Philippines

In chronicling CIA operative Edward Lansdale's adventurous life and approach to counterinsurgency, The Road Not Taken definitively reframes our understanding of the Vietnam War.

In early May, Malaysia was stunned by the victory, in national elections, of the opposition coalition, led by Mahathir Mohamad and essentially (from jail), longtime opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim. Although some journalists had, in the run-up to the election, noted that the opposition’s support appeared to be cresting, in the wake of years of massive corruption allegations against former Prime Minister Najib tun Razak and his allies, the win still came largely as a shock. Najib had governed increasingly autocratically, including by detaining many prominent opponents, and his coalition—which had ruled Malaysia since independence—also benefitted from control of state media, massive gerrymandering, and the ability to hand out large amounts of cash in the run-up to election day, a strategy it had used repeatedly in the past to ensure victory. Yet despite these obstacles, the Malaysia opposition won—and Najib and his coalition (eventually) conceded, marking the country’s first democratic transfer of power. Yet democrats throughout the rest of Southeast Asia, where many elections are due this year and next, should not take too much heart from Malaysia’s example. For more on why they should not, see my new piece in the Globalist.

Over the past decade, Southeast Asia’s democratic decline has accelerated, and in the past two years the recession has picked up notable speed. With the exception of Malaysia, which shocked the region with the defeat of the governing coalition in May, Southeast Asia’s hybrid states are backsliding, while its most authoritarian states are becoming more autocratic. Even Indonesia and Timor-Leste, the region’s most solid democracies, have become shakier in the past two years. In an extended interview with The Diplomat, I assess the state of democracy in Southeast Asia today, the regional and international causes for Southeast Asia’s democratic backsliding, and whether there are causes for hope for the future. See the interview here.

Over the past three decades, since the end of the Ferdinand Marcos era in the Philippines, the country has often combined corrupt and semi-authoritarian elected politics with strong cultural and institutional checks on elected leaders. One of the most powerful checks has been the Philippines’ vibrant media and highly active civil society, including NGOs, unions, and many other actors. The Catholic Church, at times, also has pushed back against politicians’ graft and amassing of power. The judiciary, too, often has served as a firewall against allegedly corrupt presidents and lower-ranking politicians. So far, however, these checks on President Rodrigo Duterte’s power have displayed a mixed record. The Catholic Church continues to criticize Duterte’s brutal, extrajudicial war on drugs, but it is unclear whether the Church has the same power to sway Philippine society as it did in the past. Duterte’s administration has co-opted several prominent civil society figures. In other cases, Duterte has used his bully pulpit to personally threaten civil society activists, while his declaration of martial law on the southern island of Mindanao has hampered civil society organizations’ operations in the south. With the media, meanwhile, the Duterte administration has taken a harsh approach, and has had some success in taming news outlets. The Philippine judiciary, however, has not always been as cowed by Duterte. For more on the judiciary’s battles with Duterte, and how Philippine judiciary fits into a global movement of empowered judges, see my new World Politics Review article.

As I noted late last year, 2017 was a disastrous year for democracy in Southeast Asia. Democratic rights and freedoms already have been in decline in Southeast Asia for more than a decade, but 2017 was perhaps the worst year for the region in that decade. Cambodia’s semi-democratic system collapsed last year, the Philippines’ rule of law deteriorated, Myanmar witnessed ethnic cleansing, Thailand remained ruled by a military junta, and Indonesia faced rising populism and Islamism. Freedom House’s latest version of Freedom in the World, released today, in fact chronicles a global collapse in democracy, with global freedoms regressing for the 12th consecutive year, and democracy threatened nearly everywhere in the world. (I worked with Freedom House on some Asia chapters of Freedom in the World.) So far, however, in just the initial weeks of the year, 2018 is looking like it could be even worse for Southeast Asia. Most notably, press freedom is increasingly threatened across Southeast Asia. In some countries, like the Philippines, Cambodia, and Malaysia, even periods of authoritarian or semi-authoritarian rule did not in previous years halt the creation of powerful, independent news outlets. In fact, in Cambodia, independent news outlets and other civil society groups continued to operate, over the past two decades, even at times of severe repression by the Hun Sen government. But in recent months, even some of the most groundbreaking, independent news outlets in Southeast Asia have faced possible mortal peril, as increasingly autocratic rulers try to shut down media groups. Several of these Southeast Asian leaders, like Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, have openly celebrated the U.S. administration’s war on “fake news,” and tried to associate their own crackdowns on the media with the White House’s approach to the press. The number of press outlets and reporters facing severe consequences is growing. In Thailand, the government has detained multiple reporters and increasingly just refuses to deal with the media—Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha last week installed a cardboard facsimile of himself to “answer” media questions of the government. Last year, Hun Sen oversaw the shuttering of the Cambodia Daily and multiple independent radio outlets in Cambodia. The prime minister could well come after more news outlets in Cambodia this year, before national elections. At the end of last year, in a case similar to other cases brought against Myanmar journalists from local publications, the Myanmar authorities arrested two Reuters journalists, under the Official Secrets Act. Reuters noted that “The Ministry of Information has cited the police as saying they were ‘arrested for possessing important and secret government documents related to Rakhine State and security forces.’” The military and the civilian government in Myanmar have indeed become increasingly repressive in trying to crack down on reporting of events in Rakhine State, where a wave of ethnic cleansing has been going on. The two Reuters reporters allegedly had gotten documents showing a site in Rakhine State where a mass grave was located. The military has since admitted that there was a mass grave found in this village, but the two reporters are still under arrest. Now, last week another major blow was struck against Southeast Asian press freedom. Rappler, one of the most prominent independent news outlets in the Philippines—and one that has aggressively investigated the administration of President Rodrigo Duterte and been called “fake news” by the Philippine president—now faces government action that could force its closure. On Monday, Philippine officials confirmed that the Duterte government had revoked Rappler’s license to operate, although Rappler is appealing the decision. Duterte has in fact been at war with the press since he took office in 2016, and he has no love for Rappler. As the Guardian notes: In March [2017], Duterte described top newspaper Philippine Daily Inquirer and leading television broadcaster ABS-CBN as ‘sons of whores’ and warned them of karmic repercussions over their criticism of his drug war... Four months later, the Inquirer announced its owners were in talks to sell the publication. A business tycoon who backed Duterte’s 2016 election bid later disclosed he was planning to buy the Inquirer. Duterte in 2017 also threatened to block ABS-CBN’s application to renew its operating franchise, a permit that requires congressional approval. The ongoing war against the press in the Philippines, and the sale of the Daily Inquirer, has made Rappler even more central as an independent voice. But Rappler too may face so much pressure that it might close.

Part Two Read Part One here.  So, the bilateral meeting between U.S. President Donald J. Trump and Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte appears to have gone well, at least on the surface. Earlier in the visit, Duterte actually crooned a Philippine love song at a leaders’ dinner, reportedly at the request of Trump. But while the bilateral meeting appears to have been warm, and the two men have developed a kind of mutual admiration society over months—partly, it seems, because the U.S. president admires other strongmen including Duterte, Xi Jinping, and many others—there is only so much that the United States can do to sway Duterte from many of his policy positions. Indeed, in addition to the fact that Trump’s meeting with Duterte probably hurt the cause of human rights in the Philippines, it is unclear whether the meeting achieved anything substantial on key issues including the South China Sea. In fact, according to some news reports, Trump did not even bring up the South China Sea in his meeting with Duterte. Instead, the two leaders talked about the self-proclaimed Islamic State and counterterrorism, among other topics. Duterte definitely is increasingly realizing that he needs U.S. assistance in counterterrorism, piracy, and other issues related to the Islamic State than he had imagined a year ago. Since the battle in Mindanao this past year, the Philippine armed forces are exhausted, and unprepared for another breakout of major conflict in the south. Duterte has lined up new counterterrorism assistance commitments from Singapore and Australia, but these countries’ counterterrorism assistance cannot match the levels of potential aid from Washington. But on the South China Sea, Duterte seems resolute—though it makes little sense that Trump did not even bring up the issue in their bilateral meeting. After all, much of the Philippine military and security establishment still hopes to take an assertive approach to the South China Sea, one in line with the position of the previous Benigno Aquino administration. Trump should have at least raised U.S. concerns about Duterte’s South China Sea policy. To be sure, Duterte appears determined to let Beijing dictate terms on the South China Sea, even as the Philippine military establishment tries to convince him otherwise—and to circumscribe his ability to completely overhaul Manila’s South China Sea policy. It is not wrong that the White House is eager to prioritize counterterrorism in its relationship with the Philippines—this is an issue where real, win-win cooperation is possible. In addition, Trump and Duterte both share goals of reducing piracy in the Sulu-Celebes Sea, a highly lawless area that is rife with pirates, human traffickers and Islamist militant groups—including organizations that combine all three activities. But in the White House’s vision of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” in which the United States and its partners would defend freedom of navigation, among other interests, it is hard to see how Duterte and his South China Sea approach would fit in. For the past year, nearly every time China has applied pressure on Duterte to take a relatively accommodating position regarding the South China Sea, Duterte has complied. Most recently, earlier this month the Philippines’ defense chief announced that Manila would end any work on a sandbar at Sandy Cay, near Thitu Island—after pressure from Beijing. Earlier in the year, Duterte also canceled a planned visit to Thitu, probably after pressure from Beijing, telling China he’d done so because he valued Beijing’s friendship. The Philippine leader, who this year serves as the chair of ASEAN, also has done little to rally ASEAN nations to come up with a coherent position on the South China Sea. He has, in some ways, seemingly been an obstacle on any ASEAN unity on the South China Sea. And, despite Duterte’s desire for greater U.S. assistance on counterterrorism and other domestic security challenges, there is little evidence that Duterte plans to move Manila back, even modestly, toward the Aquino administration’s tougher approach to the South China Sea.

Part One The meeting between U.S. President Donald J. Trump and Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte was highly anticipated, and—for theater—the two leaders did not disappoint. The two leaders have been engaged in a long-distance kind of bromance going back months. On a phone call in the spring whose transcript was later leaked to the press, Trump and Duterte chatted warmly, and Trump has praised Duterte’s brutal approach to the Philippine drug war. The Philippine president seems to appreciate a U.S. leader who has made human rights a low priority in Southeast Asia, and who thus has mostly ignored any criticism of Duterte’s undermining of the rule of law. Indeed, the Trump administration has downplayed human rights in all aspects of U.S. foreign policy, including bilateral meeting with foreign leaders and funding for rights and democracy programs within the U.S. government, among other areas. This approach has, without a doubt, helped restore ties with some top Southeast Asian leaders, although it risks alienating large portions of Southeast Asian politicians. Besides Duterte, other autocratic-minded Southeast Asia leaders also see an opening in the Trump administration’s “America First” policies. Leaders from Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen to Malaysian Prime Minister Najib tun Razak to Thai Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha are operating, this year, with the gloves off against civil society and all other kinds of opposition. Prayuth and Najib already have visited the White House and met with Trump. In the run-up to Trump’s Asia visit, the U.S. president notably highlighted that he enjoyed warmer relations with Duterte than President Barack Obama had. Trump told reporters in early November that he was proud of his ties to Duterte, even though Duterte is widely criticized for his massive rights abuses. “You remember the Philippines—the last trip made by a president that turned out to be not so good,” Trump said, according to the Washington Post. “Never quite got to land.” [This statement is not exactly true—Obama was going to meet Duterte at a regional summit in Laos, not by landing in Manila, and Obama called off the visit, not Duterte, as the Post noted.] During Trump’s meeting with Duterte, the two indeed spent little time speaking about human rights, Then, Trump praised his “great relationship” with the Philippine president. Some administration officials seemed to suggest, before the meeting, that Trump would bring up human rights with Duterte, but it remains unclear whether he actually did. (This disinterest in discussing rights in Manila follows a visit by Trump to Vietnam where he also said virtually nothing about human rights.) White House Press Secretary Sarah Huckabee Sanders said that human rights had briefly come up in the meeting between the U.S. and Philippine presidents, but Duterte denied the issue was broached at all. What’s more, in a press availability with the two leaders, Trump also just ignored reporters’ questions about human rights in the Philippines, according to the Los Angeles Times. The U.S. president further said nothing as Duterte called reporters “spies” during a press availability. This was a chilling comment given that Duterte has in recent years warned that journalists could be targeted for assassinations, and that the Philippines in recent years has had some of the highest annual rates of journalists being murdered of any nation in the world. It may help keep the Trump-Duterte bromance going, but as I explore in the next post, the value of that bromance remains limited. Read Part Two here.

As Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte moves into 2018, the third calendar year of his time in office, the tough-guy leader’s policies on many critical issues remain unclear. Sure, Duterte is known for his straight-talking rhetoric, which has helped keep his popularity high—a September poll by Pulse Asia showed that about 80 percent of Filipinos have trust in Duterte, an impressive figure. Yet on three important issues, his talk and actions have been muddled and contradictory. What does 2018 hold for these three important areas? For more on Duterte’s approach to the economy, the relationship with the United States, and militancy in the southern Philippines, see my new column in World Politics Review.

Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte, who blasted the United States repeatedly in 2016, and has reportedly had a lifetime of grievances against Washington, may be recognizing he needs to take a different approach to U.S.-Philippines ties. Duterte repeatedly slammed former president Barack Obama in 2016, and bristled at U.S. criticism of his brutal war on drugs. As the Wall Street Journal reported, this anger seemingly ran deep. Duterte grew up in the Philippine south, a hotbed of anti-American sentiment. According to the article, he had been infuriated by U.S. actions in Mindanao during his time as governor of Davao—and also by the United States’ reported refusal to grant Duterte a visa to visit. After Donald Trump was elected president, Duterte’s rhetoric toward the United States warmed somewhat. In part, Duterte simply seemed to like Trump’s style. The Philippine leader also surely realized that the Trump administration would not push him hard on rights abuses in his war on drugs—a realization that came true this week, when Secretary of State Rex Tillerson avoided mentioning Duterte’s rights abuses in his public appearance. As CBS reported: “Tillerson did not use the moment [of meeting Duterte] to take a stand for human rights. As Duterte and Tillerson stood and shook hands in the presidential palace, each donning a wide grin, Tillerson ignored a CBS News reporter's questions about the agenda of the meeting. Another reporter blurted out a question about human rights—which was hard to hear above the loud, incessant camera clicks in the room—but Tillerson didn't say anything … Tillerson never publicly addressed the brutal anti-drug tactics while he was in the country. When Tillerson met one on one with Duterte, two Filipino government officials say that Tillerson didn't mention the U.S. government's human rights concerns with regard to the anti-narcotics tactics.” But despite his warm words for Trump, noticeable in a call he held with the U.S. president earlier this year, Duterte still seemed determined to pursue a foreign policy that shifted the Philippines away from the United States and toward warmer ties with China, Russia, and other powers. He also appeared wary of seeming too conciliatory with Washington, even with Trump as president. After being invited to Washington by Trump, Duterte publicly declared that he did not know if he had the time to visit. But in the past three months, the major deficiencies of the Philippine armed forces, already known to defense experts in the Philippines, the region, and the United States, have become even more obvious to all. As regional powers like China and Vietnam spar over the South China Sea, backed by their military modernization efforts, the Philippines is left behind. As Islamic State–linked groups continue to battle the Philippine military in Mindanao, predictions of a rapid victory by Philippine government forces have proven hollow. The military has lost troops to friendly fire incidents, used conventional bombs that killed civilians, and still has not taken all of Marawi city back from the militants. As the military struggles in Mindanao, Duterte reportedly has asked Philippine congresspeople to increase funding to expand the armed forces. Duterte’s administration seems to increasingly realize it needs help. During the Tillerson visit, the Philippine president told the Secretary of State that he was a “humble friend” of the United States. According to NBC, the Philippines now may allow U.S. forces—probably drones—to launch airstrikes against militants in the southern Philippines. This would be a dramatic shift from Duterte’s former claims, earlier in his presidency, that he wanted to actually evict all U.S. forces out of the southern Philippines. Yet as the struggle for Marawi drags on, Duterte already had shifted, even before the NBC report. He had been allowing U.S. advisors and U.S. surveillance flights over Mindanao, as well as new shipments of U.S. small arms. As the battle against Islamic State–linked groups in Southeast Asia expands, the Philippine armed forces likely will need much more help—from the United States and other regional powers.    

As the battle for Marawi, a major city of some 200,000 in the southern Philippines, has dragged on for weeks, it has begun to raise global concern. The conflict pits fighters who have pledged allegiance to the self-declared Islamic State against the Philippine armed forces; leading politicians from the United States and countries in Southeast Asia now fear that the southern Philippines battle, increasingly prominent in Islamic State propaganda, will lure militants from around the world. “They [Islamic State] are certainly trying to get fighters into that region" in the southern Philippines Republican Sen. Joni Ernst told the Associated Press earlier this month. "We need to address the situation. It should not get out of control." Yet although Duterte has already taken an extremely harsh and brutal approach to narcotics, and although he was the mayor of the biggest city on the major southern island of Mindanao, as president he actually paid relatively little attention to the conflict in the southern Philippines—until recently. Meanwhile, his declaration of martial law will not help the Philippine authorities destroy Islamic State-linked groups in the south. For more on Duterte’s misguided approach to militants in the Philippine south, see my new Expert Brief.  

Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte’s hard-line, but chaotic, strategy against radical, Islamic State-linked groups in the southern Philippines risks undermining a real chance for peace while failing to defeat the most extreme militants.

Miguel Gomez is a senior researcher at the Center for Security Studies and Brandon Valeriano is a reader at Cardiff University, the Donald Bren Chair of Armed Politics at the Marine Corps University, a fellow at the Niskanen Center, and author of Cyber War versus Cyber Realities on Oxford University Press. The recent disclosure that an Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) operating out of Vietnam covertly released the transcript of talks between the Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte and the United States’ Donald Trump sheds light on an often overlooked cyber actor in the region. The recent disclosure suggests Vietnam is becoming a disruptive regional force in cyberspace. The appearance of inter-state cyber operations within South East Asia is not surprising given the long-standing, and often territorial, disputes between geographically proximate states. While Vietnam is a known actor in the regional cyber domain, its activity has paled in comparison to China, which undertakes frequent cyber espionage operations against neighbors, including Vietnam. In addition, cyber operations attributable to Vietnam have mainly targeted companies and dissidents – thus letting Vietnam fly under the radar. What is new and unique is attribution of Vietnamese attacks on Philippine state agencies, which was first reported on May 15. Cyber intelligence firms such as FireEye have attributed these attacks to an actor designated as APT32 (aka OceanLotus Group). The group has been associated with espionage campaigns targeting both foreign governments and local dissidents alike – to an extent mimicking the profile of Chinese operations within this domain. While no definitive link can be drawn between this group and direct government sponsorship, the alignment between targets and national interest is quite telling and supports the cyber forensic analysis already conducted. While still relying on common techniques such as spear phishing and corrupted Doc files, the hackers’s use of custom-built code suggests they are part of a well-resourced group. The timing of the documents leak suggests an attempt on the part of the Vietnamese regime (or elements of it) to increase pressure on the Philippines by exposing its warming ties with China. The document disclosure also included notes from a conversation between Duterte and Chinese President Xi Jinping. This rationale is not surprising considering the new president’s conciliatory remarks towards China and his willingness to forgo the advantage gained by the Philippines from the Permanent Court of Attribution in the Hague decision last spring, which weakens the on-going claims by other South East Asian states, including Vietnam. Nevertheless, even if Vietnam’s motive is evident, what it hopes to achieve is unclear. Is Vietnam trying to shame the Philippines into taking an assertive stance against China? If this is the goal, then the Vietnamese are overlooking the unique characteristics of the current Philippine administration, which has demonstrated an unwillingness to change its policies in the face of external pressure. Duterte’s refusal to curb the excesses of his “war on drugs” despite economic threats (e.g. loss of EU financial aid) reinforces this view. Perhaps, Vietnam’s goal is simply to sow chaos and distrust – which has been Russia’s objective in recent information operations against the electoral systems of Western democracies. Understood in this context, the burden of response is not on the state, but the society to reject these information disclosures and the more pernicious threat of disinformation. So far, the Philippine public has remained unresponsive to such stimuli and has maintained an overall position of unity against external threats. This outcome calls into question the efficiency of disinformation operations. If the goal of the Vietnamese was to foment outrage in the Philippines and force Duterte to reconsider his position, then proponents of this operation have either failed to understand how the Philippine public would react or have simply poorly timed their disclosure. In this situation, it may have been both. However, even if ineffective, Vietnam will incur little cost for engaging in cyber operations against neighbors, which is why we can expect them to continue. Despite growing interest in the ASEAN bloc regarding the threat of cyber operations, no mechanism exists to “punish” Vietnam. Similarly, as espionage is considered a routine state behavior, it is unlikely that its neighbors would reprimand Vietnam. Finally, the fact that ASEAN members, in general, are characterized as having limited defense capabilities in cyberspace, publicly criticizing Vietnam may invite future retaliation through cyberspace that other members may wish to avoid.

Richard Javad Heydarian is a Manila-based academic and author of Asia's New Battlefield: U.S., China, and the Struggle for the Western Pacific. His forthcoming book is Duterte's Rise. Shortly after Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte embarked on a high-profile visit to Russia earlier this month, a self-proclaimed Islamic State affiliate group launched a surprise attack on Marawi City on the southern island of Mindanao. As the situation deteriorated, Duterte cut short his five-day trip to Moscow, where he managed to hold an earlier-than-scheduled meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, who Duterte has described as his “favorite hero.” The visit to Russia came only a week after Duterte’s second trip to China in less than a year. During this visit to Beijing, Duterte secured a $500 million long term soft loan to purchase Chinese defense equipment for the Philippine military, which has traditionally relied on U.S.-made and donated hardware. Duterte’s back-to-back visits to China and Russia was part of his broader strategy of diversifying Manila’s strategic relations, as the Philippines pursues what Duterte calls an “independent” foreign policy that would make it less reliant upon the United States. In the past, despite Russia’s desire to boost its ties to Southeast Asian nations and sell arms to countries in the region, governments in Manila usually shunned closer relations with Russia either in deference to the United States or simply out of fear of displeasing Washington. In contrast, Duterte apparently believes East Asia is entering a post-United States international order, where smaller powers such as the Philippines should reach out to alternative poles of influence in the region, such as China and Russia. Duterte also may prefer boosting ties with Beijing and Moscow since they have few concerns about his record on rights and democracy issues, such as the war on drugs and the recent declaration of martial law in Mindanao.  In the past year, rights issues became a major stumbling block between Duterte and the United States, although it remains unclear whether the new U.S. administration will continue to push Duterte on rights. Disturbed by Duterte’s drug war, the Obama administration deferred deployment of firearms to the Philippine National Police (PNP), while postponing renewal of the $434 million Millennium Challenge Corporation aid package. For Duterte, Russia, a leading arms exporter in the world, could be an alternative source of weapons, from light firearms to tanks, drones, helicopters, submarines and other major military hardware. Duterte also sees Russia and China, which have permanent seats on the United Nations Security Council, as potential sources of diplomatic support at international organizations, in light of growing international pressure and scrutiny of Duterte’s administration, including by the International Criminal Court (ICC). Despite Duterte’s premature departure from Russia, he left key cabinet secretaries in Moscow to oversee the signing of ten major agreements between Russia and the Philippines. Of particular importance was an Agreement on Defense Cooperation (ADC), which paves the way for institutionalized military-to-military exchanges, including training, intelligence-sharing, and, down the road, even joint exercises between the two countries. Specifically, the Philippines is looking at joint naval drills with Russia in the South China Sea or possibly even in the Sulu and Celebes Sea, where Islamic State-affiliate groups like Abu Sayyaf have been conducting piracy operations. The two countries also signed an agreement to promote bilateral intelligence sharing, with a particular focus on counterterrorism cooperation. During his meeting with Putin, Duterte expressly sought greater Russian assistance in dealing with extremist groups. Moscow, which is closely monitoring Islamic State members hailing from Caucasus and Central Asia and returning to Russia, could provide valuable intelligence to the Philippines on how to deal with foreign fighters coming to Mindanao. The Philippine government has reported the possible presence of fighters from Chechnya among the group of militants fighting in Marawi. Russia could potentially provide information on Chechens and others of Russian citizenry who are traveling to Mindanao.  Buoyed by his budding strategic partnership with Putin, Duterte declared martial law across Mindanao, which has faced conflicts for nearly half a century. “It [the martial law] will not be any different from what [former president Ferdinand] Marcos did,” Duterte warned shortly before departing Moscow.  The militants who attacked in Marawi may have been emboldened to strike by the fact that Duterte and the bulk of his key cabinet members, including Duterte’s national security adviser, were thousands of miles away in Russia. Whatever the spark for the fighting, as the 2013 siege on Zamboanga shows, it will likely take weeks before the Philippine government will return things to a semblance of normality in Marawi, with tens of thousands of citizens fleeing for safety. If the militants continue to strike hard in Mindanao, Duterte may be forced to rebuild his ties with the United States. Whether Duterte wants to admit it or not, only Washington has a long history of interoperability with the Philippine military, which has relied heavily on U.S. assistance to develop counterterrorism skills and launch counterterror operations. Neither Russia nor China, which have had limited success in dealing with Islamist insurgencies in their own backyards, can provide as effective assistance as the U.S. military.  In addition, if Duterte wants to purchase weapons from alternative suppliers like Russia, Manila will have to also take into consideration factors that come along with the arms, including the necessity for long-term training on them, quality and maintenance concerns, and compatibility of Russian technology with the Philippines’ mostly U.S.-supplied weapon systems. As the crisis in Mindanao festers, Duterte will have to contemplate patching up differences with Washington. So far, Duterte appears highly encouraged by the Trump administration’s seemingly sympathetic position on the Philippines’ war on drugs and limited interest in human rights issues in the Philippines. And there are plans for a Duterte-Trump summit in the coming months, whether in the White House or during the East Asia Summit in Manila in November. Perhaps, a diplomatic reset between the two allies is in the offing, as counterterrorism begins to dominate Duterte’s policy agenda. 

This past week, Southeast Asia observers have been buzzing over a leaked transcript of a phone call, made in April, between U.S. President Donald Trump and Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte. In the call, the two men spoke of each other warmly, with Trump praising Duterte’s brutal drug war in the Philippines. Trump told Duterte he was “doing an unbelievable job on the drug problem,” and invited him to the White House. Trump also seemed to ask Duterte, hardly a specialist on Northeast Asia, for advice on how to deal with North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un and his nuclear and missile arsenal. Trump even let slip that the United States had moved two nuclear submarines toward the Korean Peninsula. But the budding relationship could quickly go south, for a variety of reasons. For more on the Trump-Duterte relationship, and what it will mean for the U.S.-Philippine relationship, see my new article for World Politics Review.