Thailand

Throughout much of the 1990s and early 2000s, Southeast Asia was one of the world’s bright spots for democracy. Even Myanmar, long one of the most repressive nations in the world, seemed to be changing. In 2010 and 2011, the xenophobic leadership of the Myanmar army, which had ruled the country since 1962, began a transition to civilian government by holding elections that ultimately helped create a partially civilian parliament. The country seemed poised for free elections in 2015 that would solidify its democratic change. Since the early 2010s, however, Southeast Asia’s democratization has stalled and, in some of the region’s most economically and strategically important nations, it has even reversed. Over the past decade, Thailand has undergone a rapid and severe democratic regression and Malaysia’s democratic institutions and culture have regressed as well. While less drastic, there have also been troubling developments in a number of other countries. In Malaysia, the long-ruling Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition has cracked down on dissent and tried to destroy what had been an emerging, and increasingly stable, two-party system. However, this has changed since Malaysia’s BN government won a narrow victory in the 2013 election in large part because of its strong support from the most conservative and anti-opposition ethnic Malays. Following the election, the government has “rewarded” these loyal constituents by proposing a raft of new legislation that aims to suppress the opposition and entrench economic and political preferences for ethnic Malays, disempowering ethnic Indians and Chinese, who together represent about one-third of the country’s population For example, the government essentially reinstated the despised Internal Security Act (ISA), which allows Malaysia’s government to detain people without trial indefinitely, often on vague charges. Things have been just as bleak in Thailand, which has been mired in political crisis since 2006, when the Thai military launched a coup while then-Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra was abroad. Since that time, Thailand has been plagued by repeated cycles of street protests and counterprotests, rising street violence and political instability, short-lived governments brought down through extra-constitutional means, and the return of harsh crackdowns on dissent. Thai institutions have become increasingly polarized and politicized, and few Thais now trust the integrity of the judiciary, the civil service, or other national institutions. Even the king, once so revered that Thais worshipped him like a god, has had his impartiality questioned by many Thais. For more on how Southeast Asia’ s democracy has regressed, and the role of U.S. policy in this regression, see my new piece for The Diplomat.

It’s nice, in a way, to see issues one has worked on appear in major, globally important publications. This past week, just before President Obama’s trip to Asia, the Banyan column in The Economist, a column that focuses on Asia, detailed the Obama administration’s general disinterest in issues related to democracy and human rights in Asia. Banyan notes that President Obama has kept quiet as protests for suffrage have raged in Hong Kong. Banyan also writes that the Obama administration also has ignored a serious regression in political freedoms in Malaysia, maintained the close bilateral relationship with Thailand even as a military junta took over in Bangkok, and spent little time working on relations with the new Indonesian president, Joko Widodo, as authentic a democrat as you will get anywhere. The Washington Post editorial board last week echoed these same sentiments. In an editorial, the board focused on the growing crackdown on dissent in Malaysia, noting that, “Mr. Obama has made a point of cultivating [Malaysian Prime Minister] Najib [tun Razak] and his government as part of his policy of ‘rebalancing’ toward Asia, and so far the administration has had little to say about the political crackdown [in Malaysia].” I have been detailing the administration’s lack of interest in democracy promotion and human rights issues in Southeast Asia for several years now, including in a book, a working paper, and many articles. But though it’s nice to see others hitting the same notes, I see little evidence that the White House’s policies are changing. The president still has said nothing about Anwar Ibrihim’s trial, which almost surely will conclude with him being sentenced this week or next. The White House has been mum about the general deteriorating climate of free speech in Malaysia, which Anwar’s case fits into. The administration also has decided to push ahead with rapprochement with Myanmar despite the country’s deteriorating political environment, and the White House has made the decision to keep the Cobra Gold multilateral military exercises in Thailand in 2015. The decision to retain Cobra Gold in Thailand is a choice the Thai (military) government is interpreting as a signal that U.S.-Thai relations are returning to normal, even though Thai politics surely is not. As Human Rights Watch notes, the Thai government continues to ban public gatherings and has detained hundreds of activists and journalists and academics; the initial reporting of the government’s plans for a return to legislative rule suggest that the legislature will be comprised in an extremely gerrymandered way that allows people in Bangkok to dominate despite being, numerically, a minority of the population. As the Banyan column notes, these decisions have a cumulative effect, and that effect is not just a symbolic tarnishing of ideals. Ignoring rights in Asia, Banyan writes: Has a cost....It squanders part of America’s “soft power,” a great asset.…For all its flaws and missteps, [America] represents not just economic and military might, but an ideal to aspire to, in a way that China does not. And when American leaders appear to give less weight to that ideal, they not only diminish America’s attractions, they also lend more credence to the idea of its relative economic and military decline. Having written for The Economist, I know its editors love one-word sentences, so I can say only...Indeed.

Despite the fact that Thai junta leader–turned prime minister Prayuth Chan-ocha recently let slip that the current Thai regime might not hold elections until 2016 or later, U.S. policy toward the kingdom remains largely the same as before the coup. Some in the State Department and other parts of the administration have urged the U.S. government to take a tougher line against Thailand, noting that there should be a clear U.S. response to the overthrow of an elected government. But recent reports suggest that the Obama administration is not going to cancel the 2015 Cobra Gold military exercises with Thailand next year or move it to another country, which would be a serious blow to the prestige of the Thai armed forces. Moving Cobra Gold, in fact, would be a much tougher response to the coup than the mild sanctions put in place by the Obama administration thus far. The administration plans merely to scale Cobra Gold down. As Stars and Stripes recently reported:  The United States and Thailand will scale down next year’s Cobra Gold military exercise because of the rift in relations that followed Thailand’s military coup earlier this year.…Many consider the multinational exercise to be not only important military training but also an instrument of U.S. regional diplomacy. Despite some uncertainty over the future of next year’s exercise, logistical planning [with the Thai military] had been ongoing and a bilateral conference is planned for later this month, State Department officials said. In other words, Cobra Gold is still going to happen. The Thai government, eager for any signals from Western nations that they accept the coup (see, for example, Siam Voices’ blog post on Prayuth’s recent trip to Europe to accumulate stamps of approval), will interpret this decision as one more sign that U.S.-Thailand relations are returning to business as usual, whether or not Thailand is returning to electoral democracy. Some in the Obama administration have defended its stance toward Thailand, such as not moving Cobra Gold, by saying that it is worth waiting to assess how the Thai military prepares a transition to electoral democracy again. But five months after the coup, it is evident that this putsch is what some Thais call a “hard coup,” to differentiate it from earlier “soft coups” that quickly gave way to electoral democracy. The military has released only a vague timetable for a return to democratic rule and created a road map that will push elections far into the future. When the army leader-turned prime minister actually steps down, Thailand probably will not return to electoral democracy as defined by any standard definition. Thailand’s parliament could become an institution with some members appointed (probably by the military and the royal family) and many members selected by educated groups of people—coded language for saying that most of the parliament would essentially be chosen by Bangkok elites, in the same way that Hong Kong’s legislature is mostly chosen by Beijing and a small handful of pro-Beijing Hong Kong elites.  In fact, this parliament dominated by elected MPs, including a non-elected prime minister, seems to me the most likely scenario after the military finally gives way. Since the outlines of Thailand’s political future appear clear, and Prayuth is getting more and more comfortable with his one-man, personality cult rule, why keep Cobra Gold in Thailand? Why not send a signal that a “hard coup” merits a hard response? After all, Thailand’s democratic regression has strategic consequences for the United States as well. In Thailand, a country that long was one of the most reliable American partners in Asia, the Obama administration has actually struggled to work with Bangkok on many important strategic and economic issues, largely because Thai leaders are so preoccupied with domestic crises, and have been for years. These crises will recur over and over in Thailand as long as democratic freedoms are repressed, and the Thai cycle of instability will go on.

On his way to meetings in Europe this week, Thai Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha, who still seems to believe all reporters will simply accept his word without question as if they were in the military, stopped to briefly lecture journalists. Reporters have been asking Prayuth about the junta government’s roadmap for a return to electoral democracy, a question that, like all inquires, seems exasperating to Prayuth. In the course of his lecture, Prayuth basically let slip that, though he had earlier promised that elections would be held by October 2015, that date might have been overambitious, and Thailand actually might not have elections before 2016. Prayuth left open the possibility that even 2016 might be too soon for elections, or that elections might not happen at all. As Reuters reported: "I outlined a road map. The election must come with a new constitution and eleven reform areas," said Prayuth [to reporters]. "Everything depends on the road map so we must see first if the road map can be completed. Elections take time to organize,’ he added, giving no further details." Prayuth’s fudging on elections reminded me of a famous New Yorker cartoon about a businessman trying to avoid a meeting. (The cartoon was also the title of New Yorker cartoon editor Bob Mankoff’s recent memoir.) But for most people in Thailand, Prayuth’s suggestion is not so funny. The clear suggestion that elections might be put off, possibly indefinitely, means that Prayuth and his allies are becoming more comfortable in power, more assured that they can root out support networks for Puea Thai and Thaksin Shinawatra (and possibly the Crown Prince), and less worried that Thailand needs to hold elections soon to please the international community and the majority of Thais who support electoral democracy. I disagree with some Thailand observers who argue that Prayuth’s desire to return to extreme 1950s-style authoritarian Thai rule will soon spark a significant public response. Although the Thai public certainly is far more educated, assertive, and desiring of democratic elections than it was in the 1950s, when old ideas of hierarchy still held great sway, many Thais also simply are tired of years of political conflict. They also are fearful of this era in which the king could die at any moment, and cowed by the military’s extremely tough post-May response to any dissent. I don’t expect there to be significant blowback against Prayuth’s slow election timetable, even if it stretches into 2016 or 2017 while also revamping Thai legislative institutions to make them less representative. That doesn’t mean I think most Thais want this kind of elite and anachronistic rule that Prayuth champions, or that the Obama administration should accede to Prayuth’s rule. For instance, the United States should take the opportunity of Ambassador to Thailand Kristie Kenney’s departure to maintain only a charge d affaires in Bangkok as a sign of diplomatic displeasure. It just means that I think that, for now, Prayuth can stall and stall on elections without serious consequences.

Ashlyn Anderson, Lauren Dickey, Darcie Draudt, Andrew Hill, Will Piekos, and Sharone Tobias look at the top stories in Asia today. 1. Indian and Pakistani share Nobel Peace Prize; gunfire results in casualties in Kashmir. Kailash Stayarthi, an Indian activist against child labor and trafficking, and Malala Yousafzai, a Pakistani activist for girls’ education, jointly won the Nobel Peace Prize on Friday. At seventeen, Yousafzai is the youngest person to ever receive the prize. In unrelated news, Indian and Pakistani troops exchanged gunfire over their border in the divided region of Kashmir, resulting in the deaths of at least seventeen civilians and forcing thousands out of their homes. Each country blames the other for targeting civilians and violating a border truce that has largely held since 2003. 2. U.S. and Japan enhance defense pact for the first time in decades. The United States and Japan released an interim report this week on their efforts to revise their defense cooperation guidelines. The development comes after Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s government announced in July that it will reinterpret the constitutions’s Article 9, in which Japan formally renounced war, to allow Japanese forces to fight abroad in support of collective self-defense. The last time the two countries revised these guidelines was in 1997. A senior U.S. State Department official noted that the new guidelines will reflect the alliance’s “more global nature.” The announcement will likely cause increased tension with South Korea and China, where memories of Japanese actions in World War II are still fresh. 3. North Korea and South Korea exchange fire across the DMZ. On Friday, North Korean forces fired machine gun rounds at balloons containing propaganda leaflets sent across the demarcation line by South Korean activists; South Korea’s military responded with gunfire of its own. There were no casualties. Also this week, South and North Korean patrol boats exchanged warning shots off the disputed western maritime border. These incidents dampen new hope for inter-Korean dialogue sparked by last Saturday’s unannounced visit of high-ranking North Korean officials to South Korea. 4. The leaders of Thailand and Myanmar meet amidst protests. Thai Prime Minister Prayuth Chanocha traveled to Myanmar to meet with President Thein Sein, marking his first official foreign visit since the military coup. The two leaders—both former generals—discussed the expansion of economic relations, as well as a number of thorny issues marring the bilateral relationship, including border security concerns and the plight of Myanmar’s migrant workers in Thailand. The leaders also chose the Mae Sot district, an important border-crossing area, for the creation of a special economic zone. The visit was overshadowed by protests over the arrest of two Myanmar migrant workers in Thailand suspected of murdering two British tourists. Protesters in Myanmar are suspicious of the investigation, and results of DNA testing have cast further doubt on the involvement of the workers. 5. Hong Kong protests pick up steam after calm. Protests in Hong Kong dwindled into the hundreds over the past week as the Hong Kong government and student leaders agreed to Friday talks. But with neither side indicating a willingness to compromise, protesters called for a new round of civil disobedience on Thursday, and the government subsequently canceled the negotiations before they even began. Demonstrators are now repopulating the streets and barricades that they had previously manned. Meanwhile, an anonymous source informed the Sydney Morning Herald of a secret contract that paid Hong Kong Chief Executive Leung Chun-ying $6.4 million from an Australian engineering company. Both Leung, whose removal from power has been a focus of the Hong Kong protests, and the Australian firm, UGL, have denied that the contract and payments were improper. Bonus: Siberian tiger defects to China from Russia. Chinese forestry officials were alerted to the presence of an endangered Siberian tiger in the country’s northeast this week. The tiger, named Kuzya, was personally released earlier this year by Russian President Vladimir Putin (who celebrated his sixty-second birthday on Tuesday). No word yet if Putin will be called upon to wrangle the beast back to Siberia.

In my previous post on the rule of Prayuth Chan-ocha, I noted that, in this “hard coup,” army rule could last a considerably long time–two years, and possibly even more. Some Thai observers are suggesting that Prayuth and the army will retain power for as much as five years. As I mentioned previously, in this “hard coup,” the military is likely to take more draconian action against any opponents in the next year as well, since the army has overseen somewhat of an economic rebound, has muffled most of the Thai press, and has gotten relatively little criticism from Asian countries like Japan, Indonesia, and India. I expect to see activists detained for longer periods of time, and treated much more roughly under army detention than they have been so far. I also expect Thaksin sympathizers to be purged from the civil service and the armed forces, and many leading pro-Thaksin politicians to be charged with offenses and actually sent to jail, a rarity in the past for Thai elites of any political persuasion. Given these grim possibilities, how should the United States respond? Thailand is of course a treaty ally and a longtime partner of the United States, as Thai diplomats are fond of reminding Americans. What’s more, despite the junta’s tough talk about the United States-Thailand relationship and Bangkok’s cozying up to China in recent months as a supposed counterweight to American influence in the kingdom,  the Thai military, and Thai elites in general, very much still need American and European weaponry, training, and diplomatic ties. In addition, Thailand’s economy is so dependent on tourism and exports that it is, more than many other countries, naturally forced to be somewhat responsive to American, European, and Japanese policy toward the kingdom. It will be a long time before Chinese investment could replace Western and Japanese investment in terms of its overall impact on the Thai economy. Pavin Chachavalpongpun  had an excellent op-ed on why Thailand still needs Western investment and acceptance, and why this situation gives Western democracies continuing influence over the kingdom. Both the United States and the European Union have taken some measures in response to the coup, including suspending some military aid and, in the case of the European Union, halting progress on a planned free trade agreement with Thailand. But both Washington and Brussels continue to operate as if this coup were similar to previous Thai coups, just a bump in relations that will soon be overcome. Many American officials have quietly pressed for resuming Cobra Gold joint exercises with Thailand next year, for example, arguing that Thailand is a critical partner on everything from counterterrorism cooperation to narcotics interdiction to dealing with troublesome neighbors like Myanmar and Cambodia. But this assumption, of a quick return to robust ties, is based on flawed thinking. Thailand will continue to remain highly unstable under prolonged junta rule, since the military cannot maintain power indefinitely. The large numbers of Thais who have repeatedly voted for pro-Thaksin parties will not be silenced forever.  Instead of simply preparing to return to normal, the United States should be making plans to move operations in Thailand to other partners in the region and, overall, to become much less dependent on the kingdom, while reminding contacts in the Thai government and military that, if the kingdom returns to real democracy, the robust U.S.-Thai partnership of the past would resume in earnest. Such moves could include shifting more of the FBI and narcotics interdiction programs in Thailand to Singapore, and moving Cobra Gold, for an extended period of time, to Singapore or the Philippines. The shifts also could include moving some aspects of the International Law Enforcement Academy in Bangkok to Singapore and other countries in the region, and eventually, if necessary, moving ILEA in its entirety. Along with moving ILEA, the United States government could shift some of the military officer training programs it runs in Thailand for soldiers from other Asian countries to Singapore, Malaysia, Australia, or other countries.

To the surprise of few Thai observers, in August Thailand’s legislative assembly, packed with military men and military allies, chose coup leader Prayuth Chan-ocha to be the prime minister, until elections supposedly to be called late next year or early in 2016. Prayuth thus became the first Thai coup leader in decades to take the job as prime minister in Thailand, rather than finding a fig leaf civilian as interim prime minister, solidifying the notion that this was indeed a “hard” coup more similar to the draconian authoritarian rule in Thailand in the 1950s and 1960s than the “soft” coup that took place in 2006. The military, Bangkok elites, and the royal family supposedly learned from the 2006 “soft” coup that only a “hard” coup could really wipe out Thaksin Shinawatra’s organization in Thailand and entrench elite rule for at least another generation. The 2006 coup was followed by a new constitution and then elections that resulted in a pro-Thaksin Shinawatra party winning power again,  thus defeating–in the minds of Bangkok elites–the very purpose of the coup. Given that this is a “hard” coup and that the dour and fierce Prayuth himself is now prime minister, what should we expect to see under the next year, or year and a half, of Prayuth’s rule? Of course, that assumes that Prayuth will only rule for a year or so–some Thais already are comparing Prayuth to military leaders of the 1950s and 1960s, who ruled for years if not decades. Purges within the army The coup leaders have detained activists, politicians, academics, journalists, and other potentially outspoken and or pro-Thaksin, or simply pro-democracy, voices. They have not yet launched purges within the armed forces, probably because Prayuth has wanted to be careful to maintain support, and he knows that many mid-level officers and regular soldiers are sympathetic to Thaksinite parties and ideas. Still, during the next year or two expect to see Prayuth and his allies combing the ranks of mid-level and higher officers for men perceived to be sympathetic to Thaksin. Officers from the pro-Queen’s Guard faction will be moved up in the ranks. Similar purges already are occurring in other parts of government. Already, the boards of state enterprises are being purged of Thaksin sympathizers, replaced with staunch royalists and Prayuth allies. A verdict against former prime minister Yingluck Shinawatra, leaving her with a choice of either jail or exile In the past, one of the long-held truths of Thai politics was that, while peons fought out battles in the streets, and sometimes were arrested and jailed, Thai elites never were tried and jailed, even when they actually led violent street protests or contributed directly to violence. In addition, Thai politicians could be charged with offenses, but rarely actually served any jail time even if they were found guilty. This truth no longer seems to hold. Although Yingluck has not gone into exile yet, and she may believe that the military will not actually oversee a trial in which she gets jail time, she will ultimately be faced with this possibility.  Of course, royalists and members of the Democrat Party who led the street protests that helped oust Yingluck and, in some cases, contributed to violence, will not face jail time. Re-arrests and much harsher treatment of junta critics, activists, and other outspoken Thais So far, the coup leaders have been relatively careful to keep detentions short and treatment of political detainees – who, of course, should not be detained at all simply for speaking out – mild enough that the military can maintain a fiction that the detainees are just being spoken with, and can deny any reports of rough treatment. This deniability has helped keep the junta in good graces with most of its Southeast Asian neighbors, who are always wary to criticize anyway, and with Japan, the most important investor in Thailand by far. But Thai society is not as placid and subservient as it was in the 1950s and 1960s, and eventually many activists, red shirt leaders, academics, and other voices – some of whom supposedly were freed from their original detentions after promising not to be involved in politics – will speak out again. This time, with relations with Asian countries shored up, the economy back on track (somewhat) and Thaksin’s political machine quieter, the junta likely will detain people again and keep them in jail for much longer periods of time. In my next post, I will examine whether, during Prayuth’s time as prime minister, the United States and other leading democracies will be able to influence Thailand’s future direction.

As if Thailand’s international image hadn’t suffered enough, with a coup government trying to turn the clock back forty years, the country’s seafood industry being exposed as one of the worst examples of human trafficking and outright slavery in the world, and even neighboring Myanmar’s politics looking good by comparison, Human Rights Watch today released a lengthy report on the detention of migrant children in Thailand. The report is available here. HRW’s report offers damning evidence and suggests even more reasons why it was correct for the United States government to drop Thailand into Tier 3, the worst offenders, in its annual report on trafficking in persons. It shows that the Thai government detains thousands of migrant children in horrible immigration detention facilities, which endanger the children’s health and social welfare. Often, the children have limited or no access to judicial reviews of their cases, and could be in these Thai detention centers indefinitely. The newest large influx of migrant children has come along with Rohingya fleeing the violence in western Myanmar over the past three years. Even by Thailand’s horrendously low standards of treatment of migrants from other countries, the treatment of the Rohingya has set a new low, with the Thai navy allegedly pushing Rohingya refugee boats back to sea or simply murdering Rohingya at sea, while also trapping some Rohingya into slavery in cahoots with human traffickers. Now, HRW reveals that Rohingya migrant children are, perhaps unsurprisingly, being abused in Thailand as well.

Ashlyn Anderson, Lauren Dickey, Darcie Draudt, Andrew Hill, Will Piekos, and Sharone Tobias look at the top stories in Asia today. 1. Thai junta leader Prayuth Chan-ocha appointed prime minister. In a 191-0 vote on Thursday, Thailand’s rubber-stamp legislature named as prime minister the general who in May led the military coup of Thailand’s elected government. General Prayuth awaits an expected endorsement from King Bhumibol Adulyadej. Some have described Thailand’s new system as one of “soft dictatorship,” where the military guides the democracy. The increase of military power in Thailand is one example of recent regression from the previously growing democracies in Southeast Asia. 2. Indonesian court affirms Joko Widodo’s victory. After a month of uncertainty, Indonesia’s constitutional court rejected a legal challenge to president-elect Joko Widodo’s victory, clearing the final hurdle for him to take office in October. Claims by Prabowo Subianto, who lost the presidential election in July, that the election was marred by “massive, structured and systematic fraud” were discarded due to a lack of evidence. The court did acknowledge claims of voting irregularities in remote provinces, but firmly upheld that a revote would still not overturn the election results. As police clashed with protesters in the hours leading up to the court’s decision, concerns that the transfer of power will be anything but calm linger. 3. Sri Lanka refuses to cooperate with the United Nations war crimes investigation. Sri Lankan president Mahinda Rajapaksa announced that United Nations investigators will be denied entry into Sri Lanka to probe alleged war crimes committed during the last stages of the civil war by Sri Lankan authorities and the Tamil rebel group, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. As many as forty-thousand Tamil civilians are believed to have been killed in the final stage of the twenty-six-year civil war, many in no-fire zones agreed upon with the UN. The UN investigative team still plans to move forward, relying on Skype interviews and satellite imagery to carry out the investigation. The team is expected to present its findings to the UN Human Rights Council in March 2015. 4. China levies record fine on Japanese auto parts maker under anti-monopoly law. China’s anti-monopoly regulator, the National Reform and Development Commission (NRDC), fined twelve Japanese companies 1.24 billion yuan (US$202 million), the largest fine ever levied under the 2008 anti-trust law. The NRDC’s investigation revealed that the companies had colluded to reduce competition and establish favorable pricing. Earlier in the week, German carmaker Mercedes-Benz was found guilty of manipulating the price of spare parts; the likely penalty was not publicized. China’s regulators have been increasing pressure on foreign multinationals in the past couple years, most likely to reduce competition for domestic companies. 5. Landslides in Japan kill thirty-nine. At least thirty-nine people, including two children and one first responder, have been confirmed dead after severe rains triggered over thirty landslides in Hiroshima early Wednesday morning. Fifty-one were still missing as of Thursday, as evacuation orders went out to 106,000 residents in twenty-five locations in Hiroshima. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has sent over 600 self-defense force personnel to the area, which experienced a record 8.5 inches of rainfall in just three hours. A similar disaster in June 1999 killed twenty people in the same area and prompted legislation to require prefectural governments take more precautions against potential landslides. Bonus: Taiwanese restaurant under fire for naming “Nazi” pasta dish. Taiwan, home to airplane and toilet-themed restaurants, encountered a scandal after a Taipei restaurant named a dish “Long Live the Nazis.” The dish was meant to evoke German themes because it contains sausage as the primary ingredient, said the manager, and “it never occurred to us that the word Nazi would stir up such controversy.” Both the Israeli and German representatives to Taiwan expressed regret at the choice. The restaurant has apologized and changed the dish’s name to the (still head-scratching) “Long Live Purity.”

Ashlyn Anderson, Lauren Dickey, Darcie Draudt, Andrew Hill, Will Piekos, and Sharone Tobias look at the top stories in Asia today. 1. Meat scandal erupts in China. Shanghai Husi Food Co., a Chinese food supplier owned by the Illinois-based global food processor OSI Group Inc., has been shown to have repackaged old meat and changed expiration dates before shipping it to retailers. Some of the world’s best-known chain restaurants, including McDonald’s, KFC, Pizza Hut, and Starbucks, were sold the rotten meat and have been forced to alter their supply chains or cancel the sale of some products entirely. The Shanghai police have detained five employees of Shanghai Husi, and the head of the OSI Group has accepted “responsibility for these missteps.” 2. Jokowi declared winner of Indonesian election, but rival rejects results. In the weeks after the July 9 Indonesian presidential election, conflicting “quick counts” led to dueling declarations of victory by candidates Joko Widodo, known as Jokowi, and his opponent Prabowo Subianto. Although most quick counts projected Jokowi as the winner, Prabowo remained insistent that he was leading, citing four pollsters favorable to him. After the tabulation of around 136 million votes by the General Elections Commission, on Tuesday night, Jokowi was officially announced as the winner of the election, taking 53 percent of the vote. Prabowo, claiming the election was illegitimate, will appeal the results to the Constitutional Court, but it is doubtful that the court will rule in his favor as the election is generally regarded as free and fair. 3. Taiwanese plane crashes during emergency landing. More than forty people were killed when a TransAsia Airways passenger plane tried to land in the Taiwanese Penghu Islands amid rain and lightning. Twelve injured passengers were rushed to the emergency room but the rest are feared to be dead. The cause of the crash is still under investigation, but inclement weather and technical failures are likely contributing factors. The Taiwan-based airline has been involved in a number of incidents since 2002, when a cargo plane crashed into the sea. This incident is one of three aviation tragedies that have shocked the world in the last week. 4. Japan to join U.S.-India military exercises. Naval vessels from the United States, India, and Japan began the annual Malabar Exercise in the northern Pacific on Thursday. This marks the third time that New Delhi has invited Tokyo to participate in what is normally an annual bilateral exercise between India and the United States. The exercises have brought the ire of China, whose own naval presence has become increasingly assertive in the region, but all Malabar participants maintain that the exercises are not aimed at containing or countering Beijing. Both India and Japan are also currently participating in the U.S.-hosted Rim of the Pacific, or RIMPAC, naval exercise off the coast of Hawaii, where, for the first time, China is also participating. 5. Thai junta adopts interim constitution. Thailand’s junta won approval from King Bhumibol Adulyadej for a provisional constitution that will pave the way for a new legislature and interim government. Under the constitution, the junta has the authority to handpick 220 legislative members, who will then appoint a prime minster and thirty-five cabinet members. In addition to exonerating the junta for its actions since the May 22 coup, the constitution calls for the formation of a reform committee tasked with approving a permanent constitution before elections can be held. While the document is a first step toward restoring electoral democracy in Thailand, the junta will continue to hold substantial power even after the cabinet and legislature take office in September. Bonus: Inflatable animals in China gone wild. A giant inflatable toad unveiled in Beijing has been purged from the Chinese internet after Chinese bloggers photoshopped eyeglasses on the toad, comparing the creature to former Chinese president Jiang Zemin. Elsewhere in China, a hunt has begun for the toad’s counterpart—Dutch artist Florentijin Hofman’s giant rubber duck—after floodwaters sent the duck floating away on the Nanming river in Guizhou.

The past week has been so busy with events, both tragic and hopeful, related to Southeast Asia, that I barely have time to keep up with the news.  A few short thoughts: 1. Is Prabowo Going to Concede? No way. Prabowo Subianto is now tacitly hinting in interviews that, on July 22, he might be declared the loser of Indonesia’s presidential election, and he is now using interviews to argue that, whatever the result announced on July 22, it is likely a fraud. This is a shift from his earlier position stating simply that he was going to win. On July 22 he will expand on his fraud argument and file a case to the Constitutional Court. Jokowi – and Indonesia – better be prepared for a long and drawn-out legal contest. 2. Should Malaysia Airlines Have Used a Different Route for MH17? Obviously, most of the news about MH17 has focused, naturally, on who brought down the plane, who was behind the missile strike, the grief of relatives of the dead, and the long-term implications for great power politics in Eurasia. There has been a kind of truce in Malaysian politics, as everyone in Malaysia is stunned by the tragedy; this kind of truce did not happen with the previous disaster, the disappearance of MH370 – opposition politicians and many commentators (including myself) blasted the Malaysian government for their inept handling of MH370. I think that this truce in Malaysian politics is likely to break down next week, as relatives of the dead from MH17, already angry at what they perceive as government stonewalling about information (though I think that the Malaysian government has done nothing wrong this time around), ask more forcefully why Malaysia Airlines was still flying through airspace above war-torn eastern Ukraine. True, some other Asian carriers also had continued flying through this airspace, probably because it was the cheapest way to get from Europe to Southeast Asia, but other regional carriers, like Qantas and Cathay Pacific, had been avoiding eastern Ukraine’s airspace for months now. Expect family members to put more pressure on the Najib government this week to more fully explain why MH17 was still flying the route. 3. Does China’s Moving a Rig out of Disputed South China Sea Waters Matter? Last week, China moved the China National Petroleum Corporation rig in waters disputed with Vietnam to an area of the South China Sea closer to China. The decision defused, to some extent, the growing tension in the South China Sea between China and Vietnam, which had sparked riots in Vietnam and clashes on the waters. The move was touted by some Southeast Asian analysts as a sign that China is adopting a more moderate approach to South China Sea disputes. Some speculated that Beijing might even be willing to finally agree to a formal code of conduct on the sea or to address Southeast Asian countries’ concerns through international arbitration. (The Philippines has taken its sea dispute with China to international arbitration, but China thus far has essentially refused to respond to the arbitration.) I really doubt that China is going to modify its South China Sea stance in any substantial way. Beijing is never going to agree to go to international arbitration, which would set a precedent that could be used by other countries in disputes with China over seas or land borders. And there are no signs that China is going to make any real moves toward a formal code of conduct on the South China Sea either. Instead, the removal simply signals that, for now, Beijing wants to cool tensions with Hanoi, Manila, the United States, and Jakarta, which also was becoming increasingly angry over Beijing’s claims to the South China Sea. Expect no change in Beijing’s position that it claims most of the South China Sea, and expect another rig to be moved into disputed waters in the next six months to a year. 4. Is Yingluck Shinawatra Going to Return to Thailand? Thailand’s junta last week allowed Thai prime minister Yingluck Shinawatra to leave the country to attend a party for her brother Thaksin in France. She took her only child with her. During her absence from Thailand, the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) recommended that Yingluck be indicted for dereliction of duty in relation to the former government’s rice subsidy program. The former prime minister, ousted by the May coup, has vowed to return to Thailand to fight the charges. I’m not so sure that will happen. In Paris, Yingluck’s brother, in exile himself, might counsel her to stay abroad as she is almost sure to be found guilty as long as the junta runs the country.

Over the weekend, Thailand’s junta leader, Prayuth Chan-ocha, announced a firmer roadmap toward civilian rule than the army had previously revealed. Prayuth went on Thai television and announced that a drafting committee will write a new permanent constitution, to replace the 2007 version the army junked in its May coup. The committee will finish drafting by the middle of next year, Prayuth announced, and then by the fall of 2015, Thailand can hold national elections again. In the meantime, Thailand will operate under an interim constitution that the junta draws up. The junta will pick some civilian ministers to help run the country. Although allowing some non-military men and women to help run one of the biggest economies in Asia is at least a small step forward—some Thai businesspeople had feared that Prayuth and the army believed they themselves could run all the ministries, as if it were 1960 again—Prayuth’s timeframe left a lot of questions unanswered. No one is going to ask Prayuth these questions, since criticism of the junta is officially banned in Thailand. But a few questions left unanswered include: Will the Thai public have a chance to vote on the new constitution, in a referendum like the one that was held on the 2007 constitution? Don’t count on it. Prayuth did not mention such a referendum in his televised speech, and the army knows that the majority of rural Thais, unhappy about the coup, likely would vote down the new constitution, which almost surely will be drafted by conservative, royalist, army-backed elites. So the constitution most likely will be drafted and then simply put into place with no public referendum at all, a major step backward for Thai politics. Will the parliament seated sometime in late 2015 (or maybe even later) be made up of elected MPs? Don’t count on that one either. The new constitution will surely allow for a small number of elected MPs, but it will create new ways for the military and Bangkok elites to install non-elected MPs who can dominate parliament. The army may even reserve a percentage of appointed seats in the new parliament to be named by army leaders, Myanmar-style. What will Prayuth do for the next year and a half? Although the junta may put some civilian ministers into place, don’t count on Prayuth relaxing his grip on power. Prayuth will probably make himself prime minister in the interim government, even though the junta says publicly that it will only oversee the interim ministers. Prayuth also may simultaneously extend his term as army chief rather than handing over power in the army to someone else, even if that person is a trusted lieutenant. What will Prayuth do after the next year and a half? Publicly, the junta continues to portray its coup as a necessary action, and Prayuth as a reluctant leader who only stepped in when there were no other options to resolve Thailand’s political stand-off. (Even if this theory were true, it says a lot about the weakness of Thai institutions that the army could defend a coup as necessary and have the theory bought by many Thais and foreigners.) But news stories indicating that Prayuth had collaborated for a long time prior to the coup with Suthep Thaugsuban, who led the protests that helped topple the Yingluck Shinawatra government, suggest Prayuth hardly acted on the spur of the moment in May. Though he does not have a good political ear, and though he hates speaking to the media, Prayuth also clearly believes that he is Thailand’s savior. Giving up that role may not prove so easy, in Prayuth’s mind. It is certainly possible that, even after the constitution is drafted and elections are held, Prayuth may keep himself as the power behind the government, possibly by further extending his term as army chief.

  In the new State Department 2014 Trafficking in Persons report, officially released this morning by Secretary of State John Kerry, the administration pulls no punches. In previous years, some countries that had deserved being downgraded from a Tier 1 country to a Tier 2 country, signifying deteriorating progress in combating trafficking, or from a Tier 2 to a Tier 3 country, the worst possible rating in the report, had been saved from downgrades. Usually, they were saved due to their close strategic ties with the United States and their effective lobbying of this administration and its predecessors. A ranking in Tier 3, according to the report’s definition, means a country “whose government does not fully comply with the minimum standards [in combating trafficking in persons] and are not making significant efforts to do so.” Countries that fall into Tier 3, the report notes, “may be subject to certain restrictions on bilateral assistance, whereby the U.S. government may withhold or withdraw non-humanitarian, non-trade-related foreign assistance.…Governments subject to restrictions would also face U.S. opposition to assistance from international financial institutions.” In the run-up to this year’s report release, the Thai government, as it had in the past, desperately attempted to lobby the United States to keep Thailand from being dropped into Tier 3, which is a particularly tough blow at a time when Thailand has just suffered a military coup and is facing penalties for the coup not only from the United States but also from Europe, Australia, and many other countries. Besides Thailand, other countries downgraded in the new report also had lobbied the administration hard, stressing not only that they were (allegedly) taking action against trafficking but also emphasizing their increasingly warm bilateral ties with the United States. Qatar, an important American partner which received a ranking slightly above that of Thailand, had pushed to be given a higher rating. This time, to its credit, the White House was not swayed. For example, Thailand surely deserves to be placed among the Tier 3 nations, and should have been downgraded to Tier 3 years ago. In just the past year, the Thai navy has been implicated in the trafficking and outright murder of refugees fleeing Myanmar, Thailand’s seafood industry has been the subject of damning reports from nonprofit organizations and journalists revealing outright slavery in the industry, and in just the past two weeks over 100,000 Cambodian migrant workers in Thailand, many of whom worked under slave-like conditions, have fled the country in panic, fearing that the junta is going to arbitrarily detain and abuse them. The Thai governments–both the elected government that was in place until May 2014, and the new junta government–have taken only woefully inadequate measures to reduce Thailand’s status as one of the biggest centers of trafficking in the world. The State Department got it right in this report.

Ashlyn Anderson, Lauren Dickey, Darcie Draudt, Charles McClean, Will Piekos, and Sharone Tobias look at the top stories in Asia today. 1. China sends more oil rigs to already-tense South China Sea. Two rigs are now stationed between China and the Taiwan-occupied Pratas Islands, and one has been given coordinates to be towed just outside Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone. Vietnamese President Truong Tan Sang asked China to remove the rigs that are in disputed waters. China has been increasingly assertive in its claims to the Paracel and Spratly Islands, all of which are off Vietnam’s coast, and is reportedly moving sand onto reefs and shoals to support buildings and surveillance equipment. In Hanoi, Chinese and Vietnamese officials met on Wednesday for the first time to discuss the disputed waters, without much progress. The talks come on the heels of deadly protests in Vietnam against Chinese companies in May. 2. Japan protests Korean live-fire drills near disputed islands. On Friday, South Korea held a live-fire naval exercise thirteen miles south of the islands known as Takeshima in Japan and Dokdo in Korea. Korea has maintained administrative control of the islands since 1954, but Japan also claims sovereignty over the islands.Japanese chief cabinet secretary Yoshihide Suga “strongly demanded that the South Korean government stop its plans,” and called the decision to go ahead with the drill “extremely regrettable.” In response, a South Korean defense ministry spokesman said that “when it comes to conducting a military drill for the self-defense of the Republic of Korea, any outside demand or interference is not a subject for consideration.” The South Korean navy went on to say that the drills were not meant to be aimed at Japan, but rather to practice targeting North Korean submarines. 3. Tens of thousands of Cambodian migrant workers flee Thailand. A month after the Thai army seized control of the country, rumors of a crackdown on undocumented workers have sent at least 200,000 Cambodians in eastern Thailand fleeing over the course of just twelve days. Many of the workers are leaving voluntarily, but the police have reportedly also forced many on buses and charged a 3,000 baht ($92) fine. The Thai government denied any new policy, saying, “No crackdown order targeting Cambodian workers has been issued.” According to the International Organization for Migration, most of the 2.2 million migrant workers in Thailand are from Myanmar and approximately 438,000 are from Cambodia. Thailand has a very low unemployment rate at 0.9 percent and could face a labor shortage if more workers flee. 4. Modi faces his first foreign policy test. Forty Indian expatriates were abducted in Iraq when the Islamic militants from the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) seized Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city. A spokesman for the Indian Ministry of External Affairs announced today that the forty kidnapped workers had been found, but did not provide further details. In addition, forty-seven Indian nurses are stranded at a hospital in Tikrit, abandoned by their employers when ISIS stormed the city. The Ministry of External Affairs issued a travel advisory and set up a twenty-four-hour call line for families with missing relatives in Iraq. With over ten thousand expatriates working in Iraq, ISIS’ victories are chilling news for India. 5. China executes thirteen in Xinjiang. Thirteen people were executed in the restive province of Xinjiang, convicted of “organizing, leading and participating in terrorist groups; murder; arson; theft; and illegal manufacture, storage and transportation of explosives.” It was also announced that more than sixty terrorist and extremist suspects had been captured in the past month. The executions and arrests are part of the Chinese government’s intensifying response to a series of deadly attacks blamed on Uighur separatists in Xinjiang and other places in China, including Beijing’s Tiananmen Square and a train station in Kunming. Bonus: China says “House of Cards” is an accurate illustration of corruption, calls the United States “the Matrix.” On Tuesday, China’s Discipline Inspection Commission published an article linking the abuse of power seen on television to reality. The author said that corruption in shows like “House of Cards” and “American Gangster,” is real and widespread in Western societies like the United States. Some netizens criticized the article, saying that corruption in the West is only seen on television, while most Chinese “feel corruption in real time every day of [their] lives.” The pop culture references continued when, in unrelated news, a spokesperson from the Chinese foreign ministry called the United States "the Matrix," in response to U.S. Department of Justice indictment of five alleged Chinese hackers and in reference to the NSA’s Internet surveillance programs.

As an excellent piece in the Associated Press notes this week, Thailand’s junta appears to be entrenching itself for the long haul. Junta leader Prayuth Chan-ocha has named himself to Thailand’s Board of Investment. The junta is putting other cronies at the heads of major state-controlled companies, Prayuth has left the timetable for a total return to civilian rule purposefully vague, and the coup leaders also have refused to say exactly what that civil government will look like, or what Thailand’s next constitution will look like either. (The generals essentially ripped up the previous constitution after launching the coup in May.) However, you can bet that the “democracy” Thais inherit some time after the junta steps down is going to bear little resemblance to the political system in Thailand of the past fifteen years–or to internationally accepted norms of what constitutes democracy. Having learned from Thailand’s 2006 coup, when the army failed to totally undermine the power of rural voters, the junta likely will push through new legislation that will never allow Thailand’s numerical majority to prevail over other power centers again. Instead, expect the post-coup “democratic” government to look like this: 1.  Appointed members of parliament or those selected from Hong Kong-style “functional constituencies” will have immense power in the next civilian government. The People’s Democratic Reform Committee protestors, who paralyzed Bangkok for months in late 2013 and early 2014 and helped trigger the coup, often pushed for such a scheme. A scheme in which appointed members of parliament constitute a large percentage of the chambers would dilute the rural majority’s power and keep Bangkok effectively in control of the legislature, which is especially important during a monarchical succession. (This idea of non-elected MPs has a long history, and dates back to previous elite protests in Thailand in the late 2000s.) The army leaders have said that they want to cool political temperatures and do not favor any side of Thailand’s poisonous color-coded politics, but that vow of neutrality already has been proven completely false. Expect the military to push through an appointed/functional constituencies scheme in which at least half of parliament’s upper and lower house (the Senate previously had non-elected members) is selected this way. 2.  Prominent members of Thaksinite parties will be banned from politics for life, unless they have already turned tail and totally given into the junta, like former Thaksin ally and former Minister of Agriculture Sudarat Keyuraphan. Since Thaksin first won the prime ministership in 2001, the judiciary, the palace, and the military have used five-year bans to keep pro-Thaksin politicians out of office, but the elites underestimated the staying power of Thaksin and of rural voters. Indeed, many politicians who were banned, like former minister Chaturon Chaiseng, were able to come back after five years and again lead Thaksinite parties and serve in ministerial positions. Expect the army and its selected constitution drafters (all of whom will be appointed and not elected) to find a way to keep the most important pro-Thaksin politicians out of politics for the rest of their lives. It used to be said that, in Thailand, everyone in politics always gets a chance to come back, no matter what they have done in the past…but that was then, and this is a different time in the kingdom. 3.  The judiciary and other institutions will be made even stronger. Since 2006, the judiciary and other bureaucratic institutions have been key weapons in the Bangkok elites and middle classes’ battle to maintain control of politics, but at times Thaksinite parties have managed to put some of their own allies in key judicial and bureaucratic posts. No more. The junta will leave a constitution and legislation that both makes the judiciary and other institutions stronger and insulates these institutions from any control at all by an elected prime minister. 4. The army’s constitution drafters will figure out a way to provide an amnesty for the 2014 coup-makers who, after all, broke the law by seizing power. Amnesty for the coup-makers? That’s one Thai tradition that isn’t going out of style.