NATO’s Indo-Pacific Aspirations

With China, North Korea, and Russia moving into closer alignment, members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have concluded that European and Indo-Pacific security are not divisible. China’s provision of dual-use items to Russia has provided a vital lifeline to its defense industrial base, while North Korea’s shipment of munitions and ballistic missiles has helped Russia replenish its weapons stocks. Countries in the Indo-Pacific are thus enabling Russia to prosecute the largest war in Europe since World War II.

These dynamics will, in turn, affect Indo-Pacific security. In exchange for the support it has received, Russia will likely provide technical assistance to North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs, closely back Beijing and Pyongyang’s positions on the main geopolitical fault lines in Asia, and may even intervene directly on behalf of its partners during a contingency.

If a war breaks out in the Indo-Pacific, the economic costs to NATO members would likely surpass those associated with the war in Ukraine. In addition, direct involvement in a regional contingency would force the United States to draw down its forces in Europe, which may court further Russian aggression. Thus, NATO has an interest in contributing to deterrence in the Indo-Pacific and preventing China from providing even greater military assistance to Russia.

At the same time, NATO’s potential contributions of hard power to the Indo-Pacific are limited. NATO should focus more narrowly on deterring a Russian attack on members and preparing for the day the United States might have to fight a direct conflict in Asia. Its most helpful contributions to Indo-Pacific security, therefore, are in spelling out to China the economic costs of aggression, exploring defense industrial cooperation with countries in the region, and pursuing discrete projects on cyber threats, economic coercion, and disinformation.

NATO Turns to the Indo-Pacific

NATO has begun to signal its growing worry about China’s assertiveness and its growing partnership with Russia. The 2019 London Declaration marked the first time that China was mentioned in an official NATO statement. References to China have since become more pointed, especially since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. At the Madrid Summit in 2022, NATO adopted a new Strategic Concept, which said that China’s “ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests, security and values.” For the first time, leaders from Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea (known as the Indo-Pacific Four, or IP4) joined a NATO summit. The Washington Summit Declaration of 2024 used the sharpest language to date, calling out China for becoming a “decisive enabler of Russia’s war against Ukraine” and warning Beijing that it “cannot enable the largest war in Europe in recent history without this negatively impacting its interests and reputation.” 

When Two Become One

Two potential flashpoints in the Indo-Pacific are animating NATO’s focus on the region. First, NATO members are concerned that if China uses force against Taiwan and the United States comes to its direct defense, Washington would have to make difficult trade-offs that would compel its NATO allies to shoulder more of the burden in deterring Russia. In addition, if deterrence in the Taiwan Strait fails, the economic consequences for Europe would be devastating. Supply chains across Europe would be severely disrupted, with a conflict over Taiwan estimated to shave up to $10 trillion off global GDP. 

Second, a conflict on the Korean Peninsula would bring about similar dynamics. Whereas it remains unknown whether the United States would defend Taiwan, there is no doubt that it would defend South Korea against North Korean aggression. Such a contingency would likely draw U.S. forces from Europe and harm European economies, with a recent analysis estimating that a war on the Korean Peninsula would reduce global GDP by $4 trillion.

Growing Russian, Chinese, and North Korean alignment exacerbates this strategic dilemma. China and Russia are increasing their military cooperation, including joint naval exercises in the South China Sea, a first-ever joint coast guard patrol in the Arctic, and a first-ever joint patrol near Alaska. Russia, for its part, fully supports China’s position on Taiwan, including any actions it takes “to protect its own sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as to unify the country.” In June 2024, Russia and North Korea revived their Cold War alliance, which includes a mutual defense pledge. In exchange for providing Russia with valuable artillery shells, North Korea has likely secured assistance with its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs.  

A Path Forward

NATO will not expand to include any countries from the Indo-Pacific as members. There is no consensus within NATO that the alliance should become more active in the Indo-Pacific, and divisions remain on the extent to which China poses a fundamental challenge to European security. With war raging in Europe and many NATO members struggling to build up their defenses, now is not the time to take on additional obligations.

Nonetheless, NATO can contribute to Indo-Pacific security. First, NATO should begin to reckon with the potential that a conflict in the Indo-Pacific could force the United States to shift military assets from Europe to the Pacific, pushing NATO members to shoulder the burden of conventional deterrence and defense in Europe. As a practical matter, this would entail NATO members boosting defense spending, rebuilding defense industrial bases, and conducting operational planning accounting for a major U.S. military engagement in another region and a reduced presence in Europe.

Second, NATO members and Indo-Pacific partners should pursue tailored cooperation, heavily focusing on industrial cooperation. NATO, having come to recognize the importance of a healthy defense industry, should seek to improve interoperability and interchangeability in munitions and air and missile defense with its IP4 partners. Technology sharing and coproduction are also important. Greater compatibility would allow NATO members to assist the United States and its Indo-Pacific allies during a regional contingency, even if they were to refrain from direct involvement, and would similarly allow countries in the Indo-Pacific to bolster European security. 

Third, NATO should publicly express the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and privately warn China that if it were to use force against Taiwan, its economic relationship with Europe would be permanently changed. The leaders of NATO countries can outline to their Chinese counterparts the crippling sanctions that would be imposed during a Taiwan contingency and the long-term technology and other export controls that would be put in place, regardless of the duration or outcome of a war.

Fourth, NATO should seek to counter China’s narrative that the alliance is fomenting conflict in the region, which has the potential to alienate NATO’s Indo-Pacific partners should it gain traction. In April 2024, China’s state-run media published an article that argued, “Where NATO goes, war is most likely.” China’s foreign ministry spokesman recently stated, “Wherever NATO shows up, turmoil and chaos will follow.” Beijing is attempting to link a greater NATO presence in the Indo-Pacific with the growing likelihood of conflict so that it can blame its aggressive actions on NATO, just as Russia sought to pin responsibility for its invasion of Ukraine on the alliance. NATO should explain that it has no plans to include countries in the region in the alliance. At the same time, its secretary-general should regularly meet with senior Chinese officials and explain how China’s actions are driving the alliance’s activities in the region.

A version of this piece originally appeared in the East-West Center’s Asia-Pacific Bulletin.