Reading Lai Ching-te’s National Day Speech and Its Implications for Cross-Strait Relations

On October tenth, Taiwan’s president Lai Ching-te delivered his first speech marking the National Day of the Republic of China (ROC), as Taiwan is formally known. The “Double Ten” speech, as it is colloquially referred to, is seen as second only to the inaugural address in importance for sending signals and conveying Taiwan’s intent on cross-strait relations. Lai’s speech demonstrated restraint, refraining from breaking new ground, repeating well-known positions, vowing to uphold the status quo, and extending goodwill to China. In tone, it was also more measured than his inaugural address, with fewer direct criticisms of China.  

China’s reaction to Lai’s speech will tell observers a lot about the likely trajectory of cross-strait relations over the next three-plus years. If Beijing responds to Lai’s speech by applying additional pressure on Taiwan, as seems most likely, Lai may very well conclude (not without reason) that there is little to be gained through restraint and may embrace more explicit rhetoric on cross-strait relations. If, however, China reciprocates Lai’s restraint, cross-strait relations may settle in at an elevated but sustainable equilibrium. 

What Lai Said 

Leading Taiwan amidst a polarized political climate – his Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) does not have a majority of the seats in the legislature, which has subsequently sought to stymie his agenda – Lai called for political unity. With the speech primarily focused on a domestic audience, Lai spent most of his time discussing issues that resonate with voters, from infrastructure to childcare, education, minimum wage, housing prices, and long-term care for the elderly. 

The sections on cross-strait relations, however, are most heavily scrutinized outside of Taiwan. Here Lai did not break any new ground, repeating longstanding DPP positions and those articulated by his predecessor, Tsai Ing-wen. Lai mentioned the Republic of China (ROC), a way of acknowledging a one-China framework, eleven times, while Tsai mentioned the ROC seven times during her final Double Ten speech (Lai mentioned it ten times during his inaugural address). 

Lai also extended olive branches to Beijing, stating, “We are willing to work with China on addressing climate change, combatting infectious diseases, and maintaining regional security to pursue peace and mutual prosperity for the well-being of the people on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.” He also reiterated that Taiwan’s “commitment to hoping for parity and dignity, and healthy and orderly dialogue and exchanges between the two sides of the strait remains unchanged.” He expressed hope that China will “live up to the expectations of the international community” and “take up its international responsibilities and, along with Taiwan, contribute to the peace, security, and prosperity of the region and the globe.” 

China will, however, object to Lai repeating the formula from his inaugural address that “the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are not subordinate to each other.” But this concept is not new; Tsai stated this during her 2021 Double Ten speech as part of her “Four Commitments.” Lai also commented that the PRC “has no right to represent Taiwan,” but this is neither a statement about the future of cross-strait relations nor a rejection of a one-China framework. Rather, it is more likely an attempt to push back against Beijing’s attempt to distort UN Resolution 2758 as stating that Taiwan is a part of the PRC and therefore should not have an independent status in the international community. 

Lai pledged that he would “also uphold the commitment to resist annexation or encroachment upon our sovereignty” but this is also consistent with Tsai, who during her 2021 Double Ten speech stated, “Let us here renew with one another…our commitment to resist annexation or encroachment upon our sovereignty.” 

Lai argued that “expanding authoritarianism is posing a host of challenges to the rules-based international order, threatening our hard-won free and democratic way of life.” This is an implicit rebuke of China but importantly it is not an explicit one. Indeed, this line should be read as a softening of the language he used in his inaugural address, where he explicitly claimed that China’s “military actions and gray-zone coercion are considered the greatest strategic challenges to global peace and stability.” In the inaugural, he also called on China “to cease their political and military intimidation against Taiwan,” though he did not repeat this language in his Double Ten speech. 

He used similar language to his inaugural in discussing Taiwan’s name: “Regardless of what name we choose to call our nation – the Republic of China; Taiwan; or the Republic of China Taiwan – we must all share common convictions: Our determination to defend our national sovereignty remains unchanged.” While this will be sure to irk Beijing, a more generous interpretation of this line is that Lai is attempting to set aside divisive questions such as Taiwan’s official name in the spirit of unity. Such a move could be intended to signal that he has no intention of seeking to formally change Taiwan’s name, a move that would surely provoke a crisis. 

Signals to Washington 

In addition to messaging his domestic audience and leaders in Beijing, Lai also used the opportunity to reassure Taiwan’s partners, above all the United States, that he would not instigate a crisis. To that end, he pledged that “Taiwan is resolved in our commitment to upholding peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and achieving global security and prosperity.” He later offered, “In an era when the international landscape is becoming increasingly chaotic, Taiwan will become more calm, more confident, and stronger; it will become a force for regional peace, stability, and prosperity.” He also noted, “Our efforts to maintain the status quo of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait remain unchanged.” 

What Will Beijing Do? 

Despite Lai’s restraint, it is highly unlikely that China will resume cross-strait communication at an official level, which it cut off after Tsai assumed office over eight years ago. China can, however, set cross-strait relations on a more stable footing by scaling back military activity in Taiwan’s self-declared air defense identification zone and in the waters around the island, working with Taiwan to resume cross-strait tourism and scholarly exchanges, and refraining from introducing additional tariffs on Taiwanese goods. Such steps would incentivize Lai to demonstrate further restraint. 

It seems far more likely, however, that China will dismiss Lai’s Double Ten speech and continue to ratchet up the pressure on Taiwan, for instance by introducing major military exercises akin to those that followed Lai’s inaugural address or peeling away some of Taiwan’s few remaining diplomatic partners. In response to Lai’s speech, a spokesperson for China’s foreign ministry stated that his “words attempt to sever the historical connections between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. He is again peddling various versions of ‘Taiwan independence’ narrative…It once again exposed that he is hellbent on advancing ‘Taiwan independence’ and has the ill intention of heightening tensions in the Taiwan Strait for his selfish political interest.” A spokesperson for China’s Taiwan Affairs Office alleged that Lai “continued to advocate the ‘new two-state theory’ of ‘not being subordinate to each other,’ fabricated the fallacy of ‘Taiwan independence,’ propagated separatist ideas, and incited hostility and confrontation.” 

If Beijing indeed chooses to continue its pressure campaign on Taiwan, Lai will likely conclude that there is little to be gained by demonstrating restraint. Such a determination could in turn lead to a vicious cycle in the Taiwan Strait, one in which the possibility of miscalculation and even conflict continues to rise.