Philippines

Rachel Brown, Sherry Cho, Gabriella Meltzer, and Gabriel Walker look at five stories from Asia this week. 1. New president, new approach? Moon Jae-in, South Korea’s new president, has pledged to pursue dialogue with North Korea and stated that he was willing to meet with North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-un, if it would bring about lasting peace to the Korean peninsula. In comparison with Moon’s two conservative predecessors, who stressed a united approach with the United States in attempting to isolate North Korea through sanctions and pressure, Moon has often called for South Korea to take the lead in diffusing tensions through negotiations and dialogue.The last inter-Korean summit meeting occurred in 2007 between the previous North Korean leader Kim Jong-il and the president of South Korea at the time, Roh Moo-hyun, a longtime friend and ideological ally of President Moon’s. Roh’s “Sunshine Policy,” which focused on engaging North Korea through dialogue, joint economic projects, and humanitarian aid, is generally expected to serve as the basis of Moon’s North Korea policy. Its successful implementation remains to be seen, however, as Moon has also vowed to reinforce South Korea’s relationship with the United States and President Trump, whose diplomatic overtures and fractious military posturing toward North Korea have led to general bafflement in the region. 2. Philippines faces new extremist threats. Alarms rang this week over the possibility that terrorist groups would kidnap tourists at popular destinations in the Philippines. In particular, Western embassies warned of plans to target tourists at two locations on the island of Palawan. The threats emanated from the southern Philippine terrorist group Abu Sayyaf, which has a decades-long history of kidnapping foreigners and locals for ransom. Now Abu Sayyaf, which claims allegiance to the self-proclaimed Islamic State group, is increasing its power as it uses the high-value ransoms to finance new weapons purchases. And the group’s influence is rising despite Philippine President Rodrgio Duterte’s military operations against them. Earlier this month, the Islamic State also claimed responsibility for explosions in Manila, although Philippine officials denied that the group had been involved. President Duterte has pledged to take an aggressive stance against terrorism. Never one to shy away from coarse language, he even said that he would eat militants—“give me salt and vinegar and I'll eat his liver.” As threats from both the Islamic State and other extremist groups in Southeast Asia mount, President Duterte would do well to pursue a more comprehensive strategy than just sharpening his knife and fork. 3. Taiwan vies to join World Health Assembly. Despite objections from Beijing, Taiwan is pushing to be included as an observer in this year’s World Health Organization’s World Health Assembly in Geneva, which will take place from May 22 to May 31. This seventieth annual gathering will include the election of a new director general from a finalist pool of three candidates. China has consistently tried to block Taiwan’s participation in international agencies due to its claims of sovereignty over the island. As a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, Beijing continues to wield strong political influence at both the UN and WHO. President Tsai Ing-Wen has remained vocal on Twitter, writing “Taiwan should not be excluded from W.H.A. this year for any reason… Health issues don’t stop at border & Taiwan’s role is impt to global health.” Taiwan’s minister of health and welfare, Chen Shih-chung, has told the press that Taiwan plans to send a delegation to Geneva even without a formal invitation. 4. Japan and South Korea hit impasse over comfort women dilemma. South Korea’s newly elected President Moon Jae-in has cast doubt on a 2015 deal with Japan over the issue of wartime sex slaves known colloquially as “comfort women.” On Thursday, Moon told Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe that a 2015 deal to resolve a dispute over Korean women forced into sexual service for Japanese soldiers during World War II was “unacceptable” to most South Koreans. Moon’s remarks are likely to reignite the emotionally charged issue between Japan and South Korea during a time when cooperative efforts against the North Korean nuclear threat are more significant than ever. Under the 2015 agreement, Mr. Abe offered his “most sincere apologies and remorse” to all former “comfort women,” and the two countries agreed to “finally and irreversibly” settle the comfort women issue; additionally, Japan disbursed 1 billion yen ($8.9 million) last year to a South Korean fund designated to help former comfort women and their families. However, victim advocacy groups have protested that the apology did not do enough to address the Japanese government’s role in forcing tens of thousands of women in Asia into sexual slavery as part of the “comfort women” program. Such groups have also pointed to Japanese history books that underplay Japan’s war crimes. Moon had promised to seek a renegotiation of the agreement with Japan as one of his key election pledges but it remains to be seen if this historically fraught issue will impede the bilateral relationship between South Korea and Japan and joint efforts to address the North Korean nuclear threat. 5. Chinese millennials snap up foreign properties via smartphone. According to an HSBC survey published earlier this year, 70 percent of Chinese millennials (born between 1981 and 1998) are home-owners—twice the rate in the United States. And many millennials are shopping for foreign properties on their smartphones with mobile apps like Uoolu and SouFun, just two examples of the Chinese mobile fintech boom. Uoolu reports that 80 percent of its active users are between 20 and 39, and that 20,000 customers have already purchased or are purchasing properties outside of China through their app. The company even encourages prospective customers to “hurry to invest” in Southeast Asia as part of Xi Jinping’s One Belt, One Road development strategy. A few factors are driving the scramble for overseas real estate: foreign investments as a hedge against a depreciating yuan; ever-climbing real estate prices in Chinese cities; and an interest in living abroad in a clean city rather than enduring China’s worrisome environmental pollution. Despite China’s strict capital controls (including a $50,000 annual limit on investments or money transfers abroad), buyers seem undaunted and leverage family members or other smurfing techniques to make their purchases. As Uoolu’s COO stated, “The more the government limits people, the more they want to invest overseas.” Bonus: Once upon a time on the Silk Road… The One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative entered its next frontier this week: bedtime stories and bubblegum pop. In a series of videos released by China Daily, American father and journalist Erik Nilsson regales his daughter with tales of Xi Jinping’s vision for OBOR. Before he joins guests from nearly one hundred and thirty countries at this weekend’s Belt and Road Forum in Beijing, he explains that the project is about more than just new transportation routes—it’s about “people and cooperation.” Meanwhile in a new music video from the ever-entertaining Fuxing Road Studios, children from Belt and Road nations, accompanied by a ukulele and cartoon backdrops, extol the virtues of the initiative in song. While it is unclear why China Daily or Fuxing Road feel they need to convince children that OBOR is not a bore, at least this is one audience unlikely to pose thorny geopolitical questions about the initiative’s future.

Over the weekend, the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations held the Thirtieth ASEAN Summit, in Manila—the Philippines is the chair of ASEAN this year. As has become usual, much of the discussion before the summit centered on a potential joint statement about the South China Sea, which has become one of the most divisive issues in Southeast Asia. Countries growing closer to China, like Cambodia and Thailand (which also have no direct claims in the South China Sea), and those that have direct claims and are increasingly suspicious of Beijing’s activities, like Vietnam, have faced off over South China Sea statements at many ASEAN meetings. In addition, the summit provided an opportunity for Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte to play up his role as a statesman and host. The fact that, over the weekend, U.S. President Donald Trump invited Duterte for a White House visit, essentially praising Duterte for his brutal approach to narcotics and claiming that the two had a very friendly chat, only further bolstered Duterte’s image in the region—and probably at home. Duterte, of course, then reacted with bizarre mixed messages, making it sound like he was too busy to visit the White House in the near future. This is probably bluster by the Philippine leader to make it clear that: he takes orders (or even invites) from no one; and, that he will continue to chart an independent foreign policy, even if he visits the White House. Some of the winners from the summit: 1. China While Southeast Asian states may still be divided about how to respond to China’s approach to the South China Sea—the region is witnessing a rapid arms race, led by countries like Vietnam, yet Beijing is supposedly pushing for a Code of Conduct, which seems to further befuddle many ASEAN nations—the ASEAN summit produced a relatively tepid statement on the Sea. In fact, the final statement was one of the most tepid on the South China Sea released by ASEAN in years. As Rappler reported, “The ASEAN Chairman’s Statement on Sunday merely ‘took note of concerns expressed by some leaders over recent developments’ in the South China Sea.” Any discussion of China’s land reclamation projects in the South China Sea, which supposedly had been included in earlier drafts of the statement, was gone by the time the final statement was released. A reference to all parties respecting “legal and diplomatic processes” related to the South China Sea, essentially a reference to the need to respect last year’s Hague tribunal ruling, was gone by the time the final statement was released as well, another victory for Beijing. As the Cambodia Daily noted, the final statement also omitted a mention of China’s “militarization” of parts of the South China Sea and claimed that Southeast Asian states and China were cooperating more effectively on South China Sea issues—a dubious claim. 2. Rodrigo Duterte Duterte seems to have incurred little public backlash in the Philippines for shifting Manila’s approach to the South China Sea and Beijing in general—a strategy that was on display in the weeks leading up to the summit, and possibly at the summit as well. Earlier in April, Duterte had vowed to visit Thitu, an island in a disputed area of the South China Sea. Reportedly after pressure from Beijing, he abruptly cancelled his visit to Thitu. On Duterte’s watch, the ASEAN Summit then ultimately released a statement sure to please Beijing. Yet Duterte’s high popularity ratings at home seem unchanged, even though some data also suggests that Philippine citizens desire a tough approach to protecting Philippine claims in the South China Sea. 3. Thailand’s Military Timed to the ASEAN Summit, President Trump also called the leaders of Singapore and Thailand over the weekend and extended an invitation for a White House visit to them as well. The invitation for Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong was completely uncontroversial. But Thailand’s prime minister is coup leader Prayuth Chan-ocha, the path to future elections in Thailand still seems unclear, and the military essentially enshrined its long-term power over government with the new constitution; any return to real and robust democracy in the kingdom is far off. Yet Prayuth’s legitimacy, and the Thai military’s actions, are going to essentially be endorsed by the White House with a visit to Washington. To be sure, former president Barack Obama included Prayuth as part of the U.S.-ASEAN summit last year in California. But Obama could at least claim that Prayuth was invited as part of the entire group of ASEAN leaders. Inviting the coup leader to the White House individually connotes a stronger endorsement of Prayuth.

Richard Javad Heydarian is a specialist in Asian geopolitical/economic affairs based in Manila.   After upending Asian geopolitics over the past year, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte now is set to make his mark on the most important regional organization, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Manila has taken over the chairmanship of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations this year---chairmanship rotates annually---amid much fanfare about ASEAN. The regional body is marking its 50th anniversary in 2017 , and declaring that ASEAN is “Partnering for Change, Engaging the World.” There is hope that global leaders from dialogue partners, namely U.S. President Donald Trump, Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo will visit the Philippines during the ASEAN summit in November. The regional body can congratulate itself on several victories during its five decades of existence. It can justifiably look at decades of robust economic integration, which ASEAN has promoted---all leading up to the current ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), which is essentially a regional free trade agreement that cuts tariff rates on some sectors to as low as zero. (Critics charge that in certain economic sectors the AEC is not really a true free trade agreement, and allows for continued high barriers in many sectors.) In addition, since ASEAN was created fifty years ago, at the height of the Vietnam War, there have been few outbreaks of armed conflict between members of the organization. ASEAN was launched by the five proximately positioned states of Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, which were largely aligned with the West and against the Communist bloc during the Cold War. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, which marked the end of ideological battles in Asia, Indochinese states, some still formally communist, of Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, and Myanmar. (Brunei had joined in 1984, after gaining its independence.) During the Cold War, Southeast Asia was of course a major battleground for foreign powers as well as a site for battles between Southeast Asian nations.The tempestuous years of Konfrontasi (1963–1966), saw Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia flirting with all-out military confrontation. Although there have been internal conflicts since then, like the violence in Papua, Aceh, and East Timor, the organization has worked to avoid a major regional conflict. Now, with the AEC in place ASEAN has also set its eyes on establishing a common market. If ever truly implemented, a Southeast Asia-wide common market would facilitate labor and capital mobility enormously. It also would reduce or remove the remaining non-tariff barriers that still impede regional growth. Yet even as it celebrates decades of successful efforts, ASEAN also is trying to solve several major diplomatic challenges in 2017. In particular, the organization is scrambling to negotiate a Code of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea, where China and a number of Southeast Asian countries are at loggerheads over disputed land features (i.e., Spratlys, Paracels, and Scarborough Shoal), large-scale fisheries stock, and potentially vast seabed hydrocarbon and mineral resources. The festering disputes with Beijing in the South China Sea are beginning to tear the fabric of the regional organization asunder. Operating on a notoriously slow decision-making process, where unanimity is the prerequisite for every joint statement and agreement, ASEAN has been fractured over the South China Sea. Back in 2012, during Cambodia’s chairmanship, the ASEAN leaders even failed to agree on discussing the South China Sea disputes. For the first time in its history, the regional body even failed to issue a joint communiqué during the meeting of its foreign ministers in mid-2012. Although the Philippines historically has been one of the leaders of ASEAN, with highly competent diplomats and successful chairmanships of the organization in its past, with Duterte at the helm in Manila, the Philippine president could add to the organization’s instability. Under Duterte, the Philippines, is also in the middle of an uncertain and perilous foreign policy recalibration. Since Duterte’s ascent to presidency last year, he has called for a downgrade in military cooperation with the United States, closer Philippine ties with China, and relegation of maritime disputes to bilateral talks, rather than multilateral discussions via ASEAN. So far, he has scaled back joint military exercises and cancelled plans for joint patrols with America in the South China Sea. Though he has given the green light for the implementation of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), Duterte disallowed Americans from building facilities in the Bautista Airbase in Palawan, which faces the hotly disputed Spratlys chain of islands. Duterte has also refused to raise the Philippines’ landmark arbitration victory over China at ASEAN meetings. While not opposed to the discussion of the South China Sea disputes in generic terms, Duterte prefers to instead focus on areas of presumed consensus within ASEAN such as counterterrorism and transnational crime, particularly the proliferation of illegal drugs. Duterte is particularly interested in using the ASEAN platform to promote and defend his controversial war on drugs at home, especially when he will deliver the annual chairman’s statement in November. Many in the Philippine security establishment, however, want the South China Sea issue front and center in the ASEAN agenda this year. In contrast to Duterte, they want to use the Philippines’ victory in the arbitration case last year in The Hague, a victory based upon the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, as a basis for the formulation of a legally-binding COC in the South China Sea. The Philippines’ recently-dismissed foreign secretary, Perfecto Yasay, who failed to garner confirmation from Philippine Congress due to his failure to disclose his American citizenship, suggested that he wanted to pursue this approach to the South China Sea during the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in Boracay, Philippines. Other members of the Philippines’ foreign policy establishment, such as Secretary of Defense Delfino Lorenzana, have consistently raised concerns about China’s creeping challenge to the Philippines’ territorial claims and sovereign rights in eastern (Benham Rise) as well as western (Scarborough Shoal) waters of the South China Sea. The larger problem, however, is whether the ASEAN can achieve unanimity on sensitive issues, when certain members, particularly Cambodia, have stridently toed Chinese line on the South China Sea issue. In his annual press conference, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi made a surprising announcement that a first draft of a COC has already been finalized. Yet, neither he nor any ASEAN official has clarified its key elements or who will ensure compliance if a Code of Conduct is actually completed. And if ASEAN can make no headway on the most important regional security issue, the organization will look extremely weak, even while celebrating its fiftieth anniversary.

Rachel Brown, Sherry Cho, Larry Hong, and Gabriel Walker look at five stories from Asia this week. 1. Samsung heir indicted on corruption charges. Lee Jae-yong, the de facto head of Samsung Group, was formally indicted on Tuesday on bribery and embezzlement charges. Lee’s indictment was the culmination of a ninety-day special prosecutor investigation of an intensifying corruption scandal that has already brought about President Park Geun-hye’s impeachment. Lee was arrested on February 17 but was not formally indicted until February 28 on charges that include allegedly paying roughly $38 million (43 billion won) to Choi Soon-sil, Park’s close confidante and corruption scandal linchpin, and two nonprofit foundations Choi controlled. Samsung is one of eight Korean conglomerates that has admitted to making payments to Choi and her nonprofit foundations, but claims that the payments were made under coercion. The alleged bribes were purportedly made in exchange for the South Korean government’s backing of a contentious merger in 2015 of two Samsung affiliates that helped Lee inherit corporate control from his father. The merger allegedly enlarged the stock value of the Lee family by at least $758 million at the cost of at least $123 million in losses for the national pension fund, which held large stakes in the two affiliates. Lee’s father, Lee Kun-hee, has been twice convicted of bribery and tax evasion but was presidentially pardoned both times by then-presidents Kim Young-sam and Lee Myung-bak. At least six of South Korea’s top ten chaebol conglomerates—which generate a revenue equivalent to more than 80 percent of South Korean gross domestic product—are led by men once convicted of white-collar crimes. Four other Samsung senior executives were also indicted on February 28, but not arrested, on the same corruption charges as Mr. Lee; three of the four have resigned. 2. Self-proclaimed Islamic State targets China in new video. A video released by the self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS) showed a Uighur fighter in Iraq conducting an execution and proclaiming to China, “We will come to you to clarify to you with the tongues of our weapons, to shed blood like rivers and avenging the oppressed.” It also features shots of Chinese police conducting surveillance, most likely in Xinjiang, and a burning Chinese flag. The video follows other China-focused media released by IS, including an online chant issued in Mandarin in December 2015, which encouraged Chinese Muslims to “take up weapons to fight.” Some Chinese nationals have heeded the call, and an estimated one hundred to three hundred Uighurs, including children and the elderly, have traveled to Iraq and Syria. The video comes at a particularly unfortunate time for Chinese officials already on edge about violence in Xinjiang. Security tightened dramatically following a knife attack in the autonomous region in mid-February, and over ten thousand troops rallied in the provincial capital this week. In the long run, however, it is unclear whether this crackdown will improve public safety or simply drive further radicalization. 3. Philippine fight against HIV falters as rates climb. Since 1984, when HIV was first reported in the Philippines, the prevalence and spread of the virus were described as “low and slow.” Between 2010 and 2015, the rate of new infections climbed by more than 50 percent—the highest in all of Asia. Though the population-wide prevalence is still relatively low today, the epidemic is widespread among young people. According to the Philippine Department of Health, 57 percent of young gay men in high school or college are at risk for contracting HIV, and 67 percent of those who are HIV positive are between fifteen and twenty-four years old. To combat the epidemic, this past Valentine’s Day the National Youth Commission launched an anti-HIV campaign called “Virus Ends With Us,” which aims to teach parents and educators how to approach taboo subjects and help eliminate stigma surrounding the condition. Unfortunately, stakeholders are of different minds as to how to fight the skyrocketing infection rates: last month, a coalition of conservative politicians, parents, and the Roman Catholic Church pressured the Departments of Health and Education to halt a proposed program that would have provided sexual education and distributed condoms in schools. 4. More Chinese students study abroad, and more return home. According to China’s Ministry of Education, around 80 percent of Chinese students studying abroad, or “sea turtles” as they are called in China (because the word is a homophone for “returning from overseas”), have returned home, in contrast to about one-third in 2006. While Beijing claims that the record number of returnees is due to the fact that the Chinese job market has become increasingly appealing, the reality could be more complex. In the United States, which is the most popular destination for Chinese students, the demand for foreign skilled-workers visas, known as H-1Bs, often far outstrips the supply of such visas, forcing the U.S. government to employ a lottery system. A seasoned immigration lawyer suggested that the chance of being selected in the lottery in 2014 is about 50 percent. Those who are not chosen will be forced to return home or apply to another degree program. H-1B visa sponsors also generally favor technology experts and those with more advanced degrees, and most Chinese students are enrolled in master programs in business and marketing. Beijing is at least partly correct on one count: many “sea turtles” are returning to China to join the frenzied startup boom in China, thanks in large part to the Chinese government’s generous financial support for startups. 5. Xiaomi debuts smartphone chip. Lei Jun, the founder and CEO of China’s Xiaomi mobile phone company, showed off the firm’s first internally developed chip, the Pengpai S1, on Tuesday. The chip was produced by Xiaomi subsidiary Beijing Pinecone Electronics, and the entire endeavor cost more than one billion RMB ($145 million). The company received government support in developing the chip, although the exact value of that assistance remains unknown. Xiaomi now ranks among just two phone companies in China (the other is Huawei) and four international companies to create its own chip. The new smartphone processor is a major coup in China’s ongoing effort to strengthen its domestic semiconductor sector and reduce reliance on foreign manufacturers, particularly Qualcomm. Chinese firms have also sought to purchase semiconductor manufacturers abroad and acquire their technology, although foreign investment reviews have at times hampered such acquisitions. Chinese authorities and private companies are spending big on the semiconductor push, and now these efforts appear to be paying off. Bonus: India to publish first official sign language dictionary. This month, the Indian Sign Language Research and Training Center (ISLRTC) in Delhi, a group established by India’s ministry of social justice, will publish the first installment of its Indian Sign Language (ISL) dictionary. Though a university released another ISL dictionary early last year, ISLRTC’s promises to be the country’s first official and most comprehensive version, containing six thousand words in English and Hindi and forty-four different hand shapes under which each sign is categorized. India is estimated to have as many as 7 million deaf individuals (and only 300 certified ISL interpreters), with significant linguistic variation between sign languages of different regions. The ISLRTC dictionary promises not only to take into account regional variations in ISL, but also to improve ISL practitioners’ awareness of syntax and grammar necessary for communicating through written language. According to one ministry official, among all persons living with disabilities in India, deaf individuals have the lowest literacy rate. ISLRTC undertook its project as a part of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Bill 2016, which requires the government “to ensure that persons with disabilities can access an inclusive, quality, and free primary education and secondary education on an equal basis with others in the communities in which they live.”

Richard Javad Heydarian is an assistant professor in political science at De La Salle University in Manila, and, most recently, the author of Asia’s New Battlefield: The U.S., China, and the Struggle for Western Pacific. As electoral shocks overhaul the Asian geopolitical landscape, Japanese Prime Minster Shinzo Abe is on an all-out charm offensive. When Donald Trump Jr. pulled off a surprising electoral victory on the back of a populist, anti-globalization rhetoric, the Japanese leader immediately scrambled to secure a meeting with the president-elect. In fact, Abe became the first head of government to visit Trump Tower after the November elections in the United States. However, there is little indication that the Japanese leader managed to change the president-elect’s views on some of Tokyo’s key strategic concerns, particularly the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement. Well before meeting Trump, however, Abe was already on a mission to win the favor of the Philippines’ tough-talking leader, Rodrigo Duterte, who has been dubbed as the “Trump of the East”. In his first six months in office, Duterte has shaken up the regional geopolitical landscape to the consternation of traditional allies such as Japan. A self-described socialist with a long history of tense relations with the United States, Duterte has managed to recast his country’s foreign policy more radically than any of his recent predecessors in Manila. Vowing to pursue a more independent foreign policy, Duterte has gradually downgraded military relations with Washington in favor of closer economic and military ties with China and Russia. In recent months, Manila has moved towards terminating major joint military exercises with Washington, namely the Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training Exercise (Carat) and the joint U.S.-Philippine Amphibious Landing Exercise (PHIBLEX). Manila’s deteriorating ties with Washington have gone hand in hand with improved ties with Beijing. In fact, the Dutetre administration is now considering military agreements with both China and Russia. In a dramatic departure from its predecessor’s hawkish foreign policy on China, the Duterte administration has effectively sidelined the Philippines’ landmark arbitration case against China in the South China Sea, advocated for joint development schemes in disputed South China Sea waters, and often described Beijing as a friend and partner. With the Philippines assuming the chairmanship of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) this year, Duterte has signaled minimum interest in mobilizing regional pressure against China’s maritime assertiveness, even though other Asean members, like Vietnam and Singapore, would be happy if the organization stepped up the pressure on Beijing. Thus, Abe’s recent two-day visit to the Philippines came at a critical juncture in Asian geopolitics. Tokyo is deeply troubled by deepening tensions between Manila and Washington, particularly over Duterte’s controversial campaign against illegal drugs. In many ways, the Japanese leader’s goal was to maintain strong strategic relations with Manila, mediate between feuding allies, and ensure the Duterte administration is not moving too far into the Chinese strategic orbit. The Abe administration seems interested in assertively countering China’s charm offensive in Manila and matching whatever economic incentives Beijing offers the Duterte administration. Abe became the first head of government to visit the Philippines during Duterte’s term, even though the Philippine president chose to make his own first state visit to Beijing rather than Tokyo. Given the importance in Asia of Japan, the world’s third largest economy and an increasingly major bilateral security partner for many Southeast Asian nations, the Abe visit also served as a major source of legitimization for Duterte, who has faced increasing international pressure over his human rights record. As the Philippines’ biggest export destination, leading foreign investor, and largest source of overseas development assistance, Japan already has significant leverage over the Philippines. Still, Abe offered a whopping additional $8.7 billion five-year aid package, focusing on infrastructure development across the Philippines, including in Duterte’s home island of Mindanao. In a classic display of personal diplomacy, Abe also visited Duterte in Davao, where they had breakfast amid much fanfare. Abe also became the first global leader from a rich democracy to offer support for Duterte’s controversial campaign against illegal drugs, offering assistance in terms of drug rehabilitation. But aside from charming, there was also some prodding by Abe. Though Abe formally welcomed improved relations between Manila and Beijing, he pushed the Philippines to be cautious on repairing ties with China, to maintain a strong stance on the South China Sea issue, and to uphold the rule of law (a code word for the arbitration award) on the high seas. Abe also offered more maritime security assistance to bulk up the Philippines’ surveillance and coast guard capabilities in the South China Sea. Abe also encouraged the Duterte administration to find a common understanding with Washington, especially with the Trump administration, which has shown little interest in human rights concerns overseas, set to take over the White House. It is far from clear whether Abe has convinced Duterte to reconsider his strategic posturing, but Duterte now appears to be the beneficiary of a bidding war among regional powers.

Over the past year, new Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte has signaled that he wants to dramatically shift Manila’s relationships with the United States, Russia, and China. Duterte also has taken a wrecking ball to many norms of Philippine democracy, overseeing a war on drugs that has led to a spike in extrajudicial killings, pushing his vice president out of Cabinet meetings, and reportedly threatening reporters and civil society activists who criticize him. He also vows to upend and radically reform Philippine politics and the Philippine economy, taking measures to reduce high economic inequality and, possibly, to shift the country to a more federalized system. Duterte’s administration has set back U.S.-Philippine relations, putting them on a rocky course; for the most part of 2016, U.S. officials in Washington and Manila seemed unsure of how to respond to the fiery populist, who has retained high approval ratings among Filipinos. (However, Duterte’s decision to allow former dictator Ferdinand Marcos a burial in a heroes’ ceremony may have dented Duterte’s popularity, although it is too soon to really tell.) In the wake of the U.S. presidential election, some U.S. officials believe relations between Manila and Washington will warm up again, in part because the next U.S. administration may be less critical of Duterte’s drug war and other alleged abuses. (Duterte’s administration has claimed that the U.S. president-elected endorsed Duterte’s drug war, but the evidence of this claim remains sketchy.) However, thus far there has been no clear, on the ground evidence of a positive shift in U.S.-Philippines ties. In a new podcast discussion with War on the Rocks, I analyze the future of the U.S.-Philippines relationship under Duterte. In addition, I discuss my forthcoming book, A Great Place to Have a War: America in Laos and the Birth of a Military CIA, about the secret war in Laos in the 1960s, and how it helped transform the Central Intelligence Agency into a paramilitary organization.

Richard Javad Heydarian is an assistant professor in political science at De La Salle University in Manila, and, most recently, the author of Asia’s New Battlefield: The U.S., China, and the Struggle for Western Pacific. In the past few months, the Philippine-U.S. alliance has suffered an unprecedented setback. Diplomatic exchanges have been rife with tensions, while military cooperation has been downgraded, although it is unclear whether it has been formally downgraded. This deterioration in relations is mainly due to bilateral disagreements over human rights issues and policy responses to Chinese maritime assertiveness in the South China Sea. But the surprising election of Donald J. Trump, a populist and businessman, could reset bilateral ties towards a more positive direction---though it risks further undermining the rule of law in the Philippines. Under the presidency of Rodrigo Duterte, the Philippines has witnessed a significant reconfiguration in both its domestic political landscape and its foreign policy outlook. Domestically, the tough-talking leader, true to his campaign promise, has launched a scorched-earth campaign against the proliferation of illegal drugs. While a majority of the population has remained supportive of the president, the Duterte administration has nonetheless grappled with heavy criticism from the international community and some Philippine opposition lawmakers and rights groups, because of the violent nature of the drug war. The outgoing U.S. President Barack Obama has been firm in his criticism of Duterte’s drug war and its impact on the rule of law. The Obama administration has called upon the Duterte government to uphold “the rule of law and a commitment to upholding basic, universal human rights,” warning that a violent crackdown on drug users and sellers is “not going to solve the problem.” The European Parliament, the United Nations, and Australia have also expressed similar concerns, as have many international and Philippine rights organizations. In response, Duterte has lashed out at leaders of Western nations, accusing them of preventing him from fulfilling his law-and-order campaign promise. Meanwhile, he has maintained broadly cordial relations with key U.S. allies such as Japan and South Korea, which have mostly refrained from directly criticizing the Duterte administration. As Duterte inches closer to the end of his first six months in office, he is under increasing domestic and international pressure to show success in suppressing the drug menace in the country as well as shift to a more rehabilitation-centered and public health-focused approach. Duterte’s foreign policy has been equally earthshaking. He has threatened to end Manila’s military alliance with Washington, opted for a bilateral (rather than multilateral) strategy in the South China Sea, and engaged in unprecedented strategic flirtations with Beijing. In the past month, the Duterte administration has warned that he might end some of existing joint military exercises with U.S. forces as well as restricting their access to Philippine bases, although he did not take formal moves to follow through on these threats. Since Trump’s election, however, Duterte has been singing a somewhat different tune. Just months earlier, Duterte dismissed Trump as a ‘bigot’ and buffoon.  Upon Trump’s election victory, however, which seemingly took even Duterte by surprise, the tough-talking Philippine leader immediately switched to a more cordial tone, offering congratulations and best wishes to Trump, declaring: “I don’t want to fight [with Washington anymore] because Trump is there.” Duterte, previously dubbed as the “Trump of the East,” proved more than eager to also emphasize his temperamental similarity with the newly-elected American leader. There are legitimate reasons for Manila to be more optimistic about the direction of relations with the United States. First of all, there is growing expectation that Trump won’t be tough on the Philippines vis-à-vis human rights and democracy issues. In fact, Duterte controversially claimed, after his phone call with Trump, that the incoming U.S. leader supports his war on drugs, though the Trump transition team is yet to confirm that anyone actually said this. Duterte also has welcomed Trump’s seemingly tough approach to China, even though Duterte himself has pursued accommodation with Beijing. It is possible that Duterte could embrace a tougher U.S. policy toward China since this might mean Washington will more directly take on China rather than pushing regional allies like the Philippines to do so. For Dutetre, the best outcome is for the Philippines to maintain good relationship with both superpowers, and let Washington shoulder the costs of constraining Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea. Moreover, Duterte also allegedly hopes to leverage business linkages with Trump to bolster U.S.-Philippine relations. Duterte’s personal envoy to Washington owns the Trump Tower in Manila. If the Philippines and China fail to arrive at a mutually-satisfactory agreement in the disputed waters, then Duterte has even more reasons to repair frayed ties with Washington. It goes without saying that it is perhaps too early, if not foolhardy, to speculate about the likely rapport of two of the most mercurial leaders in recent history, Duterte and Trump. For now, however, the government in Manila seems more eager to build ties with Obama’s successor than it was with the Obama administration.

Since the election, last spring, of President Rodrigo Duterte, the Philippines has witnessed the effects of increasingly demagogic politics on its culture and institutions. While Duterte has won praise domestically and internationally for some of his efforts, including plans to resolve the southern insurgency and strategies to reduce economic inequality in the Philippines, he also has increasingly personalized politics, while dramatically undermining the rule of law. Campaigning as a demagogue, he has often governed as a demagogue, brooking little opposition and overseeing bloody policies. His war on drugs, which has descended into a bloody killing spree with few seeming constraints on the power of the security forces, is but one example of how the rule of law has deteriorated in a few months. [The New York Times has a compelling and graphic new look inside the antidrug campaign here.]. Duterte also has threatened journalists and other members of civil society, while embarking upon a foreign policy that has bewildered many Philippine security experts. The president’s mercurial style, although popular with many Philippine citizens so far, has often made it difficult to know what policy initiative---in both domestic and foreign policy---to take seriously, and which to ignore. The country’s politics, always noisy and vibrant, have become especially dangerous, and currents of opposition to Duterte appear to be forming. After Duterte’s administration approved the burial of the body of former dictator Ferdinand Marcos in a hero’s cemetery, with little warning, anti-Duterte protests have swelled in Manila. (Although Duterte comes from a left-leaning background, he has long expressed warm feelings for the Marcos family, and Duterte’s father served in the former dictator’s cabinet.) The protests, which began as Philippine citizens realized Marcos was going to be interred, quickly spread from Manila to other parts of the country, and included not just older Filipinos who remembered the Marcos era but some younger men and women who objected to the burial, and who used the demonstrations to voice anger at some of Duterte’s dictatorial approaches to politics. As Mong Palatino notes in The Diplomat, Duterte seems to have underestimated the strong lingering anger over the Marcos era and over giving Marcos any hero’s burial. The president also seems to have underestimated the possibility that anti-Marcos burial protests could become rallying points for supporters of the previous administration, and opposition parties, to air grievances about Duterte’s policies and approach to governing. Duterte’s administration, meanwhile, has repeatedly responded to the demonstrations by calling the protesters agitators who are seeking to foment violence. Now, just after the burial demonstrations, a new crisis has emerged. In the Philippines, the vice president and the president are elected separately, and so the country often winds up with a vice president and president from different parties---indeed, two political figures who are major rivals and who clash, rhetorically, for the president’s whole term. This is the current situation; in the same election in which Duterte was elected president, Leni Robredo, a respected human rights lawyer and former mayor from a different party as Duterte, was elected vice-president. Predictably, Robredo and Duterte, who is not known for his interest in human rights norms, have clashed from the first day of his administration. While she was given a Cabinet position in addition to her vice presidency---she was working as a housing secretary in the Cabinet---Robredo claims she was essentially frozen out at Cabinet meetings and her agency was ignored. Earlier this month, she quit her position as housing secretary, while retaining her post as vice president. She told reporters she had sent Duterte a letter saying “remaining in your cabinet has become untenable.” More worryingly, she publicly insinuated that the administration had been maneuvering to remove her from the vice presidency, possibly to replace her with Ferdinand Marcos Jr, the son of the former dictator and a close ally of Duterte’s. According to Bloomberg, she warned of a “plot to steal” the vice presidency from her. There are several dangers from Robredo and Duterte becoming more publicly alienated from each other. Duterte could maneuver more aggressively to replace Robredo, though the constitutionality of such a move would prove challenging. Still, if he succeeded he might trigger much larger protests, since Robredo is nearly as popular as the president. The second, also worrying implication, is that Robredo could increasingly be seen, by many Filipinos who oppose Duterte’s brutal style of governing, as a viable alternative leader---especially if Duterte continues to abuse the rule of law. Although Duterte’s actions are dangerous, corrosive to the rule of law, and potentially dislocating to the Philippines’ safety and security, if his opponents want to challenge him they should do so in the legislature and the courts and the media. Doing so in these ways would push back against the president’s reported abuses while reinforcing the rule of law. But too often in the past, Philippine leaders have been forced from power in murky, sometimes extralegal ways---and having a vice president beloved by Duterte’s opponents exacerbate the risk of some kind of extralegal challenge to the presidency. One does not have to look too far back for an example of a controversial, even dangerous president being removed through questionable means---with his vice president ready to take over and possibly playing a role in his ouster. In fact, this is roughly what happened to former president (and now mayor of Manila) Joseph Estrada in 2001. He was replaced by his vice president, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. Estrada was no role model. His removal certainly rid the Philippines of a president who did little to promote the rule of law---after stepping down following massive street protests, an impeachment, and the withdrawal of army support for him, Estrada was later convicted of graft. In office, he had weathered massive allegations of graft and widespread complaints from advisors and foes alike that he was uninterested in public policy. But Estrada’s removal, a combination of a legal process, street protests, and a kind of coup, did little to strengthen Philippine institutions or set any precedent for how to address illegal activities by a president.

Although Southeast Asia was not mentioned often during the presidential campaign, the new U.S. administration will face several imminent regional challenges. For one, the relationship between the United States and the Philippines has deteriorated significantly since the election of President Rodrigo Duterte earlier this year. Duterte has publicly blasted U.S. officials and U.S. policy in the region, suggested he wants to move Philippine foreign policy closer to China, and threatened to scale down joint military exercises. Duterte expressed seeming approval of Trump’s election, presenting a possibility to restore closer ties, but the fact that Trump—a figure with some similar characteristics as Duterte—was elected will probably not change the Philippine president’s underlying anti-American worldview. Over decades, Duterte has grown increasingly suspicious of the United States and U.S. intentions in the Philippines, and it is hard to imagine that, in his seventies, his fundamental views of the United States will change that much. The Trump administration may please Duterte by criticizing his brutal war on drugs less than its predecessor did, and the death of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is unlikely to affect Philippine views of the United States, since the Philippines was not (yet) in the TPP. But the new U.S. administration likely will still want to pursue close bilateral ties, joint exercises, and a continuation of the new enhanced defense partnership with the Philippines, all of which Duterte apparently is skeptical of. Figuring out some way to maintain continuity in the bilateral security relationship and continue preparing the Philippine military for its own defense, while simultaneously assuring Duterte that the United States respects Philippine sovereignty and respects Duterte, will be a complex task. At the same time, the next U.S. administration will have to recognize that, even if it criticizes Duterte, it must be sure not to encourage critics within the Philippine security establishment to oust Duterte by illegal means. In addition, the new administration in Washington will have to handle the United States’ other treaty ally in Southeast Asia, Thailand, which has been ruled by a military junta for more than two years and appears ready to hand back government to civilian leaders next year, albeit under a new constitution that will dramatically weaken the powers of elected politicians. The country’s economy is stagnating, its politics are in crisis, and like the Philippines it appears to be drawing closer, strategically, to China. The new U.S. administration will probably be less critical of any Thai government’s abuses, but it will need to shore up support within the Thai political and military leadership for a continued close bilateral security relationship. At the same time, a new U.S. administration will need to ensure that, in a time of regional crisis, the United States could count on Thailand for basing access and other critical support. Third, the United States will have to address the increasingly contentious South China Sea issue. Countries like Vietnam, Singapore, and to a lesser extent the Philippines (under Duterte), Malaysia, and Indonesia, all fear that China is militarizing the sea and will soon be able to limit freedom of navigation in regional waters. Indeed, with some reason they fear that China’s long-term strategy is total dominance of the South China Sea. Southeast Asian nations like Vietnam, Singapore, and Indonesia have been aggressively modernizing their navies, coast guards, missile capacities, and air forces, and the incoming U.S. administration will have to decide how much to help them. This is especially true in the case of Vietnam; the United States only recently lifted the embargo on lethal arms sales to Hanoi, and Vietnamese leaders, alarmed by the Philippines’ shift toward China, may want to dramatically expand Vietnam’s U.S. arms purchases and other strategic ties. Meanwhile, a new presidential administration that appears committed to modernizing and expanding the U.S. navy will have to decide whether to take more assertive, regular actions of deterrence in the South China Sea, as some current U.S. admirals have proposed—a plan endorsed by many top Singaporean, Vietnamese, and Australian defense specialists and naval officers. These could include more regular patrols of the South China Sea, building floating bases in the South China Sea, sending U.S. planes and ships through areas of the South China Sea every time China takes assertive steps, such as potentially announcing an air defense zone, and sanctioning Chinese companies involved in the buildup of artificial islands and military installations in the South China Sea. Read more about how the Trump administration should approach U.S. policy toward China (here and here), Japan, Korea, and South Asia.

Richard Javad Heydarian is an assistant professor in political science at De La Salle University in Manila, and, most recently, the author of Asia’s New Battlefield: The U.S., China, and the Struggle for Western Pacific. In a matter of months, the Philippines’ controversial leader, Rodrigo Duterte, has managed to recalibrate his country’s foreign policy, potentially revive frayed ties with China, and seemingly reduce tensions in the South China Sea, at least for now. Under Duterte, the Philippines and China recently signed a whopping $24 billion in bilateral business deals and officially declared their relations as fully “normalized.” But Duterte’s greatest challenge vis-à-vis Beijing is the South China Sea dispute over the long run, with China’s occupation of the Philippine-claimed Scarborough Shoal the biggest point of contention. Reports suggest that the two sides may have secured a rudimentary, short-term deal for the contested waters. Since Duterte’s high-profile visit to Beijing, the two neighbors have begun to implement what looks like a provisional joint fisheries arrangement in the South China Sea, specifically in the bitterly-contested Scarborough Shoal. In recent days, Philippine fishermen, for the first time in years, have been able to enter the contested shoal without harassment by Chinese Coast Guard vessels. China seems to have also relaxed its grip on the shoal by decreasing the number of vessels deployed to the area. To signal its commitment to protect Philippine sovereign rights, as affirmed by a landmark arbitration case earlier this year, the Duterte administration is also deploying Philippine Coast Guard vessels to the area. It is a strange mix of territorial assertiveness and accommodation on the part of the Philippines in the Shoal. The bigger picture suggests that Manila and Beijing are intent on rebuilding diplomatic ties and moving towards a bilateral economic renaissance after years of mutual acrimony and diplomatic flare-ups. But it is too early to say whether the Philippines has achieved a fair and lasting compromise in the South China Sea, one that will actually benefit Philippine interests over the long term. So far, there are no indications that the two sides are negotiating even a blueprint of a formal, binding agreement on disputed areas in the South China Sea---a formal deal that would make it harder for China to keep building in the Sea and taking other assertive measures. Absent a formal deal, China can renege on any informal understanding whenever it deems it convenient or justified. Satellite imageries suggest that China has been tightening its grip on the disputed shoal over the past few months, so the letup in recent days could be just a temporary, reversible maneuver to ease bilateral tensions. Even if the two parties find a mutually-satisfactory deal that is consistent with international law in the Scarborough Shoal, it is still far from certain whether they can ever find a compromise over the bulk of the Philippine Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which is claimed by China in contravention of international law. China and the Philippines have no overlapping EEZs, so China has no legal basis to occupy low-tide elevations such as the Mischief Reef or to block the Philippines from developing its resources in the Reed Bank. Most likely, what we are witnessing now are confidence-building measures that are designed to cement the re-normalization of bilateral ties without necessarily resolving the territorial disputes. Not to mention, this could be part of a broader divide-and-conquer strategy by China, undermining multilateral efforts to rein in Beijing’s maritime assertiveness in adjacent waters.

On Monday, I sat down with my colleague Anya Schmemann, CFR’s communications director, to review some foreign policy events in the news. We discussed the Iraqi bid to retake Mosul from the Islamic State, Rodrigo Duterte’s desire to distance the Philippines economically and militarily from the United States, and the growing crisis in Venezuela, among other topics. You can check out the video of our discussion below or on Facebook. Note: If the video is not displaying in your browser, please click here.

Rachel Brown, Sherry Cho, Gabriella Meltzer, David O’Connor, and Gabriel Walker look at five stories from Asia this week. 1. Suicide attack in Pakistan leaves sixty-one dead. Late Monday night, three masked terrorists breached a police training college outside of Quetta, Pakistan, and fired on unarmed sleeping recruits. After a five-hour gun battle with security forces, during which one of the terrorists was shot, the remaining two detonated suicide vests. In total, more than sixty—mostly cadets—lay dead and over one hundred were injured. Though the self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS) claimed responsibility for the attack, one Pakistani general told reporters that security officials believed Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, a Pakistan-based terrorist group with links to al Qaeda, to be actually responsible. Some suggest that the operation could be a signal of a new alliance between IS and jihadist factions in the country. Earlier this month, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif publicly rebuked his country’s military for its failure to combat terror groups, which has led in particular to a recent deterioration of relations with India. 2. South Korean President Park Geun-hye publicly apologizes amidst growing scandal. In a nationally televised broadcast on Tuesday, President Park Geun-hye made a public apology in the midst of a growing scandal revolving around a close associate of Park’s. Choi Soon-sil, the daughter of Park’s late mentor, has been charged with using her relationship with the president to pressure corporations to donate millions to foundations that Choi allegedly used as a personal ATM. President Park has also been accused of giving Choi, a person with no government job or official public role, a high level of influence in Park’s politics. A recent report by a South Korean media network revealed that an old computer hard drive belonging to Choi, which contained classified documents sent by Park’s office, sparked Tuesday’s public apology. In her apology, the president did not make any direct mention of the allegations against Choi, stating that she had sought Choi’s help with public outreach when she was running for president in 2012, and apologized only for having caused “public distress.” Domestic reaction to her apology has been mixed, as many of Park’s critics have derided her apology as perfunctory and insincere, and public furor over the scandal has continued to grow, with more civic groups, university students, and professors denouncing President Park over the scandal. 3. Bridges between the Philippines and the United States still aflame. A week after announcing his country’s “separation” from the United States—a comment that was quickly softened—Rodrigo Duterte told Japanese officials that his trip to China was purely for discussing economic matters, strongly affirming that Japan will continue to be an important ally in his independent foreign policy. He followed up on his remarks by calling for the removal of foreign (American in particular) troops in the Philippines within “maybe two years,” even if he needs to “revise or abrogate” existing treaties, though such an actions may prove to be domestically unpopular. The realignment has certainly not gone unnoticed by neighboring nations, and China in particular must plot a delicate course. 4. Afghan opium production skyrockets. According to a new report released by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the Afghan Ministry of Counter Narcotics, opium production and land use for poppy cultivation in the country rose by 43 and 10 percent, respectively, between 2015 and 2016. Officials attribute this drastic increase to a deteriorating security situation hampering eradication efforts, whose success (measured by amount of crops destroyed) fell by 91 percent. Afghan opium is the source of 90 percent of the world’s heroin, and a major source of income for the Taliban, which now controls the most territory since the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. Most of the crops are grown in militant-controlled areas where authorities have faced logistical and security challenges, including attacks from local farmers who do not want to give up their lucrative cash crop. UNODC Executive Director Yury Fedotov believes the report signifies a “worrying reversal” in worldwide efforts to combat illicit drug production, and the agency hopes that greater international support toward Afghanistan’s sustainable development will help alleviate the problem. 5. Chinese drone maker to go public. Nanyang Technology is purchasing a portion of the state-owned China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation that manufactures Caihong drones. Since Nanyang is already a public company on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, the acquisition will allow Caihong to go public as well. The deal suggests a greater willingness to accept outside funding among China’s defense companies at a time when Chinese military and commercial drones are also making inroads into global markets. China is now the third-largest exporter of arms in the world and the Iraqi military has used Chinese-made drones in past strikes. One of Caihong’s most well-known drones is the Caihong-4 (CH-4), which bears many similarities to the MQ-9 Reapers used by the U.S. Air Force. While the Caihong drones are viewed as somewhat technologically inferior, they nonetheless appeal to many nations because of their lower cost and have been sought out by certain African and Middle Eastern governments. Bonus: More women in Japan fight to keep their surnames. Obstacles abound in the face of growing demand by women in Japan to use and keep their own surnames after marriage. Despite the Japanese constitution’s affirmation of gender equality and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s emphasis on a Japan where all women can “shine,” many Japanese women say this is hard to do when they cannot even keep their own surnames after marriage. Under a century-old Japanese law that dates back to the Meiji era, all married couples must use one surname. Theoretically, a couple may choose to use the wife’s surname, but in reality, 96 percent of Japanese women adopt their husband’s surname after marriage. An increasing number of Japanese firms permit women to use their given surnames professionally. Yet, Japanese law has yet to catch up to professional norms: last December, Japan’s Supreme Court ruled that the surname law did not place an undue burden on women or violate the constitution. Recently, a Tokyo District Court rejected a high school teacher’s request to use her original name at work. With this lack of legal formalization, it is unsurprising then that Japan ranks quite low among developed democratic countries on gender equality in terms of health, education, economics, and politics. And if these recent court rulings are any indication, true legal parity for Japanese women, at least regarding their surnames, seems a far-off fantasy.