Asia

Taiwan

Taiwan
Why China Would Struggle to Invade Taiwan

Interactive by David Sacks, Author

Although China’s ambition to gain control of Taiwan is clear, doing so through force would prove enormously difficult and costly.
Jun 12, 2024
Although China’s ambition to gain control of Taiwan is clear, doing so through force would prove enormously difficult and costly.
Jun 12, 2024
Taiwan’s Democracy Is Thriving in China’s Shadow
Despite China’s growing pressure, Taiwan has developed one of the world’s strongest democracies—one that will be increasingly tested in the coming years. 

Blog Post by David Sacks May 13, 2024

Taiwan’s Trump Conundrum
Taiwan should not dismiss Donald Trump’s recent comments about the island.

Blog Post by David Sacks Jul 19, 2024

Why China-Taiwan Relations Are So Tense
Get up to speed on the China-Taiwan relationship, U.S. policy, and the potential for conflict as tensions rise.

Backgrounder by Lindsay Maizland Feb 8, 2024

  • International Economic Policy
    Asia's Central Banks and Sovereign Funds Are Back
    East Asia (China, Japan, and the NIEs) ran a $600 billion current account surplus in 2017. "Official" (central bank and sovereign fund) outflows accounted for about half of that. Asia's foreign exchange market intervention isn't as overt as it once was, but also hasn't entirely gone away.
    Blog Post by Brad W. Setser April 24, 2018 Follow the Money
  • Thailand
    Previewing the U.S. Treasury’s April Foreign Exchange Report
    The U.S. Treasury Department’s next foreign exchange report is due on April 15—so it should come out soon, maybe even tonight. Normally the section on China attracts all the attention. But right now there isn’t any reason to focus the foreign exchange report on China. China has neither been buying or selling large quantities of foreign exchange in the market—and, well, the yuan did appreciate a bit in 2017. China no doubt still manages its currency but it isn’t obviously managing its currency in a way that is adverse to U.S. economic interests. And China’s loose macroeconomic settings have kept its current account surplus down even though China’s industrial policy seeks to displace imports with domestic production. I worry about what may happen if China tightens excessively before it stops saving excessively—but that isn’t an immediate concern. The real Asian interveners right now are China’s neighbors—Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Singapore. All bought foreign exchange on net in 2017, and all also run sizeable current account surpluses. Korea’s surplus is well above 5 percent of its GDP; Taiwan, Thailand, and Singapore all run surpluses of over 10 percent of their GDP. Combined these four countries run a current account surplus of close to $250 billion—bigger, in dollar terms, than either China or Japan. And they all have plenty of fiscal policy space: they could rely more on domestic demand and less on exports. Singapore isn’t going to be in the report—it is intervening rather massively (also see Gagnon), but it gets an unwarranted free pass as a result of its bilateral trade deficit with the United States (a deficit that likely reflects some tax arbitrage, as firms import into Singapore to re-export). So I will be most interested in what the Treasury has to say about Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. Thailand is the most interesting case. It hasn’t been traditionally covered in the report as it wasn’t considered a major trading partner. But in 2017 it met all three of the criteria that the Treasury has set out to determine if a country is manipulating: a bilateral surplus of more than $20 billion, a current account surplus of more than 3 percent of GDP, and intervention in excess of 2 percent of GDP. Thailand’s bilateral surplus just topped $20 billion, but it easily meets the other two criteria with a current account surplus of 11 percent of its GDP and intervention of 8 percent of GDP. I personally think the Treasury should go ahead and name Thailand and give the Bennet Amendment process a test. There is more than a bit of flexibility in the determination of who counts as a major trading partner. And there is a more intermediate option—the Treasury could indicate that it plans to expand the report’s coverage in October and indicate that if Thailand doesn’t change its policies, it would likely meet all three of the Bennet amendment criteria. It would be rather disappointing if the Treasury simply sticks to its current list of major trading partners (and leave Thailand out entirely). The changes introduced to a designation under the Bennet amendment were designed to make designation (technically, designation for enhanced analysis) a live option. The actual sanctions are quite mild (arguably too mild) and only come into play after a year of negotiation. And the available sanctions on the Bennet list stop well short of any new tariffs. In some ways, Thailand is easy. It hasn’t tried to hide its activities in the foreign exchange market and a strict by the books application of the criteria set out in 2015 would lead to the conclusion that Thailand should be named. It has let its currency, the baht, appreciate over the last year (most currencies have strengthened against the dollar) but the scale of both its intervention and its current account surplus stands out. Korea and Taiwan are harder. Both have long been subject to scrutiny in the foreign exchange report. And both have become adept at adopting domestic policies that encourage large capital outflows and thus reduce the need for headline intervention. Korea channels a significant fraction of the buildup of funds in its social security fund (the national pension service) into foreign assets. And Taiwan has allowed its life insurers to buy a ton of foreign assets—loosening limits on foreign exchange exposure in the process (a new note by Citi's Daniel Sorid and Michelle Yang estimates that the life insurers have added $300 billion to their foreign assets in the last five years, bringing their total foreign portfolio up to $480 billion/65 percent of total assets). As a result of these “structural” outflows from regulated institutions, both Korea or Taiwan have been able to keep their intervention, using the Treasury's methodology, under the 2 percent of GDP threshold in recent years. Taiwan, though, is close and it has never disclosed its activities in the forward market, so there is a possibility that it actually violates the intervention criteria.*    And this is a case where methodology matters. The Treasury deducts estimated interest income from estimated reserve growth, which helps Taiwan a lot given Taiwan's enormous stock of reserves. A simple estimate that takes reported reserve flows in the balance of payments and adds in the reported change in the forwards book puts Korea over the threshold in 2013 and 2014 (before the Bennet criteria were articulated) and would put Taiwan just over 2 percent of GDP.** A by the books application of the Bennet criteria thus would let both Korea and Taiwan off. Treasury could say that neither meets all three criteria and more or less be done with it—perhaps adding that both the won and the new Taiwan dollar appreciated against the U.S. dollar in 2017.  Treasury will of course laud Korea for agreeing to more disclosure in the renegotiated KORUS and ding Taiwan for failing to disclose its forward book or any of the other details that should be disclosed if it voluntarily committed to live up to the IMF’s standard for reserve disclosure. Calling for transparency around intervention is squarely within the Treasury’s comfort zone. But in this case going strictly by the book would ignore what I think is the real issue. Both Korea and Taiwan are currently intervening to cap the appreciation of their currencies—Korea at 1050 to 1060 won to the U.S. dollar, and Taiwan at around 29 new Taiwan dollars to the U.S. dollar. To be fair, both have shifted the intervention range up a bit in 2018—in early and mid-2017 Korea intervened at around 1100 (it shifted a bit in late 2017), and Taiwan at around 30. But 1050 and 29 are still relatively weak levels for both currencies—given the size of each countries’ surplus** there is ample scope for further appreciation. I consequently will be watching to see if the Treasury signals that it objects to the level where Korea and Taiwan are intervening even if the amount of intervention falls short of the formal criteria. Korea's intervention in November, December, and January was actually relatively heavy (the won weakened a bit in February, allowing Korea to sell some of its January purchases, but it looks likely that Korea intervened again to block appreciation through 1050 in late March/early April). And I am curious if the Treasury will show any sign that it is looking closely at shadow intervention—asking, for example, Korea to disclose the net foreign exchange position (including hedges) of its national pension service, and Taiwan to report not just the central bank’s forward book but also the aggregate foreign exchange position of its regulated insurers. There are also signs that Taiwan’s state banks may have been buying more foreign exchange than in the past. But there I am not holding my breath, I don’t really expect any changes.  Looming in the background is another issue. Without large-scale intervention, foreign demand for Treasuries may be a bit weaker than it has been in the past (see my magnus opus on how the U.S. finances its current account deficit). Deutsche Bank has highlighted this possibility in some of its recent research. They are in my view, more or less right to note that foreign demand for Treasuries historically has been a by-product of intervention, and often, the result of intervention well in excess of the current 2 percent of GDP threshold. But I am not sure that the Trump Administration is willing to declare that it wants to toss aside the Bennet criteria in order to encourage countries to maintain undervalued currencies so as to raise demand for Treasuries and thus facilitate foreign funding of the fiscal deficit.   *Taiwan though benefits from the bilateral balance criteria, as it exports its chips (semiconductors) to China, and thus the reported bilateral balance understates its "value-added" bilateral surplus. Taiwan's current account surplus rose in 2017 and is now bigger in dollar terms than Korea's surplus. ** The Setser/Frank estimates for reserve growth in the tables differ from the Treasury numbers in two ways: Cole Frank and I used the balance of payments data to estimate reserve growth, while the Treasury uses valuation-adjusted change in headline reserves, and I didn't deduct out estimated interest income. The Treasury believes that only actual purchases in the foreign exchange market should count, and tries to strip out interest income. For countries that already have too many reserves, I think the country should normally sell the interest income received on foreign bonds for domestic currency to cover payments on sterilization instruments and profit remittances back to the Finance Ministry. This matters for a country like Taiwan, which has about 80 percent of GDP in reserve assets. Interest income is likely over a percent of GDP, and will rise over time if U.S. rates continue to increase. I also included for reference changes in the government's holdings of portfolio debt. These purchases have often appeared in the balance of payments at times when Korea is intervening in the market: they look to be to be a form of shadow intervention.  
    Blog Post by Brad W. Setser April 13, 2018 Follow the Money
  • South Korea
    Korean Won Up, New Taiwan Dollar Flat: An Update on Asian Intervention
    Korea didn’t stop the won from appreciating through 1090 (its intervention level in 2016); Taiwan seems to be blocking any move through 30.
    Blog Post by Brad W. Setser December 8, 2017 Follow the Money
  • Health
    Tedros, Taiwan, and Trump: What They Tell Us About China’s Growing Clout in Global Health
    In one of my recent blog posts on the World Health Organization (WHO) director general (DG) election, I discussed how the new election procedure has reduced the advantage larger states have in influencing election outcomes. Still, since health is a “highly politicized” topic, competition for the job involves deal-making and horse-trading that allow a complex set of factors (e.g., geopolitical considerations) to decide who will be the final winner. In this process, major powers can exert significant influence in part because they have more non-health-related bargaining chips than smaller nations to use in the negotiations. This might explain why days before the WHO election Dr. David Nabarro was campaigning in Beijing, busy meeting with Chinese health and foreign affairs officials, giving interviews to local media, and delivering a speech at the prestigious Tsinghua University. China at the time was very likely debating whether to throw its support behind him or Dr. Tedros Adhanom, former Ethiopian minister of health and minister of foreign affairs. As early as March, Dr. Tedros was invited to visit China where he delivered a keynote speech at Peking University. The political entity that felt left out of the party was Taiwan, which viewed formal participation at the World Health Assembly (the WHO’s executive body) as a critical step in its quest for international recognition. Under President Ma Ying-jeou, who served in that capacity between 2008 and 2016, Taiwan was able to participate as an observer under the title “Chinese Taipei.” The invitation arrived at the last minute last year, apparently as a warning sign from mainland China against the newly elected pro-independence President Tsai Ing-wen. This year, China was convinced that Tsai’s government had no intention of following the so-called “1992 Consensus,” which dictates that both Taiwan and mainland China are inalienable parts of a single entity, though each side has a different interpretation of what that entity is. Under pressure from China, the WHO secretariat did not issue an invitation to Taiwan. Dismayed and disappointed, Taiwan lobbied eleven of its twenty-one diplomatic allies to raise a motion calling for Taiwan’s inclusion at the WHA. The motion was deleted from the agenda when the WHA met on May 22, dashing any hopes that Taiwan could secure representation at the meeting. Interestingly, in its WHA bid Taiwan was advised to lobby its allies to vote for Nabarro, who was believed to be “nicer to Taiwan.” This kind of wishful thinking only did a disservice to Nabarro’s campaign: while both candidates sought to befriend China, Tedros now seemed to be a more favorable choice to China. Like Margaret Chan, the current WHO DG, Tedros was keenly aware of the importance of the Taiwan issue in WHO’s relationship with China. The day after his electoral victory, he reiterated his adherence to the “One China” principle (read: WHO will not invite Taiwan for formal participation without China’s approval). What about the United States, the largest funder of the WHO? As my colleague Laurie Garrett observed, Tedros was the favorite candidate of the Obama administration, but was not the Trump administration’s first choice. This is in part because Tedros’s focus on universal health coverage ran counter to U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services Tom Price’s interest in global health security. But the U.S. preference was not echoed by developing countries, which voted overwhelmingly in favor of Tedros. While the WHA was in session, the Trump administration unveiled its proposed budget, which would cut the annual global health budget by about 26 percent. The massive cut in global health funding would not only pose existential challenges to specific global health programs, including those related to family planning, malaria, and HIV/AIDS, but also risk fulfillment for WHO’s overall budget, exacerbating the international agency’s funding crisis. By contrast, China’s top health official bragged that 2017 would bring a “bumper crop” for its global health engagement: in January, it signed a MOU with the WHO for cooperation on the One Belt, One Road initiative; in March, it opened the Global Health Drug Discovery Institute, a partnership with the Gates Foundation that focuses on early drug discovery to fight HIV, tuberculosis, and malaria; in April, it co-chaired the China-Africa Health Ministers Conference, committing itself to “multilateralism and a rules-based global health governance mechanism”; in May, President Xi Jinping hosted the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, during which he pledged 60 billion RMB ($8.8 billion) to developing countries and international organizations participating in the initiative to launch more projects to improve people’s well-being worldwide; in July, China will host the BRICS Health Ministers Conference; and in August, a high-level forum will be held in Beijing to discuss global health cooperation. With China’s rapid advancement in global health and U.S. retreat from this area, we will see a WHO increasingly looking toward China for leadership.
    Blog Post by Yanzhong Huang June 7, 2017 Asia Unbound
  • South Korea
    Moon's Win, IS in the Philippines, Taiwan at WHA, and More
    Rachel Brown, Sherry Cho, Gabriella Meltzer, and Gabriel Walker look at five stories from Asia this week. 1. New president, new approach? Moon Jae-in, South Korea’s new president, has pledged to pursue dialogue with North Korea and stated that he was willing to meet with North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-un, if it would bring about lasting peace to the Korean peninsula. In comparison with Moon’s two conservative predecessors, who stressed a united approach with the United States in attempting to isolate North Korea through sanctions and pressure, Moon has often called for South Korea to take the lead in diffusing tensions through negotiations and dialogue.The last inter-Korean summit meeting occurred in 2007 between the previous North Korean leader Kim Jong-il and the president of South Korea at the time, Roh Moo-hyun, a longtime friend and ideological ally of President Moon’s. Roh’s “Sunshine Policy,” which focused on engaging North Korea through dialogue, joint economic projects, and humanitarian aid, is generally expected to serve as the basis of Moon’s North Korea policy. Its successful implementation remains to be seen, however, as Moon has also vowed to reinforce South Korea’s relationship with the United States and President Trump, whose diplomatic overtures and fractious military posturing toward North Korea have led to general bafflement in the region. 2. Philippines faces new extremist threats. Alarms rang this week over the possibility that terrorist groups would kidnap tourists at popular destinations in the Philippines. In particular, Western embassies warned of plans to target tourists at two locations on the island of Palawan. The threats emanated from the southern Philippine terrorist group Abu Sayyaf, which has a decades-long history of kidnapping foreigners and locals for ransom. Now Abu Sayyaf, which claims allegiance to the self-proclaimed Islamic State group, is increasing its power as it uses the high-value ransoms to finance new weapons purchases. And the group’s influence is rising despite Philippine President Rodrgio Duterte’s military operations against them. Earlier this month, the Islamic State also claimed responsibility for explosions in Manila, although Philippine officials denied that the group had been involved. President Duterte has pledged to take an aggressive stance against terrorism. Never one to shy away from coarse language, he even said that he would eat militants—“give me salt and vinegar and I'll eat his liver.” As threats from both the Islamic State and other extremist groups in Southeast Asia mount, President Duterte would do well to pursue a more comprehensive strategy than just sharpening his knife and fork. 3. Taiwan vies to join World Health Assembly. Despite objections from Beijing, Taiwan is pushing to be included as an observer in this year’s World Health Organization’s World Health Assembly in Geneva, which will take place from May 22 to May 31. This seventieth annual gathering will include the election of a new director general from a finalist pool of three candidates. China has consistently tried to block Taiwan’s participation in international agencies due to its claims of sovereignty over the island. As a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, Beijing continues to wield strong political influence at both the UN and WHO. President Tsai Ing-Wen has remained vocal on Twitter, writing “Taiwan should not be excluded from W.H.A. this year for any reason… Health issues don’t stop at border & Taiwan’s role is impt to global health.” Taiwan’s minister of health and welfare, Chen Shih-chung, has told the press that Taiwan plans to send a delegation to Geneva even without a formal invitation. 4. Japan and South Korea hit impasse over comfort women dilemma. South Korea’s newly elected President Moon Jae-in has cast doubt on a 2015 deal with Japan over the issue of wartime sex slaves known colloquially as “comfort women.” On Thursday, Moon told Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe that a 2015 deal to resolve a dispute over Korean women forced into sexual service for Japanese soldiers during World War II was “unacceptable” to most South Koreans. Moon’s remarks are likely to reignite the emotionally charged issue between Japan and South Korea during a time when cooperative efforts against the North Korean nuclear threat are more significant than ever. Under the 2015 agreement, Mr. Abe offered his “most sincere apologies and remorse” to all former “comfort women,” and the two countries agreed to “finally and irreversibly” settle the comfort women issue; additionally, Japan disbursed 1 billion yen ($8.9 million) last year to a South Korean fund designated to help former comfort women and their families. However, victim advocacy groups have protested that the apology did not do enough to address the Japanese government’s role in forcing tens of thousands of women in Asia into sexual slavery as part of the “comfort women” program. Such groups have also pointed to Japanese history books that underplay Japan’s war crimes. Moon had promised to seek a renegotiation of the agreement with Japan as one of his key election pledges but it remains to be seen if this historically fraught issue will impede the bilateral relationship between South Korea and Japan and joint efforts to address the North Korean nuclear threat. 5. Chinese millennials snap up foreign properties via smartphone. According to an HSBC survey published earlier this year, 70 percent of Chinese millennials (born between 1981 and 1998) are home-owners—twice the rate in the United States. And many millennials are shopping for foreign properties on their smartphones with mobile apps like Uoolu and SouFun, just two examples of the Chinese mobile fintech boom. Uoolu reports that 80 percent of its active users are between 20 and 39, and that 20,000 customers have already purchased or are purchasing properties outside of China through their app. The company even encourages prospective customers to “hurry to invest” in Southeast Asia as part of Xi Jinping’s One Belt, One Road development strategy. A few factors are driving the scramble for overseas real estate: foreign investments as a hedge against a depreciating yuan; ever-climbing real estate prices in Chinese cities; and an interest in living abroad in a clean city rather than enduring China’s worrisome environmental pollution. Despite China’s strict capital controls (including a $50,000 annual limit on investments or money transfers abroad), buyers seem undaunted and leverage family members or other smurfing techniques to make their purchases. As Uoolu’s COO stated, “The more the government limits people, the more they want to invest overseas.” Bonus: Once upon a time on the Silk Road… The One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative entered its next frontier this week: bedtime stories and bubblegum pop. In a series of videos released by China Daily, American father and journalist Erik Nilsson regales his daughter with tales of Xi Jinping’s vision for OBOR. Before he joins guests from nearly one hundred and thirty countries at this weekend’s Belt and Road Forum in Beijing, he explains that the project is about more than just new transportation routes—it’s about “people and cooperation.” Meanwhile in a new music video from the ever-entertaining Fuxing Road Studios, children from Belt and Road nations, accompanied by a ukulele and cartoon backdrops, extol the virtues of the initiative in song. While it is unclear why China Daily or Fuxing Road feel they need to convince children that OBOR is not a bore, at least this is one audience unlikely to pose thorny geopolitical questions about the initiative’s future.
    Blog Post by Guest Blogger for Asia Unbound May 12, 2017 Asia Unbound
  • China
    Chinese Carrier in the Strait, Philippine Birth Control, $100 Billion SoftBank Fund, and More
    Rachel Brown, Sherry Cho, Lorand Laskai, Gabriella Meltzer, and Gabriel Walker look at five stories from Asia this week. 1. China’s aircraft carrier sails through Taiwan Strait. Early Wednesday morning, China’s sole aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, sailed into the Taiwan Strait, leading Taipei to scramble F-16 fighter jets and ships to “surveil and control” the movement of the Liaoning and its accompanying five warships. The carrier ship group was returning to Qingdao after training exercises in the South China Sea, and did not technically veer into Taiwanese waters during its ten-hour journey through the Taiwan Strait. This new military posturing by China comes at a delicate time in cross-strait relations. On her way to a diplomatic visit in Central America, Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen recently met with prominent U.S. politicians such as Senator Ted Cruz in a visit that, unsurprisingly, met with Chinese censure. Tsai’s Central America visit was itself intended to shore up support from Taiwan’s dwindling number of diplomatic allies after São Tomé and Príncipe’s recent diplomatic recognition of China, which left Taiwan with just twenty-one diplomatic allies. Since last May, when Tsai refused to acknowledge the 1992 Consensus in her inauguration speech, relations between China and Taiwan have deteriorated. China views the consensus, a tacit agreement that there is only one China, with each side having its own interpretation, as crucial to ensuring stable cross-strait ties. An unprecedented phone call between Tsai and U.S. President-Elect Donald Trump last month injected further uncertainty into China-Taiwan relations. And while Beijing may continue to claim that its recent maneuvers are normal training exercises, China’s most recent round of military exercises in the disputed South China Sea continues to sustain tensions with its Pacific neighbors in a theater already full of fraught enmities and uneasy allies. 2. Philippines to expand birth control access. Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte authorized his government to increase contraception availability for approximately 6 million women currently lacking access. The government’s first priority will be assisting 2 million women living in poverty over the next year by partnering with civil society organizations. Birth control is already available in the Philippines, but it is often prohibitively expensive, making it accessible only to middle- and high-income individuals. Family planning poses a conundrum for the Philippines, which is 81 percent Catholic and the only Asian country to experience a rise in the rate of teen pregnancies over the past twenty years. In 2008, 54 percent of pregnancies were unintended, most of which occurred among poor women. Abortion is illegal in all circumstances. While the Philippines passed the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act in 2012, which would have provided nationwide birth control access, it has been stalled by a temporary restraining order from the Supreme Court. The order stopped issuance of implanted birth control devices, and budgets for birth control provision have been cut independent of the court’s ruling. Duterte’s latest move to promote contraception access will likely anger the Catholic Church as well. 3. $100 billion SoftBank Vision Fund takes shape. Last October, Japanese telecommunications multinational Softbank made headlines by announcing a plan to create a $100 billion fund to invest in new technologies—the largest such fund in history. Now, with a number of investors and leaders in place, the fund is beginning to take shape. So far, investments have come from Saudi Arabia’s sovereign wealth fund ($45 billion) and SoftBank itself ($25 billion), along with Qualcomm, Apple, and others. The sovereign wealth fund of Abu Dhabi may soon join as well. In addition to SoftBank Chief Executive Masayoshi Son, many of the fund’s leaders are Wall Street veterans, including the fund’s head Rajeev Misra who formerly worked at Deutsche Bank. The Vision Fund is expected to invest in a range of new technologies including robotics, artificial intelligence, and the “Internet of Things,” and will likely make investments in larger companies as well as start-ups. With the fund, Son will endeavor to build off previous technology investment successes including deals with Alibaba and Yahoo! Japan. Some have speculated, however, that the fund may also serve as a way for SoftBank to cozy up to the incoming Trump administration by investing large sums in the United States. 4. China offers to remove compulsory IUDs. For more than thirty years, the Chinese government has required many women be fitted with an intrauterine device (IUD) in order to comply with the country’s controversial one-child policy. But now with the country’s birth rate declining, the government has replaced the one-child policy with a “two-child” policy and is offering women that were forced to receive an IUD a free surgery to remove the device. But many women are not accepting that gesture graciously: after years of being subjected to forced family planning, the government’s about-face without an apology has left many women indignant. Since the inception of the one-child policy, over 300 million Chinese women were fitted with IUDs and more than 100 million underwent tubal ligations. The enforcement of the one-child policy, which Nobel Prize-winning author Mo Yan portrays in Frog, a novel about the most intense years of forced sterilization and abortion in a fictional village, has had a brutal history. Over three decades later, its victims’ scars have not yet healed. 5. Australia and East Timor tear up maritime agreement. On Monday, Australia and East Timor, a nation of just over a million citizens that became a sovereign state in 2002, agreed to terminate a decade-old treaty in favor of negotiating a new maritime boundary. Under the 2006 treaty, the two countries agreed to suspend boundary talks for fifty years and split the tax revenues of the Greater Sunrise oil and gas field equally—a tract closer to East Timor’s coast with up to $40 billion in hydrocarbons. Now, according to a joint statement, the governments have committed to negotiate a new maritime boundary under the auspices of The Hague’s Permanent Court of Arbitration. But this time around, East Timor will likely demand a boundary line equidistant between the two countries and, as a result, a greater share of the oil and gas revenues from the region. For East Timor, the revenues are practically a matter of life and death: without new sources of income, some predict that the fledgling nation could be bankrupt within a decade. Bonus: Benefits of China’s “anti-smog” teas debunked. Chinese citizens in Beijing are finally finding relief after a period of dangerous smog that forced a red alert for twenty-three cities throughout northern China and shut down schools, construction sites, and factories. The smog extended 3.9 million square miles, which is roughly the area of the continental United States. In an effort to protect themselves from pollution levels ten times greater than those advised by World Health Organization guidelines, many Chinese have turned to “anti-smog” teas, sold widely in medicine shops, pharmacies, and online for about $2.90 per pack. Listings claim that the tea’s combination of traditional Chinese herbs, including dried chrysanthemum and honeysuckle, can boost overall health and remove smog-induced impurities from the body. However, a recent state report on CCTV featuring Liu Quanqing, president of the Beijing Hospital of Traditional Chinese Medicine, attacked these claims as false, saying that the “digestive and respiratory systems are separate” and that many of these teas contain ingredients that in fact can cause “health problems if taken for a long time.” China’s Centers for Disease Control instead recommends face masks and air purifiers to combat smog.
    Blog Post by Guest Blogger for Asia Unbound January 13, 2017 Asia Unbound
  • China
    Reading Between the Tweets: Trump, Taiwan, and China
    As the Trump-Taiwan-China saga continues to unfold, I thought it might be useful to look at the sequence of events and report on how Chinese scholars are looking at President-Elect Trump’s first foreign policy musings and how we in the United States might understand his statements and actions to date. Here is a brief rundown: President-Elect Trump accepts a congratulatory phone call from Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen, breaking decades of diplomatic precedent in the process. He defends the phone call on Twitter on the grounds that she called him; it would have been rude not to accept the call; Taiwan buys billions of dollars of arms from the United States; and China can’t tell him what to do. Via Twitter, he calls China out on currency manipulation, unfair trade practices, and its military buildup in the South China Sea. He names China’s “old friend” Iowa Governor Terry Branstad as his pick for ambassador to China. He indicates that he is ready to rethink the “One China” Policy because China does everything he noted earlier in his tweets, plus Beijing doesn’t help out the United States enough with North Korea. He could be persuaded to rethink his rethink, however, if China puts something good on the table, perhaps related to trade. While the official view from Beijing has evolved from tempered to truculent, Chinese scholars continue to try to understand the president-elect, holding out hope that the relationship will eventually find a new equilibrium. Wang Wenfeng, a scholar at the Ministry of Public Security’s influential think tank, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, for example, reflects hope mixed with anxiety: “We really need to know more about Donald Trump the person. Why he does something and what is his logic behind his words and deeds are important for the outside world to understand Trump and his policy. For Trump, he definitely needs to know more about the world. He still has a lot to learn about policy issues… It will take time for Trump to get used to his new job, and we only hope that before that, not much damage will be done.” Senior scholar Tao Wenzhao suggests that the United States cannot afford for the relationship to deteriorate and Trump’s business sense ultimately may serve the bilateral relationship well. He comments,  “Trump can…not afford the risk of worsened relations with China. In particular, the U.S. is now experiencing fiscal difficulty and internal division. There is no basis for a policy that would worsen U.S.-China relations…The two countries may well cooperate through some commercial arrangement...Trump is a businessman, who values solid interests. He will also focus his attention on domestic affairs rather than having a strong impulse to expand American-style democracy overseas. Human rights pressure on China is likely to decrease.” My own view reflects a similar mix of hope, anxiety, and serious concern. On the positive side, Donald Trump brings a singular advantage to the table as a foreign policy novice. He is unencumbered by all the diplomatic decisions—good and bad—that have come before him. He is willing to question the underpinnings of our relationship with Taiwan and China. No one should fault him for that. It would be helpful, however, if he is going to dive headfirst into one of the most longstanding and thorny issues the United States confronts—how to navigate its relations with China and Taiwan—that he articulate his priorities. He seems to be suggesting that the name of the game is trade and investment. He believes that the United States has received the short end of a stick in its economic relations with China and appears willing to try whatever it might take to change the situation. Security concerns are a distant second, and debate about human rights is missing in action. Donald Trump may elevate Taiwan in U.S. foreign policy and help it to achieve greater recognition internationally or he may sell it down the proverbial strait. We just don’t know. He may not either. Moreover, at some point in time—and that time is coming soon—President-Elect Trump will be in a position to act, not just speak, and his actions will have consequences. China has the capacity to hit and hit back hard—both on the trade and investment front and in the security arena. President-Elect Trump’s staff has promised that he would spend considerable time getting up to speed on foreign policy in his first months as president – he might want start by reading Steven Goldstein’s excellent piece on the “One China” policy in the Washington Post that lays it all out. Before Trump begins to dismantle what Americans have spent a century negotiating and fighting to achieve, I hope that even if he does not know what has come before, he has a good idea of what he wants to come next and what it will take and cost to get it.
    Blog Post by Elizabeth C. Economy December 13, 2016 Asia Unbound
  • China
    Friday Asia Update: Five Stories From the Week of August 5, 2016
    Rachel Brown, Sherry Cho, Lincoln Davidson, Theresa Lou, Gabriella Meltzer, and Gabriel Walker look at five stories from Asia this week. 1. Tokyo elects first female governor. On Sunday, Yuriko Koike was elected as the first female governor of Tokyo with 2.9 million votes, nearly one million more than her closest competitor. Although she is a member of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), she ran as an independent when the LDP endorsed rival candidate Hiroya Masuda instead. Koike has previously been mocked for lack of commitment to a given political party, earning her comparisons to a conveyer belt sushi restaurant or migratory bird. Of the mayoral candidates, her record was considered to be the most conservative. However, in this election she emphasized programs to benefit the prefecture including increasing government transparency, prioritizing residents’ needs, and emphasizing her green credentials. Koike has a diverse background, having previously served as Japan’s environment minister and defense minister, a role that highlighted her strong nationalist stances, particularly against North Korea and China. She also studied at Cairo University and served as a newscaster. While Koike may now be one of the highest-profile female politicians in Japan, she encountered sexism in the campaign. A former governor of Tokyo said, “We cannot leave Tokyo to a woman with too much make-up.” Tokyo has now been left to Koike, leaving her to face new challenges such as preparing Tokyo for the 2020 Olympics and working with the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly, which is still dominated by the LDP. 2. North Korea lobs missiles into Japanese waters. North Korea reportedly fired two mid-range Rodong ballistic missiles on Wednesday. Although one missile exploded shortly after launching, the other fell approximately 155 miles off the coast of northern Japan. The incident marks the first time a North Korean missile has come in such close proximity to Japan since 1998, when a ballistic missile flew over the country. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has called the reckless act “a grave threat to Japan’s security.” This is North Korea’s second missile test since the United States and South Korea agreed in July to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery to South Korea. Pyongyang had subsequently threatened to turn future South Korean sites for THAAD into a “sea of fire.” South Korean military officials reportedly view Pyongyang’s recent missile launches as an attempt to demonstrate its ability to target its neighbors. Japan’s annual defense white paper disclosed analysis on North Korea’s missile program and “expressed a sense of alarm” over Pyongyang’s increasingly developed weapons technology. 3. Uber sells China business to Didi Chuxing. After years of bleeding billions of dollars in subsidies competing for market share in China, ride-hailing service Uber announced this week it plans to sell its China operations to its leading rival in the country, Didi Chuxing. Under the deal struck between the two countries, Didi will take over Uber China, and Uber Global, Uber’s international parent company, will take a 20 percent stake in Didi, which is now valued at $35 billion. Didi will also make a $1 billion investment in Uber Global. The two firms have fought fiercely for several years, attempting to steal customers and drivers from each other by deeply subsidizing rides, and the deal signals that China’s intensely competitive ride-hailing market may begin to cool down. Adding to that impression, Chinese regulators last week made it illegal for the companies to provide services below cost, essentially ending the subsidy war. Commentators have pointed out that Uber’s retreat from China is a reminder of how difficult it is for foreign tech companies to succeed in the country. But in a way, it’s a victory for Uber: for $2 billion invested in China, Uber built an operation valued at $7 billion and gained and a permanent stake in Didi Chuxing, which now dominates the Chinese ride-hailing landscape. 4. Australia faces scrutiny for treatment of refugees. A joint investigation by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch (HRW) shows that Australia is mistreating refugees trying to reach its shores. Both Australia’s Liberal-National coalition and Labor parties support tough asylum policies. This was demonstrated by the 2013 Operation Sovereign Borders, which placed the military in charge of all asylum operations. Most migrants make the treacherous journey to Australia on boats from Indonesia after paying huge sums of money to criminal gangs, and the Australian government claims that they have the duty to stop this process. Refugees are either turned away or taken to the island nations of Papua New Guinea or Nauru for detention. Amnesty and HRW researchers secretly traveled to the Nauru Regional Processing Centre (after being denied formal entry), where their interviews with eighty out of 1,200 forcibly transferred refugees revealed appalling conditions. Interviewees described their situation as “prison-like” with overcrowded tents, unbearable heat, and constant attacks, robbery, and sexual assault by the local population. The report also details concerns regarding the inhabitants’ mental health and access to adequate medical care and education. Amnesty and HRW claim that the Australian government is well aware of these issues and hopes that the current situation will deter future asylum-seekers. 5. Taiwanese president offers first formal apology to indigenous community. President Tsai Ing-wen, the first female leader of Taiwan, issued the first official apology to the indigenous people of Taiwan at a formal ceremony at the presidential office in Taipei on Monday. This apology is representative of President Tsai’s focus on social justice issues and rectifying historical injustices. At the ceremony, attended by many indigenous aboriginal community leaders, Tsai stated, “If we wish to declare ourselves as a country of one people, we need to face these historical facts. We have to face the truth." Indigenous people make up 2 percent of Taiwan’s population and have historically faced economic, social, and sometimes violent discrimination by ethnic Han Chinese. As the first Taiwanese president to have an indigenous background, Tsai faces high expectations from Taiwan’s indigenous community. At the ceremony, Tsai reassured attendees by announcing the formation of a commission to address social and economic issues affecting indigenous groups and her intention to enact a law guaranteeing basic rights for indigenous people. However, despite hope of better treatment from President Tsai’s administration, some suspect Tsai of focusing on indigenous peoples so as to better construct a Taiwanese cultural identity capable of supporting a formal independence push from the People’s Republic of China. Bonus: Scientists confirm world’s deepest dragon burrow in the South China Sea. Chinese scientists have confirmed that the world’s deepest underwater sinkhole, known as the “Dragon Hole” or “eye” of the South China Sea, lies in the Paracel Islands. At just over 300 meters (987 feet) deep, researchers explored its murky bottom with a small underwater robot. They found more than twenty species of fish and other marine organisms near the surface of the formation, but because of low oxygen levels past 100 meters, finding life deeper into the hole is unlikely. According to local legend, it is also the source of the magical “golden cudgel” belonging to Sun Wukong, the famed monkey-hero from the Chinese classic Journey to the West. Might a dragon-king and his mighty army of shrimp soldiers and crab generals still reside in the hole’s inky depths?
    Blog Post by Guest Blogger for Asia Unbound August 4, 2016 Asia Unbound
  • China
    Friday Asia Update: Five Stories From the Week of July 1, 2016
    Rachel Brown, Lincoln Davidson, Bochen Han, Theresa Lou, and Gabriella Meltzer look at five stories from Asia this week. 1. Nepalis seeking employment in Afghanistan face severe risks. Faced with a faltering economy and few job opportunities following the devastating April 2015 earthquake, thousands of Nepalis have sought employment in Afghanistan as security contractors at foreign missions, military bases, and embassies. An attack by the Taliban that killed fourteen Nepalese guards hired by private security firm Sabre International for the Canadian embassy in Kabul demonstrates the inherent risk involved in this venture. Many of these foreign employees have remarked that they are more financially and physically vulnerable than their Western counterparts. The Nepalese guards must work several months to recover enormous debts incurred by broker fees to secure their posts and are paid lower wages. In addition, they are escorted around the city in regular minibuses rather than armored cars, and live in separate facilities with far more stringent rules. Following the attack, the Nepalese government has announced that it is restricting all citizen travel to Afghanistan and will facilitate the travel of those who wish to return to Nepal. 2. China suspends diplomatic communication with Taiwan. This week, China suspended communication mechanisms between the Chinese mainland and Taiwan due to Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen’s failure to endorse the 1992 Consensus. The 1992 Consensus refers to the tacit understanding that both parties recognize the “one China” principle, but each side has its own interpretation of the term. Beijing views the acceptance of the consensus as the prerequisite for normalized cross-strait relations and thus blames Taiwan for the suspended communication. Tsai maintains that Taiwan will seek other options to continue dialogue with China. Ties between the two sides have chilled after Tsai and her pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party took power in January’s presidential and legislative elections. The decision to cut communication with Taipei is seen as Beijing’s latest effort to hinder Tsai’s domestic agenda of reviving the island’s slowing economy. 3. United States upgrades Thailand in human trafficking report. The U.S. Department of State raised Thailand from Tier 3, for those doing most poorly in addressing human trafficking issues, to Tier 2 in its annual Trafficking in Persons (TIP) report. In recent years sex trafficking and the trafficking of Rohingya involved in fishing were major concerns in Thailand. Observers largely attributed this year’s upgrade to improvements in labor conditions and anti-trafficking efforts in the seafood industry. Some speculate, however, that geopolitics may color the objectivity of the TIP report. Last year, Voice of America reported that the rankings of fourteen nations with strategic value had been increased. Particularly controversial was the upgrade of Malaysia, which the Bangkok Post called “blatantly politicized” due to Malaysia’s involvement in the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations, which were ongoing at the time. Some speculate that Thailand’s upgrade this year occurred not only because of actual improvements, but also because the United States was worried that the Thai government was listing too far towards China. Still, one can hope that the desire to maintain Tier 2 status will encourage further Thai efforts to crack down on trafficking. 4. UN human rights rapporteur wraps up visit to Myanmar. Today, UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar Yanghee Lee concluded her first official visit to the National League for Democracy-led regime. The twelve-day visit, made at the invitation of the Myanmar government, allowed Lee to assess the progress in implementation of recommendations she had made in March to the administration, the findings of which will be released in a report to the UN General Assembly in September. Lee’s meetings with authorities and civil-society groups struck a firm but uncontroversial tone amidst an ongoing battle over words that had her previously condemned by the government and continuously reviled by radical nationalist Buddhist groups. Myanmar’s state counselor and de facto leader Aung San Suu Kyi received Lee early last week, during which Aung San Suu Kyi reiterated that the government will—and that outside entities should—avoid using “divisive” and “emotive” terms like “Bengali” and “Rohingya” to describe the persecuted Muslim minority group in western Myanmar’s Rakhine state (and rather use “Muslim community in the Rakhine state”). Lee’s delicate balancing hasn’t fully pleased either side, however, with Muslim groups lamenting her lack of commitment to them on behalf of the UN, and Buddhist groups preemptively dismissing her upcoming report as “biased.” 5. Vietnam considers motorcycle ban. As traffic congestion in Hanoi worsens, local officials have announced a plan to ban motorcycles in the city center starting in 2025. The city currently has more than 4.9 million motorcycles, with between eight and twenty thousand new ones being registered in the city each month in 2015. However, meeting growing demand for transportation will require expanding public transit systems, and Hanoi officials also intend to double the number of buses and construct two new urban rail lines. China has also begun implementing similar restrictions in recent months, banning electric bikes and limiting traffic in the nation’s congested capitol. Bonus: Falun Gong fights back on the street and in court. Flushing, NY, home to one of the largest Falun Gong followings in North America, is also now the birthplace of a Brooklyn court battle between two Chinese immigrant groups. In a federal lawsuit filed in March 2015, Falun Gong members have accused the Chinese Anti-Cult World Alliance (CACWA), a group with alleged ties to the Chinese Communist Party, of pursuing an “ongoing campaign of violent assaults, threats, intimidation, and other abuses” against them. Falun Gong practitioners are a stalwart presence on crowded Flushing streets, often handing out flyers that promote the spiritual practice and raise awareness about persecution the group faces within China. CACWA has its own counter-propaganda that refers to Falun Gong as an evil cult. Members of the two groups occasionally engage in scuffles, described as anything from “typical” New York City street arguments to “attacks,” depending on the perspective. With the final ruling impending, the latest official news is that the plaintiff’s motion to seal the case from the public record has been denied. But in a battle for hearts and minds, can there really be a winner?
    Blog Post by Guest Blogger for Asia Unbound July 1, 2016 Asia Unbound
  • China
    How Much Can We Learn From Taiwanese Inauguration Speeches?
    Pei-Yu Wei is an intern for Asia Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. The inauguration speech of Tsai Ing-Wen, the new president of Taiwan, on May 20, drew much attention from audiences both at home and abroad who hoped to glean information about the future path that Taiwan’s China policy might take. Tsai, the island’s first female president, is the leader of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), a party known for its more independent stance vis-a-vis China, and Beijing has so far regarded her rise with wariness. But how indicative are Taiwanese inaugural speeches of policies down the line? The inaugural addresses of Taiwan’s democratically elected presidents have always touched on the issue of China, from broad principles for engaging with Beijing to detailed policies. The cross-strait relationship is not only a critical challenge faced by administrations throughout the years, but also important to regional stability. However, a look back at the speeches of Taiwan’s four democratically elected presidents suggests that inaugural addresses are not necessarily a useful guide to the eventual policy pursued. Lee Teng-Hui, Taiwan’s first democratically elected president and then-chairman of the ruling Kuomintang party, noted in his 1996 inauguration speech that reunification was the common goal of both the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China.  Lee appeared to follow this policy until 1999, when he declared that bilateral ties between Beijing and Taipei should be redefined as a “special state-to-state” relationship. During his term, Lee also supported “Taiwanization,” a movement to build an identity that emphasized Taiwan instead of China or Japan, and, more contentiously, was originally part of the independence movement. Unlike Lee, Ma Ying-Jeou, who swept to victory in 2008 on a platform of establishing greater economic ties with China, did not stray from the pledges he made in his inaugural address. After a landslide victory, Ma addressed the nation and highlighted the importance of better ties between Taiwan and China. In his inaugural speech, he emphasized that the status quo reflected mainstream opinion, and that the two sides should interact based on the 1992 Consensus, a compromise of “one country, different interpretations [on both sides of the strait].” Ma also promised to normalize the cultural and economic relationship, and to open up direct flights between China and Taiwan. Even though the implementation of direct flights occurred later than scheduled, Ma did consistently follow the 1992 Consensus, the importance of which he stressed once again in his second inaugural address in 2012. Even during periods when his insistence on closer ties with Beijing, such as attempting to pass a contentious trade agreement through parliament, saw his approval drop to 9 percent in 2013, he continued to adhere to his vision. Chen Shui-Bian, Ma’s predecessor, however, strayed from his originally more centrist position on the China-Taiwan relationship. As the first DPP president-elect, it went without saying that he attracted much skepticism from China. In his inauguration speech in 2000, Chen famously put forth the “Four Nos,” a pledge that as long as Beijing had no intention of using military action on Taiwan, his administration would not do four things: declare Taiwanese independence, change the national title from the Republic of China to the Republic of Taiwan, include a doctrine of special state-to-state relations with China in the Constitution of the Republic of China, or promote or hold a referendum on unification or independence.  Just two years later, however, Chen announced in a telecast to the World Federation of Taiwanese Associations meeting that “Taiwan and China occupy the two sides [of the Taiwan Strait], and that there is one country on each side.” This drew criticism from both China and the United States; both countries considered it a departure from Chen’s earlier inaugural promise. Chen further antagonized both states when he condemned the “One China Policy” a year later. Of the three presidents before her, Tsai’s situation most closely mirrors that of Chen. Like Chen, she faces a balancing act between the dangers that China poses and the demands of the electorate. Chen may have been more ideologically motivated than Tsai, and he also faced a KMT-majority legislature and different domestic situation when inaugurated. However, it is important to consider that, like Chen, Tsai was elected on a platform that in part advocates a cautious approach to cross-strait relations, and may face pressure from her party, which holds a majority in parliament. Furthermore, Tsai will undoubtedly confront greater pressure from a populace that is not only increasingly skeptical of China, but also identifies less and less as Chinese. Good, or at least stable, relations between Beijing and Taipei will thus require a give-and-take process. In her own inauguration speech, Tsai was careful to demonstrate that she will not do anything that would veer far from the status quo.  She said she would follow the Constitution (which claims mainland China as territory of the Republic of China), but did not reference the 1992 Consensus, an omission in line with the majority opinion in Taiwan. A poll conducted this April showed that around 52 percent of those surveyed opposed basing bilateral relations with China on the 1992 Consensus, while over 60 percent said that they could not accept Beijing pressuring then-president-elect Tsai into accepting the Consensus. Beijing’s current strategy of pressuring Tsai to give in and agree with the 1992 Consensus, through actions such as holding military drills along its southeast coast, undoubtedly will backfire, as heavy-handed strategies against Taiwan usually do. This will make it even more unlikely for Tsai to come to a compromise on the Consensus. Tsai’s omission shows that she is willing to follow mainstream opinion on cross-strait relations, even when it may anger Beijing. Tsai has demonstrated that she is willing to toe the party line for now, so to speak. However, if there is not enough incentive for her to follow her inaugural promises, past experiences show that she may stray from her centrist position.
    Blog Post by Guest Blogger for Asia Unbound June 2, 2016 Asia Unbound
  • China
    Friday Asia Update: Five Stories From the Week of May 27, 2016
    Rachel Brown, Lincoln Davidson, Theresa Lou, Gabriella Meltzer, Pei-Yu Wei, and James West look at five stories from Asia this week. 1. Obama offers subtle criticisms in Vietnam. Much of the coverage of U.S. President Barack Obama’s trip to Vietnam this week centered around the lifting of the lethal weapons ban and tensions in the South China Sea. However, Obama also used his visit to address concerns surrounding human rights violations and autocratic governance in Vietnam. During remarks on Tuesday shown on Vietnamese television, Obama stressed the need to protect human rights as well as the importance of freedom of expression for innovation and economic development. He also met with a group of six civil society leaders. The following day, at a town hall meeting for the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative, Obama responded to a question on brain drain by emphasizing the need to reward talent and that the best way to do so “is to have strong rule of law.” He also highlighted the importance of reducing corruption, strengthening education, and improving air quality to keep skilled individuals at home. Some read this list as an implicit critique of current conditions in Vietnam, where cities are highly polluted and bribes for business projects can run as steep as 20 to 50 percent of total cost. Strategy will likely continue to supersede ideals in U.S.-Vietnam relations, but these recent remarks suggest there is some room for the two to coexist. 2. Taliban leader killed in U.S. drone strike. Less than a year after assuming leadership of the Taliban insurgency, Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour was killed last Saturday by a targeted air strike inside Pakistan. Mansour, a longtime deputy to reclusive founder and former leader Mullah Omar, was chosen as the group’s leader in July 2015 after it was revealed Omar had been dead since 2013. The Taliban confirmed his death on Wednesday, and announced that the leadership shura had chosen Mawlawi Haibatullah Akhundzada to succeed him. Mawlawi Haibatullah, previously one of Mansour’s two deputies, is a “respected religious cleric . . . and formerly a leading member of the Taliban judiciary.” Given Haibatullah’s credentials, his selection is seen as a move to reunite the insurgency, which has fragmented somewhat over the past year. However, he is also considered a hard-liner unlikely to reopen negotiations with the government in Kabul over reaching a political reconciliation. The location of the attack that killed Mansour is also particularly important, as it marks the first U.S. strike in Pakistan’s Balochistan province, and may signal a shift in U.S. strategy toward dealing with the insurgency. 3. South Korea seeks assistance from Pyongyang’s African partners. After visiting Iran in April, South Korean President Park Geun-hye traveled to Uganda this week as part of a twelve-day African tour to enhance Seoul’s relations with the continent. In addition to discussing measures for future cooperation, Park aimed to weaken military links between North Korea and countries such as Uganda, which have known military ties to Pyongyang. Since Kampala established diplomatic relations with Pyongyang in 1963, its forces have received training from North Korean military personnel. Uganda is also one of the “resilient nations” that imports arms from North Korea despite UN Security Council sanctions. Park hopes that she can enlist countries such as Uganda—as well as Kenya and Ethiopia, both of which also have historical military ties to North Korea and are on Park’s list of destinations—to help starve North Korea of the financial resources that the regime’s weapons program requires. 4. Indonesian child laborers suffer from nicotine poisoning. A report released by Human Rights Watch on Tuesday reveals that thousands of children working in tobacco fields in Indonesia have nicotine poisoning, are being exposed to toxic pesticides, and perform dangerous physical labor. Children as young as eight years old, primarily on the country’s main island of Java, suffer from “green tobacco sickness,” whose symptoms include nausea, vomiting, headaches, and dizziness as a result of nicotine seeping through skin from wet tobacco plants. In addition, pesticide exposure is associated with respiratory issues, cancer, depression, neurological disorders, and reproductive health problems. The vast majority of Indonesia’s over 500,000 tobacco farms are family-owned enterprises based on 2.5 acres of land or less, and the product is sold on the open market—conditions that make it virtually impossible to source an ethical supply chain. Indonesia is the fifth-largest tobacco producer, and the International Labor Organization estimates that over 1.5 million Indonesian children ages ten through seventeen work on farms in similarly hazardous conditions. 5. Chinese official criticizes Tsai for being “emotional” because she is single. A Chinese official at the People’s Liberation Army’s Academy of Military Sciences has blasted Taiwan’s new president Tsai Ing-wen as unfit to lead because she had never married. Tsai, who was sworn in as president last Saturday, is Taiwan’s first female politician to hold the office. The International Herald Leader, a newspaper affiliated with the state-run Xinhua News Agency, published an opinion piece on Tuesday written by Wang Weixing, who is also a board member of the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS). The article noted that Tsai’s political style and decisions “tend to be emotional, personal, and extreme” because “from a humanist perspective, as a single female politician, [Tsai] doesn’t bear the burdens of emotional love, family constraints, or child rearing.” The editorial also observed that Tsai had only a “simple” history of relationships, with just one known boyfriend. These factors supposedly contribute to her aggressive political style and support for Taiwanese independence. The article has since been removed from all Chinese news portals that carried the story amidst an outcry from both Chinese and Taiwanese citizens. Tsai’s rise has been regarded with wariness by Chinese authorities. Bonus: China’s five thousand years of (beer) history. When most think of Chinese beer, the first name that usually comes to mind is Tsingtao, a mildly hoppy pilsner brewed in Shandong since the early 1900s. Its history is complicated, however, by the fact that it was founded by a group of German and English industrialists who had rushed into China’s treaty ports as the Qing dynasty slowly crumbled. Despite an abortive attempt in the 1950s to promote local breweries, the beverage never caught on in China to the same extent as in Western markets, and per capita consumption is still less than half of that in the United States. But new evidence suggests that beer was first brewed in China not a century ago, but five thousand years ago. Pottery unearthed by archaeologists was recently found to contain traces of grains and tubers used in fermenting beer. Another glorious invention of Chinese civilization!
    Blog Post by Guest Blogger for Asia Unbound May 27, 2016 Asia Unbound
  • China
    Friday Asia Update: Five Stories From the Week of May 20, 2016
    Rachel Brown, Lincoln Davidson, Theresa Lou, Gabriella Meltzer, Ayumi Teraoka, and Gabriel Walker look at five stories from Asia this week. 1. Sri Lanka reeling from massive flooding and mudslides. Sri Lanka is currently experiencing its heaviest rains in twenty-five years, leading to flooding and landslides that have devastated twenty-one out of the country’s twenty-five districts. The death toll as of today has reached nearly seventy people, over 300,000 have been displaced from their homes, and 220 families are still reported missing beneath the mud, which in some places reaches up to thirty feet. The Sri Lankan army is working tirelessly to relocate communities to roughly 600 temporary shelters across the country housed in schools and temples, as well as to provide food and clean water. More rains are expected to come with the approach of the cyclical monsoon season from May through September in the south, followed by one in the north from December through February. On Thursday, Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera commented that there will be an urgent, long-term need for water purification tablets, water pumps, and drinking water following the disaster. 2. Tsai Ing-wen assumes presidency of the Republic of China. On Friday, Tsai, a former law professor who is the leader of Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), was inaugurated as the first woman and second DPP member to serve as president of the island. In her inauguration address (transcript, recording), Tsai made it clear that addressing economic challenges—like youth unemployment and a risk of falling behind in regional integration—would be the first task of her presidency. She also advocated recalibrating cross-Strait relations with a recognition that both Taiwan and mainland China are in very different positions than they were twenty-five years ago. It takes two to tango, though, and it’s not clear Beijing is on board. Tsai and the DPP-controlled legislature have a difficult task ahead, and failure to deliver on campaign promises may lead to disillusionment, particularly among youth. Despite this, Tsai’s election—concurrent with the first non-Kuomintang (Taiwan’s other major party) majority in the legislature—is a reminder that Taiwanese democracy has matured and consolidated since the transition from Kuomintang dictatorship in the late 1980s. 3. Trafficking of Vietnamese women expands across Asia. The patterns of movement for women and girls trafficked from Vietnam to other parts of Asia are shifting. According to the Pacific Links Foundation, which works on counter-trafficking in the Asia-Pacific region, the majority of victims end up in China as brides, factory laborers, or prostitutes. Other destinations, including Cambodia and Malaysia, have also become increasingly common. Chinese demand for Vietnamese brides is largely attributed to skewed gender ratios that persist as a result of the one-child policy and historical preferences for sons. New concerns have also emerged that greater economic integration between ASEAN nations will lead not only to money and goods circulating more freely, but also to traffickers operating more easily. Trafficking patterns within Vietnam itself are also changing; historically many women and girls were taken from northern provinces near the Chinese border, but now trafficking appears to be originating in sites across the country. The use of violence and drugging by abduction networks has also increased. 4. Public distrust mounts as Tokyo governor’s scandals grow. Controversies continued this week surrounding the Tokyo Metropolitan Governor Yoichi Masuzoe’s alleged use of public funds for personal items—ranging from using an official vehicle almost every weekend for family trips to purchasing oil paintings online. The manner in which Masuzoe dealt with these allegations only exacerbated the situation: he first admitted the use of 450,000 yen ($4,000) for hotel stays and use of high-end restaurants last week, and then further admitted to using political funds for paintings and other “research materials” to the tune of more than 9 million yen ($82,000) this week. Masuzoe has also spent 213 million yen ($1.9 million) on overseas trips in his two years in office, more than double that spent by one of his predecessors, Shintaro Ishihara. Senior officials from the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, which backed Masuzoe in the 2014 gubernatorial election, expressed criticism as they prepare for the upcoming national election this summer. Despite a total of 4,600 angry telephone calls and emails, including some demanding his resignation, Masuzoe insists on staying in office and regaining “trust through my work.” Masuzoe announced today that his expense reports will henceforth be scrutinized by third-party lawyers. Yet given the fact that Masuzoe’s predecessor, Naoki Inose, quickly resigned over allegations of election fundraising irregularities, it will likely take more than third-party involvement to regain public trust if Masuzoe wishes to stay in office. 5. North Korea losing faith in its sole ally. Recent interviews of North Koreans hint that the Hermit Kingdom may be increasingly paranoid about China, the North’s most important patron. Forged on the fronts of the Korean War, the relationship between North Korea and China has traditionally been referred to as close as “lips and teeth.” But relations have deteriorated. Pyongyang’s brazen behavior—such as the nuclear test in January and repeated missile launches—have reduced Beijing’s tolerance, evidenced by China’s support for the adoption of the strongest-ever sanctions against North Korea in UN Security Council Resolution 2270. President Xi Jinping’s unprecedented decision to visit South Korea twice before having first visited North Korea exemplifies Xi’s displeasure toward Kim Jong-un. And the feeling seems mutual. Kim is reportedly wary that China will “trade away [North Korea’s] interests” for other strategic benefits. Though strained ties between the two countries is almost certainly bad news for North Korea, which depends heavily on China for food and fuel, it offers a unique window of opportunity for further U.S.-China cooperation on addressing the North Korean issue. Bonus: Red is the color of love. Some traditional Chinese marriage practices date back thousands of years—and others are just being invented. This week, groom Li Yunpeng and bride Chen Xuanchi commemorated their wedding night by hand-copying the Communist Party of China’s (CPC) constitution. Their hard work was about more than romance, however: it was a studious effort to follow the nationwide “Copy the CPC Constitution for 100 days” campaign that is encouraging party members to transcribe the more than 15,000-character document and post pictures of their results online. A broad national education campaign focusing on the study of the CPC constitution launched in February targets party members with “wavering confidence in communism and socialism with Chinese characteristics” and “those who advocate Western values, violate Party rules, work inefficiently or behave unethically.” Though it is unclear whether Li and Chen actually finished copying the document, it is unlikely anyone will doubt the couple’s revolutionary fervor and work ethic after seeing their wedding photos. And luckily they should still have the first ninety-nine days of their married life to finish the grueling task.
    Blog Post by Guest Blogger for Asia Unbound May 20, 2016 Asia Unbound
  • Global
    The World Next Week: May 12, 2016
    Podcast
    The new president of Taiwan is inaugurated, the Sykes-Picot Agreement centennial is marked, and the UN Security Council takes on a mission to Somalia.
    Podcast with James M. Lindsay and Robert McMahon May 12, 2016 The World Next Week
  • China
    Friday Asia Update: Five Stories From the Week of April 29, 2016
    Rachel Brown, Lincoln Davidson, Gabriella Meltzer, Gabriel Walker, and Pei-Yu Wei look at five stories from Asia this week. 1. Afghan female athletes forced to the sidelines. Despite annual donations to the tune of $1.5 million from the American government and other Western donors to women’s sports in Afghanistan, these programs have proven to be an abject failure in the promotion of women’s empowerment and equal participation. The efforts have been riddled by corruption; the cricket program “consist[s] of little more than a young woman with a business card and a desk” and the women’s soccer team has not played an international match in years. The most corruption has been in women’s cycling. The cycling program was originally hailed as a model for women’s sports in the Middle East defying prevailing gender norms. However, the National Olympic Committee terminated its coach and manager, Haji Abdul Sediq, once it was revealed that he had married and divorced three young athletes during his tenure. Another rampant problem is growing violence against women in a conservative, patriarchal culture where many women do not feel safe to publicly train and instead often leave the country to pursue their athletic ambitions. Shamila Kohestani, an Afghan soccer star who aspired to return to Kabul to coach, commented that Afghan officials’ support for women’s sports programs was motivated more by their popularity with donors than a belief in female athletes. 2. U.S. Justice Department asserts its oversight over espionage cases. In a private letter to federal prosecutors around the country, Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates wrote that all cases relating to U.S. national security would require “coordination and oversight in Washington.” Although that procedure had always been intended, the explicitness of Yates’ letter was likely due to a growing number of botched espionage cases against Chinese-Americans over the past two years. Among the most prominent were cases—all of which were later dismissed—against two pharmaceutical scientists accused of leaking proprietary information to a Chinese drug manufacturer, a hydrologist accused of stealing national dam data, and a physics professor accused of sharing U.S. superconductor technology with China. But at the same time, there have also been real cases of recent espionage against the United States by Chinese nationals, including Su Bin, who tried to steal information on the F-22 and F-35 jets, and Mo Hailong, who conspired to steal corn seeds engineered by DuPont Pioneer and Monsanto from an Iowa field. Just yesterday, a Chinese businesswoman was indicted for procuring underwater drone equipment for the People’s Liberation Army Navy. Hopefully, increased Washington oversight means fewer legal mistakes for cases that may be driven more by suspicion than actual facts. 3. China reasserts control over web. As China’s National People’s Congress passed a law restricting the activities of non-governmental organizations in China, the Chinese government also reasserted its control of the Internet. On April 19, Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping convened a meeting with top officials and heads of technology companies, where he said that “the fact that core technology is controlled by others is our greatest hidden danger.” Chinese leaders have long expressed fears that the United States uses technology companies to spy on the rest of the world. According to the Wall Street Journal, the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), the country’s chief Internet regulator, put forward a proposal this week that the government take a financial stake in major domestic technology companies and be given a seat on the companies’ governing boards. Meanwhile, CAC Director Lu Wei met with his Russian counterpart at the first China-Russia Cyberspace Development and Security Forum in Moscow. At the meeting, Igor Shchegolev, Russia’s top Internet regulator, echoed the Chinese position on technology, reportedly saying that to protect national interests, Russia “can’t rely on transnational IT firms.” As the two governments come together to promote a norm of “cyber sovereignty” in opposition to the norm of openness online promoted by the United States, it remains to be seen if other countries will join them. 4. Papua New Guinea shuts down asylum detention center. Australia’s asylum processing system faced new challenges this week following a ruling by Papua New Guinea’s Supreme Court to close the Manus Island detention center hosted for Australia. Papua New Guinea’s prime minister confirmed the decision, creating a dilemma for Australia over whether to relocate the approximately eight hundred and fifty asylum seekers held on the island. Australia operates a much-criticized policy of “offshore processing” for refugees in which prospective asylum seekers are sent to small Pacific islands. The government argues that this deters migrants from embarking on perilous ocean journeys to Australia.  The Australian and Papua New Guinean governments are currently debating who has responsibility in the case. One option would be for Australia to relocate asylum seekers to other detention sites at Christmas Island or Nauru. Troubles also exist on the latter island, however, which hosts over four hundred and fifty asylum seekers in an open camp. A twenty-three year-old Iranian man detained on Nauru died today after setting himself on fire in protest of camp conditions. These two incidents may force Australia to rethink its immigration policies. 5. Party organizers receive jail time in Taiwan.  The organizer of a “Color Play Party” that caused a fire at a Taiwanese water park last June was sentenced to four years and ten months in prison. The party, which took place at Formosa Water Park in New Taipei City, featured colored powders  sprayed into an audience of roughly one thousand guests. A subsequent explosion killed fifteen and injured more than four hundred party goers. Some victims sustained burns to over 80 percent of their bodies. Lu Chung-Chi, owner of Color Play Asia, which organized the party, was found guilty on April 26 of negligence causing death. The families of the victims and many members of the public thought that the sentence was too light, but prosecutors said that under Taiwanese law the maximum prison sentence for workplace negligence is five years and so four years and ten months is comparatively harsh. Relatives of the deceased were also angry that Lu was the only person indicted over the fire and eight other park executives were not charged due to lack of evidence. Some family members protested outside the courthouse on Tuesday. Taiwan’s high prosecutor’s office has ordered the case to be reopened and for the district prosecutors to reexamine the culpability of other suspects in the tragedy. Bonus: Movie studios “whitewash” Asian characters. Upcoming movie adaptations of books have drawn ire in recent weeks following announcements that characters who are Asian in the books will be played by white actresses. Major Motoko Kusanagi, the main character of the Japanese manga, TV show, and animated movie series Ghost in the Shell, will be played by Scarlett Johansson in the show’s live-action adaptation. Marvel Studios’ movie adaptation of the Doctor Strange comics will likewise feature a character who is a Tibetan man in the original being played by Tilda Swinton, a white woman. Critics have accused the studios of continuing the Hollywood tradition of reducing the role of Asian characters in film. Producers of both films argue the casting decision is a business imperative. Ghost in the Shell screenwriter Max Landis defended Johansson’s casting with the argument that “there are no A-list female Asian celebrities right now on an international level.” And Doctor Strange writer Robert Cargill suggested that casting a Tibetan would be too sensitive for the Chinese market.
    Blog Post by Guest Blogger for Asia Unbound April 29, 2016 Asia Unbound
  • China
    Taiwan’s WHA Status in Limbo
    The World Health Assembly (WHA), the executive body of the World Health Organization (WHO), will convene on May 23-28 in Geneva. While member states have received invitations to participate in this year’s WHA, the only assurance Taiwan has received from the WHO Secretariat is that “internal operations were ongoing.” Why is the invitation letter from WHO of any significance to Taiwan?  Well, over the past twenty years, the Republic of China (Taiwan) has been seeking to rejoin the WHO and WHA.  But it was not until 2009—following Mr. Ma Ying-jeou’s electoral victory and the rapid warming of cross-strait relations—that goodwill from the mainland China or People’s Republic of China (PRC) enabled ROC to participate in the WHA as an observer under the title “Chinese Taipei.”  Because it was the first time since its withdrawal from the United Nations (UN) in 1971 that ROC formally participated in a UN organization, this move was viewed as a milestone in cross-strait relations, as well as Taiwan’s quest for international space. Maybe it is still too early for Taiwan to be seriously concerned about its WHA participation this year—in the past, an official invitation to WHA could arrive as late as May.  Still, amidst the uncertainties surrounding the cross-strait relations after Mame. Tsai Ing-wen’s successful bid for the presidency in January, few would remain optimistic that Taiwan’s continuous participation in WHA is a matter of course. In a recent meeting with a delegation of the Council on Foreign Relations, Minister Andrew Hsia of the Mainland Affairs Council (the agency charged with PRC relations) pointed out a slew of developments since mid-March that had made his job even more daunting.  On March 17, China resumed diplomatic ties with Gambia, a former Taiwan ally, ending an unofficial “diplomatic truce” that had suspended PRC’s efforts to poach Taiwan’s twenty-three diplomatic allies. This was followed by its rejection of Taiwan’s bid to become a founding member of the Beijing-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.  On April 11, news broke that eight Taiwanese involved in a telecom fraud in Kenya (which does not have diplomatic relations with Taiwan) were deported to PRC, rather than their homeland. One week later, ROC representatives were expelled from a high-level international steel symposium held in Brussels under alleged pressure from Beijing. These developments, including the delayed invitation from the WHO, are viewed widely in Taipei as signs of Beijing’s hardening stance on Taiwan.  In the eyes of many watchers of cross-strait relations, they are warnings aimed at putting pressure on President-elect Tsai to stick to the so-called “1992 Consensus,” which insists that both Taiwan and mainland China are inalienable parts of a single “China.” Whether or not that insinuation tactic will work remains to be seen, but one thing is clear— it will undermine President Ma’s greatest legacy in cross-strait relations. When receiving the Council on Foreign Relations delegation on April 12, President Ma spent much of the time talking about his accomplishments in promoting cross-strait peace and stability over the past eight years. Tightening the diplomatic screws on Taiwan while Ma is still in office has not only shown how fragile cross-strait relations are, but has also done a disservice to Ma’s efforts to defend his record in handling cross-strait relations. It may further alienate the Taiwan public when support for an independent Taiwanese identity is at an all-time high.  According to a 2015 poll, 90 percent of respondents would identify themselves as “Taiwanese” rather than “Chinese” if they were to choose between the two. As PRC ramps up pressure on ROC, a growing sense of victimhood in Taiwan may further narrow Tsai’s space for political maneuver, encouraging her to jettison Ma’s policy on cross-strait relations and actively quest for Taiwan international space, even though she may still prefer to sustain the existing constitutional order. Already, Tsai has indicated that her administration would reassess the agreements Ma’s administration had reached with the mainland. To many leaders of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), PRC did not really give up much when Taiwan was granted observer status in WHA. As early as 2005, China signed a memo with the WHO Secretariat purportedly stipulating that all exchanges between Taiwan and the WHO have to be approved by Beijing. As chairwoman of the opposition DPP, Tsai then lambasted Ma’s decision to participate in WHA under “Chinese Taipei,” saying that while Taiwan was able to maintain its sovereign status when negotiating the joining of APEC, Asian Development Bank, and the World Trade Organization, Ma had paid too high a price in Taiwan’s sovereignty for a dubious gain in WHA participation. The observer status in WHA, she contended, was no different from an NGO affiliated with PRC. To be sure, if diplomatic activism were to be rekindled by either side, China’s economic clout and international prestige would make Taiwan’s efforts to keep any of its remaining twenty-two diplomatic allies (not to mention winning over even one from China) an uphill battle. The so-called diplomatic truce hinges more upon goodwill from PRC; in game theoretical terms, the truce is unstable and unsustainable because it is not a Nash equilibrium in which no player has anything to gain by deviating from the existing strategy. Still, by playing “tit for tat,” ROC can cause more diplomatic trouble to PRC. It could take advantage of the growing international sympathy to beef up its soft power, which happens to be China’s Achilles heel despite the latter’s near one decade’s worth of tremendous investment in this area.  It may also lobby for more active participation in international organizations where universality is critical to their effectiveness. Indeed, the need to include every country (region) to forge a seamless global framework against transborder spread of acute disease outbreaks means that states will have to cede sovereignty to a certain extent in specific cases in order to ensure the adequate provision of health security as a global public good. Taiwan’s odds are pretty good at a time when Washington is disappointed with the lack of reciprocity from China in bilateral relations. Last month, President Obama signed a bill supporting Taiwan’s observer status in the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol). In that sense, it would be diplomatically more productive for PRC to map out a strategy on how to use the WHA model as a template in preparing for ROC’s future access to other global bodies rather than use its gatekeeper status in Taiwan’s WHA participation to marginalize Taiwan in global diplomacy. The effectiveness and replicability of the model, though, depend on whether leaders on both sides can agree upon a new political formula as flexible as the 1992 Consensus to anchor the future cross-strait dynamics.
    Blog Post by Yanzhong Huang April 27, 2016 Asia Unbound