Philippines

Richard Javad Heydarian is an assistant professor in political science at De La Salle University in Manila. His latest book is "Asia’s New Battlefield: The US, China, and the Struggle for Western Pacific." The Philippines’ new president, former Davao mayor Rodrigo Duterte, won last week in a five-way vote. His tough-talking style, effective social media campaign, and vows to reduce the power of the country’s elite and crack down on crime resonated enough to deliver him the win. Promises to give political autonomy and fiscal resources to peripheral regions also helped with many voters, especially in the central and southern Philippines. Overall, Duterte captured a large plurality (38.5 percent) of votes cast, with much of his support from Manila and its outskirts, Cebu (his paternal homeland), and the island of Mindanao, where Davao is the largest city. In a single-round, first-past-the-post system, where reformist voters were split between Senator Grace Poe and former Interior Minister Mar Roxas, this was enough to give Duterte a clear victory. But who is Duterte? His critics have compared him to Donald Trump, while supporters describe him as the Lee Kuan Yew of the Philippines. But neither comparison holds much water. Unlike the real estate mogul from New York, Duterte boasts more than two decades of actual political experience. He is widely credited for transforming, albeit with an iron fist, the Hobbesian city of Davao into a (supposedly) ‘Switzerland of Mindanao’. Yet, Duterte is also no Lee Kuan Yew. The late Singaporean leader, a Cambridge-trained lawyer, was polished and sophisticated, both an effective domestic leader and a diplomat and statesman. Although Lee Kuan Yew could be blunt when discussing Singaporean politics, he was skilled in working with neighbors and major foreign powers like Japan and the United States. In addition, Lee Kuan Yew managed a city-state a tiny fraction of the size of the Philippines. Duterte, in contrast, is known for his intemperate outbursts, which have already scared some investors and worried some of the Philippines’ foreign partners. During the campaign, he vowed to form a “revolutionary government” if he could not pass legislation he wanted, and just in the past week he has promised to be a “dictator” against crime and to bring back the death penalty to be used against a wide range of criminals. In fact, Duterte vowed to hang criminals twice. He also will have to govern a nation of hundred million people and navigate difficult rural-urban dynamics and entrenched socioeconomic inequalities. As a result, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi could serve as a better comparison for Duterte, in terms of the challenges Duterte faces and the bulldozer style Duterte employs. Like Modi, Duterte will face both enormous challenges and the difficulty of balancing expectations he created among his supporters with the reality that combating entrenched interests will take significant time. Indeed, Duterte faces the difficult balancing act of reassuring investors, civil society leaders worried about some of his promises on crime and international partners, on one hand, and continuing with the tough talk and rapid action that has attracted his supporters. A look at his potential presidential cabinet, which is set to be filled by a ‘team of rivals’ of communists, technocrats and military men, reflects Duterte’s desire to signal simultaneous continuity as well as radical change in both the domestic and international realms. Domestically, he is expected to focus on infrastructure development, suppression of crime, and effective tax collection, while maintaining many of the Aquino administration’s macroeconomic policies, which helped deliver six years of strong growth. Externally, he is expected to transform the Philippines’ foreign policy into one less reliant on ties with the United States and more willing to balance between Washington and Beijing. For Duterte, a realist at heart, safety and development come first. By launching a comprehensive anticrime initiative, he hopes to create the basic security that would undergird long-term development. On multiple occasions, he also has telegraphed his willingness to launch direct dialogue with China, explore joint development agreements in the South China Sea, and invite large-scale Chinese infrastructure investments in the country. He apparently hopes that Manila and Beijing can settle their disputes over the South China Sea amicably, and that Chinese companies are interested in heavily investing in the Philippines. The biggest challenge for Duterte, however, is the lingering fear among many Filipinos that he is a dictator-in-the-making. No less than the outgoing president, Benigno Aquino, has made such accusation. Human rights groups, members of the security establishment, as well as the Catholic Church have also been alarmed by Duterte’s rhetoric and track record in Davao. Thus, the moment Duterte tries to dramatically reconfigure the country’s institutional checks and balances, it is reasonable to expect a huge political backlash and a concerted pushback by his legions of supporters. For now, however, there is cautious optimism that Duterte’s more pragmatic dimension will prevail. Without a doubt, the Philippines has entered a new period of uncertainty, filled with high hopes and deep fears.

Ashlyn Anderson, Rachel Brown, Theresa Lou, Gabriella Meltzer, and Gabriel Walker look at five stories from Asia this week. 1. Philippine congress gains its first transgender member. Despite the country’s discriminatory laws against gay and transgender people, Liberal Party candidate Geraldine Roman received more than 60 percent of the vote in her home province of Bataan in northern Philippines. Roman comes from a long line of politicians, and will take the congressional seat occupied by her mother during the previous three terms. Campaigning on promises to improve public hospitals and roads and fight for equal opportunity for all, Roman insists that she is not a “novelty candidate” and seeks to continue her family’s legacy of public service. Roman will also push for an anti-discrimination bill and an end to the law that prevents transgender Filipinos from changing their names and genders. Overcoming “bigotry, hatred, and discrimination,” she also hopes that her election will inspire other LGBT Filipinos to consider government service. 2. Economists offer “Twilight Zone” monetary policies to salvage Japanese economy. Despite years of economic stimulus under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Japan is still fighting on all fronts against low GDP growth, stagnant prices, weak consumer spending, and other economic woes. Recently, Japanese and foreign economists have put forth some far-fetched prescriptions heretofore relegated to textbooks and academic journals. These ideas include “helicopter money,” which would require the Bank of Japan to essentially print free money for the government to spend on infrastructure projects and stimulus measures, and various methods of incentivizing corporate and consumer spending like taxing low-risk assets and setting negative interest rates on deposits. But each of these approaches bears inherent risks, and none is a surefire way of boosting growth. For example, recent negative interest rates on some deposits have done nothing to depreciate the Yen (which would boost Japanese exports), and the currency in fact has surged in the past two months, contrary to expectations. A number of prominent economists have suggested giving “helicopter money” a try, potentially as a last resort, but the approach has no precedent and could possibly be illegal by trespassing upon the division of fiscal and monetary responsibilities within the government. Whatever the Abe administration’s next step may be, it seems there is no simple solution—desperate times call for desperate measures. 3. Kim Jong-un promises “a responsible nuclear state.” The seventh congress of the North Korean Workers’ party (WPK)—the first of such meeting in thirty-six years—ended without much fanfare. As was expected, Kim Jong-un officially assumed the title of chairman of the WPK and consolidated his control over the Hermit Kingdom. After celebrating his country’s nuclear accomplishments, Kim claimed that North Korea is a responsible nuclear state and “will not use nuclear weapons first unless aggressive hostile forces use nuclear weapons to invade on our sovereignty.” Given Pyongyang’s history of issuing nuclear threats—including a recent propaganda video depicting a nuclear strike on Washington—and brazen weapon tests, regional actors are wary of taking Kim’s statement at face value. The young leader also announced a vague five-year plan to develop his country’s moribund economy in hopes that “his people will never have to tighten their belt again.” Pyongyang’s insistence on building up its nuclear arsenal, however, is part of downward spiral toward isolation. The regime’s efforts to establish legitimacy through its nuclear weapons program has brought forth rounds of economic sanctions and further estranged North Korea from the global economy. 4. Bangladesh opposition leader executed. Motiur Rahman Nizami, leader of the biggest Islamic party in Bangladesh, Jamaat-e-Islami, was executed on Wednesday. Jamaat-e-Islami opposed Bangladesh’s separation from Pakistan, and was for a time banned from Bangladeshi politics. He was convicted of carrying out acts of genocide, including murder and rape, during Bangladesh’s war for independence in 1971, and for establishing a militia that engaged in torture and assisted Pakistani forces in killing independence supporters. Extra police were deployed in Dhaka after the hanging to handle potential riots. Nizami is the fifth opposition leader executed based on verdicts of Bangladesh’s controversial war crimes tribunal. Many international bodies have critiqued the trials as unfair and not presenting the accused with sufficient opportunities for defense. The most recent execution has strained some of Bangladesh’s diplomatic ties. Turkey called its ambassador home for consultations and Pakistan described the hanging as “unfortunate” and summoned the Bangladeshi ambassador. The legacies of the bloody civil war are still far from resolved, and the execution may also revive internal debates in Bangladesh. 5. Climate change swallows five Pacific islands. A study released this week in Environmental Research Letters has demonstrated the devastating impact that climate change will have on low-lying islands across the Pacific region in the coming years. Using time series aerial and satellite imaging from 1947 through 2014 over thirty-three vegetated reef Solomon Islands, Australian researchers made the unfortunate discovery that five islands were completely submerged by rising sea levels driven by anthropogenic climate change. An additional six islands have lost over 20 percent of their inhabitable surface area, forcing families to abandon their communities, relocate to higher ground, and potentially stir conflict over traditional property rights. The greatest concern surrounds Taro Island, which “may become the first provincial capital on the planet that people desert due to climate change,” and will force the relocation and reconfiguration of entire health, security, infrastructure, and education systems. Bonus: Queen calls Chinese officials “very rude.” The “golden era” in UK-China relations lost some glimmer this week after a conversation was caught on video between Queen Elizabeth and Lucy D’Orsi, who directed security during Xi Jinping’s state visit to the United Kingdom last fall. The Queen remarked that the Chinese were “very rude to the ambassador” when they walked out of a meeting, and noted what “bad luck” it was to be in charge of the visit’s security. This isn’t the first royal China gaffe: in a leaked diary describing the Hong Kong handover ceremony in 1997, Prince Charles described Chinese leaders as a “group of appalling old wax works.”  Most news of the Queen’s remarks was censored in China, but the Global Times later ran an editorial calling the Western media “full of reckless ‘gossip fiends’ who bare their fangs and brandish their claws and are very narcissistic, retaining the bad manners of ‘barbarians.’”  It seems that all sides could stand to brush up on their manners.

With Rodrigo Duterte now officially confirmed as the winner of the Philippines’ presidential election last Monday, it is time for some brief thoughts on the immediate implications of his victory. Duterte will now try to win a mass of defectors from the president’s party. Although the Liberal Party performed reasonably well in some local elections, political parties in the Philippines are notoriously weak, which is one reason why charismatic figures like Duterte and celebrities are able to win higher office. Expect the president-elect to try to win over large numbers of Liberal Party members who won local elections earlier in the week. Duterte is not going to focus on foreign affairs; he might not be as accommodating to China as some suggest, but he is also not going to prioritize the conflict in the South China Sea---no matter what he said on the campaign trail about jet skiing to contested waters to reinforce Philippine claims. Like President Joko Widodo in Indonesia, Duterte has been elected with a mandate to focus on domestic issues, principally inequality, perceived needs for political reform, and crime. He has already promised to continue many of President Aquino III’s macroeconomic policies. He is a mayor, and he will likely stick to these domestic challenges. He is unlikely to just jettison Manila’s South China Sea arbitration case, as some Philippine and U.S. commentators have feared; the case is near completion, and the decision will probably be released this summer. Duterte surely realizes that if Manila wins, it will be a boon for the Philippines’ claims. Even if he ultimately wants to take a more accommodating stance---which would surely worry the United States and other partners---and work more closely with China in resolving South China Sea claims, winning the arbitration might provide some leverage. Duterte is going to press hard for major reforms to the Philippine political system. The president-elect surely understands that the idea of changing to a parliamentary, more decentralized system is popular with most voters, and also might help entrench his rule in the long run. In addition, there are substantial, serious arguments to be made for switching to a parliamentary system or some kind of hybrid presidential/parliamentary system. Such a switch would potentially empower more regions of the country, foster wider development, reduce the influence of a small number of political elites, and eventually make for stronger and more ideologically coherent political parties. Getting there---reforming the constitution---will however be extraordinarily difficult. And while Duterte’s at it, he might consider changing the laws on the presidential election to mandate runoffs, French-style, so that the winner has to take at least the majority of the votes. Leni Robredo makes an unlikely coup-plotter. Leni Robredo, who appears to be the next vice president, is a left-leaning social activist, lawyer, and politician. She is renowned for her advocacy for better governance. Although it is true that, in the Philippines, previous vice presidents have collaborated with the military and helped facilitate presidents’ downfalls, putting the vice president in office, Robredo is hardly close to military elites. She is also a member of the Liberal Party---where top leaders remember the many attempted coups against Aquino’s mother.

As the Philippines ushers in the presidency of Rodrigo Duterte, the longtime mayor of Davao, the country is poised for dramatic changes from the leadership of Benigno Aquino III. Aquino’s tenure was generally stable, and he oversaw the longest sustained period of growth the country had enjoyed in decades. Aquino rhetorically touted the need to retain strong democratic institutions, and he also used typical political methods of trying to achieve policy successes: he consulted with advisors, unveiled policy platforms, and then tried to build support for them in the legislature and with the public. His persona was rarely controversial. Yet even as he tried to combat corruption and oversaw high growth, Aquino achieved only modest success in reducing income inequality, long one of the most significant problems in the country. Despite new cash transfer programs, inequality in the archipelago has grown in the past three years, according to Patricio Abinales of the University of Hawaii. Indeed, he notes, despite consistent growth rates of six percent or above during Aquino’s tenure:   “Job-generation has not caught up. Unemployment continues to hover between 6 and 6.6 per cent. The Philippine poverty rate remains one of the highest in Asia at 16.6 per cent, while income inequality has worsened in the last three years, though the remittances of overseas Filipino workers---which rose to a high of US$28.4 billion in 2014---mitigate this sad portrait."   Duterte, a charismatic speaker who affects a Hollywood-style tough guy persona, took advantage of the perceived failures of Aquino’s tenure. He touted his anticrime record in Davao, even if that record included condoning extrajudicial killings of suspects, according to Human Rights Watch. He emphasized that he would fight inequality and would take on Manila’s economic and political elites, at one point claiming that he would establish a “revolutionary government” as president. With five presidential candidates dividing the vote, and Aquino failing to broker a unity ticket between the two candidates closest to him, Senator Grace Poe and Interior Minister Mar Roxas, Duterte only had to win between 30 and 40 percent of the vote to triumph. On Monday, he took nearly 39 percent of the vote, good enough to win (according to unofficial election results). Poe took 21 percent and Roxas took 23 percent---perhaps making Aquino wonder why he waited so long to publicly call for a unity strategy in which Poe or Roxas dropped out and supported the other. (Although the Philippines’ presidency has substantial powers, there is no runoff to ensure that the winner gets a majority of votes, as there is in some nations like France.) What will Duterte actually do as president? He has no national level policy experience. His campaign speeches were usually light on policy specifics; appearing before Manila’s most prominent business group just before the election, Duterte offered few details on economic proposals but repeated his promise, delivered often during campaign season, to have criminals killed without due process. Domestic and foreign investors are worried; the last time the Philippines had a president who seemed as uninterested in economic policy, Joseph Estrada, growth stagnated, popular protests forced him from office, and Estrada eventually went to jail on graft charges. But at the same time, Duterte has established a record, in Davao, of promoting investment and growth, where he relinquished significant control over economic policy-making to technocrats, and oversaw significant infrastructure development. As Reuters reported, under Duterte, it took fewer days to start a business in Davao than in Manila, and the Davao region grew even faster than the rest of the country over the past five years. Despite his populist pledges on the campaign trail, it seems more likely that Duterte will focus his presidency on crime, corruption, and national security and maintain the Aquino administration’s moderate, pro-investment economic policies. In addition, Duterte has pledged to work to pass and implement the peace agreement for the restive south launched by the Aquino administration. With his record as a southern mayor, Duterte could be just the figure needed to convince both the remaining militant holdouts, and Filipinos from other parts of the country, that the peace agreement is worth passing. The deal could foster greater stability in the south and unlock Mindanao’s vast economic potential. However, as I have written, Duterte’s rise---and now his election---is a very troubling sign for the country’s politics, and for democracy in Southeast Asia overall. In some ways, Duterte resembles other elected autocrats in the region and elsewhere, like Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen or former Thai prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who notably presided over his own “war on drugs” that included reports of thousands of extrajudicial killings---leaders who cared only about winning elections, after which they would undermine or destroy legal and constitutional institutions of democracy. In the run-up to Election Day, Duterte gave no signs that he would moderate his antidemocratic promises, like presiding over the killing of criminals or trying to pass policies without working through the legislature. Even if Duterte turns out to be an economic moderate, his election raises the prospect that another of the success stories of the third wave of global democratization will slide back into authoritarianism.

Ashlyn Anderson, Rachel Brown, Lincoln Davidson, and Gabriella Meltzer look at five stories from Asia this week. 1. Duterte ahead in Philippine pre-election polls. Leading candidate Rodrigo Duterte is currently the mayor of Davao city on the southern island of Mindanao, where he is considered to have effectively cracked down on crime and improved the local economy. Duterte has pledged to do the same for the nation if elected and and to act decisively as president. He leads in current opinion polls with roughly 32 percent of the vote, and is trailed by Senator Grace Poe with 25 percent, and Interior Minister Mar Roxas with 22 percent. In the vice-presidential race, Ferdinand Marcos Jr., the son of the nation’s previous dictator, leads in polls. Duterte has stirred up considerable controversy during the campaign, however, earning him comparisons to Donald Trump. The Economist magazine called Duterte’s candidacy “downright alarming.” Among his questionable remarks were a joke about the rape of an Australian missionary (for which he subsequently apologized), a proposal to jet-ski to territory reclaimed by China in the Spratly Islands and plant a Philippine flag, and a threat to declare a “revolutionary government.” Duterte has also proposed bilateral negotiations with China over joint resource exploration. The Philippines’ over fifty four million registered voters head out to the polls on Monday, May 9. 2. Chinese agriculture authorities meddle as pork production plummets. Pork prices in China have climbed 35 percent year-on-year, responding to a 5.9 percent decline in production. Local governments, hoping to ease the burden on Chinese consumers—the country consumes more than half of the world’s pork—have released stocks of subsidized pork. It’s not likely to have much effect: they’re only adding 3,050 metric tons of pork over the course of two months to a market that consumes fifty seven million metric tons annually. That may be a good thing, though. Like so much instability in the Chinese economy, the rise in pork prices can be partially attributed to regulators tinkering. Analysts have pointed to the shutdown of many small pig farmers by authorities as a contributing factor in the production decline. There’s hope for Chinese bacon lovers, though. Chinese regulators are taking baby steps towards liberalizing grain markets, and feed prices are dropping in response, with corn down 19 percent from this time last year. 3. Fight against tobacco takes center stage in India. This week, India’s Supreme Court ordered tobacco companies in India to comply with regulations to cover 85 percent of cigarette packages with pictorial and text health warnings, making India one of the world’s strictest countries on label regulations. With more than one million smoking-related deaths in India each year, the ruling was welcomed by India’s public health advocates. ITC Limited, India’s top cigarette company, shut down manufacturing on May 4 until “the company is in a position to comply with the interim requirements.” Not everyone has welcomed the move, however. Despite the health warnings, India’s tobacco industry is valued at $11 billion and employs millions of workers. Moreover, legal cigarettes only make up 11 percent of tobacco consumption in India. Much of the tobacco smoked in India comes from a largely unregulated market in the form of “bidis,” crushed and dried tobacco rolled in tendu leaves. Bidi production employs five million people in India, mostly women. Farmers employed by big tobacco, makers of bidis, and the Tobacco Institute of India have all voiced their disapproval of the regulations. Others have pointed to the need for a comprehensive tax policy to regulate the sales of cigarettes and bidis, arguing that tax increases are a better deterrent against smoking. 4. Domestic abuse alive and well in China. Two months ago, Li Hongxia, a twenty-four year old woman from Henan province, was strangled to death by her husband in her hospital bed while recovering from a post-miscarriage surgery. Li’s parents have refused to bury the mangled body in an effort to raise awareness about a silent epidemic that impacts at least one out of every four Chinese women, according to estimates from the state-affiliated All-China Women’s Federation. Since coming to power in 2012, Xi Jinping’s administration has made a concerted effort to prioritize domestic violence in its social policy agenda and characterize it as a unified, legal issue to address in courts, rather than simply a familial, private phenomenon. China’s first official anti-domestic violence legislation came into effect on March 1 (two days prior to Li’s murder). Despite these advances, anti-discrimination groups such as Yirenping argue that the law is still “far from enough” to curb the pervasive culture of domestic violence, as it fails to address sexual violence, as well as domestic violence between same-sex couples. 5. Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia commit to joint patrols. The three nations announced plans for joint patrols in the Sulu Sea at a trilateral meeting in Yogyakarta, Indonesia this Thursday. They also plan to establish domestic crisis centers and a coordination hotline. The decision comes after multiple recent incidents of piracy and kidnapping. Over the past two months, four sailors from Malaysia and fourteen from Indonesia were taken from ships; many believe the abductions were the work of Abu Sayyaf, a militant group operating from the southern Philippines. Ten Indonesians kidnapped by Abu Sayyaf in March were recently released, but the Indonesian security minister expressed concerns that continued piracy would revive an image of lawlessness for the sea routes in question and affect shipping traffic. Details have not been finalized, but one model the new trilateral effort could follow is that of patrols in the Malacca Straits conducted by Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, and Thailand, which include both marine and aerial surveillance. Bonus: PLA enters the rap scene. In the latest in a series of musical forays by the Chinese government, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) released a recruitment video this week. The video, titled “Battle Declaration,” includes patriotic lyrics chanted as images of China’s newest military hardware and of soldiers in action flash by. Lyrics include “kill, kill, kill" and “responsibilities are always upon a soldier’s shoulders / passion always in his chest / war can break out any time / are you ready for it?”. While the PLA does not actively need to recruit more soldiers (in fact 300,000 troops are being cut), it does need to boost morale, especially as the military comes under closer scrutiny in the anti-corruption campaign. The video’s mixed reception among Chinese netizens suggests additional approaches may still be required.

As I wrote last week, the Philippines’ presidential race is still extremely close, going into the final days before Election Day. But as numerous Philippine polling organizations have reported, Davao Mayor Rodrigo Duterte maintains a slim lead over his closest challenger, Senator Grace Poe, and over the other three major candidates. Since there is no runoff system like that of the French presidential election, which has more than one round, Duterte could win the presidency with a plurality 30 to 35 percent of the total votes. The Davao mayor is certainly thrilling his base. His rallies have drawn large, fevered crowds. As The Economist noted in a piece on the Philippines election last week, Poe’s recent rallies have attracted crowds that seem more “dutiful” than passionate, and that sometimes seem to be appearing to haul off free T-shirts and other gear. By contrast, Duterte’s rallies, where he often speaks off the cuff and makes macho promises to crush crime and corruption, feel like raucous parties, his supporters screaming and applauding. Duterte made his name as mayor of Davao, the largest city in Mindanao, where he supposedly oversaw significant reductions in the crime rate and inroads into corruption, although both of these achievements have been questioned by independent analysts. He is, however, originally Visayan and, as the Economist notes, can draw votes from both Visayan areas and from Mindanao, the biggest island in the south. He boasts of his long relationships with Muslim leaders in the south, but also seems to be running strongly, in polls, with some groups of Catholics and evangelicals. More generally, however, Duterte’s image rests on a popular perception, stoked by him throughout his tenure in Davao, that he is a blunt-talking strongman who will be able to resolve longstanding political challenges---corruption, high inequality, business cartels in many sectors, violent crime, the continuing banditry and insurgency in the south---more effectively than politicians who follow democratic norms and institutions. As Davao mayor, Duterte became famous for allegedly sanctioning death squads against criminal syndicates. As the Economist notes, Duterte has already promised that his presidency is “going to be bloody. People will die”---in other words, he will use harsh, possibly extrajudicial means to combat crime. He also has promised to kill all the criminals in the Philippines if they resist his crime control methods. (One prominent Duterte campaign symbol is, perhaps unsurprisingly, an iron fist.) In addition, he has repeatedly mocked many of the Philippines’ democratic institutions and customs. Duterte’s strongman promise seems to have hit a chord, in particular, among middle and upper middle class Philippine citizens who believe that democracy is controlled by a handful of elites, mostly based in Manila, and who think that a more authoritative leader also could help boost the growth rate and spread wealth more equally. (It is unclear whether Duterte, even if he took on more powers than previous elected presidents, would be able to boost the growth rate, already one of the highest in Asia.) These middle class voters in some respects resemble middle classes in neighboring Thailand and Indonesia, where growing skepticism about democracy led to middle class support for the May 2014 Thai military coup, and for the 2014 presidential campaign of Indonesia’s Prabowo Subianto, who himself seemingly expressed grave doubts about the need for democratic rule. The mood in the Philippines today, writes prominent political commentator Richard Jayad Heydarian is:   “One of grievance politics and yearning for change---for better, or for worse. The Philippines is steadily giving into ‘strongman syndrome’, the misguided belief that tough-talking and political will alone can address complex 21st century governance challenges.”   Duterte’s apparent popularity coincides with the growing popularity of vice presidential candidate Ferdinand Marcos Jr, son of the late dictator. The younger Marcos, in his own way, also taps into popular dissatisfaction with Philippine democracy, and into an increasingly rosy, ill-informed popular view of the authoritarian era. Although the vice president in the Philippines wields few substantial powers, the office is often a stepping stone to running for the presidency. A Marcos victory in the vice presidential race (vice president and president are elected separately in the Philippines) would put the younger Marcos, who has downplayed the abuses of his father’s regime, in line to win the presidency six years from now.

Rachel Brown is a research associate in Asia Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. In February, $81 million stolen from the central bank of Bangladesh’s account at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York was laundered through the Philippines. Most observers worried about the security of the institutions involved. But equally if not more important is the potential impact on overseas Filipino workers. Increased scrutiny of vulnerabilities in the Philippines’ anti-money laundering provisions could make it harder for the over ten million Filipinos working abroad to send remittances home, as has occurred in many other developing nations. Globally, the Philippines is the third-highest recipient of remittances, which compromised 10 percent of GDP in 2014. These funds help fuel domestic consumption, and anything that affects the cost or ease of sending money to the nation will have significant economic implications. The Bangladesh Bank scandal highlights flaws in the Philippines’ current anti-money laundering regime. While the government strengthened regulations in 2013, highly secretive banking laws remain. Additionally, the 2001 Anti-Money Laundering Act does not cover the Philippines’ thriving casino industry, the destination of the pilfered funds. The revelation of these flaws and the parties involved may taint the image of the firms Philippine workers use to send money home. Philippine Senate investigations found that PhilRem, a Filipino remittance company in the United Kingdom and United States, converted and transferred the money into the accounts of one casino tour operator at the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC). In theory, the Philippines’ Anti-Money Laundering Act encompasses businesses like PhilRem that send or receive funds from workers overseas.  In practice, the funds are small and hard to track, and firms may misidentify themselves. (PhilRem originally listed as a land-transport company). PhilRem partners with major foreign banks such as Barclays and Lloyds to facilitate goods and cash transfers, but its involvement in the scandal could make banks wary of remittance firms’ capacity to monitor for suspicious transactions. The scandal has also sparked concern that the Philippines will be blacklisted by the inter-governmental Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF). The Philippines was on the FATF blacklist in the early 2000s. When the FATF previously considered sanctioning the Philippines, officials worried about the repercussions for remittances. Senator Serge Osmeña noted this March that if re-blacklisted, “We will be at a loss because our banks will not be able to transact with their counterparts in New York and London.” Sending money to a blacklisted nation may entail higher fees, delays, and even denial of service. Even if the Philippines is not blacklisted, remitters could still face challenges. The experiences of other countries perceived as weak on money laundering reveal potential risks. After September 11, requirements to monitor stringently the paths and recipients of money – and penalties for not doing so – increased. Some foreign banks simply ended partner relations with firms in suspect nations, as there was little incentive to risk incurring fines given the small profits. These changes hit particularly hard in Somalia as by 2015, most major American, British, and Australian banks ceased remittance services. Remittances also dropped considerably in Guyana when the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force blacklisted it. Already, Philippine firms feel the squeeze of heightened suspicion. In late March, the Cebu Daily News reported greater scrutiny of remittances sent through a Filipino company in Australia. Even prior to the scandal, nearly forty banks shut down accounts of Filipino remittance firms in sixteen nations. In early 2016, RCBC, the Bank of the Philippine Islands, and Philippine National Bank all lost relationships with correspondent banks in Italy. If more firms lose relationships with international partners, reduced competition could lead to higher fees. Further closures or increased fees would also deal a blow to already weakening Philippine remittances. In July 2015, remittances grew at 5.9 percent their slowest rate in half a decade. Falling oil prices, in particular, have hurt remittances, roughly a third of which come from the Gulf. So what are the prospects for reforms that might forestall such closures? Last Thursday, the Philippine Central Bank’s governor announced efforts to minimize the damage to remittances from foreign banks limiting risk exposure. An inter-agency assessment of terrorist financing and money laundering weaknesses is underway, and the scandal has also revived interest in a biometric national ID system to better track who ultimately receives remitted funds. There is no question that the Philippines’ genuine money laundering vulnerabilities necessitate closer supervision, but lasting changes will occur only after the next president’s inauguration. Until then, banks should avoid too hastily curtailing services, otherwise families of overseas workers may pay too high a price.

On May 9, the Philippines will hold its presidential election. Philippine presidents are limited to one, six-year term, which makes them powerful and weak at the same time. They enjoy a long term in office, removing them from the regular grind of campaigning that is common in many other democracies. But, as soon as they are inaugurated, they become a kind of lame duck. Under President Benigno Aquino III, the Philippines has reached a plateau of economic and political stability not seen since the presidency of Fidel Ramos nearly two decades ago. Aquino has made significant inroads into fighting corruption, has overseen an economy that has become one of the fastest-growing in East Asia and drawn increasing levels of interest from foreign investors, has pushed through population planning programs (the country has one of the highest fertility rates in Asia), and has inked a framework agreement for a permanent peace deal in the southern Philippines. A peace deal could transform the southern part of the country, even though the Philippines’ legislature has failed to pass the Basic Law that, under the proposed deal, is supposed to govern parts of the south. If the southern Philippines achieved peace, the region could become an agricultural and manufacturing powerhouse. How would Aquino’s potential successors handle the country’s still-significant challenges, including the need to rebuild Mindanao and implement the southern peace deal, the continuing battle against political corruption, the looming confrontations with China in the South China Sea, the need to upgrade the country’s deteriorating physical infrastructure, and the need to combat the still-dangerous threat of Islamic militants, some of whom now are pledging their allegiance to the Islamic State? Mar Roxas, Aquino’s choice and a man who has held many positions in the executive branch, would likely oversee a smooth transition from the Aquino government, attempting to build on Aquino’s achievements. Roxas would probably try to implement the peace deal, continue the drive to make the Philippines more attractive to investment, and pursue an increasingly tough approach to the South China Sea, one that includes beefing up defense ties with not only the United States but also with Japan and other regional powers. Senator Grace Poe has now been approved by the Philippines’ top court to contest the presidential vote. (She had previously been barred over claims that she did not fulfill the residency and citizenship requirements to run for the president.) Poe has a loyal following, and she is currently leading polls of the major candidates in the race, although she is only a percentage point or two ahead of her nearest rival, Davao major Rodrigo Duterte. She is an economic liberal who has vowed, as president, to ensure the Philippines join the Trans-Pacific Partnership and other free trade deals. She also promises to push through tax reforms and to liberalize Philippine investment laws to make it easier for foreign companies to invest in key sectors. However, Poe is a neophyte on foreign policy, and has not developed a clear stance on how the Philippines should address looming threats in the South China Sea with its need to maintain relatively warm diplomatic and economic ties with Beijing. Still, like Roxas, Poe would probably continue to push the Philippines’ South China Sea claims through a multilateral, legal framework, such as the current case being heard in the Netherlands, while also trying to modernize the Philippines’ antiquated navy and coast guard. The other two major contenders are even bigger wildcards. The current vice president, Jejomar Binay, is running for the presidency. He does not enjoy Aquino’s support. (The vice president and president are elected separately in the Philippines and do not necessarily belong to the same party.) Binay has bashed many of the Aquino administration’s foreign policy and domestic policy achievements, and Binay promises, if elected, to work more closely with China. He has suggested that Manila and Beijing should cooperate on resource exploration in the South China Sea; as president, he might slow down the Philippines’ defense modernization and/or end the Philippines’ legal case on claims to the sea. This approach could have benefits, if it truly lowered tensions in the South China Sea, but more likely it will prod China to become even more assertive in contested waters. In addition, Binay could be problematic for the Philippines’ economy, which could grow even faster if corruption were seriously addressed. Yet Binay has faced an extensive corruption investigation into his time as mayor of Makati, in Metro Manila. A Philippine Senate report has recommended filing criminal charges against Binay for graft. Binay would potentially have trouble delivering the message that the Philippines is committed to fighting corruption. Duterte, the longtime, tough-guy mayor of Davao, in the southern Philippines, is the ultimate wildcard. He has essentially no foreign policy experience and no experience with national government. He achieved renown in Davao for his blunt talking and for fighting crime, earning comparisons to the “Dirty Harry” film hero, but his methods were highly controversial. Human rights groups accused him of overseeing large numbers of extrajudicial executions in Davao. Like Binay, he wants the Philippines to move closer to China, and he also has said he wants to bring some of his questionable crime-fighting strategies to the presidential palace, including ordering the killing of criminals. “When I become president, I’ll order the police and the military to find these people and kill [the criminals,]” he vowed on the campaign trail. In a country where the judiciary and the rule of law remain weak, Duterte’s promises to just kill criminals without due process, though popular on the campaign trail, are extremely worrying.

Captain Sean R. Liedman currently serves as the U.S. Navy Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.  Previously, he was the commander of Patrol and Reconnaissance Wing Eleven operating the P-8A and P-3C maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft. He has twice served in the Air Warfare Division on the Chief of Naval Operation’s staff and also as the executive assistant to the deputy commander of U.S. Central Command.  The conclusions and opinions expressed are his own and do not reflect the official position of the U.S. government. Reuters reported on March 19 that the U.S. Navy had observed Chinese maritime survey activities around Scarborough Shoal that may be a precursor to reclamation activities similar to those executed by China on seven other maritime features in the Spratly Islands located more than three hundred and fifty nautical miles to the south. The U.S. response to China’s island building campaign in the Spratlys has been confined to calls to “halt the expansion and the militarization of occupied features” and maritime and aerial freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS) to preserve freedom of access to the high seas and international airspace. However, the case of Scarborough Shoal is different as an arbitration case remains ongoing, and the United States and its allies and partners in the region should be prepared to use a broader range of the tools of statecraft to prevent similar ecological destruction and occupation of Scarborough Shoal by the Chinese. On the heels of the Chinese seizure of Mischief Reef in the Spratlys in 1995, a U.S. State Department press briefing outlined the elements of a South China Sea policy that remains in place today. The briefing stated that the United States: “strongly opposes the use or threat of force to resolve competing claims and urges all claimants to exercise restraint and to avoid destabilizing actions,” “has an abiding interest in the maintenance of peace and stability in the South China Sea,” has “a fundamental interest” in maintaining freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, “takes no position on the legal merits of the competing claims to sovereignty over the various islands, reefs, atolls, and cays in the South China Sea” and, …would “view with serious concern any maritime claim or restriction on maritime activity in the South China Sea that was not consistent with international law, including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).” Therein lies the policy conundrum for the United States; while it continues to assert that it takes no position on the legal merits of any of the multitude of sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea, it also opposes the use or threat of force to resolve competing claims and any restrictions on maritime activity that are not consistent with UNCLOS. The Chinese seized Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines in June 2012 in a strategic move that the Wall Street Journal labeled “Putinesque.” China employed a hybrid strategy of diplomatic ruse backed up by paramilitary forces that included the use of fishing vessels, China Marine Surveillance vessels, and People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) vessels to coerce the Filipinos into departing the waters surrounding Scarborough Shoal. The Chinese have exerted de facto sovereign control over Scarborough Shoal ever since through the constant presence of China Marine Surveillance vessels that have resorted to ramming and using water cannons to eject any non-Chinese registered fishing vessels from the area. While no shots have been fired, Chinese behavior during the seizure and subsequent patrolling of Scarborough Shoal clearly violated the first and fifth U.S. policy principles listed above. In 2013, the Philippines initiated arbitral proceedings at the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea’s Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) at The Hague to request rulings on fifteen submissions regarding UNCLOS disputes in the South China Sea. The PCA ruled in October 2015 that it has jurisdiction over seven of the fifteen submissions, including three key submissions regarding Scarborough Shoal: “China has unlawfully prevented Philippine fishermen from pursuing their livelihoods by interfering with traditional fishing activities at Scarborough Shoal”; “China has violated its obligations under the Convention to protect and preserve the marine environment at Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal”; “China has breached its obligations under the Convention by operating its law enforcement vessels in a dangerous manner causing serious risk of collision to Philippine vessels navigating in the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal”; A PCA ruling is expected on those three submissions sometime during the summer of 2016. Allowing China to dredge, reclaim, and occupy Scarborough Shoal prior to the PCA ruling would completely undermine the first, second, and fifth policy principles outlined above and the broader U.S. principles of adherence to the rule of law and the peaceful resolution of disputes through international mechanisms. In December 2014, China stated its policy position of “three no’s” in regards to the Philippines’ PCA filing: no acceptance of the filing, no participation in the proceedings, and no implementation of any findings. However, the PCA found that China’s non-participation does not deprive the tribunal of jurisdiction in accordance with Article 9 of Annex VII to UNCLOS which provides that: “Absence of a party or failure of a party to defend its case shall not constitute a bar to the proceedings.” Finally, Scarborough Shoal has not been developed or reclaimed to date and remains a pristine part of the South China Sea ecosystem. China’s reclamation activities on the seven maritime features in the Spratlys have been labeled the “quickest rate of permanent loss of coral reef area in human history” with widespread environmental damage that is “irrecoverable and irreplaceable.” What is at stake at Scarborough Shoal is not simply preservation of an important regional ecosystem; the ecological destruction of Scarborough Shoal would constitute a gross violation of Article 145 of UNCLOS, which addresses the protection and conservation of the marine environment, and would further enable bad behavior around the globe with regard to international marine environmental protection law. To date, the Chinese have incurred little strategic cost from their reclamation and occupation campaign in the South China Sea as the United States has sought to secure and preserve Chinese cooperation on broader strategic interests such as climate change, the desired denuclearization of Iran and North Korea, cyber theft, and fair trade and monetary policies. It is now time for the United States and regional allies like Japan, Australia, and South Korea to accept more friction in their relationship with China and raise the cost/risk calculus for further Chinese expansion and occupation in the South China Sea, including Scarborough Shoal. A strategy to prevent reclamation activities on Scarborough Shoal should begin with public diplomacy pronouncements that the United States will not permit the wanton destruction of Scarborough Shoal, backed up by private diplomatic communications that there could be serious consequences such as revoking the invitation for the Chinese to participate in RIMPAC 2016 and other regional security cooperation fora and exercises. If China fails to heed those diplomatic warnings and commences reclamation activities on Scarborough Shoal, there are a variety of non-lethal, covert means that the United States and its allies could utilize to disable the dredgers that the Chinese have employed in the Spratlys, including fouling the “cutter suction” mechanism or disrupting the continuity of the “floating sediment pipe” that delivers the dredged ocean bottom and coral fragments ashore. Failing to prevent the destruction and Chinese occupation of Scarborough Shoal would generate further irreversible environmental damage in the South China Sea – and more importantly, further irreversible damage to the principles of international law. Finally, it would further consolidate the Chinese annexation and occupation of the maritime features in the South China Sea, which would be essentially irreversible in any scenario short of a major regional conflict.

Ashlyn Anderson, Rachel Brown, Lincoln Davidson, Ariella Rotenberg, Gabriel Walker, and Pei-Yu Wei look at five stories from Asia this week. 1. Bangladeshi bank chief resigns after $101 million cyber theft. The governor of Bangladesh’s central bank stepped down in the wake of a financial heist involving hackers, casinos, and multiple Asian nations. In early February, $81 million were transferred electronically from Bangladesh’s Federal Reserve Bank of New York account to the Philippines, mainly to accounts at the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation. The funds were eventually laundered through casinos, which are not required to adhere to some of the nation’s money-laundering regulations. Hackers also attempted other transactions, including one to Sri Lanka for $20 million, which was stopped after a typo in the transfer request raised alarms. The crime has sparked a debate between officials in Bangladesh and at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York over culpability, with Bangladesh threatening to sue the New York Fed to get the money back, since the Fed did not confirm transfers made with the Bangladeshi central bank’s SWIFT codes. The Fed has maintained that it followed appropriate procedures and that its systems remain secure. 2. Another district falls to the Taliban in Afghanistan. A district of Afghanistan’s southern Helmand Province fell the Taliban this past Tuesday, making an important addition to the insurgent-controlled area. Government forces fled the government center in Khan Deshin after a firefight that lasted from Monday night until five in the morning on Tuesday. After Tuesday, the Taliban has overthrown the government centers in five of fourteen districts in Helmand Province. At least two additional districts have large areas of under Taliban control, while government forces are still in those government centers. In at least four other districts, the Taliban is considered to be very active. By many calculations, more than half of the province is now under insurgent control. 3. There’s money to be made in China’s aging. That’s the bet that Bain Capital is making, at least. The company announced this week that it had purchased a controlling stake in Asia Pacific Medical Group, a medical-services provider that operates seven hospitals and twenty-two clinics throughout China and Southeast Asia, according to the company’s website. China is aging rapidly—by 2050, the country’s median age will be forty-nine and 26 percent of the population will be over the age of sixty-five—compounding its already challenging demographic problems. The Chinese government is struggling to respond. In October 2015, the government ended the one-child policy. And late last month, the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security announced it would release a plan next year to raise the retirement age by 2022, likely to counteract a looming funding shortage for the state’s pension commitments. 4. Trump sparks alarm in Japan. As polls opened this Tuesday for primaries in five states, the Japanese government is faced with the possibility of its closest trading partner and security ally electing Donald Trump as president. Having criticized Japan on his campaign trail for manipulating the yen and hurting U.S. employment, and for “playing unfairly” on defense, Trump’s remarks have led to analysts noting that due to the public sentiment he has stirred up, Japan-U.S. ties could suffer even if Trump were not nominated or elected. Japanese media have become increasingly critical of Trump, with one column proclaiming, “Trump’s Japan-bashing shows why he’s unfit to lead America.” Originally entertained by Trump’s campaign, Japanese officials now find themselves facing the challenge of identifying the right moment to step in and correct the misunderstandings caused by Trump’s statements, as they fear that rushed correction of Trump’s statements may backfire. Japan is not the only country that has started to hit back. China, another country that Trump has often targeted, ran an opinion piece in the state-owned Global Times newspaper this week that labeled Trump as “big-mouthed” and a “clown,” and compared his rise to those of Mussolini and Hitler. 5. Argentine coast guard sinks Chinese fishing boat. On Wednesday, in coastal waters around 750 miles south of Buenos Aires, Argentina’s coast guard sank a Chinese fishing boat operating illegally in the country’s exclusive economic zone. According to reports, the Chinese trawler responded to initial warning shots by shutting off its lights and trying to ram the Argentine ship, prompting the latter to fire defensive shots and sink the Chinese vessel. Four crew members were detained, and twenty-eight more were rescued by nearby Chinese ships. The confrontation was a rare occurrence, as Chinese fishing vessels are typically cooperative with the Argentine coast guard. China has subsequently demanded an investigation into the dispute to ensure the safety and rights of Chinese fishermen if similar incidents should ever occur in the future. China has the world’s largest fishing fleet, with nearly 2,500 “distant-water” vessels operating around the world far from Chinese coastal waters. Bonus: A transplanted Afghan bazaar offers artisans a receptive audience in Washington, D.C. Potters, carpenters, rug weavers, jewelers, and a host of other Afghan artisans are setting up shop at the Smithsonian Institution for the next eleven months. Afghan artisans will have the opportunity to share their work in a recreated bazaar environment as part of the Turquoise Mountain: Artists Transforming Afghanistan exhibit. Turquoise Mountains is a break from traditional museum exhibits and intended to be an all-sensory experience based on the “IPOP” exhibit elements—ideas, people, objects, and physical. In addition to offering a unique museum experience, the exhibit also provides a platform for the artisans to renew global interest in the old traditions of the Silk Road.

For the past five years, the Philippines, which long lagged behind faster-growing Asian economies like Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Indonesia, has posted some of the highest annual growth rates in the region. Although the Philippines’ boom has not received as much attention from investors and the international media as one might have imagined, the numbers are impressive. ANZ Bank projects the country to grow by 6.1 percent in 2016. In 2014, the country’s economy also grew by over six percent, and in 2015 it grew by 5.8 percent, according to World Bank data. There are several reasons for the boom, which has occurred on the watch of President Benigno Aquino III. The potential for real peace in the southern Philippines has boosted the economy of Mindanao, with aid and investment pouring in to the island. Aquino’s high-profile efforts, early in his term, to combat corruption, made an impact on some investors. Although the president’s anti-corruption campaign has not quite lived up to its promises, it did help make investors reconsider the country as a destination. The Philippines has risen in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index on Aquino’s watch, and investment and sounder fiscal policies have paid off, allowing the Philippines to borrow at better rates. The country’s debt is now ranked as investment or above-investment grade by Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s, and Fitch. Still, in 2016 the Philippines face several major challenges, all of which will be inherited by Aquino’s successor after this spring’s presidential election. The Philippines remains one of the most vulnerable countries in the world to climate change, and the government has not demonstrated that it can effectively handle the aftermath of another devastating typhoon like 2013’s Typhoon Haiyan. Tension with China is rising, and could spike later this year with the results of the Philippines’ South China Sea claim currently being heard in The Hague. China has refused to recognize the tribunal’s power, but a result in The Hague that goes against Beijing’s claims in the South China Sea could well lead to a strong show of force by China. In fact, Chinese leaders already have made clear that China will, if anything, be even more assertive in the South China Sea this year than last. Beijing reportedly is ready to deploy a new “monster” coast guard ship in the South China Sea, a boat that is the largest coast guard vessel in the world. The ship seems more like a warship than a coast guard vessel. According to the Diplomat, the monster “appears to be first and foremost a coercive instrument for such encounters and will help to advance China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea.” Some of the leading contenders for the Philippines presidency, like Davao mayor Rodrigo Duterte, have limited experience in foreign affairs. Their inexperience could make any potential crisis with China worse, and might embolden Beijing’s actions in the South China Sea. The Philippines’’ economy also still faces serious challenges, revealing structural problems that persist through the end of the Aquino era. The country’s physical infrastructure still lags badly behind those of competitors like Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore, and investment in Mindanao’s infrastructure could be undermined if the peace process fails. The education system, although capable of producing English-speaking graduates, still does not produce enough skilled workers for the country to move into higher-value industries, and unemployment remains stubbornly high in regions, in part because of the Philippines’ substantial birth rate. Corruption continues to cut into growth, and one of the leading presidential candidates, current Vice President Jejomar Binay faces a wide range of corruption allegations that could make him an unlikely figure to continue Aquino’s anti-corruption campaigns. In addition, though a lasting peace in the south appears near, serious obstacles remain. Extremist groups, some pledging allegiance to the Islamic State, appear determined to puncture a permanent cease-fire in the south. These groups disdain the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the biggest rebel group in the south, for entering peace negotiations with the government. The Philippines’ legislature still has not passed the Bangasmoro Basic Law, the legislation critical to devolving political and economic powers to the south---and to making the peace deal stick. If the legislature does not pass the law by February, the proposed legislation could easily become a major topic in the final days of the presidential campaign, which might lead candidates to embrace major changes to the Law that would undermine the entire peace process. The May 2016 general election itself could further undermine growth. Philippine general elections have tended to be unruly and bloody affairs, and the already-combative campaign could wind up harming the legitimacy of the ultimate winner. Senator Grace Poe, who appeared to be the front-runner last year, has been prohibited from running by the election commission, which held she has not been a citizen of the Philippines long enough to be a presidential candidate. The Philippines’ top court is scheduled to decide on Poe’s candidacy the week of January 19, and if Poe is disqualified, many of her supporters might refuse to recognize whoever wins the election. If twenty to thirty percent of the public, the current level of Poe’s support, does not accept the results of the election, the Philippines could be in for serious turbulence.

Ashlyn Anderson, Rachel Brown, Lincoln Davidson, Ariella Rotenberg, and Gabriel Walker look at the top stories in Asia this week. 1. Xi Jinping visits the United Kingdom. Fresh off his trip to the United States, Chinese President Xi Jinping made an official visit to the UK, meeting with Queen Elizabeth II and Prime Minister David Cameron. As with Xi’s U.S. trip, PRC propagandists have pulled no punches, airing warm and fuzzy videos explaining how good China-UK relations are and showing thousands of Chinese nationals “spontaneously” lining London’s streets to wave pro-China banners shipped in by the country’s UK embassy. Xi and Cameron signed an agreement to cooperate on cyber crime very similar to the one Xi negotiated with the U.S. last month. Xi has sweetened his UK visit with the announcement of more than $46 billion of Chinese investment into the country; in response, some have accused Cameron and his government of sucking up to the Chinese. The friendly atmosphere with which Xi was greeted stands in contrast to that in the U.S. last month, where Xi was met with the threat of economic sanctions and companies worried about China’s business climate. 2. First case of cancer linked to Fukushima. On Tuesday, the Japanese Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare announced that a former Fukushima nuclear plant worker will receive compensation for leukemia he developed as a result of participating in the plant cleanup effort. Although the forty-one-year-old man, who worked on the site for a year and was said to have been exposed to “relatively low” amounts of radiation, is the first person to receive compensation for his illness, he likely will not be the last. More than twenty thousand others have been exposed to enough radiation to have subsequent cancers qualify as occupational illnesses. The Tokyo Electric Power Company, or Tepco, which owns the plant, has long been criticized for its cleanup practices and treatment of private contractors, who on average are exposed to much more radiation than company employees. Despite the billions of dollars spent on decontamination efforts, and the fact that radiation levels in many nearby communities have returned to safe levels, occupational cancer diagnoses like this week’s may hinder government efforts to encourage displaced residents to return home. 3. Korean families reunite. Approximately 640 South Koreans and 330 North Koreans are participating in two sets of reunions this week at North Korea’s Kumgang Mountain resort. Over the past six decades reunions between families split across the two Koreas have been rare, and the only other reunion to have taken place in the last five years was in February 2014. Cancellation of the meetings are frequent due to changes in the political climate. In September 2013, for example, the North Korean government cancelled a scheduled set of reunions and threatened to call off this round as well following a critique of North Korea’s human rights situation by South Korean President Park Geun-hye. A total of 18,800 Koreans have participated in all reunions, but an estimated 130,000 South Koreans were recorded in the government’s database as being separated from family members in North Korea. Just 66,000 remain on the list, as the rest are now deceased. Given the advanced age of many still on the waiting list, South Korea has given preference to elderly applicants in the lottery selection. 4. In a familiar gesture, Washington extends sale of new F-16s to Islamabad. During Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s visit to the United States this week, Washington had hoped to reach a deal addressing Pakistan’s expanding arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons. When Pakistan insisted they would not accept any limits on their nukes, Washington proceeded with plans to sell the country eight new F-16 fighter jets—a sale that many view skeptically due to the aircraft’s limited utility in counterterrorism operations. Following the recent announcement that the United States would maintain a presence in Afghanistan beyond 2016, the two sides discussed the regional security situation and the need for an Afghan-led peace process. The United States underlined “Pakistan’s role as a key counterterrorism partner” while continuing to press Pakistan to take action against all terrorist groups operating on Pakistani soil, including Laskhar-e-Taiba and the Haqqani network. The leaders also agreed to double down on the U.S.-Pakistan Knowledge Corridor, among other education and technology initiatives, and announced a new U.S.-Pakistan Clean Energy Partnership. Prime Minister Sharif invited business leaders to invest in Pakistan, insisting that the security situation had improved and that it would help to achieve regional integration and connectivity. 5. Typhoon hits the Philippines. A powerful storm named Typhoon Koppu struck the Philippines earlier this week, causing tens of thousands of people to flee their homes. The typhoon hit the Philippine’s main island, Luzon, and lingered there for three days. Currently the death toll stands at fifty-four. Torrential rains caused by the typhoon have submerged coastal fishing and farming villages under almost ten feet of water in some places. This is the second typhoon to hit the Philippines this year, and the combined effect of the flooding has forced an estimated half a million people from their dwellings. The Philippines is struck by an average of twenty typhoons per year. Bonus: Singaporean megachurch leaders convicted of fraud. Six Singaporean religious leaders were convicted in a case involving the unlikely combination of pop music, megachurches, and fraud. The individuals were members of the City Harvest Church, founded by Pastor Kong Hee, whose wife, Sun Ho, used church funds to launch her pop career. The group was accused of using an initial twenty-four million Singaporean dollars to pay for Ho’s singing, and then spending another twenty-six million Singaporean dollars to cover up the operation. Originally, Ho’s songs were intended to spread her faith, but her music gradually became more risqué. While her career never truly took off, she did appear in a 2007 song and music video with Wyclef Jean, a Grammy Award–winning musician. The trial, which lasted for nearly three years, drew much attention in Singapore, where the church has a congregation of over 17,500. Such a high-profile corruption scandal is unusual in Singapore, which is renowned for its clean government and rule of law. City Harvest Church also has numerous affiliate churches abroad, and the scandal may cast new light on the practices of other megachurches in Asia.

Ashlyn Anderson, Lincoln Davidson, Lauren Dickey, Darcie Draudt, William Piekos, and Ariella Rotenberg look at the top stories in Asia today. 1. Hong Kong legislators reject a proposed framework for electing the next chief executive. The plan would have allowed the people of Hong Kong to elect a chief executive from a slate of three candidates chosen by a pro-Beijing nominating committee. While the measure was expected to fail—it needed to pass by a two-thirds majority—a botched attempt to boycott the vote by pro-Beijing lawmakers resulted in an embarrassing defeat of 28-8 that left one legislator in tears. When the election guidelines were announced in August 2014, they led to massive demonstrations, known as the Umbrella Movement, that occupied Hong Kong’s busiest thoroughfares for weeks; now that the proposal has failed, it’s not clear what’s next. Beijing has already expressed its disapproval, and some members of the opposition say this is the best offer Hong Kong was going to get from Beijing. 2. The Islamic State group makes inroads into South Asia. Amid heightened tension in Kashmir, the flag of the Islamic State was sighted waving in the area this week—a sign of the group’s growing South Asia presence. India’s Intelligence Bureau recently alerted police forces across India to the possibility of Islamic State terrorist attacks, and police reportedly busted the first Islamic State terror cell in India last month. Recent social media trends also prompted the Afghan Taliban to send a letter to the leader of the Islamic State this week warning of the consequences of fomenting dissent between jihadi groups in the region. Through its online campaigns, the Islamic State threatens to overshadow al Qaeda’s subsidiary branch in South Asia. The group has gained new recruits who were previously members of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, the Afghan Taliban, and Kashmiri militant groups. 3. Australia accused of bribing human traffickers. Relations between Indonesia and Australia continue to worsen, as Jakarta displayed tens of thousands of U.S. dollars that a smuggler captain claims was used by Australian officials to bribe his ship to turn back. If proven true, these officials would have violated Australian, Indonesian, and international law. In response, Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott refused to confirm or deny the allegations, and declined to give Indonesia an answer; Foreign Minister Julie Bishop rejected the bribery claims and indicated that Indonesia was at fault for failing to secure its borders in the first place. A recently released Lowy Institute poll shows that Australians’ feelings toward Indonesia have fallen to their lowest point in a decade. 4. North Korea facing the worst drought in one hundred years. The United Nations food agency reported that North Korea faces further food shortages as production in the country’s main agricultural region is expected to be cut in half. Potato, wheat, and barley harvests found in the countries breadbasket are said to be on track for a 50 percent reduction. Additionally, reservoir levels are sinking and wells are drying up as a result of low rain- and snowfall this past winter. Low water levels are having a devastating effect on rice crops, a staple for the North Korean diet. Due to limited information access, international organizations are unable to say whether or not people are starving, but the situation is certainly a serious one. The country suffered a devastating famine in the 1990s and has relied on international food aid since, but support has fallen sharply in recent years because of North Korea’s human rights abuses as well as its refusal to allow monitoring of food distribution. 5. Philippine Muslim rebels take step in process toward peace. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front handed in dozens of weapons at a ceremony this week, signaling the organization’s willingness to work with the government of President Benigno Aquino. In exchange for their weapons, the government provided a cash handout of 25,000 pesos (or $555) for each combatant to use toward education, training, and livelihood. With more than 10,000 fighters and an extensive arsenal of heavy weapons, the largely symbolic handover is a successful step in a tentative peace deal, with complete disarmament scheduled to take place when the Filipino legislature passes final accords on the Bangsamoro Basic Law. If the law receives a congressional seal of approval, an autonomous region will be established in Muslim-dominated areas of the southern Philippines, marking an end to more than four decades of fighting with the rebel group. BONUS: North Korea touts cure for MERS. As Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) cases appear in Thailand and level off in South Korea, North Korea is claiming it has developed a vaccine for the disease that also cures SARS, ebola, and AIDS. The state-owned KCNA reported Thursday that scientists developed the “Kumdang-2 Injection” by extracting compounds from ginseng that has been injected with the “micro-elementary fertilizers” of rare earth elements. North Korea has been praising the benefits of the drug, which is currently available for purchase online at “koreabud.com.”