Philippines

Richard Javad Heydarian is an assistant professor in political science at De La Salle University in Manila, and, most recently, the author of Asia’s New Battlefield: The U.S., China, and the Struggle for Western Pacific. During his four-day visit to Beijing (October 18-21), the Philippines’ firebrand leader, Rodrigo Dutetre, once again grabbed global headlines by reportedly bidding goodbye to and “separation” from the United States. Instead, he spent his time in China declaring his realignment with China’s “ideological flow.” Not shy of melodramatics, he dropped another bombshell by declaring he thought it could now be Russia, China and the Philippines “against the world.” The visit came amid festering diplomatic tensions between Washington and Manila over human rights concerns, particularly Duterte’s war on drugs. During his trip, Duterte sought to reopen communication channels with Beijing, break the ice in frosty bilateral relations, expand areas of economic cooperation, and explore bilateral discussions about resolving contested claims to areas of the South China Sea. A cursory look, however, shows that commercial considerations dominated the agenda. A total of $24 billion in economic deals were put on the table, although it remains to be seen whether these deals will all actually come through. Many leading Philippine tycoons accompanied Duterte on his visit to China, where he was granted a formal state visit. Duterte managed to also secure a pledge from Beijing of $9 billion in soft loans and grants, with a particular focus on revamping the Philippines’ decrepit public infrastructure through big-ticket projects. China also lifted a travel advisory on Chinese tourists bound for the Philippines and relaxed restrictions on the Southeast Asian country’s banana exports. Eager to woo the Philippine president, China also rhetorically backed Duterte’s campaign against drugs, and is currently negotiating a 25-year military deal with the Philippines. There were, however, little indications that any breakthrough in the disputed waters were achieved, whether it is a joint fisheries agreement in and around the Scarborough Shoal or proposed joint exploration deal in the energy-rich Reed Bank in the South China Sea. Nonetheless, the two parties triumphantly declared their relationship as fully normalized, after years of tensions during the Aquino administration. In their joint statement, they agreed to “make concerted efforts to cement the traditional friendship of the two peoples.” But far from creating clarity in Philippine foreign policy direction, Duterte injected more confusion into the picture when he publicly backtracked from his most controversial comments upon his return to the Philippines. Crucially, back in the Philippines he acknowledged that it’s “in the best interest of my countrymen [Philippines] to maintain that [military] relationship [with America]." This comes as no surprise, since as I have argued earlier, the Philippine security establishment is extremely close with their peers in the United States, and supportive of continued close strategic ties. Yet Duterte seemed to contradict himself once again, when he declared days later that he wants U.S. troops out of the country in two years without providing more policy details. Interestingly, just before Duterte embarked on his China visit, a survey showed that Filipinos view America, by far, highly favorably, while viewing China, by far, with tremendous mistrust. Steeped in left-leaning ‘anti-imperialist’ thinking, the self-described “socalist” Duterte has a long record of tense relations with the United States, dating back to his mayoral days in Davao city, when he blocked joint U.S.-Philippine military exercises and usage of Davao airbase for American drone operations in Mindanao. Since taking power, he has tried to convince the public to have support his more “independent” foreign policy, moving the country away from the U.S., but surveys still suggest that vast majority of Filipinos see Washington favorably. As an elected leader, Duterte will have to take public opinion into consideration, lest he risks undermining his popularity, especially among sectors that are deeply dependent on U.S. investment and aid. To be sure, Duterte may be willing to slightly downgrade military cooperation with the United States, such as suspending joint exercises in disputed waters or restricting access to Philippine military bases, in exchange for Chinese concessions in the South China Sea. But if China refuses to grant the Philippines any tangible concession in the South China Sea such as a formal joint fisheries agreement in the Scarbrough Shoal and an end to its harassment of Filipino oil exploration activities in the Reed Bank, Duterte will be under increasing pressure to change his foreign policy approach. With Beijing itself seemingly baffled by Duterte’s mercurial character and contradictory statements, it may indeed shun making any lasting compromise with Manila on sensitive territorial issues. As for China’s economic carrots, they are pledges that are yet to be translated into concrete, consequential and quality investments that could dramatically improve its image among Filipinos. And China faces stiff economic competition from Japan, the leading investor, trading partner and source of development aid to the Philippines. Unlike major Western powers, Japan has enjoyed excellent relationship with Duterte over the past decades. And Duterte’s subsequent visit to Tokyo has shown that Japan is willing to ensure the Philippines doesn’t become too dependent on Chinese investments. In fact, Duterte went the extra mile to reassure his Japanese hosts that he is not seeking an alliance with China, and welcomed Japan assistance in resolving the South China Sea disputes. During his visit to Japan, both sides vowed to expand areas of maritime security and economic cooperation, with Japan offering surveillance aircraft on lease and billions of dollars in soft loans. In many ways, the Philippines’ rapprochement with China, therefore, is more a strategic recalibration in favor of calibrated engagement with Beijing rather than a revolutionary break from existing alliances.

Over the past six months, the U.S.-Philippines relationship has become increasingly strained and, at times, confused, as new Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte has made a series of emphatic statements suggesting he wants to downgrade the bilateral relationship. U.S. officials, meanwhile, have struggled to make sense of his comments and to determine whether they accord with actual Philippine policy. In my new interview with the Cipher Brief, I discuss Duterte’s vision for the Philippines and the future direction of bilateral relations.

The Philippines is one of the United States’ oldest allies in Asia-Pacific and the long-lasting defense relationship is at the heart of U.S. policy in the region.

Over the past decade, the United States and the Philippines have bolstered what was already a strong strategic and diplomatic relationship with deep historical roots and a 65-year treaty alliance. During the George W. Bush administration, after 9/11, the U.S. launched a training and assistance program for the Philippine armed forces, designed to help combat terrorist networks based in the southern Philippines, especially Abu Sayyaf. For a time, a significant detachment of U.S. Special Forces was based there, training Philippine soldiers. Under the Obama administration, the U.S. and the Philippines have moved even closer together. For the last six years under President Benigno Aquino III, the Philippines was a major recipient of increased U.S. assistance for maritime security in Southeast Asia—the result of frequent travels to Washington by Philippine officials to plead for aid to modernize their navy and coast guard. Two years ago, Manila and Washington signed a 10-year enhanced defense partnership that is supposed to allow U.S. forces to rotate through the Philippines for extended periods of time at local bases. But since Rodrigo Duterte was elected president of the Philippines earlier this year, Manila has staked out a drastically different approach to its relations with the U.S.—or at least, it appears to, based on Duterte’s bombastic rhetoric. In his latest tirade Tuesday, the new Philippine president said that Obama could “go to hell” for criticisms of Duterte’s vigilante war on drugs and if the U.S. refuses to sell his government weapons, although that possibility seems unlikely. Last week, Duterte likened himself to Hitler, boasting he would potentially kill three million drug dealers and users in the Philippines. For more of my analysis of the future of the U.S.-Philippine relationship, see my new article for World Politics Review.

Over the past year, as the Islamic State (ISIS) has suffered multiple losses in Syria and Iraq, the group has clearly been looking to widen its impact, taking the fight to countries outside of the Middle East. Increasingly, ISIS leaders have used social media to call on Islamic radicals to stage attacks in countries in the West like France and the United States, where the Orlando gunman, the San Bernardino gunmen, and the Nice attacker, among others, have publicly identified themselves with ISIS. In most of these cases, the attackers were lone wolves (or duos) who had not received any training or funding from ISIS, and often had not even traveled to Islamic State-controlled territory to train and fight. (To be sure, some recent attackers in Western nations had traveled to ISIS-controlled territory and fought with the group.) At the same time, ISIS leaders also have stepped up their campaigns to train, advise, and influence potential radicals in South and Southeast Asia, which are home to the largest number of Muslims in the world. As coalition forces advance on ISIS centers like Mosul in Iraq and, eventually, Raqqa in Syria, this campaign to win over South and Southeast Asians is likely to intensify. South and Southeast Asia are home to the majority of Muslims in the world, but ISIS is not looking to the region just because it has a potentially large pool of recruits to draw from. These countries might seem like environments conducive to ISIS for several reasons. For more of my analysis of how South and Southeast Asia may be turning into ISIS’s new recruiting grounds, see my new piece for the Carnegie Council.

Richard Javad Heydarian is an assistant professor in political science at De La Salle University in Manila, and, most recently, the author of Asia’s New Battlefield: The U.S., China, and the Struggle for Western Pacific. The Philippines’ controversial president, Rodrigo Duterte, has once again grabbed global headlines with his inflammatory statements. This time, he reportedly invoked Hitler to underscore his commitment to continuing a ‘shock and awe’ campaign against illegal drugs, which has provoked global outcry. In response to a chorus of international condemnation, senior Philippine officials were quick to dismiss Duterte’s latest off-the-cuff remarks as a joke that should not be taken literally. Recognizing his mistake, the president himself apologized “profoundly and deeply” and clarified that there “was never an intention to derogate” the Holocaust. With suspected drug users and sellers surrendering to the government, there is growing pressure on the Duterte administration to adopt a more public health-centered approach on the issue. And the cash-strapped Philippine government is in need of significant foreign assistance to deal with the public health crisis. Some foreign actors have responded, despite Duterte’s criticism of them. Though at the receiving end of Duterte’s tirades---he has called the European Union “hypocrites” and sworn at them---the European Union has stepped up its assistance for new drug rehabilitation centers in the Philippines. The United Nations could also pursue common ground with Manila in addressing the country’s real drugs problems by focusing on augmenting the Philippines’ limited rehabilitation capacity for drug users. Meanwhile, Duterte has also forcefully questioned the foundations of Philippine foreign policy, taking aim at existing security agreements with the United States, and most recently threatening to cancel the new Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA). In the past month, Duterte has called for the expulsion of U.S. Special Forces from the southern island of Mindanao, where they have been advising their Philippine counterparts on counterterror operations since 2001. He also has called for the cancellation of joint patrols with foreign powers within the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone in international waters, and for the termination of U.S.-Philippine joint military exercises. Duterte has further suggested that, while reducing security ties to the United States, the Philippines could bolster links with China and Russia. A major problem, however, is that it is not clear whether any of these comments are instances of Duterte-style bluster and bravado, or actual policy statements, and it is hard to know how to confirm which comments indicate policy shifts. So far, there has been no confirmation from the presidential palace that the Philippine government has formally requested these changes in the security relationship with the United States. Similarly, despite suggesting that Manila would bolster security ties to Moscow and Beijing, Duterte subsequently clarified that he was mainly seeking closer trade and investment ties with Russia and China. But reports suggest that Manila and Beijing are exploring a 25-year military deal that might allow Manila to purchase advanced Chinese weaponry. There are three possible and interrelated explanations for Duterte’s latest remarks regarding Manila’s security relationship with Washington. First, his comments, while not necessarily meaning an end to joint exercises, are still consistent with his geopolitical vision of the country as more balanced between major foreign powers. Unlike many Philippine politicians, including his predecessor Benigno Aquino III, Duterte has consistently emphasized his preference for an “independent” foreign policy, which, to him, apparently means less dependence on the United States. Duterte believes that his country has been too subservient to Washington, and has repeatedly expressed his doubts about whether the U.S. military would be willing to come to the Philippines’ rescue in an event of war with China in the South China Sea. Second, Duterte’s latest tirades could be a means of expressing his frustration with Washington over human rights issues. The Obama administration---in addition to many international and domestic human rights organizations---has progressively stepped up its criticism of Duterte’s war on drugs campaign as the casualty count rises and Manila has no clear strategy for dealing with the public health ramifications of the growing drug crackdown. This criticism has, unsurprisingly, not gone over well with the blunt president, who has accused America of interfering in domestic Philippine affairs. Finally, these remarks could be part of his diplomatic charm-offensive vis-à-vis Beijing. Later this month, Duterte will make his first state visit to China, where the two neighbors are expected to negotiate the outlines of cooperation over the South China Sea, ranging from a joint fisheries agreement regarding the Scarborough Shoal to the establishment of a China-Philippine emergency hotline, as well as other confidence building measures. In exchange, Duterte may tinker with existing Philippine-U.S. security agreements. It is possible, for instance, that the Philippines may relocate annual Balikatan (shoulder-to-shoulder) exercises from the South China Sea to a less controversial site. It is doubtful though whether Duterte will move ahead with complete severance of existing security agreements, such as the new Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) or the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), or the 1951 Philippine-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty. Actually cutting these links this could alienate the Philippine armed forces and security establishment, which is close to and reliant on its U.S. counterparts, as well as undermine the president’s appeal among the population. Surveys consistently show that residents of the Philippines have the most pro-U.S. views of any country in the world. The United States is also home to millions of Filipinos, and is the biggest source of remittances, and one of the largest investors and trade partners of the Philippines. Any significant downgrade in bilateral ties would surely alienate a significant portion of the population.

Having already launched a grim, brutal war on drugs that has reportedly led to thousands of deaths and hundreds of thousands of arrests, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte is now turning his eye to southern Philippines, where a collection of insurgent groups/terrorist organizations/bandits have wreaked havoc for decades. (Southeast Asia is also now home to more piracy attacks than any other region of the world, and the waters of the southern Philippines are part of this massive piracy problem.) In recent days, Duterte has, in his usual tough guy style, vowed to step up the government’s war against the Abu Sayyaf, which in the past year has allied itself with the Islamic State group, increased its number of kidnappings, and appeared bolder in its ability to stand toe-to-toe with Philippine army troops in gunfights in the deep south. Duterte now has promised to have the army totally destroy the Abu Sayyaf militarily. In early September, the president vowed that he would “eat [the Abu Sayyaf] alive,” and declared that the Abu Sayyaf were trying to build a caliphate in the southern Philippines. But destroying the Abu Sayyaf, a wily group with havens in some of the most remote and lawless areas of the southern Philippines and the waters between the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia, is going to be very difficult. For fifteen years, Philippine presidents, and the Philippine army, have tried and largely failed with various strategies to destroy the Abu Sayyaf. These have included all-out wars (including plans by the Aquino administration to declare martial law in the deep south), special operations designed to kidnap the top Abu Sayyaf leaders while pressuring their followers to surrender, and putting feelers out to the Abu Sayyaf for a negotiation that would lead to a permanent ceasefire. Duterte has not explained how his war on the Abu Sayyaf will differ from those of previous administrations, and the Philippine armed forces face the same challenges in their battle now as they did during the Aquino or Macapagal-Arroyo administrations. The army has limited intelligence about the Abu Sayyaf’s strongholds. Graft remains a huge problem in the Philippine armed forces, as is keeping details about impending maneuvers secret. Meanwhile, the Abu Sayyaf is widely reviled in the deep south, but the army’s history of brutality in the south---and its inability to protect informants---badly undermines its chances of effectively tracking the Abu Sayyaf’s movements. The Duterte administration has shown few signs that it has a new approach that could comprehensively eliminated the Abu Sayyaf, or lead to some kind of negotiation in which the Abu Sayyaf would join other southern groups in accepting a peace deal for Mindanao and the deep south. It doesn’t help matters that Duterte’s brusque, wild style could alienate many of the regional partners whose support he needs in the fight against the Abu Sayyaf. Duterte has, in recent weeks, condemned the United States for criticizing the abuses that have become common in his war on drugs, but U.S. assistance and training has been crucial in helping Philippine troops learn modern counterinsurgency strategies and develop battle plans for combating the Abu Sayyaf. It will be challenging for the Duterte administration to take the fight to the Abu Sayyaf if Duterte is serious about reducing U.S. assistance for the Philippine army and coast guard. In addition, although the new president has not yet alienated Malaysia and Indonesia and Singapore, whose cooperation he needs to improve the quality of patrols in the lawless Sulu Sea, don’t count out the possibility. Duterte needs Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur’s cooperation to implement a deal the three nations made in August to allow their navies to pursue Abu Sayyaf members who have taken hostages into each others’ territorial waters. But earlier this year, Duterte slammed Singapore publicly. Given his personality, it is probably only a matter of time before he says something that alienates leaders in Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur, further undermining cooperation in combating the Abu Sayyaf and piracy in general.

Richard Javad Heydarian is an assistant professor in political science at De La Salle University in Manila, and, most recently, the author of Asia’s New Battlefield: The U.S., China, and the Struggle for Western Pacific. Three months into office, the Philippines’ firebrand president, Rodrigo Duterte, made his global diplomatic debut, when he attended the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and East Asia Group summits earlier this month. No less than the leaders of China, Japan, Russia, India, and the United States as well as the Secretary General of the United Nations were in attendance. The Duterte administration scheduled nine bilateral meetings on the sidelines of the sidelines of the regional gathering, including with U.S. President Barack Obama. Duterte was also slated to formally accept the Philippines’ (rotational) chairmanship of the Southeast Asian regional grouping. (The Philippines technically become ASEAN chair next year.) The ASEAN summit in Vientiane, Laos, thus was a perfect opportunity for him to showcase a more statesmanlike and composed demeanor, in contrast to the blunt style he has used as president this summer. After all, shortly after securing an election victory earlier this year, the controversial leader promised not to be rude anymore, reassuring citizens of the Philippines that, “when I take my oath of office . . . there will be a metamorphosis.” Duterte’s promise was put to test just hours before he landed in Laos for the ASEAN summit. In another spontaneous, long-winded press conference in the Philippines, Duterte apparently referring to President Obama with a curse word, when he was asked about Washington’s criticism of Duterte’s antidrug campaign. Soon after, the White House announced that the bilateral meeting with Duterte was called off, provoking diplomatic alarm in Manila. In response, the Duterte administration released an official statement of “regret” for Duterte’s words, prompting Washington to reiterate that U.S.-Philippine relations remain “rock solid” and that Obama never took the insults personally. But just when everyone thought the issue was smoothed over, Duterte went on the offensive again, making an impromptu speech in Vientiane criticizing what he called the United States’ colonial-era crimes against the Philippine population. Duterte also skipped the U.S.-ASEAN summit portion of the Vientiane event. This was a snub to the United States. To be sure, Duterte remains an extremely popular leader at home, but the reception in the Philippines for Duterte’s first efforts at diplomacy were, at best, mixed. According to one survey, the Philippines is the most pro-United States nation on earth. So many Philippine citizens were unsurprisingly shocked to see such an open dispute between their government and Washington. Instead of holding back, Duterte has upped the ante in recent days since the Vientiane meeting, even suggesting that he may consider scrapping existing military agreements with the United States. In one of his characteristically spirited speeches, he asked U.S. Special Forces, who have for more than a decade been training Philippine soldiers in fighting extremist groups, to leave the southern Philippines. He also announced the termination of joint patrols with U.S. forces in the South China Sea, while indicating that his country would begin sourcing its military hardware from Russia and China. Duterte tried to justify his controversial statements by invoking the Philippines’ constitutional commitment to an “independent” foreign policy. Critics, meanwhile, were quick to portray Duterte as essentially decoupling the Philippines from its traditional alliances, including with the United States, in favor of other regional powers, like China. Yet the United States continues to enjoy deep and institutionalized ties with the Philippines’ security establishment and other influential Philippine policymakers. Thus, it would be very difficult for any Philippine president to upend security cooperation with the United States without suffering a domestic backlash. Reports also suggest that there has been no formal request by the Manila to actually terminate any U.S. military presence in the southern Philippines. It is more likely that Duterte is simply signaling what he hopes becomes a new normal in bilateral relations with the United States during his time as president. Duterte wants to make it clear that when it comes to human rights issues and his war on drugs, he is in no mood to be lectured. With Duterte also likely to visit Beijing in the coming month, in hopes of negotiating a modus vivendi in the South China Sea, his recent anti-American tirades also could reflect a calibrated maneuver to communicate to China Manila’s independence from Washington.

Richard Javad Heydarian is an assistant professor in political science at De La Salle University in Manila, and, most recently, the author of Asia’s New Battlefield: The U.S., China, and the Struggle for Western Pacific. While the world is transfixed by the Duterte administration’s ‘shock and awe’ crackdown on the drug trade, which has drawn global condemnation for its alleged widespread use of extrajudicial killings yet enjoys significant domestic support, the newly-inaugurated President Rodrigo Duterte, a self-described ‘socialist’, is also shaking up Philippine foreign policy. So far, however, under the country’s new firebrand leader, the country has seen more change than continuity in its foreign policy. Earlier this year, before the presidential campaign formally kicked off, the Philippines was generally regarded as one of the stronger liberal democracies in Asia, as well as a vibrant emerging market and a staunch ally of the United States. The United States and the Philippines are treaty allies, but under the previous Aquino administration, Washington and Manila signed a new bilateral defense pact, and U.S. security assistance to the Philippines rose markedly. A new administration in Manila, however, is rapidly reshaping the country’s domestic politics, but its impact on foreign policy remains unclear. When it comes to Duterte’s overheated rhetoric, sometimes it seems he really means what he says, as evidently shown in his uncompromising ‘war on drugs’ campaign. As president, he has followed through on the promises to combat the drug trade, even through extralegal means, that he made on the campaign trail. Shortly after his election victory, Duterte declared, "I will be charting a [new] course [for the Philippines] on its own and will not be dependent on the United States." Since then, when it comes to relations with Washington, the new president has broken one diplomatic taboo after the other. On multiple occasions, he has openly questioned America’s commitment to come to the Philippines’ aid in an event of conflict in the South China Sea. He has intimated that he will put new restrictions on the movement of American military personnel on Philippine soil, though vowed to honor existing bilateral security agreements. So far, the Obama administration has tried to walk a diplomatic tightrope with Duterte, generally avoiding any criticism of the new Philippine government. In fact, President Barack Obama was the first head of state to call Duterte and congratulate him upon his election victory. Secretary of State John Kerry made a trip to Manila shortly after the new Philippine president was inaugurated. Washington has begun, though in a carefully crafted language, to criticize Duterte on human rights concerns. President Obama is expected to raise the issue again when he meets the Philippine leader at the upcoming Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit. Yet Washington’s diplomatic outreach apparently has neither prevented Duterte from publicly insulting the American ambassador nor impacted Duterte’s domestic political agenda. If anything, Duterte has moved closer to China in recent months, extending an olive branch to China, despite the latter’s refusal to even acknowledge a United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) ruling at The Hague this summer, which debunked the bulk of Beijing’s claims over the South China Sea. Over the past few months, Duterte has met Chinese Ambassador to the Philippines Zhao Jinhua more than any other diplomatic envoy in Manila. The two met shortly before the final award from The Hague was announced. By all indications, the exchanges were cordial and intimate, underlining the Duterte administration’s determination to renormalize relations with Beijing after years of icy relations under the Aquino government. In recent months, Beijing has generously offered large-scale investments in Philippine infrastructure, including in Mindanao, where Duterte served as mayor of Davao for decades. To ensure maximum diplomatic success, Duterte has appointed former President Fidel Ramos, who deftly managed South China Sea disputes in the mid-1990s and maintains friendly relations with Beijing leaders, as special envoy to China. After a five-day ‘ice breaker’ visit to Hong Kong, where he informally met a senior Chinese official, Ramos received an invitation for direct talks in Beijing. Duterte himself will likely meet Chinese Premier Li Keqiang on the sidelines of the ASEAN in Laos, paving the way for a potential state visit by Duterte to Beijing later this year. A joint fisheries agreement in the Scarborough Shoal, which is consistent with The Hague ruling, is one potential compromise on the horizon. To ensure smooth progress in his diplomatic outreach to China, the Duterte administration has de-emphasized the arbitration outcome and has sought to de-multilateralize the disputes by not vigorously raising the South China Sea disputes in the ASEAN. Obviously, improved ties between the Philippines and China aren’t necessarily inimical to American interests, since the Obama administration has welcomed diplomatic resolution of regional disputes. But Duterte’s approach to the United States has certainly raised eyebrows in Washington.

Over email, Professor Richard Javad Heydarian of De La Salle University in Manila and CFR Senior Fellow for Southeast Asia Joshua Kurlantzick discussed some of the potential effects—both positive and negative—of the administration of new Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte. Richard Javad Heydarian: By many indicators, Rodrigo Duterte is emerging as the Philippines’ most powerful president since the fall of the Marcos dictatorship three decades ago. Fresh into office, and after months of aggressive campaign rhetoric, the new president enjoys excellent trust ratings, has amassed super-majority support in the Philippine Congress, and is set to appoint a majority of Supreme Court justices in coming years. The Ombudsman office, which has been waging a relentless campaign against corrupt officials, also enjoys close and cooperative relations with Duterte. From a maverick candidate, who galvanized nationwide support and gained notoriety internationally, Duterte has seemingly transformed into a more statesmanlike, unifying figure. Or at least, that is how a growing number of Filipinos are coming to see him, despite his unorthodox style and still colorful language, which tends to estrange the polite society. Less than a month into office, Duterte sits confidently atop the Philippine state, relishing an unprecedented amount of political capital, potentially granting him enough space to overhaul the Philippine political system—although this will require a constitutional amendment, which is not easy to pass. Much of this is a reflection of his leadership dynamism, but also profound public yearning for meaningful change. A month into office, Duterte has already instructed his allies in the Congress to form a Constituent Assembly to draft a new constitution, paving the way for a federal form of government with both parliament and a president, if the changes to the constitution pass. Duterte plans to finalize the transition before the end of his term. Many experts, however, doubt whether such move is necessary or even desirable, since federalism could further empower local political dynasties and exacerbate regional divides, not to mention weaken the Philippines’ already fragile state institutions. Joshua Kurlantzick: Richard, I agree with you about the desire for change, since the previous Aquino administration clearly failed to make serious inroads into inequality, and to convince most voters that the political and economic system works for anyone but elites. This despite strong GDP growth, a more stable macroeconomic environment than the Philippines had enjoyed in decades, and an overall high level of political stability.  But is it actually true that Duterte has more political capital than any other leader in recent memory? After all, he was just inaugurated president, and new presidents always have a fairly high degree of political capital in their early months in office. He won a race with multiple candidates and only with a plurality of votes, and it is very early in his relations with Congress. Also, what’s the hard evidence to show he’s suddenly become a more statesmanlike figure?  I’ll quote from this Sydney Morning Herald article on Duterte’s State of the Nation speech: “Mr Duterte shrugged off alarm over the rising body count in his first state of the nation address to parliament, declaring that drugs were drowning his country and human rights were no excuse to shield criminals. ‘Double your efforts. Triple them if need be,’ the tough-talking former provincial mayor said in a message to police.” Is this statesmanlike? Or worryingly undermining the rule of law? Heydarian: More than nine out of ten Filipinos, latest polls show, have expressed confidence in the new Filipino leader. This is the highest  figure enjoyed by any Filipino president in modern history, although it is very early in Duterte’s term. Six out of ten Filipinos, another poll shows, expressed high confidence in Duterte’s ability to fulfill most of his campaign promises. Yet, these numbers could be more a reflection of high public expectations and an ephemeral “benefit of the doubt,” which can significantly diminish in the medium-run if Duterte fails to fulfill his wide-ranging promise of political transformation. Nonetheless, Duterte has yet to roll out a coherent and feasible national vision.  During his recent first State of the Nation address, the new president promised a more caring, responsive and, above all, effective government. Though entertaining, and in many ways unorthodox, it ultimately evinced lack of proper organization and policy clarity in the new government. Kurlantzick: The lack of organization and policy clarity—that is a major concern. In his time as mayor of Davao, Duterte, despite policies that encouraged extrajudicial killings and other potential violations of human rights, also was known for courting advice from a wide range of experts and actually rolling out detailed policies on a wide range of issues. How could he not have a clear, detailed vision in the SONA, when it was his best, first chance to show the country how he actually plans to transform his big rhetoric into policy? How does he plan to really get constitutional change, if it is so hard to do so with a constitutional amendment? Heydarian: Duterte dedicated the bulk of his speech to defending his relentless war on organized crime, which has provoked growing opposition from the liberal media, human rights groups, and the Catholic Church for his seeming toleration for abuses by security forces. “Human rights must work to uplift human dignity,” Duterte exclaimed. “But human rights cannot be used as a shield or an excuse to destroy the country—your country and my country.” He explained his peace and security agenda to the conflict in Mindanao, calling upon Moro Islamic rebels in the south to unify under the banner of a multi-ethnic, inclusive society. Duterte has also promised more political autonomy for the Muslim-majority regions in the south through a modified version of his predecessor’s proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL), which faced stiff opposition in the Philippine Congress and did not pass by the time Aquino left office. Kurlantzick: My understanding is that even a modified BBL is still going to face strong opposition in Congress. What is the evidence otherwise—especially if there are new rounds of violence in the south? Also, aren’t some of Duterte’s own appointees known for being highly skeptical of a southern peace deal, or have poor relations with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)? I am noting Zachary Abuza’s piece here, in which he writes that: “Duterte immediately selected Jesus Dureza as his advisor on the peace process. Duereza held the same position in the cabinet of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo from 2001 to 2003. Duereza had a terrible reputation as a back-channel wheeler dealer.” Abuza further notes: “Secretary of Agriculture Emmanuel Piñol had cut his teeth as an elected official in North Cotabato, where some of the most fierce fighting between the government and the MILF, and later the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters, has taken place. North Cotabato has always been contested space between Christian dominated eastern Mindanao and lands claimed by the Bangsamoro. Piñol has been a leading critic of the BBL and a hardline Christian advocate within Congress, opposing the peace process.” How do you reconcile these cabinet officials’ backgrounds with movement toward peace in the south and some kind of BBL? Are you saying that, because these officials are so close to Duterte, if he wants to push for a revised BBL, they will be more effective interlocutors with the MILF this time, simply because Duterte is a stronger leader? Heydarian: In Philippine politics, personality, trust, and political will matters. We saw how this helped previous President Aquino’s efforts to rekindle peace talks, which were unfortunately undermined by Mamasapano tragedy, and undermined similar efforts by his less trusted predecessors. As far as Duterte is concerned, he is not only the first president from Mindanao, with intimate understanding of the conflict in the region, but he has nurtured his close ties with various rebel leaders. Among Muslims in the Philippines, Duterte is right now highly popular. And there is a growing sense that if there is any president who can end the conflict in Mindanao, it is him. But of course, the challenge is to translate this unique political capital into actual gains in peace negotiations. So far, there is no indication that any of his cabinet members are going to use their posts to come out now against peace in the south. He also hopes to revive Mindanao’s economic fortunes by containing terrorism, ending insurgencies and brining in massive infrastructure projects, likely with the help of China and Japan. Meanwhile, Duterte dedicated only few lines to external security concerns, particularly the South China Sea disputes. Eager to re-open communication channels with the Chinese leadership, Duterte has adopted a “keep it quiet” pragmatic policy in the aftermath of a landmark legal victory against China in the South China Sea. No less than former President Fidel Ramos is expected to serve as Duterte’s special envoy to China. For Duterte, who is more focused on domestic security challenges, sometimes the best form of communication is calibrated silence. There is, however, a huge risk that China will take advantage of the Philippines’ recalibration under a new leadership to expand its presence across disputed waters and renege on any provisional deal with the Duterte administration. Kurlantzick: I think to say that Duterte’s so far low-key approach to the South China Sea runs a risk of allowing China to further entrench its gains in the South China Sea is kind of a major understatement. The Philippines got a significant victory from the tribunal in The Hague in July. Sure, Duterte can leverage this victory to help make gains in negotiations with China. There’s nothing wrong, I think, with bilateral negotiations, as long as other Southeast Asian nations are informed, and both the Philippines and China know they can’t negotiate away areas that are claimed by Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, and Vietnam. But there’s little evidence from the past—in the South China Sea, the East China Sea, or elsewhere—that China responds to calibrated silence by being willing to make deals.  

Tomorrow, an international tribunal in The Hague is expected to deliver its verdict on the Philippines’ legal case against China’s claims in the South China Sea. Under the previous Aquino administration, Manila launched a case at the Permanent Court of Arbitration tribunal, asking for it to rule on whether China’s nine-dashed line claim in the South China Sea was legal under international maritime law, and whether other aspects of Beijing’s claims were legal. Although few other countries paid attention when the case was taken up by the court last year, Vietnam has now rhetorically supported the Philippines’ right to a hearing. The Obama administration also increasingly has seen the case as a way to demonstrate that U.S. partners obey international law in the South China Sea, while Beijing does not. Indeed, while senior Obama administration officials said little about the case last year, in recent weeks they have repeatedly mentioned it, warning Beijing not to launch provocative actions after the ruling, and emphasizing that the court is a neutral decider. The new Rodrigo Duterte administration, though potentially more open to bilateral negotiations on the Sea than Aquino’s administration was, has continued to support the Philippines’ right to seek a ruling in The Hague. China is not actually participating in the case, rejecting any third-party efforts to resolve South China Sea disputes. Yet although China has said that it rejects the Court’s jurisdiction and will not heed any ruling made, Beijing seems to have become increasingly skittish that the court is going to rule against Beijing. A ruling could not really be enforced, but it would give the Philippines legitimacy and leverage in dealing with China. A ruling against China’s claims also possibly would strengthen the claims of other countries, like Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei, to the South China Sea. It is very likely that, tomorrow, the tribunal will rule against Beijing. In recent months, China has apparently exerted significant pressure on Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand, and other ASEAN nations it considers potential allies to prevent ASEAN from releasing a consensus statement about the ruling. Beijing also has used state media and other outlets to public cast doubt on the court’s legitimacy before the ruling is released. If the ruling goes against China, and Beijing responds with a show of force in the South China Sea---clearly increasing the pace of building on man-made islands or declaring an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) in the South China Sea, for instance---it will be a critical test of how far the United States will go to support its allies and partners with South China Sea claims. The declaration of an air defense identification zone would be particularly provocative, but it should not catch the United States and its partners off-guard, since Beijing has been threatening to announce an ADIZ in the South China Sea for months now. When China announced an ADIZ in the East China Sea in 2013, it came as something of a surprise to both U.S. and Japanese forces. The stakes in the South China Sea, of course, are enormous. In advance of tomorrow’s ruling, and the potential aftermath, here is a link to the Contingency Planning Memorandum I wrote for CFR last year. It examines several potential warning signs of emerging conflict in the South China Sea, as well as signs of other types of conflict between China and its Southeast Asian neighbors.

It doesn’t look like there is going to be a more presidential Rodrigo Duterte. The former mayor of Davao made his name on the campaign trail for his blunt rhetoric, which often offended many civil society activists, journalists, and other Filipinos. He had a reputation, as mayor of Davao, for both effective management and for allegedly condoning extrajudicial killings of criminal suspects. He had a highly testy relationship with the press. Not much has changed, even though Duterte is now president. Since he was elected, there has been a rash of suspicious killings of criminal suspects---killings that seemingly resemble the “encounter killings” common in India in which police are believed to have just executed suspects. While president-elect, he also has made a series of statements that could be construed as highly insulting to women, and questioning the rule of law. Duterte also has brought his seeming contempt for journalists to a national stage. As president-elect, he announced that journalists could be assassinated if they were corrupt, a terrible public signal in a country where more journalists are killed each year than anywhere else in East Asia. He appointed as his presidential spokesman a man who had worked as a lawyer for the leaders of the Ampatuan clan, which was linked to a massacre of 58 people in 2009. The dead included at least 34 journalists. Now, Duterte banned journalists from his swearing-in, even though the Philippines has a vibrant media culture and one of the most media-hungry populations in East Asia. (The swearing-in was shown only on a state television station.) As Foreign Policy reported:   “The move [to ban reporters from the inauguration] is in line with Duterte’s promise to boycott the media: Earlier this month, he subjected a female reporter who was mid-sentence in asking a question to catcalling and then a serenade---all during a televised news conference. Three days after that, he cut his losses and announced he would no longer grant interviews until the end of his term.”   On the other hand, Duterte has long demonstrated that he hates Manila, that he wants the country to have a larger and more diverse set of political and economic capitals, and that he plans to include a broader range of Filipinos in his government. On the campaign trail, he repeatedly disparaged Manila, and he has now appointed many of his allies from Davao to his cabinet. He also seemingly plans to run the government, at least some of the time, from Davao rather than from the Palace in Manila. More importantly, Duterte appears willing to push hard for a constitutional amendment that would shift power from a highly centralized system to a decentralized one, potentially modeled on the political and economic devolution tried in Indonesia, which has been highly successful. Although passing an amendment will be extremely difficult---as hard as pushing through a constitutional amendment in the United States---there is deep popular desire for systemic political change in the Philippines. Just don’t expect Duterte to change.

Rachel Brown, Gabriella Meltzer, and Gabriel Walker look at five stories from Asia this week. 1. Smoldering discontent rekindles protests in Wukan, China. Nearly five years ago, popular protests erupted in the small fishing village of Wukan, Guangdong province, over illegal land grabs by the local government. The “Siege of Wukan,” as it was later known, set a precedent for diffusing tensions on the local level through democratic means, as villagers were allowed to elect new leaders after protesting for three months. Late last week, Wukan residents began planning a new round of protests over similar illegal land sales, partly spurred by an online letter from Lin Zuluan—the village party secretary elected after the last protests—which announced Lin’s intention to mobilize residents. But this weekend, Lin was detained by police on account of accepting bribes, a charge that many believe to be spurious despite Lin’s videotaped confession. Between two and four thousand villagers took to the streets early this week calling for his release. Though coverage of the ongoing protests has mostly been expurgated from the Chinese web and press, one Global Times article stated that “the disputes in Wukan may eventually be solved in accordance with the law.” Unfortunately for Lin, who seems to have been denied legal counsel, Chinese authorities sometimes bend laws when fighting the flames of public discontent. 2. Duterte administration pushes population-control measures. Rodrigo Duterte, president-elect of the Philippines, plans to implement strong family-planning programs to curb poverty in the country and maximize its demographic dividends to attract further foreign investment. As of 2015, 26.3 percent of the country’s population is living in poverty, and although 30 million people are between ten and twenty-four years old, 25 percent of workers ages twenty through twenty-four remain unemployed. In order to address these issues, the administration is pushing for “rapid and sustained implementation” of the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Act of 2012, which allows public health centers to freely distribute contraceptives and teach sex education in schools. In addition, Duterte intends to execute a three-child policy whereby families who have more than three children will be disqualified from receiving government aid through a conditional cash-transfer program that currently supports 4.4 million poor families. The influential Catholic Church (80 percent of Filipinos identify as Catholic) opposes these measures, but Duterte has controversially stated that the Church’s doctrine is no longer relevant to modern Filipino society. 3. Famed Sufi singer killed in Karachi drive-by shooting. Amjad Sabri, a beloved singer of Sufi devotional song, or qawwali, was killed this Wednesday when gunmen on a motorcycle drove by and fired shots into his car. Three of his family members in the car also succumbed to their injuries. A senior Karachi police officer stated that the attack was targeted, and a faction of the Pakistani Taliban later claimed responsibility for the killing. A spokesperson for the Pakistani Taliban said that Sabri was a target because the group considered his music blasphemous—possibly referring to particular qawwali Sabri performed that mentioned religious figures. Thousands of Karachi residents paid their respects by pouring into the streets and throwing rose petals over the ambulance carrying Sabri’s body. Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif also mourned the loss of the singer, whom he called a “goodwill ambassador of Pakistan around the world,” and announced a $150,000 grant for Sabri’s family. To one scholar of Islam, Sabri’s death represents more than just the loss of a great artist—it is a tragic affront to the kind of deep religious love that can only be expressed through music. 4. India further opens to foreign investment. This week, the Indian government put forth major plans to liberalize foreign investors’ access to the Indian economy. The reforms include granting foreigners the ability to have full ownership over companies in the food, civil aviation, and defense sectors, as well as stakes of 74 percent or below in Indian pharmaceutical firms. Investments in single-brand retail will also undergo reform, which will make it easier for companies like Apple and IKEA to further establish themselves in the Indian market. The decision was seen as part of an effort to create jobs and maintain strong economic growth. It also came shortly after the resignation of Raghuram Rajan, the head of the Reserve Bank of India, whose departure raised concerns about India’s future economic prospects. The Modi government issued the new rules by an executive order because Modi’s party, the BJP, does not control the Upper House of Parliament, which has previously been considered a hindrance to reform. 5. Women MBAs fall behind in Asia. Business schools around Asia are paying increasing attention to the lack of opportunities for and recruitment of women. While some schools, such as Hong Kong University, have begun to develop more robust systems for supporting female students, many institutions lag behind. This may have limited the number of women who could assume leading roles in Asian finance firms, where a mere 13 percent of executives are female (compared to 21 percent in the United States). However, the gap may beginning to narrow. Women made up over 67 percent of the class of 2015–16 in business schools in Asia (excluding Turkey and India) affiliated with the Global Alliance in Management Education, and were found to be more open to international career paths and specialized programs. Outside of classrooms and c-suites, more opportunities for women in business could also have a significant financial impact. The United Nations estimates that if women in Asia “achieve their full economic potential” it could add $89 billion annually to the regional economy. Bonus: Seoul fights “smartphone zombies” with street signs. In South Korea, the smartphone capital of the world (88 percent of the population has one), collisions between pedestrians and vehicles has skyrocketed in recent years. The reason is likely simple: more city-dwellers glued to their screens have been carelessly stepping into oncoming traffic. As a result, Seoul has taken the initiative to install its first batch of three hundred signs around the city to remind plugged-in pedestrians to walk with more care. The signs will be strategically placed in locations with large populations of young people, and mostly on sidewalks to increase the likelihood that tweeters and texters will see them while staring down at their devices. “I am always on my smartphone, and I have never seen the signs before,” said one local. If these signs don’t prove effective enough, maybe using a more traditional, and aggressive, reminder—like a recording of a car horn—would do the trick.

The new president-elect of the Philippines, Rodrigo Duterte, came into office without a clear policy platform. On the campaign trail, Duterte had vowed to get tough on crime, duplicating his efforts as mayor of Davao on a national level. He had made vague promises of changing the Philippines’ political system to reduce the power of entrenched elites, and he had offered contradictory, sometimes confusing statements on the Philippines’ major security challenges---the ongoing threat of militant groups in the southern Philippines, and the growing contest with China over control of disputed parts of the South China Sea. Since his election in early May, Duterte’s plans for his six year presidential term have become clearer. The first president to have come from the southern Philippines (Duterte was not born in Mindanao, but he served as mayor of Davao for decades), Duterte clearly intends to make ending the decades-long wars with southern insurgents and communist militants a centerpiece of his administration. He also clearly sees a need for a dramatic decentralization of power away from Manila, both to reduce the power of elites and to end insurgencies in the south. The decentralization of political and economic power in Indonesia since 1998 is an obvious inspiration for Duterte, according to several of his advisors; before the end of the Suharto regime, Indonesia was one of the most centralized states in the region. Today, Indonesia is one of the most federalized states in Southeast Asia, and other countries in the region, like Myanmar, also are looking at Indonesia as a potential model of decentralization. As a new Wall Street Journal article notes, Duterte intends to change the constitution to transform the Philippines into a more federal country, proposing a national referendum for these constitutional change by 2019. Duterte will confront significant hurdles; as the Journal notes, previous Philippine presidents have not been able to push through constitutional changes. Still, the idea of decentralization makes real sense in such a large and diverse country, and decentralization has been effective in Indonesia in fostering political engagement and promoting economic competitiveness. Duterte also has made clear that he intends to continue many of the Aquino administration’s economic policies, which should be reassuring to domestic and foreign investors. The Duterte administration, however, hopes to shift the Philippines’ economy in a way that brings broader growth. Duterte has promised to use his power to foster growth that not only expands the economy but helps reduce the Philippines’ high income inequality. Such a strategy includes fostering investment in the south and other outlying regions, and in making the economy more reliant on agricultural and manufacturing exports, rather than consumption, according to Duterte economic advisor Ernesto Pernia. As he notes, an economy so dependent on consumption is not creating enough jobs, especially given the Philippines’ high birth rate. The government also apparently plans to create new special economic zones, designed to attract investment, in areas other than Metro Manila and Central Luzon. Finally, Duterte has begun to offer some clarity about his policies on the South China Sea. Although, on the campaign trail, he often offered an olive branch to Beijing, suggesting he would break from the Aquino administration’s tough rhetorical approach and increasing military buildup. But there is little evidence that Duterte is going to completely break from Aquino’s policies. He has said that he will not rely on the United States for long-term security guarantees, and that his administration would be open to direct talks with Beijing about disputed areas, but he also has stated that the Philippines is not going to give up its rights to Scarborough Shoal. He also has not pulled back from the Philippines’ case before international arbitration in The Hague, as some of his critics suggested he might.