Thailand

Today is Earth Day, an appropriate moment to remember Africa’s HeroRats. On April 19, the New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof called attention to these creatures and their ability to sniff-out land mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) as well as their ability to screen sputum samples for tuberculosis. To date these animals have detected over 48,000 land mines and UXO’s, and screened over 290,000 samples for tuberculosis. APOPO, a Belgian non-governmental organization (NGO) with an international staff, trains these HeroRats in Tanzania. Originally starting with mine and UXO detection APOPO has more recently begun using these HeroRats to detect tuberculosis. According to APOPO’s web site, it deploys mine detecting rats in Mozambique, Thailand, Cambodia, and Angola. They have also worked to clear UXO’s in Laos and Vietnam. For tuberculosis screening, APOPO deploys the rats in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Maputo, Mozambique. The rats are able to clear mine fields and screen sputum for tuberculosis faster and more efficiently than other methods. For example, while a human can screen twenty-five samples of sputum for tuberculosis in a day, HeroRats are able to screen one hundred samples in twenty minutes. In clinics using HeroRats the number of patients identified with tuberculosis has risen by 48 percent. Along with being efficient, HeroRats are an inexpensive answer to the problems they seek to solve. APOPO estimates that in order to fully train one rat the cost is approximately $6,400, far cheaper than the alternatives. A theme of Kristoff’s column is that HeroRats are an example of innovative non-profit approaches. HeroRats are Gambian pouched rats. They can be up to three feet long and weigh perhaps forty ounces, too light to set off a mine. Their sense of smell is very strong, compensating for weak eyes. Their life span is about eight years, and they are retired after six. They eat fruits and nuts. Kristof reports that they become close to their handlers. Despite their name, they are rats, not marsupials. HeroRats are an unabashed good-news story. A NGO has identified how a creature can be used to tackle two different horrors, unexploded munitions and tuberculosis. Kristoff writes that his children “gave” him a HeroRat as a Father’s Day present a few years ago. The cost to adopt a rat is $84 per year, most of which goes toward the year-long training that APOPO provides the rats. If you are interested in adopting your own HeroRat, you can visit apopo.org.

Thailand’s ruling junta now has replaced martial law, which had been in force since the coup in May 2014, with legislation under Article 44 of the interim constitution. This shift has been heavily criticized by human rights organizations, many foreign countries, and some Thai media outlets. Human Rights Watch has called the shift to operating under Article 44 an attempt to give Prayuth “unlimited powers without safeguards against human rights violations.” The New York Times, in an editorial released April 10, called the shift “trickery and false promises”---“a cynical sleight of hand” that has only given “even more draconian powers for the ruling military junta led by Gen. Prayuth Chan-ocha.” In response, Thailand’s new ambassador to the United States, in a letter to the New York Times, claimed that the Times editorial had it all wrong---that under Article 44, the junta operates under measures “limited in scope [and] governed by due process” and that, “since May 2014, Thailand’s leaders have lifted the country out of political paralysis and violence.” Yet despite the new Thai ambassador’s charm offensive in America, the Thai government also appears to be realizing that it is unlikely to change many democracies’ opinion of it, as long as unelected leaders remain in power in Bangkok. At first, in the months following the May 2014 coup, Thai diplomats, and the junta leaders themselves, aggressively tried to shape global opinion of the putsch. This outreach was followed by a period, earlier this year, of angry backlash against even the most muted foreign criticism. When Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Russel made a speech in Bangkok in January at Chulalongkorn University, he noted that “our [the United States’] relationship with Thailand has been challenged by the military coup that removed a democratically-elected government eight months ago.” He also urged Thailand to end martial law and visited former prime minister Yingluck Shinawatra and other politicians, from both major political parties, who had been sidelined by the coup. The Thai government reacted furiously, summoning the charge d’affaires from the U.S. embassy in Bangkok (who was the top American diplomat in Thailand at the time, since the ambassador post was vacant) and expressing extreme disappointment with Russel’s comments. Now, Bangkok appears, for the most part, to be recognizing that its relations with democracies will remain strained---the United States recently put off planning for next year’s Cobra Gold exercises, for example. While Prayuth has been promoting closer strategic and economic ties with China almost since the day after the coup, the Thai government also recently has begun aggressively courting other governments that have been uncritical of the junta. When Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev visited Bangkok in early April, Bangkok and Moscow inked deals to increase Russian direct investment in Thailand, and vice versa; the two sides hope to double bilateral trade within two years. The two sides also agreed to facilitate greater Russian investment in Thailand’s energy sector. (Medvedev, of course, offered no criticism of Prayuth’s human rights record, and Prayuth called Russia a “friend” for standing by Thailand after the coup.) Meanwhile, Prayuth’s government also has been trying to foster closer strategic ties with India, which despite its own vibrant democracy tends to be uncritical of the rights records of other nations in its neighborhood. This outreach to Russia, China, and other powers who express no interest in critiquing Thailand’s rights record is a savvy move by the junta. It could put pressure on the European Union, the United States, Australia, and, most importantly, Japan to warm up strategic ties with Thailand again. But Thailand’s economy will remain in serious trouble. As long as Thailand’s politics remain unstable, all the deals signed with Moscow or Beijing are not going to lure more investment from the biggest foreign players in Thailand---Japan, most notably.

This past week, Thai prime minister---and junta leader---General Prayuth Chan-ocha ended martial law, which had been in place since the May 2014 coup, and replaced it by invoking an article of the interim constitution that gives him nearly-absolute powers. This shift did not necessarily mean Thailand is moving any closer to a return to democracy. General Prayuth also has repeatedly noted that Thailand eventually will return to democracy, but that whatever democracy emerges will be what he and many Thai elites call a “Thai-style democracy” or a democracy with Thai characteristics. What exactly they mean is unclear. To some elites, such a Thai-style democracy may mean little more than a system in which there are multiple institutions that represent elite interests and that can overrule or undermine representatives elected by a popular vote. Such a system would not fit any standard definition of an electoral democracy. But other Thai elites, including even some military elites, may have in mind a system that contains free elections, and rule by elected leaders, but that also reflects Thai traditions, culture, and history. After all, Germany’s highly federal democratic system reflects Germany’s history; Indonesia’s and Spain’s decentralized political systems reflect those countries’ wide range of ethnicities and cultures; and, many other democracies have political systems that are designed in some way to reflect their unique peoples and cultures. In a recent podcast with Asia News Weekly, I discussed the idea of Thai democracy, and whether Thailand could craft a political system that was both democratic and reflected Thai traditions. You can hear the podcast here.

Ashlyn Anderson, Lauren Dickey, Darcie Draudt, William Piekos, and Ariella Rotenberg look at the top stories in Asia today. 1. Thailand lifts martial law and puts in place a “new security order.” Thailand’s King Bhumibol Adulyadej approved a request from the country’s junta to lift martial law on Wednesday and trade it for a so-called new security order. Most experts agree this choice was a cosmetic one, not substantive, that was an attempt to improve the appearance of Thailand to the outside world while maintaining absolute power for the junta. In the place of martial law, the new security order invokes Article Forty-Four of the military-imposed interim constitution, which grants General Prayuth Chan-ocha, head of the junta, expansive powers in over the Thai government. Human Rights Watch described the change as an indication of “Thailand’s deepening descent into dictatorship.” The article effectively grants General Prayuth the power of all three branches of government: executive, legislative, and judicial. 2. South Korea issues settlement to Sewol Ferry students’ families. The South Korean government on Wednesday announced it would pay about US$380,000 to each family of students who died when the local tour ferry Sewol capsized nearly a year ago, on April 16, 2014. The official death toll was 295. In November, the Sewol’s captain was sentenced to thirty-six years in prison for gross negligence, after a judge acquitted him for homicide (for which prosecutors sought the death penalty). Victims’ relatives have sought an independent inquiry into the cause of and response to the sinking; several of them have shaved their heads in protest (a symbolic act common in protests in Korea) over the decision to forgo investigation for the monetary compensation. The incident has called into question not only national safety standards and practices, but also the government’s ability and choices made during the rescue operations. Civil society groups continue to lead protests throughout the country, including in Seoul’s central Gwanghwamun Square near the president’s house. 3. Cyberattack targets anti-censorship forum. Github, a coding site that also hosts tools to bypass China’s Great Firewall, experienced a large distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack that started last Thursday. DDoS attacks flood a site with traffic in an attempt to take it offline. A number of security researchers have alleged that international web traffic to sites that use analytics tools from Baidu, China’s largest search engine, was hijacked and redirected toward Github’s site; some analysts have suggested that the Chinese government was behind the attack. A Baidu spokesman said the firm found no security breaches and was working find the source of the issue; meanwhile, a spokeswoman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry stated that “it is quite odd” that whenever a website is attacked elsewhere in the world, Chinese hackers are to blame. Github provides access within China to a mirror of GreatFire.org, a website that monitors blocked websites and keywords, and the Chinese-language version of the New York Times, both of which are censored in China. 4. Vietnamese factory workers on strike over new pension law. Thousands of workers occupied the factory compound of Taiwanese-owned Pou Yuen, a supplier for Nike and Adidas, in Ho Chi Minh City this week. New pension rules slated to come into effect next year will stop many workers from being eligible for lump-sum social insurance payments when they leave a company, delaying payouts until retirement. The strikes—a rare challenge in a country where large, unsanctioned gatherings are prohibited—ended peacefully after the Vietnamese government agreed to amend the law, allowing laborers to choose when they receive retirement payouts. 5. Deadline to join AIIB passes, with forty-six founding members, including some surprises. Beijing had set March 31 as the deadline to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) as a founding member; committed countries include Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, India, Indonesia, and Malaysia. Norway also applied to join, considered a surprise since in 2010 it awarded a Nobel Peace prize to a dissident Chinese writer, causing a rift in Sino-Norwegian relations. Taiwan’s announcement that it would seek to join also comes as a surprise; Beijing responded it would include Taiwan should they join “under an appropriate name.” Protests over the prospect of submitting to the name change have ignited protests in Taipei. Noticeably absent was regional economic powerhouse and U.S. ally Japan, which—along with the United States—dominates international financial institutions such as the World Bank and Asian Development Bank. Other strong U.S. allies in the region, including Australia and South Korea, have pledged to join. The United States has viewed the AIIB with wariness, raising questions about its transparency and governance. Bonus: Australia triumphs over New Zealand in the cricket World Cup final. In what was considered a one-sided and anticlimactic match, Australia dominated to bring home their fifth World Cup title. New Zealand came into the match on a wave of eight successive wins, but couldn’t pull off a first World Cup victory. Despite their win, the Australian team was met with some disapproving eyes for its poor sportsmanship and how it chose to celebrate the victory.

Over the past month, the Thai press has repeatedly suggested that the junta-installed government will soon remove martial law. Martial law has been in place since the May 2014 coup. (Some provinces in the south had martial law long before 2014.) And indeed, this week the Thai government does appear ready to lift martial law. Coup leader-turned prime minister Prayuth Chan-ocha and his government may be making this move since many foreign governments and rights organizations have specifically criticized martial law, holding it up as a sign of serious restrictions on rights and freedoms. Bangkok may hope that by removing martial law, the government can mend fences with many of the democracies that have criticized Prayuth and the post-coup period. Yet in reality, Prayuth’s government appears ready to merely replace de jure martial law with de facto martial law. In fact, Prayuth potentially will wield even more power than he had before---virtually absolute power, according one of Thailand’s most prominent national human rights commissioners. Although martial law seems about to end, Prayuth will instead invoke article 44 of the interim (junta-created) Thai constitution, a provision that specifically gives the prime minister absolute and unchecked power, according to Thai newspapers. “The article [44] gives the prime minister absolute authority,” National Human Rights Commissioner Niran Pitakwatchara told The Nation.  Indeed, the article could give Prayuth even more control over the bureaucracy and judiciary than he had under martial law---which is saying a lot. Prayuth reportedly has promised to exercise his absolute power under article 44 “in a constructive manner,” though it is unclear what he means by that. Prayuth’s plan to potentially amass more power is worrying given a series of recent tense interactions between the prime minister and reporters, activists, and other critics of the current Thai government. Since the May 2014 coup, political and civil rights have been curtailed significantly in the kingdom, but sectors of Thai civil society, such as some media outlets, have continued to be critical of the government. Last week, seemingly unhappy with reporting about his administration, Prayuth said, “We’ll probably just execute” reporters who do not support the government. The execution comment came after a string of other harsh encounters between the prime minister and the press. These included one in which the prime minister simply left the podium rather than answering questions, one in which Prayuth threw a banana peel at a reporter for asking a tough question, and one in which he threatened to “smack” a reporter with the podium. Saksith Saiyasombut, a renowned Thai blogger, noted that the execution comments may change public perceptions of General Prayuth. Previously, the prime minister’s multiple outbursts at the press and other critics were, as Saksith notes, viewed by some Thais as “amusing one-note anecdotes about somebody’s [Prayuth’s] public anger issues”---especially since Prayuth often seemed to be speaking off-the-cuff and smiling while saying harsh things. (The prime minister did not smile while making his execution comment, though much of the Thai press reported his comment as if he were joking, which he may have been.) Instead, Saksith writes, perhaps Thai civil society should take Prayuth’s threats more literally---“as [those] of somebody who knows no other way to exert power than by abusive force---and more worryingly, is in a situation and position powerful enough to actually do it.” Saksith may be correct. However, while some Thai media outlets remain critical of the government, and while Prayuth has not (yet) carried out his severest threats, there is no doubt that the military remains firmly in charge. As a result, fewer and fewer Thais may be willing to express fear of the prime minister. Removing martial law and replacing it with a situation in which Prayuth claims absolute rule will only further entrench the prime minister’s power, and potentially make it harder to move back toward democracy.

For nearly fifteen years in the 2000s and early 2010s, Thailand’s economy, once one of the fastest-growing in the world, survived the effects of near-constant political turmoil, natural disasters, and worries about the country’s future in the wake of a looming royal succession. Even after the massive floods in the monsoon season of 2011 that destroyed much of the industrial estates north of Bangkok, home to auto parts, disk drive, and other key manufacturing plants, Thailand’s economy rebounded strongly. Even after street protests in Bangkok in May 2010 led to a brutal military crackdown in which much of the downtown wound up looking like a war zone, several major commercial buildings were torched, and at least 90 people were killed, Thailand’s economy rebounded. Tourists continued to come to the kingdom---more than 22 million in 2012, the year after the flooding---and in 2012 Thailand’s GDP grew by over six percent. Many observers of the kingdom believed that, after the May 2014 coup, the Teflon economy would display its usual resilience. In fact, a large majority of the CEOs of the largest Thai businesses in Bangkok allegedly supported the military putsch, publicly or privately, according to multiple businesspeople and journalists who have spoken with top Thai CEOs. In part, they may have supported the coup because they believed that, at its heart, the Puea Thai Party and its leaders either were republicans or could not be trusted to be in power at a time of royal succession. (There is little evidence that Puea Thai leaders actually have republican sentiments.) But business leaders also may have supported the coup since they believed the generals could bring a modicum of stability, and since Thailand’s economy had performed strongly in the 1980s during a long period of de facto military/technocratic rule. But the era in which Thailand’s economy could withstand any political turbulence, and would continue to attract tourists and foreign investors, appears to be over. Fifteen years of political chaos has distracted Thai policymakers from making important investments in infrastructure or the country’s education system, which has never been upgraded to prepare people for a middle-income economy. In particular, Thailand’s English classes and information technology classes lag badly behind those of Thailand’s regional competitors. A recent article in Singapore’s Today notes that “Thailand ranks 55th out of 60 countries on the English Proficiency Index, the world’s major ranking of English-language skills. That is the lowest among Southeast Asian countries.” This despite the fact that several other countries in Southeast Asia are far poorer than Thailand and have much less resources than Bangkok to help promote English education. As the Association of Southeast Asian Nations moves toward a single market in goods and services, English skills will be even more important for businesses that want to attract regional investment and for workers in a range of industries looking for opportunities throughout ASEAN. The country’s seemingly endless turmoil also finally seems to have deterred investors, who for years continued to pour money into the kingdom because of its natural attractiveness and history of liberal investment policies. At the same time as Thailand stalls, other countries in the region, like the Philippines, Myanmar, Vietnam, and even Indonesia have promoted policies that have made them more attractive to foreign investment. The Japanese government continues to court Bangkok, even after the coup, as a means of stalling the Thai generals approach to China; Japan’s desire to blunt China’s influence is likely the major reason why Tokyo is proposing its own plan for funding a rail line in Thailand. (The Chinese government has proposed its own, competing rail project in the kingdom.) Yet unlike the Japanese government, private sector Japanese investors are not so bullish on Thailand. Japanese investors, the biggest group of foreign investors in the kingdom, have begun to shift new investments to Vietnam and other countries in the region. Other foreign investors have become increasingly cautious in approving new Thailand projects. A recent Bloomberg analysis of the growth rates of major Southeast Asian economies showed that, since 2010, Thailand’s GDP growth rate has been about half that of neighboring Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. And in 2015, the World Bank projects that Thailand’s growth rate will again be the lowest in the region. Thailand’s central bank last week cut its own forecast for Thailand’s 2015 growth rate. Expect it to cut that forecast further as the year progresses.

In a recent letter to the Washington Post, Thailand’s new ambassador to the United States insisted that despite the May 2014 coup, continued martial law, crackdowns on activists of all types, and an unclear path to election, Thailand remains a democracy. “Thailand has not wavered in its commitment to democracy...progress is being made,” the ambassador insisted. His letter was written in response to a Washington Post editorial entitled “Thailand’s Ineffective Rule by Force,” which argued that the generals are holding hundreds of political prisoners, have mismanaged the Thai economy, have failed to bring stability to the country, and are trying to “permanently hobble democracy” in Thailand. Although some Thai supporters of the junta will claim that elections are only a subsidiary part of democracy, democracy cannot exist without some type of elections. (Of course, democracy requires much more than just regular elections, but without elections there cannot be democracy.) Yet junta leader Prayuth Chan-ocha, and his powerful number two Prawit Wongsuwan, seem to be coming up with reason after reason why Thailand should not hold elections anytime soon. In the early days after the coup, the junta declared that a new charter would be drafted to reform the political system and that elections would be held in 2015. Then, the government announced that the date for elections would be pushed back to early 2016, a promise the ambassador to the United States reiterated in his letter to the Post. Now, even that goal may not be met. Prayuth, who has become increasingly testy as the Thai media has refused to just accept unquestioningly that whatever he says is correct, has hinted that Thailand must attain political stability before any election can be held. (Prayuth’s relations with the Thai press have deteriorated so much that he reportedly recently said that he wanted to punch a journalist in the face.) According to Khao Sod, when asked by reporters this week about the impact of recent grenade attacks in Bangkok on the prospects for an election, Prayuth responded: "Can you [reporters] solve it? [political turmoil] If you can’t solve it, then no election. No election! If you can’t solve it, then no election! Are you done now?" In recent weeks, Prayuth has made other similarly murky statements about the prospects of an election hinging on stability. Who determines when Thailand has reached this stability remains unclear. Is it Prayuth? The courts? Some group of the same elites who are drafting the new charter and presumably will serve in the unelected upper house of Parliament that will be created by the new charter? Someone else? And what constitutes stability? Thailand is unlikely to become calmer in the next year, since opposition to military rule is likely to find some outlet, including violent outlets such as grenade attacks. Of course, under the charter currently being drafted, even a free and fair election would not necessarily mean elected politicians will be running the country. The new charter will likely weaken the power of political parties, strengthen unelected parts of the government like the Senate and the bureaucracy, and allow for an unelected prime minister to rule the country under certain circumstances. (Even Democrat Party leader Abhisit Vejjajiva, normally a supporter of the military and elite politics, has publicly blasted the draft charter as “snatching democracy” from Thais). Still, an election, even for a weakened lower house of Parliament, would be better for Thai democracy than no election at all. Will an election happen at all?

Ashlyn Anderson, Lauren Dickey, Darcie Draudt, William Piekos, Ariella Rotenberg, and Sharone Tobias look at the top stories in Asia today. 1. Myanmar declares martial law in Kokang. President Thein Sein announced a state of emergency and three months of martial law in the Kokang Self-Administered Zone, on the border with China, after a series of clashes between the Myanmar army and armed Kokang rebels. Under martial law, administrative and judicial power has been granted to the army’s commander in chief; the imposition of martial law is aimed at securing a ceasefire and political dialogue well in advance of general elections later this year. The conflict is a setback for Myanmar’s semi-civilian government, which took power in 2011 after nearly fifty years of military rule. Myanmar is turning to neighboring China for help even as tens of thousands of refugees are fleeing into Yunnan province from Kokang. 2. Japan emerges from recession, though not as strongly as some hoped. Japan’s economy expanded in the last quarter of 2014 after contraction in the two previous quarters, growing at an annualized rate of 2.2 percent. Though a positive sign, this was lower than economists’ expectation of 3.7 percent growth. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s pro-growth policies—known as Abenomics—have had some successes: for example, borrowing costs are being kept low, the stock market is up, and annual exports increased in January the most since late 2013. However, it also is to blame for a sales tax hike last April that precipitated lower consumption and the two quarters of contraction, which required the Bank of Japan to expand monetary stimulus. A second sales tax hike, initially scheduled for October 2015, has been delayed. 3. Modi targets defense industry in his latest drive of the ‘Make in India’ campaign. In an effort to reduce India’s reliance on defense imports, Prime Minister Narendra Modi called on foreign companies to manufacture defense equipment in India. As the world’s top importer of weaponry, Modi said on Wednesday, “this is an area where we do not want to be number one,” in his inauguration at Aero India 2015 in Bangalore. The defense industry announced $8 billion of spending for new warships, and Modi pledged to ease the process of setting up defense manufacturing joint ventures in India. Israel’s defense minister met with Modi on Thursday, welcoming greater defense cooperation; Israel is already one of India’s top arms suppliers. 4. Indonesia to execute two Australians for drug trafficking despite diplomatic pressure from Australia. In another threat to relations between Indonesia and Australia, Indonesian President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo announced that the execution of two Australian national on death row will not be delayed, despite the protestations of Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott. In discussing the case with reporters, Abbott reminded Jokowi of the contributions Australia made in the aftermath of the 2004 tsunami and asked that he repay that generosity by sparing the two Australians. Indonesian authorities arrested Andrew Chan, 31, and Myuran Sukumaran, 33—members of the “Bali Nine” drug trafficking ring—in 2005 as they attempted to smuggle eighteen pounds of heroin out of Indonesia and to Australia; the penalty for drug trafficking is death. Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop has been in contact with Indonesia’s vice president in continued efforts to broker a deal. 5. Former Thai Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra faces charges for botched rice subsidy scheme. Thailand’s attorney general filed charges against the former prime minister for a rice subsidy scheme in which the government bought rice from Thai farmers at above-market rates, costing the government billions of dollars. She faces a jail sentence of up to ten years for criminal negligence and will be banned for politics for five years. Supporters of the charges say that the rice subsidy scheme was a corrupt plan to buy rural votes; skeptics believe the prosecution is just a way to curb the influence of Yingluck and her brother, former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinwatra. The action comes after the military seized power in May 2014, claiming to restore order after months of protests against Yingluck’s government. Yingluck’s brother Thaksin was also ousted by a military coup in 2006; the Shinawatra family is popular among rural voters but disliked by the middle class and elite. The indictment of Yingluck by the military-led government , who was democratically elected, has led to strained ties with the United States. Bonus: Mark Zuckerberg and Prince William tackle the Mandarin language in Chinese New Year greetings. At the start of the year of the sheep—or goat or ram, for some—Facebook’s chief executive officer Mark Zuckerberg and Prince William, the Duke of Cambridge, have both sent new year greetings to Chinese speakers. Zuckerberg seems keen to make China his Facebook friend, mentioning that his office will have a party to ring in the new year; Prince William’s words received an equally warm reception ahead of his bridge-building tour of China next month.

Although much of the negotiations within Thailand’s constitutional drafting committee, hand picked by the Thai military, will go on without public input, the outlines of the next constitution are becoming clearer as the drafting committee has begun to meet. In recent weeks, some aspects of the drafting have been covered – and even occasionally criticized – by the Thai media, and it is clear that, despite being picked by the military, a few drafters have concerns about the opaque drafting process and the possible rollback of democratic institutions in the next constitution. These concerned drafters are likely the ones leaking information to media outlets about some of the most controversial aspects of the probable next constitution, like writing a clause allowing for an unelected prime minister. Their leaks are not going to sway the majority of drafters, who are so staunchly pro-military that they will do anything the army says, but leaks have allowed the public to gain insight into what their next constitution will entail. (Reporters are technically banned from attending committee sessions and reporting on what the committee discusses.) For one, a provision allowing for an unelected prime minister under certain circumstances is looking like a sure thing. Multiple people with connections to the draft committee privately say that leaving an unelected prime minister a possibility is a key objective of the new constitution. How and under what circumstances this person would be chosen remains unclear. A possible unelected prime minister is seen by the military and its allies as critical to stopping any Thaksinite party from dominating Thai politics again. An unelected prime minister could be appointed in some way outside of normal electoral politics when elites do not like what an elected government is doing. The appointee would almost certainly be someone trusted by the military and its allies to serve as an obstacle to any Thaksinite party’s legislation in Parliament. The military, and the constitution drafters, surely assume that, no matter how they construct elections for the next parliament, a Thaksinite party will dominate the poll. Drafters have floated various ideas of new electoral systems, and I still believe the constitution will eventually create for Thailand a mixed-member, proportional representation system, like Germany’s. Yet even in a mixed-member proportional representation system like Germany’s, a Thaksinite party would still probably get as many MPs as it did in the last election under the old constitution. (Bangkok Pundit analyzed the prospects in Thailand under a German-style system, as compared to Thailand’s previous proportional representation system, which allocated more power to constituency votes rather than party votes than in a MMP system.) In addition, the new constitution almost surely will give more power to Thailand’s courts, another potential block to the power of any Thaksinite party in a future Thai parliament. Although Thaksin briefly gained sway over the most important courts in the early 2000s, when judges surely feared that Thaksin was going to unseat the old Thai establishment, since the mid-2000s the courts have almost always gone against Thaksinite parties, leading some Thais to claim the courts had become capable of launching a “judicial coup.” Yet in the new constitution, the top courts, including the Constitutional Court, will get even stronger, according to reports in the Thai press and private discussions with several people close to the constitution drafters. The courts will thus have even more power to shape politics in a much more proactive way than is normal in most established democracies. Strengthening the Constitutional Court, and making it the vehicle for breaking the toughest political deadlocks, also serves another purpose. The Constitutional Court could replace the Thai king as the final arbiter in a political deadlock, helping ensure that the Crown Prince, who is widely disliked by Thai elites, will not enjoy anywhere near the power current King Bhumibhol has wielded at times during his reign.

Since the start of President Barack Obama’s first term, the United States has pursued a policy of rebuilding ties with Southeast Asia. By 2011 this regional focus had become part of a broader strategy toward Asia called the “pivot,” or rebalance. This approach includes shifting economic, diplomatic, and military resources to the region from other parts of the world. In Southeast Asia, a central part of the pivot involves building relations with countries in mainland Southeast Asia once shunned by Washington because of their autocratic governments, and reviving close U.S. links to Thailand and Malaysia. The Obama administration has also upgraded defense partnerships throughout the region, followed through on promises to send high-level officials to Southeast Asian regional meetings, and increased port calls to and basing of combat ships in Southeast Asia. Yet despite this attention, the Obama administration’s Southeast Asia policy has been badly misguided. The policy has been wrong in two important ways. First, the White House has focused too much on the countries of mainland Southeast Asia, which—with the exception of Vietnam—have provided minimal strategic benefits in return. This focus on mainland Southeast Asia has distracted attention from the countries of peninsular Southeast Asia—Indonesia, the Philippines, and Singapore—that are of greater value strategically and economically. Indonesia, in particular, is a thriving democracy and an increasingly important stabilizing force in regional and international affairs. Second, increased U.S. ties with mainland Southeast Asia have facilitated political regression in the region by empowering brutal militaries, condoning authoritarian regimes, and alienating young Southeast Asian democrats. This regression is particularly apparent in Thailand. It seemed to have established a working democracy in the 1990s, but has regressed politically more than any other state in Southeast Asia over the past twenty years. In May 2014, Thailand was taken over by a military junta. Reform also has stalled in Myanmar, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Malaysia. This political regression has had and will have strategic downsides for the United States as well. In the long run, young Southeast Asians—the region’s future leaders—will become increasingly anti-American and an authoritarian and unstable mainland Southeast Asia will prove a poor partner on economic and strategic issues for the United States. Through the remainder of the Obama presidency, the United States should refocus its Southeast Asia policy in two ways: prioritize the countries of peninsular Southeast Asia and restore the emphasis on democracy and human rights in the region. In particular, the United States should slow and, in some cases, halt growing military-to-military ties with the countries of mainland Southeast Asia such as Myanmar. Washington also should refocus its aid on democracy promotion in Southeast Asia. Meanwhile, the United States should upgrade its relations with Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam by working to sign a treaty alliance with Singapore and expanding diplomatic, economic, and military ties with these four nations. Such a shift in Southeast Asia policy would allow the United States to better align Asia policy with democratic values and maximize the strategic benefits of U.S. interest in Southeast Asia. For more on how Obama’s Southeast Asia policy has gone wrong, and what the administration can still do to fix it, see my new CFR Working Paper, "The Pivot in Southeast Asia: Balancing Interests and Values."

Following up from last week, I am now counting down my top five predictions for 2015. 5. Jokowi wins over majority of parliament Currently, Indonesian President Joko Widodo’s coalition still lacks a majority in parliament, which is hindering Jokowi’s ability to pass legislation. But by the end of 2015, I think Jokowi’s party, PDI-P, will be at the head of a coalition that includes of majority of members of parliament. Jokowi has for weeks been wooing former president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), whose Democrat Party lawmakers could, if they switched from the opposition to Jokowi’s coalition, give Jokowi a majority in parliament. Although Yudhoyono and PDI-P chief Megawati Sukarnoputri still reportedly detest each other, SBY and Jokowi have reportedly gotten along well at a series of private meetings since early December. In addition, SBY, who always saw himself as a major figure in Indonesian history, clearly is worried that people will remember only his behavior at the end of his second term, when he did nothing as the opposition in parliament passed legislation that would drastically reduce the number of direct elections for regional governors and other local offices. This is a strikingly anti-democratic piece of legislation, and one that, polls show, is not supported by most Indonesians. (SBY also probably still hopes to eventually find some sort of senior job at the United Nations or another global agency, for which his reputation matters as well.) Now, SBY may be trying to move the Democrat Party into Jokowi’s camp to show the public that Yudhoyono will fight to maintain direct elections, and to bask in some of the reflected Jokowi’s democratic glow. 4. The NLD dominates Myanmar elections In the run-up to next fall’s national elections in Myanmar, some analysts have begun suggesting that the National League for Democracy (NLD), the party led by Aung San Suu Kyi, might not win such an overwhelming victory as it did in 1990, or in by-elections held in 2012, when the NLD won nearly every seat contested. The military and its favored party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), have allegedly already begun handing out money, and surely will provide more handouts as Election Day gets closer. In addition, the USDP is the party of President Thein Sein, who helped launch Myanmar’s reform process; many foreign analysts, still besotted with Thein Sein despite Myanmar’s backsliding in 2013 and 2014, believe the linkage to Thein Sein will help win the USDP seats next year. In addition, the NLD remains a party too dominated by Suu Kyi and lacking an effective apparatus for research, for developing policy positions, and potentially for governing. It won’t matter. The NLD is going to sweep the polls in late 2015, though Suu Kyi will remain barred from the presidency by the Myanmar constitution, and the Myanmar military will continue to wield excessive power through its allocation of 25 percent of seats in parliament and through its enormous network of various security forces throughout the country. Then, the NLD will have to govern. The party’s policy weaknesses will be exposed, it will have to work with a president other than Suu Kyi – perhaps current parliament speaker Shwe Mann – and it will face the tough task of trying to slowly reduce the military’s influence over politics. But the NLD will win the election, and win big. 3. Hillary Clinton walks back her embrace of Burma policy As she lays plans in 2015 to run for president, Hillary Clinton will have to grapple with the legacy of U.S. rapprochement with Myanmar, which Clinton helped launch as secretary of state in Barack Obama’s first term. Up to now, Clinton has continued to point to this rapprochement as a highlight of her time as secretary, a foreign policy victory in which the United States helped spark reform in one of the most isolated nations in the world. Clinton made Myanmar a central success story in Hard Choices, her book on her time as secretary. Yet since 2013, Myanmar’s political reforms have stalled, and though the NLD will win the 2015 election, its victory will hardly guarantee a return to democracy. Instead, the country is likely to face chaos, as the NLD fights the military and its allies to retain control of the government, civil strife continues in several parts of the country, and violence against Muslims rises. A consummate strategist, Clinton will find some way in 2015 to write herself out of the troubled story of U.S.-Myanmar rapprochement. 2. Southeast Asia survives (and even thrives on) low oil prices Low oil prices already have wreaked havoc on Russia, Venezuela, Mexico, Brazil, and other oil producers, particularly those whose state companies, like Gazprom or Petrobras, have issued large amounts of corporate debt. Cheap oil will hurt some Southeast Asian countries that are significant exporters, like Brunei, Malaysia, and, to some extent, Vietnam. Of all the large Southeast Asian economies, Malaysia, which has developed a range of sophisticated oil-related industries that together account for about 30 percent of GDP, will be hurt worst. Yet none of these countries’ state petroleum companies have issued as high the levels of debt as Gazprom or Petrobras. Despite Malaysia’s many economic challenges, its state oil company, Petronas, is well-managed, a far cry from Petrobras, which is now facing a massive corruption scandal. In addition, the drop in the price of oil will be a huge boon to Indonesia, significantly cushioning the impact of President Joko Widodo’s recent cut in fuel subsidies – and possibly allowing Indonesian consumers to spend more on other items, helping goose the economy. Cheaper oil also will be a boon to consuming nations like Thailand, the Philippines, and other oil consumers in the region. 1. Congress smacks down Barack Obama’s policies Granted, that could be a headline related to almost any foreign or domestic policy issue in 2015; you have an incoming Congress dominated by the GOP, with leaders angry that, after the November elections, President Obama issued several groundbreaking executive orders that will transform relations with Cuba, immigration, and climate change. But on Southeast Asia, Congress has always played a much larger role than it has played in many other areas of foreign policy. Congress has for two decades been central to policy-making on Myanmar, Vietnam, and other authoritarian states in mainland Southeast Asia, partly successive presidents mostly ignored these countries, partly because of the legacy of American wars in mainland Southeast Asia, and partly because of genuine concern in Congress that American presidents, of both parties, ignored human rights abuses throughout Southeast Asia. Seeing a void in policy-making, Congress imposed tough sanctions on Myanmar, injected human rights questions into U.S.-Vietnam rapprochement, restricted U.S. military sales to Vietnam, Indonesia, and other countries in the region, and took other measures over the past two decades to make human rights a centerpiece of U.S. policy toward Southeast Asia. Combine Congress’s historical interest in Southeast Asia with anger at Obama and you have a recipe for a Congress active on Southeast Asia issues, and possibly hostile to the administration’s efforts to build relations with Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Myanmar, and Malaysia, all of which are authoritarian states of one kind or another. New Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell long has been a hawk on Myanmar, critical of the Myanmar military and skeptical of the chances of reform there. Though McConnell warily went along with the Obama administration’s plan for rapprochement with Myanmar, the slowdown in Myanmar’s reforms and a desire by the White House to continue moving forward with closer military to military ties with Myanmar are likely to lead to pushback from McConnell’s office, especially if the Myanmar constitution remains rigged so that Suu Kyi cannot become president. Other Republican senators also clearly see Myanmar as an issue on which they can stake their human rights bona fides, and question Obama’s commitment to rights as well.  As Roll Call noted earlier in the year: McConnell certainly isn’t alone in taking interest in the development of Myanmar’s political system. Fellow Republican Sens. Mark S. Kirk of Illinois and Marco Rubio of Florida fired off a joint letter to Kerry Thursday, asking him to address political issues while in the country. In addition to the specific problems with the constitution, Kirk and Rubio point to ongoing human rights abuses and what they term “the national phenomenon of anti-Muslim violence that is rooted in a narrative of Buddhist grievance. Expect similar congressional pushback on other human rights-related issues in Southeast Asia, including the administration’s rapprochement with Cambodia and Malaysia, the White House’s desire to move quickly toward significant arms sales to Vietnam, and many other issues.

It’s that time of year again. Since I will be away between Christmas and the end of the year, this is the week for boldly making predictions about 2015 in Southeast Asia. At the end of 2015, just like this year, we can look back and see how many of my fearless predictions were right, and how many missed the mark. This post will offer five predictions; you will have to wait a few days for the other five. 10. Thailand’s ruling military regime pushes elections back farther The Thai regime already has put off planned elections from late 2015, the date mentioned shortly after the coup government took power, to 2016. But the process of drafting a new constitution is, even with a rigged drafting committee, going to be more complicated than the army initially thought. Thais are becoming more vocal about expressing their desire for directly elected leaders and about having some say over the final draft of the constitution. In addition, although the Thai media has mostly become quiescent, it has not completely given in to army rule, as would have happened in the past. Several prominent media outlets continue to criticize the military for maintaining martial law, detaining activists and journalists, and keeping the constitution drafting process opaque. In the face of mounting opposition, coup leader Prayuth Chan-ocha, whose intolerance of public debate is showing through more and more each day, is likely to postpone the final drafting and approval of the constitution even farther into the future. Indeed, elections might not be held in 2016, and could possibly wait until 2017. If the royal succession process remains plagued with uncertainty, such as continued instability in the Crown Prince’s household, this instability will only reinforce Prayuth’s desire to delay a handover back to civilian rule. 9. Tony Abbott confronts a test from within his party Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott’s personal unpopularity is dragging down the Liberal Party. The Liberals’ coalition just lost state elections in Victoria, the first time in sixty years a government has been defeated in Victoria after just one term; polling showed that Abbott’s personal unpopularity spilled over into Victoria, influencing state voters to go against the Liberals in the state election. Abbott has often looked befuddled on foreign policy. He was taken by surprise by Barack Obama and Xi Jinping’s major climate deal, announced on the eve of the G-20 summit in Australia, and he has repeatedly stumbled on crafting an effective and humane Australian policy for dealing with refugees. Abbott frequently has appeared tone-deaf in dealing with members of his party, the media, and the public. Indeed, he has one of the lowest popularity ratings of any Australian prime minister in modern history. However, the Liberal Party retains decent ratings for now. In the cutthroat world of Australian politics, where prime ministers can be dumped a few weeks before an election, expect other leading Liberals to try to oust Abbott in an internal party vote in 2015. 8. Jokowi faces major challenges to his new maritime doctrine Indonesian President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo announced an ambitious new Indonesian foreign policy doctrine at the East Asia Summit in November. Jokowi declared that Indonesia was going to become a maritime power, playing a larger role in Indian and Pacific Ocean trade, upgrading its ports and infrastructure, and modernizing its navy to protect Indonesian territorial waters and exclusive economic zones. In the weeks since Jokowi’s speech, Indonesia has taken several tough actions designed, I think, to show that the president means business. The first week of December, Indonesia sank several Vietnamese fishing boats that were allegedly illegally fishing in Indonesian waters; after the sinking, one of Jokowi’s top advisors, Rizal Sukma, told reporters, “We sank Vietnamese boats last week…maybe we will sink Chinese boats after that.” (More details on Sukma’s speech can be found here.) Jokowi’s vision, though ambitious, is a long way from reality. In 2015, as Indonesia tries to translate this doctrine into actual policy, it will face multiple obstacles. For one, the doctrine will now be subjected to intense intra-bureaucratic fighting within Jokowi’s cabinet, and it remains unclear whether the coordinating minister responsible for the new maritime policy will have the clout to handle Indonesia’s notoriously challenging intra-bureacratic warfare. Secondly, Indonesia will face serious pushback from China, which up to now has mostly focused its South China Sea claims on areas disputed with the Philippines and with Vietnam. However, China’s claims to areas near Indonesia’s Riau islands are becoming a point of diplomatic friction between Beijing and Jakarta, and the not-so-subtle message sent by the sinking of the Vietnamese boats will not play well in Beijing. Although China has taken a relatively soft approach toward Indonesia, trying to cultivate Southeast Asia’s biggest power, a more emphatic Indonesian defense of its waters, including sinking Chinese vessels, will surely be met with a tough response from Beijing. 7. Aung San Suu Kyi will not become president of Myanmar In my next post, I will offer some projections of the likely results of Myanmar’s 2015 national elections, scheduled to be held next autumn. But whatever the result of the election, Aung San Suu Kyi is almost surely not going to become president of Myanmar. Suu Kyi’s party, the National League for Democracy, appears to be giving up its efforts to try to change the Myanmar constitution before the election, in the face of intense opposition to a constitutional change from the Burmese army. The constitution contains a clause barring Suu Kyi from becoming president because she was married to a foreigner. 6. Thailand’s 2015 growth rate will fall below 4 percent The World Bank currently predicts that Thailand will grow by 4.5 percent in 2015, year-on-year. Even this rate of growth would be among the slowest in Southeast Asia – the Bank predicts the Philippines will grow by nearly 7 percent, Indonesia will grow by 5.6 percent, and Vietnam will grow by 5.5 percent. But I am doubtful that Thailand will even reach 4 percent growth for 2015. Continuing political uncertainty will weigh heavily on Thai consumers, seriously depressing domestic consumer spending. In addition, political uncertainty – and the high-profile international coverage of several recent murders of foreign tourists in Thailand – will hurt tourism badly. Tourism revenues account for between six and seven percent of Thailand’s total annual GDP. Finally, Japanese companies, the most important investors in Thailand, will continue to slowly move some of their investments to Vietnam and other countries in the region, worried about Thailand’s political instability and the long-term competitiveness of Thai labor.

Ashlyn Anderson, Lauren Dickey, Darcie Draudt, William Piekos, Ariella Rotenberg, and Sharone Tobias look at the top stories in Asia today. 1. Liu Tienan sentenced to life in prison. Liu Tienan, former deputy head of the National Development and Reform Commission and former head of the National Energy Administration, was convicted of bribery and sentenced to life in prison. He was one of the first officials to be singled out by President Xi Jinping’s anticorruption campaign and is among the highest-ranking officials to be imprisoned. Liu admitted to accepting bribes valued at 35 million yuan (approximately US$5.7 million) from 2002 to 2012. During his trial in September, Liu pleaded guilty and was quoted as stating, “having done so much damage to the country and the party, I have no defense.” 2. Modi and Putin meet, sign twenty pacts. Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in New Delhi at an annual bilateral summit to discuss expansion of ties in a range of crucial sectors. At this year’s summit—which has been taking place since 2000 in alternating capitals—the two sides inked a total of twenty agreements. Among these deals, the two sides agreed to establish a joint investment fund of US$1 billion for Indian infrastructure and hydroelectric projects. Moscow also offered to help India set up ten more nuclear reactors, jointly manufacture light-utility helicopters, increase oil and gas supply, and acquire US$2.1 billion in diamond sales. 3. Japan secrecy law takes effect amid protests. The strict state-secrets law, which passed a year ago and took effect this past week, mandates prison terms of up to ten years for civil servants who leak state secrets, while journalists or others who encourage such leaks could face up to five years in prison. Hundreds of protesters took to the streets to protest the law, which critics fear will help conceal government misdeeds and limit press freedom. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe claims that the law is necessary to convince allies (especially the United States) to share intelligence, and he has stated that, “If the law prevents films from being made, or weakens freedom of the press, I’ll resign.” 4. Vietnamese brides missing in rural China. More than one hundred Vietnamese brides have vanished in Hebei province after marrying Chinese bachelors. The women disappeared in late November, along with a Vietnamese matchmaker who had introduced the brides to local Chinese men in exchange for 105,000 yuan (US$17,000) per introduction. As police have begun to investigate the mass disappearance, there is speculation that an “organized ring” helped the brides flee. For many men, a gender imbalance in favor of women and the material expectations of Chinese brides—men are expected to provide a house, car, appliances, and a steady income—mean that paying for a bride from Vietnam or elsewhere can be a cheaper option for Chinese bachelors. Such transactions further perpetuate regional human trafficking problems. 5. Uber encounters speed bumps across Asia. Fast-growing ride sharing app Uber and other app-based taxi services have been temporarily banned in New Delhi after a twenty-seven-year-old female passenger alleged she was raped by one of its drivers in New Delhi. The company does not conduct its own background checks in India, instead relying on the state’s less scrupulous system; for example, in this case the accused driver had been arrested for rape (though not convicted) and other criminal activities in the past. The company had previously encountered problems in India when the country’s central bank reprimanded it for violating the country’s credit card regulations. Uber’s problems in Asia aren’t limited to India: Thailand, Vietnam, and Singapore are examining the service’s legality under current regulations, and Thailand’s transportation minister said that the government would ask Uber to cease its operations because of regulatory concerns. All is not lost, however; Chinese internet giant Baidu is set to invest up to $600 million to establish the firm in China. BONUS: Singapore’s airport will sport world’s largest indoor waterfall. Singapore’s Jewel Changi Airport, rated the world’s best airport by many, is building the world’s largest indoor waterfall in a new terminal to open in 2018. The terminal will have one of the largest indoor collections of plants in Singapore and a five-story garden filled with local trees and plants as well as a 130-foot “Rain Vortex.” See pictures here.

This post is part two of a series on Thai leadership. As I noted last week, Thailand has been consumed by recent news that Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn appears to be on the verge of divorcing his third wife, Srirasmi, and erasing all remnants of her and her family from his life and from the royal palace. Of course, no Thai media are openly reporting this news, since saying almost anything at all about the crown prince or any other leading member of the royal family (or even about royal events that allegedly took place hundreds of years ago) can get one slapped with harsh lèse-majesté charges. Still, the Thai media have reported on the decisions taken by the crown prince, while delicately dancing around the implications of these decisions or how they affect the royal succession and Thai politics in general. In addition, Thais have been talking in private, and even quietly on social media, about the arrests of many of Princess Srirasmi’s family members, who were high-ranking police officers, and of the crown prince’s recent decision to revoke the royal name given to all the of princess’s family members. The crown prince allegedly has a fourth wife waiting in Germany and has had a son with her. That son, rather than his son with Princess Srirasmi, would then be put in line to be Vajiralongkorn’s heir. This is not the first time the crown prince has gotten rid of a wife, and disowned her whole family to boot, but this time the crown prince’s actions are far more consequential. The crown prince could inherit the throne at any time, given the state of King Bhumibhol’s health. With King Bhumibhol not well enough even to appear at his own 87th birthday celebration last Friday, the crown prince appears to be taking these actions in order to bolster his reputation among Thailand’s royalist elites and the Thai military before a royal succession takes place. The crown prince essentially seems to be sending a message that he will distance himself from his third wife’s allegedly corrupt relatives in the police, and will settle down with his fourth wife and raise his heir. This is a message that needs to be sent. After years of allegedly insulting Bangkok elites and leaders of other countries, and flitting from woman to woman, the crown prince needs to assure both elites and the Thai public that he can bring stability and continuity to the palace, which is a critical mediating institution in Thai politics. After all, Thailand lacks other strong institutions besides the palace, such as an impartial judiciary, that could step in and resolve political conflicts. In addition, the crown prince needs to assure the military – which is, after all, in charge of a country currently under martial law and unlikely to hold elections before 2016 – that as king Vajiralongkorn will preserve the military/palace alliance that has thrived for decades under King Bhumibhol. Although King Bhumibhol has at times served as a stabilizing force in chaotic Thai politics, whenever he has had to make a real choice between the military/conservative elites and electoral democracy, he has sided with military conservatism. Over time, the king – theoretically a constitutional monarch and a man who came to the throne over sixty years ago at a time when Thais were seriously debating abolishing the monarchy altogether – amassed significant power of his own, through his longevity and his popularity with the public. However, he never forgot that he originally owed his elevation to the throne and his power to the armed forces. The king has always stacked his Privy Council, the king’s group of advisors, with former generals. By allowing, or even overseeing, a purge of senior police, the crown prince is sending a signal that he is willing to take the side of the army against the police if disputes ever again arise between these two powerful Thai institutions. This signal is of critical importance – the police, in the past decade, had emerged as a serious rival for political power to the army. In addition, since the coup in May 2014, the crown prince has not tried to position his allies in the armed forces to take prominent positions in the current government. Until recently, the crown prince mostly laid low after the May 2014 coup, another signal to the military he would not threaten their vast financial and political powers. What does the crown prince want in return for these actions? Presumably, in return senior military leaders would not attempt to delegitimize the prince and potentially elevate his sister to the throne instead after the king’s passing. The idea of Vajiralongkorn being skipped over if the succession happened under the military regime is a possibility suggested by some palace watchers such as Andrew MacGregor Marshall, author of the recently published book A Kingdom Divided: Thailand’s Struggle for Democracy in the Twenty-First Century. Does the crown prince’s disavowal of Princess Srirasmi and apparent detachment from the police bode ill for Thaksin Shinawatra, long the most powerful politician in Thailand and, for years, reputed to be a close ally of Vajiralongkorn? After all, one of the other main reasons why Thailand’s elite has feared the royal succession is that it was long believed that a King Vajiralongkorn would welcome Thaksin back from exile and possibly help Thaksin’s political party dominate electoral politics. Although some analysts have suggested that the crown prince is breaking with Thaksin, I do not think it is so clear. Thaksin remains the most popular politician in the country, his party remains the most popular, and even the completely rigged national reform commission set up by the military regime believes that, eventually, Thailand should have a prime minister directly elected by the public. When Thailand eventually returns to elections, Thaksin’s party almost surely will win again, no matter how the military tries to rig the political system to reduce Thaksin’s power. That popularity alone will ensure Thaksin’s relevance, and the crown prince surely knows this. In addition, Thaksin also has built personal links to several of the key military men in the coup government, who could eventually take seats on the crown prince’s Privy Council. Overall, I think, an eventual accommodation will be reached in which Thailand will return to elections, Thaksin’s party will likely control Parliament, the crown prince will become king, and both Thaksin and Vajiralongkorn will allow the military to retain its out-sized budget, influence over state companies, and power over aspects of the political system. In addition, Vajiralongkorn will help maintain the palace’s aura by behaving, raising his heir, and continuing to suggest that the military enjoys a special status bestowed by the crown.

This post is part of a series on Thai leadership. The past ten years of political turmoil in Thailand have revolved around several contentious challenges. A growing, politically empowered, and vocal working class in Thailand’s provinces has clashed with traditional Bangkok elites. Shifts in Thailand’s constitutions have led to a two-party system, rather than the old multi-party politics, but the two-party system has struggled to effectively represent the interests of a majority of Thais. The Thai military, once thought to be under civilian control, has reasserted its power throughout the past decade, while other institutions have failed to control the military’s resurgence. Violent street protests have emerged as a weapon to bring down governments, with no consequences for the violent demonstrators, a development that only fosters more violent protests. But the past decade of crisis also has stemmed from a struggle among Thai elites to control the royal succession, after the  passing of King Bhumibhol, who will be eighty-seven on Friday. The king has been on the throne since 1946, making him the longest-reigning monarch (or any head of state) in the world. Bhumibhol today is physically incapacitated – some rumors suggest he has Parkinson’s disease, while others suggest he has had a series of strokes – and rarely appears in public, and it is unclear whether he remains mentally lucid. Although Thailand is technically a constitutional monarchy, like the Netherlands or Great Britain, in reality the palace in Thailand wields enormous political power behind the scenes, and also controls vast amounts of land, stakes in blue-chip Thai companies, and other wealth. Forbes estimates that the Thai monarch is the richest royal in the world, worth some $30 billion. In a new book A Kingdom in Crisis: Thailand’s Struggle for Democracy in the Twenty-First Century, former longtime Reuters journalist Andrew MacGregor Marshall effectively summarizes this royal clash. Drawing upon his sources within the palace and leaked diplomatic cables discussing the royal family, Marshall writes that the impetus for a decade-long struggle by Bangkok’s traditional royal elites, who have supported two coups since 2006, is to make sure that traditional royalists, and the military, are running the country when the king dies. In addition, Marshall suggests that traditional elites harbor hopes that, in the succession, they will be able to maneuver the king’s daughter, Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn, into power as the ruling monarch. By putting the princess into power elites would bypass the heir anointed decades ago by Bhumibhol, Crown Prince Maha Vajiralongkorn. Marshall suggests that Thaksin, meanwhile, long ago formed an alliance with the crown prince, and if the crown prince becomes king he could rehabilitate Thaksin and allow pro-Thaksin populist parties to dominate politics. Marshall’s book is a short but provocative and entertaining examination behind the palace curtain, though his use of unnamed sources and the inability to check his claims makes it hard to evaluate his theses. He offers only modest evidence for his theory that royalist elites want to maneuver the princess into power. In addition, he tends to underplay the conflict between the rural working class and Bangkok elites as a driving factor in Thai politics, as compared to the succession struggle. Still, the book’s reportage and analysis are unique. The fear of the crown prince’s future reign stems from several factors. Elites fear a return of Thaksin in part because Thaksin’s effective politics have left the Democrat Party in shambles. More genuinely democratic elites also have opposed Thaksin because, as prime minister, he worked to undermine the country’s liberal institutions and to concentrate power in his hands. (Of course, tossing out Thaksin and replacing him with a junta is an even worse remedy for strengthening the rule of law.) Beyond the elites, most Thais also have never known another king, and the palace and Thai elites have created such a cult of personality around Bhumibhol that they have fostered an existential sense of panic among Thais about a post-Bhumibhol world. In addition, the crown prince has for decades acquired a reputation as an alleged hothead, womanizer, and poor decision-maker, in contrast to Bhumibhol, who despite flaws has generally been a moderating influence on the kingdom. Among other foibles, the crown prince allegedly used his own planes to blocked the plane of a visiting Japanese prime minister on the tarmac in Bangkok in a fit of pique, threw a lavish birthday party for his pet dog at which his wife appeared topless in a leaked video, and stormed home early from a visit to Japan after he felt subjected to a series of minor protocol slights by Thailand’s most important investor. Now, in recent weeks, this succession struggle appears to be coming into public view. Of course, Thais are prohibited from publicly talking or writing about the monarchy by the harshest lese majeste laws in the world. But this past week’s news that the military junta has arrested a group of senior policemen linked to the crown prince’s wife, Princess Srirasmi, and the crown prince’s public announcement that his wife’s family may no longer use their royally-given name (a kind of title) have shaken the country. Although all Thai-language and English-language newspapers have reported on the arrests and the crown prince’s order, believed to be the first step toward divorcing his third wife, they have studiously avoided mentioning the link between the policemen and Princess Srirasmi, or even the fact that the family banned from using their royal title is actually Srirasmi’s family. Still, every Thai understands that these events impact Srirasmi and the succession as well. Further, the dramatic turn of events seems to suggest that the crown prince is not only going to divorce his wife – he allegedly has a fourth wife waiting in Germany – but also abandon his alliance with Thaksin and throw in with the junta and traditional royalists. In my next post, I will examine why these events suggest a shift in royal politics and what this shift will mean for Thai politics in general in the near term.