Six Takeaways From the Pentagon’s Report on China’s Military

On Wednesday, December 18, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) released a 182-page report on China’s military. The China Military Power Report, as it is colloquially known, was mandated by Congress in 2000 and has been issued every year since, providing the best unclassified resource on the state of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Analysts of the PLA and China more broadly eagerly await its release, comparing passages and tables against previous versions to see how China’s military is evolving.

This year’s report revised upwards the estimate of China’s defense budget, the second-largest in the world (behind the United States), to one-and-a-half to two times its public defense budget ($330 billion to $450 billion). While the report included a special section on corruption in the PLA, it would be a mistake to focus on this issue at the expense of the significant strides China is clearly making toward building a highly modern and capable military that can threaten the United States and its allies and partners. Indeed, the fact that China’s leader Xi Jinping continues to aggressively root out corruption in the PLA over a decade into his tenure demonstrates his determination to have a military that can provide him with credible options to achieve his political objectives, above all unification with Taiwan.

Here are six takeaways from this year’s report:

First, China’s rapid expansion and modernization of its nuclear force continues, in an attempt to provide Beijing with greater control of escalation dynamics in a potential war with the United States. DoD estimates that China has over 600 operational nuclear warheads, up from 500 last year, and still estimates that China will have over 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030 and will continue to expand its nuclear force beyond that. In addition to the expansion of its nuclear arsenal, China is also improving every element of its triad. China completed construction of three new missile fields with 320 silos for intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and is developing new, more survivable ICBMs. In addition, its ballistic missile submarines conduct at sea deterrent patrols armed with missiles that can reach the continental United States, its nuclear-capable bombers continue to be deployed, and it is reportedly considering a rail-mobile launch option. China is also developing fractional orbital bombardment systems and hypersonic glide vehicles, with Beijing now possessing “the world’s leading hypersonic missile arsenal.” China’s readiness is improving, with the report noting the “PLA is working to implement a launch on warning (LOW) posture this decade, called ‘early warning counterstrike,’ where warning of a missile strike leads to a counterstrike before an enemy first strike can detonate.” In a sobering note, the report states that China’s “force modernization suggests that it seeks the ability to inflict far greater levels of overwhelming damage to an adversary in a nuclear exchange.”

Second, China’s overall military readiness and proficiency continues to increase. The report noted the PLA Navy (PLAN) “maintains its surface fleet at high readiness with an emphasis on enabling a surge capacity to respond to regional contingencies…The PLAN’s submarine fleet is similarly positioned to maintain high readiness, with an increasing focus on real-world contingency training further from shore for longer periods of time.” The PLA Air Force (PLAAF), meanwhile, “has embarked on a set of major institutional reforms aimed at creating a modern, professional fighting force. A major tenant of these reforms is an effort to train and exercise under what the PLA refers to as ‘actual combat conditions,’ which include training and exercise scenarios meant to mimic real-world battle conditions.” The PLA Army (PLAA) “continued to improve its methods and standards of training combined arms units.” Finally, the PLA Rocket Force “routinely practices live-fire strikes on mock airfields, bunkers, aircraft, and ships, indicating that the PLARF is improving its readiness for several counter intervention strike contingencies.”

Third, China is building a global military and investing in capabilities that will allow it to project power far beyond the first island chain. In 2023, the PLAN “continued to grow its ability to perform missions beyond the First Island Chain” and in the near term it “will have the ability to conduct long-range precision strikes against land targets from its submarine and surface combatants using land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs), notably enhancing the PRC’s power projection capability.” The PLAAF’s bomber fleet now offers “a long-range standoff precision strike capability that can range targets in the Second Island Chain from home airfields in mainland China.” The report notes China “is seeking to expand its overseas logistics and basing infrastructure” and that it “probably has considered other countries as locations for PLA military logistics facilities, including but not limited to Burma, Thailand, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, United Arab Emirates, Cuba, Kenya, Equatorial Guinea, Seychelles, Tanzania, Angola, Nigeria, Namibia, Mozambique, Gabon, Bangladesh, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Tajikistan.” Assistant Secretary of Defense Ely Ratner remarked during an event introducing the report that, “The demand from the PRC for these things [overseas bases and facilities] is vast. They will take almost anything they can get globally. Their list of targets is very, very long.”

Fourth, China’s military modernization is enabled by a world-class defense industrial base. The PLAN is numerically the largest navy in the world, with 370 ships and submarines, while DoD projects it will have 395 ships by 2025 and 435 by 2030. China “is capable of producing a wide range of naval combatants, gas turbine and diesel engines, and shipboard weapons and electronic systems, making it nearly self-sufficient for all shipbuilding needs.” It has “sufficient capacity to produce any required numbers of naval classes: submarines, surface combatants, and auxiliary and amphibious ships.” This stands in stark contrast to a U.S. defense industrial base that is struggling to produce everything from submarines to surface warships and munitions.

Fifth, corruption remains endemic within the PLA. During the second half of 2023, at least 15 high-ranking military officers and executives from China’s defense industry were removed, including senior leaders of the PLARF, a defense minister who was previously in charge of the Equipment Development Department, and the head of China’s largest missile manufacturer. These personnel issues “may have disrupted the PLA’s progress toward stated 2027 modernization goals,” the report concludes. At the same time, however, Xi’s determination to confront corruption within the military should be seen as evidence of his determination to build a world-class military. As Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Michael Chase said during the report’s rollout, “despite what the PRC sees as an increasingly turbulent strategic environment and domestic challenges, they continue to forge ahead with the pursuit of Xi Jinping’s national strategy and they continue to work toward his military modernization goals for the PLA.”

Sixth, China’s military modernization remains focused on Taiwan. The report notes that China’s leadership views unification with Taiwan as a fundamental condition of national rejuvenation, which must be accomplished by 2049. To that end, “the PLA is aggressively developing capabilities to provide options for the PRC to dissuade, deter, or, if ordered, defeat third-party intervention in the Asia-Pacific region” (i.e. Taiwan). Its nuclear expansion is a key pillar of that effort, as China likely believes that a larger arsenal will allow it to deter U.S. intervention, check potential U.S. nuclear escalation, and provide a greater degree of escalation control.

The PLA continues to hone its skills for an attack on Taiwan. The report assessed that “PLA training and exercises increasingly focus on military contingencies in the Taiwan Strait while simultaneously delaying or denying third-party intervention. During 2023, the PLA conducted exercises around Taiwan to improve joint operations and combat readiness with simultaneous land, air, and sea exercises.” China’s Joint Sword exercise in April 2023 marked the first time “in which an aircraft carrier simulated targeting Taiwan.”

At the same time, however, DoD assesses that the PLA “has not yet demonstrated the type and scale of sophisticated urban warfare or long-distance logistics capabilities that would likely be required for operations against Taiwan or major contingencies overseas.” Ely Ratner also noted in his public comments, “to the extent that their particular goal is to be feeling ready and confident that they can execute a short, sharp invasion of Taiwan at acceptable cost, they’re not there today. They’re trying to get there…But it’s not clear they’re getting any closer than they were over the last couple of years.”