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Kahn analyzes economic policies for an integrated world.

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Headquarters of Sberbank, one of the Russian institutions under U.S. sanctions
Headquarters of Sberbank, one of the Russian institutions under U.S. sanctions REUTERS/Sergei Karpukhin

Have Sanctions Become the Swiss Army Knife of U.S. Foreign Policy?

The Congress takes an important, positive step to reinforce Russian sanctions, but are we at risk of overusing the sanctions tool?

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Budget, Debt, and Deficits
No Good Choices: Why a Short Term Debt Limit Extension Is on the Table
Politico last night highlighted a scenario that has become my ‘base case’: a short-term debt limit extension followed by a government shutdown at the end of March.  This consolidates the three cliffs–debt limit, sequester, and continuing resolution–into one larger showdown that, hopefully, produces an agreement some time in April. This scenario has become a focus ahead of a Republican House retreat on Wednesday and reports that perhaps half the Republican caucus favors default if significant spending cuts are not agreed.  I’ve previously blogged on why using the debt limit is a terrible idea; scenarios where the debt limit bites and Treasury prioritizes would have a quick, devastating and politically nonviable effect on the economy. From this perspective, the short-term debt limit extension is seeks to shift the battle onto ground less damaging to the U.S. economy and the government’s long-term creditworthiness.  Call me an optimist. The president in his press conference today pushed back, again rejecting negotiating over the debt limit.  He also seemed to signal support for a $1.5 trillion package (sufficient to bring overall deficit reduction in his first term to $4 trillion) in spending cuts and revenue. While a broad deal that avoids the cliffs remains possible, for now each side will continue to float alternatives in order to show toughness ahead of a contentious negotiation. The main argument for the alternatives is that, as bad as they are, a comprehensive default by the U.S. government is worse.  It’s a ‘theory of the second worst’. On Sunday, the U.S. Treasury shot down the idea of a $1 trillion dollar platinum coin.  Good for them. Of the ideas for evading the debt limit, this would have caused the highest collateral damage both for the Federal Reserve (which would have been signaling its willingness to accept the coin as currency and monetize the deficit directly) and for the credibility of fiscal policy over the longer term. Most also believe that the Administration is not interested in using the 14th Amendment to the Constitution, and its injunction that the validity of the debt shall not be questioned, to end-run the debt limit.  The more likely escape hatch is the creation of debt or other IOUs that are not subject to the debt limit.  One variant of this comes from Paul Krugman, who has called for the government to issue “Moral Obligation Coupons” that has no explicit legal obligation to repay. Once a deal is reached, this debt would be normalized.  This also has costs–debt not subject to the debt limit would be more costly than existing debt and the market would become fragmented, but as a short-term bridge to avoid default it is perhaps the best of the bad options if default is looming. I assume that an April agreement would result in material, but back-loaded, spending cuts to discretionary spending and entitlements.  This means that the fiscal drag this year would be limited to the January 1st fiscal cliff deal–about 1 ¼ percentage points.  The effect on growth in 2013 would be 1 percentage point.  If alternatively, the sequester goes into effect as part of the spending cuts, the fiscal drag rises to closer to 2 percentage points. Against this background, a short-term debt limit extension, a temporary government shutdown when the current CR expires, and then a deal cutting spending gradually over time seems positively upbeat.
Budget, Debt, and Deficits
Drawing the Wrong Lessons From Argentina’s Debt Mess
The Financial Times  has joined the chorus of those calling for a new statutory sovereign debt restructuring mechanism (SDRM), citing Argentina’s legal battle with holdout creditors as evidence of a broken system for restructuring sovereign debt.  The SDRM, as most commonly understood, envisages a formal restructuring process, analogous to national bankruptcy law, to deal with the debt of distressed countries.   It was an impractical and unnecessary idea when first raised by the IMF in 2001, and it remains so today. The case for the SDRM rests on the judgment that the current approach for restructuring international debt is chaotic and inefficient, and in particular that holdouts have too much power to prevent good deals from being done.   With SDRM, creditors would negotiate a deal with the country subject to certain principles (e.g., standstill during negotiation, appropriate creditor prioritization, debt sustainability). If the agreement passed official muster, it would be enacted.  The legal protections provided by the SDRM’s treaty-like status would override national law and thus limit the incentives for holdouts. The earlier IMF-led effort to establish the SDRM failed primarily because of the unwillingness of the United States and some other major countries to relinquish sovereignty over its courts to a multilateral organization.  It’s hard to believe that convincing the U.S. Congress to pass SDRM would be any easier today.  One could look to Europe, where a common set of rules for restructuring is envisaged, to test-drive the approach.  But as long as non-EU law debt is outstanding, the problem remains.  Further, most European debt is domestic, its terms subject to the laws of the debtor country, which reduces significantly the holdout problem.  Greece in 2012 was able to bind in all Greek-law bondholders and some international law bonds, leaving only a small amount of holdout debt (which is being paid). Beyond the politics, the current system of debt restructuring–primarily through officially supported debt exchanges–has worked reasonably well.  It has allowed a flexible case-by-case approach, with debt relief that has varied based on country situation and the strength of the adjustment effort.  Most creditors will prefer the certainty of the exchange to a time consuming and costly litigation; holdouts have been further limited by legal innovations in contracts and moral suasion from the international community.  The majority of restructurings do not end in litigation.  If you think these deals have provided too little debt relief, it’s primarily a critique of the principles the IMF and other policymakers have used to define the goals of these deals, rather than a failure of creditor coordination or market failure that would justify a more formal, rules-based approach. Why Argentina Matters Argentina’s battle with holdout creditors from its earlier debt restructuring took a dramatic turn last year when a New York court ruling expanded the remedies available to creditors under the heretofore minor pari passu clause.  The court, frustrated by what it saw as Argentine contempt for its earlier rulings, in essence said that should any creditor receive 100% of what’s due (interest on bonds issued during the restructurings, in this case), then the holdouts must receive 100% of what’s owed them.  More significantly, it sharply expanded the range of related parties that could be drawn into the litigation, including the banks and payments systems that act as intermediaries in the transfer of payment.  The ruling is now being appealed. The problem for most policymakers is not what it means for Argentina, which has been much more aggressive than other countries in defying efforts at a settlement, but its implications for other countries that are acting cooperatively with creditors.  If a financial institution fears that a sovereign might someday have such a ruling against them, and that as a result it may have its assets attached, it will not be willing to be an intermediary.  That logic could cause substantial stress on the sovereign funding market and increase the incentive to holdout.  This concern has led SDRM skeptics, such as Anna Gelpern, to reassess their opposition to SDRM.  If this is the end of sovereign debt restructuring as we know it, then the SDRM is worth the effort. There are several reasons for avoiding a rush to this conclusion.  The ruling could be reversed, or the scope of the remedy narrowed.  Further, contract innovations have the potential to restore an appropriate debtor-creditor balance by redefining and narrowing the pari passu law. Policymakers could reinforce this move through endorsement of the new contracts, as well as more aggressive actions to encourage old debt to be converted to the new terms (one example, also from Gelpern, would require narrowly worded pari passu clauses as a condition of accessing payment systems, though she admits it seems a remote possibility for now).   In sum, the SDRM is an unlikely fix to a system that isn’t now, and may not in the future, be broken.
Budget, Debt, and Deficits
The Debt Limit: Not a Credible Way to Control Spending
The Bipartisan Policy Center today has produced a package of charts on the debt limit. Their bottom line isn’t shocking, but it’s persuasively laid out: The debt limit is expected to become binding (i.e., extraordinary measures will become exhausted) between February 15 and March 1. The limit needs to be raised by $1.1 trillion to get through 2013 and by $2.1 trillion by the end of 2014. There is no secret bag of tricks:  the Administration’s view is that the 14th Amendment does not give it the power to ignore the debt ceiling; other ideas, such as minting a trillion-dollar platinum coin, are seen as impractical, illegal and/or inappropriate. This leaves the Treasury little choice but to begin to run arrears after the debt limit becomes binding.  On average, the Treasury takes in only $0.60 for each dollar of spending, so arrears would be broad-based and accumulate rapidly. Treasury could prioritize payments, but that presents substantial political as well as practical (i.e., reprogramming computers) challenges. Why is government paying the debt but not paying for federal salaries, veterans benefits, and food safety? (See their tables for prioritized payments from February 15 to March 15, below.) The alternative is to pay bills as they become due.  But this would mean a quick default on U.S. government debt, possibly at the end of February when a $6.6 billion interest payment is due. (Treasury also would have to roll over roughly $500 billion in debt from February 15 to March 15, a task that could be extremely difficult to manage given the risk of default.) My takeaway is that any partial payment strategy–even one that paid debt in full–would quickly become hugely disruptive for the US economy, and is not sustainable on political as well as economic grounds.   For that reason, it’s hard to see how going over the debt limit is a credible, useful way of disciplining spending.  I expect that market participants will broadly come to the same conclusion, and that expectations of a deal will limit “market discipline” as we approach the cliff (as was the case in 2011).  Further, if revenue is boosted by end-year, tax-driven transactions, it’s possible Treasury can go into March before it exhausts the extraordinary measures.  But a troubled auction or continued gridlock could change market expectations in a hurry.   BPC Table.  Illustrative Scenario #1: Protect Selected Big Ticket Programs If you choose to pay these programs for a total of $276.5 billion... ...then you can’t fund these programs, worth $175 billion. Source: Bipartisan Policy Center
  • Budget, Debt, and Deficits
    The Cliff Is Dead, Long Live the Cliff
    Tuesday’s fiscal agreement defuses the fiscal cliff by deferring most tax hikes and pushing back the sequester.  A deal has been made, a financial crash avoided, and near-term growth prospects look rosier.  Markets have cheered news of the agreement. Is such cheer warranted? That depends on what happens next.  By itself, the package raises little revenue, creates new cliffs, leaves hard choices for the future, and by separating revenue and spending debates may make the next showdown over the debt limit more difficult to resolve.  If subsequent agreements make sustained progress towards addressing our long-term fiscal challenges, this deal may be seen as a significant first step; if not, it’s further evidence of dysfunctional government.  Either way, uncertainty around fiscal policy seems here to stay.  The next key dates are end February, when the debt ceiling becomes binding, and March 27th, when funding for the government expires. While the political debate has focused on the historic nature of the tax increases, at the core this is a deal to not raise taxes. Compared to 2012 policies, gross tax revenue totals $620 billion over 10 years and the deficit is reduced by $650 billion. While these are big numbers, they are small relative to the roughly $4 trillion in new deficits produced by the package compared to what would have happened if we went off the cliff.  Further, new revenue in 2013 amounts to only about 0.4 percent of GDP. That’s what happens when you make the Bush tax cuts permanent for 98 percent of the population. Details on the package are listed below. Next up is the debt ceiling, a cliff we had hoped could be avoided but was left unaddressed in this deal. Treasury has announced that the debt limit was reached at end-2012, and that exceptional measures will now be employed.  This is expected to allow the government to fund itself until around end-February.  If history is a guide, we face another down-to-the-wire negotiation with an immense amount at stake. Statements from both sides yesterday signaled profoundly different views of what a debt-limit deal would look like – Republicans wanting cuts in discretionary spending and entitlement reforms equal to the increase in the limit, while the White House made clear it will continue to demand a “balanced approach.” When both sides think they have the leverage, deals are hard to come by.  Further, with key tax elements now addressed, it may be harder to agree to the tradeoffs necessary to bridge these views.  It is also worth noting that the sequester, now that it has been deferred two months, will need to be dealt with at the same time. Assuming that deficit reduction in future agreements will be back loaded, the drag on the economy in 2013 from tighter fiscal policy looks to be on the order of 1% of GDP. Around half of this comes from the expiration of the payroll tax, with the remainder primarily reflecting tax increases for high income Americans in this package and taxes related to health care reform.  On this basis, the US should avoid a recession in 2013 though growth may well be below trend. Governing by deadline is a terrible way of doing business.  Leads to bad policy at home, weakens our status abroad.  This deal avoids hard choices and ensures continued policy uncertainty that will be a drag on the economy. It produces a small amount of revenue and makes permanent tax rates that are too low for the long term.  For all these negatives, give this deal a grade of incomplete.  On to the next cliff. The agreement Numbers are savings over 10 years based on newspaper reports and estimates from the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget Income taxes (expected revenue $395bn). An increase to 39.6 percent for individuals making more than $400,000 a year and families making more than $450,000 (previously 35 percent). All income below the threshold will be taxed at previous (Bush era) rates. Dividends and capital gains ($55bn): The rate will increase to 20 percent for individuals making at least $400,000 and $450,000 for families. The rate will remain at 15% for everyone else.  (The Clinton-era rates were 20 percent for capital gains while dividends were taxed as ordinary income.) This does not include the previously passed 3.8 percent surcharge for those with income over $200,000/$250,000. Estate tax ($20bn).  The estate tax will rise to 40 percent for those at the $450,000/$400,000 threshold, and remain at 35% for others, with a $5 million exemption ($10 million per couple). The threshold will be indexed to inflation. Alternative minimum tax:  Permanently patched and indexed to inflation. Deduction caps ($150bn): The Personal Exemption Phase-out (PEP) will be reinstated with a starting threshold for those making $250,000. The “Pease” deduction will be reinstated for those making $300,000 or more. Extenders ($75bn cost relative to current law) .  Tax cuts first enacted in 2009, including the expanded earned income tax credit, child tax credit and college tax credit, will be extended for five years.  Other temporary business tax breaks will be extended for another year. Unemployment insurance (cost of $30bn). Extended Federal unemployment insurance continues for another year, benefiting those unemployed for longer than 26 weeks. Cost will not be offset. Doc fix.  Scheduled cuts to doctors under Medicare would be avoided for a year through medicare spending cuts that haven’t been specified. Sequester ($24bn).  The sequester will be delayed for two months and the cost of this move will be offset. Half will be offset by unspecified discretionary cuts, while half will be offset by a budget trick -- accounting for one-off revenue resulting from the voluntary transfer of traditional IRAs to Roth IRAs.   By deferring by only two months, it ensures the rest of the sequester will be tied into the debt limit debate. Other provisions.  A nine-month farm bill fix is attached to the deal, avoiding the "Milk Cliff." The bill also cancels pay raises for members of Congress.
  • Budget, Debt, and Deficits
    The Fed and the Fiscal Cliff
    One interesting footnote to the Fed’s decision today to introduce quantitative thresholds--that it expects to keep rates low at least as long as unemployment exceeds 6.5%, their inflation forecast doesn’t exceed 2.5%, and long term inflation expectations are well anchored--relates to the fiscal cliff. The fiscal cliff creates a risk to the outlook that is unusually sizeable in a short timeframe.  First, while some of the cliff is phased in over time (a “fiscal glide”), there are significant upfront effects that will be reinforced by potentially sharp moves in financial markets.  This suggests the pass-through to the real economy would be rapid.  Also, whatever the eventual outcome, uncertainty due to the fiscal cliff is highest over the next few weeks or months.  This is not a combination that monetary policy is well designed to address.  With interest rates at the lower bound, evidence that successive rounds of quantitative easing are having a diminishing impact on the economy, and the long lags through which monetary policy feeds through to the economy, the Fed has limited short-term ability to buffer the economy if we go off the cliff.  But there will still be a monetary policy offset through changing expectations of future policy.  If we go fully off the cliff, and growth plunges, the yield curve should flatten (bond prices rise) on revised expectations of easy-for-longer monetary policy and safe-haven flows, providing a brake against the worsening of financial conditions that would result.  Conversely, a good deal brings forward expectations of the timing of the recovery. What’s different now?  The new approach creates automatic adjustment by markets.  Now when a shock hits the economy, we change our forecast and reset expectations accordingly; we don’t need a confirming change in guidance from the Fed.  Chairman Bernanke emphasized this point in today’s press conference. Yesterday I blogged about the seeming disconnect between how NY and DC look at the fiscal cliff.  My bottom line was that while there was an upside to markets if a comprehensive deal was agreed that included the debt limit, the markets may be underestimating the risk of outcomes that leave the debt limit unaddressed and cause substantial uncertainty to persist into 2013.  This is still the case, but if the Fed’s new approach and the clarity it provides results in a stronger or quicker market response, then monetary policy may be a more effective buffer against a negative cliff shock.  In any event, it will be an early test of the new approach.