiations with the Second Marquetalia, the Sierra Nevada Self-Defense Forces (ACSN), and the Gulf Clan. The latter is Colombia’s single biggest criminal group, present in about 30 percent of the country and in control of 60 percent of its cocaine trade. Talks between the government and urban gangs in the Valle de Aburrá and Buenaventura as well as with 40 percent of the EMC continue. 

The AGC’s decision to select members of its top leadership to serve on the negotiating team also shows some seriousness on the group’s part, even if this is just the beginning. 

Meanwhile, offensive operations carried out by Colombian security forces and rival armed groups have sapped the Second Marquetalia’s strength and thinned out its leadership. Petro’s decision to designate the Second Marquetalia as a political group was controversial. But because no future president is likely to make such an offer again, and this deal potentially offers a legal loophole for members who defected from the 2016 peace accord to be eligible for transitional justice, the group has strong incentives to take these talks seriously. 

However, there are still other hurdles. As criminal groups, rather than insurgencies under the “Total Peace” law, the ACSN and Gaitanistas aren’t eligible for transitional justice—a key mechanism used to demobilize the FARC and, before that, Colombia’s umbrella group of paramilitaries. Both the ACSN and Gaitanistas seem to accept that for now, although the Gaitanistas have previously demanded transitional justice and could derail talks if they do so again.

And then there’s the risk that any or all of these groups could be negotiating with the government in bad faith, using talks to hold off government offenses as they build up force. Some observers also speculate that the illegal armed groups appear to be delaying talks with the government until after the U.S. election, perhaps in expectation that a second Trump presidency would put pressure on Colombia to end the talks. 

As Petro finishes his term, he should consider adopting a more pragmatic and regionalized approach to negotiations. Currently, his government is negotiating at the regional level with the Comuneros del Sur, an ELN dissident group in Nariño. If Petro can reach a peace agreement with the Comuneros del Sur, it could provide a blueprint for the government to engage in additional regional peace dialogues elsewhere. By engaging with illegal armed groups at the regional level, Petro can focus on those groups which have demonstrated a real willingness to end violence, instead of tangling endlessly with large national-level groups riven by their own internal divisions.

Regardless of which strategy Petro adopts for the remainder of his term, any advances will require a mix of force and diplomacy. Petro must set red lines for the armed groups he negotiates with and enforce them. The more rule-breaking that goes unpunished in the negotiation process, the less bargaining power the government has. To maintain security forces’ capacity and morale, his government should do all that it can to maintain a strong bilateral relationship with the United States—this at a time when Congress has voted to halve U.S. assistance to Colombia (fortunately, Senate approval of this reckless move is unlikely). 

The regional approach is not risk-free. Regional deals, if implemented poorly, could open territorial vacuums still active armed groups could fill. Negotiating with multiple armed groups and blocs at the regional level would also likely require more resources and personnel than currently assigned.

Petro campaigned for office promising to reduce conflict in Colombia’s most conflict-ridden areas. His window to deliver on that promise, even partially, is rapidly closing.